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 CONFIDENTIAL

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N(YTICI.':

'[FlIT i;
DOC .I1.IKU'T CONMIIN' I1JIFORM0ATI ON

AFFT.CTIN(; TIH; NATIONAIJ UL)FYNRE OF

TILE UJIJ'I1) :;TA1h:; [T|IUhN T1|. MIAN-

ING OF TIUHE FI.;1qONAGE JAWS',, TITTI1• l)

U .s.Cc , SECTI[.ONS ' )• ,utt b. Tin

')ON OR THE RWVKIA'I'r ON OF

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BY IAW.
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This docurneni ronsiats of I" pages-

DOMINIC 11 No.- ~ of 1-5 copies. Series A.

" SHOT SMALL BOY

PROJECT OFFICERS REPORT--PROJECT 7.14

BOMB ALARM DETECTOR TEST (U)

Cecil C. Harvell, Project Officer

C_)

and the staff of

Western Union Telegraph Company
"New York, New York

D)irectorate of Telecommunications,
AII
'Xi'L1i1)IIl) |:].tO\ ,AT1MA A FOAC
RFG1ItA1IN(G; D01) I)IR :,'O... Washington 25, D.C.
1DOE"SN.'V ,AIPPLY.

FORM ERLY RESTR ICTED DATA

Handle as Restricted Data in foreign dis-
,. . ,:
""'u ' April 1..

semination. Section 144b. Atomic Energy

Act of 1954.

This material contains Information affect-

ing the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, U.S.C., Sees. 793 and 794. the
transmission or revelation of which In any
manner to an unauthorized person is pro7
hiblted by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
Inquiries relative to this report may be made to

Chief, Defense Atomic Support Agency

Washington 25, 1). C.

When no longer required, this document may be

destroyed in accordance with applicable security
regulations.

DO NOT RETURN THIS DOCUMENT

- . . .It. - 1 -. " 1 .1 ..T

 CONFIDENTIAL ,
,,POit,:2250
'/, -,- /,'r•-2250

! OPERATlI)N DOMINIC 11

SHOT SMAI,. 110Y

PRIOJECT (OFFICERS RE
lie 'l'- )R11,1]ECT 7.14-
NU

. BOMB AAIRM DE.:TlE:CTOR "tiST (U)T

2

Cecil C. Ilarvell, Project Officer

and the staff of
Western Union Telegraph Company
New York, New York

Directorate of Teleconnimnuications,
A FOAC
Washington 25, D).C.

E-XCLLi)EI) FROM AUTOMATIC

IREGLADING; DOD I)DI h2,0.10

DOES NOT APPLY.

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA Thisdocumentis the author(s) report to the Chief,

dexperimentation sponsored by that agency during
seminatton. Section 144b, Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.
This material contains information affect-
Ing the national defense of the United States
within the meaning of the espionage laws,
Title 18, U.S.C., Sees. 793 and 794, the
transmission or revelation of which in any
manner to an unauthorized person is pro-
hiblited by law.
InDfense Atomic Support Agency, of the results of
nuclear weapons effects testing. The results and
findings in this report are those of the author(s) and
not necessarily those ot the DOD. Accordingly,
reference to this material must credit the author(s).
This report Is the prnerty of the Department of
Defense and, as such, maybe reclassified or with-
drawn from circulation as appropriate by the De-
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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, ). C.

CONFIDENTIAL
 AliS'MPt4C'i

Wecten
Uto'1\'etrap Copay1191. 'ih1o Vu~rlou c ompon_.'Itz; of

t3,sstm iincluding the vesrhave been tested 1llyider

labor:ttory condititoir. Thie primary purpose of the tet ae

to prove unequivocally that the s-ensors wcrild re*giea

nuclear event :i'td trnu[' L

DMsagS tc. I). diE-p~ry$'i-- at S'J"V

distant. lot~'niti't~lJsnub antee~~~e r-e s: ,Trr:Isry

QLwj)()5C of je e t '.ea; t.' a-scertain the elcrt~ntc(EM)

effect of a 'u'rrrem'tie-i oin -itmatm cations i- itcY

utilize.d to) co11nrcrt the' varioucldncnt Of thle ala-rm.

To achieve thoseý roesult:,0severv.l sol rwer j:ttY>

and con-nected -to th'- y.;t~eM

-~tuw~ and tO ilttnriath

These eonftgura-tio'vi w.ero toý determine that the syvtem, was

respn-Awiv, or,, it' xetnindicsite where the sy:--tst t 4

in ordcr--: tht propexr design ehferges ci-n be %S.carporated .t

thle syote~m to) achfve.r the (1-c1r-id eperatiznal i-ttent.l-

Thle. sensor3;, colnwc ted. to( thle. nationwide systesm, -cora

installed in a cofgrto.ewrir-ronnrntal to tacý ote.~

sors, of the nationwideý system. Since thi-s i's anY ur_:;. 4tded

systm,ýJ these sensqoryý detected., transmitted., and- dls1,ptavred

the event u1ponccrene

CONFIDENTIAL
 The instrumented sensors checked the go., no-go of the

various actions required of the sensor elements in recogniz-

ing a nuclear detonation and transmitting a signal to this

effect.

Thec instrumented open-wire line was to determine the

electromagnetic inductive effect on such facilities. This

information was to determine whether or not the EM effect

would deter the transmission of the signal by the sensor.

Performance of the various sensors and the electromag-

netic phenomena of the open-wire lines was, recorded on oscil-

loscope camera film., magnetic and teleprinter tapes. Thin,

information confirms theoretical calculations relative to

sensitivity and range. of the sensors.

CONFIDENTI1A L
 CONTENTS

ABISTIAC'lT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

CHIAPTER I INTROI)DUCTION . ........... 9

1.1 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 llackgrott| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.1 System Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.2 1)etectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11

CHAPTER 2 OE.RATIONS ................ 14

2.1 Equipmniiit Cotnfiguration .. . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 Instrumentation Co nffiguratior
............. 16
2.3 Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

CHIAPTIER 3 RiESUIITS AND DISCUSSION ... .......... 22

CIIAP'T1ER 4 CONCLUSIONS ......... ............... .. 46

FIGIIRIES

2.1 lx)cation1 of ett1uipnMelt..t ....... .............. ... 19

2.2 Instrumentation site ......... ................ 20
2.3 Instrumentation at trailer site ..... ............ 21
;3.1 leletype record of red alarms ........... ............ 33
.1.2 Photocell and main amplifier performue..e .......... .. 33
.1.3 Orange aiiplifier performance .... ............ .. 34
.1.4 Performance of two-mile detector ............. ... 34
3.5 P1erforin:uice of one-half-mile detector (seconds) ...... 35
3.6 Performance of one-half-mile detector (milliseconds) . . 35
3.7 Performane, of one-mile detector .... ........... .. 36
3.8 Performance of one-mile detector (seconds) ... ..... .. 36
3.9 Performance of two-mile detector .... .......... .. 37
3.10 Performance of four-mile detector ... .......... .. 37
:3.11 Performiance of seven-mile detector ... ........ .. 38
3.12 Perform~nrce of twelve-mile detector (time 'zero). . .. 39
3.12a Performance of twelve-mile detector (time = zero) . . 39
3.13 Performance of unmodified detector (only timing pulses
visible) ............ .................. 40
3.13a 1'erbucixmicc of unmodified detector (only timing pulses
visible) ................ .............. . .. 40
7
CONFIDENTIAL
3.14 One-mile detector installation and portion of
open-wire pole line ...... .............. ... 41
".15 Line-to-ground potential ...... .............. .. 42
3.16 Potential between wires ....... .............. .. 42
3.17 First thermal pulse ........ ................ .. 43
3.18 Second thermal pulse ....... ............... .. 43
3.19 Second thermal pulse (overall).................... ... 44
3.20 Gamma radiation at four miles (milliseconds) ...... .. 44
3.21 Gamma radiation at four miles (milliseconds) ...... .. 45

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

CHAP1MR 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 OBJECTIVES

The primary objective of this test was to insure that

the bomb alarm sensors would positively react upon observance

of a nuclear event.

The secondary objective of this test was to obtain in-

formation with regard to electromagnetic (EM) inductive effect

on various types of communications plant facilities.

1.2 BACKOUND

The bomb alarm system, including the detectors, was

designed by Western Union. The detectors utilized have been

tested under laboratory conditions, utilizing a nuclear flash

simulator as described below.

Briefly, a photoflash lamp and a photospot lamp nare

energized sequentially, the photoflash lamp being energized

with a pulse of current having a first predetermined mrave

shape, and the photospot lamp being energized with a pulse

of current having a second pre-determined wave shape. The

combination simulates the tbermal energy generated by the

occurrence of a nuclear explosion.

CONFIDENTIAL
FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
1.3 THEORY

1.3.1 System Operation. Briefly, the operation of Bomb

Alarm Display System 21 0-A is as follows-. The system is

under continuous operation and observes selected designated

areas ennaldired tn he of prim- Inpnrtanre in the contigouns

states of the United States. Each of these designated areas

is observed by three (or a multiple of three) omnidirectional

detectors, each of which has associated with it a signal-

generating station capable of initiating a message indicating

the recognition by the detector of a nuclear event. A number

of these signal generating stations are connected by duplex

circuits into a master control center that is the control

center for these stations. Each master control center has

the capability of polling all of its associated signal gener-

ating stations. Upon receipt of this polling message. the sig-

nal-generating stations have the capability of transmitting a

message in reply that normally would indicate that Its associ-

ated detector was in proper working order and that no nuclear

event was being observed (green light - normal condition). At

the conclusion of each polling sequence, each master control

center transmits the status of each of its signal generating

stations over txnuk circuits to all display centers. Thus, the

status of each area is displayed at all times with respect to

10

CONFIDENTIAL
(i) recognition ot' a ucic-rir event (red light - ale-na c-ondi-

tion), (2) readlitons to r-port such an event if it wevre to

occur (green light - normal con:dition), and (3) equripmlrt or

circuit malft•iction (yellow light - trouble condition), initi-

ated by the auViter control ceUier wuen Urouble iu indiUcaLd

during polling,.

1.3.2 Deteetors. The detectora used in the vystem are

designed to dc-beet the thermal radiation from nuclear blasts

and to operate :,rYtitfifanuv.y. They ha ve a minimuu foggy we' -

ther r••ne ot' morre thnit 19 miles and 'ov-Žr a field extending

from 0 degreet to 10 dcgreet in clevation and from 0 drgrees

to 360 deLgreeit 1i azimuth. They nra ,used in groups of three,

spaced at approximately )20 degree intr.rvajs and Il' miles dis-

tant from the center of the area under observationo With this

arrangement, the distance between any two detectors is 19

miles. The detectors are installed at the tops of poles or

on suitable buildings or similar structur.es.

A blast at the center would be reported by all of the

three detector., for the fl-mile distance is well within their

range, and at this disti.nce there is ample tinr for the detec-

tor to report the cvent before the arrival of the bLast wave.

All conuecting wires enad other system elements are: outside

the ceutral area. Tf the blast were close enough to one of

CONFIDENTIAL
the detectors to de3troy it before it (culd report, the other

two detectors In the group would send the alhnm.

The detector rc•eive.s it,; opterrting power owi.r a pair

of wi-res from th1e telegraph signal-generating station at about

30 volts and 0.06 impere de. Signals from the det-c o," Ltu the

signal-t;eneratiP4. station pas= over tle .3ame wire.s in the, form

of audio-frequency tones, a c(ontinuous f100 cps indicating a

normal green condition, and a one-second burst of approximately

920 cps followed by a one-second barst of approximately (40 cps

indicating a red alarm. The A.ignal generating station may be

some considerable distance IProm the det+ector, dependi•g on the

resistance and permlsziblo line voltagc0

The detector is housed in a heavy, airtight; alu•inu-m,

cylindrical contaixer, about 9 inches it. rliamsirtr and 1 foot

high, paint-ad white on the ouxtside to reflect solir heat., and

is surmouLnted by a cylindrical fresnol-type marine Vnr.

Within the lens is t cylindricnl p•.erforated fe.i tl shi.iLd t.hat

has a light o ttenuation, factr)r ol 100, and, within the shib.ld,

photocells of tlhe_ tiliccu sun battery type are mounted at the

focus of the lens0

The individual photocefls are th]in plates of 1 by 2 cm

and three of them are mounted at the focus in a trianegular

structinv, cm high and 1 cm on a sidc- with th.n sensitive

12

CONFIDENTIAL
surface on the outer face. They are a photovoltaic type. of

cell that responds to the wave length range from 0.4 to 1.1

microns oad thtus aire well natched to tin black-body type -nd

temperaturte of the nuclear blast. As used in the detector,

they have a logarithmlic response, producing 0.2 volt for a

miniium event and 0.8 volt for a flash that is a million

tiwme brighter. 'ftheir respons3e time, is only a few micro-

seconds.

Tie electrical pulse generated in the photocells by a

nuclear blast ic: amplified and put into disc riminating cir-

euits. These circult.s are designed to res-pond only to pulses

of sufficient ma-nnJtude and of the shape that is unique to a

nuclear blast and to perform a series of five successive tests

to assure that an alarm will be given only in the ver~t of a

nuclear flash. First$ the thermal energy must lie in the wave,

length range between 0.1 .and 1.1 microne. Second, the rise

titol. of the fiJfnh must he vYry Aihert, c'f the order of 30 micro-

seconds or less. Mirlp the intenci.y or amplitude mw-t be at

least conrlarab.e to tint of the n•-wray siin i 0e.•

OI"? ft-
amihe. Foturtlh, the, iiiiti:iI [lItse' muttLSt iist, 't minimum of
ato

II0,i00(0 It-c adh" am I (Ic cay to our-hl value within :30 in seC.

lil-th, Ihe, s,-conld e)t'.ak must rise to k mini mum of 101,00 ft-cmndles

Ln one second and sustain for at least one additoitonl ec~cnd.

13

CONFIDENTIAL
 CHAPTER 2

OPERATIOQS

2.1 EQUIPfNT CONFIGURATION

In order to test the detectors in this shot, it was

necessary1 due to the difference in time amplitude character-

istic of the thermal pulse generated by this smaller event,

to effect a change in the sampling times of the detectors.

These modifications were made by Western Union, prior to ship-

ment of the equipment.

The detector modifications consisted of reducing the

first pulse sampling time from thirty to two msec and the

second pulse sampling tine from one second to sixty msec.

The signal-generating stations wore also modified so act

to react to the reduced time cycle. The red alarm signal

from a standard sensor cr-nsitits of a hlift to 920-cpe- tone

for one second followed by a shift to a 7 1 O--cps ton.e: for one

additional second. The sigatl-generating statione ware designed

to require the presence of these tones for an npprectble por-

tion of a second in order to reduce the hazard of generating

false reds from spurious bursts of tones or noise. The modified

sensors Rend the 920-cps tone for onijy sixty msec fý lrcwed by

red tone for one second. Then time constar.t of the 920-eps tone

14

CONFIDENTIAL
detector In these signal-ge-nerating stationo had to be red~acý.ed

:3o that the station wou-ld react to a fifty-mac-c burst :of tina.

Becatuse. the in~tenvity of the radiation wao- or-.ry 1 peýr

ocent of -that for which the L-yvtem was designed, three detectors

wore mount-d at 1/10t;1 of' the normaL distance from ground zerc,

(at one mtile) no an~ to expose,, them t,) norwil inteflGltiý'25. lmccc,

one-mile detectorO were, connect,-d by cable circuits to EtgnsiV

gefleratin4; st~ations at the inetrumnntation rite- located approxi-

mately 4 mitec from grouind ',r.rn- (0.9 tilo eust of the int.ýr-

section of MLrreury Highwvay ini- the c-aet-wert rac-d Linto Frc~nchnnnm

Flat). From the inctrwnintaticn r~ite, thrzce teleIgrxaph' circ-uits

into Inn, Vegnasý connected thlcc;e gene-rating .-tations irnto- the

210-A Nationwide Alrm Sys-tem by waty of the, master centrol sto9-

tions located at Helena, W'atwvm, Salt Inke City, Utah, nrmA

Tullsa,. okiahioet.

Addit Lanai ,tntr worn lac~tafled in at CO'\ftgttr¶tiC-fl

that. pliced theml -t dtzstqxn.e., of ppcimtly1/2, 1, 2, h, 7

end 12 ltc.jCram grn'aYid z.-ro t-) further chick bLhefr ti

tivit)y mid ralgE, (Figure e onnected by cable

tectors %%VWe
'2.1). (Ihe

Inl addition to the trist of' the doteýctnrr, ail~~.-ir

line was constructed from a point 1/2 w11- froim gro'ia r,-t' t-i

a po)int. apqploxiuri iaoly 2' 1/2 idltes from'j g'roundzer :detrl

15

CONFIDENTIAL
from there by ur~ats of 1. 1/2 miles of t'wiatedo-, pair fieldf wire

to the instrumnentation site. At the i/9- mile point the open-

wire tlne w~ts resistive ly U' rmiiinatd :uid a sp~ark gap) lightning
.1rr1estor'w as Iplatevl hetweenl each %%ire arid a drivenl g rounid

rod. (It is Quite, certatin, that this was a poor ground due tc',

the dry nat'nx:ý of the soil.). At the inptrumentation s~tt- th'-

other end of thiti line vns conniected to oscilloscopes- so that

the tine-amplitude relationshtp of? any EM effects might be

nvwasured.

A portable radiatio)n instrumient wms connected to) a clvtn-

nel of a t-ape recorder at the in --trumrntation site. to. provide.

an Indication of the intensity of gawm radiation at thin

distance.

The insýtrunn-ntation site consisted of an ajir-c.Olc~ll

trailer in which we--t housed all of the rensitive ir'3trdnrwnts.

t
Adjacen~jt to thn- tr-~.- vc- mounted four detectc ra, and such
wre

other optical inrrtrtw~nt:- al.3 were n!ecessary to nMea'u~re the.

tfrw-omzpljtudaý re-lhtionzhip of the the,7rnnl emiucion of? theý

event as well t-½ genrratvŽ the pr-acise type, of syrchrcni'-

ing pulse- nece-:-,-qry to makeu thie mevasureients (see Figure 2.2).

2.*2 lYE ¶OlLJNTATION CONFIGURATION

The eqyijx~mtrt within the trailer- fell1 in'.- Livegr.rf

16

CONFIDENTIAL
c atego -ites (1F' Igii c 2.3). '11'he i i g coupj cuniisjteIl of th iap

generating stations and teictype equipnrent (mentioned abo-v-)

which were tied into the Nationwide AIL'inn circuit. Arnother

group consaisted of two orcellcoscpes ('with recordinig

c-mieras), two- el-actron] c cotunters) and a magnetic tape z'*e-

corder to monitor the lerformance of' the detail csgrt

f

a sensor mounted adjacent tni thbe taitl~er. A third group was'

set upi to monitor tie pjnrfunnarce of th~e detecPtors, spaced

from 1/2- to) 12 tfl--o f~r') grou~xc v-ro andI corsiat!!d of thLree

dual,-track magnetic tape rtcorder;- and a timini~g-pulsa

generator. The ttatxg;-p'ilse generitor wan, doboigned to) add

timing pips to the r-ecorded phenocmena every 100 m±>ec! begin-

fling at time- zero. Theo fourth group corststed of' fourt

oscilloscopes with recoirding carrrss- 4-rd phcnto:e1J rircuW.'zy

and was devoted to nessaring the. time-amplitu.de r*aini

of the thermal pukle. "I),- fifth grn'ip include'S t)u 1ý-1

la.neous circuiatry for t',!i~ 'rrt'm

totnc Lx'-,' -nr eq'gip-

nM!to, power vlp.e 3 rŽodn .rfutn l -r Keaeplng

tmnrk of the slupply vo1-tag&i- anxd tW', tempar.-atw'e- w.ithin t'b'

instrumented deta!rt.:.r. In addi Fi-on, this grm,ýp iiLVia

synchronizing pu11-;- gite-rat-'r that. deve1lopcd r .4~'. ttuna

the initial rise time. of' the thenmil pxuxe-ic o-f tir C&xvL:.iR'n

to tr~ggerý: the Esweep geneý-rators of eli. of tit eeil;cp-

17

CONFIDENTIAL
and to start the timing pulse generator. Another item was a

teletypewriter connected to the service channel of the Bcrb

Alarm system which simplified the aligxinnt and nairteranac

of the outgoing teletype circuitry and the establishment of

testing proecL-frv and echedules.

2.3 MANPOWER

Forty eight man weeks of preparation were required

prior to shipment to the test site. An additio'al forty MR'.

weeks were spent at the site for the following purposec: to

install the equipment, to keep it manned durirg dry runr, to

check the status of eqrnipment during inactive periods) vd t3

keep the station manned in anticipatian of and during the

firing sequence.

18

CONFIDENTIAL
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Figuro 2.1 Location of equipment.

19
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23.

coNFDNT1AL
 C HAPIER 3

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Data determining the reliability of the 210-A Bomb Alarm

sensors van recorded by oscilloscope cameras, tape recorders,

teleprinters, and counters, recording the performanee of the

various sensors and the EM effects on the open-wire line.

At detonation time an absolutely perfect response

from each of the three sensors connected to the Nationwide

system brought up audible and visual red alarms on the communI-

cators' panels and maps in the three display centers at the

Pentagon and at Ent and Offutt Air Force Bares. The perform-

ance of the three generating stations was also mcnitored and

recorded locally at the instrumentation siteý, at Las Vegas, at

the master eontrol stat..nr, and at other kfy repiantr points.

Fi.igure1 3.1. shoN s the nature of these records with a normld poll

request BBBG and the normal green responce of each station

preceding and folLwtng the red a'A=rm mer'..AgP of each &4atior..

Or.e sensor located at the :.t..n4zentation site

was modified to e1.able the recording of the time-ampl.tude

relationsbip of the output signal of the var.ious detail el-

ments of the sensor. Figure 3.2, upper trace, shows the output

22

CONFIDENTIAL
of the photocell with respect to tiz, the lower trace shows

the output of the main amplifier and Figure 3.3 the output of

thit stecondary amplifier. The flares along the base line on

these and other photographs were the result of multiple

traces after the event took place and while the camera shut-

ters were still open. The photocell output voltage is actu-

ally a logarithmic function of the thermal input. Both

amplifiers are designed t- saturate with nominal inputs. The

tonal output. of this sensor was also recorded on magnetic tspe

aund when reviewved (Fig~ure 3.4) was found to have gone through a

normal ala-rm sequence from 1100 cps to 9r0 cps to 740 cps and

then back to 1100 cps. A similar unit was monitorad aurally

and was also found to have functioned normally. Two electronic

timers were also coinnected to this sensor to record the time

after detonation that the various internal switches operated;

the first nhnil.d have switche:d at 2 msec, the recnd at 60 nwec.

Although the magn.ttic tape record showed that, this detector

operated propwerly, thee.e -monttoring timerg were both tirned off

exactly 10 psec after detonation by a' interferirg sigral.

The five additional senaors located at 1/2-> 1, 2,

4, 7 and 12 miles were monitored to confirm theoretical data

on range and sensitivity. The tonal output of each of th9 sen-

sors was recorded on electromagnetic tape along with timing

23

CONFIDENTIAL
pulses to determine and record the fact and time of the shift

in tones for each of the sensors. The timing pulses occur at

100-msec intervals, beginning within a pec or two of the

beginning of thermal emission. AU sensors with the exception

of those at 1/2 and 1 mile reacted as anticipated; those at

2, 4%Sfd 7 miles functioned normally~while the one at 12 miles

without a line of site view and near the thecretical distance

limit did not react at all. The records of those sensors con-

nected to the instrumentation site by cable showed the presence

of an EM disturbance near time zero. The sensors at the instr':-

mentation site were tied directly to the recording equipment

and were free of such disturbances. The sensors at 1/2 mile

and 1 mile reacted differently in several respects. The line

to the sensor at 1 mile was completely free of EM effects,

while the line to the 1/2-mile sensor was disturbed by a larg&

EM transient beginning 72 msec after zero time. (Specula-

tively one might suggest that the fact that the cable from the

two-mile point toward ground zero was lying on the ground had

some effect on the EM disturbance and the disturbance at 72

msec was induced from other unrelated equipment in the near

vicinity of the 1/2-mile sensor). The signal from these two

sensors went directly from a 1100-cps tone tc the 740-cps

tone at time zero rather than through an intervening period of

24

CONFIDENTIAL
at least 60 mscc of 920-qrp tone. We hav'- not beeýn abl'! toý

sixmulate this reaction and thexrefore have no eFxplanatior. t-

offer at this tini. The ther three eror loc~ateýd at -,ný

mpile- reacted normaly, becatase the generating BtatioflF will

re-cognize 'i. -ed sigral only 'S it, ii preceded by a I-t

burst of orange tone.* The genn~ratiiig stationsý have beern

thoroughlyv checked since thbetr raturn to the llabonrtoryv and

canmnot be triggered ti O'er a r:ed alan'rm Ze tho orarpe mrý

precedes the red to.ne ir, the nonnmal ramrlnýr. !A'-ge e-e~t

static discharges by t.be.nt-.elvee- or in obr-ti~ with a c&

cident shift to 720 ep~wi'l, not inilc- a r-<1 alarni.

F'igujres 31.5 through 3.13 are- oseillographic photographs of

various tapes.
the signals as stored on tlit' Figures 3.5 aUnd 3.6

pertain to th.ý senisor at the l/-ieprint. Eaých tn

tY'ws

effects of' a slight EM dicsturbancF qt tiur zer,-' and aq rmch

larger dijsturba~nceP bgn .Vit 72 xi~,Figure 3.6 is to a

rqale rf 0 inuýc per d~Vn.ir

-.. )osth)-' .% of t½-diý~-

turban-ces in best detatil. Figure 3.5, wvith a scale of 100 misec

per dvi'ii'ttettue it-rct fr:;in htft from 3.107)

cp-ý te 74tQ eps. The7 'vrý.tl spikýz arx7 tbc-slO-me t~amtng

pui~sesPint vs r~t Upprest~d by th-2 t-iýc Fcin-tr

The la-rge! intetrferertce !;gnal In also evidtrnt at 72 me---

Figures 3. 7 and 3.h pertain to the sensor at the 1-mile point (Figure 3.14).
With the timie scale of 50 misec per division, Figure 3.7 shows the

25

CONFIDENTIAL
complete absence of EM effects from a time more than 100 msec

before to nearly 400 msec after time zero. The shift to 74o

cps, illustrated by the change in amplitude at time zers, iPz

also illustrated. Figure 3.8, with a time scale of I00 msec per
divininn, hnw' the direct shift to 740 cps at time ze-ro Most

of the l00-nwee timing pulses are visible, beginning with th-Ž

frequency shift to 740 cps.

Figures 3.4 and 3.9 illustrate the reaction of the sensor

at the 2-mile point. Both show the rather violent effect

(presumably fram EM causes) lasting Prr nearly 20 msec. The

shift in tone from 1100 cps to 920 cps at zero time and to 7hO

cps at 60 msec is clearly illustrated in Figure 3.4. Figure 3.9

(showing voltage raplitude vs time) best illustrates the nature

of the EM effect.
Figure 3. It) illustrates the' behav'ior of the sensor atdthe

instrureutAtion site (the 4--mile point). Since no cable was

involved, (the senruor wast directly corn nected to the tape

recorder), the equipment was not zusc-Ptible to EM induction.

The shift in frequency from 1100 cps tix 940 cps at zero time

is illtLutratsdhae well as the farther thift to 740 cps at

60 msec.

Figure :3.1 1 illustrates the performance of the sensor

located 7 miles from ground zero. An Induced potenttal pulsej

because of EM effect on the cable) can be seen near zero time.

26

CONFIDENTIAL
"Tlehe shilt il tones, [Ioi'n 1100 cps. to 9201 Cp)s to 7-10 cps is

ClhH'tr il tistr:t•tte(I, along with the 100-in-sc timling [)ulIseS.

V ig rl'tsL-3.12 Wuitl 3.12ai lInlain to the stnso(i loc atedlloi a

hill back of CP-1 about 12 miles from ground zero. The view

of the area inmrdiately adjacent to ground zero was obetructed

by intervening hillc. It is believed that at least part of

the Iiir(elhil %%-.svisible Iromu ti.s p)ointI. Figure 3.12 shows

the effects of a disturbance at tiiw zero, lO0-msrec timing

pulses, and nothing more. Figure 3.112:i coatlirms the fac't that

there was no shift in tone, either tt' 920 cps or 740 opp.

Due to extrenme ri-nge, this sensor was not expected to detect

the blast; no more than v possible shift to 920 eps was

anticipated.

Iigui'c.r 3.13 ani 3.13:t i llustl':ite ihe peldorimue.uc of a stal-

dard detector that was not modified to react to the smaller

event. This detector dnr's i+,s internal sampling at 30 msec

and at one second. Since this sensor was mouited at the

instruwntat.ion site, therŽ is no evidence of ary EM eff',ctc,

The absence of disturbances ji illtutrated il Figure :1.13,

which illustratec amplitude effects t-) best advantage--onily

the timing pulses are visible, Figure 3.13a illustrates the

frequency shift to 92) ClpS near time zero and a return to

LlOO cps in about two seconds. This is completely ntnmal;

any sudden bright i~ght will cau•se a shift to 920 cps. There

27

CONFIDENTIAL
was no shift to 740 cps because of the short duration of the

smaller event. The significance of this effect is that the

sensors in the alarm system, which were designed to Air Force

supplied criteria, will not in fact react to explosions of

weapons whose yields are as small as the one under test.

While results of the neasurement on the open-wire

line are somewhat inconclusive, valuable data were recorded.

Obviously, the time scale was short of ideal. Figure 3.15 indi-

cates a voltage swing of at least plus and minus 400 volts

(the traces may have gone off scale) between the open-wire

line and ground. The driven ground at the 1/2-mile end of the

line was of doubtful quality)and it is doubtful whether the

spark gap protectors operated to full advantage. With the

equipment back in the laboratory, the only way the pattern

can be duplicated is with the ground at the 1/2-mile point

missing. ligure 3.16 indicates the diffrcrentid potential

between the wires of the pair. With an effective ground, the

differential voltage increascs faster because of the fact that

the arrestors are not exactly identical, do not spark over at

exactly the sawe time and in the same way, therefore generating

fairly large instantaneous differential potentials. Tests in

the laboratory both now and in the past, when the system was

being designed, indicate that potentials of the sort experienced

2C

CONFIDENTIAL
dutring the expLogior and varl'nts o-tt~r types st'rnalated, In the

Thboratory have little effect on the perfo~mnnance )f tlhe sys-tem.

A lirect hit (-r nr-?.r mi by lt.v-htzing --r ra nwl -rrxpLnr

s--

wilt mirdrubtciLly inconpar-itatn ra sensor or Its allied equjipment

han-.+- ae' tnfr a-t + ,n,1i t 0 the ensor f!a

aset
t.imn 'e Thpcrqble.

Aaddito)!al CVIICriCt12 res;xoet to EM eýfrects may he

gathered from a-n -bqr2rvntionr at. the ti-me of the blast and an

examination of' theroe

mordc. At the time of the blast a spark-

Pigi- over was; obs-ervr-d at tho trailer termi-,ntio-n of? th?ý open-ý

wire line. It lv),c boon notd,l that the electroni:r tirnerr, whichb

were started by the synch~ronizingv pulsec and 'troit-ende~d tn

measure the samplinf- times of the instrvunented detector, were,

actually both shu~t off ten ps-c after they were started.

Further, an r-xxamL-Lqt-inr, of thec oz-ciltoscope trace of t½h rite

ttw. C4 the: f!.rt p-1-s A h therma emissio EhE e-n

cxtrvwir¶,r '*-: rt jL71 I'-) r is peil1. in t-mp-nec mid a scv

higbe1r pool:, -i' 15a'ita

tsrn y11CsC.

IL .:iss'gr tl thaj-t the-mv ttirtc hitsý ci information

were related,: t,' tb" siiir pl7tnLr '.I is suggef'ýtcd that theý

most se-vereý diszturnance ass-ociated with the EM effftct 2ss~ted

for no maon:ý than 20 u;aecl because a pulse of this duirat~i--n was

conducts-I t-o the inrn r~q rite, by the open-wtre l'A

CONFIDENTIAL
The time duration can be determined by the interfering signal

induced into- the oscilloscope circuitry and recorded along with

the rise time nf the first thermal pulse. it is also s-aggent•l

that this same, pulse was induced into the timer circuitry and

was the carc nf thr- timers having been shut off at tin )flec.

The fact that a spark was observed indicates a high voltage; the

fact that it was observed at the open-wire line termination

fixes its source as the open-wire line. Therefore, a high -

voltage, high-frequency signal was conducted into the trailer

by the open-wire line.

Because of the inexact nature of available informa-

tion concerning the time-amplitude characteristic of the ther-

mal emission, a photocell and measurir.g circuitry were included

in the instrumentation which world enable us to check our

design parameters. The pass band of the system was good

enoiugj t- cnpb!, •u•s V s-- at least a 2 ygsec rise tine. Dro

oscilloscopes wer) set up vfth diff0ering amplitude sensitivities

to record the oof the first thermal p'Jisz. These

scopes wer. set t) sweep rnte3 of 50 psec per cent.met'er for s

total sweep time of 500,isec. The sensitivity of the fir-;t was

such as to render the trwe useless. ThW. ,:cond showed the

pulse in all the detail hopi'i for. Figure:3.17 is t copy of this

30

CONFIDENTIAL
 Two additional oscilloscopes were also set up to Measure

the nature of the second thermal pulse. Figurc 3A.M• is; a p

of the pattern developed by the high sensitivity instrument

and is useful for the detail given at low levels. For

instance, after the first pulse, the intensity dropped to less

tha.n ,1,000tl-,-'.idl. . Vig1ur'. 3. 19 giveS :L•,tn ()J\'fl' ]l

picture.

The time duration and the amplitudes of both pulses

checked our design parameters exactly within the accuracy of

the measurements. For a weapon of Small Boy's sizej, the equip-

ment had been tailored to react to a rise time of 50 usec and

a first pulse duration of 3 msec. It was anticipated the

second pulse would rise to peak amplitude in 60 msec. It was

also anticipated that the peak intensity should be near 100,000

tt-,:,ih. althe
,t il.s-.lt1hTu'il:Lt.i,-i sit'. It will be noted

that all of these figures were in fact verified.

Since it was felt that some knowledge of the radia-

tion intensities was of interest, a spare chtuanel on one of the

tape recorders was used to record the response of a portable

gamma- detection instrument. V igi•ut- 3-'.20' h1hm S the iui lihi lu:a

pulses diuring the first 10 msec of the explosion and indicates

a pulse rate near or beyond the frequency capability (15,000

cps) of the tape recorder. I.'giu r ;t . 1 Is :3 ilt leg.rated record

of the first second after time zero and indicates that

CONFIDENTIAL
essentially all of the gamma radiation took place within 0.5

see. The peak reading on the meter on the instrument was

10 mr; however, the short duration of the pulse and the

time constant of the metering circuit my have been such

... to
as ke th. a low reading.

Since this was a desert installation during the hot-

test part of the year, it was anticipated that the temperatures

within the detectors might be of interest., Thermal elements

were installed in the instrumented detectors and the tempera-

ture of the one connected to the system was monitored on a 24-

hour basis. The temperatures encountered were (within calibra-

tion accuracies) the csae as those measured in the shade. The

white paint used is apparently quite effective in keeping the

temperatures within the sensors near ambient.

32

CONFIDENTIAL
 B~ll:,,C ,."~•.C~tWC 3CYGC-., CYBL•UiQ GGBW•

BVlU;C JGLW JCiJ*CYJGDCYB[UG JGBW

t;, MGIH W Gl C.YMGBCYBBBP-, MGBW
POLL GREEN I ST . 2NO. IPOLL I GREEN

IRESPONSE J RED JRED j jRESPONSE

F'igure :.1 Trelitype record of red alarms.

0 s0 100
MlI LLISECONDS

Figure 3.2 Photocell aid maini amplifier performwice.

CONFIDENTIAL
0 50 I00
MILL ISECONDS
t~ igu rt :1.3 1)'antgu •mIfli1)'i' c
perorm ance

U.

920
740
00-

0 0.2 0.4
SECONDS
1 igt irt 3.1 I 'v'II'
11) 11111c v '1itwo~ -ill i le dettecto r.

CONF IDENTIAL
 00

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.6 LO

SECONDS
Figure 3.5 Ilerforinuiate of onc-hialf-mile dletector (seconds).

0 50 100
MILLISECONDS

Fig-ure 3 .G PurfornmWtnuOf oiwV-1);lf-llilU

I detCt~elo' (illlijjSeCC0nds).

35

CONFIDENTIAL
 0 0.1 0.2 0. 3 SEC.

I"ig•irc 3 .7 l't'l'fol'ni;UljCU Of OllV-nile det, tPl-.

z
WC

100-

- 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

SECONDS
Figure 3.:.8 PV'ormtnceo o - l-i detecl'tor (ScolldS).

3M

CONFIDENTIAL
 0 50 100
MILLISECONDS
Figure- 3.9 Pc rforimunec of two-mle
lIc dtector.

L U)

w
Ii.

1100-
920-
740-

-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2

SECONDS
Figii -e 3.10 Per-formanc~le of fouir-mlile dletector.

:17

CONFIDENTIAL
z
w
"= Ig

- 0. 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8

SECONDS

Figure• "3.11 P~erforiinalce of se~ven-mile detector.

CONFIDENTIAL
 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
SECONDS
Figure 3.12 P'erformaunce of twelve--mile detector (time zero).

00
•w

ILO
1100

920-
74

0•

- 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6

SECONDS
Figure 3.12a 1'erformance of twelve-mile detector (time = zero).

39
CONFIDENTIAL
 -0.6 0 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.4
SECONDS
Figure 3.13 Performance of unmlodified detector
(only timing pulses visible).

,a.

IL
IWO

3now
990-•

740-
0

-0.6 0 0.6 1.2 1.8 2.4

SECONDS
Figure 3,13a Performince of unmodified detector
40 (only timing pulses visible).
CONFIDENTIAL
Figure 3.14 One-mile detector installation
and portion of open-wire pole line.

41

CONFIDENTIAL
 oommmmimmmmm
400- An W
m- mmnm
30
+, OinmEE..E*** ~m

So E ••--- .... ....

.30-EEEE*
10.0
I
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
SECONDS

Figure 3.15 Line-to-ground potential.

+ 80

+30

t 0L
0.

-30

-S0

0 0.1 0.2 O 0.4 0.5

SECONDS

Figure 3.16 Potential between wires.

42

CONFIDENTIAL
 16 X1 0
U,
O•8 X104
hiL

00

0
0 t00 200 300 400 G00
At SEC.
Figure, 3.17 First the'rmal ptulse•

3X10 4

En"o U....
rm..j
0
o purswuw 'nmwmw
0 50 500
MILLISECONDS

Figu ,r:3.18 Sccond thermal pulse.

4:1

CONFIDENTIAL
. Eu.....IN~nnn
I K108
19 Itnmnn
IiN*mEEEEEm~lN
0

B-°
0
-
~dEREINNENNN

so too
MI LLI SECON DS

F:igure 3.19 Second thermal pulse (overall).

0 '10
MILLISECONDS

Figure 3.20 Gamma radiation at four miles (milliseconds).

44

CONFIDENTIAL
Sz
Spm

,ii

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0

SECONDS

Figure .3.21 Gamnia radiation at four miles (milliseconds).

45

CONFIDENTIAL
 CHAPIER 4

COE LUEIOE

The primaxry obJucti;v •f th"i teI+St •- • atrFrtrlln

evidence relative to the operation of the Bomb Alarm Syrtem,

and not to gather scientific data. From the data gatheredthe

fact was established that the detectors possess the ability

to recognize, upon occurrence, a nuclear event, to transmit a

messca to this effect2 and to activate the appropriate ele.

meants of the display equipuents. The data gatbered also con-

firms theoretical calculations relative to the sensitivity

and range of the detectors in that this data checks very well

the thermal pulse model used in the design of the detectors.

A secondary objective was to record electromagnetic

effects on an open-wire line. Review of the data recorded on

the open-wire facility indicates that phenormna similar to

those experienced in connection with lightning storms were

prebent; and no adverse effects that would disrupt the trans-

mittal of a signal. from the detector and/or signal-generating

station were experienced.

Further, by tests performed on all of the circuits and

detectors immediately after the data was taken and recorded,

it was determined that all of the equipments were in as good

condition as before the test. None of the equirment suffered

any damage as a result of the test.

46

CONFIDENTIAL
 CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL
FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
 C ONFIDENTIAL
FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA

CONFIDENTIAL
 Defense Threat Reduction Agency
45045 Aviation Drive
Dulles, VA 20166-7517

SWIITRC 14 October 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION

CENTER
ATTENTION: OCQ/Mr. William Bush

SUBJECT: AD-343196L

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency, (formerly the Defense Special

Weapons Agency) Security Office has reviewed and declassified the subject
document:

POR-2250 AD-343196L
Operation SUNBEAM, SHOT SMALL BOY
Project Officers Report - Project 7.14,
Bomb Alarm Detector Test, Issuance Date:
April 19, 1963.

Distribution statement "A" now applies.

ARDITH JARRETT
Chief, Technical Resource Center

4(