Decision-Making in Crisis: An Introduction

Author(s): Robert C. North

Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6, No. 3, Case Studies in Conflict (Sep., 1962),
pp. 197-200
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/172900
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Decision-making in crisis: an introduction
ROBERT C. NORTH
Department of Political Science, Stanford University
The Stanford University Studies in Inter-
national Conflict and Integration emerged
from a volunteer seminar of faculty members
from various disciplines who met fortnightly
during the academic year 1957-1958 to plan
more effective ways of investigating the be-
havior of nation states. In the course of these
discussions it became evident that two kinds
of interaction processes-the conflictual and
the integrative-could be identified as char-
acteristic of national behavior throughout the
course of history. On this basis the decision
was made to undertake a comparative study
of international crises with the intent of clari-
fying the relationship between conflict and
integration and, in the long run, testing out a
series of general hypotheses about the be-
havior of states. Exploratory investigations
were begun into the 1914 crisis and extended
later into a number of other conflict situa-
tions.
In February 1960 the Ford Foundation
awarded Stanford University funds in order
to enlarge the research and graduate training
that had already begun to emerge from these
investigations. As developed since that time,
the Studies in International Conflict and In-
tegration have become a systematic program
for applying techniques from several disci-
plines to the study of international relations.
More recently, under a small contract with
Project Michelson of the Naval Ordnance
Test Station, China Lake, the Studies under-
took an assessment of the Sino-Soviet con-
troversy, using the same techniques and
conceptual framework that were developed
for the crisis studies.
During these investigations it became ap-
parent that the high stress that is almost
universally characteristic of international
crisis situations tends to have a crucial effect
upon the decision-making patterns of the
leaderships involved. The question then
arose whether the concepts and techniques
which had been developed by the Studies
were appropriate and adequate for relating
and measuring the emotional phenomena
associated with decision-making in situations
of crisis. It seemed worthwhile to take time
for appraisal.
On January 12 and 13, 1962 the Studies
in International Conflict and Integration
held a seminar on the general topic of
"Decision-making in Crises." Participants
included members of the staff and also a
number of scholars from other institutions
engaged in conflict research. The purpose of
the seminar was to compare decision-making
processes in a number of specific crisis situa-
tions in terms of three general kinds of
factors: (1) the calculated or anticipated
element in decision-making; (2) the miscal-
culation, or error, aspect of the decision
process; and (3) the emotional or affective
factor. Participants were encouraged to
write papers emerging from their own re-
search, with the consequence that both qual-
itative and quantitative approaches were
198
represented,and also contributionsthat were
primarily methodological.
The intent of the meetings was focused
upon problems of operationalresearch, and
it seemed important to avoid fruitless dis-
cussions about "rationality"and "irration-
ality." These termsmay be useful when used
in a given societal context, but in the inter-
national and interculturalspheres the same
choice frequently appears "rational"from
one perspective and "irrational"from an-
other. The passage of time also plays its
tricks: the decision which seemed "rational"
-at the time-to those who made it may
appear increasingly "irrational"as history
unfolds.
In an effort to minimize these difficulties
a set of definitions was circulated among
the seminarparticipantsas a broad frame of
reference. A decision was said to be calcu-
lated or anticipated, for example, if the
decision-maker perceives the problem ac-
curately, selects that alternativewhich leads
to the consequences he desires, and then
acts appropriately and consistently. This
kind of decision is often called "rational."
A miscalculated decision was defined as
one which failed to recognize or consider all
of the alternatives,or which failed to identify
or properlyassess all of the attendantconse-
quences. During the summer of 1914, for
example, the Austro-Hungarianleadership,
feeling threatened by the spectre of Pan-
Slavism,put forwardthe preservationof the
Dual Monarchy at all costs as their major
policy goal. In pursuitof this goal they then
proceeded to activate with considerablecon-
sistency and purposefulness the following
means-endchain: mobilize -> invade Serbia
-> punish Serbia -> check Pan-Slavism. In
fact, of course,the Austro-Hungarianleaders
were putting in motion a sequence of events
over which they soon lost control and which
led to the destruction of the Empire-the
CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME VI
ROBERT C. NORTH
precise outcome they were seeking to fore-
stall.
It was postulatedthat one expects to find
miscalculation or error emerging generally
from incorrector insufficient information.
An emotionaldecision was defined as one
in which, as a function of high affect, an
alternativeis chosen which is not the best of
those available in light of the decision-mak-
er's own goal. For example, an analysis of
the documents just prior to the outbreakof
World War I reveals that Germany recog-
nized that her militaryestablishmentwas not
prepared for a major war. Yet Germany's
most salient perception at that time was not
her lack of power or capability,but her per-
ceptions of hostility, of being endangeredor
threatened-a tendency not uncommon in
conditions of extreme crisis (Zinnes, North,
and Koch, 1961, pp. 469-82).
It was recognized,of course,that virtually
all decisions are to one degree or another
shaped by emotionalelements, and that one
might find a considerable overlap of deci-
sions fitting the emotionaland miscalculation
categories. Indeed, one would expect a
strong correlation,in a given decision-mak-
ing situation, between high negative affect
and insufficient information-or misinter-
preted information. On the other hand, it
should be entirely feasible, also, for a calcu-
lated decision to emerge from circumstances
highly charged with emotion.
There was no expectation,of course, that
the seminar participants would necessarily
accept these definitions. The intent was to
provide a common focus for the papers and
for the ensuing discussions.
Among professional decision-makers at
the national and internationallevels there is
a strong tendency to perceive of oneself as
"hard headed," "realistic,"and "controlled"
in crisis. Empirical evidence persuasively
suggests, however, that the "realist"is also
vulnerable to the dynamics of fluctuating
NUMBER 3
DECISION-MAKING IN CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTION
affect-and that there may well be a close
correlationbetween the high "emotionalcon-
tent" of a crisis situation-and also the
deeply nourishedhopes and fears of the de-
cision-maker-and a tendency to misper-
ceive and miscalculate.
In developing his revised "two-factor"or
"two-step"approachto behavior,0. Hobart
Mowrerhas introducedfear and hope (and
other related affects) as intervening or
"mediating"variables between the environ-
mental stimulus and the behavior of the
subject. "Thus, where Behaviorism re-
stricted itself to the simple, one-step S-R
formula,"accordingto Mowrer,"we are here
confronted by the necessity of postulating,
minimally, a two-step, two-stage formula:
S-r: s-R, where S is the danger signal, r the
response of fear which is conditioned to it,
and where s is the fear, experienced as a
drive, which elicits (after learning) re-
sponse, R" (Mowrer, 1960, p. 77). In
grossly oversimplified fashion the stimulus
can be viewed as increasing or decreasing
the level of a given affect which, in turn,
shapes the organism'sconsequent behavior.
If at all applicable to interational rela-
tions and the behavior of states, this basic
hypothesis suggests that it is at least as im-
portantto study the interveningaffect vari-
ables as it is to analyze the environmental
stimuli or the record of decisions reached
and actions taken. Indeed, it is precisely in
the affect phases of the interaction system
between two or more states that one would
expect to find the pulsing dynamicsof inter-
national behavior. Hostile states-trading
reciprocallythreateningor punishingstimuli
-build explosive accumulations of affect
which, by a kind of reaction process or
"Richardsonprocess," give rise to increas-
ingly provocative decisions and actions
(Boulding, 1962, pp. 25-40).
The papers presented in this issue-par-
ticularly the quantitative ones-are frankly
199
experimental,and we shall not be taken by
surpriseif they attract criticism and contro-
versy. In the attempt to go beyond hypoth-
esis building-to test our propositions
empirically-we have run into unforeseen
difficulties at every stage. After a year of
content analysiswe discardedour 1914 data,
amounting to several thousand units, and
began all over again because our original
definitionshad proved too fuzzy. In seeking
the best available counsel on scaling tech-
niques and on statistical methods we have
more than once been confrontedby conflict-
ing advice from equally competent sources.
In some instances we have had to "invent"
methodology;in others we have been forced
to make operationaldecisions almost by the
flip of a coin.
More and more, then, we perceive that
there is frequently something to gain and
something to lose whatever technique is
adopted or developed. In this connection it
is worth noting, for example, that Holsti,
Zaninovich,and (in work subsequentto that
reported in her present paper) Zinnes have
used separatemethodsof scaling-each with
something to be said for it and something
to be said against it. Under these circum-
stances we consider multiple approaches
highly appropriateto the pioneering phases
of our research.
Finally, it should be kept in mind that
most of the quantitative work represents
thousands of hours of work by numbers of
unidentified collaborators-coders, scaling
judges, key punchers, programmers,and a
wide variety of consultants. The authors
would be amongthe first to acknowledgethe
vast amountof teamworkbehind the presen-
tation of their reports.
REFERENCES
E. Conflict and Defense.
BOULDING, KENNETH
New York: Harper & Bros., 1962.
MOWRER,0. HOBART. Learning Theory and
200 ROBERT C. NORTH

Behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
1960.
ZINNES,DINA A., NORTH, ROBERTC. and KocH,
HOWARD
E., JR. "Capability,Threat and the
Outbreak of War." In JAMES N. ROSENAU
(ed.), International Politics and Foreign
Policy. New York:The Free Press of Glencoe,
1961.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION VOLUME VI NUMBER 3