2015 Campanilla Notes in Criminal Law

2015 BAR REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
PRO REO
In dubio pro reo is means "when in doubt, for the accused.” Intimately related to the in
dubio pro reo principle is the rule of lenity. The rule applies when the court is faced with two
possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is prejudicial to the accused and another
that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an interpretation which is more lenient
to the accused (Intestate estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
POSITIVIST THEORY AND CLASSICAL THERORY
The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the sum total of the
social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The purpose of penalties is
to secure justice. The penalties imposed must not only be retributive but must also be
reformative, to give the convict an opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive
and civic-spirited member of the community. The adoption of the aspects of the Positivist theory
is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law, impossible crime, privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority and modifying circumstances, rule on imposition of penalties for
heinous and quasi-heinous crimes) (Joya vs. Jail Warden of Batangas, G.R. Nos. 159418-
19, December 10, 2003;).
Under the classical theory, man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free
will choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act, the act is
presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e. with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man,
therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired (People vs. Estrada, G.R. No. 130487, June 19, 2000). Since the Revised Penal Code
is based on the classical school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered
the predominant consideration and, therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty for
conspirators on the consequential theory that the act of one is thereby the act of all (Hon.
Sandiganbayan, Honrado, G.R. No. 115439-41, July 16, 1997). Under this theory, the criminal
liability is based on the result of the felonious act (proximate cause rule).
CHARACTERISTIC OF CRIMINAL LAW
There are three characteristics of criminal law, to wit: (1) generality (2) territoriality, and
(3) prospectivity. The general, territorial and prospective characteristics of criminal law are
principles that define and demarcate the scope and limitation of the operation of criminal law.
Under these three principles, the operation or enforceability of criminal law is limited to wrongful
acts committed on or after its effectivity (prospectivity) within the territory of the Philippines
(territoriality) by person living and sojourning therein (generality).
GENERALITY - Generality principle is akin to territoriality principle in the sense that

the demarcating factor of both principles is the territory of the Philippines. Under generality
principle, criminal law is enforceable to person living or sojourning in the territory of the
Philippines. Under the territoriality principle, criminal law is applicable only to criminal act
committed within the territory of the Philippines. But the concept of generality is different from
territoriality. The applicability of territoriality principle or generality principle will depend on the
issue raised by the accused in questioning the jurisdiction of the court. If the accused attacks
the jurisdiction of the court because of the unique characteristic of his person (e.g. he is a
foreigner, military, hermit, primitive, ambassador, legislator, President), the applicable principle
is generality. If the accused attacks the jurisdiction of the court due to the unique characteristic
of the place where the crime was committed (e.g. the place of commission is foreign vessel,
embassy or high sea) etc, the applicable principle is territoriality.
1. Military officers - The Revised Penal Code and special criminal laws are enforceable
against military men living or sojourning in the Philippines. However, CA 408 (Articles of War)
which vests jurisdiction over members of the AFP to the courts-martial. RA 7055 (AN ACT
STRENGTHENING CIVILIAN SUPREMACY OVER THE MILITARY) did not divest the military
courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving "service-connected crimes or offenses" under CA 408
(Example: Mutiny or sedition, quarrels, frays; disorders, breaking an arrest or escaping from
confinement, releasing prisoners without proper authority, wrongful appropriation of captured
property, corresponding with, or aiding the enemy, spies, dueling, fraud against the government
affecting matters and equipment). In fact, RA No. 7055 mandates that these service-connected
crimes shall be tried by the court-martial (Navales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 162318, October 25,
2004). CA 408 is a law of preferential application since it excludes members of the AFP from the
operation of the Revised Penal Code and special criminal laws if the crimes committed by them
are service-connected as defined by RA 7055.
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2. Consular officers - Despite the ruling in Schneckenburger vs. Moran, consular

officers and employees are now enjoying immunity from criminal prosecution of acts performed
in the exercise of consular function under 1967, Convention on Consular Relation. Slander
(Liang vs. People, GR NO 125865, January 28, 2000) or reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide is not function-related. Consul is liable for committing this crime.
TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE: Under the principle of territoriality, the Philippines has

jurisdiction over crimes committed inside its territory except as provided in the treaties and
laws of preferential application.
1. Embassy - The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the territory of the USA to
which the premises belong through possession or ownership. A person who committed a crime
within the premises of an embassy will be prosecuted under the law of Philippines because of
the principle of territoriality (See: Reagan vs. Commission on Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968,
En Banc; Answers to 2009 Bar Examination Questions by UP Law Complex). However,
jurisdiction of the Philippines over the embassy is limited or restricted by “the principles of
inviolability of diplomatic premises”, which is a generally accepted principle of international law.
Warrant of arrest cannot be served inside US embassy without waiver of American government
of its right under the principle of inviolability.
2. English rule - There are two fundamental rules in International Law regarding crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel (not military vessel), if the same is within the 12-
mile territorial water (not internal or archipelagic water or high seas) of the Philippines to wit: (1)
French rule - Crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel within the territorial water of
the Philippines are subject to the jurisdiction of the flag state (extra-territoriality principle)
unless their commission affects the peace and security of our country. (2) English rule – Crimes
committed aboard a foreign merchant vessel within the territorial water of the Philippines are
subject to jurisdiction of the Philippines (territoriality principle) unless their commission does
not affect its peace and security, or has no pernicious effect therein. It is the English rule that
obtains in this jurisdiction.
3. Convention of the law of the Sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the
flag state of foreign merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea has jurisdiction over
crimes committed therein. However, the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction to arrest any
person or to conduct any investigation in connection with any crime committed on board the
ship during its passage in the following cases: (1) if the consequences of the crime extend to the
coastal State; (2) if the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order
of the territorial sea; (3) if the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the
master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag State; or (4) if such
measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances.
4. Drug trafficking - Following the English rule, the Philippines has no jurisdiction over
transportation of opium in a foreign vessel in transit in territorial water of our country because
possession of opium does not have a pernicious effect on our country (U.S. vs. Look Chaw). But
under the Convention of the law of the Sea, the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction to arrest
any person or to conduct any investigation involving transportation of dangerous drugs since
this is a measure necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic
substances.
EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY - Under the principle of extra-territoriality, the Philippines has

jurisdiction over crimes committed outside its territory for those five instances mention in Article
2 such as crime committed in vessel of Philippines registry (ownership is not material), function-
related crime committed by public officer (such as corruption or direct bribery), crimes against
national security (such as treason, espionage; rebellion is not a crime against national security),
and crime against law of nation such as piracy and mutiny). In People vs. Tulin, G.R. No.
111709, August 30, 2001- “Piracy is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law
(Article 2). The same principle applies even if accused were charged, not with a violation of
qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, PD No. 532 which penalizes
piracy in Philippine waters. It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the
same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world.”
PROSPECTIVITY: Article 22 of RPC - If the court in trying an accused, who committed a

crime prior to the passage of the law, should give retroactive effect to the law provided that: (1)
it is favorable to the accused and (2) the accused is not a habitual delinquent (Article 22). Ex
post facto law - Congress in passing a law can insert retroactive effect provision therein subject
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to the Constitution of ex post facto law. If the retroactive provision of the law has passed the
constitutional test on prohibition against ex post facto law, the court must give retroactive effect
to this law even if the accused is a habitual delinquent. Nullum crimen poena sine lege – If the
law repeals a previous law or provision defining a crime, the applicable principle is not Article
22 of RPC but nullum crimen poena sine lege (There is no crime when there is no law punishing
it). Since the intention of the new law is to decriminalize an act punishable by the repealed law,
the accused should be acquitted or released if the already convicted, even though he is a
habitual delinquent.
X committed crime under RA No. 6425, the penalty for which is life imprisonment. RA
No. 7659 amended RA No. 6425 by prescribing the penalty of reclusion temporal. Should RA No.
7659 be given retroactive effect? Answer: Yes. The maximum duration of reclusion temporal is
40 years of imprisonment while life imprisonment has no duration. Thus, reclusion perpetua is
a lighter penalty than life imprisonment. The amendatory law, being more lenient and favorable
to the accused than the original provisions thereof should be accorded retroactive application
(People vs. Morilla, GR No. 189833, February 05, 2014).
RA No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty, prescribes reclusion perpetua in
lieu of death penalty or life imprisonment if the special law does not use the nomenclature of
the penalties under RPC and declares a person sentenced to reclusion perpetua as a prescribed
or reduced penalty is ineligible for parole. This law has a retroactive effect. Penal laws which are
favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of
RPC, which provides: Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal (People vs. Talaro, et.al., GR No. 175781, March
20, 2012).
REPEAL: Decriminalization - Repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to

punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal (Sindiong and
Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000; Binuya, 61 Phil. 208; U.S. vs. Reyes, 10 Phil. 423; U.S. vs. Academia, 10
Phil. 431; Arizala vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 43633, September 14, 1990; Almuete, et al.,
G.R. No. L-265, February 27,19 76). The intention of the new law is to decriminalize an act
punishable of old law. Thus, person cannot be punished for subversion under RA 1700, which
was repealed by RA 7637, even though he is a habitual delinquent.
New regulation - Repeal with re-enactment of a penal law does not deprive the courts of
jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal.
Such repeal even without a saving clause would not destroy criminal liability of the accused
(U.S. vs. Cana, 12 Phil. 241). The intention of the new law is not to decriminalize an act
punishable of old law but merely to provide new regulation. If the new law is favorable to the
accused, who is not a habitual delinquent, it shall be given retroactive effect. Example: “A” was
charged for the crime of rape under Article 336 of RPC for raping his minor daughter. However,
RA 8353 expressly repealed Article 336 but re-enacted the provision on rape by reclassifying it
as a crime against person, redefining it and prescribing a graver penalty for the commission
thereof. The repeal of Article 336 does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try and punish
“A” for rape under Article 336. RA No. 8353 shall not be given retroactive effect since it is not
favorable to the accused.
DECRIMINALIZATION
1. Vagrancy - Before Article 202 of RPC punishes vagrancy and prostitution. But Article
202 of RPC as amended merely penalizes prostitution. In sum, RA No. 10158 has decriminalized
vagrancy by omitting portions of Article 202 involving crime vagrancy. A reading of the Senate
deliberation pertaining to the passage of law decriminalizing vagrancy shows that they
considered vagrants as victims of poverty and that the law on vagrancy serves to oppress the
very people that the government sought to protect.
In view of the new policy of the State decriminalizing vagrancy, which is embodied in RA
No. 10158, ordinance, which punishes vagrancy, should be declared as contrary to law, and
hence, invalid. Settled is the rule that what the national legislature expressly allows by law, a
local legislature may not disallow by ordinance or resolution (Lina vs. Pana, G.R. No. 129093,
August 30, 2001). The spring cannot rise higher than its source. As aptly explained by Justice
Nachura in his book, “An ordinance must not be contrary to the Constitution or law. Prohibited
activities may not be legalized in the guise of regulation; activities allowed by law cannot be
prohibited, only regulated.”
RA No. 10158 shall be given retroactive effect. Under Section 2 and 3 thereof, all pending
cases for vagrancy shall be dismissed and all persons serving sentence for vagrancy shall be
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immediately released. Since Sections 2 and 3 of RA No. 10158 expressly provide retroactive
application to the law without distinction, whether the offender is a habitual delinquent or not.
2. Premature marriage - Under Article 351 of RPC, a woman in contracting marriage

within 301 days from death of husband, or dissolution or annulment of marriage is liable for the
crime of premature marriage. However, RA No. 10655 decriminalizes premature marriage by
repealing Article 351. Premature marriage was decriminalize since Article 351 discriminates
women because this provision is not applicable to men. Moreover, Article 351 sought to prevent
a possible confusion as to whether the father of the child born after the dissolution of the
marriage is the first husband or the second. This preventive measure is not anymore necessary
since paternity and filiation could now be easily determined through modern technology.
MISTAKE OF FACT PRINCIPLE:
Requisites: (1) That the acts done would have been lawful had the facts been as the
accused believed them to be (2) that the mistake of fact is not due to negligence or unlawful
intent of the offender. The Supreme Court in several cases had applied the “mistake of fact”
doctrine, which allowed the accused, who committed a crime on a mistaken belief, to enjoy the
benefit of the justifying circumstance of self-defense (United States vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488),
defense of person and right (US vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 10678 August 17, 1915), defense of honor
(United States vs. Apego, 23 Phil. 391), performance of duty, (People vs. Mamasalaya, G.R. No.L-
4911, February 10, 1953), and the exempting circumstance of obedience of an order of superior
officer (People vs. Beronilla, G.R. No. L-4445, February 28, 1955). In Ah Chong, the accused,
who believed that the victim was a robber and that his life was in danger because of the
commencement of unlawful aggression, was acquitted due to mistake of fact doctrine in relation
to the rule on self-defense. In Oanis vs. Galanta, the accused, who believed that the sleeping
victim is a notorious criminal to be arrested by them, was held guilty of murder for shooting
him since the mistake of fact principle in relation to performance of duty is not applicable.
Second element is not present since they did not ascertain first his identify despite opportunity.
The first element is not likewise present since the killing of victim believed to be a criminal was
not necessary consequence of the due performance of duty of the accused as police officers.
The gist of the theft is the intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either
for gain or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the thing taken. This
cannot be where the taker honestly believes the property is his own or that of another, and that
he has a right to take possession of it for himself or for another, for the protection of the latter.
However, the belief of the accused of his ownership over the property must be honest and in
good faith and not a mere sham or pretense. If the claim is dishonest, a mere pretense, taking
the property of another will not protect the taker (Gaviola vs. People, G.R. No. 163927, January
27, 2006). This belief of ownership as a defense in theft is in accordance with the mistake of
fact doctrine.
X informed the authorities regarding armed rebel elements on board a vehicle in a certain
barangay. Several policemen, Barangay officers and members of the Civil Home Defense Force
(CHDF) responded to information and set a check point. X pointed at an approaching jitney
occupied by rebels. They flagged down the vehicle but the same did not stop. They attacked the
vehicle with automatic weapons by firing directly thereat. One died and another was wounded.
It turned out however that the victims are unarmed innocent civilians. Are those responsible for
the death and injuries of the victims liable for homicide? Is the doctrine of mistake of fact
applicable? Answer: They are liable for homicide and attempted homicide. The duty of those
manning the check point is to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for
firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless
arrest. While, rebellion is a continuing offense, they cannot open fire at or kill the suspects under
any and all circumstances. There is no evidence showing that they were placed in real mortal
danger in the presence of the victims. Hence, the mistake of fact principle is not applicable since
there is negligence or bad faith on their part (Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 120744-46,
June 25, 2012).
South African athlete Oscar Pistorius has been found guilty of culpable homicide after
the judge found he killed his girlfriend by mistake. The judge said the athlete had acted
"negligently" when he fired shots through a toilet door, but in the "belief that there was an
intruder". If the case happened here, should the athlete be convicted of homicide or reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide?
Answer: The athlete should be held liable with homicide with privilege mitigating
circumstance of defense of property.
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In mistake of fact, which negates dolo, it is important requisite that that act would have
been lawful had the fact been as the accused believed them to be. If there was really an intruder
inside the toilet, it would be considered as unlawful aggression against his property, which would
allow him to use reasonable means to repel it in accordance with the self-help doctrine under
Article 429 of the Civil Code and defense of property under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, the means employed by him firing shots through the toilet door is not reasonable; and
hence, he is only entitled to privileged migrating circumstance of incomplete defense of property
(See: People vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983). In sum, the act would have been
attended by the privilege mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification had the facts been
as the accused believed them to be.
VOLUNTARINESS – Concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent makes up the

“criminal mind” behind the “criminal act.” Thus, to constitute a crime, the act must, generally
and in most cases, be accompanied by a criminal intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
No crime is committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent
(People vs. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004). Voluntariness is an element of crime,
whether committed by dolo or culpa or punishable under special law. The act to be considered
a crime must be committed with freedom and intelligence. In addition to voluntariness,
intentional felony must be committed with dolo (malice), culpable felony with culpa, and mala
prohibita under special law with intent to perpetrate the act or with specific intent (such as
animus possidendi in illegal possession of firearm). Presumption of voluntariness: In the
determination of the culpability of every criminal actor, voluntariness is an essential element.
Without it, the imputation of criminal responsibility and the imposition of the corresponding
penalty cannot be legally sanctioned. The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is
not purely an intellectual process but is dependent to a large degree upon emotional and
psychological appreciation. A man’s act is presumed voluntary. It is improper to assume the
contrary, i.e. that acts were done unconsciously, for the moral and legal presumption is that
every person is presumed to be of sound mind, or that freedom and intelligence constitute the
normal condition of a person (People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos. 147674-75, March 17, 2004).
CRIMINAL INTENT – To be held liable for intentional felony, the offender must commit
the act prohibited by RPC with specific criminal intent and general criminal intent. General
criminal intent (dolo in Article 3 of RPC) is an element of all crimes but malice is properly applied
only to deliberate acts done on purpose and with design. Evil intent must unite with an unlawful
act for there to be a felony. A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption of malice
by intent. On the other hand, specific intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some
particular thing. In estafa, the specific intent is to defraud, in homicide intent to kill, in theft
intent to gain (Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217, June 27, 2006, ). In the US vs. Ah Chong,
the accused was acquitted because of mistake of fact principle even though the evidence showed
that he attacked the deceased with intent to kill (United States vs. Apego, G.R. No. 7929,
November 8, 1912; Dissenting opinion of J. Trent), which was established by the statement of
the accused "If you enter the room I will kill you." Article 249 (homicide) should be read in relation
to Article 3. The accused was acquitted not because of the absence of intent to kill (specific
intent) but by reason of lack of general intent (dolo or malice).
PRESUMED MALICE - The general criminal intent (malice) is presumed from the
criminal act and in the absence of any general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence
must be proved by the accused (Ah Chong case, the accused was able to rebut the presumption
of general criminal intent or malice). Generally, a specific intent is not presumed. Its existence,
as a matter of fact, must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may
be shown, however, by the nature of the act, the circumstances under which it was committed,
the means employed and the motive of the accused (Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No. 168217, June
27, 2006). There are other specific intents that are presumed. If a person died due to violence,
intent to kill is conclusively presumed. Intent to gain is presumed from taking property without
consent of owner.
MOTIVE
Doubt as to the identity of the culprit - Motive gains importance only when the identity
of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of cases, the prosecution does not need to prove
the motive of the accused when the latter has been identified as the author of the crime. The
accused was positively identified by witnesses. Thus, the prosecution did not have to identify
and prove the motive for the killing. It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been
killed for no apparent reason at all, and that friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to
the commission of a crime. The lack or absence of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction where there are reliable witnesses who fully and satisfactorily identified the
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petitioner as the perpetrator of the felony (Kummer vs. People, GR No. 174461, September 11,
2013).
Circumstantial or inconclusive evidence - Indeed, motive becomes material when the

evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there is some doubt on whether a crime has been
committed or whether the accused has committed it. The following circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to convict accused: 1. Accused had motive to kill the deceased because
during the altercation the latter slapped and hit him with a bamboo, prompting Romulo to get
mad at the deceased; 2. Accused was chased by the deceased eastward after the slapping and
hitting incident; 3. Said accused was the last person seen with the deceased just before he died;
(4) Accused and Antonio Trinidad surrendered to police authorities with the samurai; (5) Some
of the wounds inflicted on the deceased were caused by a bolo or a knife. (Trinidad vs. People,
GR No. 192241, June 13, 2012).
INDETERMINATE OFFENSE DOCTRINE – In People vs. Lamahang, G.R. No. 43530,

August 3, 1935, En Banc - Accused who was caught in the act of making an opening with an
iron bar on the wall of a store was held guilty of attempted trespassing and not attempted
robbery. The act of making an opening on the wall of the store is an overt act of trespassing
since it reveals an evident intention to enter by means of force said store against the will of its
owner. However, it is not an overt act of robbery since the intention of the accused once he
succeeded in entering the store is not determinate; it is subject to different interpretations. His
final objective could be to rob, to cause physical injury to its occupants, or to commit any other
offense. In sum, the crime the he intended to commit inside the store is indeterminate, and
thus, an attempt to commit it is not punishable as attempted felony.
In Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014 - The petitioner climbed on top of
the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her breasts
when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring
from such circumstances that rape, and no other, was his intended felony would be highly
unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest.
Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double interpretation" (People v.
Lamahang). Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rape had he been allowed by her to
continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if
he should employ deceit to have her yield to him) could also be ultimate felony.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Proximate cause is the primary or moving cause of the death of the victim; it is the cause,
which in the natural and continuous sequence unbroken with any “efficient intervening cause”
produces death and without which the fatal result could not have happened. It is the cause,
which is the nearest in the order of responsible causation (Black’s Law Dictionary). Intervening
cause - The direct relation between the intentional felony and death may be broken by efficient
intervening cause or an active force which is either a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from
the felonious act of the offender. Lightning that kills the injured victim or tetanus infecting the
victim several days after the infliction of injuries, or voluntary immersing the wounds to
aggravate the crime committed by accused is an intervening cause. Thus, the accused is liable
for physical injuries because of the intervening cause rule. On the other hand, carelessness of
the victim, or involuntary removal of the drainage, lack of proper treatment is not an intervening
cause. Hence, the accused is liable for the death because of the proximate cause rule.
If the victim died due to tetanus of which he was infected when the accused inflicted
injuries upon him, the crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16,
1947). If the victim died due to tetanus of which he was infected after the accused inflicted
injuries upon him, the crime committed is physical injuries. The accused is not liable for
homicide because tetanus is an efficient intervening cause. Thus, the proximate cause of the
death of the victim is not the infliction of injuries. In Villacorta vs. People, G.R. No. 186412,
September 7, 2011 (Justice De Castro), there had been an interval of 22 days between the date
of the stabbing and the date when victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe
tetanus infection. Since the victim was infected of severe tetanus, he died the next day. The
incubation period of severe tetanus is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not have been infected
at the time of the stabbing since that incident occurred 22 days before the victim was rushed to
the hospital. The infection of victim’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause.
The accused was held liable for physical injuries.
Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred." Although there was no direct injury on his vital organs of
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the victim, his wounds affected his kidneys, causing multiple organ failure and eventually his
death. Accused is liable for homicide. Without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been
afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his
death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused,
accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim (Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 181052,
November 14, 2012).
ERROR IN PERSONAE - In case of error in personae, person is criminally responsible

for committing an intentional felony although the consequent victim is different from that
intended due to mistake of identity. Requisites: In order to make a person criminally liable in
case of error in personae, the following requisites must be present: (1) Offender committed an
intentional felony; (2) The consequent victim against whom the felony was directed is different
from that intended due to mistake of identity. If the penalty for the intended crime is different
from that of the committed crime, the court shall impose the penalty for the intended crime or
committed crime, whichever is lesser.
ABERRATIO ICTUS - In case of aberratio ictus, person is criminally responsible for

committing an intentional felony although the consequent victim is different from that intended
due to mistake of blow. Requisites: In order to make a person criminally liable in case of
aberratio ictus, the following requisites must be present: (1) Offender committed an intentional
felony; (2) The consequent victim against whom the felony was directed is different from that
intended due to mistake of blow. The crime committed against the intended victim and victim
injured due to aberratio ictus shall be made a complex crime (compound crime). The court shall
impose the penalty for the most serious crime in its maximum period.
The circumstance of aberratio ictus (mistake in the blow) can neither exempt the accused
from criminal responsibility nor mitigate his criminal liability. Under Article 4 of RPC, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different
from that which he intended (Matic vs. People, G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011).
PRAETER INTENTIONEM: In case of praeter intentionem, person is criminally

responsible for committing an intentional felony although its wrongful consequence is graver
than that intended. Requisites: In order to make a person criminally liable under Article 4 (1)
in case of praeter intentionem, the following requisites must be present: (1) Offender committed
an intentional felony; (2) The wrongful act done, which is graver than that intended, is the direct,
natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender. Praeter intentionem
may be appreciated as mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
than that committed.
When death resulted, even if there was no intent to kill, the crime is homicide, not just physical
injuries, since with respect to crimes of personal violence the penal law looks particularly to the material
results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.
He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused (Seguritan vs. People, G.R. No.
172896, April 19, 2010).
1. Mitigating circumstance - The mitigating circumstance that “the offender had no

intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed” or praeter intentionem is obtaining when
there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and
the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of
the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury
sustained by the victim (People vs. Maglian, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011).The mitigating
circumstance of praeter intentionem cannot be appreciated if the acts employed by accused were
reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim (People vs. Sales, G.R.
No. 177218, October 3, 2011).
2. Evident premeditation- In case of aberatiu ictus and error in personae, the SC did
not appreciate evident premeditation since the victim, who was actually killed, is not
contemplated in the premeditation of the accused (People vs. Trinidad, G.R. NO. L-38930, June
28, 1988; People vs. Mabug-at, 51 Phil., 967; People vs. Trinidad, G.R. No. L-38930, June 28,
1988). However, praeter intentionem and evident premeditation can be independently
appreciated. there is no incompatibility between evident premeditation and no intention to
commit so grave a wrong since the latter is based on the state of mind of the offender while the
former manner of committing the crime (Reyes; People vs. Enriquez, 58 Phil. 536).
3. Treachery - If accused employed means to render the victim defenseless, treachery

shall be appreciated even if the killing is due to error in personae (People vs. Del Castillo, Sr.,
G.R. No. L-32995, April 30, 1984) or aberratio ictus (People vs. Mabug-at, G.R. No. 25459,
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August 10, 1926, En Banc) or with the circumstance of praeter intentionem (People vs. Cagoco,
G.R. No. 38511, October 6, 1933)
4. Conspiracy - Conspirators, who conspired to kill a particular parson, are equally

liable for the killing of another person due to error in personae (People vs. Pinto, Jr. and
Buenaflor, G.R. No. No. 39519, November 21, 1991). However, conspirator, who never even
fired a single shot and whose only participation was to drive their getaway vehicle and to lend
his firearm to his back rider so that the latter could finish off the target victim was not found
accountable for the injury sustained by the unintended victim was just a star-crossed bystander
who was accidentally hit in the process (aberratio ictus) (People vs. Herbias, G.R. No. 112716-
17, December 16, 1996; People vs. Flora and Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000).
INTENT TO KILL: Intent to kill is an element of homicide and murder. But even if
offender had no intent to kill, he would be held just the same liable for homicide or murder if his
felonious act is the proximate cause of the death of the latter. Even if there is no intent to kill,
offender is liable for homicide or murder if the victim died as a result of the “felonious act” of the
former. The offender’s act is considered felonious if it is accompanied with criminal or evil intent
such as intent to inflict injury, intent to hide the body of the crime, intent to threaten victim,
intent to silence the hold-up victim, or intent to rape. Offender is liable for homicide because it
is the natural, direct and logical consequence of an act committed with criminal intent.
a. With intent to hide the body of the crime – In People vs. Ortega, Jr., G.R. No.
116736, July 24, 1997 - Ortega stabbed the victim. Garcia assisted Ortega in concealing the
body of the victim by throwing the body into the well. Victim died due to drowning. Issue: Is
Garcia liable for the death of the victim as principal in homicide even if his intention was not to
kill the victim but merely to assist Ortega in concealing his dead body not knowing that the
victim was still alive at that time? In assisting Ortega carry the body of victim to the well, Garcia
was committing an intentional felony; concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery
makes him liable as an accessory in homicide. Hence, Garcia should be held liable for the direct,
natural and logical consequence of his felonious act of assisting Ortega in hiding the body of
the victim. Since proximate cause of death of the victim is the felonious and accessory act of
throwing the victim into the well, Garcia should be held liable for the death as principal in
homicide.
b. With intent to threaten – In US vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, March 22, 1921, En
Banc - The accused in rage he moved towards victim with a big knife in hand, threatening to
stab him. Victim believing himself in great and immediate peril jumped into the water where he
was drowned. The accused was found guilty of homicide. The act of threatening to stab victim
constitutes a felony of threat. Hence, accused is liable for the direct, natural and logical
consequence of his intentional and felonious act. It was held that: "If a man creates in another
man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result."
d. Intent to inflict injury - Intentional infliction of injury resulting in death of the victim
constitutes homicide or murder. In People vs. Pugay, et al., No 74324, November 17, 1988, the
deceased, a retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Deceased used to run errands for
Pugay and at times they slept together. During a town fiesta fair was held in the public plaza.
Accused, Pugay and Samson with several companions, who appeared to be drunk, made the
deceased dance by tickling him with a piece of wood. Not content with what they were doing
with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of gasoline from under the engine of
the Ferris wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former. Then, the accused Samson
set victim on fire making a human torch out of him. Pugay and Samson were stunned when
they noticed the deceased burning. Crime committed by Samson: There is no intent to kill. The
act of the Accused was merely a part of their fun-making that evening. Accused merely intended
to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not relieve him of criminal
responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least some kind of
physical injuries on his person, a felony. Since such felony of physical injuries resulted into a
graver offense, he must be held responsible therefor. (Note: The crime is not murder qualified
by means of fire because the fire was not use to kill but merely to inflict injury).
e. Recklessness – Even if there is no intent to kill and evil intent, offender is liable for
culpable felony if the victim died as a result of the recklessness of the former. Crime committed
by Pugay: Having taken the can from under the engine of the Ferris wheel and holding it before
pouring its contents on the body of the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained
gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable liquid could not have escaped his notice even
before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all the diligence necessary to avoid every
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undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be committed by his companions who
at the time were making fun of the deceased. The accused is only guilty of homicide through
reckless imprudence.
f. Accident - If there is no intent to kill, evil intent and recklessness on the part of the
accused, he is not liable for his intentional act, which caused the death of the victim. In United
States vs. Tanedo (15 Phil. Rep., 196), deceased went with the accused to hunt wild chickens
at the forest. While hunting, the accused came upon a wild chicken, and, not seeing deceased
about and not knowing or having any reason to believe that he was in that vicinity shot the
chicken. The bullet that hit the chicken recoiled and hit the deceased. It was held that accused
is not criminally liable. Life was taken by misfortune or accident while in the performance of a
lawful act executed with due care and without intention of doing harm. Note: The accused could
not have foreseen that the slug after hitting the chicken would recoil and hit deceased. The
principle enunciated in Tanedo case will not apply if the place where the accused lawfully
discharged his firearm is populated. In People vs. Nocum, G.R. No. L-482, 25 February 1947,
En Banc - There was a fistic fight between two persons. Desiring to stop the encounter, accused
shouted at the combatants. As these paid him no attention, he drew a .45 caliber pistol and
shot twice in the air. The bout continued, however; so he fired another shot at the ground, but
unfortunately the bullet ricocheted, and hit an innocent by-stander, resident of the place. Victim
died. It was held that: “The mishap should be classed as homicide through reckless imprudence,
the slaying having been unintentional. It is apparent that defendant willfully discharged his gun-
for without taking the precautions demanded by the circumstance that the district was populated,
and the likelihood that his bullet would glance over the hard pavement of the Manila thoroughfare.
Note: The accused should have foreseen that the slug after hitting the pavement would recoil
and might hit somebody.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
Offender shall be held liable for impossible crime if the following requisites are present:
(1) offender performing an act which would have been an offense against person or property; (2)
offender performed an act with evil intent; (3) offender did not commit the offense because of
the impossibility of its accomplishment or employment of inadequate or ineffectual means; and
(4) offender in performing an act is not violating another provision of the law (Luis B. Reyes).
Impossible crime of theft - X, employee of Mega Inc., received check from the customer
of her employer. Instead of remitting the check to her employer, X deposited the check under her
account. However, the drawee bank dishonored the check because of insufficiency of funds. What
is the crime committed by X? Answer: The crime committed is impossible crime of qualified theft.
Qualified theft is a crime against property. The act of depositing the check is committed with evil
intent. The mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Inc. showed her intent to
gain or be unjustly enriched. There is factually impossibility to accomplish the crime of qualified
theft since the check is unfunded. (Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009).
Intod principle - In Intod vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992 –
Outside the house of the victim, accused with intent to kill fired at the bedroom, where the
victim is supposed to be sleeping. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No
one was hit by the gun fire. The accused were convicted of impossible crime. Accused shoot the
place where he thought his victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in
said place and thus, the accused failed to accomplish their end due to its factual impossibility.
In the United States, criminal laws are silent regarding impossible crimes; hence where the
offense sought to be committed is factually impossible of accomplishment, the offender shall be
liable for attempted crime. On the other hand, where the offense is legally impossible of
accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime. In the Philippines, the crime
committed is impossible crime if the offense sought to be committed is factually or legally
impossible. Killing a dead person is impossible crime because of legal impossibility. Putting the
hand inside an empty pocket with intention to steal a wallet is impossible crime because of
factual impossibility.
Raping a dead person - Prior to RA 8353, rape is a crime against chastity. Thus, if a
person raped a dead person believing that she was just sleeping, offender could not be held
liable for impossible crime (J. Ramon Aquino). In impossible crime the act could have
constituted the crime against person or property if its accomplishment was not impossible. Rape
is neither a crime against person nor against property. However, RA 8353 reclassifies rape from
crime against chastity to crime against person. Hence, an offender for raping a dead person
without knowing that she was already dead may now be held liable for impossible crime.
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Committing another crime - “A” discharged shotgun at “B” from a distance of 300
yards; but because of the limited range of the firepower of the shotgun, it would be impossible
for “A” to harm “B”. “A” is liable of discharged of firearm and not impossible crime. Where the
offender unlawful entered the house and took a watch that turned out to be his own, he is liable
for trespass to dwelling and not impossible crime (Criminal Law Conspectus by Justice Florenz
Regalado). If the accused administered abortive drugs upon his girlfriend whom he believed to
be pregnant, which turned out not to be true, but the woman became ill for more than 30 days,
the accused will be liable for serious physical injuries and not impossible crime of abortion
(Criminal Law Reviewer by Gregorio).
STAGES
ATTEMPTED AND FRUSTRATED STAGES: In attempted felony, the offender performs

directly an overt act, which consists of one or more acts of execution, but not enough to
consequently produce the felony. In frustrated felony, the offenders perform all the acts of
execution that would produce the felony as a matter of consequence. To determine whether the
felony is at the attempted or frustrated stage, acts of execution of execution of a felony must be
identified. Example: The acts of execution that would produce homicide or murder are infliction
of mortal wounds upon the victim. If the wounds inflicted upon the victim with intent to kill are
non-mortal, the crime committed is attempted homicide; if wounds are mortal, the crime
committed is frustrated homicide.
In attempted felony and frustrated felony, the external acts performed by the offender
and the intended felony must have a direct connection; but in an attempted felony, the offender
failed to perform all the acts of execution; thus his external acts would “not produce” the felony
as a consequence; on the other hand in a frustrated felony, the offender performed all the acts
of execution; thus, his external acts “would produce” the felony as a consequence.
FRUSTRATED AND CONSUMMATED - In frustrated and consummated felony, the

accused performed all acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence. If the
felony is not produced due to external cause, the crime committed is frustrated felony; if the
felony is produced the crime committed is consummated.
In frustrated felony, the offender performed all the acts of execution but the felony was
not produced as a consequence due to extraneous cause. However, there are felonies, the
commission of which has no frustrated stage since the performance of all the acts of execution
immediately consummates the felony. In homicide or murder case, once the offender inflicted
mortal wound on the victim, all the acts of execution are considered performed. However, what
consummates homicide or murder is not the infliction of mortal wounds but the death of the
victim as a consequence of the mortal wound inflicted. Thus, if the mortally wounded victim did
not die due to medical intervention, homicide or murder is only at the frustrated stage. On the
other hand, in rape once the offender sexually penetrate the labia of the vagina of the victim, all
the acts of execution are considered performed. But since sexual penetration consummates
rape, there are no occasions where the offender performed all the acts of execution and yet the
felony was not produced as a consequence. In sum, there is no such thing as frustrated rape
since the performance of all the acts of execution immediately consummates rape.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE – In attempted felony and frustrated felony, the offender failed to
accomplish his criminal objective by reason of extraneous causes; if the causes are not
extraneous, the accused will be absolved from criminal liability.
a. Negative Act - In the attempted stage of the execution of a felony, the offender must
do a “negative act” to be exempt from criminal liability for attempted felony; since the offender
has not yet performed all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence,
he must spontaneously desist from further doing criminal acts that will complete all the acts of
execution. Example: “A” with intent to kill shot “B”; “B” sustained non-mortal wound. To be
exempt from criminal liability for attempted homicide or murder, “A” must spontaneously desist
from further shooting “B” in order not to inflict mortal injury upon him.
b. Positive Act – If the offender performs all the acts of execution, which would produce
the felony as a consequence, offender is not exempted from liability for frustrated felony even if
he voluntary desisted from further doing criminal act. Spontaneous desistance is a defense in
attempted felony but not in frustrated felony. In the frustrated stage of the execution of a felony,
the offender must do a “positive act” to be exempt from criminal liability; since the offender has
performed all the acts of execution that would produce the felony as a consequence, he must
do something to prevent, or thwart the production of the felony. Example: “A” with intent to kill
shot “B”; “B” sustained mortal wound. To be exempt from criminal liability for frustrated felony,
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it is not enough that “A” would desist from further shooting “B”. The spontaneous desistance is
not a valid defense since “A” had already inflicted mortal wound on “B” that would cause his
death as a consequence. Thus, “A” must save the life of “B” by treating his wound. If “B” did not
die because “A’s” medical treatment, the latter will not be held liable for frustrated felony
because the homicide was not produced due to the will of “A”.
c. Not absolutory cause – If the felony is consummated, offender cannot undo what was
done. Offender would not be absolved from criminal liability even if he had done something that
will mitigate the effects of the felonious act. Example: (1) Restitution of funds malversed
immediately and voluntarily made before the case was instituted is not an absolutory cause
(Navarro vs. Meneses III, CBD Adm. Case No. 313, January 30, 1998, En Banc). (2) “A” stole
chicken under the house of “B” one evening. Realizing that what he did was wrong, “A” returned
the chicken to the place under the house of “B”. Since the crime of theft was already
consummated, the return of the stolen property does not relieve “A” of criminal responsibility.
“A” had already performed all the acts of execution, which produced the crime of theft before he
returned the chicken (Reyes). (3) The fact that the accused abandoned victim after six days of
captivity does not lessen his criminal culpability much less exempt him from criminal liability
for the kidnapping and detention of victim (Baldogo, G.R. No. 128106-07, January 24, 2003,
En Banc).
SPONTANOEUS DESISTANCE - The term spontaneous is not equivalent to voluntary.

Even if the desistance is voluntary, the same could not exempt the offender from liability for
attempted felony if there is an external constraint. The term “spontaneous” means proceeding
from natural feeling or native tendency without external constraint; it is synonymous with
impulsive, automatic and mechanical (People vs. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003,
En Banc).
Accused had previously raped the victim several times. During the subject incident,
accused was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up. He entered the bedroom of
victim, went on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched
her sex organ. However, accused saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He
berated Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to sleep. Accused then
left the room of the victim. Held: Accused intended to have carnal knowledge of victim. The overt
acts of accused proven by the prosecution were not merely preparatory acts. By the series of his
overt acts, accused had commenced the execution of rape, which, if not for his desistance, will
ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused desisted from performing all the acts of execution,
however, his desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the
sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused is guilty only of attempted rape (People
vs. Lizada, G.R. No. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, En Banc).
HOMICIDE OR MURDER – The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at

whatever stage, may be before or simultaneous with the infliction of injuries. The evidence to
prove intent to kill may consist of, inter alia, the means used; the nature, location and number
of wounds sustained by the victim; and the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or
immediately after the killing of the victim (Escamilla vs. People, GR No. 188551, February 27,
2013).
X opened the door and while still in the car drew a gun and shot A once, hitting him just
below the left armpit. X sped away. The wound sustained by A is not fatal. What is the crime
committed? Answer: X only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latter's body.
If he intended to kill him, X could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with
the car. Since intent to kill is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not
attempted murder but physical injuries only (Pentecostes, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 167766, April
07, 2010).
X was charged with frustrated murder for hacking the neck of victim with the use of a
scythe. Invoking the doctrine in Pentecostes, Jr., X claimed that had he intended to kill victim,
he could have repeatedly hacked him to ensure the latter’s death. Is the argument tenable?
Answer: No. Pentesoste Jr. case is not applicable since the victim in that case was shot in the
arm, a non-vital part of the body. In this case, the use of a scythe against victim’s neck was
determinative of the homicidal intent of X. A single hacking blow in the neck could be enough to
decapitate a person and leave him dead. Refraining from further hacking the victim does not
negate intent to kill. What could have been a fatal blow was already delivered and there was no
more desistance to speak of (People vs. Abella, G.R. No. 198400, October 07, 2013).
Using a gun, he shot the victim in the chest. Despite a bloodied right upper torso, the
latter still managed to run towards his house to ask for help. Nonetheless, petitioner continued
11 | P a g e
to shoot at him three more times, albeit unsuccessfully. The wound sustained by the victim is
fatal. The crime committed is frustrated homicide (Escamilla vs. People, GR No. 188551,
February 27, 2013).
COMPLEX CRIME
Killing persons and injuring two more by treacherously detonating a hand grenade in a
dancing place constitutes the complex crime of multiple murders with double attempted murder.
Single act of detonating an explosive device may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several
separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only
as a single crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled
by a single criminal impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity. Even though the other
victim did not suffer mortal wounds, the crime committed is not physical injuries, because
accused was motivated by the same intent to kill when he detonated the explosive device inside
the dancing place (People vs. Barde, G.R. No. 183094, September 22, 2010).
RECOMMENDED EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Accused was convicted of crime RA No. 8282 for his failure to remit SSS contributions of
his employees and was sentenced to suffer up to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The penalty is
excessive since he already paid his delinquent contribution. Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal
Code, the courts are bound to apply the law as it is and impose the proper penalty, no matter
how harsh it might be. The same provision, however, gives the Court the discretion to recommend
to the President actions it deems appropriate but are beyond its power when it considers the
penalty imposed as excessive. Although an accused is convicted under a special penal law, the
Court is not precluded from giving the Revised Penal Code suppletory application in light of
Article 10 of the same Code (Mendoza vs. People, G.R. No. 183891, October 19, 2011).
CONSPIRACY
IMPLIED CONSPIRACY - In People vs. Dollendo, G.R. No. 181701, January 18, 2012 -
The “evidence of a chain of circumstances,” to wit: that appellant went inside the house of
Romines to ascertain that the victim was there; that he fetched Dollendo to bring him to Ruiz;
that he gave the dipang to Dollendo to commit the crime; and that they both fled after the
stabbing, taken collectively, shows a community of criminal design to kill the victim. Evidently,
there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime.
COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY - It is immaterial whether appellant acted as a principal

or as an accomplice because the conspiracy and his participation therein have been
established. In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all and the conspirators shall be held
equally liable for the crime (People vs. Siongco, G.R. No. 186472, July 5, 2010).
DISSOCIATION - To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have

performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony
and prevent the commission thereof (People vs. Ebet, G.R. No. 181635 November 15, 2010).
MASTERMIND - To be held liable as conspirator, it must also be shown that the accused
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy except in the case of the mastermind of
a crime (People vs. Vera, GR No. 128966, August 18, 1999). One who plans the commission of a
crime is liable as conspirator and principal by inducement (People vs. Comiling, G.R. No.
140405, March 4, 2004, En banc).Notwithstanding, the fact that one was not at the crime scene,
evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the criminal act or the principal by inducement.
What is important is that inducement was the determining cause of the commission of the
crime. The command or advice made by principal by inducement was of such nature that,
without it, the crime would not have materialized (People vs. Janjalani, G.R. No. 188314, January
10, 2011).
PRESENCE - Accused, unarmed, appeared in the company of his employer, and another
person. His employer shot and killedthe victim. Accused did nothing to prevent the killing.
Accused fled together with his employer and other person.The fact that accused appeared
together with employer and another and fled with them proves a certain degree of participation
and cooperation in the execution of the crime. However, there is doubt as to whether accused
acted as a principal or just a mere accomplice. Such doubt should be resolved in favor of the
milder form of criminal liability—that of a mere accomplice (People vs. Tomas, G.R. No. 192251,
February 16, 2011). If the accused is armed at the time, he could be held liable as principal on
the basis of implied conspiracy. The fact that the companion of the criminal actor is armed may
mean that the former is supplying moral assistance to the latter. The armed presence of
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conspiratorial companion may prove a sense of security and encouragement on the part of the
material executor or may serve as deterrence against possible defender or rescuer (Galgo, G.R.
No. 133887, May 28, 2002, En Banc).
SPECIAL LAW - B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the supplementary application
of the provisions RPC including the rule on conspiracy. Hence, such rule may be applied
supplementarily. Thus, a non-issuer of bum check can be held liable for violation of BP Blg. 22
on the basis of conspiracy. (Ladonga vs. People, G.R. No. 141066, February 17, 2005). The
principle of conspiracy may be applied to RA No. 9262. Thus, a person (such as mother-in-law),
who has no marital, sexual or dating relationship with the victim, can be held liable for violence
against woman on the basis of conspiracy (Go-Tan vs. Go, G.R. No. 168852, September 30, 2008)
Anti-graft law - May a private person be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died
prior to the filing of the Information? Answer: Yes. The death of the public officer does not mean
that the allegation of conspiracy between him and private individual can no longer be proved or
that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of
the public officer is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove
the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private individual (People vs. Go, GR NO.
168539, March 25, 2014, en banc).
Robbery with rape – When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide whether they actually participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was
an endeavor to prevent the killing. The records are bereft of any evidence to prove, or even
remotely suggest, that appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Therefore, the basic principle
in conspiracy that the "act of one is the act of all," applies in this case (People vs. Ebet, GR No.
181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu,
GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013)
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the
robbery, he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to
commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited
and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs
of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized (People
vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
Kidnapping with rape - A, B and C kidnapped X from her house, and then detained her
in a safe house for purpose of extorting ransom. While C went to Jolibee to buy food, A raped X
in the presence of B. What is the crime committed by A, B and C? Answer: A is liable for special
complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. Since X is a female, taking
her away from her house against her will and holding her as captive constitute kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. Raping the kidnapped victim is a qualifying circumstance. These two
crimes should be integrated together to form a composite crime where the law prescribes a single
penalty.
B is also liable for special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
rape. Since conspiracy is established between A and B in the commission of kidnapping, the
latter is responsible for the rape committed by former since there is no showing that B
endeavored to prevent A from raping X (People vs. Anticamaray, GR No. 178771, June 08, 2011).
C is only liable for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Since there is no evidence
that he is aware of the commission of rape, he could not have prevented A from raping the victim.
Hence, he is not responsible for the rape (People vs. Anticamaray, supra).
SELF-DEFENSE
SELF-HELP PRINCIPLE - In People vs. Apolinar, CA, 38 O.G. 2870, it was held: Defense
of property is not of such importance as right to life, and defense of property can be invoked as
a justifying circumstance only when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted
with said property. However, in People vs. Narvaez, G.R. Nos. L-33466-67, April 20, 1983, the
SC found the presence of unlawful aggression despite the fact that the invasion of his property
right was not coupled by an attack against the accused. The accused has the right to resist
pursuant Article 429 of the Civil Code, which provides: “The owner or lawful possessor of a thing
has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose,
he may use such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or threatened
unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.” However, since the means employed
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to resist the invader (killing) is not reasonable, the accused is merely given the benefit of
incomplete self-defense. Justice Florenz Regalado stated that the rule in Apolinar case may be
deemed to have been superseded by Narvaez case.
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION – The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense. Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to
inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack
(Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 181052, November 14, 2012).
The rule consistently adhered to in this jurisdiction is that when the accused’s defense is
self-defense he thereby admits being the author of the death of the victim, that it becomes
incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. The
rationale for the shifting of the burden of evidence is that the accused, by his admission, is to be
held criminally liable unless he satisfactorily establishes the fact of self-defense. But the burden
to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not thereby lifted from the shoulders of the State,
which carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi shifts
to the accused, for self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with
certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof. He must now discharge the burden by relying on
the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of that of the Prosecution, considering
that the Prosecution’s evidence, even if weak, cannot be disbelieved in view of his admission of
the killing (People vs. Roman, GR No. 198110, July 31, 2013).
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-
defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can
validly be invoked. “There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in
actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must
be actual physical force or actual use of a weapon.” It is present only when the one attacked
faces real and immediate threat to one’s life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does not
constitute aggression warranting self-defense (People vs. Gamez, GR No. 202847, October 23,
2013). Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of three elements of unlawful
aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful
(People vs. Roman, GR No. 198110, July 31, 2013).
Kinds of aggression - Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful
aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means
an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the
intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that
is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude,
nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a
revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack).
Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as
pressing his right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry
countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot (People v. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18,
2012; People vs. Roman, GR No. 198110, July 31, 2013; People vs. Malicdem, G.R. No. 184601,
November 12, 2012 (Justice De Castro)
Ordinarily there is a difference between the act of drawing one’s gun and the act of
pointing one’s gun at a target. The former cannot be said to be unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim. For unlawful aggression to be attendant there must be a real danger to life or
personal safety. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. Here, the act of
the victim in drawing a gun from his waist cannot be categorized as unlawful aggression. Such
act did not put in real peril the life or personal safety of appellant. The facts surrounding the
case must, however, be differentiated from current jurisprudence on unlawful aggression.
Accused was justified in defending himself considering that victim was a trained police officer
and an inebriated and disobedient colleague. Even if the victim did not point his firearm at
accused, there would still be a finding of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim (Nacnac
vs. People, G.R. No. 191913, March 21, 2012).
In People vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 177743, January 25, 2012 - Indeed, had victim really
attacked accused, the latter would have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains,
however, that no injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of accused
when he presented himself to the hospital. In contrast, the physician who examined the cadaver
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of victim testified that he had been hit on the head more than once. The plea of self-defense was
thus belied, for the weapons used by accused and the location and number of wounds he inflicted
on victim revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to prevent or repel an attack from victim.
We consider to be significant that the gravity of the wounds manifested the determined effort of
the accused to kill his victim, not just to defend himself.
Ceased aggression - The unlawful aggression on the part of the victim ceased when
accused Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Although there was still some
struggle involved between the victim and accused, there is no doubt that the latter, who was in
possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Retaliation is not the
same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already
ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when
the aggressor was injured by the accused. Such an aggression can also be surmised on the four
stab wounds sustained by the victim on his back. It is hard to believe based on the location of
the stab wounds, all at the back portion of the body, that accused was defending himself. It
would have been different if the wounds inflicted were located in the front portion of the victim's
body. Thus, the first element of self-defense is not present (Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 181052,
November 14, 2012).
Necessary means - The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be

commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In the present case, four stab
wounds that are the product of direct thrusting of the bladed weapon are not necessary to prevent
what the accused claim to be the continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter
was already without any weapon. In connection therewith, having established that there was no
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he was stabbed, accused cannot avail of the
mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense (Belbis, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 181052,
November 14, 2012).
Under doctrine of rationale equivalence, plea of self-defense would prosper if there is a

rational equivalence between the means of attack by the unlawful aggressor and the means of
defense by the accused that would characterize the defense as reasonable. The doctrine of
rational equivalence presupposes the consideration not only of the nature and quality of the
weapons used by the defender and the assailant—but of the totality of circumstances
surrounding the defense vis-à-vis, the unlawful aggression. Clearly, this “continuous attack” by
accused despite the fact that aggressor already was neutralized by the blow constitutes force
beyond what is reasonably required to repel the aggression—and is therefore unjustified
(Espinosa vs. People, G.R. No. 181071, March 15, 2010).
BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME: "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically

defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (Section 3 of RA No. 9262). Each of the phases of
the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized “at least two battering episodes”
between the accused and her intimate partner and such final episode produced in the battered
person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that
she needed to use force in order to save her life. (People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January
15, 2004). The three phases of the Battered Woman Syndrome are: (1) the tension-building
phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving or non-violent phase (People
vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004; Answer to the 2010 Bar Examination
Questions by UP Law Complex). The essence of this defense of “Battered Woman Syndrome” as
a defense is that battered woman, who suffers from physical and psychological or emotional
distress, is acting under an irresistible impulse to defend herself although at the time of
commission of the crime the batterer-victim had not yet committed unlawful aggression. In
Genosa supra, it was held that “it is crucial to the BWS defense is the state of mind of the battered
woman at the time of the offense. She must have actually feared imminent harm from her batterer
and honestly believed in the need to kill him in order to save her life.” That is why even in the
absence of “actual aggression” or any other element of self-defense, a woman, who is found to
be suffering from battered woman syndrome is not criminally liable for killing her husband.
IRRESISTABLE FORCE
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability
because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invite factus non est meus actus. An act done
by me against my will is not my act. The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce
the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but against his will. The duress,
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to
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induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat
of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused for escape or self-defense in equal combat (People vs. Dequina, G.R.
No. 177570, January 19, 2011)
MINORITY
The rights and privileges of a child in conflict with the law are as follows:
1. Exempting circumstance of minority - To exempt a minor, who is 15 years old or

more, from criminal liability, it must be shown that he committed the criminal act without
discernment. Choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection
and boxing the victim to weaken her defense” are indicative of accused’s mental capacity to fully
understand the consequences of his unlawful action (People vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March
16, 2011).
A child, who are already serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of RA 9344. They shall be immediately released if they are so qualified under this Act
or other applicable law (Section 68 of RA No. 9344; People vs. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507,
January 30, 2013).
2. Privilege mitigating circumstance – In People vs. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, January
7, 2013 – Accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, which
graduates the penalty one degree lower. The rationale of the law in extending such leniency and
compassion is that because of his age, the accused is presumed to have acted with less
discernment. This is regardless of the fact that his minority was not proved during the trial and
that his birth certificate was belatedly presented for our consideration, since to rule accordingly
will not adversely affect the rights of the state, the victim and his heirs.
Under Section 98 of RA No. 9165, the provisions in RPC is not applicable unless the
accused is a minor. In such case, the penalty of life imprisonment shall be considered reclusion
perpetua. In sum, if the accused is a minor, Article 68 of RPC on the privilege mitigating
circumstance of minority shall apply to crime of illegal possession of dangerous drug even though
this is malum prohibitum punishable by life imprisonment. Hence, the penalty of life
imprisonment for illegal possession of dangerous drug committed by a minor, which is treated
as reclusion perpetua, shall be graduated to reclusion temporal because of the privilege
mitigating circumstance of minority (People vs. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011)
3. Suspension of sentence - While Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of

sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of age
or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the
said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, the child in
conflict with the law, who reached 21 years, cannot avail of privilege of suspension of sentence
(People vs. Mantalba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; People vs. Salcedo, GR No. 186523, June
22, 2011; People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563, December 14, 2011 (Justice De Castro; People vs.
Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013).
4. Probation - Right to apply for probation despite appeal - Section 4 of PD No. 968
provides: “Application for probation must be filed within the period of perfecting an appeal and no
application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction.” However, RA No. 9344 has expressly amended Section 4 of PD
No. 968 and provides that a child in conflict with the law can apply for probation at any time.
Section 42 of RA No. 9344 provides: “The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced
a child in conflict with the law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in lie
of service of his/her sentence taking into account the best interest to the child. The phrase “at any
time” mentioned in Section 42 means the child in conflict with the law may file application for
probation even beyond the period of perfecting an appeal and even if the child has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Right of possessor or user of dangerous drugs to apply for probation - The rule under
Section 24 of RA No. 9165, which disqualifies drug traffickers and pushers for applying for
probations, does not extend to possessor of dangerous drugs. In Padua vs. People, G.R. No.
168546, July 23, 2008, it was held that: “The law considers the users and possessors of illegal
drugs as victims while the drug traffickers and pushers as predators. Hence, while drug
traffickers and pushers, like Padua, are categorically disqualified from availing the law on
probation, youthful drug dependents, users and possessors alike, are given the chance to mend
their ways.”
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Right to apply for probation even if the penalty for possession of dangerous drug is more
than 6 years – Under Section 9 of PD 968, one is sentenced to suffer a penalty (maximum
indeterminate penalty) of more than is not qualified to apply for probation. However, under
Section 70 of RA No. 9165, a first time minor offender can apply for probation for the crime of
illegal possession of dangerous drug even if the penalty is higher than 6 years of imprisonment.
5. Agricultural camp or other training facilities - The child in conflict with the law
may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his sentence, in lieu of
confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities
in accordance with Section 51 of RA No. 9344 (People vs. Mantalba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20,
2011; People vs. Salcedo, GR No. 186523, June 22, 2011; People vs. Arpon, G.R. No. 183563,
December 14, 2011, Justice De Castro).
6. Full credit of preventive imprisonment - Under Article 29 of RPC, a convicted

recidivist is not entitled to a full or 4/5 credit of his preventive imprisonment. However, if the
convict is a child, the applicable rule for crediting the period of commitment and detention is not
Article 29 of RPC but Section 41, RA 9344. Under the said provision, the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention of juvenile delinquent shall be credited in the services of his sentence
(Atizado vs. People, G.R. No. 173822, October 13, 2010.
IMBECILITY
In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important

is the chronological age of the accused. If the actual age of the child is 15 years or under, he is
exempt from criminal liability. In People vs. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 04, 2014 - In
determining age for purposes of exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 clearly refers to the
age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age.
In exempting circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the mental age of the

accused. If the mental age of the accused is 2 years, he is an idiot; if his mental age is 7 years
old, he is an imbecile (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011). An idiot or
imbecile is exempt from criminal liability.
If the mental age of the accused is 12 years old, he is a feebleminded (People vs. Butiong).
A feebleminded is not an imbecile; hence, he is not exempt from criminal liability (People vs.
Nunez, G.R. NO. 112429-30, July 23, 1997)
In People vs. Roxas, the chronological age of the victim is 18 years while his mental age
is 9 years old. Exempting circumstance of minority cannot be appreciated since he is not a minor.
His actual age is not below 18 years. Exempting circumstance of imbecility cannot be
appreciated. He is not an imbecile since his mental age is not 7 years.
INSANITY
Acts penalized by law are always presumed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude
that a person acted unconsciously in order to relieve him of liability, unless his insanity is
conclusively proved (People vs. Pambid, GR No. 124453, March 15, 2000).Insanity is the
exception rather than the rule in the human condition. The presumption, under Article 800 of
the Civil Code, is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of
insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of
confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but
claims that he or she is not guilty because of insanity (People vs. Tibon, G.R. No. 188320, June
29, 2010).
Insanity as an exempting circumstance must relate to the time immediately preceding or

coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which accused is charged (People vs. Tibon,
supra).
COGNITION TEST AND VOLITION TEST - The case of Formigones established two
distinguishable tests to determine the insane condition of the accused:
(a) The test of cognition – whether there was a “complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the criminal act” After satisfying his lust, accused threatened the victim. This implies
that accused knew what he was doing, that it was wrong, and wanted to keep it a secret. It also
indicated that the crime was committed during one of his lucid intervals. Accused is not exempt
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from liability for failure to pass the cognition test (People vs. Alipio, G.R. No. 185285, October 5,
2009) and
Evidence tended to show that accused was not deprived of reason at all and can still
distinguish right from wrong when, after satisfying his lust, he threatened victim. This single
episode irresistibly implies, for one, that accused knew what he was doing, that it was wrong,
and wanted to keep it a secret. And for another, it indicated that the crime was committed during
one of lucid intervals of accused (People vs. Alipio, supra).
(b) The test of volition – whether there was a “total deprivation of freedom of the will.” In
the Bonoan case, schizophrenic accused, who acted under irresistible homicidal impulse to kill
(volition test), was acquitted due to insanity. This is not anymore a good rule. Even if the mental
condition of the accused had passed the volition test, the plea of insanity will not prosper unless
it also passed the cognition test. The controlling test is cognition (People vs. Opuran, G.R. Nos.
147674-75, March 17, 2004). Accused will be convicted if he was not totally deprived of reason
and freedom of will (People vs. Garchitorena, G. R. No. 175605, August 28, 2009 (Justice De
Castro). Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the commission
of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered (People vs. Bulagao,
G.R. No. 184757, October 05, 201, Justice De Castro).
In recent Supreme Court cases, the plea of insanity of person, who is suffering from
schizophrenia, was rejected because of failure to pass the cognition test. In sum, a schizophrenic
accused must be deprived completely of intelligence to be exempt from criminal liability (See:
People vs. Medina, G.R. No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People vs. Pascual, G.R. No. 95029,
March 24, 1993).If a person (such as sex maniac, homicidal maniac or kleptomaniac)had merely
passed the volition test but not the cognition test, he will only be given the benefit of mitigating
circumstance of illness. Diminution of freedom of the will is enough to mitigate the liability of the
offender suffering from illness (See: People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991, G.R. No. 54135,
November 21, 1991).
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE IN CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY
No criminal liability is incurred by the stepfather who commits malicious mischief against
his stepson; by the stepmother who commits theft against her stepson; by the stepfather who
steals something from his stepson; by the grandson who steals from his grandfather; by the
accused who swindles his sister-in-law living with him; and by the son who steals a ring from
his mother (Intestate Estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010). The
absolutory cause applies to theft, swindling and malicious mischief. It does not apply to theft
through falsification or estafa through falsification (Intestate Estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R.
No. 181409, February 11, 2010). There are two viewson whether the extinguishment of marriage
by death of the spouse dissolves the relationship by affinity for purpose of absolutory cause. The
first holds that relationship by affinity terminates with the dissolution of the marriage, while the
second maintains that relationship continues even after the death of the deceased spouse. The
principle of pro reo calls for the adoption of the continuing affinity view because it is more
favorable to the accused (Intestate estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11,
2010).
INSTIGATION AND ENTRAPMENT
“Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention
to commit, in order to prosecute him." It differs from entrapment which is the employment of
ways and means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to
commit an offense originates from the inducer and not from the accused who had no intention
to commit and would not have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In
entrapment, the criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers
merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. Instigation results
in the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution and conviction.
Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to
commit, in order to prosecute him. It differs from entrapment which is the employment of ways
and means in order to trap or capture a criminal. In instigation, the criminal intent to commit
an offense originates from the inducer and not from the accused who had no intention to commit
and would not have committed it were it not for the prodding of the inducer. In entrapment, the
criminal intent or design originates from the accused and the law enforcers merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by using ruses and schemes. Instigation results in the acquittal of
the accused, while entrapment may lead to prosecution and conviction (People vs. Espiritu, G.R.
No. 180919, January 9, 2013).
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In People vs. Espiritu et. Al., G.R. No. 180919, January 9, 2013 - Here, the evidence
clearly established that the police operatives employed entrapment, not instigation, to capture
appellant and her cohorts in the act of selling shabu. It must be recalled that it was only upon
receipt of a report of the drug trafficking activities of Espiritu from the confidential informant
that a buy-bust team was formed and negotiations for the sale of shabu were made. Also,
appellant testified that she agreed to the transaction of her own free will when she saw the same
as an opportunity to earn money. Notably too, appellant was able to quickly produce a sample.
This confirms that she had a ready supply of the illegal drugs. Clearly, she was never forced,
coerced or induced through incessant entreaties to source the prohibited drug for Carla and PO3
Cariño and this she even categorically admitted during her testimony.
Moreover, a police officer’s act of soliciting drugs from appellant during the buy-bust
operation, or what is known as the "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not
invalidate the buy-bust operation. in a prosecution for sale of illicit drugs, any of the following
will not exculpate the accused: "(1) that facilities for the commission of the crime were
intentionally placed in his way; or (2) that the criminal act was done at the solicitation of the
decoy or poseur-buyer seeking to expose his criminal act; or (3) that the police authorities
feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisted in its commission."
Hence, even assuming that the PAOCTF operatives repeatedly asked her to sell them
shabu, appellant’s defense of instigation will not prosper. This is "especially true in that class of
cases where the offense is the kind that is habitually committed, and the solicitation merely
furnished evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by the police officer will not shield the
perpetrator, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or instigation of the
police officer."
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER – To appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender, the following requisites must be proven, namely: (1) the offender has not actually
been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender
was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges
his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search
and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance (People vs. Tabarnero, G.R. No.
168169, February 24, 2010, Justice De Castro)
The surrender made after 14 days from the date of killing cannot be considered voluntary
since his act did not emanate from a natural impulse to admit the killing or to save the police
officers the effort and expense that would be incurred in his search and incarceration. (People
vs. Agacer, G.R. No. 177751, December 14, 2011).
The accused surrendered only after having been informed of the charge of rape against
him or about two months from the commission of the alleged crime. He even denied the said
charge upon his purported surrender. The alleged surrender, therefore, does not qualify as a
mitigating circumstance (People vs. Salle, G.R. No. 181083, January 21, 2010, Justice De
Castro).
Surrender is not voluntary where the accused went to Barangay Chairman after the
killings to seek protection against the retaliation of the victims’ relatives, not to admit his
participation in the killing of the victims (People vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 169084, January 18,
2012).
The evidence shows that the appellants were arrested when the police officers manning
the checkpoint stopped the passenger jeepney driven by appellant Ronald and arrested the
appellants. The fact that the appellants did not resist but went peacefully with the peace officers
does not mean that they surrendered voluntarily (People vs. Castillano, G.R. No. 139412, April
2, 2003).
VOLUNTARY CONFESSION - A plea of guilty made after the prosecution had begun
presenting its evidence cannot be considered voluntary since it was made only after the accused
realized that the evidence already presented by the prosecution is enough to cause his conviction.
It is not required that the prosecution must have presented all its evidence when the plea of
guilty was made to negate the appreciation of mitigating circumstance of voluntary confession
(People vs. Montinola, G.R. No. 131856-57, July 9, 2001, En Banc).
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VENDICATION: The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate
vindication of a grave offense was, likewise, properly appreciated. The appellant was humiliated,
mauled and almost stabbed by the deceased. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased
when the appellant stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which the appellant
may be given the benefit of a mitigating circumstance. But the mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave
offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the
appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance
(People vs. Torpio, G.R. No. 138984, June 4, 2004).
In vindication of grave offense, criminal exemption of accessories, alternative

circumstance of relationship and defense of stranger, the concept of relationship is the same. It
refers to (1) spouse, (2) ascendants, (3) descendants, or (4) legitimate, natural or adopted brothers
or sisters or (5) of his relatives by affinity in the same degrees. However, in defense of relative,
there is an additional concept of relationship. It includes relatives by consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree. Thus, an uncle is a relative within the concept of defense of stranger (Reyes).
However, relationship of uncle and niece is not an alternative circumstance (People vs. Ulit, G.R.
Nos. 131799-801, February 23, 2004).
PASSION - The following essential requirements must be present: (1) there was an act
that was both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition (passion or obfuscation) of the
mind; and (2) such act was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator might have recovered his normal equanimity (People
vs. Comillo, G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009). Four days after the victims attempted on the
virtue of his wife, accused killed them. The period of four days was sufficient enough a time
within which accused could have regained his composure and self-control. Hence, passion
should not be appreciated (People vs. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011, Justice De
Castro).
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Generic aggravating circumstances has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime
to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always
be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be
appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance (People vs. De
Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
It is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be

expressly and specifically alleged in the complaint or information. Otherwise, they cannot be
considered by the trial court in its judgment, even, if they are subsequently proved during trial
(Sombilon, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 175528, September 30, 2009, Justice De Castro)
Section 8, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court has expressly required that qualifying and
aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the information. Due to such requirement
being pro reo, the Court has authorized its retroactive application in favor of even those charged
with felonies committed prior to December 1, 2000, which is the date of the effectivity of the 2000
revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure that embodied the requirement (People vs. Dadulla,
G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011).
TAKING ADVANTAGE OF POSITION - The mere use of service firearm is not enough to
constitute taking advantage of public position. Fact that accused made use of firearms which
they were authorized to carry or possess by reason of their positions, could not supply the
required connection between the office and the crime.The crime in question, for example, could
have been committed by the defendants in the same or like manner and with the same case if
they had been private individuals and fired with unlicensed weapons (People vs. Mandolado, G.R.
No. L-51304, June 28, 1983; People vs. Joyno, G.R. No. 123982, March 15, 1999, En Banc;
People vs. Villa, Jr., G.R. No. 129899, April 27, 2000; People vs. Villamor, G.R. Nos. 140407-08
and 141908-09, January 15, 2002, En Banc; and People vs. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March
4, 2004, En Banc).
IGNOMINY - After killing the victim, the accused severed his sexual organ. Should
ignominy be appreciated? No. For ignominy to be appreciated, it is required that the offense be
committed in a manner that tends to make its effect more humiliating, thus adding to the victim’s
moral suffering. Where the victim was already dead when his body or a part thereof was
dismembered, ignominy cannot be taken against the accused (People vs. Cachola, G.R. Nos.
148712-15, January 21, 2004)`
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TREACHERY – To appreciate treachery, two (2) conditions must be present, namely, (a)
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted
(People vs. Duavis, GR No. 190861, December 07, 2011).
Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery

with homicide although said crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible
crime (People vs. Baron, G.R. No. 188601, June 29, 2010).
As the killing, in this case, is perpetrated with both treachery and by means of explosives,
the latter shall be considered as a qualifying circumstance since it is the principal mode of
attack. Reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense while
treachery will be considered merely as a generic aggravating circumstance (People vs. Barde G.R.
No. 183094, September 22, 2010).
EMPLOMENT OF MEANS TO WEAKEN DEFENSE - If the employment of means to

weaken the defense of the victim renders the victim defenseless, treachery absorbs circumstance
of employing means to weaken defense (People vs. Tunhawan, G.R. NO. L-81470, October 27,
1988).
DISGUISE - If the accused covers his face with a handkerchief when he treacherously
killed the victim, the crime committed is murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by
disguise (People vs. Piring, G.R. No. 45053, October 19, 1936). If the accused covers his face with
a handkerchief when he killed the victim, the crime committed is murder qualified by
employment of means of affords impunity.
If the accused treacherously stabbed the victim, and the crime committed is murder
qualified by treachery and aggravated by disguise. If the accused covers his face with a
handkerchief when he killed the victim, the crime committed is murder qualified by employment
of means of affords impunity.
NIGHTTIME - Thus, treachery absorbs nighttime where had it not been at night the
offender, with his cohorts, would not have been able to approach the deceased without the latter's
becoming aware of his presence and guessing his intention; If they were able to catch victim
completely unawares, it was due to the darkness of the night which covered them (People vs.
Gumarang , GR N. 46413, October 6, 1939).
As a general rule, nighttime is aggravating because the darkness of the night facilitated
the commission of the crime or insured impunity. Thus, nighttime cannot aggravate the crime if
it is committed in a lighted place although at the wee hours of the night (People vs. Clariño, G.R.
NO. 134634, July 31, 2001). The darkness of the night and “not nighttime per se” is important in
appreciating it as modifying circumstance (People vs. Banhaon, G.R. No. 131117, June 15,
2004). But if the offender purposely selected the wee hour of the night when neighbors and
occupants of the house including the victim were sleeping to facilitate the commission of the
crime or to afford impunity, nighttime is appreciable even if the place of commission is lighted.
(People vs. Demate, G.R. No. 132310, January 20, 2004, En Banc).While accused were already
outside the victims’ house at around 11:00 p.m., they purposely waited until 2:00 a.m. before
breaking into the residence so as not to call the attention of the victims, household members
and/or their neighbors. Taking advantage of the fact that the victim and household members
were asleep, accused entered the well-lighted bedroom and killed the victim. Nighttime should
be appreciated since accused took advantage of the silence of the night (People vs. Ventura and
Ventura, G.R. No. 148145-46, July 5, 2004, Per Curiam).
ABUSE OF SUEPRIOR STRENGHT - Abuse of superior strength is present whenever

there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, considering that a situation
of superiority of strength is notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and is selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime (People vs. Garchitorena, G. R. No.
175605, August 28, 2009 (Justice De Castro).The victim need not be completely defenseless in
order for the said aggravating circumstance to be appreciated (People vs. Paling, G.R.
No. 185390 March 16, 2011). If the victim is completely defenseless, treachery should be
appreciated (People vs. Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011). When the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed in the latter (People
vs. Dadao, et.al., G.R. No. 201860, January 22, 2014 (Justice De Castro).
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION - To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the

prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: (a) the time when the
offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung
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to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the
execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act (People vs.
Sabangan, G.R. No. 191722, December 11, 2013, Justice De Castro). The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and
reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient
to arrive at a calm judgment (People vs. Alinao, GR No. 191256, September 18, 2013).
Accused told witness that they were “going to kill the doctor”. After less than thirty
minutes, the accused killed the victim, who is a doctor. Evident premeditation should not be
appreciated. The span of time (less than thirty minutes), from the time the accused showed their
determination to kill the victim up to the time they shot the victim, could not have afforded them
full opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime they
committed (People vs. Patelan, G.R. No. 182918, June 6, 2011).Unlike evident premeditation,
there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be a sufficient period of time to elapse
to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection. Instead, conspiracy arises on the very
moment the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the subject felony (People vs.
Carandang, G.R. No. 175926, July 6, 2011).
DISREGARD OF SEX: Robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of the victim’s age is applied only to crimes against
persons and honor. Moreover, the bare fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute
disregard of sex. For this circumstance to be properly considered, the prosecution must adduce
evidence that in the commission of the crime, the accused had particularly intended to insult or
commit disrespect to the sex of the victim (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 153119, April 13, 2004.
The circumstances of disregard of sex, age or rank should be taken singly or together.
But the circumstance of dwelling should be considered independently from the circumstance of
disregard of age, sex and rank since these circumstances signify different concepts. In the latter,
the disrespect shown by offender pertains to the person of the offended due to her rank, age
and sex. In the former, the disrespect pertains to the dwelling of the offended party due to the
sanctity of privacy which the law accords it. In People vs. Puno, G.R. No. L-33211, June 29,
1981, En Banc - Disregard of rank and dwelling were appreciated independently.
In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating

because in this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing
the sanctity of the offended party's house(People vs. Evangelio, G.R. No. 181902, August 31,
2011).
AID OF ARMED MEN: Aid of armed men or persons affording immunity requires (1) that
the armed men are accomplices who take part in minor capacity, directly or indirectly (People vs.
Lozano, G.R. Nos. 137370-71, September 29, 2003, En Banc) and (2) that the accused availed
himself of their aid or relied upon them when the crime was committed. Thus, this circumstance
should not be appreciated were armed men acted in concert to ensure the commission of the
crime (People vs. Carino, G.R. No. 131117, June 15, 2004). In “aid of armed men,” the men act
as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime under the same
purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-
conspirators (People vs. Enoja, GR No. 204894, March 10, 2014).
CRUELTY: The crime is not aggravated by cruelty simply because the victim sustained
ten stab wounds, three of which were fatal. For cruelty to be considered as an aggravating
circumstance there must be proof that, in inflicting several stab wounds on the victim, the
perpetrator intended to exacerbate the pain and suffering of the victim. The number of wounds
inflicted on the victim is not proof of cruelty (Simangan vs. People, G.R. No. 157984. July 8,
2004).
REPETITION - Differences of recidivism, quasi-recidivism, reiteracion and habitual

delinquency:
(a) Nature of crime – In recidivism, the first crime, and the aggravated second crime are
embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code; In quasi-recidivism, the nature of the first
crime and aggravated second crime is not material. In reiteration, the penalty for the first crime
is equal or greater than that for the aggravated second crime or the penalty for the first two
crimes is lighter than that for the aggravated third crime. In habitual delinquency, the first,
second and third crimes must be a habitual-delinquency crime, and that is, serious or less
serious physical injuries, theft, robbery, estafa or falsification of document.
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(b) Time element – In recidivism, the accused was convicted of the first crime by final
judgment at the time of trial of the second crime. In quasi-recidivism, the accused has been
convicted by final judgment of the first offense but before beginning to serve his sentence or while
servicing of his sentence, he committed the second crime. In reiteration, the accused was
convicted of the first crime (or first two crimes) and served his sentences at the time he was
convicted of the second crime (or third crime). In habitual delinquency, the accused was convicted
of first habitual-delinquency crime; within 10 years after conviction or release, he was found
guilty of habitual-delinquency crime for the second time; within 10 years after conviction or
release he was found guilty of habitual-delinquency crime for the third time or oftener.
(c) Nature of the aggravating circumstance - Recidivism and reiteration are ordinary
aggravating circumstances, the presence of any of which will trigger the application of the penalty
for the second crime committed in its maximum period unless it is off-set by mitigating
circumstance. Quasi-recidivism is special aggravating circumstance, the presence of which will
trigger the application of the penalty for the second crime or third crime in its maximum period
regardless of the presence of mitigating circumstance. Habitual delinquency is an extraordinary
or special aggravating circumstance, the presence of which will trigger the imposition of
additional penalty for the third or subsequent crime. This is not subject to the off-set rule.
ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCE
Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as

aggravating or mitigating according to the nature and effects of the crime and other conditions
attending its commission. Based on a strict interpretation, alternative circumstances are thus
not aggravating circumstances per se. (People vs. Orilla, G.R. Nos. 148939-40, February 13,
2004, En banc).
If the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, this circumstance may
be mitigating or aggravating. If the prosecution claims intoxication as aggravating, it must
establish that the intoxication is habitual or intentional (People vs. Patelan, G.R. No. 182918,
June 6, 2011). Even if the accused could still fully comprehend what is right and what is wrong,
intoxication is aggravating as long as intoxication is habitual or intentional and it boasted the
courage of accused that propelled him to commit the crime. To aggravate the liability of the
accused, it is not necessary that degree of intoxication must have impaired the will power of the
accused (People vs. Ga, G.R. No. 49831, June 27, 1990). If accused claims intoxication as
mitigating, he must establish that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to
commit the crime and that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission
of the crime, as would blur his reason (People vs. Fontillas, G.R. No. 184177, December 15, 2010,
Justice De Castro). Failure of the prosecution or the accused to do so, intoxication is neither
aggravating nor mitigating.
PARTICIPATION
Chief actor - Criminal or chief actor is the person who actually committed the crime. He
is the one who committed or omitted the act, which causes the criminal result. He directly
perpetrated the acts, which constitute the crime. With or without conspiracy, the chief actor is
a principal by direct participation.
Criminal participator - Criminal participator is the offender who participated in

committing a crime by indispensable or dispensable act. He performed an act, which is not
constitutive of felony but intended to give moral or material aid to the chief actor.
(1) With conspiracy - If there is conspiracy, the criminal participator or cooperator is a

principal by direct participation. The act of the chief actor is considered the act of the criminal
participator.
(2) Without conspiracy - If there is no conspiracy, criminal participator may be held liable
as principal by indispensable cooperation, accomplice or accessory depending upon the
nature and time of participation. A criminal participator may participate in the commission
of the crime by previous, simultaneous and/or subsequent acts.
(a) Previous or simultaneous acts – The criminal participator by previous or

simultaneous acts is liable either as principal by indispensable cooperation or
accomplice. If the cooperation is indispensable, the participator is a principal by
indispensable cooperation; if dispensable an accomplice.
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(b) Subsequent acts – The criminal participator by subsequent acts is liable as an
accessory. An accessory does not participate in the criminal design, nor cooperate in the
commission of the felony, but, with knowledge of the commission of the crime, he
subsequently takes part by any of the three modes under Article 19.
The liability of accessory and principal should also be considered as quasi-collective. It

is quasi-collective in the sense that the principal and the accessory are liable for the felony
committed but the penalty for the latter is two degrees lower than that for the former.
ACCOMPLICE AND CONSPIRATOR - In People vs. PO1 Eusebio G.R. No. 182152,
February 25, 2013 - It noted that victim had only three gunshot wounds despite the many shots
fired at him. Since Bongon shot victim thrice at very close range, causing him to fall, it appears
that it was only Bongon who inflicted those wounds. And, considering that the prosecution
evidence did not show that the shots three other accused fired from their guns made their marks,
there is doubts that the three agreed beforehand with Bongon to kill victim. It cannot rule out
the possibility that they fired their guns merely to scare off outside interference.
Because witnesses are rarely present when several accused come to an agreement or
conspired to commit a crime, such agreement is usually inferred from their "concerted actions"
while committing it. On the other hand, accomplices are the persons who, not being principals,
cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
The line that separates a conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous
or simultaneous acts is indeed slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be
committed; but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. The solution in
case of doubt is that such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. It was held that
when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in a homicide performed the role of
principal or accomplice, the Court should favor the "milder form of responsibility." He should be
given the benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice. Hence, in the case at
bar, the other three accused should be granted the benefit of doubt and should considered merely
as accomplices.
It is immaterial whether accused acted as a principal or an accomplice. What really

matters is that the conspiracy was proven and he took part in it. Without the participation of
accused, the offense would not have been committed. He was the one who paved the way for
victim to board the vehicle and his closeness with the victim led the latter to trust the former,
thus, accomplishing their devious plan of kidnapping him. Consequently, the conspirators shall
be held equally liable for the crime, because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all (People
vs. Cruz, Jr., GR No. 168446, September 18, 2009).
ACCOMPLICE - In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely, (1) that
there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution
by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the
execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts
done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice (People vs.
Gambao, GR No. 172707, October 01, 2013).
Accused entered the room where the victim was detained and conversed with kidnappers
regarding stories unrelated to the kidnapping. Accused should be held liable as accomplice. The
defenses raised by accused are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal liability.
Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a swimming party, it was
inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of the principals when she saw
victim being guarded in the room. A rational person would have suspected something was wrong
and would have reported such incident to the police. Accused, however, chose to keep quiet; and
to add to that, she even spent the night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present
and giving moral support when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an
accomplice in the crime committed. It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence
and company were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for
ransom; hence, she is only liable as an accomplice. Moreover, in case of doubt, the participation
of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal (People
vs. Gambao, GR No. 172707, October 01, 2013).
X and Y did not participate when the victim was forcibly abducted. However, they owned
the safehouse, the basement of their house, where the kidnapped victim was detained. X assisted
the kidnappers when the victim the basement stairs of the safehouse. Y brought foods to the
safehouse. Are X and Y liable as accomplice or principal by direct participation? They are liable
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as principals because of conspiracy. Their participations are of minor importance. These acts
pertain to those committed by mere accomplices. However, their acts coincide with their
ownership of the safehouse. They provided the place where the victim is to be detained, which is
logically a primary consideration in a conspiracy to commit the crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Ownership of the safehouse and their participations reasonably indicate that they were among
those who at the outset planned, and thereafter concurred with and participated in the execution
of the criminal design (People vs. Salvador, GR No. 201443, April 10, 2013).
FENCING
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or
theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the
commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything
of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the
accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of
one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April 10,
2013).
The essential elements of the crime of fencing under PD No. 1612 are as follows: (1) A
crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) The accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft (or carnapping but not malversation
or estafa), buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and
sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been
derived from the proceeds of the said crime; (3) The accused knows or should have known that
the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and (4) There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself
or for another (Francisco vs. People, G.R. No. 146584, July 12, 2004).
a. Proving robbery or theft – Commission of robbery or theft by the principal as an

element of fencing should be proven beyond reasonable doubt to convict the fencer. One may
not be convicted of the crime of fencing if the complainant did not lodge a criminal complaint
against the principal in the crime of theft. This will create doubt if theft was really committed
(Tan vs. People, G.R. No. 134298, August 26, 1999) Failure to show finality of conviction of theft
against the principal is fatal to prosecution for fencing. In Francisco vs. People, G.R. No. 146584,
July 12, 2004, - The decision of the trial court convicting the principal of theft does not
constitute proof against the accused for the crime of fencing, that the principal had, indeed,
stolen the jewelry. There is no showing that the said decision was already final and executory
when the trial court rendered its decision in the fencing case. Accused was acquitted.
b. Knowledge - In Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012 – But
Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and, therefore, its violation is regarded as malum
prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. Of course, the prosecution must still prove that
accused knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to
complainant was derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of
his acts. Accused knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said
that Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly
could not be true because, the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to
show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on his promise to produce new documents
undoubtedly confirmed to accused that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source. Still,
accused sold the same to complainant who apparently made no effort to check the papers
covering her purchase. That complainant might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment
since she did not stand accused in the case.
Accused was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past 24 years, ] ought to have
known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller. Admittedly, Go
approached accused and offered to sell the 13 tires (which were stolen) and he did not even ask
for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the
delivery of tires happened in just one day. His experience from the business should have given
him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to
transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the 13 tires in the
streets. Accused was convicted of fencing (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April 10, 2013).
Accused knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good,
article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
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thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated
National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before
offering the item for sale to the public. In fact, accused has practiced the procedure of obtaining
clearances from the police station for some used tires he wanted to resell but, in this particular
transaction, he was remiss in his duty as a diligent businessman who should have exercised
prudence (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April 10, 2013).
The issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be
raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. In this case,
the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove
that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. Accused failed to overcome the evidence presented
by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut
the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612 (Ong vs. People, GR No. 190475, April
10, 2013).
c. Presumption: Section 6 of PD No. 1612 provides: “Mere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be
prima facie evidence of fencing.”Possession is not limited to actual manual control of the
offender over the stolen property but extends to power and dominion over it.
Circumstances normally exist to forewarn, for instance, a reasonably vigilant buyer that
the object of the sale may have been derived from the proceeds of robbery or theft. Such
circumstances include the time and place of the sale, both of which may not be in accord with
the usual practices of commerce. The nature and condition of the goods sold, and the fact that
the seller is not regularly engaged in the business of selling goods may likewise suggest the
illegality of their source, and therefore should caution the buyer. This justifies the presumption
found in Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 that “mere possession of any goods, object or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing”.
This presumption is reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the
established fact of possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft (Ong vs. People, GR
No. 190475, April 10, 2013).
The accessory in theft should materially benefit from it. Riding in a stolen vehicle is “not
profiting” within the contemplation of Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code since it does not
improve his economic position. Profiting is not synonymous to intent to gain as an element of
theft (Gregorio). However, in violation of PD No. 1612, use of stolen property gives rise to the
presumption of fencing. Hence, the user may be held liable for fencing even though he did not
materially benefit from crime of theft.
The presumption of theft is disputable. The presumption of fencing may be overcome by

showing proof that accused bought the item from a licensed dealer of second-hand items (Hizon-
Pamintuan vs. People, G.R. No. 11414, July 11, 1994) or by showing official receipts covering
the purchases of property, which is the subject of fencing (D. M Consunji, Inc. vs. Esguerra,
G.R. No. 118590, July 30, 1996).
d. Recently stolen property – If suspect is found in possession of recently stolen

property, he should be charged as principal in the crime of theft or robbery. Under Section 3 (j),
Rule 131, a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of recently wrongful act is
the taker and the doer of the whole act. Settled is the rule that unexplained possession of
recently stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt of the crime of theft ( US vs. Ungal, 37
Phil., 835). If the subject property is not recently stolen, the presumption under Section 3 (j),
Rule 131 will not arise. However, the possessor is still presumed to have violated PD No. 1612
even if the property being possessed was not recently stolen. Under the law, mere possession of
stolen property gives rise to the presumption of fencing.
OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
Obstruction of justice under PD No. 1829 is committed by any person who knowingly or
willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by (1) altering, destroying, suppressing or
concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity,
legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings
in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
(2) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
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a. Commission of crime, not an element - To be held liable as accessory under the
Revised Penal Code, it is required that the crime was committed by the principal. To be held
liable for obstruction of justice, it is not necessary that the crime was committed by a criminal
suspect. Example: “A” committed suicide. To make it appear that “B” murdered “A, “C” placed
the gun used in perpetrating suicide inside the bag of “B”. “C” committed the crime of
obstruction of justice for having obstructed the investigation of a criminal case involving the
death of “A”. “C” cannot be held liable as accessory because murder was not really committed.
b. Knowledge - An accessory under Revised Penal Code must have knowledge of the
commission of the crime by the principal. To commit obstruction of justice, what is important
is not knowledge of the commission of a crime but awareness of an ongoing or impending
investigation and prosecution of a criminal case. In fact, even though the suspect did not commit
a crime, obstruction of justice is committed if he knowingly obstructs, impedes, or frustrates
the said investigation and prosecution.
c. Obstructing criminal investigation or prosecution - Public officer, who destroyed

dangerous drugs as evidence for monetary consideration, is liable for obstruction of justice in
addition to graft and corruption and direct bribery (2005 Bar Exam)
If a respondent in a preliminary investigation altered the allegation in the complaint-

affidavit as to the date of criminal incident to make it appear that the crime, with which he was
charged, had prescribed, the alteration is constitutive of the crime of falsification of document
under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and obstruction of justice under PD No. 1829.
d. Principal of the crime - “A” and “B” killed “X”. After the slaughter, “A” and “B” burned
the dead body of “X” in the forest to prevent its discovery. Can “A” and “B” be charged as
accessory of the crime to murder or obstruction of justice? “A” and “B” are principals by direct
participation in the crime of murder qualified by employment of means to afford impunity.
Hence, they cannot be charged as accessories. Under the Revised Penal Code, accessories must
not have participated in the commission of the crime as principals. However, in addition to
murder, they can be charged with the crime of obstruction of justice for destroying an object to
impair its availability as evidence in a case. Under PD No. 1829, it is not required that the
offenders must not have participated as principals.
e. Suspicion - An accessory under Article 19 (3) of the Revised Penal Code must have
knowledge of the commission of the crime by the principal. Entertaining suspicion is not itself
proof of knowledge that a crime has been committed. “Knowledge” and “suspicion” are not
synonymous. The word suspicion is defined as being the imagination of the existence of
something without proof, or upon very slight evidence or upon no evidence at all (Reyes). On the
other hand, the offender may violate Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829 even though he has no
knowledge of the commission of the crime as long as he has reasonable ground to believe or
suspects that the person he assisted has committed a crime. In some, mere suspicion is enough
to establish the second element of the offense.
d. Preventing an illegal arrest – Harboring or concealing a criminal suspect in order to

prevent a lawful warrantless arrest or the implementation of a warrant of arrest constitutes
obstruction of justice. However, harboring or concealing a criminal suspect to prevent an illegal
arrest is not a crime. The term “arrest” in Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829 contemplates a lawful
arrest (Posadas vs. the Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 131492, September 29, 2000)
e. Accessory – To make a person liable as accessory under the Revised Penal Code, it is
required that he is a public officer, who acted with abuse of his public functions, or that the
person assisted is guilty as principal in treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the
life of the Chief Executive or a principal, who is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime. This requirement is not applicable if the accused is charged with obstruction of justice.
f. No exempting circumstance - Accessories are exempt from criminal liability if the

principal merely committed a light felony (Article 16 of the Revised Penal Code). Accessories of
the second or third kind are exempt also from criminal responsibility if they are related to the
criminal actor (Article 20 of the Code). However, if the accessories of the crime were charged
with the crime of obstruction of justice, they cannot claim criminal exemption under the Revised
Penal Code. PD No. 1829 has no provision on criminal exemption.
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Article 29 of RPC
RA NO. 10592 and its implementing rules
1. Preventive imprisonment – Under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592

and its implementing rules and regulations, an accused who has undergone preventive
imprisonment shall be credited, either full or four-fifths (4/5) term, for his actual detention or
service of his sentence, provided he is not disqualified.
Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
deducted from thirty (30) years.
a. No credit by reason of disqualification – The grant of credit of preventive

imprisonment shall not apply to the following:
a. An accused who is recidivist;

b. An accused who has been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
c. An accused who, upon being summoned for the execution of his sentence, has failed
to surrender voluntarily before a court of law.
b. Full time credit - An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment shall be
credited with the full time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if;
a. He agrees voluntarily, in writing, to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners; and
b. Such undertaking is executed with the assistance of the counsel.
The undertaking is called detainee’s manifestation, which is defined as a written

declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating his refusal to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a convicted prisoner for the purpose of availing the
full credit of the period of his preventive imprisonment
c. 4/5 time credit - An accused who has undergone preventive imprisonment and who
does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon prisoners convicted by final
judgment shall be credited by the service of his sentence with four-fifths (4/5) of the time during
which he has undergone preventive imprisonment if;
a. He shall do in writing
b. With the assistance of counsel.
In sum, the detainee must execute a written waiver, which is called detainee’s waiver
defined as a written declaration of a detained prisoner, with the assistant of a counsel, stating
his refusal to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon a prisoner convicted by final
judgment and thus be entitled to a credit of four-fifths (4/5) of the time during preventive
imprisonment.
d. Full time credit for child in conflict with the law - If the offender is a child, the
applicable rule for crediting the period of commitment and detention is not Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code but Section 41, RA 9344. Under the said provision, the full time spent in
actual commitment and detention of juvenile delinquent shall be credited in the services of his
sentence.
2. Immediate release – Under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592, whenever

an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the imposable
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is
not yet decided, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the
trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review, except for the following:
1) Recidivist
2) Habitual Delinquent
3) Escapee
4) Person charged with heinous crimes
If the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
released after thirty (30) days of imprisonment.
The computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release shall be

the actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance; provided, however, that if the
accused is absent without motu propio order the re-arrest of the accused.
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3. Good conduct time allowance (GCTA) – Before, only prisoner service sentence is
entitled to allowance for good conduct. However, under Article 94 of RPC as amended by RA
10592, the following shall be entitled to good conduct time allowance:
a. A detention prisoner qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment for his good
conduct and exemplary behaviour; and
b. A prisoner convicted by the final judgment in any penal institution, rehabilitation or

detention center or any other local jail for his good conduct and exemplary behaviour.
The good conduct time allowances under Article 97 as amended are as follows:
First 2 years of imprisonment – 20 days for each month of good behavior

3rd to 5th year – 23 days for each month of good behavior
6th to 10th year – 25 days for each month of good behavior
11th year and successive years – 30 days for each month of good behavior
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances
for good conduct.
4. Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring (TASTM) - A prisoner is also
entitled to Time Allowance for Study, Teaching and Mentoring, which is privilege granted to a
prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, as a reward for having earned a post
post-graduate degree or collage degree, a certificate of completion of a vocational or technical
skills or values development course, a high school or elementary diploma or to one serving his
fellow prisoner as a teacher or mentor while incarcerated, equivalent to a deduction of a
maximum of fifteen (15) days for every month of study or mentoring services
5. Special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) - Special time allowance for loyalty is a
privilege granted to a prisoner, whether detained or convicted by final judgment, who has evaded
preventive imprisonment or service of sentence during said calamity, and surrendered to the
authorities within forty-eight (48) hours following the proclamation announcing the passing away
of the calamity and the catastrophe referred to in the said article in the form of the deduction of
one fifth (1/5) from his preventive imprisonment or service of sentence or a deduction of two fifth
(2/5) if prisoner opted to stay in jail or prison during the calamity.
However, prisoner is not entitled to special time allowance for loyalty if he has committed
other offense or any act in violation of the law.
In case of disorder in the penal institution resulting from a conflagration, earthquake,

explosion, or similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in which the prisoner has not participated,
the prisoner, entitled to special time allowance for loyalty (STAL) or liable for evasion of sentence.
a. No evasion - In case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement
notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe, he is entitled to deduction of two-
fifths (2/5) of the period of his sentence. This a new rule introduced by RA No. 10592.
Article 98 under the original version does not grant special allowance for loyalty to
prisoner who did not escape despite the existence of calamity (Losada vs. Acenas, GR NO. L-
810, March 31, 1947; Fortuno vs. Director of Prisons, GR NO. L-1782, February 2, 1948). RA
No. 10529 sought to correct this rule since a prisoner who did not escape despite of the calamity
manifests a higher degree of loyalty to the penal system than those who evaded their sentence
but thereafter gives themselves up upon the passing away of the calamity.
b. Evasion – In case the prisoner chose to evade evaded his preventive imprisonment or
the service of his sentence during the calamity and the President issued a proclamation by the
President announcing the passing away of such calamity, he has to options:
1. He may give himself up to the authorities within forty-eight hours following the
issuance of a proclamation by the President announcing the passing away of such calamity. In
such case, he is entitled to one fifth (1/5) special time allowance for loyalty under Article 98; or
2. He may not give himself up to the authorities within said period of forty-eight hours.
In such case, he is liable for evasion of sentence under Article 158. The penalty for evasion under
Article 158 is equivalent to one-fifth of the time still remaining to be served under the original
sentence, which in no case shall exceed six months.
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Prisoner is entitled to special time allowance for loyalty whether he is a convicted or
detention prisoner. Article 98 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592 provides "This Article shall
apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence." Special
allowance is given to prisoner, who evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his
sentence during calamity but give himself up within the required period.
However, a detention prisoner is not liable for evasion of sentence under Article 158 of
RPC if he fails to give himself up within forty-eight hours following the announcement of the
passing away of such calamity. RA No. 10592 amended Article 98 to extend the benefit of a
special allowance to preventive prisoner but the amendment does not include Article 158. The
crime of evasion under Article 158 is committed only by a convict, who shall evade the service of
his sentence during calamity and fail to give himself up within the period.
PENALTY
In De Castro vs. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015, the court should prescribe
the correct penalties in complex crimes in strict observance of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. In estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the court should impose the
penalty for the graver offense in the maximum period. Otherwise, the penalty prescribed is
invalid, and will not attain finality.
RECLUSION PERPETUA AND LIFE IMPRISONMENT
If the law was amended to change the penalty from life imprisonment to reclusion
perpetua, the amendatory law, being more lenient to the accused than the previous law, should
be accorded retroactive application. The penalty of reclusion perpetua is a lighter penalty than
life imprisonment. (People vs. Pang, G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011).
ISLAW
RA 9165 provides that illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of shabu is penalized
with imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. The court sentenced the accused to suffer
a straight penalty of imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day. Is the penalty imposed by the court
correct? No. The indeterminate Sentence Law mandates that, in case of a special law, the accused
shall be sentenced "to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same." (Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011)
SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE: Under Article 64 (5), the presence of two or

more mitigating circumstances will graduate the “divisible penalty prescribed by law” to one
degree lower. This is called special mitigating circumstance. However, the appreciation of this
circumstance is subject to two conditions: (1) the penalty prescribed by law must be divisible;
and (2) there must be no aggravating circumstance. In People vs. Takbobo, G.R. No. No. 102984,
June 30, 1993 - Accused was found guilty of parricide punishable by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death. Applying Article 63, when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties,
the penalty cannot be lowered by one degree, no matter how many mitigating circumstances are
present. The rule on special mitigating circumstance is found in Article 64 (5) which provides
the "rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods," meaning, divisible
penalties. Article 64 (5) is inapplicable. Thus, the rule applicable in said case is found in Article
63, and not in Article 64.
If there are two mitigating circumstances, the penalty prescribed law shall graduated to
one degree lower, and the graduated penalty shall be applied in it medium period. If there are
three mitigating circumstances taken as special mitigating, the penalty prescribed law shall
graduated to one degree lower, and the graduated penalty shall be applied in it minimum period.
Reason: The two mitigating circumstances were taken to constitute special mitigating
circumstance; while the remaining mitigating circumstance was used to apply the graduated
penalty in its minimum period.
GRADUATING DEATH PENALTY - For purposes of graduating penalty, the penalty of

death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. RA No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of
death penalty, does not exclude death penalty in the order of graduation of penalties. In qualified
rape, the penalty for accomplice is reclusion perpetua, the penalty next lower in degree than
death prescribed for the crime (See: People vs. Jacinto, G.R. No. 182239, March 16, 2011).
SUPPLETORY APPLICATION - A special law prescribes the penalty of 10 years of

imprisonment for violation thereof while another law prescribes the penalty of arresto mayor.
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Can the rules on graduation of penalties or application of penalty on its proper imposable period
under RPC applicable to violation of these special laws?(a) Where the special law has not adopted
the Spanish penalties (10 years of imprisonment) under RPC, rules on graduation of penalties or
application of penalty on its proper imposable period is not applicable. Article 10 of RPC on
suppletory effects of the Code cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility
of such supplementary application (People vs. Mantalba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011). The
penalty of 10 years of imprisonment can neither be graduated by decrees nor divided into three
periods. (b) Where the special law has adopted the Spanish penalty (arresto mayor) under RPC,
rules on graduation of penalties or application of penalty on its proper imposable period are
applicable. Where the penalty under a special law is actually taken from the Revised Penal Code
in its technical nomenclature, the penal system under the Code is necessarily applicable to this
law (See: People vs. Mantalba, supra). This adoption reveals the statutory intent to give the
provisions on penalties for felonies under RPC the corresponding application to said special law,
in the absence of any express or implicit proscription in these special laws (See: People vs. Simon,
G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994).
SUBSIDIARY PENALTY UNDER RA No. 10159
Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA No. 10159 provides: If the convict
has no property with which to meet the fine mentioned in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article, he shall be subject to a subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each amount
equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of
the rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court, subject to the following rules:
1. If the principal penalty imposed be prision correctional or arresto and fine, he shall
remain under confinement until his fine referred in the preceding paragraph is satisfied, but his
subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case
shall it continue for more than one year, and no fraction or part of a day shall be counted against
the prisoner.
2. When the principal penalty imposed be only a fine, the subsidiary imprisonment shall
not exceed six months, if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony,
and shall not exceed fifteen days, if for a fight felony.
3. When the principal penalty imposed is higher than prision correctional, no subsidiary
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the culprit.
4. If the principal penalty imposed is not to be executed by confinement in a penal

institution, but such penalty is of fixed duration, the convict, during the period of time
established in the preceding rules, shall continue to suffer the same deprivations as those of
which the principal penalty consists.
5. The subsidiary personal liability which the convict may have suffered by reason of his
insolvency shall not relieve him from the fine in case his financial circumstances should improve.
Special law - In Escalante vs. People, G.R. No. 192727, January 9, 2013 - The penalty
for election offense is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years. Under
ISLAW, if the offense is punished by special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by
said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same.
Applying the ISLAW, the imposable penalty for violation of the election gun ban should have a
maximum period, which shall not exceed six (6) years, and a minimum period which shall not
be less than one (1) year.
THREE-FOLD AND 40 YEARS LIMITATION RULE
Simultaneous service - When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve
them simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Thus, convict could serve
simultaneously arresto mayor and fine, prision correccional and perpetual absolute
disqualification, or reclusion perpetua and civil interdiction. In sum, while lingering in prison,
convict could pay fine, return the property confiscated, be disallowed to cast his vote or to act
function as a public officer. In Rodriguez vs. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-35386, September
28, 1972, En Banc - Penalties which could be served simultaneously with other penalties, are
perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual or temporary special disqualification,
public censure, suspension from public office and other accessory penalties. There are only two
modes of serving two or more (multiple) penalties: simultaneously or successively. Successive
service – When the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he shall serve them successively if
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the nature of the penalties will not permit simultaneous service. Convict must serve multiple
penalties successively: (1) where the penalties to be served are destierro and imprisonment; and
(2) where the penalties to be served are imprisonment. However, the successive service of
sentences is subject to the three-fold rule and 40-year limitation rule.
a. Three-fold rule - The maximum period of the imprisonment that convict must suffer
in serving multiple penalties must not exceed threefold the length of time corresponding to the
most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. “A” was sentenced to suffer penalty of 7 years
of prision mayor for serious physical injuries, 6 years of prision correccional for qualified less
serious physical injuries, 5 years of prision correccional for robbery and 5 years of prison
correccional for theft. The total duration of the penalties imposed on him is 23 years. The most
severe penalty imposed on him is 7 years of prision mayor. Thus, threefold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties is 21 years. “A” will be imprisoned for 21 years
because of the three-fold rule.
b. Forty-year limitation rule – The maximum period of the imprisonment that convict
must suffer in serving multiple penalties must not exceed forty years. “A” was sentenced to
suffer three penalties of 15 years of reclusion temporal for three counts of homicide and the
penalty of 10 years of prision mayor for serious physical injuries. The total duration of the
penalties imposed on him is 55 years. The most severe penalty imposed on him, is 15 years of
reclusion temporal. Thus, threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties is 45 years. “A” will be imprisoned for 40 years because of the forty year limitation
rule.
Article 70 provides that “the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be
more than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed
upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of
those imposed equals the said maximum period. Such maximum period shall in no case exceed
forty years.” Applying said rule, despite the four penalties of reclusion perpetua for four counts
of qualified theft, accused-appellant shall suffer imprisonment for a period not exceeding 40
years (People vs. Mirto, G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011).
In Mejorada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-51065-72, June 30, 1987, En Banc - This
article is to be taken into account not in the imposition of the penalty but in connection with the
service of the sentence imposed. Article 70 speaks of "service" of sentence”. Nowhere in the article
is anything mentioned about the "imposition of penalty". It merely provides that the prisoner
cannot be made to serve more than three times the most severe of these penalties the maximum
of which is forty years.
SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME
KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE
Old rule: (1) Where the accused kidnapped the victim for the purpose of killing him, and
he was in fact killed by his abductor, the crime committed was the complex crime of kidnapping
with murder as the kidnapping of the victim was a necessary means of committing the murder.
(2) Where the victim was kidnapped not for the purpose of killing him but was subsequently slain
as an afterthought, two (2) separate crimes of kidnapping and murder were committed. Present
rule: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether
the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished
as a special complex crime (People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998, En Banc,
People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75, February 3, 2004, En Banc; People vs. Montanir, GR No.
187534, April 04, 2011; People vs. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014)
However, where there is no actual detention (People vs. Masilang, 1986) or intent to
deprive liberty (People vs. Estacio Jr., G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009, En Banc) killing the
person is murder. Demand for ransom will not convert the crime into kidnapping.
If kidnapping is a necessary means to commit frustrated murder, special complex crime

of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated homicide. Homicide as a component
of special complex crime must be at the consummated stage. In this situation, the crime
committed is complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder
(See: People vs. Roxas, GR No. 172604, August 17, 2010)
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RAPE WITH HOMICIDE
Raping a dying victim – Stabbing the victim and raping her while she was dying is not
a special complex crime of rape with homicide because the original design of the victim is kill
and not to rape the victim. These are not separate crimes of murder and rape since the bestiality
at the threshhold of death of the victim shall be regarded either as a form of ignominy causing
disgrace or as a form of cruelty which aggravated the murder because it was unnecessary to the
commission thereof (People vs. Laspardas, G.R. No. L-46146, Oct. 23, 1979). Hitting the victim
thrice with a piece of wood and inserting toothbrush into the anal orifice while the victim was
dying is not special complex crime of rape through sexual assault with homicide because the
original design of the victim is kill and not to sexually assault the victim. These are not separate
crimes of murder and rape through sexual assault since the bestiality at the threshhold of death
of the victim shall be regarded as a form of cruelty which aggravated the murder because it was
unnecessary to the commission thereof (People vs. Bernabe, G.R. No. 185726, October 16, 2009,
Justice De Castro)
Homicide - In the special complex crime of rape with homicide, the term "homicide" is
to be understood in its generic sense, and includes murder and slight physical injuries
committed by reason or on occasion of the rape. Hence, even if the circumstances of treachery,
abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation are alleged in the information and duly
established by the prosecution, the same would not qualify the killing to murder and the crime
committed is still rape with homicide. However, these circumstances shall be regarded as
ordinary aggravating (People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011).
By reason or on occasion of rape - The phrase “by reason of the rape” obviously conveys
the notion that the killing is due to the rape, which is the crime the offender originally designed
to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim of the killing. The indivisibility of the homicide
and the rape (attempted or consummated) is clear and admits of no doubt. In contrast, the import
of the phrase on the occasion of the rape may not be as easy to determine. The phrase “on the
occasion of the rape” as shown by Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs
immediately before or after, or during the commission itself of the attempted or consummated
rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim herself for as
long as the killing is linked to the rape, became evident (People vs. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926,
April 11, 2012).
“A” and “B” were walking along the rice paddies when “X” suddenly assaulted them with
a lead pipe. “X” killed “A”, and thereafter, raped “B”. “X” is liable for special complex crime of
rape with homicide. There is no doubt that “X” killed “A” to prevent her from aiding “B” or calling
for help once she is able to run away, and also to silence her completely so she may not witness
the rape of “B”, the original intent of “X” (People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011).
Stabbing after the rape - In People vs. Isla, G.R. No. 199875, November 21, 2012 - With
respect to the stabbings, it appears that Isla committed two acts. The first was while he was
ravishing AAA. The Court considers this and the rape as one continuous act, the stabbing being
necessary, as far as he was concerned, for the successful perpetration of the crime. When he
testified, Isla claimed that he had to use the knife so he could have sexual intercourse with her.
The second stabbing took place after consummation of the rape act. According to AAA, after her
defilement, she noticed the knife bloodied and she tried to wrest it from him. In their struggle,
she was stabbed under her lower left breast but she was able to force Isla to drop the knife. This
second stabbing is a separate and distinct offense as it was not a necessary means to commit
the rape. It was intended to do away with her life.
COMPLEX CRIME
There are two kinds of complex crimes. The first is known as compound crime, or when
a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies. The second is known as complex
crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other (People vs.
Rebucan, G.R. No. 182551, July 27, 2011).The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the
Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by
imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale being, that the
accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity
than when the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions (People
vs. Gaffud, Jr., G.R. No. 168050, September 19, 2008)
COMPLEX CRIME AND COMPOSITE CRIME - A composite crime, also known as a

special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes that the law treats as a
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single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of a single criminal impulse. It is a
specific crime with a specific penalty provided by law. The distinctions between a composite
crime, on the one hand, and a complex or compound crime under Article 48 are as follows: (1)
In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law; In a complex or compound
crime, the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less
grave, or one offense being the necessary means to commit the other; (2) For a composite crime,
the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific; for a complex or compound crime,
the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the maximum
period; and (3) A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed; a light felony that
accompanies the commission of a complex or compound crime may be the subject of a separate
information (People vs. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926, April 11, 2012).
COMPOUND CRIME
The single act of pitching or rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium which
resulted in the death of one victim and injuries to other victims constituted a compound crime
of multiple murders qualified by means of explosion (People vs. Mores, GR No. 189846, June 26,
2013, Justice De Castro). The single act of running over the victims with a van constitutes
compound crime of multiple murders (People vs. Punzalan, Jr., G.R. No. 199892, December 10,
2012 (Justice De Castro)
X was charged with complex crime with murder and attempted murder. The information
alleges that the accused shot the victim, but it does not allege that he did so several times.
However, the evidence show that accused shot her and her father several times. Can X be
convicted of separate crimes of murder and attempted murder or complex crime? Answer: On
the basis of evidence, X committed separate crimes of murder and attempted murder. Several
shootings rule out the application of the concept of complex crime. However, evidence does not
conform to the Information, which contains no allegation accused shot the victims several times.
In the absence of a clear statement of several shootings in the Information, the accused may be
convicted only of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder. After all, the concept of
complex crimes is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the
number of crimes committed. Information merely states that accused shot the victims. This is a
compound crime since murder and attempted murder was produced by a single act of shooting.
To rule that the accused should be convicted of two separate offenses of murder and attempted
murder pursuant to the evidence presented but contrary to the allegations in the Information is
to violate the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him (People vs. Bernardo, GR No. 198789, June 03, 2013).
Single act rule - If there is more than one death resulting from different acts there is no
compound crime of multiple homicides or murder. Article 48 speaks of a “single act”. In People
vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975 - Twin brothers, who ran amok like
“juramentados” in a passenger train, and killed their eight co-passengers, were held liable for
eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. The conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and
community of design. The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means
of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code, which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more
grave felonies, of, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
In People vs. Punzalan G .R. No. 199892, December 1, 2001 - Appellant was animated by
a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a single act of stepping on the
accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road ramming through the navy personnel, causing
the death of two persons and, at the same time, constituting an attempt to kill others. The crime
committed is complex crime of multiple murders and attempted murder.
Single criminal impulse – Several acts committed by several offenders with one criminal
impulse resulting in several deaths constitute one crime: the compound crime of multiple homicides
or murders. In People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30, 1955 - Members of the Home Guard, upon
order of their leader, Lawas, simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. After a
short time, the firing stopped immediately when Lawas ordered his men to “cease fire”. As a
result of the firing, fifty (50) persons died. It was held that the evidence positively shows that the
killing was the result of a single impulse, which was induced by the order of the leader to fire,
and continued with the intention to comply therewith, as the firing stopped as soon as the leader
gave the order to that effect. There was no intent on the part of the accused either to fire at each
and every of the victims as separately and distinctly from each other. If the act or acts complained
of resulted from a single criminal impulse, it constitutes a single offense - compound crime of
multiple homicides.
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Under the Lawas principle, if accused fired their guns killing several victims pursuant to
a single impulse, they shall be held liable for continued crime of murder. The Lawas principle
should only be applied in a case where (1) there is no conspiracy (People vs. Hon. Pineda, G.R.
No. L-26222, July 21, 1967) and (2) it is impossible to ascertain the number of deaths caused
by each accused (People vs. Tabaco, G.R. No. 100382-100385, March 19, 1997). In conspiracy,
each conspirator is not only liable for deaths attributable to him but also for deaths caused by
others because in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all. Thus, the Lawas doctrine should not
be applied if there is conspiracy since the number of victims actually killed by each conspirator
is not anymore material if there is conspiracy (People vs. Elarcosa, G.R. No. 186539, June 29,
2010).
In People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012 - Significantly, there was no
conspiracy in Lawas case. However, the Lawas doctrine is more of an exception than the general
rule. With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants had assumed joint criminal
responsibility ─ the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who among them actually
hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Collective
responsibility replaced individual responsibility. The Lawas doctrine, premised on the
impossibility of determining who killed whom, cannot be applied.
In Lawas, this Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of RPC because of the
impossibility of ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was
not proven therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each
accused could not be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing
the number of persons actually killed by each of them.
In conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. It is as though each one performed the act
of each one of the conspirators. Each one is criminally responsible for each one of the deaths
and injuries of the several victims. The severalty of the acts prevents the application of Article
48. The applicability of Article 48 depends upon the singularity of the act, thus the definitional
phrase "a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies." To apply the first half
of Article 48, there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not
written into the law.
Single purpose rule - In People vs. Abella, 93 SCRA 25, the “Lawas principle” was applied
despite the presence of conspiracy. In the said case, sixteen prisoners, who are members of the
OXO gang, were able to break into the cell of Sigue-Sigue gang and killed fourteen (14) inmates.
All accused were convicted for a compound crime. It was held: Where a conspiracy animates
several persons with a single purpose, their individual acts done in pursuance of that purpose
are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving rise to a complex offense. Various
acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a single complex offense. Basis - The
“single purpose rule” was actually adopted in consideration of the plight of the prisoners.
Requisites -There are two requisites to apply the Abella principle: (1) there must be a conspiracy,
which animates several persons to commit crimes under a single criminal purpose; and (2) the
offenders committed crimes in prison against their fellow prisoners (People vs. Pincalin, et al.,
G.R. No. L-38755, January 22, 1981).
In People vs. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500. September 11, 2012 - The application of the
Abella doctrine, has already been clarified in Pincalin, thus: where several killings on the same
occasion were perpetrated, but not involving prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to
say, the killings would be treated as separate offenses. If the killings did not involve prisoners or
it was not a case of prisoners killing fellow prisoners, Abella would not apply.
COMPLEX CRIME PROPER - In U.S. vs. Hernandez, 29 Phil. 109, accused Hernandez,
who seduced a 15-year-old girl to live with him by procuring the performance of a fictitious
marriage ceremony with the help of Bautista, who pretended to be a Protestant minister, was
held liable for the complex crime proper of simple seduction (Art. 338) through usurpation of
official function (Art. 177). Usurping the function of a priest to solemnize marriage is a necessary
means to seduce a minor. Comment: The case of Hernandez was decided prior to the effectivity
of the RPC. At that time, a religious official such as a bishop is a person in authority within the
purview of the Old Penal Code (Smith, G.R. No. 14057, January 22, 1919). However, Article 152
of RPC does not include religious minister as a person in authority. Hence, performing the
function of religious minister in solemnizing marriage is not usurpation of official function.
DOCTRINE OF ABSORPTION - What is the effect of the elimination of the overt acts of
violence in Article 135 by RA No. 9668? In People vs. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-6025, July 18, 1956
– The Supreme Court justified the doctrine of absorption in rebellion since murder, robbery,
and arson are just a part of the “engaging in war against the forces of the government",
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"committing serious violence", and “destroying property in Article 135. However, RA No. 6968
eliminated the phrases "engaging in war against the forces of the government", "committing
serious violence" and “destroying property” in Article 135. According to Florenz Regalado, the
amendment of Article 135 does not affect the accepted concept of rebellion and these “overt acts
of violence” are deemed “subsumed” in the provision on rebellion in Article 134. Under this
principle of subsumption, engaging in combat against the forces of the Government, destroying
property or committing serious violence is an essential ingredient of rebellion.
If the accused committed robbery, but thereafter, they detained the victims to forestall
their capture by the police, the crime committed is robbery only. Robbery absorbs kidnapping
and serious illegal detention. The detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery,
and although in the course thereof women and children were also held, that threats to kill were
made, the act should not be considered as a separate offense (People vs. Astor, G.R. Nos. L-
71765-66, 29 April 1987). If the accused committed robbery, but thereafter, they detained the
victims to demand additional money, and later forestall their capture by the police, the crime
committed is complex crime of robbery through kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The
detention was availed of as a means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. The detention
was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape, but deliberate as a
means of extortion for an additional amount. Hence, the Astor principle is not applicable (People
vs. Salvilla, G.R. No. 86163 April 26, 1990). If the accused committed robbery by band, but
thereafter, they took one of the victims and detained him for seven days in another place for
purpose of demanding ransom, they are liable of separate crimes of robbery by band and
kidnapping for ransom (People vs. Basao, G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012, Justice De
Castro).
ABDUCTION AND MULTIPLE RAPES
Main objective is to rape – If the main objective of the accused is to rape the victim, the
crime committed is rape. Forcible abduction (People vs. Mejoraday, G.R. No. 102705, July 30,
1993; People vs. Almanzor, G.R. No. 124916, July 11, 2002) or illegal detention (People vs.
Nuguid, G.R. No. 148991, January 21, 2004), which is incidental to the commission of rape, is
absorbed. The doctrine of absorption rather than Article 48 of RPC is applicable since forcible
abduction or illegal detention is an indispensable means to commit rape.
Abduction with lewd design – If forcible abduction is a necessary means to commit rape,
this is a complex crime proper under Article 48 of RPC. However, multiple rapes were committed,
forcible abduction will be considered as a necessary means to commit the first rape but not the
subsequent rape. Hence, with respect to the first rape, the crime committed is rape though
forcible abduction while the subsequent rapes will be treated as separate crimes (People vs. Jose,
G.R. No. L-28232, February 6, 1971; People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002,
En Banc; People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
As a rule, forcible abduction is an indispensable means to commit rape; hence, the latter
absorbs the former. However, if the victim was brought in a house or motel or in a place with
considerable distance from the place where she was abducted, forcible abduction will be
considered as a necessary means to commit rape; hence, the crime committed is complex crime
proper.
Abduction to deprive liberty – If the accused abducted the victim without clear showing
of lewd design, the crime committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention since it will
appear that the intention of the accused is to deprive victim of his liberty. If as a consequence of
illegal detention, the victim was rape, the crime committed is a special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. This is the crime committed regardless of the
number of rapes. Multiple rapes will be considered as a component of this special complex crime
(People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011; People vs. Anticamaray, G.R. No.
178771, June 8, 2011). If as a consequence of illegal detention, the victim was rape and then
killed, the crime committed is a special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
with homicide and rape. Both the homicide and rape will be considered as a component of this
special complex crime (People vs. Larranaga, 138874-75, February 3, 2004, En Banc).
The difference between rape through forcible abduction and kidnapping with rape lies on
the criminal intention of the accused at the precise moment of abduction. If the abduction is
committed with lewd design, the crime committed is rape through forcible abduction. On the
other hand, if the abduction is committed without lewd design, the crime committed is
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape (People vs. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417,
July 27, 2011). Even if the victim was detained for one week and in the course thereof, she was
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rape, the crime committed is rape through forcible abduction if the abduction is committed with
lewd design (People vs. Amaro, G.R. No. 199100, July 18, 2014).
MULTIPLE KIDDNAPPINGS - In People v Tadah, G.R. No. 186226, February 1, 2012 -

Since the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused conspired to
kidnap the 5 victims for ransom, and kidnapped and illegally detained them until they were
released by the accused after the latter received the P2,000,000.00 ransom xxx Appellant Yusop
Tadah is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 5 counts of kidnapping.
DELICTO CONTINUADO
In order that continuous crime may exist, there should be: (1) plurality of acts performed
separately during a period of time; (2) unity of criminal intent and purpose and (3) unity of penal
provision infringed upon or violated (Santiago vs. Garchitorena , GR NO. 109266, December 2,
1993).
a. Single criminal impulse to steal - In People vs. Tumlos, G.R. No. 46428, April 13,
1939, En Banc - The theft of the thirteen cows owned by six owners involved thirteen (13) acts
of taking. However, the acts of taking took place at the same time and in the same place;
consequently, accused performed but one act. The intention was likewise one, namely, to take
for the purpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen cows which he found grazing in the same
place. The fact that eight of said cows pertained to one owner and five to another does not make
him criminally liable for as many crimes as there are owners, for the reason that in such case
neither the intention nor the criminal act is susceptible of division.
b. Single criminal impulse to commit robbery - In People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-
1745, May 23, 1950, it was held that ransacking several houses located within the vicinity of a
sugar mill while two of the bandits guarded the victims with guns leveled at them is a continued
crime of robbery. Several acts of robbery were made pursuant to general plan to despoil all those
in the said place, which is an indicative of a single criminal design.
Accused intended only to rob one place; and that is the Energex gasoline station. That
they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the employees
working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances are the series of acts
which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful
act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force,
however long a time it may occupy. The perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and
unconnected from one another. Thus, there is only single offense or crime (People vs. De Leon,
GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
c. Single criminal impulse to satisfy lust - In People vs. Aaron, G.R. NOS. 136300-
02, September 24, 2002 - The accused inserted his penis into the victim’s vagina; he then
withdrew it and ordered the latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he inserted
again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the
victim to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the third time, he inserted again
his penis into the victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions. Accused is convicted
of only one count of rape. Accused thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part
of victim. However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of rape in which
the accused obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. Accused decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault merely because of his lustful desire to change
positions inside the room where the crime was committed.
In People vs. Lucena, GR No. 190632, February 26, 2014 - Accused thrice succeeded in
inserting his penis into the private part of victim. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after
the other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the accused would rest after satiating his lust
upon his victim and, after he has regained his strength, he would again rape the victim. When
the accused decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault upon victim,
he was not motivated by a single impulse, but rather by several criminal intents. Hence, his
conviction for three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.
d. Foreknowledge doctrine - In Gamboa vs. CA, G.R. No. L-41054, November 28, 1975
- Accused cannot be held to have entertained continuously the same criminal intent in making
the first abstraction on October 2, 1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the following days
and months until December 30, 1972, for the simple reason that he was not possessed of any
fore-knowledge of any deposit by any customer on any day or occasion and which would pass
on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to misappropriate may arise only when he
comes in possession of the deposits on each business day but not in future, since petitioner
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company operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result, there could be as many acts of
misappropriation as there are times the private respondent abstracted and/or diverted the
deposits to his own personal use and benefit (People vs. Dichupa, G.R. No. L-16943, October
28, 1961).
“X” as punong barangay was angered when he discovered a tap from the main line of the
public water tank. On separate occasions, “X” threatened to kill and crack the skulls of “A”, “B”,
and “C”, who suspected to be responsible for the tapping of water line. There is no continued
crime since the three crimes of grave threat were not committed under a single criminal impulse.
“X’s” intent to threaten “A”, “B”, and “C” with bodily harm arose only when he chanced upon
each of his victims. Moreover, “X” has no foreknowledge that will change upon the second and
third victims at the time he was committing the first threat. Several threats can only be
considered as continued crime if the offender threatened three individuals at the same place
and at the same time (Paera vs. People, G.R. No. 181626, May 30, 2011).
NOVATION
The novation theory may perhaps apply prior to the filing of the criminal information in
court by the state prosecutors because up to that time the original trust relation may be
converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-debtor situation, thereby placing the
complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust. But after the justice authorities have
taken cognizance of the crime and instituted action in court, the offended party may no longer
divest the prosecution of its power to exact the criminal liability, as distinguished from the civil.
The crime being an offense against the state, only the latter can renounce it (Degaños vs. People,
GR No. 162826, October 14, 2013).
It may be observed in this regard that novation is not one of the means recognized by the
Penal Code whereby criminal liability can be extinguished; hence, the role of novation may only
be to either prevent the rise of criminal liability or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original
basic transaction, whether or not it was such that its breach would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise
is resorted to (Degaños vs. People, GR No. 162826, October 14, 2013).
Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may relieve an
offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen here, for the partial payments
and the proposal to pay the balance the accused made during the barangay proceedings were
not at all incompatible with Degaños’ liability under the agency that had already attached. Rather
than converting the agency to sale, therefore, he even thereby confirmed his liability as the sales
agent of the complainants. The acceptance of partial payments, without further change in the
original relation between the complainant and the accused, cannot produce novation. For the
latter to exist, there must be proof of intent to extinguish the original relationship, and such
intent cannot be inferred from the mere acceptance of payments on account of what is totally
due. Much less can it be said that the acceptance of partial satisfaction can effect the nullification
of a criminal liability that is fully matured, and already in the process of enforcement. Thus, this
Court has ruled that the offended party’s acceptance of a promissory note for all or part of the
amount misapplied does not obliterate the criminal offense (Degaños vs. People, GR No. 162826,
October 14, 2013).
DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
Novation can only be used as a defense in a crime where one of its elements is the
existence of contractual relationship between the offender and the victim. Defense of novation is
applicable to estafa through misappropriation because the contractual trust relationship
between the parties can be validly novated or converted by the parties into an ordinary creditor-
debtor situation, thereby placing the complainant in estoppel to insist on the original trust
(People vs. Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February 5, 1964, En Banc). Novation cannot be used as a
defense in case of theft or estafa through falsification of document. In theft case, there was no
contractual relationship or bilateral agreement which can be modified or altered by the parties
(People vs. Tanjutco, G.R. No. L-23924, April 29, 1968, En Banc).In estafa through falsification
of public documents, the liability of the offender cannot be extinguished by mere novation (Milla
vs. People, G.R. No. 188726, January 25, 2012).
In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to
final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
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“the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.”
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused,
if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission: law; contracts; quasi-contracts; quasi-delicts;
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section
1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may
be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this
separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action
and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription
(People vs. Amistoso, GR No. 201447, August 28, 2013)
PRESCRIPTION
The crime of falsification of a public document involving a deed of sale which was
registered with the Registry of Deeds, the rule on constructive notice can be applied in the
construction of Article 91. Hence, the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned
from the time the notarized deed of sale was recorded in the Registry of Deeds (People vs. Reyes,
G.R. No. 74226, July 27, 1989). Constructive notice rule is not applicable to registration of
bigamous marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar. Furthermore, P.D. 1529, which governed
registration of document involving real property, specifically provides the rule on constructive
notice. On the other hand, Act No. 3753 or the Family Code, which governed registration of
marriage do not provide rule on constructive notice (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
109454, June 14, 1994); hence the period of prescription commences to run on the date of
actual discovery of the bigamous marriage.
COMMENCEMENT - As a rule, period of prescription commence to run from the date of

discovery of its commission. However, if the crime is not yet actionable at the time of its
commission, period of prescription will commence to run from the time it becomes actionable. In
false testimony, the crime was committed at the time the accused falsely testified in court.
However, the period of prescription for false testimony commences to run from the date of the
finality of judgment of a case in which the offender testified falsely. Prior to the date of finality,
the crime is not yet actionable (People vs. Maneja, G.R. No. 47684, June 10, 1941).
In violation of BP Blg. 22, the crime is consummated upon the dishonor of the check by
the drawee bank (Bautista vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143375, July 6, 2001). However, the
period of prescription for such crime commences to run from the date of the expiration of the
five-day period from receipt of notice of dishonor by the drawer. Prior to that date, the crime is
not yet actionable since the offender can still avert criminal prosecution by satisfying the
amount of the check or making arrangement for its payment within five day grace period.
Moreover, the running of prescription for crime punishable under special law shall be
interrupted upon filing of complaint with prosecutor office for preliminary investigation. It would
be absurd to consider the prescriptive period for crime under BP Blg. 22 as already running
even prior to the expiration of the grace period despite the fact that the complainant could not
cause its interruption by filing a complaint for preliminary investigation since it is not yet
actionable.
In People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012 - This Court reckons the
commencement of the period of prescription for violations of BP Blg. 22 imputed to accused
sometime in the latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the accused was notified by
the private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the five (5) days grace
period granted by law had elapsed. The private complainant then had, pursuant to Act 3326,
four years there from or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against
the petitioner before the proper court.
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Blameless ignorance doctrine - Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to
run on the day the crime is committed. An exception to this rule is the "blameless ignorance"
doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this doctrine, "the statute of
limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a
cause of action. Considering that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
assail the legality of the transactions involving cronies such as behest loan, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986
(Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013). Hence,
the prescriptive period for violation of RA No. 3019 commenced from the date of its discovery in
1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation (Presidential Ad hoc fact-finding
committee vs. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011)
INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION – Under Act No. 3326, the running of the

prescription of offense punishable under special law shall be interrupted when “judicial
proceedings for investigation and punishment” are instituted against the guilty person. The
proceeding is described as “judicial” since when Act No. 3326 was passed on December 4, 1926,
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace.
Considering that preliminary investigation in criminal case for purposes of prosecution has
become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term “proceedings” should now be
understood either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation
phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. Hence, institution of
proceeding, whether executive or judicial, interrupts the running of prescriptive period
(Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008).
Thus, the commencement of the following proceedings for the prosecution of the accused
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offense charged: (1) Filing of complaint for
violation of BP 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor (Panaguiton vs. Department of Justice,
supra); (2) Filing of complaint for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities with
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC vs. Interport Resources Corporation, G.R. No.
135808, October 6, 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc); and (3) Filing of complaint for violation
of RA No. 3019 with the Office of the Ombudsman (Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-
24 and 174764-65, September 11, 2013)
Exceptions:
1. Violation of ordinance – In Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No. 102342, July 3, 1992 -
The proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are “judicial proceedings” (which does
not include administrative proceedings). Thus, a crime such as violation of ordinance may
prescribe even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or
not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it is too late.
In Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua, Sr., GR No. 169588, Oct. 7, 2013, the
Supreme Court applied the Zaldivia principle to prescription of violation of ordinance. In this
case, what is involved in this case is violation of ordinance of Baguio City, a chartered city.
Accordingly, when the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint before the Provincial
Prosecutor of Baguio, the prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of
the Information. They had two months to file the Information and institute the judicial
proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.
While the case of Pangilinan categorically abandoned the Zaldivia principle, the Supreme
Court in Jadewell case ruled the doctrine of Pangilinan pertains to violations of special laws
but not to ordinances. In sum, if what is involved is prescription of violation of special law,
institution of administrative proceeding for investigation interrupts the prescriptive period.
Zaldivia is not controlling. If what is involved is prescription of violation of ordinance, institution
of judicial proceeding is required to interrupt the running of prescription. Zaldivia case is
controlling.
2. Invalid proceeding – In People vs. Romualdez and Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166510,
April 29, 2009 - The investigatory power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth
cases, absent previous authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and
corruption cases involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary investigation
conducted by the PCGG leading to the filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus
could not be considered as having tolled the fifteen (15)-year prescriptive period for violation of
RA No. 3019. After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by
the PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect.
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MARRIAGE IN RAPE
There are two rules under Article 334 of RPC in connection with marriage as a mode of
criminal extinction. First, in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape,
the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or
remit the penalty already imposed upon him. Second, the provisions of this paragraph shall
also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the
abovementioned crimes.
According to Regalado, since rape is now a crime against person, it should be

considered ad deleted from the text of Article 334. In case of rape, the applicable rule is Article
266-C of RPC as amended by RA 8353. Under this provision, subsequent marriage between
the offender and offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or penalty. It seems that
RA 8353 adopted the first rule in Article 344 of RPC but not the second rule. Hence, marriage
between the offender and offended party will not extinguish the criminal liability of the co-
principal, accomplice or accessory of the crime of rape
PROBATION
Probation distinguished from parole and pardon – (1) Grant of probation is judicial while
that of parole and pardon is executive. (2) Probation and parole are suspension sentence while
pardon is remission of penalty. (3) Offender can only apply for probation within the period of
perfecting an appeal; offender is eligible for pardon after conviction by final judgment; offender
is eligible for parole after serving the minimum of the indeterminate penalty. (4) Offender, who
was sentenced to suffer a penalty of more than 6 years of imprisonment, is disqualified to apply
for probation. Offender, who was sentence to suffer reclusion perpetua or death penalty, is not
qualified for parole. However, the President can pardon offender even if the penalty imposed
upon him is reclusion perpetua or death penalty.
a. Mutual exclusive remedies - Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of
grace and clemency conferred by the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving
defendant. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is
to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit
of the accused (Almero vs. People, GR No. 188191, March 12, 2014).
Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It

essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his
liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of probation.
This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of
his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for probation
as an “escape hatch” thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction
(Almero vs. People, GR No. 188191, March 12, 2014).
Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale
for the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on
diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have
accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of an
accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the
Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments
of conviction – even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal
and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid (Almero vs. People, GR No.
188191, March 12, 2014).
While accused did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity
of the conviction in the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so
doing, he attempted to circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make
appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies (Almero vs. People, GR No. 188191, March
12, 2014).
b. Non-probationable offense - The accused, who was convicted by the lower court of a
non-probationable offense (frustrated homicide), but on appeal was found guilty of a
probationable offense (attempted homicide), may apply for probation upon remand of the case
to the RTC because of the following reasons: (1) The Probation Law never intended to deny an
accused his right to probation through no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation
is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions; (2) If the accused will not be allowed to apply for
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probation, he will be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of
his right to apply for probation; (3) While it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the accused
has the right to apply for that privilege; (4) It is true that under the probation law the accused
who appeals "from the judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the
benefits of probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
accused: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside;
and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court (Colinares vs. People, G.R.
No. 182748, December 13, 2011). The SC reaffirmed the Colinares case in Villareal vs. People,
G.R. No. 151258, December 1, 2014, accused was convicted of homicide, a non-probationable
crime, by the trial court. However, the SC found them liable for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide, which is a probationable crime, because of lack of dolo. They can still apply for
probation.
CRIMES AGAINST FUNDEMENTAL LAW
UNLAWFUL ARREST AND ARBITRARY DETENTION
In unlawful arrest, the private individual or public officer in its private capacity arrests
or detains the victim without reasonable ground or legal authority for purpose of delivering him
to the proper judicial authority. In arbitrary detention, the public officer, who has authority to
make arrest, detains the victim without legal grounds (People vs. Bringas G.R. No. 189093, April
23, 2010) for the purpose of: (1) Delivering him to judicial authority (U.S. us. Gellada, 15 Phil.
120); (2) Conducting criminal investigation (People vs. Oliva, 95 Phil. 962; U.S. vs. Agravante,
G.R. No. 3947, January 28, 1908); or (3) Determining if he committed or is committing a crime
[U.S. vs. Hawchaw, G.R. No. L-6909, February 20, 1912].
Arbitrary detention is a crime against fundamental law of the law or the Constitution. A
public officer, who is vested with the authority to detain or to order the detention of a person
accused of a crime, is acting in behalf of the State in arresting or detaining a person. If such
public officer detained a person in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable
seizure (or not in accordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure), the crime committed is “arbitrary detention.” Unlawful arrest is a crime against
personal liberty and security. A public officer, who is not vested with the authority to detain or
to order the detention of a person (e.g. stenographer, researcher or municipal treasurer), is not
acting in behalf of the State in making a warrantless arrest. Such public officer acting in his
private capacity (or a private individual) could not violate the Constitution (People vs Marti, G.R.
No. 81561, January 18,1991); hence, if he arrests or detains a person not in accordance with
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the crime committed is “unlawful
arrest”. The essence of this crime is not violation of fundamental law of the law but deprivation
of liberty of the victim.
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
FALSIFICATION
Affidavit - In Lonzanida vs. People, G.R. Nos. 160243-52, July 20, 2009, Justice De
Castro - Petitioner as mayor, who is authorized to administer oath, attested to the fact that the
affiants swore and signed their affidavits in his presence when in fact they never did. He
committed falsification by causing it to appear that persons have participated in an act or
proceeding when in fact and in truth, they did not participate in the act or proceeding.
Commercial document - Commercial documents are, in general, documents or

instruments which are “used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions.” Promissory notes facilitate credit transactions while a check is a means of
payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business transactions. A cashier’s
check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and signature
appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein (Tanenggee vs.
People, GR No. 179448, June 26, 2013).
Damage as an element - Is intent to cause damage an element of falsification of public

or official document? No. In falsification of public or official documents, it is not necessary that
there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the falsification
of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed (Regidor, Jr., vs. People, G. R. Nos. 166086-92 Feb.
13, 2009).
Falsification and estafa, malversation or theft
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When the offender commits falsification of public, official or commercial document as a
necessary means to commit malversation (People vs. Barbas, G.R. No. L-41265, July 27, 1934),
estafa (Ilumin vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85667, February 23, 1995; Intestate Estate of
Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010; Ambito vs. People, G.R. No. 127327,
February 13, 2009, Justice De castro, Tanenggee vs. People, GR No. 179448, June 26, 2013) or
theft (People vs. Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001), the crime committed is complex
crime proper under Article 48 of RPC.
If the public officer is an accountable officer, misappropriation of public funds is

malversation (People vs. Barbas). If the public officer is not an accountable officer,
misappropriation of funds is estafa (Ilumin vs. Sandiganbayan).
Using a falsified check to defraud the bank is estafa through falsification of commercial
document (Tanengee vs. People). Using a stolen and falsified check to defraud the bank is theft
through falsification of commercial document (People vs. Salonga).
When the offender commits falsification of public, official or commercial document as a

means to conceal malversation (People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R. Nos. L-33252-54, January 20,
1978; People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 39047, October 31, 1933, En Banc), estafa (People vs.
Monteverde, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002; People vs. Benito, G.R. No. 36979, November
23, 1932) or theft, the crimes are separate. This is not complex crime proper since one is not a
necessary means to commit another.
Other view: If falsification is committed for purpose of enabling the accused to commit
malversation (People vs. Silvanna, G.R. No. L-43120, July 27, 1935; Zafra vs. People, G.R. No.
176317, July 23, 2014) or estafa (People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 06, 20140, the accused
is liable for complex crime proper.
Under the doctrine of common element, an element used to complete one crime cannot
be legally re-used to complete the requisites of a subsequent crime (Regalado). The common
element of estafa or malversation and falsification is damage to the victim. Thus, falsification of
private document and estafa cannot co-exist. The use of damage as an element in falsification
precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa, and vice versa.
If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the

proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity
of falsifying a private document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa (Batulanon vs.
People, G.R. NO. 139857, September 15, 2006).
If the offender commits falsification of private document as a means to commit estafa, he

is liable for falsification only. Falsification absorbs estafa. (See: U.S. vs Chan Tiao, G.R. No.
12609, October 30, 1917; People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-34516, November 10, 1931).
If a person commits falsification of private document to conceal malversation or estafa,

the crime is malversation or estafa only. Falsification of private document is not committed
because: (a) the use of damage as an element in estafa precludes the re-use thereof to complete
the elements of falsification; and (b) the damage to third person is not caused by the falsity in
the document but by the commission of estafa (See: People vs. Beng, 40 O.G. 1913).
If falsification of private document was used as a means to commit estafa, the former was
committed ahead of the latter; hence, falsification absorbs the element of damage of estafa. If
falsification of private document was used as a means to conceal estafa, the latter was committed
ahead of the former; hence, estafa absorbs the element of damage of falsification.
USURPATION OF FUNCTION
Usurpation of authority is committed by knowingly and falsely representing himself to be

an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the government or of any
foreign government. Usurpation of function is committed by performing any act under pretense
of official position pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the government or
any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so (Ruzol vs.
Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013).
In Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 186739-960, April 17, 2013 - Accused, a mayor
issued permits to transport salvaged forest products. According to prosecution, DENR is the only
government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products.
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The prosecution asserted that accused usurped the official functions that properly belong to the
DENR.
Accused chose to exercise the right to protect the environment and to share in this
responsibility by exercising his authority as municipal mayor––an act which was executed with
the cooperation of non-governmental organizations, stakeholders, and concerned citizens. His
acts may be invalid but it does necessarily mean that such mistakes automatically justify his
conviction.
There is no showing that accused possessed that “criminal mind” when he in his capacity
as mayor issued the subject permits. What is clear from the records is that accused, as municipal
mayor, intended to regulate and monitor salvaged forest products in order to avert the occurrence
of illegal logging in the area.
Good faith is a defense in criminal prosecutions for usurpation of official functions. The
requirement of permits to transport was accused’s decision alone; it was a result of the collective
decision of the participants during the Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly. If, indeed, accused
intended to usurp the official functions of the DENR, he would not have asked the presence of a
DENR official who has the authority and credibility to publicly object against accused’s allegedly
intended usurpation. Thus, the presence of DENR official during the Multi-Sectoral Assembly
strengthens accused’s claim of good faith.
The DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits
relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the
general welfare clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICER
MALVERSATION
The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender be a public officer; (2) That he had the custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) That he had the custody or
control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (4) That those funds or property
were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (5) That he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person
to take them (Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 178626, June 13, 2012).
Accountable officer – An accountable public officer is one who has custody or control of
public funds or property by reason of the duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the
public officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which
he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which determines whether or
not malversation is committed by the accused public officer or employee. Hence, a school
principal of a public high school may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with
public funds and misappropriates the same (Torres vs. People, GR No. 175074, August 31, 2011).
The municipal mayor initiated the request for obligation of allotments and certified and
approved the disbursement vouchers. The municipal accountant obligated the allotments despite
lack of prior certification from the budget officer. Municipal treasurer certified to the availability
of funds and released the money even without the requisite budget officer’s certification. The
signatures of beneficiaries, who supposed to have received the money, were forged. Can the
mayor and accountant be held liable for malversation even though they are not accountable
officer? Yes. Ordinarily, a municipality’s mayor and accountant are not accountable public
officers as defined under the law. However, a public officer who is not in charge of public funds
or property by virtue of his official position, or even a private individual, may be liable for
malversation if such public officer or private individual conspires with an accountable public
officer to commit malversation. In this case, combined acts of the mayor and accountant, and
treasurer, an accountable officer, conspired to defraud the government (People vs. Pajaro, G.R.
Nos. 167860-65, June 17, 2008).
In addition, municipal mayors are chief executives of their respective municipalities.

Under the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, he is responsible for all government
funds pertaining to the municipality. As a required standard procedure, the signatures of the
mayor and the treasurer are needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. No
checks can be prepared and no payment can be effected without their signatures on a
disbursement voucher and the corresponding check. In other words, any disbursement and
release of public funds require their approval. The mayor and treasurer had control and
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responsibility over the funds of the municipality. Hence, they are accountable officers. Any
unlawful disbursement or misappropriation of the municipal funds would make them
accountable for malversation (Evangelista vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February
08, 2012).
Intentional and culpable malversation – Malversation may be committed either through

a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To
sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence,
and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the
offense, it will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence
because both are equally punishable for malversation (Torres vs. People, GR No. 175074, August
31, 2011).
Even when the Information charges intentional malversation, conviction for malversation
through negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of
commission of the offense. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by
negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of
the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of malversation
is involved and conviction thereof is proper (Torres vs. People, GR No. 175074, August 31, 2011).
Presumption of malversation - Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of

conversion; neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn over the funds at any given
time sufficient to make even the prima facie case. In fine, conversion must be proved. However,
an accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of
misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his account which he is unable to
explain.
Under Article 217, a presumption was installed that upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property – with
which said officer is accountable – should be prima facie evidence that he had put such missing
funds or properties to personal use. When these circumstances are present, a “presumption of
law” arises that there was malversation of public funds or properties. To be sure, this
presumption is disputable and rebuttable by evidence showing that the public officer had fully
accounted for the alleged cash shortage (Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 178626, June
13, 2012).
In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that
the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession
when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do
so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused is hardly necessary as long as
the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts (Icdang vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012).
FAILURE TO RENDER ACCOUNTING
In People vs. Lumauig, G.R. No.166680, July 7, 2014 - Article 218 of RPC consists of the
following elements: (1) that the offender is a public officer, whether in the service or separated
therefrom; (2) that he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property; (3) that he is
required by law or regulation to render accounts to the Commission on Audit, or to a provincial
auditor; and (4) that he fails to do so for a period of two months after such accounts should be
rendered.
Petitioner received cash advance for payment of the insurance coverage of motorcycles
purchased by the Municipality in 1994. Under COA Circular, petitioner is required to liquidate
the same within 20 days after the end of the year or on ore before January 20, 1995. To avoid
liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash advance within two months from
the time it was due, or on or before March 20, 1995. Petitioner was liable for failure to render
account under Article 218 because it took him over six years before settling his accounts.
Demand before an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime is not required.
Article 218 merely provides that the public officer be required by law and regulation to render
account.
KNOWINGLY RENDERING UNJUST JUDGEMENT
To commit the offense of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, the offender must be
a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not one who merely
committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side of a controversial point of law. The
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term knowingly means “sure knowledge, conscious and deliberate intention to do an
injustice.” Thus, the complainant must not only prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
judgment is patently contrary to law or not supported by the evidence but that it was also made
with deliberate intent to perpetrate an injustice. Good faith and the absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper consideration are sufficient defenses that will shield a judge from the charge
of rendering an unjust decision. In other words, the judge was motivated by hatred, revenge,
greed or some other similar motive in issuing the judgment. Bad faith is, therefore, the ground
for liability. The failure of the judge to correctly interpret the law or to properly appreciate the
evidence presented does not necessarily render him administratively liable (Re: Verified
Complaint for Disbarment of AMA LAnd Inc. against CA Association Justice Bueser et.al., OCA
IPI No. 12-204-CA-J, March 11, 2014).
USURPATION OF JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
Under Article 241 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority
involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the executive branch of the
government; and (2) that he assumes judicial powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or
decision rendered by any judge within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the
information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch (Munez vs. Arino, A.M. No. MTJ-
94-985, February 21, 1995). In usurpation of judicial function, the accused, who is not a judge,
attempts to perform an act the authority for which the law has vested only in a judge (Miñoso v.
Pamulag, A.M. No. P-05-2067, 31 August 2005; Pace v. Leonardo, A.M. No. P-03-1675, 6 August
2003,). A Provincial Adjudicator, who rendered judgment in DARAB Case in the performance of
a quasi-judicial function, closely akin to the function of a judge of a court of law, could not be
held liable under Article 241 of RPC, therefore, considering that the acts constitutive of
usurpation of judicial function were lacking herein (Reyes vs. People, G.R. Nos. 177105-
06, August 12, 2010). A clerk of court, who is not an officer of the executive branch, cannot be
held liable for usurpation of judicial function. However, a clerk of court, who usurped judicial
prerogative of the judge by issuing the arrest of an accused in a criminal case, is administratively
liable for grave misconduct (Albior vs. Auguis, A.M. No. P-01-1472, June 26, 2003).
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
PARRICIDE
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate
other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused (People vs. Gamez,
GR No. 202847, October 23, 2013).
MURDER
Murder, the prosecution must prove that: (1) a person was killed; (2) the accused killed
him; (3) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article
248; and (4) the killing is neither parricide nor infanticide (People vs. Camat, G.R. No. 188612,
July 30, 2012
ATTEMPTED MURDER - Accused opened the door of his vehicle and then drew a gun
and shot victim once, hitting him just below the left armpit. Victim immediately ran at the back
of the car, while accused sped away. Is the accused liable for attempted murder? No. Accused
only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of the latter’s body. If he intended to kill
him, accused could have shot the victim multiple times or even ran him over with the car. When
such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted
murder but physical injuries only (Pentecoste, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010).
EXCESSIVE CHASTISEMENT
“X” tied his son to a coconut tree and, there after hit on his right eye and right leg. As a
consequence, his son sustained injuries that would heal in one week upon medication. Is “X”
liable for slight physical injuries despite the fact that his intention in beating his son is merely
to discipline him? Yes. “X” cannot evade criminal culpability by the circumstance that he merely
intended to discipline his son (People vs. Sales, G.R. No. 177218, October 3, 2011).
RAPE
INTIMIDATION - It is a well-entrenched law that intimidation in rape includes the moral

kind of intimidation or coercion. Intimidation is a relative term, depending on the age, size and
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strength of the parties, and their relationship with each other. It can be addressed to the mind
as well. For rape to exist it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great
or of such character as could not be resisted. It is only necessary that the force or intimidation
be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. Intimidation must be
viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not by any
hard and fast rule. It is therefore enough that it produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not
yield to the bestial demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or
thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she reports the incident. Intimidation would
also explain why there are no traces of struggle which would indicate that the victim fought off
her attacker (People vs. Leonardo G.R. No. 181036. July 6, 2010).
Tenacious resistance - Among the amendments of the law on rape introduced under RA
No. 8353 is Section 266-D, which provides “Any physical overt act manifesting resistance against
the act of rape in any degree from the offended party, or where the offended party is so situated
as to render her/him incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the
prosecution rape” (People vs. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012). The legislators agreed
that Article 266-D is intended to soften the jurisprudence on tenacious resistance (People vs.
Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144344-68, July 23, 2002, En banc). Failure to shout should not be taken
against the victim (People vs. Rivera, GR No. 200508, September 04, 2013; see: People vs. Rubio,
G.R. No. 195239, March 7, 2012; People vs. Penilla, GR No. 189324, March 20, 2013). It
necessary for the victim to sustain physical injuries. She need not kick, bite, hit or scratch the
offender with her fingernails to prove that she had been defensive. It is sufficient that she yielded
because of a real application of bodily harm (People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 134766, January 16,
2004). The use of a weapon, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or at least intimidation, and
threatening the victim with a gun is sufficient to bring her into submission (People vs. Tubat,
G.R. No. 183093, February 1, 2012; People vs. Penilla, GR No. 189324, March 20, 2013).
In incestuous rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not even be employed
where the overpowering moral influence of appellant, who is private complainant’s father, would
suffice (People vs. Samandre, G.R. No. 181497, February 22, 2012) In rape committed by a father,
his moral ascendancy and influence over the victim substitute for the requisite force, threat, and
intimidation, and strengthen the fear which compels the victim to conceal her dishonor (People
vs. Ortega, G.R. No. 186235, January 25, 2012; People vs. Broca, GR No. 201447, January 09,
2013 People vs. Candellada, G.R. No. 189293, July 10, 2013, Justice De Castro). The absence
of violence or offer of resistance would not affect the outcome of the case because the
overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter takes the place of
violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused who did not have
blood relationship with the victim (People vs. Osma, G.R. No. 187734, August 29, 2012, Justice
De Castro). In People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos. 148673-75, October 17, 2003, En Banc - Being the
father, appellant’s force or threat was sufficient to create fear in the mind of the complainant
compelling her to submit to his sexual abuse.
Sweetheart theory - The sweetheart theory, as a defense, necessarily admits carnal

knowledge, the first element of rape. This admission makes the sweetheart theory more difficult
to defend, for it is not only an affirmative defense that needs convincing proof; after the
prosecution has successfully established a prima facie case, the burden of evidence is shifted to
the accused, who has to adduce evidence that the intercourse was consensual (People vs.
Deligero, GR No. 189280, April 17, 2013).
Sweetheart defense will not exculpate accused from liability for rape against mentally
retarded person. In the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no
will. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only
when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some
mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak in
intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape (People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041,
June 05, 2013).
A child was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and
in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults. Unlike rape,
therefore, consent is immaterial in cases involving sexual absue under Section 5 of RA 7610. For
purposes of sexual abuse, the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse
with another person (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10, 2013).
MENTAL RETARDATION – In People vs. Dalan, G.R. No. 203086, June 11, 2014 - The
term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person
less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency,
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or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape committed against a person "deprived of
reason" . In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate with mental age of below 12 years,
while akin to statutory rape should still be designated as simple rape. At any rate, proof of force,
threat or intimidation is dispensed with in both statutory rape and rape with a person who is
deprived of reason.
In rape, the phrase "deprived of reason" refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or

retardation, which includes (a) idiot (equivalent to two-year old child); (b) imbecile (seven-year old
child); (c) moron or feebleminded (twelve-year old child) and (d) borderline intelligence. A person
is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a
"borderline mental deficiency (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011; G.R. No.
140209, December 27, 2002, People vs. Dalandas)
Intimidation - Mental retardation was not alleged in the information. However, the
accused can be convicted of with rape though intimidation alleged in the Information. Having
sex with a mentally retarded person even with consent constitutes rape through intimidation
(People vs. Balatazo, G.R. No. 118027, January 29, 2004).
Demented person - The term demented refers to a person who has dementia, which is a
condition of deteriorated mentality, characterized by marked decline from the individual’s former
intellectual level and often by emotional apathy, madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the
phrase deprived of reason includes those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or
retardation. Thus, a mental retardate can be properly classified as a person who is “deprived of
reason,” and not one who is “demented.”
Accused was charged in the Information with rape of a demented person with a mental
age of 7 years old. Evidence however shows that the victim is not demented but mentally
retarded. The mistake will not exonerate accused. His rights to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him were violated. The allegation that the victim is a person with
a mental age of 7 years old is sufficient to inform accused of the nature of the charges against
him. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape (People vs. Caoile, GR No.
203041, June 05, 2013, Justice De Castro).
Accused was charged in the Information with rape of a demented person with mental
capacity below 18 years old. Evidence however shows that the victim is not demented but
mentally retarded. Mistake in the information will not exonerate the accused he failed to raise
this as an objection, and the particular facts stated in the Information were protestation
sufficient to inform him of the nature of the charge against him (People vs. Ventura, Sr. GR. No.
205230, March 12, 2014).
Deafmute - The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or

deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual
intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a deafmute is not necessarily
deprived of reason. These circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a deafmute is not
rape of a woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile (People vs.
Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 05, 2013).
Borderline intelligence - The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those
degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0-19, and a maximum intellectual
factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b)imbecile by an IQ of 20
to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average seven-
year old child; (c) moron or feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual
function in adult life equivalent to that of the average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and
psychologists apply the term “borderline” intelligence to those with IQ between 70 to 89. A person
is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a female who was suffering from a
“borderline mental deficiency (People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012 (Justice De
Castro).
STATUTORY RAPE - In statutory rape, what the law punishes is carnal knowledge of a
woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and
whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot
have a will of her own on account of her tender years (People vs. Dollano, Jr., GR No. 188851,
October 19, 2011).
QUALIFIED RAPE - RPC punishes the rape of a mentally disabled person regardless of
the perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition. However, the perpetrator’s
knowledge of the victim’s mental disability, at the time he committed the rape, qualifies the crime
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(People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 05, 2013). Since knowledge is an element of this
qualifying circumstance, it must be formally alleged in the information and duly proved by the
prosecution (People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014). In People vs. Lascano, G.R.
No. 192180, March 21, 2012 –the information in the present case merely stated that the victim
was blind; it did not specifically allege that the appellant knew of her blindness at the time of the
commission of the rape. Hence, the crime committed is simple rape.
In qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in rape and special aggravating

circumstance under Section 31(c) of RA No. 7610 in sexual abuse under Section 5, the guardian
must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. He must be legally appointed was
first (People vs. Flores G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010).
MARITAL RAPE – In People vs. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014 -
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within
the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated
in Section 266-C of RPC as amended by RA No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which
provides “in case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the
wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty.” RA No 8353
eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute
proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with
him is always obligatory or at least, presumed. Husbands are once again reminded that marriage
is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his wife’s body by reason of
marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital
coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife’s unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse
cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can seek succor before the
Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity
justifying an annulment of the marriage.
CONSPIRACY - Accused are liable for two (2) counts of rape on account of a clear
conspiracy between them, shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after the
other, the rapes. Each of them is responsible not only for the rape committed personally by him
but also for the rape committed by the other as well (People vs. Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March
21, 2012).
PARDON - For crimes of seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness, pardon and
marriage extinguish criminal liability. However, pardon should have been made prior to the
institution of the criminal actions (People vs. Dollano, Jr., GR No. 188851, October 19, 2011).
Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against
persons. Consequently, rape is no longer considered a private crime or that which cannot be
prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended
party of the offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the offender's criminal liability
(People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897, June 06, 2011).
UNTENABLE DEFENSE - In crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the

victim is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime as her
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused thereof (People vs. Ortega, G.R.
No. 186235, January 25, 2012).
In Sison vs. People, G.R. No. 187229, February 22, 2012 -While petitioner was portraying
AAA as a prostitute, the latter cried. AAA's crying shows how she might have felt after being
raped by the petitioner and yet be accused of a woman of loose morals. The victim's moral
character in rape is immaterial where it is shown that intimidation was used for the victim to
have sex with the accused.
Time and again, we have taken into consideration how rapists are not deterred by the
presence of people nearby, such as the members of their own family inside the same room, with
the likelihood of being discovered, since lust respects no time, locale or circumstance (People vs.
Colorado, G.R. No. 200792, November 14, 2012)
It is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave birth ten (10) months
after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestations. In any event, we dismiss
appellant’s contention as immaterial to the case at bar because jurisprudence tells us that
impregnation is not an element of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was
fathered by the accused, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important
and decisive is that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or
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without her consent, and such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner (People vs.
Gahi, G.R. No. 202976, February 19, 2014, Justice De Castro).
STAGES
CONSUMMATED RAPE – If the “touching" of the female organ constitutes the sliding of
the penis into or the touching of either labia majoraor labia minoraof the pudendum, the crime
committed is consummated rape. Anything short of that will only result in either attempted rape
or acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Publico, April 13, 2011, G.R. No. 183569). However, the
penis that touches the external genitalia must be capable of consummating the sexual act to
constitute consummated rape (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011). Touching
must be made in the context of the presence or existence of an erect penis capable of penetration
(People vs. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000).
Circumstantial evidence - In People vs. Castillo, GR No. 193666, February 19, 2014,
Justice De Castro - Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e,
touching of either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape.
However, even though the victim testified that there was no penetration and the accused simply
rubbed his penis in the victim's vagina, accused will be convicted of consummated Rape if there
are evidence that the pain felt by the victim, the sex organ of the victim suffered injury, and there
is bleeding of the victim's genitalia.
Hymen is intact - Sexual penetration even without laceration of the hymen or even the
briefest of contact consummates rape (People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 183090, November 14,
2011). It is possible for the victim’s hymen to remain intact despite repeated sexual
intercourse. Likewise, whether the accused’s penis fully or only partially penetrated the victim’s
genitalia, it is still possible that her hymen would remain intact because it was thick and
distensible or elastic. The strength and dilability of the hymen varies from one woman to another
such that it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse, or on the other
hand, may be so resistant that its surgical removal is necessary before intercourse can ensue. In
some cases even, the hymen is still intact even after the woman has given birth (People vs.
Deligero, GR No. 189280, April 17, 2013; People vs. Broca, GR No. 201447, January 09, 2013).
ATTEMPTED RAPE – If the touching merely constitutes an epidermal contact, stroking

or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s
vagina, or the mons pubis, the crime committed is either attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness
(People v. Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000). Attempted rape is committed when
the “touching” of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the intent to penetrate; otherwise, there
can only be acts of lasciviousness. The difference between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness lies in the intent of the perpetrator as deduced from his external acts. (People vs.
Dadulla, G. R. No. 172321, February 9, 2011; People vs. Collado G.R. Nos. 135667-70, March 1,
2001).
To be held liable of attempted rape, it must be shown that erectile penis is in the position
to penetrate (Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 08, 2014) or the offender actually
commenced to force his penis into the victim's sexual organ (People vs. Banzuela, G.R. No.
202060, December 11, 2013, Justice De Castro).
Mother of the victim saw “X” was kneeling before victim whose pajamas and panty were
already removed, while his short pants were down to his knees. Accused was forcing his penis
into victim’s vagina. Horrified, she cursed the accused and boxed him several times. Is “X” liable
for acts of lasciviousness or attempted rape? “X” should be held liable for attempted rape since
it was not shown that his penis was able to penetrate vagina of victim however slight (People vs.
Campuhan, G.R. No. 129433, March 30, 2000, En Banc). Intent to have sexual intercourse was
clearly established in this case.
The victim’s statements that the accused was “trying to force his sex organ into mine”
and “binundol-undol ang kanyang ari” did not prove that the accused’s penis reached the labia
of the pudendum of the victim’s vagina. Accused was convicted of attempted rape (People vs.
Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012).
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUNESS - The elements of acts of lasciviousness, punishable under

Article 336 of the RPC, are: (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances: a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or c. When the
offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) That the offended party is another person of
either sex (People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 200529, September 19, 2012; (People vs. Rellota, GR No.
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168103 , August 03, 2010). The modes of committing acts of lasciviousness are the same as those
of committing rape under the old version.
Undressing the victim (People vs. Sanico, G.R. No. 208469, August 13, 2014) or touching
her vagina by the hand of the accused (People vs. Banzuela) or rubbing his penis on the mons
pubis of the pudendum (People vs. Abanilla, G.R. Nos. 148673-75, October 17, 2003) is merely
acts of lasciviousness.
RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT
It is commonly denominated as “organ rape” or “penile rape” and must be attended by

any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1. On the other
hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault.
The perpetrator, under any of the attendant circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1, commits
this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person. It is also called
“instrument or object rape”, also “gender-free rape” (People vs. Soria, G.R. No. I 79031, November
14, 2012).
A, a child, testified that X touched her private part and licked it but he did not insert his
finger inside her vagina. What is the crime committed? Answer: If the tongue, in an act of
cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already
consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness.
This testimony of the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be
identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by X. Thus, X cannot be convicted of rape
through sexual assault. Thus, X is liable for acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No.
188897, June 06, 2011).
Prior to RA No. 8353, rape through sexual assault is considered as acts of lasciviousness.
However, upon the passage of RA No. 8353, acts, which were as acts of lasciviousness before,
are now treated as rape through sexual assault. However, the concept of rape through sexual
assault has not acquired some of the characteristic of acts of lasciviousness.
1. Doctrine of absorption – If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the
latter is absorbed by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January 29, 2002). But if
the accused commits rape through sexual intercourse and rape through sexual abuse, the
doctrine of absorption is not applicable. The accused will be convicted of separate crimes of rape
through sexual intercourse and rape through sexual abuse.
In People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014 – Accused on the same
occasion inserted a lit cigarette stick into genital orifice of victim (6 years of age) and her anal
orifice, and had sexual intercourse with her. He is guilt for two counts of rape by sexual assault
and rape through sexual intercourse.
In People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October 02, 2013 - Justice De Castro – Accused
inserted his penis into the mouth of the victim, and thereafter, rape her. He was convicted of
rape through sexual assault by inserting his penis into the mouth of the victim and rape by
sexual intercourse. Doctrine of absorption was not applied.
2. Variance rule – If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts of
lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the latter because of the variance rule. Acts of
lasciviousness is necessarily included in the charge of rape.
If the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, but the crime proven is rape
through sexual assault, the accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance rule is not
applicable since rape through sexual assault is not necessarily included in the charge of rape
through sexual intercourse. The elements of these two crimes are materially and substantially
different. In such case, the accused will be convicted of acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Pareja,
GR No. 202122, January 15, 2014, Justice De Castro; People vs. Cuaycong, G.R. No. 196051,
October 02, 2013, Justice De Castro; People vs. CA, G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015).
CHILD PROSTITUION AND SEXUAL ABUSE
Sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 has three elements: (1) the accused
commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18
years old.
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Sexual abuse and lascivious conduct - "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person
to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest
with children;
"Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing,
of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object
into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person (Section
2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse
Cases)
Child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse - Children, whether

male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct,
are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse (Section 5 of RA No
7610).
The averments in the information against the accused clearly make out a charge for
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No. 7610 although the caption charged him with child
abuse under Section 10 (a). However, the character of the crime is not determined by the caption
or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated (People vs. Rayon, G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013)
Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult
exists when there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free
exercise of the offended party’s free will (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10, 2013).
Accused (23 years of age) repeatedly assured the victim (17 years) of his love for her, and
even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed that she would not get pregnant
since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety. These were meant to influence her
to set aside her reservations and eventually give into having sex with accused, with which he
succeeded. The age disparity between an adult and a minor placed accused in a stronger position
over the victim so as to enable him to force his will upon the latter. An important factor is that
the victim refused accused's incipient advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, the
victim eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she was put in a situation deprived of
the benefit of clear thought and choice. The actuations of the accused may be classified as
"coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5 of RA 7610. Hence, accused is guilty
of sexual abuse (Caballo vs. People, GR No. 198732, June 10, 2013).
The Information alleged that accused committed acts of lasciviousness upon the person
of victim, a minor subjected to sexual abuse. Can the accused be convicted for sexual abuse
under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610? Answer: No. Under the law, committing lascivious conduct
upon a child under coercion or influence of an adult or group is sexual abuse. There is no
allegation of coercion or influence, which is an indispensable ingredient of this crime. It does not
contain the essential facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of
law. Thus, accused cannot be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information. The
information is void for being violative of the accused’s constitutionally-guaranteed right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him (People vs. Pangilinan, GR No.
183090, November 14, 2011, ).
Child 12 years of age or above – X taking advantage of his ascendancy committed sexual
intercourse with his daughter (15 years of age). What crime can X be prosecuted for? The child
is under the influence of an adult. This is sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610. The
act is committed with psychological intimidation or grave abuse authority. This is rape. Hence,
X can be prosecuted for either (1) sexual abuse under violation of RA No. 7610; or rape under
Article 266-A of RPC. X should not be charged for Rape in relation to sexual abuse. Existing
jurisprudence, however, proscribes charging an accused for both crimes, rather, he may be
charged only for either (Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, GR No. 182130, June 19, 2013). X
cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will
be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act.
Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section
48 of RPC, a felony cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law (People v.
Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009; People vs. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 183090, Nov. 14,
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2011, , People v. Dahilig, G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011, People v. Matias, G.R. No. 186469,
June 13, 2012 and Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130, June 19, 2013).
Child under 12 years Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That
when the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape
and for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period (Section 5).
X taking advantage of his ascendancy committed sexual intercourse with his daughter
(9 years of age). What crime can X be prosecuted for? The child, who is under the influence of an
adult, is under 12 years of age. Hence, X should be prosecuted for statutory rape. Section 5 (b)
of RA No. 7610 provides that when the victim (child subjected to sexual abuse) is under 12 years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape (People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-
76, November 16, 2001).
Accused was convicted of rape through sexual assault committed against a 4 year old
child. There is no allegation in the Information that the child is indulged in lascivious conduct
for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate or group. Accused was punished under RPC. In sum, the penalty under RA 7160 was
not imposed since the information failed to allege that the victim is exploited in prostitution or
subjected to sexual abuse (Pielago vs. People, GR No. 202020, March 13, 2013)
Rape through sexual assault and sexual abuse - X forced A, a minor, in an isolated
place and inserted his finger into her vagina. (a) For what crimes can X be prosecuted if A is 17
years of age at the time?
Answer: X committed rape through sexual assault, or object or instrument rape under
RPC since he inserted object, his finger, into the vaginal orifice of A by using force. The crime of
sexual abuse under Section 5 of RA No. 7160 is also committed since A is indulged in lascivious
conduct under coercion of an adult. However, X can only be prosecuted either for rape or sexual
abuse.
(b) Would your answer be the same if the age A is 10 years old?
Answer: Since A, who is a child indulged in lascivious conduct under coercion of an

adult, is under 12 years of age, X should be prosecuted for rape through sexual assault under
RPC. Under Section 5 of RA No. 7610, when the child subjected to sexual abuse is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape under RPC (People vs. Pangilinan,
GR No. 183090, November 14, 2011, ).
(c) The penalty for rape through sexual assault under RPC as amended by RA No. 8353
is prision mayor while the penalty under RA No. 7610 for acts of lasciviousness committed
against a child subjected to sexual abuse, under 12 years of age, is reclusion temporal in its
medium period. If the age of A is 10 years old, would you impose the penalty under RA No. 8353
or under RA No. 7610?
Answer: One who commits acts of lasciviousness in relation to RA No. 7610 suffers the
more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits rape
through sexual assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair
to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of RA No. 8353, to have
disallowed the applicability of RA No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the
passage of RA No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims
are children (People vs. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011). The penalty under RA No.
7160 should be imposed.
(d) The penalty for qualified rape through sexual assault is reclusion temporal under
RPC as amended by RA No. 8353. If A is the 10 year-old daughter of X, would you impose penalty
penalty under RA No. 8353 or under RA No. 7610?
Answer: Since the crime committed is rape through sexual assault with qualifying
circumstance of minority and relationship, the rationale of unfairness to the child victim that
Chingh case wanted to correct is absent because RPC as amended by RA No. 8353 already
prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for this crime. Hence, there is no more need to apply
the penalty prescribed by RA No. 7610 for sexual abuse (People vs. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897,
June 6, 2011). The penalty under RPC should be imposed.
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CONSENT OF THE VICTIM - Is consent of the victim a defense in rape, or child

prostitution or sexual abuse? A child exploited in prostitution may seem to "consent" to what is
being done to her or him and may appear not to complain. However, a child who is "a person
below eighteen years of age or those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental
disability or condition" is incapable of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse (People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012; People vs. Delantar, G.R.
No. 169143, February 2, 2007). Submissiveness of child under influence or psychological
coercion of adult is not likewise a defense in sexual abuse (People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777,
October, 7 1998).
But if the sexual abuse is committed as alleged in the information against a child, who
indulges in sexual intercourse under coercion, the prosecution must show lack of consent on the
part of the victim. Showing that the child consented to the sexual intercourse will negate
“coercion” as an element of the crime (see: People vs. Abello, G.R. No. 151952, March 25, 2009).
CHILD PROSTITUTION
The elements of child prostitution are: (1) The accused engages in, promotes, facilitates or
induces child prostitution; (2) The act is done through, but not limited to, the following means:
(a) Acting as a procurer of a child prostitute; Inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute
by means of written or oral advertisements or other similar means; (c) Taking advantage of
influence or relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; (d) Threatening or using violence
towards a child to engage him as a prostitute; or giving monetary consideration, goods or other
pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage such child in prostitution; (3) The child is
exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution and (4) The child, whether male or female, is
below 18 years of age (People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012).
X convinced A to accompany her. When they reached Kubuhan, X suddenly pulled A

inside a room where Y. Y gives money to X and tells her to look for a younger girl. Thereafter, Y
wielded a knife and tied A’s hands to the papag and raped her. A asked for X's help when she
saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but X did not do so. After the
rape, X and Y told A not to tell anyone what had happened or else they would get back at her.
What is the crime committed by X?
Answer: X is not liable as principal by indispensable cooperation. From the time X

convinced A to go with her until X received money from Y are not indispensable in the crime of
rape. Anyone could have accompanied A and offered the latter's services in exchange for money
and A could still have been raped. Note: Conspiracy was not alleged in the information.
X is liable for child prostitution under Section 5 of RA No. 7610. X facilitated or induced
child prostitution. The act of X in convincing A, who was 12 years old at that time, to go with
her and thereafter, offer her for sex to a man in exchange for money makes her liable for child
prostitution (People vs. Dulay, GR No. 193854, September 24, 2012).
CHILD ABUSE
Under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610, child abuse or cruelty is committed by any person
who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those covered by Article 59 of PD No.
603 but not covered by the RPC.
Under Section 3 (b), "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being; (3)
Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure
to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his
growth and development or in his permanent incapacity or death.
Section 10 (a) punishes not only those enumerated under Article 59 of PD No. 603, but
also four distinct acts, i.e., (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child's development. We stress that Section 10 refers
to acts of child abuse other than child prostitution and other sexual abuse under Section 5,
attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 6, child trafficking under Section 7, attempt
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to commit child trafficking under Section 8, and obscene publications and indecent shows under
Section 9 (People vs. Rayon, G.R. No. 194236, January 30, 2013).
In Bongalon vs. People, G.R. No. 169533, March 20, 2013 - Accused saw the victim and
his companions hurting his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the back
with his hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the spur of the
moment, they are perpetrated without intent to debase his "intrinsic worth and dignity" as a
human being, or to humiliate or embarrass him. Without such intent, the crime committed is
not child abuse under RA 7610 but merely slight physical injuries.
In Rosaldes vs. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014 - Although the accused, as a
schoolteacher, could duly discipline her minor student, her infliction of the physical injuries on
him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at
her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him.
Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code,
which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority. Accused was
convicted of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
ESTAFA
ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION – The elements of estafa under Article 315,

par. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code are the following: (a) that money, goods or other personal
property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there
be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his
part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of
another; and (d) there is demand by the offended party to the offender (Tabaniag vs. People, GR
No. 165411, June 18, 2009; Magtira vs. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012). However,
demand is not necessary if there is evidence of misappropriation.
Misappropriation as an element of the offense of estafa connotes an act of using, or

disposing of, another’s property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use
different from that agreed upon. Failure to account upon demand for funds or property held in
trust without offering any satisfactory explanation for the inability to account is circumstantial
evidence of misappropriation. Demand for the return of the thing delivered in trust and the failure
of the accused to account are similarly circumstantial evidence that the courts can appreciate
(Magtira vs. People, G.R. No. 170964, March 7, 2012).
The essence of estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the owner. The words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's
own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate for
one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt
to dispose of the property of another without right (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June
18, 2009).
X received from A jewelry with obligation to return the same if unsold or deliver the
proceeds of sale. In the acknowledgement receipt, X is prohibited from selling jewelry the jewelry
on credits or giving it for safekeeping. X transferred the jewelry to Y, a subagent. Y failed to return
the jewelry. Is X liable for estafa through conversion?
Answer: No. It must be pointed out that the law on agency in our jurisdiction allows the
appointment by an agent of a substitute or sub-agent in the absence of an express agreement to
the contrary between the agent and the principal. In the case at bar, the appointment of sub-
agent was not expressly prohibited by A. Neither does it appear that X was verbally forbidden by
A from passing on the jewelry to another person. Thus, it cannot be said that X's act of entrusting
the jewelry to Y is characterized by abuse of confidence because such an act was not proscribed
and is, in fact, legally sanctioned.
Since properties were given by X to Y to achieve the very same end for which they were
delivered to her in the first place, there is no conversion since the same were not devoted to a
purpose or use different from that agreed upon. Similarly, it cannot be said that X delivered them
to Y "without right." Aside from the fact that no condition or limitation was imposed on the mode
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or manner by which X was to effect the sale, it is also consistent with usual practice for the seller
to necessarily part with the valuables in order to find a buyer and allow inspection of the items
for sale (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009).
Can X be held liable for estafa through negligence? Answer: No. In estafa, the profit or
gain must be obtained by the accused personally, through his own acts, and his mere negligence
in permitting another to take advantage or benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot constitute
estafa (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009).
Can X be held liable for estafa on the basis of conspiracy? Answer: No. If an agent acted
in conspiracy with subagent in carrying out the actual misappropriation, then the former would
be answerable for the acts of his co-conspirators. However, the mere fact that X failed to return
the pieces of jewelry upon demand is not proof of conspiracy, nor is it proof of misappropriation
or conversion (Tabaniag vs. People, GR No. 165411, June 18, 2009).
ESTFA THROUGH ISSUANCE OF BOUNCING CHECK - The essential elements of estafa

through bouncing check: (1) the accused shall defraud another by issuing or postdating check
in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency
of funds to cover the check; (3) check was issued or postdated prior to or simultaneously with
the parting of money or property by the payee; and (4) damage to the payee thereof.
It is the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check that is punishable, not the
non-payment of a debt. Prima facie evidence of deceit exists by law upon proof that the drawer
of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor. To be guilty of estafa the accused must have used the check in
order to defraud the complainant. What the law punishes is the fraud or deceit, not the mere
issuance of the worthless check. Accused could not be held guilty of estafa simply because he
had issued the check used to defraud complainant. The proof of guilt must still clearly show that
it had been accused as the drawer who had defrauded complainant by means of the check.
Complainant admitted that it was another person who received the rice from him and who
delivered the bearer check to him (People vs. Reyes, GR No. 157943, September 04, 2013).
In order to constitute estafa under this statutory provision, the act of postdating or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation. This means
that the offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party by reason of
the issuance of the check, whether dated or postdated. In other words, the Prosecution must
show that the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or
property were it not for the issuance of the check by the offender (People vs. Reyes, GR No.
157943, September 04, 2013).
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE AND DECEIT - The offense of estafa, in general, is committed

either by (a) abuse of confidence or (b) means of deceit. The acts constituting estafa committed
with abuse of confidence are enumerated in item (1) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; item (2) of Article 315 enumerates estafa committed by means of deceit. Deceit is not
an essential requisite of estafa by abuse of confidence; the breach of confidence takes the place
of fraud or deceit, which is a usual element in the other estafas (Brokmann vs. People, G.R. No.
199150, February 6, 2012).
ESTAFA AND OTHER DECEIT - What is the difference between estafa through false
representation and other deceit? The common elements of these two crimes are: (1) false
pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud; and (2) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice.
It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent representation constitutes the very cause
or the only motive for the private complainant to part with her property. In estafa under Article
315, the false representation is committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions; or by means of other similar deceits. Following the principle of ejusdem generis,
other deceit as a means to commit estafa must be similar to pretending to possess power,
imaginary transaction etc. If the deceit is not similar to pretending to possess power or imaginary
transaction, the crime committed is other deceit under Article 318. In Guinhawa vs. People, G.R.
No. 162822 August 25, 2005 () - Fraudulent representation of the seller that the van to be sold
is brand new constitutes other deceit under Article 318. On the other hand, in People vs.
Rubaton, C.A., 65 O.G. 5048, issue of May 19, 1069, false representation that accused has a
palay by reason of which the victim parted his money in consideration of the palay constitutes
estafa under Article 315. Unlike in the Guinhawa case, the transaction in Rubaton case is
imaginary.
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Authority to sell - Primelink entered into joint venture agreement with the owner of a
certain land to develop a club. Accused represent to complainant on October 10, 1996 Primelink
will finished the Club by July 1998. Because of this representation complainant purchased a
Club share. However, the Club was not completed because the owner of the property mortgaged
it in violation of their agreement. The projected was aborted. Accused is not liable for estafa for
such representation. False pretense of power to develop the Club resulting in damage to buyer
is estafa. However, the law requires that the false pretense be used “prior to or simultaneous
with the execution of the fraud, and that is October 10, 1996. In this case, there is no showing
that Primelink possessed no power (capability) to develop the Club and that accused knew that
the Club was a bogus project. Primelink is a legitimate developer. In fact, it has already released
money for the initial funding of the project. The project was only aborted because of the problem
with the owner of the land, which occurred after October 10, 1996. However, the false pretense
made by accused that Primelink was authorized to sell membership shares is estafa. False
pretense of qualification (to sell securities) is within the contemplation of the provision on estafa
(Lopez vs. People, GR NO. 199294, July 31, 2013)
SUBSEQUENT FRAUD - Is the fraudulent act committed by the accused subsequent to

the time the victim parted his money constitutes estafa? In the prosecution for this kind of
estafa, it is indispensable that the false pretense or fraudulent act is committed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement or
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which induces the offended party to
part with his money. In the absence of such requisite, any subsequent act of the accused,
however fraudulent and suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for
estafa (Ambito, vs. People, G. R. No. 127327, Feb. 13, 2009).
REPRESENTATION OF FUTURE PROFIT - When will a representation of a future profits

or income be considered as an actionable fraud or estafa? Where one states that the future profits
or income of an enterprise shall be a certain sum, but he actually knows that there will be none,
or that they will be substantially less than he represents, the statements constitute an actionable
fraud where the hearer believes him and relies on the statement to his injury. In the present
case, it is abundantly clear that the profits which Elvira and her co-conspirators promised
to Elizabeth would not be realized (Joson vs. People, G. R. No. 178836, July 23, 2008).
OTHER DECEIT- Other deceit under Article 316 (a) of RPC is committed by any person
who, knowing that the real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such
encumbrance be not recorded. The law was taken from Article 455 of the Spanish Penal Code.
However, the words "como libre" in the Spanish Penal Code, which means "free from
encumbrance" do not appear in the English text of RPC, nonetheless, the same are deemed
incorporated in the RPC. The gravamen of the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered
real property by the offender under the express representation that there is no encumbrance
thereon. Hence, for one to be criminally liable for estafa under the law, the accused must make
an express representation in the deed of conveyance that the property sold or disposed of is free
from any encumbrance (Naya vs. Abing, G.R. No. 146770, February 27, 2003, ).
THEFT
QUALIFIED THEFT - The elements of the crime of theft are: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. Theft becomes qualified "if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse
of confidence, or if the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle, or consists
of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if
property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other
calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance (People vs. Bayon, GR No. 168627, July 02,
2010).
ABUSE OF CONFIDENCE - To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the

penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the information and proof that there
existed between the offended party and the accused such high degree of confidence ]or that the
stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused. In other words,
where the accused had never been vested physical access to, or material possession of, the stolen
goods, it may not be said that he or she exploited such access or material possession thereby
committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property (Viray vs. People, GR No.
205180, November 11, 2013).
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In Zapanta vs. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013 - Accused betrayed the trust
and confidence reposed on him when he, as project manager, repeatedly took construction
materials from the project site, without the authority and consent of Engr. Marigondon, the
owner of the construction materials. He is liable for qualified theft.
Taking committed by accused cannot be qualified by the breaking of the door, as it was
not alleged in the Information. Moreover, the same breaking of the door does not constitute the
qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence. The very fact that accused “forced open” the
main door because he was denied access to complainant’s house negates the presence of such
confidence in him by private complainant. Without ready access to the interior of the house
where the properties were taken, it cannot be said that complaint had a “firm trust” on
accused and that the same trust facilitated taking of the personal properties (Viray vs. People,
GR No. 205180, November 11, 2013).
If the subject matter of a crime against property was money, identity of the offended party
is material and necessary for the proper identification of the offense charged. Since money
is generic and has no earmarks that could properly identify it, the only way that it (money) could
be described and identified in a complaint is by connecting it to the offended party or the
individual who was robbed as its owner or possessor. Thus, the erroneous designation of the
offended party would also be material, as the subject matter of the offense could no longer be
described with such particularity as to properly identify the offense charged (Senador vs. People,
GR No. 201620, March 06, 2013).
If the subject matter of a crime against property is specific or one described with such
particularity as to properly identify the offense charged, then an erroneous designation of the
offended party is not material and would not result in the violation of the accused’s constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. Such error would not
result in the acquittal of the accused (Senador vs. People, GR No. 201620, March 06, 2013).
Accused asserted that the person named as the offended party in the Information is not
the same person who made the demand and filed the complaint. According to accused, the
private complainant in the Information went by the name “Cynthia Jaime,” whereas, during trial,
the private complainant turned out to be “Rita Jaime.” Applying the Uba principle, the case
should be dismissed. Is the argument tenable?
Answer: No. The principle in People vs. Uba, 106 Phil. 332 is not applicable. In Uba case,
the appellant was charged with oral defamation, a crime against honor, wherein the identity of
the person against whom the defamatory words were directed is a material element. Thus, an
erroneous designation of the person injured is material. On the contrary, in the instant case,
accused was charged with estafa, a crime against property that does not absolutely require as
indispensable the proper designation of the name of the offended party. Rather, what is
absolutely necessary is the correct identification of the criminal act charged in the
information. Thus, in case of an error in the designation of the offended party in crimes against
property, Rule 110, Sec. 12 of the Rules of Court mandates the correction of the information, not
its dismissal.
In this case, the subject matter of the offense does not refer to money or any other generic
property. Instead, the information specified the subject of the offense as “various kinds of jewelry
valued in the total amount of P705,685.00.” Thus, The error in the designation of the offended
party in the information is immaterial and did not violate accused’s constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her.
THEFT THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION - Misappropriation of personal property in

possession of the accused may constitute estafa or theft depending upon the nature of
possession. If his possession of the property is physical or de facto, misappropriation thereof is
constitutive of theft. If the possession is juridical or legal, misappropriation thereof is estafa
through misappropriation.
1. Agency - A travelling sales agent, who failed to return to his principal the proceeds of
goods he was commissioned or authorized to sell, is liable for estafa because his possession is
juridical. Under the Civil Code Article 1914 of the Civil Code, an agent can even assert, as against
his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or goods received in
consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has
made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault (Guzman v. Court of Appeals, 99
Phil. 703). On the other hand, branch manager of the company, who misappropriate payments
from customers that he collected and accepted, is liable for qualified theft. Because of this
employer-employee relationship, he cannot be considered an agent of the company and is not
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covered by the Civil Code provisions on agency. Money received by an employee in behalf of his
employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee (People vs. Mirto,
G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011).
In Carganillo vs. People, G.R. No. 182424, September 22, 2014 – Accused received money
from complainant for the purpose of buying palay with the corresponding obligations to (1)
deliver the palay to the Palay Buying Station or (2) return the money in case of failure to purchase
palay. Possession is juridical. Failure to return is estafa.
In Tria vs. People, G.R. No. 204755, September 17, 2014 - By selling the jewelry on credit,
the petitioner used the property for a purpose other than that agreed upon. The words “convert”
and “misappropriate” connote an act of using or disposing of another’s property as if it were one’s
own or devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon.
In Velayo vs. People, G.R. No. 204025, November 26, 2014 – Accused induced to
complainant to entrust to her the funds for the taxes because she knew someone at the BIR who
could help her facilitate the remittance, and even reduce the amounts due. She received the
money for remit the same to the BIR with full freedom and discretion. Thus, she had juridical
possession of money. The crime committed is estafa,
2. Employer-employee relationship – As a rule, the possession of the employee is only

physical possession. Hence, misappropriation of property is considered as theft. If the property
is accessible to the employee, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of confidence can be
appreciated.
In People v. Locson, G.R. No. L-35681, October 18, 1932 - The receiving teller of a bank,
who misappropriated the money received by him for the bank, is liable for qualified theft.
The possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. Payment by third persons to the teller
is payment to the bank itself. The teller has no independent right or title to retain or possess the
same as against the bank.
In Balerta vs. People, G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014 – Accused was handling the
funds lent by Care Philippines to his employer as cash custodian. Over the funds, she had mere
physical or material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which she can set up
against employer. Hence, juridical possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafa by
misappropriation is absent.
In Benabaye vs. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015 - Accused was merely
a collector of loan payments from clients of his employer. Hence, as an employee of the Bank,
specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no
juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession. Since
the accused was charged with estafa, but the crime proven is theft, the case was dismissed
without prejudice,
Driver of jeepney under boundary arrangement, who did not return the vehicle to it’s
owner, is liable for carnapping. In People v. Isaac G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955, the rules
prohibits motor vehicle operator from allowing the use and operation of his equipment by another
person under a fixed rental basis. In the eye of the law the driver was only an employee of the
owner rather than a lessee. For being an employee, his possession of the jeepney is physical, and
misappropriation thereof is qualified theft. In People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8,
2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the principle in Isaac case, but found the accused guilty of
carnapping in view of the passage of RA No. 6539(Anti-Carnapping Act).
However, there are instances where the possession of the employee is considered as
juridical.
1. In Aigle vs. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012 - A corporate officer received the
property to be utilized in the fabrication of bending machines in trust from the corporation and he
has absolute option on how to use them without the participation of the corporation. Upon
demand, the officer failed to account the property. Since the corporate officer received the
property in trust with absolute option on how to use them without the participation of the
corporation, he acquired not only physical possession but also juridical possession over the
equipment. He is liable for estafa through misappropriation.
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2. In People vs. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014 – The President of the Bank is
holding the bank’s fund in trust or for administration for the bank’s benefit. His possession is
juridical. Hence, misappropriating the funds by making fictitious loan is estafa.
3. In Gamboa vs. People, G.R. No. 188052, April 21, 2014 - Accused employed as Liaison
Officer of a pawnshop received money in trust to secure or renew licenses and permits. His
possession is juridical. Hence, misappropriating the money is estafa.
THEFT OF INTANGIBLE PROPERTY - The term "personal property" in the Revised

Penal Code should be interpreted in the context of the Civil Code. Consequently, any personal
property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the
object of theft. Business may be appropriated under Bulk Sales Law. Thus, the business of
providing telecommunication and the telephone service is a personal property (Laurel vs.
Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009,).
The word "take" in the RPC includes controlling the destination of the property stolen to
deprive the owner of the property, such as the use of a meter tampering, use of a device to
fraudulently obtain gas, and the use of a jumper to divert electricity. Appropriation of forces of
nature which are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can be achieved by
tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature,
wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to
fraudulently obtain such forces of nature (Laurel vs. Abrogar).
A "phreaker" is one who engages in the act of manipulating phones and illegally markets
telephone services. Phreaking includes the act of engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR)
or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines,
cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or
domestic exchange facilities of the country where destined (Laurel vs. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076,
February 27, 2006 and January 13, 2009).
Can PLDT validly claim that the “long distance calls” are its properties stolen by the
phreaker? No. “International long distance calls” take the form of electrical energy. It cannot be
said that such international long distance calls were personal properties belonging to PLDT since
the latter could not have acquired ownership over such calls. PLDT merely encodes, augments,
enhances, decodes and transmits said calls using its complex communications infrastructure
and facilities. PLDT not being the owner of said telephone calls, then it could not validly claim
that such telephone calls were taken without its consent (Laurel vs. Abrogar). Telephone calls
belong to the persons making the calls.
Can phreaker be held criminally liable for engaging in ISR involving the telephone
facilities of PLDT? Yes. Phreaker can be held liable for access device fraud under RA No. 8484
and theft under the Revised Penal Code.PLDT’s business of providing telecommunication or
telephone service is personal property which can be the object of theft. While telephone calls are
not properties belonging to PLDT that can be stolen, it is the use of these communications
facilities without the consent of PLDT that constitutes the crime of theft, which is the unlawful
taking of the telephone services and business.The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally
connecting various equipment or apparatus to PLDT’s telephone system, through which
petitioner is able to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent PLDT’s
facilities constitutes acts of subtraction (taking)penalized under the said article(Laurel vs.
Abrogar).
THEFT OF BULKY GOODS - Is the ability of the accused to freely dispose of bulky goods
stolen from the owner determinative as to the consummation of theft? No. In Valenzuela vs.
People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007, the Supreme Court En Banc expressly abandoned the
principle in Diño case. It was held that: The ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property
stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. Such factor runs immaterial to the
statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property of
another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño dictum is considerate to the mindset of the
offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the
part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of
the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Unlawful taking, which is the
deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the
offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft
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can only be attempted or consummated (Valenzuela vs. People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007,
En Banc).
THEFT OF CHECK - In Miranda vs. People, G.R. No. 176298, January 25, 2012 -
Petitioner was entrusted with checks payable to complainant by virtue of her position as
accountant and bookkeeper. She deposited the said checks to the joint account maintained by
complainant, then withdrew a total of P797,187.85 from said joint account using the pre-signed
checks, with her as the payee. Petitioner argued that full ownership of the thing stolen needed
to be established first before she could be convicted of qualified theft. Held: The subject of the
crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken
does not belong to the accused, who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial whether said
offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property.
ROBBERY
Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on

occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must
prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo
lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.
a. Intent to rob - A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the central purpose
and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to
rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery (People vs. Ladiana, GR No. 174660, May 30, 2011).
Assuming that robbery was indeed committed, the prosecution must establish with
certitude that the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrator’s
main purpose and objective. It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the
homicide was to rob; a mere presumption of such fact is not sufficient. Stated in a different
manner, a conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and objective of
the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede
the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. What is
crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the prosecution to firmly
establish the offender’s intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless of the time
when the homicide is actually carried out (People vs. Gatarin, GR NO. 198022, April 07, 2014).
b. Intent to kill and rob - However, the law does not require that the sole motive of the
malefactor is robbery and commits homicide by reason or on the occasion thereof. In one case,
it was ruled that even if the malefactor intends to kill and rob another, it does not preclude his
conviction for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The fact that the intent of
the felons was tempered with a desire also to avenge grievances against the victim killed, does
not negate the conviction of the accused and punishment for robbery with homicide (People vs.
Daniela, G.R. No. 139230, April 24, 2003).
c. Robbing, killing and raping - A conviction for robbery with homicide is proper even
if the homicide is committed before, during or after the commission of the robbery. The homicide
may be committed by the actor at the spur of the moment or by mere accident. Even if two or
more persons are killed and a woman is raped and physical injuries are inflicted on another, on
the occasion or by reason of robbery, there is only one special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. What is primordial is the result obtained without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, cause, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime (People vs.
Daniela, G.R. No. 139230, April 24, 2003).
d. One of the robbers is the victim of homicide - It is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery,
or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime.
Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would
still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery,
the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide.
The word “homicide” is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide,
and infanticide (People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011; (People vs. Ebet, GR No.
181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu,
GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
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In People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 200922, July 18, 2012 - Accused snatched victim’s
shoulder bag which was hanging on her left shoulder. No violence, intimidation or force was used
in snatching her shoulder bag. Given the facts, the snatching of shoulder bag constitutes the
crime of theft, not robbery. Accused’s co-conspirator, who was driving the motorcycle, died
because he lost control of the motorcycle and crashed in front of a taxi. Since accused as
passenger in the motorcycle, did not perform or execute any act that caused the death of his
companion, he cannot be held liable for homicide.
e. Homicide through reckless imprudence - In robbery with homicide, the original

criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.
The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening
in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony
of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated (People vs. Ebet,
GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People
vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
f. Failure to present the stolen property - Intent to rob is an internal act but may be
inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the fact of taking has
been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the
property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have
been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. The
prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen
from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is
of no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value
involved (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010; People vs. De Leon, GR No.
179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Diu, GR No. 201449, April 03, 2013).
g. Direct connection between robbery and homicide - Essential for conviction of

robbery with homicide is proof of a direct relation, an intimate connection between the
robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both
crimes were committed at the same time (People vs. Buyagan, G.R. No. 187733, February 8,
2012). Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed to (a) facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve
the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery;
or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between
the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of
the robbery (People vs. Ebet, GR No. 181635, November 15, 2010,).
h. Claim of ownership - The 10th floor unit of a building is owned by a corporation and
served as the family residence prior to the death of the parents of X and A. The unit, including
the personal properties inside, is the subject of estate proceedings pending in another court and
is, therefore, involved in the disputed claims among the siblings. X armed with a Board
Resolution authorizing him to break open the door lock system of 10th floor unit of a building
and to install a new door lock system went up to the subject unit to implement said resolution.
According to A, X brought out from the unit her personal belongings. Is X liable for robbery?
Answer: No. X took property openly and avowedly under that claim of ownership. The fact
that these properties were taken under claim of ownership negates the element of intent to gain.
One who takes the property openly and avowedly under claim of title offered in good faith is not
guilty of robbery even though the claim of ownership is untenable. X should not be held liable
for the alleged unlawful act absent a felonious intent. “Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. A
crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent”
(Sy vs. Gutierrez, GR No. 171579, November 14, 2012).
i. Robbery with rape - To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must
concur: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to
gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape (People vs. Evangelio, GR
No. 181902, August 31, 2011).
The following circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when analyzed and
taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the accused raped AAA: first, while two
of the robbers were stealing, appellant and one of the robbers brought AAA inside the comfort
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room; second, inside the comfort room, AAA was stripped off her clothes and her panty; third,
when AAA resisted and struggled, appellant and the other robber banged her head against the
wall, causing her to lose consciousness; fourth, when she regained consciousness, the culprits
were already gone and she saw her shorts and panty strewn at her side; and fifth, she suffered
pain in her knees, head, stomach and, most of all, in her vagina which was then bleeding (People
vs. Evangelio, GR No. 181902, August 31, 2011).
UNINHABITED HOUSE - In Marquez vs. People, G.R. No. 181138, December 3, 2012 -
The records show that the store alleged to have been robbed by petitioners is not an inhabited
house, public building or building dedicated to religious worship and their dependencies under
Article 299 and as defined under Article 301. From Valderosa’s testimony, it can be deduced
that the establishment allegedly robbed was a store not used as a dwelling. In fact, after the
robbery took place, there was a need to inform Valderosa of the same as she was obviously not
residing in the store. “If the store was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was
not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate house, the robbery committed therein
is punished under Article 302. Neither was the place where the store is located owned by the
government. It was actually just a stall rented by Valderosa from a private person. Hence, the
applicable provision in this case is Article 302 and not Article 299 of the RPC.
CARNAPPING - Under the Anti-Carnapping Act, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to

death shall be imposed when the owner or driver of the vehicle is killed in the course of the
commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. To prove the special complex crime of
carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping,
but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in
the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof" (People vs. Nocum
et. Al., G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013).
Under RA 9346, persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or

whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this law, shall not be eligible
for parole.
ARSON
Is it necessary for the prosecution to prove wrongful intent to burn on the part of the
accused to establish arson? No. Although intent may be an ingredient of the crime of arson, it
may be inferred from the acts of the accused. There is a presumption that one intends the
natural consequences of his act; and when it is shown that one has deliberately set fire to a
building, the prosecution is not bound to produce further evidence of his wrongful intent. If there
is an eyewitness to the crime of arson, he can give in detail the acts of the accused. When this
is done the only substantial issue is the credibility of the witness (People vs. De Leon, G. R. No.
180762, March 4, 2009).
What is the crime committed if the offender burned the building and there is person who
died? In the classification of crimes committed by fire involving the killing of the victim, attention
must be given to the intention of the author. Main objective of the offender determines the kind
of crime committed. (a) Intent to burn – If the main objective is the burning of the building or
edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson
(qualified by dead of the victim), and the resulting homicide is absorbed. (b) Intent to kill – If the
main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is
resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only. When the
Code declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it intends that fire should be
purposely adopted as a means to that end. There can be no murder without a design to take life.
Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs the crime of arson since the latter is an inherent means
to commit the former (People vs. Baluntong, G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010; People vs.
Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994) (c) Intent to conceal – If the objective is to kill, and in
fact the offender has already done so, and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing,
the offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder, and arson.
Article 320 of RPC contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and
private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. Section 3 of PD
No. 1613, on the other hand, currently governs simple arson. P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the
malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320
of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser
penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness.
Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national
security implications than destructive arson (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31,
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2013). Burning of inhabited house or dwelling is simple arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613,
and not destructive arson under RPC. Burning personal property is also simple arson under
Section 1 of PD No. 1613.
The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of
perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of The
Revised Penal Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes "for being
grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest
wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society." On the
other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser
degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words,
Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national
security implications than Destructive Arson (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31,
2013).
The Information alleged that the appellant set fire to his own house, and that the fire
spread to other inhabited houses. These allegations were established by evidence. The accused
testified that his burnt two-story house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act affected
many families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the appellant’s act does not
appear to be heinous or represents a greater degree of perversity and viciousness when compared
to those acts punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only showed that
the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the conflagration spread to the neighboring
houses (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31, 2013). Note: Setting fire to his own
property under circumstances which expose to danger the life or property of another is arson
under Section 1 of PD No. 1613.
CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY AND SECURITY
KIDNAPPING
As for the crime of kidnapping, the following elements, as provided in Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, must be proven: (a) a person has been deprived of his liberty, (b) the offender
is a private individual, and (c) the detention is unlawful. (People vs. Jovel, G.R. No.
189820. October 10, 2012).
The crime has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the
person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a public official (People vs. Jacalney, GR No. 168552, October 03,
2011).
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty,
coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a
person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It
involves a situation where the victim cannot go out of the place of confinement or detention, or
is restricted or impeded in his liberty to move (People vs. Jacalney, GR No. 168552, October 03,
2011).
X dragged A, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon reaching
the house, X tied her hands. When A pleaded that she be allowed to go home, he refused. After
more or less one hour, X released A and instructed her on how she could go home. What is the
crime committed? Answer: The crime committed is kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
When X tied the hands of A, the former's intention to deprive the latter of her liberty has been
clearly shown. For there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going
home. Because of her tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was
then and there deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed
in such a situation. If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial (People
vs. Jacalney, GR No. 168552, October 03, 2011).
X seized A, 9 years of age, him by twisting his right arm, pointed a knife at him. X brought
A to a in a place strange and unfamiliar to him. Because of his tender age, he did not know the
way back home. X called victim’s mother to inform her that the child is in his custody and of
threatening her that she will no longer see her son if she failed to show his wife to him. In a case
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for kidnapping and serious illegal detention, X argued s free to go home if he wanted to because
he was not confined, detained or deprived of his liberty. Is the argument tenable? Answer: No.
For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or
treated him harshly. Where the victim in a kidnapping case is a minor, it becomes even more
irrelevant whether the offender forcibly restrained the victim. Leaving a child in a place from
which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of
detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. For under such a situation, the child’s
freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor (People vs. Baluya, GR No. 181822,
April 13, 2011, ).
In this case, victim, a minor, was not locked up. However, she was seized and taken from
her house through force and dragged to the mountain. Since then, she was restrained of her
liberty by and kept under the control of accused. She was prevented from going back home for a
period of about six days. Accused is guilty of kidnapping and illegally detaining victim even if she
was not lock-up. Under the Spanish Penal Code, the modes of committing illegal detention is
"Secuestrare" and "Encerrare". "Secuestrare" means sequestration. To sequester is to separate for
a special purpose, remove or set apart, withdraw from circulation. It also means to lock-up or
imprison. "Encerrare" is a broader concept than secuestrare. Encerrare includes not only the
imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for
whatever length of time (People vs. Baldago, G.R. No. 128106-07, January 24, 2003).
THREATS
What is the difference among grave threats, light threats and other light threats? In grave
threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by a
condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always
accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a
crime and there is no condition (Calauag vs. People, (G. R. No. 171511, March 4, 2009).
BLACKMAIL
Blackmailing may constitute: (1) Light threats under Article 283; (2) Threatening to
publish, or offering to prevent the publication of, a libel for compensation under Article 356; and
(3) robbery with intimidation against person. Example: X, DENR officer, threatened to confiscate
the hot logs from complainant and prosecute it for illegal logging unless the latter will give her
P100,000. Complainant gave X the amount demanded. The crime committed is robbery with
intimidation (extortion). In robbery with intimidation of persons, the intimidation consists in
causing or creating fear in the mind of a person or in bringing in a sense of mental distress in
view of a risk or evil that may be impending, real or imagined. Such fear of injury to person or
property must continue to operate in the mind of the victim at the time of the delivery of the
money. In this case, the P100,000.00 "grease money" was taken by X from complainant through
intimidation. By using her position as the DENR officer, X succeeded in coercing the
complainants to choose between two alternatives: to part with their money, or suffer the burden
and humiliation of prosecution and confiscation of the logs (Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
150873, February 10, 2009).
CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
A priest, who performed a marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the couple had no
marriage license, is liable for illegal marriage. The non-filing of a criminal complaint against the
couple does not negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 does not make this an
element of the crime.
Bigamy
Even if the first marriage is null and avoid because of psychological incapacity of either
or both parties (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499) or the absence of a marriage license or of
an affidavit of cohabitation (Lasanas vs. People, G.R. No. 159031, June 23, 2014), contracting
a second marriage constitutes the crime of bigamy unless a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage has been secured beforehand.
However, the principle that “one who enters into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy” is not applicable where the parties merely
signed the marriage contract without marriage ceremony performed by a duly authorized
solemnizing officer. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a
valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more,
cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which one might be held liable
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for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a
subsequent marriage. The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally
construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done (Morigo vs. People, G.R. No. 145226,
February 06, 2004).
X married A, but during the subsistence of such marriage X married B. A filed a

complaint for bigamy against X. X filed a petition for the annulment of his first marriage with A
on the ground of psychological incapacity which was granted. X moved for the quashal of the
information and dismissal of the criminal complaint alleging that his first marriage had already
been declared void ab initio. (a) Is the argument tenable?
No. Article 40 of the Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either
as a cause of action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial
declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else,
what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Otherwise, a person who
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a petition for the declaration
of nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein before
anyone institutes a complaint against him (People vs. Odtuhan, GR No. 191566, July 17, 2013).
(b) Would your answer be the same if the declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
obtained before the filing of the complaint for bigamy against X?
Yes. Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or information is material
only for determining prescription (People vs. Odtuhan, GR No. 191566, July 17, 2013, ).
(c) Would your answer be the same if the first marriage was contracted prior to the Family
Code?
Yes. Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because
Article 256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar
as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The fact that procedural statutes
may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Jarillo vs. People, GR No. 164435, June 29, 2010,
).
(d) Would your answer be the same if the second marriage was the one declared null and
void?
Yes. It is a settled rule that the criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the
commission of the offense, and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as
provided by law. It is clear then that the crime of bigamy was committed by X from the time he
contracted the second marriage with B. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
X’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him
(Walter vs. People, GR No. 183805, July 03, 2013, ).
(e) Would your answer be the same if both the first marriage and the second marriage are
declared null and void?
Yes. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of X’s two marriages cannot be
considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The moment X contracted a second marriage
without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the second marriage, first
marriage, which had not yet been declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction,
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was deemed valid and subsisting. Neither would a judicial declaration of the nullity of second
marriage make any difference. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. What the law penalizes is the mere act of contracting
a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage" (Jarillo vs. People,
GR No. 164435, September 29, 2009)
Illegal marriage
In Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014 - Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing
officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. The law sets the minimum
requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance
of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the
presence of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife. For
purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is
not included in the requirements.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
DEFAMATION
Is truthful defamatory imputation against private individual and government employee a

defense in libel? Proof of truth of defamatory imputation against private individual is a defense if
it is published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Proof of the truth of defamatory
imputation against government employees is a defense: (1) if it is published with good motives
and for justifiable ends; or (2) if the act or omission imputed constitutes a crime; or (3) if the
imputation not constituting a crime is related to the discharge of his duties. Truthfulness of
imputation of a crime or a function-related defamatory act against a public officer is a defense
even though he does not prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends (Vasquez vs. CA, G.R. No. 118971, September 15, 1999).
MALICE - What are the different rules on presumption involving malice as an element of
libel or oral defamation? 1. Disputable presumption of malice - Every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious. Presumed malice is also known as “malice in law.” However, the
following circumstances negate the presumption of malice in a defamatory statement: (1) if there
is a good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown; (2) if the defamatory statements
is a qualified privilege communication such (a) A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and (b) A fair and true report, made
in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions (Article 354 of RPC). The enumeration under Article 354 is not an exclusive list of
qualifiedly privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
likewise privileged (Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999). 2. Conclusive presumption
of lack of malice – If the defamatory statements are an absolute privilege communication, lack of
malice is conclusively presumed. Thus, the person making defamatory imputation is not
answerable for libel. Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable
even if the author has acted in bad faith such as speech or debate in the Congress or in any
Committee thereof (Philippine Journalists, Inc vs. Thoenen, G.R. No. 143372, December 13,
2005) or words uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the
statements are pertinent or relevant to the case (Malit vs. People, G.R. No. L-58681, May 31,
1982).
FAIR COMMENT DOCTRINE - What is the doctrine of fair comment? Under this doctrine,
fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in
an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every
defamatory and public imputation is deemed false, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the defamatory imputation is directed against a public person in
his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such defamatory imputation
to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment
based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established
facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts (Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999).
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What is the difference between fair and true report, and fair comment as a privilege
communications? (1) In fair and true report, the accused makes a report on the function-related
acts performed by public officers without any comments or remarks. On the other hand, in fair
comment, the accused is making a comment on the function-related acts performed by public
officers. (2) In fair and true report, the prosecution must prove actual malice i.e., such as the
report was made in bad faith. In fair comment, the prosecution must actual malice i.e., comment
was made with knowledge that comment was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not (Sulivan vs. Newyork Times doctrine; Guingguing vs. the Honorable Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 128959, September 30, 2005) Only false statements made with the high degree of
awareness of their probable falsity demanded by New York Times may be the subject of either
civil or criminal sanctions (Flor vs. People, G.R. No. 139987, March 31, 2005). (3) In fair and true
report, the report involving defamatory statement must be true. In fair comment, the defamatory
imputation in the commentary is not true but the accused has no knowledge that it is false and
has not recklessly disregarded to know whether it is false or not.
Is error or misstatement in commentaries on function related acts of public officer

actionable in a news articles for being libelous? Even assuming that the contents of the articles
are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or
misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with
good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of
suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some
room for misstatement of fact as well as for misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and
tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy
(Borjal vs. CA, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999).
Brillante implicated Jejomar Binay, then the OIC Mayor of Makati, and Dr. Nemesio
Prudente, then President of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines in a planned
assassination of Syjuco as well as election-related terrorism. Is the doctrine of fair comment
applicable in this libel case? The New York Times principle is not applicable since the utterances
are unrelated to a public officer’s performance of his duties (Brillante vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 118757
& 121571, October 19, 2004). Obviously, commission of murder and terrorism is not related to
the performance of their duties as public officers.
Cristy Fermin imputed to Annabelle Rama Gutierrez an actress the crime of malversation
and of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law and of being a wastrel. Is the doctrine of
fair comment applicable in this libel case? No. It is unrelated to public figure’s work (Fermin vs.
People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008). The defamatory imputation has nothing to do to with
works of Annabelle as a as an actress.
In his series of articles of Erwin Tulfo, he targeted one Atty. "Ding" So of the Bureau of
Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position for personal
gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion,
saying "ikawnayataangpinakagago at magnanakawsamiyembronito." He accused Atty. So of
stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. And when Atty. So filed a libel
suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying,
"Nagalititongtarantadongsi Atty. So dahilbinabantayankosiya at in-expose angkagaguhanniyasa
[Bureau of Customs]." In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So,
and had neither met nor known him prior to the publication of the subject articles. He also
admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth research of his allegations before he published
them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau of Customs. Is Tulfo liable for Libel? Yes.
Journalists bear the burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession, even when
writing about public figures or matters of public interest. The report made by Tulfo cannot be
considered as "fair" and "true" since he did not do research before making his allegations, and it
has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not "fair and true reports,"
but merely wild accusations. He had written and published the subject articles with reckless
disregard of whether the same were false or not (Erwin Tulfo vs. People, G.R. No. 161032,
September 16, 2008).
The article in Bander newspaper details the sexual activities of a certain “Miss S” and one
“Philip Henson” who had a romantic liaison. The words used in the article convey that “Miss S”
is a sexual libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. Is the article defamatory
and malicious? Is the writer liable for libel? Yes. In a society such as ours, where modesty is still
highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to “Miss S” by the article in question
had besmirched both her character and reputation. Since on its face the article is defamatory,
there is a presumption that the offender acted with malice. However, the writer cannot be held
liable for libel. The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient
description or other indications which identify "Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that
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"Miss S" and complainant are one and the same person. Although the article is libelous,
complainant could not have been the person defamed therein (Diaz v. People, G.R. No. 159787,
May 25, 2007).
INTERNET LIBEL - Under Article 355, a libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition, or any similar means. Is the internet used to post a malicious defamatory imputation
through facebook within the contemplation of the phrase “any similar means” in Article 355?
Yes. Writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition has a common characteristic, and that is, their permanent nature as
a means of publication, and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for
oral defamation (People vs. Santiago, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30, 1962). Hence, the phrase “any
similar means” should be understood in the lights of the said common characteristic of the
means to commit libel. Since nature of internet as a means of publication is likewise permanent,
it should be considered as a means to commit libel.
What is the venue for internet libel committed? As a general rule, the venue of libel cases
where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1)
where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where
the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published (Article 360 of RPC).However, the
place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the internet is not equivalent
to the place where the libelous article is “printed and first published”. To rule otherwise is to
allow the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article 360, and that was the
indiscriminate laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, to harass
an accused. At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint
for internet libel in their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149,
G.R. No. 184800, May 5, 2010).
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government has an obligation
to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber libel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code, already punishes it. In effect, Section
4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes “similar means” for committing
libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335, February 18. 2014).
VENUE - The rules on venue for libel in Article 360 of RPC are as follows: (1) Whether the
offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published; (2) If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed
in the Regional Trial Court of the province where he actually resided at the time of the
commission of the offense. (3) If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at
the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. (4) If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where he held office at the time of
the commission of the offense (Foz, Jr., vs. People, GR No. 167764, October 09, 2009, ).
Information alleged that the libelous writings were published in Panay News, a daily
publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and that complainant (private
individual) is a physician in Iloilo. Is the Information quashable for improper venue?
Answer: Yes. The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication
with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo" only showed that Iloilo was the place
where Panay News was in considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication
was printed and first published in Iloilo City.
The Information failed to allege the residence of complainant. While the Information
alleges that complainant is a physician in Iloilo City, such allegation did not clearly and positively
indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense.
It is possible that complainant was actually residing in another place (Foz, Jr., vs. People, GR
No. 167764, October 09, 2009).
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, Jason Ivler was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by Maria and reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of Nestor and damage
to their vehicle. Court convicted Jason for the first charged. Should the information for the
second charge be quashed on the basis of the rule on double jeopardy? Reckless imprudence
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under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other
crimes; hence conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi-offense, regardless of its various consequences. The essence of the quasi offense of
criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence
is only taken into account to determine the penalty. It does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person
or several persons, the offense criminal negligence remains one and the same, and cannot be
split into different crimes and prosecutions (Ivler vs. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716,
November 17, 2010). Note: The principle in Ivler case has abandoned the principle (Ortega view)
that culpa is just a modality by which a felony may be committed.
In People vs. Dumayag, G.R. No. 172778, 26 November 2012 - The evidence indubitably
shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising along its rightful lane when the
tricycle coming from the opposite direction suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane. The
accident would not have happened had Genayas, the tricycle driver, stayed on his lane and did
not recklessly try to overtake another vehicle while approaching a blind curve. Section 37 of R.A.
No. 4136 mandates all motorists to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or
highway. When overtaking another, it should be made only if the highway is clearly visible and
is free from oncoming vehicle. Overtaking while approaching a curve in the highway, where the
driver’s view is obstructed, is not allowed. Corollarily, drivers of automobiles, when overtaking
another vehicle, are charged with a high degree of care and diligence to avoid collision. The
obligation rests upon him to see to it that vehicles coming from the opposite direction are not
taken unaware by his presence on the side of the road upon which they have the right to pass.
In Sevilla vs. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014 - That in answer to the question
of whether there is a pending criminal case against him, accused, a a municipal councilor
marked the box corresponding to the “no” answer despite the pendency of a criminal case against
him for direct assault. According to the accused, the PDS was prepared by his secretary. It was
held that there was a legal obligation on the part of accused a to disclose in his PDS that there
was a pending case against him. However, accused cannot be convicted of falsification of public
document since he did not act with malicious intent to falsify the aforementioned entry in his
PDS. However, considering that accused’s PDS was haphazardly and recklessly done, which
resulted in several false entries therein, accused was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting
in falsification of document.
In Solidum vs. People, GR No. 192123, March 10, 2014 - The standard of medical care of
a prudent physician must be determined from expert testimony in most cases; and in the case of
a specialist (like an anesthesiologist), the standard of care by which the specialist is judged is
the care and skill commonly possessed and exercised by similar specialists under similar
circumstances. The specialty standard of care may be higher than that required of the general
practitioner. Here, the Prosecution presented no witnesses with special medical qualifications in
anesthesia to provide guidance to the trial court on what standard of care was applicable. It
would consequently be truly difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the first three
elements of a negligence and malpractice action were attendant.
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMAN
Are the acts of attaching the face of his ex-girlfriend on a nude body of a woman in a
picture, sending the picture to her through cell phone text message and threatening to post it in
the internet for all to see that caused substantial emotional and psychological distress to her
constitutive of psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (h) of RA No. 9262? Yes.
Under Section 5 (h) of RA No. 9262 the following conduct that caused substantial emotional and
psychological distress to the woman with whom the offender has a marital, sexual or dating
relationship is punishable: (1) Stalking (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the
residence of the woman or her child; (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling against her will;
(4) Destroying property and inflicting harm to animals; and (5) Engaging in any form of
harassment or violence. The acts described above are considered harassment within the
contemplation of the phrase “any form of harassment” in Section 5 (h) (5) (Ang vs. The Honorable
CA, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010).
Is habituality an element of violence against women and their children under Section 5
(h)? No. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
against women. This means that a single act of harassment contemplated in Section 5 (h), which
translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children.
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Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones (Ang vs. The
Honorable CA, G.R. No. 182835, April 20, 2010).
HAZING
The night before the commencement of the rites, the neophytes of “AngGaling” fraternity
were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical beatings, that the
whole event would last for three days, that that they could quit anytime. “A”, a neophyte,
consented to the initiation ritual, having asked his parents for permission to join the fraternity.
Even after going through the fraternity’s grueling tradition rituals—mainly being beaten by a
paddle on the arms and legs—during the first day, “A” continued and completed the second day
of initiation. As consequence of the hazing, “A” died. What is the crime committed by members
of the fraternity, who directly participated in the infliction of harm against “A”? The crime
committed is hazing. The principle in Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012
finding the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is not anymore
controlling in the light of RA No. 8049 (Anti-hazing Law).
The crime of hazing is thus committed when the following essential elements are
established: (1) a person is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating situation or subjected to
physical or psychological suffering or injury; and (2) these acts were employed as a prerequisite
for the person’s admission or entry into an organization (People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222,
February 18, 2015).
Failure to allege that the physical or psychological harm were employed as a prerequisite
for admission or entry into the organization would prevent the successful prosecution of the
criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of
hazing. Plain reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete,
as it is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law
(People vs. Bayabos).
Under Section 4 of RA 8049, the officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or
organization who actually participated in the infliction of physical harm upon recruit, neophyte
or applicant on occasion of hazing shall be liable as principals for the crime of hazing. Hazing is
an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in a fraternity,
sorority or organization or a requirement for employment in a corporation by placing the recruit,
neophyte or applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations.
Organization includes – but is not limited to – groups, teams, fraternities, sororities,

citizen army training corps, educational institutions, clubs, societies, cooperatives, companies,
partnerships, corporations, the PNP, and the AFP. The Philippine Merchant Marine Academy is
included in the term organization within the meaning of the law (People vs. Bayabos).
What are the differences between hazing and homicide or murder? The differences of
homicide or murder and hazing are as follows: (a) In homicide or murder, what is criminal is the
killing of person. Hence, intent to kill is an indispensable element. Death of the victim
consummates the crime. In hazing, what is prohibited is the infliction of the infliction of physical
or psychological suffering on another in furtherance of the latter’s admission or entry into an
organization (People vs. Bayabos). Hence, intent to kill is not material. Death of the neophyte is
only important to determine the proper imposable penalty. (b) Homicide or murder is malum in
se. Consent of the victim to the infliction of harm may negate dolo or criminal intent, which
would make the killing punishable as reckless imprudence (Villareal vs. People, G.R. No. 151258,
February 1, 2012). Hazing is malum prohibitum. Consent of the neophyte is not a defense. (c) In
homicide or murder, praeter intentionem is appreciable as a mitigating circumstance. In hazing,
the law expressly disallows the appreciation of this circumstance. In homicide or murder, the
basis of criminal liability is the actual and conspiratorial participation of the offender in killing
the victim. In hazing, criminal responsibility is based on (1) actual participation in inflicting
physical harm, (2) presumed participation (of those who are present during the hazing), (3) the
presence of adviser, (4) participation in the planning (by officers, former officers and alumni of
the fraternity); (5) knowledge (of the parent of frat member in the home of whom hazing occurred,
owner of the place commission, and school authorities).
The owner of the place commission, and school authorities are liable for hazing as
accomplices.
In the case of school authorities and faculty members who have had no direct
participation in the act, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is shown that (1)
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hazing, as established by the above elements, occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or
faculty members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against hazing in
spite actual knowledge thereof (People vs. Bayabos).
The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and accessory are distinct
from each other. As long as the commission of the offense (hazing) can be duly established in
evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed
independently of that of the principal (People vs. Bayabos).
In hazing, taking action to prevent the occurrence of hazing is a defense by any offender
except (1) those who actually inflicted physical harm and (2) those (officers, former officers and
alumni of the fraternity), who planned the hazing.
LOOSE FIREARM
Section 29 of RA No. 10591 provides:
“SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. – The use of a loose firearm,
when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other
special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if the crime
committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which
is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty
for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime
charged:Provided, further, That if the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized
by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that imposed under the preceding section
for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the
crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat,such violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat.
If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation of
this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.”
USE OF LOOSE FIREARM AS AGGRVATING CIRCUMSTANCE - As a rule, when use of

a loose firearm in committing is inherent in the commission of other crime, such circumstance
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. For example, if a loose firearm was used in
committing homicide, the penalty of reclusion temporal prescribed for shall be applied in its
maximum period.
However, if the penalty for illegal possession of loose firearm is graver than that prescribed
for other crime committed, the penalty for the latter shall be applied. For example, the penalty
for simple robbery is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period while the penalty for illegal possession of small arm under Section 28 of RA No. 10591 is
prision mayor in its medium period. If a loose firearm classified as small arm is used in
committing simple robbery, the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period prescribed under
RA 10591 shall be imposed.
Furthermore, if the maximum penalty prescribed for the other crime is equal to that for
illegal possession of loose firearm, prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in
addition to the penalty for the other crime. For example, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
prescribed for homicide and illegal possession of a Class B light weapon. If a loose firearm
involving a Class B light weapon is used to commit homicide, the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period in addition to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Lastly, if a loose firearm is used in the commission of rebellion, sedition or coup ‘d etat,
the latter shall be absorbed in the former.
DISTINCT AND SEPARATE CRIME - If the crime is committed by the person without
using the loose firearm, the violation of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate
offense (RA No. 10591). Conversely, if the crime is committed by the person with the use of loose
firearm, illegal possession of loose firearm is not a separate offense. In such a case, the illegal
possession of loose firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance or a special
circumstance that justifies that imposition of graver penalty or additional penalty, or as a mere
element of rebellion, sedition or coup d’ etat.
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QUASABLE INFORMATION - Prior to RA 8294, the rules obtaining, if the offender killed
a person with the use of unlicensed firearm, were as follows: (1) use of unlicensed firearm was
not an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide under PD 1866; (2) offender is liable
independently for homicide or murder and illegal possession of firearm.
Under PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294, the rules, if the offender killed a person with
the use of unlicensed firearm, are as follows: (1) offender is liable for homicide or murder with
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm; and (2) the crimes of murder or homicide
and illegal use or possession of firearm are integrated into a single offense.
In People vs. Bergante, G.R. No. 120369-70, February 27, 1998 - The violation of PD No.
1866 should have been punished separately conformably with our ruling in the case of Quijada
G.R. No. 115008-09, July 24, 1996, En Banc. Nevertheless, fortunately for appellant, PD No.
1866 was recently amended by RA No. 8294, which provides that “if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.” In short, only one offense should be punished,
viz., either homicide or murder, and the use of the unlicensed firearm should only be considered
as an aggravating circumstance.
In Celino vs. CA, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that:
“When the other crime involved is one of those enumerated under RA 8294 (e.g. homicide,
murder, rebellion, sedition or coup d’ etat) any information for illegal possession of firearm should
be quashed because the illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such
other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,, or absorbed
as an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat.
When the other crime involved is not one of those enumerated under RA 8294, any
information for illegal possession of firearm should not be quashed. The separate case for illegal
possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted. Settled is the rule that an accused cannot
be convicted for illegal possession of firearm if another crime was committed at the same time.
Since accusation is not synonymous with guilt, it cannot establish outright that “other crime” was
committed. However, the accused must be exonerated of illegal possession of firearms if he is
convicted of some other crime.”
Considering that under RA No. 10591 use of loose firearm is not only an aggravating
circumstance in murder or homicide but also in other crime such as robbery or grave threat,
the illegal possession of firearm should not be considered a separate and distinct crime if other
crime is committed and the use of loose firearm in inherent therein. Following the same line of
reasoning in the case of Celino, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be
quashed because the illegal possession of loose firearm would have to be tried together with
such other offense, either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,,
robbery, grave threat, alarm and scandal, physical injuries or absorbed as an element of
rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat.
DANGEROUS DRUGS
POSSESSION OF DRUGS – For a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug

to prosper, it must be shown that (a) the accused was in possession of an item or an object
identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug (David vs.
People, Gr No. 181861, October 17, 2011, ).
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when
the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over
the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another (Del Castillo vs. People, GR
No. 185128, January 30, 2012, ).
Mere possession of a dangerous drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory explanation of such
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possession - the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of knowledge
or animus possidendi (Miclat, Jr. vs. People, GR No. 176077, August 31, 2011, ).
KNOWLEDGE - Is knowledge an element of dangerous drugs despite this crime is malum

prohibitum? Yes. For illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must establish that
the accused freely and consciously possessed the dangerous drug without authority. However,
mere possession of dangerous drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus
possidendi sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation
(Asiatico vs. People, G.R. No. 195005, September 12, 2011).
ATTEMPTED SALE - “A”, poseur buyer, asked “X” if he has available “shabu” for sale.
“X” answered in the affirmative and showed to “A” a plastic sachet containing shabu. “A”
immediately identified himself as a policeman, and then, apprehended “X” and confiscated the
“shabu” from his pocket. What is the crime committed by “X”? “X” is liable for attempted sale of
shabu punishable under Section 26 of RA 9165. Attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt
act of appellant therein of showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. The sale was aborted
when the police officers identified themselves and placed appellant under arrest (People vs.
Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012).
DELIVERY - Is the absence of marked money as evidence fatal to prosecution of sale and
delivery of dangerous drugs? No. The law defines deliver as “a person’s act of knowingly passing
a dangerous drug to another with or without consideration.” Considering that the appellant was
charged with the sale and the delivery of prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime of
delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently established even in the absence of the marked money
(People vs. Domingcil, G.R. No. 140679, January 14, 2004).
LACK OF COORDINATION WITH PDEA - Silence of the law as to the consequences of

the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the prior authority of the PDEA cannot be
interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without such PDEA participation illegal or
evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible (People vs. Clarite, G.R. No. 187157,
February 15, 2012). Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust
operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable requirement in buy-bust
operations. Neither Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 nor its Implementing Rules and
Regulations make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non for the conduct of a buy-bust
operation (People vs. Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327, February 29, 2012)
CONFIRMATORY TEST - In Ambre vs. People, G.R. No. 191532. August 15, 2012 - In
no instance did accused challenge, at the RTC, the supposed absence of confirmatory drug
test conducted on her. Accused only questioned the alleged omission when she appealed her
conviction before the CA. It was too late in the day for her to do so. Well entrenched is the rule
that litigants cannot raise an issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene the basic
rules of fair play and justice.
PHOTOGRAPHY AND INVENTORY – Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the apprehending

team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; However, the Implementing rules of RA No. 9165 provides that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render
void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.
Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not necessarily
render the items seized or confiscated in a buy-bust operation inadmissible. Strict compliance
with the letter of Section 21 is not required if there is a clear showing that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved, i.e., the items being offered in court
as exhibits are, without a specter of doubt, the very same ones recovered in the buy-bust
operation. Hence, once the possibility of substitution has been negated by evidence of an
unbroken and cohesive chain of custody over the contraband, such contraband may be admitted
and stand as proof of the corpus delicti notwithstanding the fact that it was never made the
subject of an inventory or was photographed pursuant to Section 21 (1) of Republic Act No. 9165
(David vs. People, Gr No. 181861, October 17, 2011, ; Marquez vs. People, G.R. No. 197207,
March 13, 2013; People vs. Morate, GR No. 201156, January 29, 2014; People vs. Ladip, GR No.
196146, March 12, 2014; People vs. Bis, GR No. 191360, March 10, 2014).
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In People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 182417, April 3, 2013 - By way of exception, Republic
Act No. 9165 and its IRR both state that the non-compliance with the procedures thereby
delineated and set would not necessarily invalidate the seizure and custody of the dangerous
drugs provided there were justifiable grounds for the non-compliance, and provided that the
integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was preserved. But the non-compliance with the
procedures, to be excusable, must have to be justified by the State’s agents themselves.
Considering that PO1 Dimla tendered no justification in court for the non-compliance with the
procedures, the exception did not apply herein. The absolution of accused should then follow, for
we cannot deny that the observance of the chain of custody as defined by the law was the only
assurance to him that his incrimination for the very serious crime had been legitimate and
insulated from either invention or malice. In this connection, the Court states that the
unexplained non-compliance with the procedures for preserving the chain of custody of the
dangerous drugs has frequently caused the Court to absolve those found guilty by the lower
courts.
CHAIN OF CUSTODY – As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule

requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony
about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered
into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to
the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not
in the chain to have possession of the same (People vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March
12, 2014).
Thus, the following links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turn over of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turn over by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turn over
and submission of the marked illegal drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court (People
vs. Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014)
MARKING - Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized
dangerous drugs or other related items immediately after they are seized from the accused, for
the marking upon seizure is the starting point in the custodial link that succeeding handlers of
the evidence will use as reference point. Moreover, the value of marking of the evidence is to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the
time of seizure from the accused until disposition at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating
switching, “planting” or contamination of evidence. A failure to mark at the time of taking of
initial custody imperils the integrity of the chain of custody that the law requires (People vs.
Constantino, Jr. GR No. 199689, March 12, 2014)
The rule requires that the marking of the seized items should be done in the presence of
the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence. There are occasions
when the chain of custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized items
immediately after seizure and confiscation is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather
than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of an accused in illegal drugs
cases. However, even a less-than-stringent application of the requirement would not suffice to
sustain the conviction in this case. There was no categorical statement from any of the
prosecution witnesses that markings were made, much less immediately upon confiscation of
the seized items. There was also no showing that markings were made in the presence of the
accused in this case (Lopez vs. People, GR No. 188653, January 29, 2014).
Drug peddling in schools is prevalent; the scenario attending this case is likely to be
repeated many times. To impose on school personnel the observance of the same procedure
required of law enforces (like marking) – processes that are unfamiliar to them – is to set a
dangerous precedent that may eventually lead to the acquittal of many drug peddlers. To our
mind, the evidentiary value of the seized specimen remains intact as long as the school personnel
who had initial contact with the drug/s was able to establish that the evidence had not been
tampered with when he handed it to the police (Marquez vs. People, G.R. No. 197207, March 13, 2013)
PARAPHERNALIA WITH TRACES OF SHABU – In People vs. Matinez, G.R. No. 191366,
December 13, 2010 - This Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec.
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11 in cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in
the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect,
it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in
order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a positive confirmatory
test result as required under Sec. 15. The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11
for the possession of residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty
under Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in a
government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone would frustrate
the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover
for a second chance at life.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users, this Court
thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper
discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form
of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for use of dangerous
drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for
or involving possession of dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity
of dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as
provided for in Sec. 15.
PENALTY FOR POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA AND SHABU - Possession of different

kinds of dangerous drugs in a single occasion constitutes a single offense of possession
of dangerous drugs (David vs. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011).
PLANTING OF EVIDENCE - As a general rule, planting of evidence to incriminate an

innocent person constitutes the crime of incriminating an innocent person under Article 363 of
RPC. However, if the incriminatory evidence planted is dangerous drugs or unauthorized
explosives, loose firearm, the crime committed is planting of evidence under RA 9165 for the
dangerous drug, PD 1866 as amended by RA 9516 for the explosive and RA No. 10591.
PLEA BARGAINING - Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any crime
involving dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of
the provision on plea-bargaining.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSON
Can accused be convicted of illegal recruitment and trafficking in person for the same of
act of recruiting a person for prostitution without violating the rule on double jeopardy? Yes.
When an act or acts violate two or more different laws and constitute two different offenses, a
prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under the other. The constitutional right
against double jeopardy only applies to risk of punishment twice for the same offense, or for an
act punished by a law and an ordinance. The prohibition on double jeopardy does not apply to
an act or series of acts constituting different offenses (People vs. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October
12, 2011).
Is trafficking in persons limited to transportation of victims? No. Trafficking in Persons

under Sections 3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of victims, but also
includes the act of recruitment of victims for trafficking (People vs. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419,
October 12, 2011).
Is recruitment of the victim for prostitution with her consent or knowledge constitutive of
the crime of trafficking in person? Yes. The crime of Trafficking in Persons can exist even with
the victim’s consent or knowledge (People vs. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011).
In People vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014 - Accused took advantage of
AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as one who need money. The victim’s consent is rendered
meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human
trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is
not given out of his or her own free will.
If the accused sell the child to another for purpose of prostitution on a single occasion, the
crime committed is child prostitution under Section 5 (a) of RA No 7610 (People vs. Dulay, GR
No. 193854, September 24, 2012). If the accused maintained the child for prostitution, the crime
committed is qualified trafficking in person under Section 4 and 6 of RA No. 9208 (People vs.
Casio).
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ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT
It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for

both illegal recruitment and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment
is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused
is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative (People vs. Chua, G. R.
No. 187052, September 13, 2012).
BP BLG. 22
What Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punished was the mere act of issuing a worthless check.
The law did not look either at the actual ownership of the check or of the account against which
it was made, drawn, or issued, or at the intention of the drawee, maker or issuer. Also, that the
check was not intended to be deposited was really of no consequence to her incurring criminal
liability under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No. 177438. September 24,
2012).
The giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply the proof for the second
element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up but also affords the offender
due process. The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of
the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check
by the drawee within five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not
been paid. The Court cannot permit a deprivation of the offender of this statutory right by not
giving the proper notice of dishonor (Resterio vs. People, G.R. No. 177438. September 24, 2012).
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons
who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." This
provision recognizes the reality that a corporation can only act through its officers. Hence, its
wording is unequivocal and mandatory – that the person who actually signed the corporate check
shall be held liable for a violation of BP 22. This provision does not contain any condition,
qualification or limitation (Mitra Vs. People and Tarcelo, G.R. No. 191404. July 5, 2010)
NOTICE OF DISHONOR IN ESTAFA CASE - The essential elements of the felony are:
(1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the time it is issued;
(2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (3) damage to the payee thereof. It is
criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made punishable under the RPC,
and not the non-payment of a debt. The postdating or issuing of a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his funds deposited therein are not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check is a false pretense or a fraudulent act. However
deceit is presumed if the drawer of the check fails to deposit the amount needed to cover his
check within three days from receipt of notice of dishonor.
a. No notice of dishonor - If there is no notice of dishonor, the prosecution can still

prove the existence of deceit such as in a case where the accused knows that his checking
account is closed. The receipt by the drawer of the notice of dishonor is not an element of the
estafa through bouncing check.
b. With notice of dishonor - If there is notice of dishonor, the presumption of deceit

can still be rebutted by: (1) proof that the check is issued in payment of a pre-existing obligation
or (1) evidence of good faith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check. Good faith may be
demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor’s offer to arrange a payment scheme with his creditor
or making full payment of the entire amount of the dishonored checks. However, simply empty
promise to pay complainant the value of the bum checks issued in order to induce her to part
with her property in favor of accused is not an evidence of good faith that will rebut the
presumption of deceit. (See: People vs. Ojeda, G.R. Nos. 104238-58, June 3, 2004, Corona;
Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26, 2008, De Castro; Recuerdo vs. People, G.R. No.
168217, June 27, 2006, )
NOTICE OF DISHONOR IN BP BLG. 22 - Notice of dishonor of a check to the maker in

BP Blg. 22 must be in writing. A mere oral notice to the drawer or maker of the dishonor of his
check is not enough. If the maker or drawer pays, or makes arrangements with the drawee bank
for the payment of the amount due within the five-day period from notice of the dishonor given
to the drawer, it is a complete defense; the accused may no longer be indicted for violation of
Section 1, B.P. Blg. 22. If he is so indicted, he may set up the payment of the amount due as a
complete defense. Assuming that the accused had knowledge that he had insufficient funds in
the drawee bank when he issued the questioned checks, he could still have paid the checks or
made arrangements with the drawee bank for the payment of the said checks if he had been
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duly notified of their dishonor. In not sending a notice or letter of dishonor to the petitioner as
required by law, the complaint deprived the accused of his right to avoid prosecution for
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 (Sia vs. G.R. No. 149695, April 28, 2004).
In San Mateo vs. People, G.R. No. 200090, March 6, 2013 - Complainant tried to serve
the notice of dishonor to the accused two times. On the first occasion, complainant’s counsel
sent a demand letter to accused’s residence at Greenhills, San Juan which the security guard
refused to accept. Thus, the liaison officer left the letter with the security guard with the
instruction to hand it to accused. But the prosecution failed to show that the letter ever reached
accused. On the second occasion, counsel sent a demand letter to accused by registered mail
which was returned with the notation "N/S Party Out 12/12/05" and that accused did not claim
it despite three notices to her. Since there is insufficient proof that accused actually received the
notice of dishonor, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of her funds cannot arise.
For this reason, the Court cannot convict her with moral certainty of violation of B.P. 22.
Nevertheless, accused’s acquittal does not entail the extinguishment of her civil liability
for the dishonored checks. An acquittal based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt does not
preclude the award of civil damages. For this reason, the trial court’s directive for San Mateo to
pay the civil liability in the amount representing the total value of the checks plus 12% interest
per annum from the time the said sum became due and demandable until fully paid, stands.
In Campos vs. People. G.R. No. 187401, September 17, 2014 - Exerting efforts to reach
an amicable settlement with her creditor after the checks which she issued were dishonored by
the drawee bank is a circumstantial evidence of receipt of notice of dishonor. Accused would not
have entered into the alleged arrangements if she had not received a notice of dishonor from her
creditor, and had no knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds with the bank and the dishonor
of her checks.
Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 166810, June 26, 2008, Justice De Castro -Under Section
114(d) of the Negotiable Instruments Law, notice of dishonor is not required to be given to the
drawer in either of the following cases where the drawer has no right to expect or require that
the drawee or acceptor will honor the check. Since petitioner's bank account was already closed
even before the issuance of the subject check, he had no right to expect or require the drawee
bank to honor his check. By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, petitioner is not entitled
to be given a notice of dishonor.
The crime involved in Lopez vs. People is estafa through issuance of bouncing check.
However, it is submitted the Lopez principle can be applied to violation of BP 22.
PAYMENT - In Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 190834, November 26, 2014 - The fact that the
issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check after having received
the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the filing of the
Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Big. 22, is the protection of the
credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people who
have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even before
charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the filing of the
informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused
from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Big. 22. Since from the commencement of the
criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused
had every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded
check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a
case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well
differentiated from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a
check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa,
damage and deceit are the essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the
accused's tool in committing fraud. In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will
not free the accused from criminal liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but
not the criminal liability.
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SUSPENSION OF PAYMENT - X in his capacity as officer of Z corporation issued a
corporate check in favor of A. The check bounced due to DAIF. Notice of dishonor was received
by X. After three months, SEC issued order creating the Management Committee and ordering
the suspension of all pending actions for claims against Z corporation. (a) Is X liable for violation
of BP Blg. 22?
Answer: Yes. X was formally notified of the dishonor of the checks. Yet, it was only more
than three months after, that the SEC issued order for the suspension of all pending actions for
claims against Z corporation. Thus, X was not precluded from making good the checks during
that three-month gap when he received the letter and when the SEC issued the order (Tiong
Rosario vs. Co, G.R. No. 133608, August 26, 2008)
(b) Would your answer be the same if the order of suspension was issued before the
presentment for payment of the check when the drawee bank and the sending of notice of
dishonor?
Answer: No. X is not liable for violation of BP Blg. 22. Considering that there was a lawful
Order from the SEC, the contract is deemed suspended. When a contract is suspended, it
temporarily ceases to be operative; and it again becomes operative when a condition occurs - or
a situation arises - warranting the termination of the suspension of the contract. When a contract
is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth takes place or its effectivity commences only if and
when the event that constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled. Thus, at the time A
presented the check for encashment, it had no right to do so, as there was yet no obligation due
from X (Gidwani vs. People, GR No. 195064, January 15, 2014).
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES LAW
RA NO. 3019
Conspiracy – Only public officer can be held criminally liable for violation of RA No. 3019.
However, if there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No. 3019 is imputable
to the private individual although there are not similarly situated in relation to the object of the
crime. Moreover, Section 9 provides penalty for public officer or private person for crime under
Section 3. Hence, a private individual can be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The
Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even if the public officer with
whom the private individual allegedly conspired, the latter can still be prosecuted for violation of
RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes the criminal liability but not the crime. Hence, if there is proof
of the crime and conspiracy of dead public officer with private individual, the latter can still be
convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go, GR NO. 168539, March 25, 2014). However,
the public officer with whom the private individual allegedly conspired is acquitted, the latter
should also be acquitted (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
SECTION 3 (a) - The elements of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 are: 1. The offender
is public officer; 2. The offender persuades, induces or influences another public officer to
perform an act or the offender allows himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit
an act; 3. That the act performed by the other public officer or committed by another constitutes
a violation of ruled and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in
connection with the official duty of the latter (Ampil vs. Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 192685,
July 31, 2013.
In Baviera vs. Zoleta, G.R. No. 169098, Oct. 12, 2006 - The Supreme Court considered
the Senate deliberation of Section 3 (a) of RA No. 3019 in resolving the case. According to Senator
Tolentino, if there is no proof of the consideration in the use of the influence, the offense is not
committed under the bill. Because the logic and intention of the sponsor (Senator TOLENTINO)
of the aforecited provision, the SC said that Acting Secretary of Justice did not commit a violation
of the same as there is no proof that she received consideration in exchange for her decision to
allow Mr. Raman to travel abroad despite the Hold Departure Order issued by the Secretary of
Justice.
SECTION 3 (b) - The elements of the crime under Section 3 (b) of RA No. 3019 are: (1)
the offender is a public officer; (2) he requested or received a gift, present, share, percentage or
benefit; (3) he made the request or receipt on behalf of the offender or any other person; (4) the
request or receipt was made in connection with a contract or transaction with the government
and (5) he has the right to intervene, in an official capacity under the law, in connection with a
contract or transaction has the right to intervene (Merencillo vs. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70,
April 13, 2007).
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Section 3 (b) of RA No. 3019, directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present,
share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract
or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his
official capacity has to intervene under the law is punishable. Section 3 (b) is limited only to
contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the
authority to intervene under the law. Preliminary investigation is not a contract or transaction
is not a contract or transaction within the contemplated of Section 3 (b). Hence, requesting or
receiving money in connection with a preliminary investigation is not a violation of this provision
(Soriano, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 65952, July 31, 1984; People vs. Sandiganbayan. and
Justice Secretary Perez).
SECTION 3 (e) - In Dela Cuersta vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 164068-69, November
19, 2013 - The informations alleged that accused as members of the Philippine Coconut
Authority, acting in conspiracy with each other and with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality, gave financial assistance to COCOFED, a private entity, without an appropriate
budget, giving unwarranted benefit to the same and causing undue injury to the Government.
The element in the crime of technical malversation that public fund be appropriated for
a public use requires an earmarking of the fund or property for a specific project. For instance
there is no earmarking if money was part of the municipality’s “general fund,” intended by
internal arrangement for use in paving a particular road but applied instead to the payrolls of
different barangay workers in the municipality. That portion of the general fund was not
considered appropriated since it had not been earmarked by law or ordinance for a specific
expenditure. Here, there is no allegation in the informations that the P2 million and P6 million
grants to COCOFED had been earmarked for some specific expenditures.
What is more, the informations do not allege that the subject P2 million and P6 million
were applied to a public use other than that for which such sums had been appropriated. Quite
the contrary, those informations allege that those sums were unlawfully donated to “a private
entity,” not applied to some public use. Clearly, the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the crimes with which they are charged would be violated if they are tried for
technical malversation under criminal informations for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 filed
against them.
This crime has the following essential elements: 1. The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue
injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions (People vs. Atienza, GR No. 171671,
June 18, 2012).
First element - The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial
or official functions. In Consigna vs. People, G.R. no. 175750, April 2, 2014 – Petitioner, a
municipal treasurer, is considered a public officer discharging official functions when she
misused such position to be able to take out a loan from complainant, who was misled into the
belief that former, as municipal treasurer, was acting on behalf of the municipality. The petitioner
misrepresented that the loan is to be used to pay for the salaries of the employees of the
municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium. The victim could have been the
Municipality of General Luna since the checks signed by the mayor was issued to the
complainant. It was just fortunate that the mayor instructed the bank to stop payment of the
checks issued by petitioner. Thus, the municipal treasurer can be held liable for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 for causing damage to complainant.
Mejorada principle - In Stilgrove vs. Sabas, A.M. No. P-06-2257, March 28, 2008 –
Admittedly, the Court made a statement in Zoomzat that for one to be held liable under Section
3 (e), he must be an officer or employee of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions. The earlier case of Mejorada however, squarely
addressed the issue on the proper interpretation of Section 3 (e). Mejorada was decided by the
Court en banc. Following the constitutional mandate that no doctrine or principle of law laid
down by the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed
except by the Court sitting en banc, the case of Zoomzat cannot reverse the pronouncement in
Mejorada, the former case having been decided by a Division of the Court. In Consigna vs.
People, G.R. No. 175750, April 2, 2014, the SC re-affirmed the principle in Mejorada.
Second element - The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as
when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the
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accused committed gross inexcusable negligence (Plameras vs. People, GR No. 187268,
September 04, 2013).
Arias principle - In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 81563 & 82512, 19 December
1989 - All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a
department secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call
the restaurant about the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the
luncheon, inquire whether the correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look
into the reimbursement voucher's accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some
added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even
small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be
signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers
that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or departments is even more
appalling. There should be other grounds than the mere signature or approval appearing on a
voucher to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction.
Non-applicability of the Arias principle – The principle of Arias case where reliance on
the subordinate was considered as a defense in case of violation of Section 3 (e) RA No. 3019 is
not applicable:
(1) Where the accused has foreknowledge of existing anomaly - e.g. mayor signed the
inspection report and the disbursement voucher despite the fact that he had foreknowledge that
the materials delivered by Guadines have already been confiscated by the DENR (Escara vs.
People, G.R. No. 164921, July 8, 2005);
(2) Where there is deviation from ordinary procedure – e.g. mayor issued and encashed
municipal checks despite the facts that the disbursement vouchers were in the name of Kelly
Lumber but the checks were not payable to the supplier, Kelly Lumber and that checks were
payable upon his order (Cruz vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493, August 16, 2005).
(3) Where the public official invoking the Arias principle is not acting in his capacity as
head of office, who is relying on his subordinate e.g. head of the office of the city administrator
relied on the acts of the heads of the Office of the City Treasurer, the Office of the City Accountant
in granting cash advance to a paymaster (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013).
4. Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 156577, December 03, 2014 - In the case at bench, Perez
should have placed himself on guard when the documents and vouchers given to him by his
subordinates did not indicate the retention money required by P.D. No. 1594. Moreover, when
he personally inspected the construction site of PAL Boat, he should have noticed the financial
weakness of the contractor and the defective works. Deplorably, Perez kept mum and chose to
continue causing undue injury to the government. No other conclusion can be inferred other
than his manifest partiality towards PAL Boat
Conspiracy of silence or inaction - As a rule, the principle of conspiracy as a mode of

committing a crime or for purpose of applying the collective responsibility rule is only applicable
to intentional felony. The concept of conspiracy, the elements of which are agreement and
decision to commit a crime, are not consistent with culpable felony. Persons cannot definitely
agree and decide to commit a culpable crime.
Exception:
Public officers can incur collective criminal responsibility through a conspiracy for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 through gross and inexcusable negligence, and of
incurring. This is called conspiracy of silence and inaction arising from gross inexcusable
negligence. To establish this kind of conspiracy, it is essential to prove the breach of duty borders
on malice and is characterized by flagrant, palpable and willful indifference to consequences
insofar as other persons may be affected. Conspiracy of silence or inaction would almost always
be inferred only from the surrounding circumstances and the parties' acts or omissions that,
taken together, indicate a common understanding and concurrence of sentiments respecting the
commission of the offense. The duties and responsibilities that the occupancy of a public office
carry and the degree of relationship of interdependence of the different offices involved here
determine the existence of conspiracy where gross inexcusable negligence was the mode or
commission of the offense (Jaca vs. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28, 2013).
In Jaca vs. People, supra - A paymaster obtained cash advances despite the fact that she
has previous unliquidated cash advances. The cash advance remained unliquidated to the
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damage of the city. The City Treasurer certified that the cash advances are necessary, lawful and
incurred under my direct supervision. The City Accountant certified that the expenditures are
supported by documents and previous cash advances are liquidated and accounted for. The City
Administrator approved the voucher and countersigned the check. The paymaster is liable for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. The City Treasurer, City Accountant and City
administrator are liable because of conspiracy of silence or inaction. According to SC, the
petitioners are all heads or their respective offices that perform interdependent functions in the
processing of cash advances. The petitioners' attitude of buck-passing in the face of the
irregularities in the voucher and the absence of supporting documents and their indifference to
their individual and collective duties to ensure that laws and regulations are observed in the
disbursement of the funds of the local government of Cebu can only lead to a finding of
conspiracy of silence and inaction.
Erroneous interpretation of the law - An erroneous interpretation of a provision of law

regarding the entitlement of a government employee who was wrongfylly removed to RATA,
absent any showing of some dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not
necessarily amount to bad faith (Ysidoro vs. Hon. Leonardo-De Castro, G.R. No. 171513,
February 06, 2012).
Third element - His action caused undue injury to any party, including the government or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
There are two ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 in the
performance of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the
Government; or (2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
The accused may be charged under either mode or both. The disjunctive term “or” connotes that
either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) (Rivera vs. People, G.R. No. 156577, December
03, 2014).
The concept of "undue injury," in the context of Section 3(e) RA No. 3019 is the same as
the civil law concept of "actual damage." It is required that undue injury must be specified,
quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty. Speculative or incidental injury is not
sufficient. The damages suffered cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or
upon speculation, conjecture or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best
evidence obtainable regarding specific facts which could afford some basis for measuring
compensatory or actual damage (M.A. Jimenez Inc. vs. The Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 155307,
June 06, 2011).
In Braza vs. the Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20, 2013 - There are
two (2) ways by which a public official violates Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance
of his functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or
(2) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference. The accused
may be charged under either mode or under both. The disjunctive term “or” connotes that either
act qualifies as a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. ] In other words, the presence of one
would suffice for conviction. "To be found guilty under the second mode, it suffices that the
accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official,
administrative and judicial functions." The element of damage is not required for violation of
Section 3 (e) under the second mode.
Private party - In Ambil vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 175457, July 06, 2011 - In drafting
the Anti-Graft Law, the lawmakers opted to use "private party" rather than "private person" to
describe the recipient of the unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference for a reason. The
term "party" is a technical word having a precise meaning in legal parlance as distinguished from
"person" which, in general usage, refers to a human being. Thus, a private person simply
pertains to one who is not a public officer. While a private party is more comprehensive in scope
to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private capacity to protect his
personal interest. In the present case, when petitioners transferred Mayor Adalim from the
provincial jail and detained him at petitioner Ambil, Jr.'s residence, they accorded such privilege
to Adalim, not in his official capacity as a mayor, but as a detainee charged with murder. Thus,
for purposes of applying the provisions of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, Adalim was a private party.
SECTION 3 (g) – In Braza vs. the Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 195032, February 20,
2013 - For conviction of violation of Sec. 3(g), the prosecution must establish the following
elements: 1. The offender is a public officer; 2. He entered into a contract or transaction in behalf
of the government; and 3. The contract or transaction is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the government.
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On the other hand, an accused may be held criminally liable of violation of Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019, provided that the following elements are present: 1. The accused must be a
public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. The accused must have
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His
action caused undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Although violation of Sec. 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019 and violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law
share a common element, the accused being a public officer, the latter is not inclusive of the
former. The essential elements of each are not included among or do not form part of those
enumerated in the other. For double jeopardy to exist, the elements of one offense should ideally
encompass or include those of the other. What the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to
identity of elements in the two offenses.
Overpricing – In Sajul vs. Sandiganbayan, supra - To substantiate the assertion that the
price of Bato-Bato Enterprises was exorbitant, the prosecution presented a quotation from Zodiac
Trading which states that a fire extinguisher of the same make and kind would allegedly cost
only about P1,500 which was P1,000 less of Bato-Bato’s price. It was held that: The comparison
of prices between Bato-bato Enterprises with that of Zodiac Trading is rather unacceptable. In
the first place, Zodiac trading was not properly identified as a company dealing with fire
extinguishers or a leading company selling fire extinguishers, for that matter. Nobody from the
company appeared in court to testify about its company or its product. The components of its
fire extinguishers were not actually proven to be the same as that of Bato-Bato Enterprises. The
quotation of Zodiac Trading was merely solicited. The veracity of such quotation was not
proven. Considering all these circumstances, it is rather unfair to compare the prices of Bato-
Bato Enterprises with that of Zodiac Trading when the basis of the comparison has not been
established. It could not be concluded that there was an overpricing of the fire extinguishers
when the prosecution single out only one company, which apparently quoted a lower price than
that of Bato-Bato Enterprises.
In order to show that there was an overpricing in the subject transaction, a canvass of
different suppliers with their corresponding prices should have been procured which could readily
show the differences in the price quotations. Absent this competent evidence, it is rather unfair
to conclude that the price of Bato-Bato Enterprises was exorbitant on the basis alone of a
submitted quotation of one company and to further rule that the contract was grossly injurious
to the government. The contract entered into by the petitioner would not cause obvious or glaring
injury to the government when petitioner merely continued the purchase from a regular supplier,
which he had authority to do so even without the benefit of bidding.
In Caunan vs. People, G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04 and Marquez vs. Sandiganbayan,
Fourth Division, G.R. Nos. 182020-24, September 2, 2009 – The evidence of the prosecution did
not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Parañaque City. In fact,
even the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was
different from the walis tingting actually utilized by the Parañaque City street sweepers at the
time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by
the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical
to the walis tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis
tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a
determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to
make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
SECTION 4 (a) - In Disini vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 169823-24 and 174764-65,
September 11, 2013 – The elements of the offense under Section 4 (a) of R.A. No. 3019 are: (1)
That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official; (2) That he capitalizes
or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary advantage from any person having
some business, transaction, application, request, or contract with the government; (3) That the
public official with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in
the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
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The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019,
if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, considering that: (1)
Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the first cousin of First Lady Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2)
Disini, taking advantage of such family and close personal relations, requested and received
$1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the entities then
having business, transaction, and application with the Government in connection with the
PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom Disini had family or close personal
relations, intervened to secure and obtain for Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural
contract, and for Westinghouse the construction of the PNPPP.
SECTION 7 – Section 7 of RA No. 3019 provides: “Section 7. Statement of assets and

liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming
office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the
expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and
file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department
or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the
Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the
corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a
statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided,
That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may
file their statements in the following months of January.”
On the other hand, Section 8 of RA No. 6713 provides: “SECTION 8. Statements and
Disclosure. — Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit
declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth
and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. (A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities
and Financial Disclosure. — All public officials and employees, except those who serve in an
honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement
of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age
living in their households. XXXXXX The documents must be filed: (a) within thirty (30) days after
assumption of office; (b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and (c) within thirty (30)
days after separation from the service.”
The rule directing full disclosure of wealth in the SALN is a means of preventing said evil
and is aimed particularly at minimizing if not altogether curtailing the opportunities for
official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. By the SALN, the
public is able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check
and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth (Gupilan-Aguilar vs. Office
of the Umbudsman, G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014).
It is imperative that every public official or government employee must make and submit
a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress any
questionable accumulation of wealth. This serves as the basis of the government and the people
in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials and employees in compliance with the
constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to promote transparency in government, and to
ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and modest lives, with the end in
view of curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a
standard of honesty in the public service (OCA vs. Usman, A.M. No. SCC-08-12, October 19,
2011). In fact, filing SALN is a constitutional duty. Article 11, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often
thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and
net worth.”
Failure to file SALN as required by law is a violation of Section 8 of RA No. 6713 and
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 (Concerned Taxpayer vs. Doblada, A.M. No. P-99-1342, June 8, 2005).
Since both laws provide a penalty for failure to file SALN, the offender should only be prosecuted
and punished either under one or the other.
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However, it is submitted that Section 7 of RA No. 3019 has been modified by Section 8 of
RA No. 6713. The court takes judicial notice of the fact that public officers are now submitting
SALN in compliance with Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees issued by the Civil Service Commission. They are required to file
the SALN “on or before April 30, of every year” as required under RA No. 6713 and not “within
the month of January of every other year” as mandated under RA No. 3019.
Section 8 of RA No. 6713 excludes public officials and employees, who serve in an honorary
capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers from the requirement of filling SALN. If these
public officers are excused from filling SALN under RA 6713, it would be absurd to criminally
make them responsible under RA No. 3019 for failure to file it. By parity of reasoning, if a public
officer filed a SALN in April of a certain year in compliance of RA No. 6713 he should not be made
criminally liable under RA No. 3019 which requires that the SALN should be filed within the
month of January.
RA No. 3019 is enacted in 1960 or prior to the 1987 Constitution, while RA No.6713 is
passed precisely to implement the constitutional provision on SALN. Section 8 of RA No. 6713 is
the latest legislative expression that gives spirit and substance to State policy of transparency
and public accountability. Hence, the time regulation and the exclusionary rule under RA No.
6713 regarding the filing of SALN is controlling even if the accused is charged for failure to file
SALN under Section 7 of RA No. 3019.
SECTION 13 - Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution
under a valid information for crime of corruption under RA 3019, crimes committed by public
officer under RPC or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Usurpation of public authority
(Miranda vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 154098, July 27, 2005, En Banc) and election
offense (Juan vs. People, G.R. No. 132378, January 18, 2000) are offenses involving fraud upon
the government. Falsification of document (voucher) is offense involving fraud upon public funds
or property (Bustillo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 146217, April 7, 2006).
Presumption of innocence - The preventive suspension under Section 13 of RA No. 3019

is not penalty. Thus, suspension, which is being ordered before a judgment of conviction is
reached, is not violation of constitutional right to be presumed innocent (Bunye vs. Escareal,
G.R. No. 110216, September 10, 1993). The suspended accused, whose culpability remains to
be proven, are still entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence (Juan vs. People, G.R.
No. 132378, January 18, 2000).
Ex post facto law - Article 24 (3) of the Revised Penal Code clearly states that suspension
from the employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings shall not be
considered as penalty. It is not a penalty because it is not imposed as a result of judicial
proceedings. In fact, if acquitted, the official concerned shall be entitled to reinstatement and to
the salaries and benefits, which he failed to receive during suspension. This is merely preventive
measures before final judgment. Not being a penal provision, therefore, the suspension from
office, pending trial, of the public officer charged with crimes mentioned in the amendatory
provision committed before its effectivity does not violate the constitutional provision on ex post
facto law (Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. L-61776 to L-61861, March 23, 1984).
Pre-suspension hearing - While the suspension of a public officer under this provision
is mandatory, the suspension requires a prior hearing to determine “the validity of the
information” filed against him, “taking into account the serious and far reaching consequences
of a suspension of an elective public official even before his conviction.” The accused public
official’s right to challenge the validity of the information before a suspension order may be issued
includes the right to challenge the (i) validity of the criminal proceeding leading to the filing of an
information against him, and (ii) propriety of his prosecution on the ground that the acts charged
do not constitute a violation of R.A. No. 3019 or of the provisions on bribery of the Revised Penal
Code (Miguel vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 04, 2012).
In Luciano vs. Mariano, G.R. N L-32950, July 30, 1971 – Where the preliminary
investigation was for falsification, the office of the prosecutor could not validly charged the
petitioner with the graver crime of violation of RA No. 3019. Thus, he is entitled to a new
preliminary investigation. The ruling on the validity of the information is to be held in abeyance
until after the outcome of the preliminary investigation of violation of RA No. 3019, and hence
no suspension order can issue. Should the fiscal find no case, he will then so inform the trial
court and move to dismiss the case. In the contrary case, respondent court will then have to hear
and decide petitioners' pending motion to quash before it, which squarely raises question that
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the facts charged do not constitute an offense and are not punishable under section 3 (a) and (e)
of Republic Act No. 3019, contrary to the information's averment.
Procedure - Upon the filing of such information, the trial court should issue an order
with proper notice requiring the accused officer to show cause at a specific date of hearing why
he should not be ordered suspended from office pursuant to 13 of RA No. 3019. Where either the
prosecution seasonably files a motion for an order of suspension or the accused in turn files a
motion to quash the information or challenges the validity thereof, such show-cause order of the
trial court would no longer be necessary. What is indispensable is that the trial court duly hear
the parties at a hearing held for determining the validity of the information, and thereafter hand
down its ruling, issuing the corresponding order of suspension should it uphold the validity of
the information or withholding such suspension in the contrary case.
No specific rules need be laid down for such pre-suspension hearing. Suffice it to state
that the accused should be given a fair and adequate opportunity to challenge the validity of the
criminal proceedings against him, e.g. that he has not been afforded the right of due preliminary
investigation; that the acts for which he stands charged do not constitute a violation of the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 or of the bribery provisions of the Revised Penal Code which
would warrant his mandatory suspension from office under section 13 of the Act; or he may
present a motion to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court (Miguel vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172035, July 04, 2012)
Period of preventive suspension- Even though the law is silent on the duration of the
preventive suspension, the suspension should not be indefinite. Section 13 of RA No. 3019 does
not provide the period of preventive suspension. Hence, the duration of suspension under the
Administrative Code, which provides that the suspension may not exceed 90 days (Layus M.D.
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134272, December 8, 1999) may be adopted in fixing the duration
of suspension under RA 3019. The said 90-day maximum period for suspension shall apply to
all those who are validly charged under RA 3019, whether elective or appointive officer or
employee (Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96131, September 6, 1991).
SPEEDY DISOPOSITION OF CASES - In People vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, and Perez,

G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013 - There was really no sufficient justification tendered by
the State for the long delay of more than five years in bringing the charges against the
respondents before the proper court. On the charge of robbery, the preliminary investigation
would not require more than five years to ascertain the relevant factual and legal matters. The
basic elements of the offense, that is, the intimidation or pressure allegedly exerted on Cong.
Jimenez, the manner by which the money extorted had been delivered, and the respondents had
been identified as the perpetrators, had been adequately bared before the Office of the
Ombudsman. The obtention of the bank documents was not indispensable to establish probable
cause to charge them with the offense. In fine, the Office of the Ombudsman transgressed the
respondents’ right to due process as well as their right to the speedy disposition of their case.
Because of the inordinate delay in resolving the criminal complaint by the Ombudsman against
respondent, the cases against respondent were dismissed.
PLUNDER
RA No. 7080
1. The elements of plunder are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members
of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
(2) That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination

or series of the following overt or criminal acts:
(a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public

funds or raids on the public treasury;
(b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position
of the public officer;
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(c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the
National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of
Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or

influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
(3) That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00 (Joseph Ejercito Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
2. A Senator on three occasions identified Napoles’ bogus non-governmental as recipient

of his PDAP in the total amount of 100 million. Instead of using the fund for legitimate purpose,
the Senator and Napoles divided the money on the basis of 40-60 sharing. Napoles got the lion’s
share. Did they commit plunder?
No. The Senator as a public officer did not amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten
wealth through series of misuse or malversation of public funds in the aggregate amount of at
least P50,000,000.00. The Senator merely acquired 40 million pesos in this modus operandi. On
the other hand, Napoles on her private capacity cannot commit plunder.
3. Would you answer be the same if the Senator got the lion’s share of 60%?
Yes. The Senator, who acquired 60 million pesos, is liable for plunder. Under RA 7080,
plunder can be committed by a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance other persons
Napoles is likewise liable on the basis of conspiracy. Because of conspiracy, the acts of
plunder committed by the Senator, a public officer, is attributable to Napoles, a private
individual, although they are not similarly situated in relation to the object of the crime.
4. Can the Senator use the defense in malversation that he is not responsible for the
misuse of his PDAP since it is the duty of the appropriate implementing agency of the
government to check that the recipient of the fund is not bogus?
No. Assuming that the duty to check that the recipient of the Senator’s PDAP is not
bogus belongs to the appropriate agency of the government, the Senator is still liable since
malversation can be committed through culpa.
CYBERLIBEL
Writing, printing, lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical

exhibition, cinematographic exhibition are means of publication in libel (2002 Bar Examination).
They have a common characteristic, and that is, their permanent nature as a means of
publication and this explains the graver penalty for libel than that prescribed for oral defamation.
Hence, the phrase “any similar means” should be understood in the lights of the said common
characteristic of the means to commit libel. Thus, defamation thorough amplifier constitutes
slander under Article 358 and not libel since its nature as means of publication is not permanent,
and thus, it is not similar to radio or other means mentioned in Article 355 since (People vs.
Santiago, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30, 1962). On the other hand, television though not expressly
mentioned in Article 355 easily qualifies under the general provision “or any similar means”
(People vs. Casten, CA-G.R. No. 07924-CR, December 13, 1974; 2005 Bar Examination). Since
nature of internet as a means of publication is permanent, it should be considered as a means
to commit libel. In Disini, the Supreme Court ruled:
“The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally
protected speech and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation
87 | P a g e
to Article 355 of the Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for committing libel.”
Venue of cyber libel - As a general rule, the venue of libel cases where the complainant
is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: 1) where the complainant
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory
article was printed and first published (Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code).
However, the place where libelous article was accessed by the offended party in the
internet is not equivalent to the place where the libelous article is printed and first
published within the contemplation of the rule on venue under Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code.
To rule otherwise is to allow the evil sought to be prevented by the amendment to Article
360, and that was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant,
isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than harass or intimidate an
accused. The disparity or unevenness of the situation becomes even more acute where the
offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite
or the need for revenge.
To equate the “first access to the defamatory article on website” with "printing and first
publication of the article" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the
RPC sought to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos
that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or anyone who
posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines that the private
complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending website.
At any rate, Article 360 still allow offended party to file the civil or criminal complaint for
internet libel in their respective places of residence (Bonifacio vs. RTC, Makati, Branch 149,G.R.
No. 184800, May 5, 2010)
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2015 BAR REVIEWER ON CRIMINAL LAW

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES LAW CENTER JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA

POSITIVIST THEORY AND CLASSICAL THERORY

CHARACTERISTIC OF CRIMINAL LAW

GENERALITY - Generality principle is akin to territoriality principle in the sense that

2. Consular officers - Despite the ruling in Schneckenburger vs. Moran, consular

TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE: Under the principle of territoriality, the Philippines has

EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY - Under the principle of extra-territoriality, the Philippines has

PROSPECTIVITY: Article 22 of RPC - If the court in trying an accused, who committed a

REPEAL: Decriminalization - Repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to

2. Premature marriage - Under Article 351 of RPC, a woman in contracting marriage

MISTAKE OF FACT PRINCIPLE:

VOLUNTARINESS – Concurrence of freedom, intelligence and intent makes up the

Circumstantial or inconclusive evidence - Indeed, motive becomes material when the

INDETERMINATE OFFENSE DOCTRINE – In People vs. Lamahang, G.R. No. 43530,

ERROR IN PERSONAE - In case of error in personae, person is criminally responsible

ABERRATIO ICTUS - In case of aberratio ictus, person is criminally responsible for

PRAETER INTENTIONEM: In case of praeter intentionem, person is criminally

1. Mitigating circumstance - The mitigating circumstance that “the offender had no

3. Treachery - If accused employed means to render the victim defenseless, treachery

4. Conspiracy - Conspirators, who conspired to kill a particular parson, are equally

ATTEMPTED AND FRUSTRATED STAGES: In attempted felony, the offender performs

FRUSTRATED AND CONSUMMATED - In frustrated and consummated felony, the

SPONTANOEUS DESISTANCE - The term spontaneous is not equivalent to voluntary.

HOMICIDE OR MURDER – The intent to kill, as an essential element of homicide at

RECOMMENDED EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY

COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY - It is immaterial whether appellant acted as a principal

DISSOCIATION - To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have

Necessary means - The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be

Under doctrine of rationale equivalence, plea of self-defense would prosper if there is a

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME: "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a scientifically

1. Exempting circumstance of minority - To exempt a minor, who is 15 years old or

3. Suspension of sentence - While Section 38 of RA 9344 provides that suspension of

6. Full credit of preventive imprisonment - Under Article 29 of RPC, a convicted

In exempting circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important

In exempting circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the mental age of the

Insanity as an exempting circumstance must relate to the time immediately preceding or

ABSOLUTORY CAUSE IN CRIME AGAINST PROPERTY

INSTIGATION AND ENTRAPMENT

VOLUNTARY SURRENDER – To appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

In vindication of grave offense, criminal exemption of accessories, alternative

It is now a requirement that the aggravating as well as the qualifying circumstances be

Treachery is not a qualifying circumstance but a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery

EMPLOMENT OF MEANS TO WEAKEN DEFENSE - If the employment of means to

ABUSE OF SUEPRIOR STRENGHT - Abuse of superior strength is present whenever

EVIDENT PREMEDITATION - To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the

DISREGARD OF SEX: Robbery with homicide is essentially a felony against property.

In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating

REPETITION - Differences of recidivism, quasi-recidivism, reiteracion and habitual

Alternative circumstances are those which must be taken into consideration as

Criminal participator - Criminal participator is the offender who participated in

(1) With conspiracy - If there is conspiracy, the criminal participator or cooperator is a

(a) Previous or simultaneous acts – The criminal participator by previous or

The liability of accessory and principal should also be considered as quasi-collective. It

It is immaterial whether accused acted as a principal or an accomplice. What really

a. Proving robbery or theft – Commission of robbery or theft by the principal as an

The presumption of theft is disputable. The presumption of fencing may be overcome by

d. Recently stolen property – If suspect is found in possession of recently stolen

c. Obstructing criminal investigation or prosecution - Public officer, who destroyed

If a respondent in a preliminary investigation altered the allegation in the complaint-

d. Preventing an illegal arrest – Harboring or concealing a criminal suspect in order to

f. No exempting circumstance - Accessories are exempt from criminal liability if the

1. Preventive imprisonment – Under Article 29 of RPC as amended by RA No. 10592

a. No credit by reason of disqualification – The grant of credit of preventive