APO | Local Governments Case Digests
Alvarez v. Guingona
Facts: HB 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the
HoR, subsequently passed by the HoR, and transmitted to the Senate. A
counterpart of HB 8817, SB 1243 was filed in the Senate, and was passed as well.
The enrolled bill was submitted to and signed by the Chief Executive as RA 7720.
When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
Issue: Constitutionality of RA 7720. SC: YES, petition denied, presumption of
constitutionality, no clear and unequivocal breach of the Consti.
1. WON Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) must be included in determining
the average annual income for purposes of conversion.YES
 For a municipality to be converted into an independent component
city, its average annual income for the last two consecutive years (at
that time, based on 1991 constant prices) must be at least 20M.
Petitioners contend that the IRAs must be deducted from the
municipality’s income because they are not income but transfers
and/or budgetary aid from the NG and that they fluctuate depending
on different factors.
 The court in its discussion of what an LGU is said that:
a. it is a political subdivision of the State which is constituted by law
and possessed of substantial control over its own affairs.
b. It is an intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, but
not intended, however, to be an imperium in imperio
c. It is autonomous in the sense that it is given more powers,
authority, responsibilities and resources.
 Since the LGU is given broadened powers and increased
responsibilities, it now operates on a much wider scale. More
extensive operations, in turn, entail more expenses. The vesting of
duty, responsibility and accountability in every LGU is accompanied
with a provision for reasonably adequate resources to discharge its
powers and effectively carry out its functions.
 Availment of such resources is effectuated through the vesting in
every LG unit of (1) the right to create and broaden its own source of
revenue; (2) the right to be allocated a just share in national taxes,
such share being in the form of internal revenue allotments (IRAs); and
(3) the right to be given its equitable share in the proceeds of the
utilization and development of the national wealth, if any, within its
territorial boundaries.
 The court held that the IRAs were properly included because they are
items of income and form part of the gross accretion of the funds of
the LGU. The IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local
treasury without need of any further action on the part of the LG unit.
They thus constitute income which the LG can invariably rely upon as
the source of much needed funds.
 LGC, Sec 450 (c): "the average annual income shall include the income
accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and
non-recurring income."
 DOF Order 35-93: ANNUAL INCOME: revenues and receipts realized by
provinces, cities and municipalities from regular sources of the Local
General Fund including the internal revenue allotment and other
shares provided for in Secs 284, 290 and 291 of the Code, but
exclusive of non-recurring receipts, such as other national aids, grants,
financial assistance, loan proceeds, sales of fixed assets, and similar
others.
2. WON considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB
8817, RA 7720 can be said to have originated in the HoR. YES
 Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the
HoR. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was
passed in the Senate, it cannot be said to have originated in the HoR.
 Such is untenable because it cannot be denied that the HB was filed
first (18 Apr 1993). The SB was filed 19 May. The HB was approved on
third reading 17 Dec, and was transmitted to the Senate 28 Jan 1994.
 The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the House, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the
House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act
thereupon until it receives the House bill.
 The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt
of the bill from the HoR, does not contravene the constitutional
requirement that a bill of local application should originate in the HoR,
for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the
House bill.
 Tolentino v. SoF: “what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills, bills authorizing an
increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application
must come from the HoR on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
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APO | Local Governments Case Digests
sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other hand, the
senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made
to bear on the enactment of such laws. Nor does the Constitution
prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a
body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.”
Basco v. PAGCOR
Facts: PAGCOR was created under PD 1869 to enable the Government to regulate
and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by
law. To attain its objectives (centralize and integrate the right and authority to
operate and conduct games of chance, generate additional revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-civic project, expand tourism, minimize evils prevalent in
conduct and operation of gambling clubs) PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all
over the Philippines. Under its Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees,
executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent therewith, are accordingly
repealed, amended or modified.
Issues:
1. WON PD 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to
impose taxes and legal fees. NO
 The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no
inherent right to impose taxes. Thus, "the Charter or statute must
plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality cannot
assume it." Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a
legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state
itself which has the "inherent power to tax"
 The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It
should be stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress" which has the power to "create and abolish municipal
corporations" due to its "general legislative powers." Congress,
therefore, has the power of control over LGs. And if Congress can
grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also
provide for exemptions or even take back the power.
 The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has
long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of LGs to regulate
gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was
withdrawn by PD 771 and was vested exclusively on the NG. Only the
NG has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation of
gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees
which is a consequence of the issuance of "licenses or permits" is no
longer vested in the City of Manila.
 LGs have no power to tax instrumentalities of the NG. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter,
PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the NG. In addition to
its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD 1869) it also exercises
regulatory powers. PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate
gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in
the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being
an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually
is exempt from local taxes. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere LG.
 The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede,
burden or in any manner control the operation of constitutional laws
enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the
federal government.--> "supremacy" of the NG over LGs.
 Holmes: absence of power on the part of the States to touch, in that
way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
 mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru
extermination of what local authorities may perceive to be
undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool
for regulation"
2. WON the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by PD
1869. NO.
 Art x Sec 5, Consti: Each LG unit shall have the power to create its own
source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other charges subject to
such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide, consistent
with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges
shall accrue exclusively to the LG.
 power of LG to "impose taxes and fees" is subject to "limitations"
which Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an
"operative" law until "amended, repealed or revoked" (Sec. 3, Art.
XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an
exception to the exercise of the power of LGs to impose taxes and
fees. It cannot therefore be violative but rather is consistent with the
principle of local autonomy.
 principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means
"decentralization." It does not make LGs sovereign within the state or
an "imperium in imperio."
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 LG: political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by
law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of
government, such as the government under the Philippine
Constitution, LGs can only be an intra sovereign subdivision of one
sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. LG in such a
system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of
government.
Vilas v. City of Manila
Facts: Vilas, Trigas, and aguado are creditors of Manila as it existed before the
cession of the Philippine Islands (PI) to the US by the treaty of Paris. According to
them, under its present charter from the Government of the PI is the same juristic
person and liable upon the obligations of the old city. PI SC: different entity.
Issue: WON notwithstanding the cession of the PI to the US followed by a
reincorporation of the city, present municipality liable for obligations of old city. YES
 The city as now incorporated has succeeded to all of the property
rights of the old city and to the right to enforce all its causes of action.
There is identity of purpose between Sp and Am charters and
substantial identity of municipal powers, area, and inhabitants.
 Argument against liability: ayuntamiento of Manila was a corporation
entity created by the Sp government . when the sovereignty of Sp
ceased, municipality, ceased as well.--> analogy to doctrine of
principal and agent, death of principal=death of agent
 Dual Character of Municipal Corporations:
1. Governmental: exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty
of the state
2. Private/Business: mere legal entity or juristic person. Stands for
the community in the administration of local affairs wholly
beyond the sphere of the public purposes for which its
governmental powers are conferred
 In view of the dual character of municipal corporations, there is no
public reason for presuming their total dissolution as a mere
consequence of military occupation or territorial cession.
 McKinley’s instruction: relinquishment or cession…cannot in any
respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the
peaceful possession of property of all kinds…
 Property rights of municipal corporations and individuals were
safeguarded. The cession did not operate as an extinction or
dissolution of corporations. The legal entity survived both military
occupation and cession. The corporate identity and liability of the city
was not extinguished.
 TVA: entitled to proceed to judgment.
Lidasan v. COMELEC
Facts: RA 4790 (An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of
Lanao del Sur) was signed into law. Dianaton is composed of Barrios Togaig,
Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan, Kapatagan, Bongabong, Aipang, Dagowan,
Bakikis, Bungabung, Losain,Matimos and Magolatung. It was later found out that
Barrios Togaig, Madalum, Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo,
Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan, Kabamakawan were not within Lanao del Sur but
within Cotabato. The COMELEC adopted a resolution recognizing the new
municipality for purposes of election. Meanwhile, the Office of the President
recommended that the COMELEC that the operation of the statute be suspended
until clarified by correcting legislation. This triggered petitioner to file action.
Issue: WON RA 4790 is unconstitutional. YES
 The constitution requires that no bill must be enacted which shall
embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill. While the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in
the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein, the
title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill,
and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation.
 Test of the sufficiency of a title: whether or not it is misleading;
technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated
in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth.
 In this case, not the slightest intimation is there that communities in
the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao
del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read
without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive.
For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose
combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton
purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and
Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also
dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from
Lanao del Sur.
 Respondents: change in boundaries merely incidental. SC: NO!
Transfer of a sizeable portion of territory from one province to
another of necessity involves reduction of area, population and
income of the first and the corresponding increase of those of the
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other. This is as important as the creation of a municipality. And yet,
the title did not reflect this fact.
 Felwa case: cannot be considered by the court, in this case, while no
reference to elective officials were made, such were incidental to the
creation of B, MP,I, and K-A.
 Hume v. Village of Fruitport: An act to incorporate the village of
Fruitport, in the County of Muskegon but statute included Ottawa.
Declared unconstitutional for having more than one subject.
Contention: “in the County of Muskegon” a mere surplusage. SC: the
court cannot reject a part of the title for the purpose of saving the act.
 RA 4790 cannot be salvaged with reference to the nine remaining
towns. While where a portion of a statute is rendered unconstitutional
and the remainder valid, the parts will be separated, and the
constitutional portion upheld, it is not so when the parts of the statute
are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to
warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, and
that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature would not
pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent,
conditional, or connected, must fall with them.
 Municipal corporations perform twin functions. Firstly. They serve as
an instrumentality of the State in carrying out the functions of
government. Secondly. They act as an agency of the community in
the administration of local affairs. It is in the latter character that
they are a separate entity acting for their own purposes and not a
subdivision of the State.
 several factors come to the fore in the consideration of whether a
group of barrios is capable of maintaining itself as an independent
municipality. Amongst these are population, territory, and income
 Speaking of the original twenty-one barrios which comprise the new
municipality, the explanatory note reads: the territory is now a
progressive community; the aggregate population is large; and the
collective income is sufficient to maintain an independent
municipality. This bill, if enacted into law, will enable the inhabitants
concerned to govern themselves and enjoy the blessings of municipal
autonomy. Obviously, what was in the mind of the proponent was the
21 barrios, and not the nine remaining.
Republic v. City of Davao
Facts: Davao filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its
proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental
Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. The EMB denied the application after
finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area and
ruled that, pursuant to Sec 2, PD 1586 (Environmental Impact Statement System), in
relation to Sec 4, PD 1151, (Philippine Environment Policy), Davao must undergo the
environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental
Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed with the construction of its
project. Davao filed a petition for mandamus and injunction with the RTC of Davao
alleging that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project
nor within an environmentally critical area; thus outside the scope of the EIS
system. Hence, it was the ministerial duty of the DENR, through the EMB, to issue a
CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of the required documents.
RTC: for Davao. LGUs not required by PDs 1586 & 1511 to comply with the EIS law.
Only agencies and instrumentalities of the NG, including GOCCs, as well as private
corporations, firms and entities are mandated to go through the EIA process for
their proposed projects which have significant effect on the quality of the
environment. An LGU, not being an agency or instrumentality of the NG, is deemed
excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius. MR: denied
Issue: WON Davao is required to comply with the EIS law. YES.
**Davao already expressed agreement that it must secure an ECC for proposed
project, hence moot and academic, but the SC decided to still discuss issues to
educate the bench and bar.
 Davao cannot claim exemption from coverage of PD 1586.
 LGU a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be
exercised by it in conformity with law. It performs dual functions: (1)
Governmental functions are those that concern the health, safety and
the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the public
generally.  LGU is an agency of the NG (2) Proprietary functions are
those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary
profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. LGU agent of
the community in the administration of local affairs.
 Sec 16 LGC: duty of the LGUs to promote the people’s right to a
balanced ecology. As a body politic endowed with governmental
functions, an LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the
environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.
 Sec 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that “no person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared
environmentally critical project or area without first securing an ECC
issued by the President or his duly authorized representative.” The CC
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defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its
political subdivisions, LGUs are juridical persons. Undoubtedly
therefore, LGUs are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586.
 State policy: achieve a balance between socio-economic development
and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable
development. This can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive
and integrated environmental protection program where all the
sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the government and the
private sectors. The LGUs, as part of the machinery of the
government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the
EIS system.
*other issue: Davao must be granted ECC, it has duly proven that the dome will not
be constructed in an environmentally critical area, hence, it becomes the ministerial
duty of the DENR to issue the CNC.
San Juan v. CSC
Facts: When the Provinicial Board Officer position was left vacant, Rizal Governor
San Juan informed Director Abella of the Department of Budget and Management
that a certain Santos had assumed office as acting PBO and requested Abella to
endorse Santos’ appointment. Abella, however recommended Almajose on the
basis of a comparative study of all MBOs which included San Juan’s nominees.
According to Abella, Almajose was the most qualified since she was the only CPA
among the contenders. DMB Usec Cabuquit signed Almajose’s appointment papers
upon Abella’s recommendation. Unaware of Almajose’s appointment, San Juan
reiterated his request for Santos’ appointment in a letter to Sec. Carague. DBM Reg.
Dir. Galvez wrote San Jose that Santos and his other recommendees did not meet
the minimum requirements under Local Budget Circular 31 for the position of local
budget officer and required San Jose to submit at least three other nominees. After
finding out about Almajose’s appointment San Juan wrote Carague protesting
against the said appointment on the grounds that Cabuquit is not legally authorized
to appoint the PBO; that Almajose lacks the required three years work experience
as provided in LBC 31; and that under EO 112, it is the Gov., not the RD or a
Congressman, who has the power to recommend nominees for the position of PBO.
DBM, through its Director of the Bureau of Legal & Legislative Affairs (BLLA)
Afurung, issued a Memorandum ruling that the San Juan's letter-protest is not
meritorious considering that DBM validly exercised its prerogative in filling-up the
contested position since none of the his nominees met the prescribed
requirements. San Juan then moved for a reconsideration of the BLLA ruling. Such
was denied. He then wrote the CSC which issued resolutions upholding Almajose’s
appointment.
Issue: WON the DBM can appoint anyone in the event that the Governor
recommends unqualified persons. NO.
 issue is not merely about validity of appointment of PBO, but
involves the application of a most important constitutional policy
and principle, local autonomy.
 Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of
centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to
local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of
autonomy.
 McKinley's Instructions: establishment of municipal
governments, natives afforded the opportunity to manage their
own local officers to the fullest extent of which they are capable
and subject to the least degree of supervision and control
 1935 Constitution: limited the executive power over local
governments to "general supervision . . . as may be provided by
law."
 Tecson v. Salas: presidential competence is not even supervision
in general, but general supervision as may be provided by law.
He could not thus go beyond the applicable statutory provisions,
which bind and fetter his discretion on the matter.
o Supervision goes no further than "overseeing or the
power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect
to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties."
o Control "means the power of an officer to alter or modify
or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the
performance of their duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter."
 RA 2264, "An Act Amending the Law Governing Local Governments by
Increasing Their Autonomy and Reorganizing Local Governments" was
passed. It was followed in 1967 when Republic Act No. 5185, the
Decentralization Law was enacted, giving "further autonomous powers to
local governments governments."
 1973 Constitution: the state shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of
LGUs, especially the barangay to ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities.
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 article on Local Government was incorporated into the Constitution. It
called for a LGC defining more responsive and accountable local
government structures.
The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present
Constitution.
Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments
The 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines
but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful.
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a LGC which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among
the different LGUs their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and
removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of the local units.
When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the
Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy. If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards
the entirety of budgetary powers and ignores the right of local governments to
develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal
of meaningful local autonomy is frustrated and set back.
The right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 which states:
Sec. 6.0 — The DBM reserves the right to fill up any existing
vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive
meet the prescribed requirements.
is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may appoint only from
the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor. If none is
qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining
why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees
who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
The PBO is expected to synchronize his work with DBM. More important, however,
is the proper administration of fiscal affairs at the local level. Provincial and
municipal budgets are prepared at the local level and after completion are
forwarded to the national officials for review. They are prepared by the local
officials who must work within the constraints of those budgets. They are not
formulated in the inner sanctums of an all-knowing DBM and unilaterally imposed
on local governments whether or not they are relevant to local needs and
resources. It is for this reason that there should be a genuine interplay, a balancing
of viewpoints, and a harmonization of proposals from both the local and national
officials. It is for this reason that the nomination and appointment process involves
a sharing of power between the two levels of government.
It may not be amiss to give by way of analogy the procedure followed in the
appointments of Justices and Judges. Under Article VIII of the Constitution,
nominations for judicial positions are made by the Judicial and Bar Council. The
President makes the appointments from the list of nominees submitted to her by
the Council. She cannot apply the DBM procedure, reject all the Council nominees,
and appoint another person whom she feels is better qualified. There can be no
reservation of the right to fill up a position with a person of the appointing power's
personal choice.
The public respondent's grave abuse of discretion is aggravated by the fact that
Director Galvez required the Provincial Governor to submit at least three other
names of nominees better qualified than his earlier recommendation. It was a
meaningless exercise. The appointment of the private respondent was formalized
before the Governor was extended the courtesy of being informed that his nominee
had been rejected. The complete disregard of the local government's prerogative
and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom, authority, and discretion
are manifest.
In his classic work "Philippine Political Law" Dean Vicente G. Sinco stated that the
value of local governments as institutions of democracy is measured by the degree
of autonomy that they enjoy. Citing Tocqueville, he stated that "local assemblies of
citizens constitute the strength of free nations. . . . A people may establish a system
of free government but without the spirit of municipal institutions, it cannot have
the spirit of liberty." (Sinco, Philippine Political Law, Eleventh Edition, pp. 705-706).
Our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on
local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon which these
provisions are based.


Pimentel v. Aguirre
Facts:
Tan v. COMELEC
Facts:
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Ganzon v. CSC
Facts:
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA
Facts:
Limbona v. Mangelin
Facts:

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Pelaez v. Auditor General

Facts: Pursuant to Sec 68 of the RAC, the President issued EOs 93-121, 124, and
126-129 which created 33 provinces. Pelaez instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in
audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said EOs and/or any
disbursement by said municipalities. Pelaez claims that RA 2370 had already
impliedly repealed Sec 68. RA 2370, Sec 3:Barrios shall not be created or their
boundaries altered nor their names changed except under the provisions of this Act
or by Act of Congress; All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall
come under the provisions hereof. When RA 2370 became effective, barrios may
"not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act
of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of
the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the
municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated."
ISSUE: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he
create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of
municipalities? NO.
 The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new
barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create
municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.
On delegation of legislative power:
 While the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid
or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining
municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature —
involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry
into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to
create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature.
In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative
function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative
power. " Municipal corporations are purely the creatures of
statutes.
 Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
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enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to
forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that
said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the
delegate — and (b) fix a standard — the limits of which are
sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet
these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the
power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not
enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the
President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to
avoid the evil effects above referred to.
 Schechter case: NIRA unconstitutional. It supplies no standards
for any trade, industry or activity. It does not undertake to
prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of
fact determined by appropriate administrative procedure.
Instead of prescribing rules of conduct, it authorizes the making
of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative undertaking, Sec.
3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general
aims of rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec.
1. In view of the scope of that broad declaration, and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of
the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus
enacting laws for the government of trade and industry
throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We think that the
code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power.
 If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the
President a discretion that is "virtually unfettered." and,
consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it
is obvious that "public welfare," which has even a broader
connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the validity of
the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there
would no longer be any legal impediment to a statutory grant of
authority to the President to do anything which, in his opinion,
may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant
of authority would be a virtual abdication of the powers of
Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established by our
Constitution, which it is the special duty and privilege of this
Court to uphold.
 the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative
bills for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case
had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of the fact that the
issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely
legislative functions can hardly be given.
On the President’s power of control:
Sec 10 (1), Art. VII, Consti: The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
 The power of control under this provision implies the right of the
President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may
be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act
in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution
to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.
 LGUs: fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority
than that of checking whether said local governments or the
officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments. The President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the
scope of their authority.
 Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality,
he could, in effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new
municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant.6
Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could
compel local officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in
effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to him
by the Constitution.
 Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive
departments, bureaus or offices implies no more than the
authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere
in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such
control does not include the authority either to abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a
consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
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municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise
by him of an authority even greater than that of control which he
has over the executive departments, bureaus or offices. In other
words, Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not
merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above
quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local
governments than that vested in him over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the process and
does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power
over municipal corporations than that which he has over said
executive departments, bureaus or offices.
 In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative
powers, as it certainly does, said Section 68, as part of the
Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must
be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and
inconsistent with said statutory enactment.
Municipality of Kapalong v. Moya
Facts: Pres. Garcia created the Municipality of Santo Tomas from portions of the
Municipality of Kapalong. Sto. Tomas now asserts jurisdiction over eight barrios of
Kapalong. Sto. Tomas then filed a complaint against Kapalong for settlement of the
municipal boundary dispute.
Issue: WON Santo Tomas legally exists. NO.
 As ruled in the Pelaez case, the President has no power to create
a municipality. Since private respondent has no legal personality,
it can not be a party to any civil action, and as such, Judge Moya
should have dismissed the case, since further proceedings would
be pointless. The Rules of Court expressly provides that only
"entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Alvarez v. Guingona (supra, see p.1)
Cawaling v. COMELEC
Facts: President Estrada signed into law RA 8806 (Act Creating The City Of Sorsogon
By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon,
And Appropriating Funds Therefor). The COMELEC conducted a plebiscite in Bacon
and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification. The Plebiscite City Board of
Canvassers (PCBC) then proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as having
been ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite.
Cawaling, invoking his rights as a taxpayer, filed a petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of the plebiscite and challenging RA 8806.
Issues:
1. WON the creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) LGC (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution)
which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city" NO.
 Criteria for the creation of a city:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A municipality or a
cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it
has an average annual income, as certified by the Department of
Finance, of at least Twenty million (P20,000,000.00) for the last
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it
has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of
at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the
Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than
one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by
the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof
shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial
jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply
where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall
include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
specific funds, transfers, and non-recurring income."
 Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is
erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but
simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section
10, Article X of the Constitution, quoted earlier and which
petitioner cited in support of his posture, allows the merger of
LGUs to create a province city, municipality or barangay in
accordance with the criteria established by the Code.
 The creation of an entirely new LGU through a division or a
merger of existing LGUs is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that such merger or division shall comply with the
requirements prescribed by the Code.
2. WON it violates the “one bill one subject” rule. NO.
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 Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 8806 actually embraces two
principal subjects which are: (1) the creation of the City of
Sorsogon, and (2) the abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon
and Sorsogon. While the title of the Act sufficiently informs the
public about the creation of Sorsogon City, petitioner claims that
no such information has been provided on the abolition of the
Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon.
 Contrary to petitioner's assertion, there is only one subject
embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City
of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence
of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger
is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of
Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical,
natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. Otherwise
put, it is the necessary means by which the City of Sorsogon was
created. Hence, the title of the law, "An Act Creating the City of
Sorsogon by Merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon
in the Province of Sorsogon, and Appropriating Funds Therefor,"
cannot be said to exclude the incidental effect of abolishing the
two municipalities, nor can it be considered to have deprived the
public of fair information on this consequence.
3. WON the plebiscite was timely conducted. YES.
 The law was first published in the August 25, 2000 issue of
TODAY a newspaper of general circulation. Then on September
01, 2000, it was published in a newspaper of local circulation in
the Province of Sorsogon. Thus, the publication of the law was
completed on September 1, 2000, which date, according to the
COMELEC, should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-
day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the
date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet
been published. The COMELEC argues that since publication is
indispensable for the effectivity of a law, citing the landmark
case of Tañada vs. Tuvera, it could only schedule the plebiscite
after the Act took effect. Thus, the COMELEC concludes, the
December 16, 2000 plebiscite was well within the 120-day period
from the effectivity of the law on September 1, 2000
 the plebiscite shall be conducted within 120 days from the date
of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval. While the
same provision allows a law or ordinance to fix "another date"
for conducting a plebiscite, still such date must be reckoned from
the date of the effectivity of the law.
 Consequently, the word "approval" in Section 54 of R.A. No.
8806, which should be read together with Section 65 (effectivity
of the Act) thereof, could only mean "effectivity" as used and
contemplated in Section 10 of the Code. This construction is in
accord with the fundamental rule that all provisions of the laws
relating to the same subject should be read together and
reconciled to avoid inconsistency or repugnancy to established
jurisprudence
Pelaez v. Auditor General (supra, see p.14)
Municipality of Candijay v. CA
Facts: The Municipalities of Alicia and Candijay were in dispute over
barrio/barangay Pagahat. The RTC ruled in favor of Candijay.
CA :
1. Court rejected the boundary line being claimed by petitioner since it would
in effect place "practically all of Barrio Pagahat . . . , part of Barrio
Cagongcagong and portions of Barrio Putlongcam and La Hacienda and all
of Barrio Mahayag and Barrio del Monte within the territorial jurisdiction
of Candijay." Candijay will not only engulf the entire barrio of Pagahat, but
also of the barrios of Putlongcam, Mahayag, Del Monte, Cagongcagong,
and a part of the Municipality of Mabini. Candijay will eat up a big chunk of
territories far exceeding her territorial jurisdiction under the law creating
her.
2. Trial court erred in relying on Exh. X-Commissioner [exhibit for petitioner],
because, in effect, it included portions of Barrios Putlongcam and La
Hacienda within the jurisdiction of Candijay when said barrios are
undisputedly part of Alicia’s territory under EO265 creating the latter"
3. After an examination of the respective survey plans of petitioner and
respondent submitted as exhibits, court: "both plans are inadequate
insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary line between
Candijay and the Municipality of Mabini (which is not a party to this case)
as declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol. Neither plan shows where
Looc-Tabasan, Lomislis Island, Tagtang Canlirong, mentioned in the
aforequoted boundary line declared by the Provincial Board of Bohol, are
actually located." The respondent Court, after weighing and considering
the import of certain official acts, including EO. 265 dated September 16,
1949 (which created the municipality of Alicia from out of certain barrios
of the municipality of Mabini), and Act 968 of the Philippine Commission
dated October 31, 1903 (which set forth the respective component
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territories of the municipalities of Mabini and Candijay), concluded that
"Barrio Bulawan from where barrio Pagahat originated is not mentioned as
one of the barrios constituted as part of defendant-appellant Municipality
of Alicia. Neither do they show that Barrio Pagahat forms part of plaintiff-
appellant Municipality of Candijay."
4. CA: there is an equiponderance of evidence When the scale shall stand
upon an equipoise and there is nothing in the evidence which shall incline
it to one side or the other, the court will find for the defendant. Under said
principle, the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his evidence and not on
the weakness of defendant's claim. Even if the evidence of the plaintiff
may be stronger than that of the defendant, there is no preponderance of
evidence on his side if such evidence is insufficient in itself to establish his
cause of action
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in its application of the principle of "equiponderance of
evidence", for having based its ruling against petitioner on documentary evidence
which, petitioner claims, are void,
2. that the challenged Decision "does not solve the problem of both towns but
throws them back again to their controversy."
 With respect to the first and second grounds, we find that the issues
of fact in this case had been adequately passed upon by respondent
Court in its Decision, which is well-supported by the evidence on
record. The determination of equiponderance of evidence by the
respondent Court involves the appreciation of evidence by the latter
tribunal, which will not be reviewed by this Court unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious; here, there has been no such showing.
 Neither party was able to make out a case; neither side could
establish its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. As a
consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In
such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the
complaints/petitions.
3.Alicia’s purported lack of juridical personality, as a result of having been
created under a void executive order
 Candijay commenced its collateral attack on the juridical
personality of Alicia some thirty five years after it first came into
existence in 1949. It appears that, after presentation of its
evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar Alicia from
presenting its evidence on the ground that it had no juridical
personality. Candijay contended that EO 265 issued by is null and
void ab initio, inasmuch as Sec 68 of the RAC, on which said EO
was based, constituted an undue delegation of legislative powers
to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declared
unconstitutional, per this Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor
General.
 Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon vs. Mendez, Sr: EO 353
creating the municipal district of San Andres was issued on 20
August 1959 but it was only after almost thirty (30) years, or on
05 June 1989, that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided
to challenge the legality of the executive order. In the meantime,
the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres,
began and continued to exercise the powers and authority of a
duly created LGU. Granting that EO 353 was a complete nullity
for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in this
case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the
Municipality of San Andres to have at least attained a status
uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining,
that of a de facto municipal corporation. Conventional wisdom
cannot allow it to be otherwise. Created in 1959 by virtue of EO
353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for
more than six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs.
Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have
sounded the call for a similar declaration of the
unconstitutionality of EO 353 but it was not to be the case. On
the contrary, certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's
recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San
Andres:
1. EO 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth
class municipality after having surpassed the income
requirement.
2. Under AO 33, the Municipality of San Andres had been
covered by the 10th Municipal Circuit Court of San Francisco-
San Andres for the province of Quezon.
3. Under the Ordinance (adopted on 15 October 1986)
apportioning the seats of the House of Representatives,
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of San
Andres has been considered to be one of the twelve (12)
municipalities composing the Third District of the province of
Quezon.
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4. Section 442 (d) of the LGC to the effect that municipal
districts "organized pursuant to presidential issuances or
executive orders and which have their respective sets of
elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the
effectivity of (the) Code shall henceforth be considered as
regular municipalities."
 No pretension of unconstitutionality per se of Section 442 (d) of
the LGC is proffered. It is doubtful whether such a pretext, even
if made, would succeed. The power to create political
subdivisions is a function of the legislature. Congress did just that
when it has incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Code. Curative
laws, which in essence are retrospective, and aimed at giving
"validity to acts done that would have been invalid under
existing laws, as if existing laws have been complied with," are
validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual
qualification against impairment of vested rights. All considered,
the de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the
province of Quezon must now be conceded.
 Alicia's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of
the municipality of San Andres. Alicia was created by virtue of EO
265 in 1949, or ten years ahead of the municipality of San
Andres, and therefore had been in existence for all of sixteen
years when Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. And
various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate the
State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence
thereof.
 For instance, under AO 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of
Alicia was covered by the 7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-
Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is
one of twenty municipalities comprising the Third District of
Bohol.
 Inasmuch as respondent municipality of Alicia is similarly
situated as the municipality of San Andres, it should likewise
benefit from the effects of Sec 442 (d) of the LGC, and should
henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality.
Vilas v. City of Manila (supra, see p.3)
Padilla v. COMELEC
Facts: A plebiscite in the matter of the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
was held in the municipality of Labo pursuant to RA 7155 and the Constitution.
Only 2890 favored its creation while 339 voted against it. The Plebiscite Board of
Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality
of TNL. Gov. Padilla seeks to set aside the plebiscite and prays that a new plebiscite
be undertaken because the previous one was a complete failure and the results
obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite should have been
conducted only in the political units affected, i.e., the 12 barangays comprising TNL,
to the exclusion of the remaining areas of the mother unit.
Issue: WON the plebiscite conducted is valid. YES.
 Padilla’s contention that the Tan ruling has been superseded by
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, hence reinstating the
Paredes ruling is untenable. Old law: “political unit or units” New
law: “political units” The deletion of the words “unit or” does not
affect the Tan ruling.
 Concom debates: Davide asked for deletion of “unit or” because
the plebiscite is to be conducted in all units affected.
 Political units directly affected: residents of the political entity
who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a
portion thereof = units which would participate in the plebiscite.
Tan v. COMELEC (supra, see p.8)
Miranda v. Aguirre
Facts: In 1994, RA 7720 converting the municipality of Santiago to an independent
component city was signed into law and thereafter ratified in a plebiscite. Four
years later, RA 8528 which amended RA 7720 was enacted, changing the status of
Santiago from an ICC to a component city. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of
RA 8528 because it does not provide for submitting the law for ratification by the
people of Santiago City in a proper plebiscite.
Issues:
1. WON petitioners have standing. YES.
 Rule: constitutionality of law can be challenged by one who will
sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement
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 Miranda was mayor when he filed the petition, his rights would
have been greatly affected. Other petitioners are residents and
voters of Santiago.
2. WON petition involves a political question. NO.
 PQ: concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure,
 Justiciable issue: implies a given right, legally demandable and
enforceable, an act or omission violative of such right, and a
remedy granted and sanctioned by law, for said breach of right
 Case at bar=justiciable. WON petitioners have right to a
plebiscite is a legal question. WON laws passed by Congress
comply with the requirements of the Consti pose questions that
this court alone can decide.
3. WON the change involved any creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries. YES.
4. WON a plebiscite is necessary considering the change was a mere
reclassification from ICC to CC. YES.
 A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal
that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial
alteration of boundaries of LGUs involve a common denominator
— material change in the political and economic rights of the
LGUs directly affected as well as the people therein. It is
precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the
approval of the people "in the political units directly affected."
 Sec 10, Art X addressed the undesirable practice in the past
whereby LGUs were created, abolished, merged or divided on
the basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the
people. Thus, the consent of the people of the LGU directly
affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing,
merging or altering the boundaries of LGUs. It is one instance
where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter
that affects them — direct democracy of the people as opposed
to democracy thru people's representatives. This plebiscite
requirement is also in accord with the philosophy of the
Constitution granting more autonomy to LGUs.
 The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of
Santiago from an independent component city to a component
city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial.
 The independence of the city as a political unit will be
diminished:
- The city mayor will be placed under the
administrative supervision of the provincial
governor.
- The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of
Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial
Board of Isabela.
- Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have
to be shared with the province.
 When RA 7720 upgraded the status of Santiago City from a
municipality to an independent component city, it required
the approval of its people thru a plebiscite called for the
purpose. There is neither rhyme nor reason why this
plebiscite should not be called to determine the will of the
people of Santiago City when RA 8528 downgrades the status
of their city. There is more reason to consult the people when
a law substantially diminishes their right.
 Rule II, Art 6, paragraph (f) (1) of the IRRs of the LGC is in
accord with the Constitution when it provides that no
creation, conversion, division, merger, abolition, or
substantial alteration of boundaries of LGUS shall take effect
unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose in the LGU or LGUs affected. The
plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the
effectivity of the law or ordinance prescribing such action,
unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.
 The rules cover all conversions, whether upward or
downward in character, so long as they result in a material
change in the LGU directly affected, especially a change in the
political and economic rights of its people.
Tobias v. Abalos
Facts: Prior to the enactment of RA 7675 (An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong)
the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Pursuant to the LGC, a plebiscite was held where the people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted
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"yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, RA 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect. Petitioners, invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents
of Mandaluyong, come before the court to assail the constitutionality of RA 7675.
Issue: WON RA 7675 unconstitutional. YES.
1. RA 7675 contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule.
 Sec. 26(1), Consti: Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.
 Petitioners: inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law
resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2)
the division of the congressional district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
 the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one
representative" proviso in the Constitution: Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI,
Section 5(3), Constitution). Hence, it is in compliance with the
aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a
separate congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is
decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R..A. No. 7675.
 The creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675, "An Act
Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly
Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and
contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the
creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
 Sumulong v. Comelec: the constitutional requirement as now
expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient
compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions are germane to that
general subject."
 Lidasan v. Comelec: Of course, the Constitution does not require
Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title
should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of
the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation"
2. WON the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law resulting in an
increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that
provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
 Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio,
and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
 Limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by
law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the
present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress
itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore,
the increase in congressional representation mandated by RA
7675 is not unconstitutional.
3. WON the division was made pursuant to a census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. NO.
 Petitioners: there is no mention in the assailed law of any census
to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their
separation into two legislative districts.
 Such does not suffice to strike down the validity of RA 7675. The
said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the
regular congressional processes, including due consideration by
the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is
not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must
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contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the
enactment of said laws.
4. WON Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts. NO.
 Sec. 5(4): Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standard provided in this section.
 Petitioners: Section 49 of RA 7675 preempts the right of
Congress to reapportion legislative districts
 argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated
upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof.
Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains
to itself.
5. WON the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their
legislative district.
 The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject
involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong
into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants
of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring
Mandaluyong.
6. WON the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is the
practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or
party. NO.
 As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be
noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law,
is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both
localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's
constituency has in fact been diminished, which development
could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
Dela Cruz v. Paras
Facts: Ordinance 84 was passed by the Municipality of Bocaue. Petitioners are
business owners who had been previously issued licenses by the Municipal Mayor
of Bocaue
Issues:
1. WON a municipality may rely on its police power to justify the enactment
of the assailed ordinance. NO.
 Police power granted to municipal corporations: "General power
of council to enact ordinances and make regulations.- The
municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon
it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide
for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of property therein."
 US v. Abendan: An ordinance enacted by virtue of police power is
valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law, an act of the
legislature, against public policy, or is unreasonable, partial,
discriminating or in derogation of a common right.
 US v. Salaveria: The general welfare clause has two branches: 1.
attaches itself to the main trunk of municipal authority, and
relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary
to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon the municipal council by law.
2.It authorizes such ordinances as shall seem necessary and
proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and
for the protection of property therein. It is a general rule that
ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found in the
general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the
general powers and purposes of the corporation, and not
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
 If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited,
certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity.
**reasonableness, consonance with the general powers and
purposes of municipal corporations, consistency with the laws or
policy of the State.
 It is clear that in the guise of a police regulation, there was in this
instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal
in the case of those individuals desirous of patronizing those
night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and
salaries to be earned by those therein employed.
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2. WON a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business,
occupation or calling. NO.
 RA 938: the municipal or city board or council of each chartered
city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs,
cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons,
bowling alleys, billiard pools, and other similar places of
amusement within its territorial jurisdiction: . . . Then on May 21,
1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the
power to regulate, but likewise "prohibit . . ." The title, however,
remained the same and the exact wording was followed. The
power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition. There
is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to
construe RA 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation of
night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.
 There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power
"to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals," in the language of the Administrative Code,
such competence extending to all "the great public needs," and
to interdict any calling, occupation, or enterprise.
 It is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of might clubs. They may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.
Technology Developers v. CA
Facts: TD received a letter from acting mayor Cruz, ordering the full cessation of the
operation of its plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, until further order.
The letter likewise requested its plant manager to bring with him to the office of the
mayor the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor's permit; c) Region III-Pollution of
Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. In compliance with said
undertaking, petitioner commenced to secure "Region III-Department of
Environmental and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit," although among the
permits previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner's plant was a
"Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation" issued by the then
National Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental Management Bureau)
and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management Bureau is trying to
determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be installed as part of
petitioner's request for the renewal of its permit.
TD's attention having been called to its lack of mayor's permit, it sent its
representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but were not
entertained. On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon
petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality's station commander
to padlock the premises of petitioner's plant, thus effectively causing the stoppage
of its operation.
RTC: action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus with preliminary
injunction. Closure order was issued in grave abuse of discretion. Judge issued of
the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction.
MR: RTC issued an order (a) setting aside the order which granted a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b) dissolving the writ consequently issued.
CA: certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. In due course
the petition was denied for lack of merit.
MR: denied.
Issue: WON the appellate court committed a grave abuse of discretion in rendering
its question decision and resolution. NO.
 The authority of the local executive to protect the community
from pollution is the center of this controversy.
 The following circumstances militate against the maintenance of
the writ of preliminary injunction sought by petitioner:
1. No mayor's permit had been secured. While it is true that the
matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the
environment that requires control if not prohibition of the
operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then
National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of
Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town
has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny the
application for a permit to operate a business or otherwise
close the same unless appropriate measures are taken to
control and/or avoid injury to the health of the residents of
the community from the emissions in the operation of the
business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called the
attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the fumes
of its plant whose offensive odor "not only pollute the air in
the locality but also affect the health of the residents in the
area," so that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation
until further orders and it was required to bring its permits
(see facts)
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3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the
complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only after
an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in her
report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes emitted
by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the surrounding
houses and that no proper air pollution device has been
installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the
municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building
permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6,1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to
operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission
on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to May
25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to extend or
validate its permit much less to install any device to control
the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health of the
residents of the community.
 TD: huge investment. SC: such is concomitant with the
need to promote investment and contribute to the
growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of
the people, from the deleterious effect of the pollution
of the environment.
Chua Huat v. CA
Facts: Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., requested the City Engineer and Building Official of
Manila, to condemn the dilapidated structures located at 1271 to 1277 Pedro Gil St.
and 1553 to 1557 Paz St., Paco, Manila, all occupied by petitioners. Notices of
condemnation were issued, stating that the subject buildings were found to be in
dangerous condition and therefore condemned, subject to the confirmation of the
Mayor as required by Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of
Manila. The orders were based on the inspection reports made by Architect Oscar
D. Andres and the Memorandum-Reports made by the Evaluation Committee of the
Office of the City Engineer, which all showed that the subject buildings suffer from
structural deterioration by more than 50% and as much as 80%.
Civil Engineer Romulo C. Molas, a private practitioner, inspected the
abovementioned structures upon the request of petitioners herein. In his
evaluation report, he stated that although the buildings are old, they are still
structurally sound and have a remaining economic life of at least eight years.
Three months after the notices of condemnation were issued, petitioners
formally protested against said notices of condemnation on the ground that the
buildings are still in good physical condition and are structurally sound based on the
abovementioned certification of Civil Engineer Romulo C. Molas.
On 26 April 1983, Maria Gamboa, one of the petitioners herein, was
informed of the issuance by the City Engineer of the demolition order with respect
to the building located at 1565 Paz St., Paco, Manila, and was told to vacate the
premises within 15 days from notice.
On 2 May 1983, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Prohibition, with
Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order, against City Mayor Ramon
Bagatsing, City Engineer and Building Officer Romulo del Rosario and Manuel Uy
and Sons, Inc., praying that a restraining order or preliminary injunction be issued
enjoining respondents from proceeding with the announced demolition of the
subject buildings, this petition be given due course, and after hearing, respondents
be prohibited from demolishing said buildings. They alleged a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and that there is no other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy.
The Mayor confirmed the rest of the condemnation orders issued by the
respondent City Engineer.
City Mayor and City Engineer: petition should be dismissed on the
following grounds: (a) that it involves questions of facts which should be ventilated
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila; (b) the subject buildings were condemned
and ordered removed after it was established that they had suffered from defects
or deterioration thereby posing perils to the lives and limbs not only of petitioners
but also to the public in general; (c) the power to condemn buildings and structures
in the City of Manila falls within the exclusive domain of the City Engineer pursuant
to Sections 275 and 276 of its Compilation of Ordinances (also Revised Ordinances
1600); (d) the power to condemn and remove buildings and structures is an
exercise of the police power granted the City of Manila to promote public safety;
and (e) administrative decisions falling within the executive jurisdiction cannot be
set aside by courts of justice except on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or
error of law.
Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc: petition is premature, unreasonable and
deserves no consideration as petitioners have not exhausted readily-available
administrative remedies and that the validity of the questioned condemnation and
demolition orders entails questions of facts not entertainable in this petition. It
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alleges that the condemnation orders were not immediately executory, as the
finding of the City Engineer/Building Official is still subject to the approval of the
Mayor per Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
Moreover, under Section 5.3, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1096, the owner of a building may appeal to the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications, whose decision is final, the finding or declaration of the
Building Official and ask that a re-inspection or re-investigation of the building or
structure be made; for not availing of this remedy, petitioners failed to exhaust
administrative remedies.
Issue: WON the mayor and city engineer committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the condemnation orders. NO.
 It is patently obvious that petitioners have no valid grievance for
the remedy of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
be available to them. It is explicitly clear from Section 1 of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court that for certiorari to be available: (a) a
tribunal, board or office exercising judicial function acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion, and (b) that there is no appeal, nor any plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Petitioners failed to show the presence of both elements.
 The power to condemn buildings and structures in the City of
Manila falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Engineer,
who is at the same time the Building Official (Sec. 206, P.D.
1096).
 Sections 275 and 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the
City of Manila (also Revised Ordinances 1600), provide: "SEC.
275. Deterioration and Defects. All buildings or parts of
buildings which show defects in any essential parts shall be
repaired and put in safe condition at once, or if the deterioration
be greater than fifty per centum of the value of the building, as
estimated by the city engineer, they shall be removed.
 SEC. 276. Condemnation Proceedings. Whenever in the
judgment of the City Engineer any building or portion of building
has been damaged by any cause to such an extent as to be
dangerous for use, he may condemn the same and shall
immediately notify the owner and the Mayor of his action. If the
owner or his agent be not willing to abide by thus order of
condemnation, he may make formal objection within the period
of seven days following such notification. The Mayor shall hear
the owner or his agent and his experts and also the city engineer,
deciding the case on the evidence presented. If the Mayor
confirms the action of the city engineer, the owner or his agent
shall immediately proceed to remove the building within fifteen
days from the date on which he was notified of such final action.
Should the owner or his agent not comply with the decision of
the Mayor the building shall be removed at his expense and the
city will proceed to recover against him for the amount
expended."
 Section 215 of P.D. 1096, otherwise known as the National
Building Code, also states the authority of the Building Official
with respect to dangerous buildings, to wit: "When any building
or structure is found or declared to be dangerous or ruinous, the
Building official shall order its repair, vacation or demolition
depending upon the degree of danger to life, health, or safety.
This is without prejudice to further action that may be taken
under the provisions of Articles 482 and 694 to 707 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines."
 From the abovementioned provisions, it is unquestionable that
the Building Official has the authority to order the condemnation
and demolition of buildings which are found to be in a dangerous
or ruinous condition. It is also clear from the Compilation of
Ordinances of the City of Manila that the Mayor has the power
to confirm or deny the action taken by the Building Official with
respect to the dangerous or ruinous buildings.
 City Engineer and Building Official, Romulo M. del Rosario, can,
therefore, validly issue the questioned condemnation and
demolition orders. This is also true with the respondent Mayor
who can approve or deny the condemnation orders as provided
in Section 276 of the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of
Manila.
 It is a settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction "when there is a capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion
of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law."
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 We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent City Engineer because the orders were made only
after thorough ocular inspections were conducted by the City's
Building Inspectors. The results of the inspections were set forth
in a memorandum dated 16 November 1982 where it was shown
that all the buildings had architectural, structural, sanitary,
plumbing and electrical defects of up to 80%.
 The Mayor's act of approving the condemnation orders was
likewise done in accordance with law. The protest made by
petitioners was submitted only on 22 February 1983, or three
months after the notices of condemnation were issued, and
clearly beyond the seven days prescribed under Section 276 of
the Compilation of Ordinances of the City of Manila.
 Moreover, appeal was likewise available to petitioners. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the then
Ministry of Public Works to implement P.D. No. 1096, under the
title Abatement/Demolition of Buildings, provide: "5. Procedure
for Demolition of Buildings. The following steps shall be
observed in the abatement/demolition of buildings under this
Rule: 5.1. There must be a finding or declaration by the Building
Official that the building or structure is a nuisance, ruinous or
dangerous . . .5.3. Within the fifteen-day period, the owner may,
if he so desires, appeal to the Secretary the finding or declaration
of the Building Official and ask that a re-inspection or re-
investigation of the building or structure be made . . .5.6. The
decision of the Secretary on the appeal shall be final."
 Certiorari will not be then because petitioners failed to exhaust
all the administrative remedies. This Court has long upheld the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies because it
rests on the assumption that the administrative body, board or
officer, if given the chance to correct its/his mistake or error,
may amend its/his decision on a given matter. Where the
enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review,
and provides a system of administrative appeal, or
reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and
convenience, will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the
appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and
correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. There
are, of course, exceptions to this rule, but none is available to
petitioners.
Binay v. Domingo
Facts: Resolution 60 confirming the ongoing burial assistance program initiated by
the mayor’s office. Under this program, bereaved families whose gross family
income does not exceed 2k/month will receive a 500php cash relief to be taken out
of unappropriated available funds existing in the municipal treasury. The Metro
Manila Commission approved Resolution 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary
certified a disbursement of P400,000 for the implementation of the Burial
Assistance Program. R 60 was referred to the Commission on Audit for its expected
allowance in audit. Based on its preliminary findings, COA disapproved R 60 and
disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. The
program was stayed by COA Decision No. 1159.
Issues:
1. WON R 60 is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare
clause. YES.
 Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal
corporations. Before a municipal corporation may exercise such
power, there must be a valid delegation of such power by the
legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the
State. A valid delegation of police power may arise from express
delegation, or be inferred from the mere fact of the creation of
the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal
corporations may exercise police powers within the fair intent
and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper to
give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes
conferring powers on public corporations have been construed
as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment
of life and desirable for the safety of the people.
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 Municipal governments exercise this power under the general
welfare clause: authority to "enact such ordinances and issue
such regulations as may be necessary to carry out and discharge
the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be
necessary and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort
and convenience, maintain peace and order, improve public
morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and insure the
protection of property therein."
 Sec 7 of BP 337: every LGU shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary and proper for governance such as to promote health
and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain
peace and order in the LGU, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of the inhabitants therein."
 Police power: power to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers; greatest and most powerful attribute
of the government; elastic and must be responsive to various
social conditions.
 COA: there is no perceptible connection or relation between the
objective sought to be attained under R 60 and the alleged public
safety, general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati
 Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by
circumscribing its exercise to "public safety, general welfare, etc.
of the inhabitants of Makati ."
 Police power of a municipal corporation: broad, and has been
said to be commensurate with, but not to exceed, the duty to
provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety,
comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private
rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad
sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the
municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and,
while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace,
security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community,
it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions
which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of
the people by promoting public convenience or general
prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of
comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed
inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition which shall
absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
 COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose
is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a
limited number of persons. OSG: "the drift is towards social
welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide
adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the
promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice
(Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human
rights. (Section 11, Ibid."
 The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty.
The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of
police power in the promotion of the common good.
 There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying
paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably
classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment.
Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local
councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled,
emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil,
housing the urban poor, etc.
 The resolution is a paragon of the continuing program of our
government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance
Program is a relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss
of a member of a family is a painful experience, and it is more
painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death.
Resolution No. 60 vivifies the very words of the late President
Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more
in law."
Tatel v. Municipality of Virac
Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the
disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatel’s
warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring
Tatel’s warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the Civil
Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more
suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal
officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of
Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses
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either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200
meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental
fire. Tatel contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due
process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not
having been passed in accordance with law.
Issue: 1. WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO
 Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in
the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law
that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the
promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as
such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively
accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under
the Administrative Code, which reads: The municipal council
shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not
repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and
such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals,
peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property
therein.
 For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.
 These principles require that a municipal ordinance
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
 In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the
ordinance is the construction of warehouses wherein
inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are
located at a distance of 200 meters from a block of houses and
not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to
avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire which is one of
the primordial obligation of the government.
 The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the
ordinance have not been substantiated. Its purpose is well within
the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is
placed upon the petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but
merely a prohibition from storing inflammable products in the
warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and
properties of the people residing in the vicinity. As far as public
policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what has
been conceived by the municipal government.
Tamin v. CA
Facts: The municipality of Dumingag file d a case for the ejectment of Medina and
Rosellon. According to the municipality, it is the owner of a parcel of residential
land located at Poblacion, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur with an area of 5,894
square meters more or less; that the parcel of land was reserved for public plaza
under PP 365 and that the incumbency of the late Mayor Isidoro E. Real, Sr. or in
1958, the municipality leased an Area of 1,350 square meters to M&R subject to the
condition that they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes;
that the defendants religiously paid the rentals until 1967. M&R, however refused
to pay the rentals as well as vacate the area. Hence, despite the national
government’s allotment for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the
public plaza, such construction which was already started could not continue
because of the presence of the buildings constructed by the defendants. According
to the municipality, the appropriation for the construction of the gymnasium might
be reverted back to the national government which would result to "irreparable
damage, injury and prejudice" to the municipality and its people who are expected
to derive benefit from the accomplishment of the project.
RTC: Judge Tamin issued an order setting the preliminary hearing for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of possession, and instead of
filing an answer, the respondents filed an MTD alleging the lack of jurisdiction of the
TC, since the complaint is for illegal detainer which is within the original jurisdiction
of the municipal court and the pendency of a cadastral case between the parties
over the ownership of the same parcel of land. Tamin denied the MTD and granted
the municipality's motion for a writ of possession "with the ancillary writ of
demolition to place in possession the plaintiff on the land subject of this case, to the
end that the public construction thereon will not be jeopardized." According to
Tamin, the municipality alleges that M&R are claiming ownership over the land
which was previously rented to them. This action is, therefore, an accion de
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reivindicacion, a real action within the jurisdiction of this court. As the complaint is
for recovery of ownership of the land not to enforce the contract, the Statute of
Fraud does not apply. The land subject of this case is covered by PD 365,
withdrawing this land from sale of settlement and reserving the same for school
site purposes under the administration of the Director of Public School and public
plaza under the administration of the Municipality of Dumingag, therefore the
Cadastral court has no jurisdiction over the land involved in this case. Tamin
justified his granting the motion for a writ of possession with the ancillary writ of
demolition by applying the rule an eminent domain in analogy in that under this
Rule the complainant is given the right to the writ of possession in order that
public construction and projects will not be delayed. According to him, the
necessity of a writ of possession is greater in the instant case considering that the
parcel of land is covered by a PP and the on-going construction thereon is being
endangered to be left unfinished on account of the buildings standing on the parcel
of land because the appropriation for the construction might be reverted back to
the national treasury. M&R filed an omnibus MR with motion to set aside order and
to quash writ of possession and demolition but this was denied. The municipality
implemented the writ of possession and ancillary writ of demolition issued by the
petitioner Judge resulting in the dispossession of the private respondents from the
parcel of land and the demolition of structures and buildings thereon owned by the
respondents.
M&R’s answer: The parcel of land has been owned, occupied and possess by
respondent Vicente Medina since 1947 when he bought the subject parcel from a
Subanan native; that the other respondent Fortunata Rosellon leased from Medina
a portion of the parcel of land; that the respondents were never lessees of the
petitioner municipality; that Proclamation 365 issued on March 15, 1968 recognized
"private rights"; and, that a case is pending before the Cadastral court between
respondent Medina and petitioner municipality as regards the ownership of the
subject parcel of land.
Before the petitioner Judge could further act on the case, the private respondents
filed a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning the orders of the petitioner
Judge. Petition was given due course and a TRO was issued enjoining the petitioner
Judge from proceeding with the hearing of the case and from enforcing the orders.
CA: RTC committed an error when it applied by analogy the rule on eminent domain
to justify the issuance of the writ of possession and writ of demolition. The
appellate court pointed out that under this rule: (i) There is clear statutory authority
for the taking of possession by the government and (ii) The authority is premised on
the government depositing the value of the land to be taken. In the case at bar,
there is neither statutory authority for the trial court's action nor bond given to
compensate the petitioners for the deprivation of their possession and the
destruction of their houses if it turns out that the land belongs to them. For this
reason, we think the trial courts order is arbitrary and void. For the fact is that
petitioners claim ownership of the land in question and until that question is
resolved either in the case pending before the respondent judge or in the cadastral
proceeding, it would be unjust to deprive petitioners of its possession.
Issue:
1. WON the allegations in the complaint constitute a cause of action for
abatement of public nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil Code.
 Applying these criteria, we agree with the petitioners that the
complaint alleges factual circumstances of a complaint for
abatement of public nuisance.
 Art. 694, CC A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property or anything else which: (5)
Hinders or impairs the use of property.
 Art. 695, CC Nuisance is either public or private. A public
nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any
considerable number of persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal.
..
 Thus, the complaint states: that petitioner municipality is the
owner of a parcel of land covered by Presidential Proclamation
No 365 which is reserved for a public plaza; that the private
respondents by virtue of a contract of lease entered into by the
former mayor occupied a portion of the parcel of land
constructing buildings thereon; that the private respondents
refused to vacate the premises despite demands; that the
municipality is constructing a municipal gymnasium in the area
financed by appropriations provided by the national
government; and that the appropriations are in danger of being
reverted to the national treasury because the construction had
to be stopped in view of the refusal of the private respondents to
vacate the area.
2. WON the municipality is entitled to a writ of possession and a writ of
demolition even before the trial of the case starts.
 Article 699 of the Civil Code provides for the following
remedies against a public nuisance:(1) A prosecution
under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or(2) A civil
action; or (3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
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 The petitioner municipality had three remedies from
which to select its cause of action. It chose to file a civil
action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land
occupied by the private respondents. Obviously,
petitioner municipality was aware that under the then
LGC (B.P. Blg. 337) the Sangguniang Bayan has to first
pass an ordinance before the municipality may
summarily abate a public nuisance. (Sec. 149(z) (ee).
 On the premise that the parcel of land forms part of a
public plaza, the petitioners now contend that the Judge
was justified in issuing the writ of possession and writ of
demolition.
 A public plaza is outside the commerce of man and
constructions thereon can be abated summarily by the
municipality, citing a case: Exactly in point is Espiritu v.
Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, (102 Phil. 869-870)
where the Supreme Court declared: There is absolutely
no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the
construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and
that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties
of public dominion, to be devoted to public use and to be
made available to the public in general. They are outside
the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even
leased by the municipality to private parties.
 Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that
petitioners had no right in the first place to occupy the
disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there
now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts.
They should have realized and accepted this earlier,
considering that even before Civil Case No. 2040 was
decided, the municipal council of San Fernando had
already adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964,
declaring this area as the parking place and public plaza
of the municipality.
 It is the decision in Civil Case No. 2040 and the said
resolution of the municipal council of San Fernando that
respondent Macalino was seeking to enforce when he
ordered the demolition of the stalls constructed in the
disputed area. As officer-in-charge of the office of the
mayor, he had the duty to clear the area and restore it to
its intended use as a parking place and public plaza of the
municipality of San Fernando, conformably to the
aforementioned orders from the court and the council. It
is, therefore, not correct to say that he had acted
without authority or taken the law into his hands in
issuing his order.
 The Court observes that even without such investigatiom
and recommendation, the respondent mayor was
justified in ordering the area cleared on the strength
alone of its status as a public plaza as declared by the
judicial and legislative authorities. .
 If, therefore, the allegations in the complaint are true
and that the parcel of land being occupied by the private
respondents is indeed a public plaza, then the writ of
possession and writ of demolition would have been
justified. In fact, under such circumstances, there would
have been no need for a writ of possession in favor of the
petitioner municipality since the private respondents'
occupation over the subject parcel of land can not be
recognized by any law. A writ of demolition would have
been sufficient to eject the private respondents.
 However, not only did the municipality avoid the use of
abatement without judicial proceedings, but the status of
the subject parcel of land has yet to be decided.
 We have to consider the fact that Proclamation No. 365
dated March 15, 1968 recognizes private rights which
may have been vested on other persons, to wit: BY THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES PROCLAMATION NO. 365
RESERVING FOR SCHOOL SITE, PUBLIC PLAZA AND
PLAYGROUND PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF
DUMINGAG, PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL SUR,
ISLAND OF MINDANAO.
 Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
vested in me by law, I FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, do hereby withdraw
from sale or settlement and under the administration of
the Director of Public Schools administration of the
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Municipal Government of Dumingag, subject to private
rights, if any there be, certain parcels of land of the
public domain situated in the Municipality of Dumingag,
Province of Zamboanga del Sur, Island of Mindanao,¦
 It is to be noted that even before the Proclamation, the
parcel of land was the subject of cadastral proceedings
before another branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Sur. At the time of the filing of the
instant case, the cadastral proceedings intended to settle
the ownership over the questioned portion of the parcel
of land under Proclamation No. 365 were still pending.
One of the claimants in the cadastral proceedings is
private respondent Vicente Medina who traced his
ownership over the subject parcel of land as far back as
1947 when he allegedly bought the same from a Subanan
native.
 Under the cadastral system, the government through the
Director of Lands initiates the proceedings by filing a
petition in court after which all owners or claimants are
compelled to act and present their answers otherwise
they lose their right to their own property. The purpose
is to serve the public interests by requiring that the titles
to any lands "be settled and adjudicated." (Section 1
Cadastral Act [No. 22593] Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Abural, 39 Phil. 996 [1919]. It is a proceeding in
rem somewhat akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation
leading to a judicial decree. (Director of Lands v. Roman
Archbishop of Manila, 41 Phil. 120 [1920])
 Considering therefore, the nature and purpose of the
Cadastral proceedings, the outcome of said proceedings
becomes a prejudicial question which must be addressed
in the resolution of the instant case. We apply by analogy
the ruling in the case of Quiambao v. Osorio (158 SCRA
674 [1988]), to wit: The instant controversy boils down to
the sole question of whether or not the administrative
case between the private parties involving the lot subject
matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial
question which would operate as a bar to said ejectment
case.
 A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
(Zapanta v. Montesa, 4 SCRA 510 [1962]; People v.
Aragon, 50 O.G.. No. 10, 4863) The doctrine of prejudicial
question comes as in to play generally in a situation
where civil and criminal actions are pending and the
issues involved in bath cases are similar or so closely-
related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in
the civil case before the criminal action can proceed.
Thus, the existence it a prejudicial question in a civil case
is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of
the latter pending final determination of the former.
 The essential elements of a prejudicial question as
provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules
of Court area: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar
or intimately related to the issue in the criminal action;
and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
 The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively
civil and administrative in character, it is obvious that
technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of.
Equally apparent, however, is the intimate correlation
between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the
fact that the right of private respondents to eject
petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily
on the resolution of the pending administrative case. For
while it may be true that private respondents had prior
possession of the lot in question, at the time of the
institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession
had been terminated, or at the very least, suspended by
the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement
to Sell executed in their favor. Whether or not private
respondents can continue to exercise their right of
possession is but a necessary, logical consequence of the
issue involved in the pending administrative case
assailing the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement
to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion
to petitioner. If the cancellation of the agreement, to Sell
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and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided, then
private respondent's right of possession is lost and so
would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.
 Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent
course for the trial court to have taken is to hold the
ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a
determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic
and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move.
To allow the parties to undergo trial notwithstanding the
possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld
in the pending administrative case is to needlessly
require not only the parties but the court as well to
expend time, effort in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us: The court in
which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, upon proper application for a stay of
that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the
outcome of another pending in another court, especially
where the parties and the issues are the same, for there
is power inherent in every court to control the
disposition of causes an its dockets with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where
the rights of parties in the record action cannot be
properly determined until the questions raised in the first
action are settled the second action should be stayed.
 While this rule is properly applicable to instances
involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the
instant case of the same considerations of identity of
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the
court, the counsels and the parties as well as the need to
resolve the parties' right of possession before the
ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the
rule's analogous application to the case at bar.
 Technically, a prejudicial question shall not rise in the
instant case since the two actions involved are both civil
in nature. However, we have to consider the fact that the
cadastral proceedings will ultimately settle the real
owner/s of the disputed parcel of land. In case
respondent Vicente Medina is adjudged the real owner
of the parcel of land, then the writ of possession and writ
of demolition would necessarily be null and void. Not
only that. The demolition of the constructions in the
parcel of land would prove truly unjust to the private
respondents.
Patalinhug v. CA
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance 363, series of
1982 otherwise known as the "Expanded Zoning Ordinance of Davao City," Section
8 of which states: Sec. 8. USE REGULATIONS IN C-2 DISTRICTS (Shaded light red in
the Expanded Zoning Map) AC-2 District shall be dominantly for commercial and
compatible industrial uses as provided hereunder: 3.1 Funeral Parlors/Memorial
Homes with adequate off street parking space (see parking standards of P.D. 1096)
and provided that they shall be established not less than 50 meters from any
residential structures, churches and other institutional buildings. Upon prior
approval and certification of zoning compliance by Zoning Administrator issued on
February 10, 1987 Building Permit No. 870254 in favor of petitioner for the
construction of a funeral parlor in the name and style of Metropolitan Funeral
Parlor at Cabaguio Avenue, Agdao, Davao City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced the construction of his funeral parlor.
Acting on the complaint of several residents of Barangay Agdao, Davao City that the
construction of petitioner's funeral parlor violated Ordinance
No. 363, since it was allegedly situated within a 50-meter radius from the Iglesia ni
Kristo Chapel and several residential structures, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
conducted an investigation and found that "the nearest residential structure,
owned by Wilfred G. Tepoot is only 8 inches to the south. . . . ."
Notwithstanding the findings of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, petitioner continued
to construct his funeral parlor which was finished on November 3, 1987.
Consequently, private respondents filed on September 6, 1988 a case for the
declaration of nullity of a building permit with preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction and/or restraining order with the trial court.
Issue:
1.
WON the CA erred in concluding that the Tepoot building adjacent to
petitioner's funeral parlor is residential simply because it was allegedly
declared as such for taxation purposes, in complete disregard of Ordinance
363 declaring the subject area as dominantly for commercial and
compatible industrial uses. YES.
 A tax declaration is not conclusive of the nature of the property for zoning
purposes. A property may have been declared by its owner as residential
for real estate taxation purposes but it may well be within a commercial
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APO | Local Governments Case Digests
zone. A discrepancy may thus exist in the determination of the nature of
property for real estate taxation purposes vis-a-vis the determination of a
property for zoning purposes.
 Even if we are to examine the evidentiary value of a tax declaration under
the Real Property Tax Code, a tax declaration only enables the assessor to
identify the same for assessment levels. In fact, a tax declaration does not
bind a provincial/city assessor, for under Sec. 22 of the Real Estate Tax
Code, appraisal and assessment are based on the actual use irrespective of
"any previous assessment or taxpayer's valuation thereon," which is based
on a taxpayer's declaration. In fact, a piece of land declared by a taxpayer
as residential may be assessed by the provincial or city assessor as
commercial because its actual use is commercial.
 The trial court's determination that Mr. Tepoot's building is commercial
and, therefore, Sec. 8 is inapplicable, is strengthened by the fact that the
Sangguniang Panlungsod has declared the questioned area as commercial
or C-2. Consequently, even if Tepoot's building was declared for taxation
purposes as residential, once a local government has reclassified an area as
commercial, that determination for zoning purposes must prevail. While
the commercial character of the questioned vicinity has been declared thru
the ordinance, private respondents have failed to present convincing
arguments to substantiate their claim that Cabaguio Avenue, where the
funeral parlor was constructed, was still a residential zone.
Unquestionably, the operation of a funeral parlor constitutes a
"commercial purpose," as gleaned from Ordinance 363.
 The declaration of the said area as a commercial zone thru a municipal
ordinance is an exercise of police power to promote the good order and
general welfare of the people in the locality. Corollary thereto, the state, in
order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty,
with property, and with business and occupations.
 Persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general welfare of the state and to this fundamental
aim of government, the rights of the individual may be subordinated. The
ordinance which regulates the location of funeral homes has been adopted
as part of comprehensive zoning plans for the orderly development of the
area covered thereunder.
Greater Balanga Development Corp. v. Municipality of Balanga
Facts: This case involves a parcel of land situated in Barrio San Jose, Municipality of
Balanga, Province of Bataan. It is registered in the name of petitioner Greater
Balanga Development Corporation. GBDC is a domestic corporation owned and
controlled by the Camacho family, which donated to the Municipality of Balanga
the present site of the Balanga Public Market. The lot in dispute lies behind the
Balanga Public Market. In 1987, GBDC conducted a relocation survey of the area. It
discovered that certain portions of the property had been "unlawfully usurped and
invaded" by the Municipality of Balanga, which had "allowed/tolerated/abetted"
the construction of shanties and market stalls while charging market fees and
market entrance fees from the occupants and users of the area. GBDC then applied
with the Office of the Mayor of Balanga for a business permit to engage in business
in the said area. On the same day, Mayor Melanio S. Banzon, Jr. issued Mayor's
Permit No. 2729, granting petitioner the privilege of a "real estate dealer/privately-
owned public market operator" under the trade name of Balanga Public Market.
However, the Sangguniang Bayan of Balanga passed Resolution No. 12, s-88
annulling the Mayor's permit issued to petitioner and advising the Mayor to revoke
the permit "to operate a public market." Pursuant to said Resolution, Mayor
Banzon, on March 7, 1988, issued Executive Order No. 1, s-88 revoking the permit
insofar as it authorized the operation of a public market.
GBDC filed the instant petition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction or restraining order aimed at the
reinstatement of the Mayor's permit and the curtailment of the municipality's
collection of market fees and market entrance fees. The Court did not issue the
preliminary reliefs prayed for.
Issue: WON the Mayor may issue, deny or revoke municipal licenses and permits.
 Respondent: as the local chief executive, the Mayor may issue, deny or
revoke municipal licenses and permits. They contended that Resolution
No. 12, s-88 of the Sangguniang Bayan, the basis of Executive Order No. 1,
s-88, was a legitimate exercise of local legislative authority and, as such,
the revocation of petitioner's permit was not tainted with any grave abuse
of discretion. GBDC asserted that the executive order and the resolution in
question were quasi-judicial acts and not mere exercises of police power. It
questioned respondents' failure to observe due process in revoking the
permit and challenged the legality of the collection of the market and
entrance fees by the municipality.
 The authority of the Mayor to revoke a permit he issued is premised on a
violation by the grantee of any of the conditions for which the permit had
been granted. Respondents claimed that petitioner had violated the
provisions of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code when it failed
to inform the Mayor that the lot in controversy was the subject of adverse
claims for which a civil case was filed.
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 Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code reads: (b) The application
for a Mayor's permit shall state the name, residence and citizenship of (sic)
the applicant's full description of the business, the particular place where
(sic) the same shall be conducted, and such other pertinent information
and date (sic) as any (sic) be required. If the applicant deliberately makes a
false statement in the application form, the Municipal Mayor may revoke
the permit and the applicant may be prosecuted and penalized in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of penal laws.
 In case a person desires to conduct the same kind or line of business in
another place within the Municipality, in addition to or aside from the
establishment specified in his permit, he shall secure a separate permit for
each business and pay the corresponding fee imposed in this article. If a
person desires to engage in more than one kind or line of business, he shall
pay the fee imposed on each separate business, notwithstanding the fact
that he may conduct or operate all distinct business (sic), trades or
occupation in one place only
 (h) Revocation of Permit. — The Municipal Mayor may revoke a permit, in
effect close the establishment, upon a violation of existing ordinance
regulating business establishments or any provisions of this article, in
addition to the fine and imprisonment that they (sic) may be imposed by
the court for violation of this article
 Respondents claim that petitioner (1) deliberately made a false statement
in the application form when it failed to provide the information that their
place of business is the subject of adverse claims; and (2) failed to apply for
two separate permits for the two lines of business it proposed to engage
in.
 The application for Mayor's permit in the case at bench requires the
applicant to state what type of "business", profession, occupation and/or
calling privileges" is being applied for. Petitioner left this entry bank in its
application form (Rollo, p. 324). It is only in the Mayor's permit itself that
petitioner's lines of business appear, which in this case are two separate
types, one as real estate dealer and another as public market operator.
 The permit should not have been issued without the required information
given in the application form itself. Revoking the permit, however, because
of a false statement in the application form cannot be justified under the
aforementioned provision. There must be proof of willful
misrepresentation and deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good
faith is always presumed, and as it happened, petitioner did not make any
false statement in the pertinent entry. Neither was petitioner's applying
for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation.
 The question of ownership over Lot 261-B had already been settled with
finality by the Supreme Court in 1983 in G.R. No. 62223. Entry of judgment
was likewise, made in the same year. When the Mayor's permit was
revoked on February 19, 1988, five years had already elapsed since the
case was decided. Petitioner was able to survey the land and have the
survey approved on March 21, 1984 (Rollo, pp. 15-16), and on January 11,
1988, petitioner obtained in its name TCT No. 120152 "without any
memorandum of encumbrance or encumbrances pertaining to any
decision rendered in any civil case" Clearly, for all intents and purposes,
petitioner appeared to be the true owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3 when
respondents revoked its permit to engaged in business on its own land.
 Assuming arguendo that Lot 261-B-6-A-3 was actually one of those
awarded to the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3803 and the Transfer Certificate
of Title of petitioner is spurious, this still does not justify the revocation of
the Mayor's permit. A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the
Sangguniang Bayan did not establish or maintain any public market on the
subject lot. The resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the lot for
expansion of the public market adjacent thereto. Until expropriation
proceedings are instituted in court, the landowner cannot be deprived of
its right over the land.
 Of course, the Sangguniang Bayan has the duty in the exercise of its police
powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and
prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already issued
may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]). But the "anxiety,
uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders cannot be a
valid ground for revoking the permit of petitioner. After all, the stallholders
and traders were doing business on property not belonging to the
Municipal government. Indeed, the claim that the executive order and
resolution were measures "designed to promote peace and order and
protect the general welfare of the people of Balanga" is too amorphous
and convenient an excuse to justify respondents' acts (Villacorta v.
Bernardo, 143 SCRA 480 [1986]).
 In view of the undisputed fact that the respondent Municipality is not the
owner of Lot 261-B-6-A-3, then there is no legal basis for it to impose and
collect market fees and market entrance fees. Only the owner has the right
to do so.
Tano v. Socrates
Facts: Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Puerto Princesa City enacted Ordinance No. 15-
92 which banned the shimpment of live fisha and lobster outside Puerto Princesa
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City from 01 Jan 1993-1998. While the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Provincial
Government of Palawan enacted Resolution No. 33 which prohibited the catching,
gathering, possessing, buying, selling, and shipment of love marine coral dwelling
aquatic organisms for a period of 5 years in and coming from Palawan waters.
Ordinance No. 2 Ordinance Prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying,
selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms was also
enacted. The respondents implemented the said ordinances, depriving all the
fishermen of the whole province of Palawan and the City of Puerto Princesa of their
only means of livelihood and the petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan
and other marine merchants from performing their lawful occupation and trade.
Petitioners Alfredo Tano, Baldomero Tano, Teocenes Midello, Angel de Mesa,
Eulogio Tremocha, and Felipe Ongonion, Jr. were charged criminally on the basis of
the ordinances.
The petitioners filed this action claiming that first, the Ordinances deprived them of
due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of
their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution. Second, Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor
condition under which the Mayor’s permit could be granted or denied; in other
words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue
permit. Third, as the Ordinance No. 2 altogether prohibited the catching, gathering,
possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms,
without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing
method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their
livelihood in lawful ways. Finally, as Ordinance No. 2 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan is null and void, the criminal cases based thereon against petitioners
Tano and the others have to be dismissed.
Governor Socrates and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan
defended the validity of Ordinance No.2 as a valid exercise of the Provincial
Government power under the general welfare clause (Section 16 of the LGC of 1991
[hereafter, LGC]), and its specific power to protect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment, such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing under Section 447 (a) (1) (vi), Section
458 (a) (1) (vi), and Section 468 (a) (1) (vi), of the LGC. They claimed that in the
exercise of such powers, the Province of Palawan had the right and responsibilty to
insure that the remaining coral reefs, where fish dwells [sic], within its territory
remain healthy for the future generation. The Ordinance, they further asserted,
covered only live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms which were enumerated
in the ordinance and excluded other kinds of live marine aquatic organisms not
dwelling in coral reefs; besides the prohibition was for only five (5) years to protect
and preserve the pristine coral and allow those damaged to regenerate.
They likewise maintained that there was no violation of due process and
equal protection clauses of the Constitution. As to the former, public hearings were
conducted before the enactment of the Ordinance which, undoubtedly, had a
lawful purpose and employed reasonable means; while as to the latter, a
substantial distinction existed between a fisherman who catches live fish with the
intention of selling it live, and a fisherman who catches live fish with no intention at
all of selling it live, i.e., the former uses sodium cyanide while the latter does not.
Further, the Ordinance applied equally to all those belonging to one class.
There are actually two sets of petitioners in this case. The primary interest
of the first set of petitioners is to prevent the prosecution, trial and determination
of the criminal cases until the constitutionality or legality of the Ordinances they
allegedly violated shall have been resolved. The second set of petitioners merely
claim that they being fishermen or marine merchants, they would be adversely
affected by the ordinances. The petitioners claim that as subsistence or marginal
fishermen, they are entitled to the protection of the State as enshrined in Section 2
of Article XII of the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether petitioners are subsistence or marginal fishermen? NO.
 Since the Constitution does not specifically provide a definition of the
terms "subsistence" or "marginal" fishermen, they should be construed in
their general and ordinary sense. A marginal fisherman is an individual
engaged in fishing whose margin of return or reward in his harvest of fish
as measured by existing price levels is barely sufficient to yield a profit or
cover the cost of gathering the fish, while a subsistence fisherman is one
whose catch yields but the irreducible minimum for his livelihood. Section
131(p) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) defines a marginal farmer or fisherman
as "an individual engaged in subsistence farming or fishing which shall be
limited to the sale, barter or exchange of agricultural or marine products
produced by himself and his immediate family." It bears repeating that
nothing in the record supports a finding that any petitioner falls within
these definitions.
 Besides, Section 2 of Article XII aims primarily not to bestow any right to
subsistence fishermen, but to lay stress on the duty of the State to protect
the nation's marine wealth. What the provision merely recognizes is that
the State may allow, by law, cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
 Anent Section 7 of Article XIII, it speaks not only of the use of communal
marine and fishing resources, but of their protection, development and
conservation. As hereafter shown, the ordinances in question are meant
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precisely to protect and conserve our marine resources to the end that
their enjoyment may be guaranteed not only for the present generation,
but also for the generations to come.
 The so-called "preferential right" of subsistence or marginal fishermen to
the use of marine resources is not at all absolute. In accordance with the
Regalian Doctrine, marine resources belong to the State, and, pursuant to
the first paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, their
"exploration, development and utilization . . . shall be under the full
control and supervision of the State."
2. Whether the ordinances in question are unconstitutional? NO.
 Moreover, Section 5(c) of the LGC explicitly mandates that the general
welfare provisions of the LGC "shall be liberally interpreted to give more
powers to the LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading
the quality of life for the people of the community."
 The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize,
by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous
substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of
fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable
fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod
and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the
general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include,
inter alia, ordinances that "[p]rotect the environment and impose
appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as
dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other
activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers
and lakes, or of ecological imbalance."
 Finally, the centerpiece of LGC is the system of decentralization as
expressly mandated by the Constitution.. Indispensable to decentralization
is devolution and the LGC expressly provides that "[a]ny provision on a
power of a LGU shall be liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of
doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
powers and of the lower LGU. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the LGU concerned."
Devolution refers to the act by which the National Government confers
power and authority upon the various LGUs to perform specific functions
and responsibilities.
 In light then of the principles of decentralization and devolution enshrined
in the LGC and the powers granted therein to LGUs under Section 16 (the
General Welfare Clause), and under Sections 149, 447(a) (1) (vi), 458 (a) (1)
(vi) and 468 (a) (1) (vi), which unquestionably involve the exercise of police
power, the validity of the questioned Ordinances cannot be doubted.
 Parenthetically, we wish to add that these Ordinances find full support
under R.A. No. 7611, otherwise known as the Strategic Environmental Plan
(SEP) for Palawan Act, approved on 19 June 1992. This statute adopts a
"comprehensive framework for the sustainable development of Palawan
compatible with protecting and enhancing the natural resources and
endangered environment of the province".
 It is clear to the Court that the Ordinances have two principal objectives or
purposes: (1) to establish a "closed season" for the species of fish or
aquatic animals covered therein for a period of five years; and (2) to
protect the coral in the marine waters of the City of Puerto Princesa and
the Province of Palawan from further destruction due to illegal fishing
activities.
 The accomplishment of the first objective is well within the devolved
power to enforce fishery laws in municipal waters, such as P.D. No. 1015,
which allows the establishment of "closed seasons." The devolution of
such power has been expressly confirmed in the Memorandum of
Agreement of 5 April 1994 between the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Interior and Local Government.
 The realization of the second objective clearly falls within both the general
welfare clause of the LGC and the express mandate to cities and provinces
to protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment.
 Therefore, it is incorrect to say that the challenged Ordinance of the City of
Puerto Princesa is invalid or unenforceable because it was not approved by
the Secretary of the DENR. If at all, the approval that should be sought
would be that of the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture. However,
the requirement of approval by the Secretary of the Department of
Agriculture (not DENR) of municipal ordinances affecting fishing and
fisheries in municipal waters has been dispensed with in view of the
following reason: (1) As discussed earlier, under the general welfare clause
of the LGC, LGUs have the power, inter alia, to enact ordinances to
enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology. It likewise
specifically vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters, and impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to
penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or
poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious
methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of
applicable fishery laws. Finally, it imposes upon the sangguniang bayan,
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the sangguniang panlungsod, and the sangguniang panlalawigan the duty

to enact ordinances to "[p]rotect the environment and impose appropriate
penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite
fishing and other forms of destructive fishing . . . and such other activities
which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes
or of ecological imbalance.

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Sangalang v. IAC
Facts: Studies were made by Mayor Yabut et al, on the feasibility of opening streets
in Bel-Air calculated to alleviate traffic congestion along the public streets adjacent
to Bel-Air. Based on the studies, it was deemed necessary, in the interest of the
general public to open to traffic Amapola, Mercedes, Zodia, Jupiter, Neptune, Orbit,
and Paseo de Roxas streets. According to Bel-Air they own the streets and as such,
should not be deprived of them without just compensation.
Issue: WON the mayor acted arbitrarily in opening up Jupiter and Orbit streets. NO.
 The opening of Jupiter was warranted by the demands of the common
good, in terms of traffic decongestion and public convenience. The same is
upheld in the case of Orbit street.
 There is not merit in BAVA’s claims that the demolition of the gates at
Orbit and Jupiter amounts to deprivation of property without due process
of law or expropriation without just compensation. There is no taking
involved in this case. The act of the mayor is in the concept of police
power.
 PASEI v. Drilon: Police Power: state authority to enact legislation that may
interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general
welfare. Consists of: 1. An imposition of restraint upon liberty or property
2. In order to foster the common good The police power of the state is a
power coextensive with self-protection and it is not inaptly termed the law
of overwhelming necessity. It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety, and welfare of society.
 Bill of rights: even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted
license to act accordingly to one’s will. It is subject to the far more
overriding demands and requirements of the greater number.
 However, it may not be done arbitrarily or unreasonably. Burden of
showing that it is unjustified lies on aggrieved party. In the case at bar.
BAVA has failed to show that the opening was unjustified or that the
mayor acted unreasonably.
 Art. 701: summary abatement may be carried out by the mayor himself
Cabrera v. CA
Facts: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158 closing the
old road leading to the new Capitol Building of this province to traffic and giving the
owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the
Highway District Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to the respective
remaining portion of their properties. Pursuant thereto, Deeds of Exchange were
executed under which the Province of Catanduanes conveyed to Remedios R.
Bagadiong, Fredeswindo F. Alcala, Elena S. Latorre, Baldomero Tolentino, Eulogia T.
Alejandro, Angeles S. Vargas, and Juan S. Reyes portions of the closed road in
exchange for their own respective properties, on which was subsequently laid a
new concrete road leading to the Capitol Building. In 1978, part of the northern end
of the old road fronting the petitioner's house was planted to vegetables in 1977 by
Eulogia Alejandro. Anselmo Peña, who had bought Angeles Vargas's share, also in
the same part of the road, converted it into a piggery farm. Learning about
Resolution 158, the petitioner filed on December 29, 1978, a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of Catanduanes for "Restoration of Public Road and/or
Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages."
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He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province
of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce
of man. He contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were
invalid, as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road.
In a decision dated November 21, 1980, Judge Graciano P. Gayapa, Jr., while holding
that the land in question was not a declared public road but a mere "passageway"
or "short-cut," nevertheless sustained the authority of the provincial board to enact
Resolution No. 158 under existing law. 1 Appeal was taken to the respondent court,
2 which found that the road was a public road and not a trail but just the same also
upheld Resolution 158. It declared:
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, municipal authorities can close, subject to the
approval or direction of the Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Although in this case the road was not closed by
the municipality of Catanduanes but by the provincial board of Catanduanes, the
closure, nevertheless, is valid since it was ordered by the approving authority itself.
However, while it could do so, the provincial government of Catanduanes could
close the road only if the persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section
2246 of the Revised Administrative Code being very explicit on this.
Before us now, the petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because
Resolution No. 158 is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an
authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. He maintains that the
public road was owned by the province in its governmental capacity and, without a
prior order of closure, could not be the subject of a barter. Control over public
roads, he insists, is with Congress and not with the provincial board.
The petitioner alleges that the closure of the road has especially injured him and his
family as they can no longer use it in going to the national road leading to the old
capitol building but must instead pass through a small passageway. For such
inconvenience, he is entitled to damages in accordance with law.
Issue: WON the provincial board can order the closure of a road and use/ convey it
for other purposes. YES.
 The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey
it for other purposes is derived from the following provisions of Republic
Act No. 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative
Code: R.A. No. 5185, Section 11 (II) (a): II. The following actions by
municipal officials or municipal councils, as provided for in the pertinent
sections of the Revised Administrative Code shall take effect without the
need of approval or direction from any official of the national government:
Provided, That such actions shall be subject to approval or direction by the
Provincial Board: (a) Authority to close thoroughfare under Section 2246;
Sec. 2246. Authority to close thoroughfare. — With the prior authorization
of the Department Head, a municipal council may close any municipal
road, street, alley, park, or square; but no such way or place aforesaid or
any part thereof, shall be closed without indemnifying any person
prejudiced thereby.
 Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed
for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed.
 Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles: closure of a city street is
within the powers of the city council under the Revised Charter of Cebu
City. It sustained the subsequent sale of the land as being in accordance
not only with the charter but also with Article 422 of the Civil Code, which
provides: "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for
public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property
of the State."
 Favis vs. City of Baguio: appellant may not challenge the city council's act
of withdrawing a strip of Lapu-Lapu Street at its dead end from public use
and converting the remainder thereof into an alley. These are acts well
within the ambit of the power to close a city street. The city council, it
would seem to us, is the authority competent to determine whether or not
a certain property is still necessary for public use. Such power to vacate a
street or alley is discretionary. And the discretion will not ordinarily be
controlled or interfered with by the courts, absent a plain case of abuse or
fraud or collusion. Faithfulness to the public trust will be presumed. So the
fact that some private interests may be served incidentally will not
invalidate the vacation ordinance.
 While it is true that the above cases dealt with city councils and not the
provincial board, there is no reason for not applying the doctrine
announced therein to the provincial board in connection with the closure
of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of
maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants
of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the
national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the
construction of provincial roads.
 The lower court found the petitioner's allegation of injury and prejudice to
be without basis because he had "easy access anyway to the national road,
for in fact the vehicles used by the Court and the parties during the ocular
inspection easily passed and used it, reaching beyond plaintiff's house."
However, the CA ruled that the he "was prejudiced by the closure of the
road which formerly fronted his house. He and his family were
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undoubtedly inconvenienced by the loss of access to their place of
residence for which we believe they should be compensated."
 Favis: The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the
closed section of a street has no right to compensation for the closing or
vacation of the street, if he still has reasonable access to the general
system of streets. The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give
a right to damages to a property owner, even though his property does not
abut on the closed section. But to warrant recovery in any such case the
property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained
special damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those
sustained by the public generally.
 Richmond v. City of Hinton : The Constitution does not undertake to
guarantee to a property owner the public maintenance of the most
convenient route to his door. The law will not permit him to be cut off
from the public thoroughfares, but he must content himself with such
route for outlet as the regularly constituted public authority may deem
most compatible with the public welfare. When he acquires city property,
he does so in tacit recognition of these principles. If, subsequent to his
acquisition, the city authorities abandon a portion of the street to which
his property is not immediately adjacent, he may suffer loss because of the
inconvenience imposed, but the public treasury cannot be required to
recompense him. Such case is damnum absque injuria.
 petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred,
such as it is, is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of
the entire community. This is not a case where his property has been
expropriated and he is entitled to just compensation. The construction of
the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the
trial judge acutely observed, whatever inconvenience the petitioner has
suffered "pales in significance compared to the greater convenience the
new road, which is wide and concrete, straight to the veterans fountain
and down to the pier, has been giving to the public, plus the fact that the
new road adds beauty and color not only to the town of Virac but also to
the whole province of Catanduanes." For the enjoyment of those benefits,
every individual in the province, including the petitioner, must be prepared
to give his share
Dacanay v. Asistio
Facts: MMC Ordinance No. 79-02 was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila
Commission, designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces
as sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up
seven (7) flea markets in that city. One of those streets was the "Heroes del '96"
where the petitioner lives. Upon application of vendors, the respondents city mayor
and city engineer, issued them licenses to conduct vending activities on said street.
Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the
market stalls on Heroes del '96, V. Gozon and Gonzales streets. To stop Mayor
Martinez' efforts, stallowners filed an action for prohibition against the City of
Caloocan, the OIC City Mayor and the City Engineer and/or their deputies, praying
the court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction ordering these city officials to
discontinue the demolition of their stalls during the pendency of the action..
LC: PI Granted. But petition was later dismissed. (1) Observed that MMC Ordinance
No. 79-02 expressly provides that the use of certain streets as flee markets are
subject to the approval of the Metropolitan Manila Commission. (2) Found that
Heroes del '96, Gozon and Gonzales streets are of public dominion, hence, outside
the commerce of man. This means that they cannot be alienated or leased or
otherwise be the subject matter of contracts (Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas). Such
lease, if ever, is null and void. This principle was supported by City of Manila vs.
Gerardo Garcia, which stated that: œThe property being a public one, the Manila
Mayors did not have the authority to give permits, written or oral, to the squatters,
and that the permits granted are therefore considered null and void.• (3) Opined
that the officials have the right to demolish the subject stalls of the plaintiffs, more
so due to Section 185, par. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
LGC. However, shortly after the LC decision came out, the city administration in
Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor
Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up the city
streets. Invoking the trial court's decision in Civil Case No. C-12921, Dacanay wrote
a letter to Mayor Asistio, Jr., calling his attention to the illegally-constructed stalls
on Heroes del '96 Street and asked for their demolition. Followed up but to no avail.
Hence, this case.
Issue: WON public streets or thoroughfares may be leased or licensed to market
stallholders by virtue of a city ordinance or resolution of the Metro Manila
Commission. NO.
 There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private
respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as
found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is
property for public use hence outside the commerce of man. Being outside
the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract.
 As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy
portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has
been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are
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null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the
city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a
few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the
community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare,
the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.
 The Executive Order issued by Acting Mayor Robles authorizing the use of
Heroes del '96 Street as a vending area for stallholders who were granted
licenses by the city government contravenes the general law that reserves
city streets and roads for public use. Mayor Robles' Executive Order may
not infringe upon the vested right of the public to use city streets for the
purpose they were intended to serve: i.e., as arteries of travel for vehicles
and pedestrians.
Macasiano v. Diokno
Facts: Paranaque passed Ordinance No. 86, Series of 1990 which authorized the
closure of J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets
located at Baclaran, Parañaque, Metro Manila and the establishment of a flea
market thereon. The said ordinance was approved by the municipal council
pursuant to MMC Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1979, authorizing and regulating the
use of certain city and/or municipal streets, roads and open spaces within
Metropolitan Manila as sites for flea market and/or vending areas, under certain
terms and conditions.
On July 20, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila Authority approved Ordinance No. 86, s.
1990 of the municipal council of respondent municipality subject to the following
conditions: 1. That the aforenamed streets are not used for vehicular traffic, and
that the majority of the residents do not oppose the establishment of the flea
market/vending areas thereon; 2. That the 2-meter middle road to be used as flea
market/vending area shall be marked distinctly, and that the 2 meters on both sides
of the road shall be used by pedestrians; 3. That the time during which the vending
area is to be used shall be clearly designated; 4. That the use of the vending areas
shall be temporary and shall be closed once the reclaimed areas are developed and
donated by the Public Estate Authority.
On June 20, 1990, the municipal council of Parañaque issued a resolution
authorizing Parañaque Mayor Walfrido N. Ferrer to enter into contract with any
service cooperative for the establishment, operation, maintenance and
management of flea markets and/or vending areas.
On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and respondent Palanyag, a service
cooperative, entered into an agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain
and manage the flea market in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to
remit dues to the treasury of the municipal government of Parañaque.
Consequently, market stalls were put up by respondent Palanyag on the said
streets.
On September 13, 1990, petitioner Brig. Gen. Macasiano, PNP Superintendent of
the Metropolitan Traffic Command, ordered the destruction and confiscation of
stalls along G.G. Cruz and J. Gabriel St. in Baclaran. These stalls were later returned
to respondent Palanyag.
On October 16, 1990, petitioner Brig. General Macasiano wrote a letter to
respondent Palanyag giving the latter ten (10) days to discontinue the flea market;
otherwise, the market stalls shall be dismantled.
Hence, on October 23, 1990, respondents municipality and Palanyag filed with the
trial court a joint petition for prohibition and mandamus with damages and prayer
for preliminary injunction, to which the petitioner filed his
memorandum/opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
On October 24, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order to enjoin
petitioner from enforcing his letter-order of October 16, 1990 pending the hearing
on the motion for writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 17, 1990, the trial court issued an order upholding the validity of
Ordinance No. 86 s. 1990 of the Municipality' of Parañaque and enjoining petitioner
Brig. Gen. Macasiano from enforcing his letter-order against respondent Palanyag.
Issue: WON the ordinance authorizing the flea markets on public streets is valid NO.
 The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property
for public use and patrimonial property (Art. 423, Civil Code). As to what
consists of property for public use, Article 424 of Civil Code states: Art. 424.
Property for public use, in the provinces, cities and municipalities, consists
of the provincial roads, city streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities or municipalities. All other property possessed by any of them is
patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without prejudice to the
provisions of special laws.
 J. Gabriel G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena streets are
local roads used for public service and are therefore considered public
properties of respondent municipality. Properties of the local government
which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the
absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no authority
whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless
specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. One such example of
this authority given by Congress to the local governments is the power to
close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the LGC, which states:
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Sec. 10. Closure of roads. - A LGU may likewise, through its head acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with existing
law and the provisions of this Code, close any barangay, municipal, city or
provincial road, street, alley, park or square. No such way or place or any
part of thereof shall be close without indemnifying any person prejudiced
thereby. A property thus withdrawn from public use may be used or
conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed.
 However, the aforestated legal provision which gives authority to LGUs to
close roads and other similar public places should be read and interpreted
in accordance with basic principles already established by law. These basic
principles have the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city or
municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare. Article 424 of the Civil
Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion
devoted to public use and made available to the public in general are
outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or leased by the
LGU to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process, which
should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure
should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public
property from public use when circumstances show that such property is
no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is
already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes
patrimonial property of the LGU concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu
Oxygen, etc. et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L--40474, August 29, 1975, 66
SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent municipality can "use or
convey them for any purpose for which other real property belonging to
the local unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in
accordance with the last sentence of Section 10, Chapter II of Blg. 337,
known as LGC. In one case, the City Council of Cebu, through a resolution,
declared the terminal road of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City as an
abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development
Plan. Thereafter, the City Council passes another resolution authorizing the
sale of the said abandoned road through public bidding. We held therein
that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city street and to vacate or
withdraw the same from public use. Such withdrawn portion becomes
patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract (Cebu
Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No.
 L-40474,
August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 481). However, those roads and streets which
are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular
traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such
case, the local government has no power to use it for another purpose or
to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
 Even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that respondent municipality has the
authority to pass the disputed ordinance, the same cannot be validly
implemented because it cannot be considered approved by the
Metropolitan Manila Authority due to non-compliance by respondent
municipality of the conditions imposed by the former for the approval of
the ordinance.
 Respondent municipality has not shown any iota of proof that it has
complied with the foregoing conditions precedent to the approval of the
ordinance. The allegations of respondent municipality that the closed
streets were not used for vehicular traffic and that the majority of the
residents do not oppose the establishment of a flea market on said streets
are unsupported by any evidence that will show that this first condition
has been met. Likewise, the designation by respondents of a time schedule
during which the flea market shall operate is absent.
 Further, it is of public notice that the streets along Baclaran area are
congested with people, houses and traffic brought about by the
proliferation of vendors occupying the streets. To license and allow the
establishment of a flea market along J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt.
Garcia Extension and Opena streets in Baclaran would not help in solving
the problem of congestion.
 The powers of a LGU are not absolute. They are subject to limitations laid
down by toe Constitution and the laws such as our Civil Code. Moreover,
the exercise of such powers should be subservient to paramount
considerations of health and well-being of the members of the community.
Every LGU has the sworn obligation to enact measures that will enhance
the public health, safety and convenience, maintain peace and order, and
promote the general prosperity of the inhabitants of the local units. Based
on this objective, the local government should refrain from acting towards
that which might prejudice or adversely affect the general welfare.
 Dacanay case: the general public have a legal right to demand the
demolition of the illegally constructed stalls in public roads and streets and
the officials of respondent municipality have the corresponding duty
arising from public office to clear the city streets and restore them to their
specific public purpose. The instant case as well as the Dacanay case,
involves an ordinance which is void and illegal for lack of basis and
authority in laws applicable during its time. However, at this point, We find
it worthy to note that Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, known as Local
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Government Lode, has already been repealed by Republic Act No. 7160
known as LGC of 1991 which took effect on January 1, 1992. Section 5(d) of
the new Code provides that rights and obligations existing on the date of
effectivity of the new Code and arising out of contracts or any other source
of prestation involving a LGU shall be governed by the original terms and
conditions of the said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights
were vested.
Pilapil v. CA
Facts: The Colomidas own a parcel of land which has a road right of way leading to
the national highway. Such road ends at the Pilapils’ land. According to the
Colomidas, a camino vecinal leading to the national highway exists while the Pilapils
deny such fact. The Colomidas tried to improve the camino for the public’s
convenience but such was met with threats from the Pilapils. The Pilapils also
threatened to fence off the camino vecinal. The Colomidas then filed a petition for
injunction and damages with a prayer for a writ of PM or prohibitory injunction
which sought to prevent the Pilapils from harassing them as well as fencing off the
camino vecinal. The Pilapils also filed a case against the Colomidas alleging that no
such camino exists on their land. In trial, the Municipal Planning and Development
Coordinator of Liloan testified that according to the zoning map of Liloan, the
camino does not traverse, but runs along the side of the Pilapils’ property
Issue: WON the Municipality of Liloan has authority to close or abandon the camino
vecinal. YES.
 It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the
camino vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No
private party can interfere with such a right. Thus, even if We are to agree
with both the trial court and public respondent that Longakit and Pepito
were telling the truth, the decision of the Municipality of Liloan with
respect to the said camino vecinal in sitio Bahak must prevail. It is thus
pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses since the
same have, for all intents and purposes, become irrelevant.
 The property of provinces, cities and municipalities is divided into property
for public use and patrimonial property. The first consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, and public works for public service paid for by the said
provinces, cities or municipalities. They are governed by the same
principles as property of public dominion of the same character. 42 Under
the applicable law in this case, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (The LGC), the
Sangguniang Bayan, the legislative body of the municipality, 43 had the
power to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations subject to
the provisions of existing laws, and to provide for the construction,
improvement, repair and maintenance of municipal streets, avenues,
alleys, sidewalks, bridges, parks and other public places, regulate the use
thereof and prohibit the construction or placing of obstacles or
encroachments on them 44 Section 10, Chapter 2, Title One, Book I of said
Code provided: 45 Sec. 10. Closure of roads. — A LGU may likewise,
through its head acting pursuant to a resolution of its Sangguniang and in
accordance with existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any
barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street, alley, park or square.
No such way or place or any part thereof shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn
from public use may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the local unit concerned might be lawfully used
or conveyed.
 A camino vecinal is a municipal road. It is also property for public use.
Pursuant, therefore, to the above powers of a LGU, the Municipality of
Liloan had the unassailable authority to (a) prepare and adopt a land use
map, (b) promulgate a zoning ordinance which may consider, among other
things, the municipal roads to be constructed, maintained, improved or
repaired and (c) close any municipal road.
 In the instant case, the Municipality of Liloan, through the Sangguniang
Bayan, approved the Urban Land Use Plan; this plan was duly signed by the
Municipal Mayor (Exhibit "1"). By doing so, the said legislative body
determined, among others, the location of the camino vecinal in sitio
Bahak. The unrebutted testimony of Engineer Epifanio Jordan shows that
the same was approved by the Sangguniang Bayan. The reluctance of the
trial court and public respondent to give due weight to the testimony of
Engineer Jordan stemmed from a doubt as to his authority to prepare the
plan. There is also some confusion regarding the party who directed him to
do so. Both courts observed that while on direct examination, he testified
that the Sangguniang Bayan instructed him to prepare the zoning map, 47
during cross-examination, he stated that he prepared it upon the Mayor's
oral order. 48 Such inconsistency is quite trivial and hence, did not affect
the preparation and subsequent approval of the zoning map. In the first
place, under the applicable law, the mayor was both a member and the
presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan. Secondly, what invested the
zoning map with legal effect was neither the authority of the person who
ordered its preparation nor the authority of the person who actually
prepared it, but its approval by the Sangguniang Bayan. Furthermore, with
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or without the order of the Mayor or Sangguniang Bayan, Engineer Jordan,
as the then Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator, had the
authority to prepare the plan and admit it to the Sangguniang Bayan for
approval. Among his functions under the governing law at the time was to
formulate an integrated economic, social, physical and other development
objectives and policies for the consideration and approval of the
sangguniang bayan and the municipal mayor, and prepare municipal
comprehensive plans and other development planning document. 50 Thus,
even if he had not been instructed by anyone to prepare the map, he could
nevertheless, on his own initiative and by virtue of his functions, make
one. The trial court and public respondent then failed to appreciate the
role and function of a Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator.
 As further declared by Engineer Jordan, this camino vecinal in sitio Bahak
"passes the side of the land of Socrates Pilapil. This is the proposed road
leading to the national highway." The Colomidas presented no rebuttal
witness to show that by the approval of the zoning map by the
Sangguniang Bayan, they were effectively deprived of access to the
national highway from their property. Of course, they may argue that the
zoning map was prepared for and approved by the Sangguniang Bayan
after the filing of their petition in Civil Case No. R-20732. Be that as it may,
this preparation and approval, clearly a supervening event, was relied
upon, introduced in evidence without objection on the part of the
Colomidas and evaluated by the trial court. In short, the latter allowed the
issue raised by the supervening event to be tried. There was nothing
procedurally objectionable to this; on the contrary, Section 5, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court allows it. Said section reads: Sec. 5. Amendment to
conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. — When issues not
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the
parties, they shall be treated in all respects, as if they had been raised in
the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to
cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment, but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If
evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleading, to be
amended and shall do so freely when the presentation on the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court may grant a
continuance to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
 Such supervening fact, duly proved to be an official act of the Municipality
of Liloan, binds not only the Pilapils and the Colomidas, but also the
general public. The solemn declarations of old people like Sesenando
Longakit and Florentino Pepito cannot overturn the decision of the
Municipality of Liloan.
MMDA v. Bel-Air
Facts: BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village.
Neptune runs parallel to Kalayaan Avenue, a national road open to the general
public. Dividing the two (2) streets is a concrete perimeter wall approximately
fifteen (15) feet high. The western end of Neptune Street intersects Nicanor Garcia,
formerly Reposo Street, a subdivision road open to public vehicular traffic, while its
eastern end intersects Makati Avenue, a national road. Both ends of Neptune Street
are guarded by iron gates.
On December 30, 1995, respondent received from petitioner, through its Chairman,
a notice dated December 22, 1995 requesting respondent to open Neptune Street
to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent
was apprised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision from the adjacent
Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 136, Makati City, Civil Case No. 96-001 for injunction.
Respondent prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the
demolition of the perimeter wall.
RTC: issued TRO, after due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
CA: MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private
subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the
authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance.
Issue: WON the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic
pursuant to its regulator and police powers.
 MMDA: it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic
because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the
delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is
traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of
thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general
public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this
Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there
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is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune
street to the public.
 Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain,
and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the
Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary
and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for
public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.
 It bears stressing that police power is lodged primarily in the National
Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or LGUs. Once delegated,
the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on
them by the national lawmaking body.
 A local government is a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is
constituted by law and has substantial control of local affairs." The LGC of
1991 defines a LGU as a "body politic and corporate", one endowed with
powers as a political subdivision of the National Government and as a
corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory. LGUs are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. They are also the territorial
and political subdivisions of the state.
 Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in the LGC of 1991. LGUs
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. The
legislative body of the provincial government is the sangguniang
panlalawigan, that of the city government is the sangguniang panlungsod,
that of the municipal government is the sangguniang bayan, and that of
the barangay is the sangguniang barangay. The LGC of 1991 empowers the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang
bayan to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the [province, city or municipality, as the case may
be], and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of the Code and in the
proper exercise of the corporate powers of the [province, city municipality]
provided under the Code. The same Code gives the sangguniang barangay
the power to "enact ordinances as may be necessary to discharge the
responsibilities conferred upon it by law or ordinance and to promote the
general welfare of the inhabitants thereon."
 Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several LGUs - i.e.,
twelve (12) cities and five (5) municipalities, namely, the cities of Caloocan,
Manila, Mandaluyong, Makati, Pasay, Pasig, Quezon, Muntinlupa, Las
Pinas, Marikina, Paranaque and Valenzuela, and the municipalities of
Malabon, , Navotas, , Pateros, San Juan and Taguig. With the passage of
Republic Act (R. A.) No. 7924 [24] in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was
declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the
Administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA.
 "Metro-wide services" are those "services which have metro-wide impact
and transcend local political boundaries or entail huge expenditures such
that it would not be viable for said services to be provided by the individual
LGUs comprising Metro Manila." There are seven (7) basic metro-wide
services and the scope of these services cover the following: (1)
development planning; (2) transport and traffic management; (3) solid
waste disposal and management; (4) flood control and sewerage
management; (5) urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, and shelter
services; (6) health and sanitation, urban protection and pollution control;
and (7) public safety. The basic service of transport and traffic
management includes the following: "(b) Transport and traffic
management which include the formulation, coordination, and monitoring
of policies, standards, programs and projects to rationalize the existing
transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of
thoroughfares, and promotion of safe and convenient movement of
persons and goods; provision for the mass transport system and the
institution of a system to regulate road users; administration and
implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering
services and traffic education programs, including the institution of a single
ticketing system in Metropolitan Manila;"
 The scope of the MMDA’s function is limited to the delivery of the seven
(7) basic services. One of these is transport and traffic management which
includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects
to rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure
requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion of the safe
movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system
and the institution of a system of road regulation, the administration of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in
Metro Manila for traffic violations. Under this service, the MMDA is
expressly authorized "to set the policies concerning traffic" and
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"coordinate and regulate the implementation of all traffic management
programs." In addition, the MMDA may "install and administer a single
ticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic
violations.
 It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following
acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation,
management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and
administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA
police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council
has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies
of the LGUs, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the
MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority."It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people’s
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature.
 Contrary to petitioner’s claim, the two Sangalang cases do not apply to the
case at bar. Firstly, both involved zoning ordinances passed by the
municipal council of Makati and the MMC. In the instant case, the basis for
the proposed opening of Neptune Street is contained in the notice of
December 22, 1995 sent by petitioner to respondent BAVA, through its
president. The notice does not cite any ordinance or law, either by the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City or by the MMDA, as the legal basis
for the proposed opening of Neptune Street. Petitioner MMDA simply
relied on its authority under its charter "to rationalize the use of roads
and/or thoroughfares for the safe and convenient movement of persons."
Rationalizing the use of roads and thoroughfares is one of the acts that fall
within the scope of transport and traffic management. By no stretch of the
imagination, however, can this be interpreted as an express or implied
grant of ordinance-making power, much less police power. Secondly, the
MMDA is not the same entity as the MMC in Sangalang. Although the
MMC is the forerunner of the present MMDA, an examination of
Presidential Decree (P. D.) No. 824, the charter of the MMC, shows that
the latter possessed greater powers which were not bestowed on the
present MMDA.
 The MMC was the "central government" of Metro Manila for the purpose
of establishing and administering programs providing services common to
the area. As a "central government" it had the power to levy and collect
taxes and special assessments, the power to charge and collect fees; the
power to appropriate money for its operation, and at the same time,
review appropriations for the city and municipal units within its
jurisdiction. It was bestowed the power to enact or approve ordinances,
resolutions and fix penalties for violation of such ordinances and
resolutions. It also had the power to review, amend, revise or repeal all
ordinances, resolutions and acts of any of the four (4) cities and thirteen
(13) municipalities comprising Metro Manila.
 It was the MMC itself that possessed legislative powers. All ordinances,
resolutions and measures recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan were
subject to the MMC’s approval. Moreover, the power to impose taxes and
other levies, the power to appropriate money, and the power to pass
ordinances or resolutions with penal sanctions were vested exclusively in
the MMC. Thus, Metropolitan Manila had a "central government," i.e., the
MMC which fully possessed legislative and police powers. Whatever
legislative powers the component cities and municipalities had were all
subject to review and approval by the MMC.
 Under the 1987 Constitution, the LGUs became primarily responsible for
the governance of their respective political subdivisions. The MMA’s
jurisdiction was limited to addressing common problems involving basic
services that transcended local boundaries. It did not have legislative
power. Its power was merely to provide the LGUs technical assistance in
the preparation of local development plans. Any semblance of legislative
power it had was confined to a "review [of] legislation proposed by the
local legislative assemblies to ensure consistency among local governments
and with the comprehensive development plan of Metro Manila," and to
"advise the local governments accordingly."
 When R.A. No. 7924 took effect, Metropolitan Manila became a "special
development and administrative region" and the MMDA a "special
development authority" whose functions were "without prejudice to the
autonomy of the affected LGUs." The character of the MMDA was clearly
defined in the legislative debates enacting its charter.
 Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA’s functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis. It is thus beyond doubt that the MMDA is not a LGU or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power. It is not even a "special
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metropolitan political subdivision" as contemplated in Section 11, Article X
of the Constitution. The creation of a "special metropolitan political
subdivision" requires the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected. R. A. No. 7924 was not
submitted to the inhabitants of Metro Manila in a plebiscite. The Chairman
of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the
President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of
his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by
the President, whereas in LGUs, the President merely exercises supervisory
authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA.
 Clearly then, the MMC under P. D. No. 824 is not the same entity as the
MMDA under R. A. No. 7924. Unlike the MMC, the MMDA has no power to
enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting
through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power
and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening
of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is
illegal and the respondent CA did not err in so ruling.
Moday v. CA
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bunawan in Agusan del Sur
passed R 43-89, "Authorizing the Municipal Mayor to Initiate the Petition for
Expropriation of a One (1) Hectare Portion of Lot No. 6138-Pls-4 Along the National
Highway Owned by Percival Moday for the Site of Bunawan Farmers Center and
Other Government Sports Facilities." R 43-89 was approved by then Municipal
Mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo and transmitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for its
approval. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved said Resolution and returned
it with the comment that "expropriation is unnecessary considering that there are
still available lots in Bunawan for the establishment of the government center."
Bunawan filed a petition for Eminent Domain against petitioner Percival Moday, as
well as his parents before the RTC at Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. The municipality
filed a Motion to Take or Enter Upon the Possession of Subject Matter of This Case
stating that it had already deposited with the municipal treasurer the necessary
amount in accordance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court and that
it would be in the government's best interest for public respondent to be allowed to
take possession of the property.
RTC: granted respondent municipality's motion to take possession of the land, held
that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's failure to declare the resolution invalid leaves
it effective. It added that the duty of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is merely to
review the ordinances and resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan under
Section 208 (1) of B.P. Blg. 337, old LGC and that the exercise of eminent domain is
not one of the two acts enumerated in Section 19 thereof requiring the approval of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. MR: denied.
CA: the public purpose for the expropriation is clear from R 43-89 and that since the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur did not declare R 43-89 invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed. MR: denied.
Meanwhile, the Municipality of Bunawan had erected three buildings on the subject
property: the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) Hall, the Municipal Motorpool,
both wooden structures, and the Bunawan Municipal Gymnasium, which is made of
concrete.
Pet: seeks the reversal of the decision and resolution of the CA and a declaration
that R 43-89 of the Municipality of Bunawan is null and void.
Court issued TRO enjoining and restraining public respondent Judge from enforcing
her order and respondent municipality from using and occupying all the buildings
constructed and from further constructing any building on the land subject of this
petition. Acting on petitioners' Omnibus Motion for Enforcement of Restraining
Order and for Contempt, the Court issued a Resolution citing incumbent municipal
mayor Anuncio C. Bustillo for contempt, ordering him to pay the fine and to
demolish the "blocktiendas" which were built in violation of the restraining order.
Bustillo paid the fine and manifested that he lost in the election. The incumbent
Mayor Leonardo Barrios, filed a Manifestation, Motion to Resolve "Urgent Motion
for Immediate Dissolution of the Temporary Restraining Order" and Memorandum
on June 11, 1996 for the Municipality of Bunawan.
Pet: contend that the CA erred in upholding the legality of the condemnation
proceedings initiated by the municipality. According to petitioners, the
expropriation was politically motivated and R 43-89 was correctly disapproved by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there being other municipal properties available for
the purpose. Petitioners also pray that the former Mayor Bustillo be ordered to pay
damages for insisting on the enforcement of a void municipal resolution.
CA: declared that the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's reason for disapproving the
resolution "could be baseless, because it failed to point out which and where are
those available lots.'" Respondent court also concluded that since the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan did not declare the municipal board's resolution as invalid,
expropriation of petitioners' property could proceed.
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Issue: WON a municipality may expropriate private property by virtue of a
municipal resolution which was disapproved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. NO.
 Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised
in the instant case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.
Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the power of eminent
domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public
entities and public utilities. For the taking of private property by the
government to be valid, the taking must be for public use and there must
be just compensation.
 The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent
domain is not disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 337, the LGC 18 in force
at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law
states: A LGU may, through its head and acting pursuant to a resolution of
its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and institute
condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose.
 What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the
municipality to exercise this right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved R 43-89.
 Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337: Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within
thirty days after receiving copies of approved ordinances,
resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the municipal mayor, the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit them
to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who
shall examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in
writing of any defect or impropriety which he may discover therein and
make such comments or recommendations as shall appear to him proper.
(2) If the
sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance,
resolution or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the
sangguniang bayan or the mayor, it shall declare such ordinance,
resolution or executive order invalid in whole or in part, entering its
actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities
thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance,
resolution or executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of
the sangguniang panlalawigan shall be final.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval of Municipal
R 43-89 is an infirm action which does not render said resolution
null and void. The law, as expressed in Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337, grants
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan the power to declare a municipal resolution
invalid on the sole ground that it is beyond the power of the Sangguniang
Bayan or the Mayor to issue. Although pertaining to a similar provision of
law but different factual milieu then obtaining, the Court's
pronouncements in Velazco v. Blas, where we cited significant early
jurisprudence, are applicable to the case at bar. The only ground upon
which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution, ordinance,
or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is "beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the same."
Absolutely no other ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal
question is before the provincial board in its consideration of a municipal
resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's) disapproval of any
resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the fact
that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal
powers conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps
the legislative function of the municipal council or president. Such has
been the consistent course of executive authority.
 Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove
Municipal R 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power
to exercise the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the
capacity to promulgate said resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows that Resolution No. 43-89 is
valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to petition for the
condemnation of petitioners' property.
 Accusation of political oppression: it is alleged that Percival Moday
incurred the ire of then Mayor Bustillo when he refused to support the
latter's candidacy for mayor in previous elections. Petitioners claim that
then incumbent Mayor C. Bustillo used the expropriation to retaliate by
expropriating their land even if there were other properties belonging to
the municipality and available for the purpose. Specifically, they allege that
the municipality owns a vacant seven-hectare property adjacent to
petitioners' land, evidenced by a sketch plan.
 The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the
use must be public, compensation must be made and due process of law
must be observed. The Supreme Court, taking cognizance of such issues as
the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the taking and the public use
character or the purpose of the taking, 23 has ruled that the necessity of
exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be
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taken. After a careful study of the records of the case, however, we find no
evidentiary support for petitioners' allegations. The uncertified photocopy
of the sketch plan does not conclusively prove that the municipality does
own vacant land adjacent to petitioners' property suited to the purpose of
the expropriation. In the questioned decision, respondent appellate court
similarly held that the pleadings and documents on record have not
pointed out any of respondent municipality's "other available properties
available for
the same purpose." The accusations of political reprisal are likewise
unsupported by competent evidence. Consequently, the Court holds that
petitioners' demand that the former municipal mayor be personally liable
for damages is without basis.
Camarines Sur v. CA
Facts: The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Camsur passed Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial Governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol site, in order to establish a
pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops and a housing project
for provincial government employees. Camsur filed expropriation cases against the
San Joaquins as well as a motion for the issuance of writ of possession. The SJs
failed to appear at the hearing of the motion. They moved to dismiss the complaints
on the ground of inadequacy of the price offered for their property.
RTC: denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Camsur to take possession of
the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount of P5,714.00,
the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer for damages that private
respondents may suffer in the event that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
Issued a writ of possession. The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order
and a motion to admit an amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied.
CA: SJs asked: (a) that the Res. be declared null and void; (b) that the complaints for
expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that the order denying the motion to dismiss
and allowing Camsur to take possession of the property subject of the expropriation
and the order denying the motion to admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set
aside. They also asked that an order be issued to restrain the trial court from
enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
Camsur: claimed that it has the authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings
under Sections 4 and 7 of LGC (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a
public purpose. SG: under Section 9 of the LGC (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no need
for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. Expressed the view that the Province
of Camsur must first secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of
the plan to expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
CA: set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of Camsur to take
possession of private respondents' lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial court to suspend the
expropriation proceedings until after Camsur shall have submitted the requisite
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the
property of the private respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Camsur: its exercise of the power of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the
provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly
Section 65 thereof, which requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform before a parcel of land can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-
agricultural land.
CA, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held that the Province
of Camsur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the SJs
Issue: WON the expropriation of agricultural lands by LGUs is subject, to the prior
approval of the Secretary of the Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the
agrarian reform program.
 When the CA ordered the suspension of the proceedings until the Province
of Camsur shall have obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian
Reform to change the classification of the lands sought to be expropriated
from agricultural to non-agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is
valid and that the expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
 Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader
interpretation of "public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of
eminent domain may be exercised. The old concept was that the
condemned property must actually be used by the general public (e.g.
roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking thereof could satisfy
the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new concept,
"public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends
to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole
community, like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of
Juancho Ardano v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154
SC.RA 461 [1987]).
 The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution
is for a public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center
would inure to the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the
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Province of Camsur. Once operational, the center would make available to
the community invaluable information and technology on agriculture,
fishery and the cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers,
fishermen and craftsmen would be enhanced.. The housing project also
satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. As held in
Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the
general welfare."
 The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province
of Camsur by stressing the fact that LGUs exercise such power only by
delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
 Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes: Court said that there was "no need
under the facts of this petition to rule on whether the public purpose is
superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in a balancing of
competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting that
petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970
square meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable
reading of the decision is that this Court viewed the power of
expropriation as superior to the power to distribute lands under the land
reform program.
 It is true that LGUs have no inherent power of eminent domain and can
exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. It is also true
that in delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain
certain control or impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the
local governments. While such delegated power may be a limited
authority, it is complete within its limits. Moreover, the limitations on the
exercise of the delegated power must be clearly expressed, either in the
law conferring the power or in other legislations.
 Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9
of B.P. Blg. 337, the LGC, which provides: A LGU may, through its head and
acting pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of
eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for public use or
purpose. Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local
government, units must first secure the approval of the Department of
Land Reform for the conversion of lands from agricultural to non-
agricultural use, before they can institute the necessary expropriation
proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law which expressly subjects the expropriation of agricultural
lands by LGUs to the control of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
closest provision of law that the CA could cite to justify the intervention of
the Department of Agrarian Reform in expropriation matters is Section 65
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, which reads: Sec. 65.
Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when
the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for, agricultural
purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a
greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes,
the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due
notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may authorize
the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: Provided,
That the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
 The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies
to lands previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks
of "the lapse of five (5) years from its award." The rules on conversion of
agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of Executive Order No.
129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of
agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the
expropriating authority. While those rules vest on the Department of
Agrarian Reform the exclusive authority to approve or disapprove
conversions of agricultural lands for residential, commercial or industrial
uses, such authority is limited to the applications for reclassification
submitted by the land owners or tenant beneficiaries.
 Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions
cannot be broadened or constricted by implication.
 To sustain the CA would mean that the LGUs can no longer expropriate
agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges, schools,
hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects
would naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be
the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the
expropriation is for a public purpose or public use.
 Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the LGU that shall determine
whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be public,
the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular
undertaking has no real or substantial relation to the public use.
 There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad
their terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is
specially mentioned as subject thereto. The Republic of the Philippines, as
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sovereign, or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign
powers, cannot be bound by provisions of law couched in general term.
Meycauayan v. IAC
Facts: The Philippine Pipes and Merchandising Corporation filed with the Office of
the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an application for a permit to fence a
parcel of land. The fencing of said property was allegedly to enable the storage of
the respondent's heavy equipment and various finished products such as large
diameter steel pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and harbors, bridge
components, pre-stressed girders and piles, large diameter concrete pipes, and
parts for low cost housing. In the same year, the Municipal Council of Meycauayan,
headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi, passed Resolution No. 258, Series of 1975,
manifesting the intention to expropriate the respondent's parcel of land. The
Special Committee recommended that the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove
or annul the resolution in question because there was no genuine necessity for the
Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate the respondent's property for use as a
public road. On the basis of this report, the Provincial Board of Bulacan passed
Resolution No. 238, Series of 1976, disapproving and annulling Resolution No. 258,
Series of 1975, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan. PPMC, then, reiterated to
the Office of the Mayor its petition for the approval of the permit to fence the
aforesaid parcels of land. The Municipal Council of Meycauayan, now headed by
Mayor Adriano D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, Series of 1983, for the purpose
of expropriating anew the respondent's land. The Provincial Board of Bulacan
approved the aforesaid resolution on January 25, 1984. Thereafter, the petitioner,
on February 14, 1984, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan,
Branch VI, a special civil action for expropriation. Upon deposit of the amount of
P24,025.00, which is the market value of the land, with the Philippine National
Bank, the trial court on March 1, 1984 issued a writ of possession in favor of the
petitioner. On August 27, 1984, the trial court issued an order declaring the taking
of the property as lawful and appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan as court
commissioner who shall hold the hearing to ascertain the just compensation for the
property. The respondent went to the Intermediate Appellate Court on petition for
review. On January 10, 1985, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision.
However, upon motion for reconsideration by the respondent, the decision was re-
examined and reversed. The appellate court held that there is no genuine necessity
to expropriate the land for use as a public road as there were several other roads
for the same purpose and another more appropriate lot for the proposed public
road. The court, taking into consideration the location and size of the land, also
opined that the land is more Ideal for use as storage area for respondent's heavy
equipment and finished products. MR: denied.
Issue: WON there is a genuine necessity to expropriate this strip of land for use as a
public road. NO.
 The petitioner's purpose in expropriating the respondent's property is to
convert the same into a public road which would provide a connecting link
between Malhacan Road and Bulac Road in Valenzuela, Bulacan and
thereby ease the traffic in the area of vehicles coming from MacArthur
Highway.
 The records, however, reveals that there are other connecting links
between the aforementioned roads. The petitioner itself admits that there
are four such cross roads in existence. The respondent court stated that
with the proposed road, there would be seven.
 The Sketch Plan clearly and conclusively shows that petitioner does not
need this strip of land as a private road. The Sketch Plan clearly shows that
petitioner's factory site is adjacent to Bulac Road which has a width of
about seven meters, more or less. Petitioner can use Bulac Road in
reaching McArthur Highway on the west or in reaching the Manila North
Expressway on the east for the purpose of transporting its products.
Petitioner does not need to go to Malhacan Road via this so-called private
road before going to McArthur Highway or to the Manila North
Expressway. Why should petitioner go first to Malhacan Road via this so
called "private road" before going to McArthur Highway or to the Manila
North Expressway when taking the Bulac Road in going to McArthur
Highway or to the Manila North Expressway is more direct, nearer and
more advantageous. Hence, it is beyond doubt that petitioner acquired
this strip of land for the storage of its heavy equipments and various
finished products and for growth and expansion and never to use it as a
private road. This is the very reason why petitioner filed an application
with the Office of the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan to fence
with hollow blocks this strip of land.
 From the foregoing facts, it appears obvious to this Special Committee that
there is no genuine necessity for the Municipality of' Meycauayan to
expropriate the aforesaid property of the Philippine Pipes and
Merchandising Corporation for use as a public road. Considering that in the
vicinity there are other available road and vacant lot offered for sale
situated similarly as the lot in question and lying Idle, unlike the lot sought
to be expropriated which was found by the Committee to be badly needed
by the company as a site for its heavy equipment after it is fenced together
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with the adjoining vacant lot, the justification to condemn the same does
not appear to be very imperative and necessary and would only cause
unjustified damage to the firm. The desire of the Municipality of
Meycauayan to build a public road to decongest the volume of traffic can
be fully and better attained by acquiring the other available roads in the
vicinity maybe at lesser costs without causing harm to an establishment
doing legitimate business therein. Or, the municipality may seek to
expropriate a portion of the vacant lot also in the vicinity offered for sale
for a wider public road to attain decongest (sic) of traffic because as
observed by the Committee, the lot of the Corporation sought to be taken
will only accommodate a one-way traffic lane and therefore, will not
suffice to improve and decongest the flow of traffic and pedestrians in the
Malhacan area. ...
 It must be noted that this strip of land covered by Transfer Certificates of
Titles Nos. 215165 and 37879 were acquired by petitioner from Dr.
Villacorta. The lot for sale and lying Idle with an area of 16,071 square
meter which is adjacent and on the western side of the aforesaid strip of
land and extends likewise from Bulac Road to Malhacan Road belongs also
to Dr. Villacorta. This lot for sale and lying Idle is most Ideal for use as a
public road because it is more than three (3) times wider that the said strip
of land.
 Since there is another lot ready for sale and lying Idle, adjacent and on the
western side of the strip of land, and extending also from Malhacan Road
to Bulac Road and most Ideal for a public road because it is very much
wider than the lot sought to be expropriated, it seems that it is more just,
fair, and reasonable if this lot is the one to be expropriated.
 The petitioner objects to the appellate court's findings contending that
they were based on facts obtaining long before the present action to
expropriate took place. We note, however, that there is no evidence on
record which shows a change in the factual circumstances of the case.
There is no showing that some of the six other available cross roads have
been closed or that the private roads in the subdivision may not be used
for municipal purposes. What is more likely is that these roads have
already been turned over to the government. The petitioner alleges that
surely the environmental progress during the span of seven years between
the first and second attempts to expropriate has brought about a change
in the facts of the case. This allegation does not merit consideration absent
a showing of concrete evidence attesting to it.
 There is no question here as to the right of the State to take private
property for public use upon payment of just compensation. What is
questioned is the existence of a genuine necessity therefor.
 City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila: this Court held that the
foundation of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain is
genuine necessity and that necessity must be of a public character.
Condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public
good and there is a genuine necessity of a public character. Consequently,
the courts have the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity therfor.
 De Knecht v. Bautista, this court further ruled that the government may
not capriciously choose what private property should be taken. Citing the
case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration (supra), the
Court held: With due recognition then of the power of Congress to
designate the particular property to be taken and how much thereof may
be condemned in the exercise of the power of expropriation, it is still a
judicial question whether in the exercise of such competence, the party
adversely affected is the victim of partiality and prejudice. That the equal
protection clause will not allow.
 There is absolutely no showing in the petition why the more appropriate
lot for the proposed road which was offered for sale has not been the
subject of the petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming there is a real
need for another connecting road.
Napocor v. Jocson
Facts: The NPC filed for the acquisition of a right-of-way easement over portions of
the parcels of land described in the complaints for its Negros-Panay Interconnection
Project, particularly the Bacolod-Tomonton Transmission Line. Provisional values
were fixed on the basis of the market value and the daily opportunity profit
petitioner may derive. Respondents sought a re-evaluation. Judge increased value
without hearing and directing the defendants to manifest within twenty-four (24)
hours whether or not they are accepting and withdrawing the amounts,
representing the provisional values, deposited by the plaintiff for each of them as
"final and full satisfaction of the value of their respective property (sic); " Judge
declared the provisional values as the final values and directing the release of the
amounts deposited, in full satisfaction thereof, to the defendants even if not all of
them made the manifestation; and suspended the issuance of the writ of
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possession until after the suspending the amounts shall have been released to and
received by defendants.
Issue: WON Judge Jocson committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. YES.
 Municipality of Biñan vs. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia, et al: there are two (2)
stages in every action of expropriation: The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
"of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be
determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint." An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final one, of course, since it finally
disposes of the action and leaves nothing more to be done by the Court on
the merits. So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final one, for
thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings before the Trial
Court, "no objection to the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard." The second phase of the
eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court
of the "just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is
done by the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It
would finally dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing
more to be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
 However, upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the
petitioner has the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
property involved upon compliance with P.D. No. 42 which requires the
petitioner, after due notice to the defendant, to deposit with the
Philippine National Bank in its main office or any of its branches or
agencies, "an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for
purposes of taxation." This assessed value is that indicated in the tax
declaration.
 P.D. No. 42 repealed the "provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court and of
any other existing law contrary to or inconsistent" with it. Accordingly, it
repealed Section 2 of Rule 67 insofar as the determination of the
provisional value, the form of payment and the agency with which the
deposit shall be made, are concerned. Said section reads in full as follows:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with National or Provisional
Treasurer. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter the
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the
real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or
Provincial Treasurer its value, as provisionally and promptly ascertained
and fixed by the court having jurisdiction of the proceedings, to be held by
such treasurer subject to the orders and final disposition of the court. Such
deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the
deposit of a certificate of deposit of a depository of the Republic of the
Philippines payable on demand to the National or Provincial Treasurer, as
the case may be, in the amount directed by the court to be deposited.
After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or other proper
officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of the property
involved.
 It will be noted that under the aforequoted section, the court has the
discretion to determine the provisional value which must be deposited by
the plaintiff to enable it "to take or enter upon the possession of the
property." Notice to the parties is not indispensable. In interpreting a
similar provision of Act No. 1592, this Court, in the 1915 case of Manila
Railroad Company, et al. vs. Paredes, et al., 45 held: The statute directs
that, at the very outset, "when condemnation proceedings are brought by
any railway corporation" the amount of the deposit is to be "provisionally
and promptly ascertained and fixed by the court." It is very clear that it was
not the intention of the legislator that before the order fixing the amount
of the deposit could lawfully be entered the court should finally and
definitely determine who are the true owners of the land; and after doing
so, give them a hearing as to its value, and assess the true value of the land
accordingly. In effect, that would amount to a denial of the right of
possession of the lands involved until the conclusion of the proceedings,
when there would no need for the filing of the deposit. Of course, there is
nothing in the statute which denies the right of the judge to hear all
persons claiming an interest in the land, and courts should ordinarily give
all such persons an opportunity to be heard if that be practicable, and will
cause no delay in the prompt and provisional ascertainment of the value of
the land. But the scope and extent of the inquiry is left wholly in the
discretion of the court, and a failure to hear the owners and claimants of
the land, who may or may not be known at the time of the entry of the
order, in no wise effects the validity of the order. . . .
 P.D. No. 42, however, effectively removes the discretion of the court in
determining the provisional value. What is to be deposited is an amount
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equivalent to the assessed value for taxation purpose. No hearing is
required for that purpose. All that is needed is notice to the owner of the
property sought to be condemned.
 Clearly, therefore, respondent Judge either deliberately disregarded P.D.
No. 42 or was totally unaware of its existence and the cases applying the
same.
 In any event, petitioner deposited the provisional value fixed by the court.
As a matter of right, it was entitled to be placed in possession of the
property involved in the complaints at once, pursuant to both Section 2 of
Rule 67 and P.D. No. 42. Respondent Court had the corresponding duty to
order the sheriff or any other proper officer to forthwith place the
petitioner in such possession. Instead of complying with the clear mandate
of the law, respondent Judge chose to ignore and overlook it. Moreover,
upon separate motions for reconsideration filed by the defendants in Civil
Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939, he issued a new Order increasing the
provisional values of the properties involved therein. No hearing was held
on the motions. As a matter of fact, as the records show, the motion for
reconsideration filed by defendants Jesus Gonzaga, et al. in Civil Case No.
5938 is dated 11 July 1990 while the Order granting both motions was
issued the next day, 12 July 1990. The motion for reconsideration in Civil
Case No. 5938 does not even contain a notice of hearing. It is then a mere
scrap of paper; it presents no question which merits the attention and
consideration of the court. It is not even a mere motion for it does not
comply with the rules, more particularly Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court; the Clerk of Court then had no right to receive it. 50
 There was, moreover, a much stronger reason why the respondent Court
should not have issued the 12 July 1990 Order increasing the provisional
values of the Gonzaga lots in Civil Cases Nos. 5938 and 5939. After having
fixed these provisional values, albeit erroneously, and upon deposit by
petitioner of the said amounts, respondent Judge lost, as was held in
Manila Railroad Company vs. Paredes, "plenary control over the order
fixing the amount of the deposit, and has no power to annul, amend or
modify it in matters of substance pending the course of the condemnation
proceedings." The reason for this is that a contrary ruling would defeat the
very purpose of the law which is to provide a speedy and summary
procedure whereby the peaceable possession of the property subject of
the expropriation proceedings "may be secured without the delays
incident to prolonged and vexatious litigation touching the ownership and
value of such lands, which should not be permitted to delay the progress
of the work."
 Compounding the above error and the capriciousness with which it was
committed is respondent Judge's refusal to place the petitioner in
possession of the property or issue the writ of possession despite the fact
that the latter had likewise deposited the additional amount called for by
the 12 July 1990 Order. Instead, respondent Judge issued the 16 July 1990
Order directing the defendants to state in writing within twenty-four (24)
hours whether or not they would accept and withdraw the amounts
deposited by the petitioner for each of them " as final and full satisfaction
of the value of their respective property (sic) affected by the
expropriation" and stating at the same time that the writ will be issued
after such manifestation and acceptance and receipt of the amounts. The
above Order has absolutely no legal basis even as it also unjustly,
oppressively and capriciously compels the petitioner to accept the
respondent Judge's determination of the provisional value as the just
compensation after the defendants shall have manifested their conformity
thereto. He thus subordinated his own judgment to that of the defendants'
because he made the latter the final authority to determine such just
compensation. This Court ruled in Export Processing Zone Authority vs.
Dulay, et al. 52 that the determination of just compensation in eminent
domain cases is a judicial function; accordingly, We declared as
unconstitutional and void, for being, inter alia, impermissible
encroachment on judicial prerogatives which tends to render the Court
inutile in a matter which, under the Constitution, is reserved to it for final
determination, the method of ascertaining just compensation prescribed in
P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533, to wit: the market value as declared by the
owner or administrator or such market value as determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees, and the value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest in
the property or the value as determined by the assessor, pursuant to the
Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the recommendation
or decision of the appropriate Government office to acquire the property,
in the last mentioned decree. If the legislature or the executive
department cannot even impose upon the court how just compensation
should be determined, it would be far more objectionable and
impermissible for respondent Judge to grant the defendants in an eminent
domain case such power and authority.
 Without perhaps intending it to be so, there is not only a clear case of
abdication of judicial prerogative, but also a complete disregard by
respondent Judge of the provisions of Rule 67 as to the procedure to be
followed after the petitioner has deposited the provisional value of the
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property. It must be recalled that three (3) sets of defendants filed motions
to dismiss pursuant to Section 3, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court; Section 4 of
the same rule provides that the court must rule on them and in the event
that it overrules the motions or, when any party fails to present a defense
as required in Section 3, it should enter an order of condemnation
declaring that the petitioner has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned.
 As may be gleaned from the 25 June 1990 Order, the respondent Judge
found that the petitioner has that right and that "there will be a (sic)
paramount public interest to be served by the expropriation of the
defendants' properties." Accordingly, considering that the parties
submitted neither a compromise agreement as to the just compensation
nor a stipulation to dispense with the appointment of commissioners and
to leave the determination of just compensation to the court on the basis
of certain criteria, respondent Judge was duty bound to set in motion
Section 5 of Rule 67; said section directs the court to appoint not more
than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to it regarding the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. Such commissioners shall perform their duties in the
manner provided for in Section 6; upon the filing of their report, the court
may, after a period of ten (10) days which it must grant to the parties in
order that the latter may file their objections to such report, and after
hearing pursuant to Section 8, accept and render judgment in accordance
therewith or, for cause shown, recommit the same to the commissioners
for further report of facts. The court may also set aside the report and
appoint new commissioners, or it may accept the report in part and reject
it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall
secure to the petitioner the property essential to the exercise of its right of
condemnation, and to the defendant just compensation for the property
so taken.
 Not satisfied with the foregoing violations of law and insisting upon his
own procedure, respondent Judge declared in his Order of 18 July 1990
that the provisional amounts he fixed, later increased with respect to the
properties of the Gonzagas, shall be considered as the full payment of the
value of the properties after the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 5938, 5939,
5940, 5942 and 5943 shall have filed their manifestations; he also ruled
that the writ of possession will be issued only after the latter shall have
received the said amounts. This Order and the records before this Court do
not disclose that the defendants in Civil Cases Nos. 5941 and 5944 filed any
manifestation; yet, in the Order, respondent Judge whimsically and
arbitrarily considered the so-called provisional values fixed therein as the
final values. By such Order, the case was in fact terminated and the writ of
execution then became a mere incident of an execution of a judgment. The
right of the petitioner to take or enter into possession of the property
upon the filing of the complaint granted by Section 2 of Rule 67 and P.D.
No. 42 was totally negated despite compliance with the deposit
requirement under the latter law.
 City Government of Toledo City vs. Fernandos, et al: does not apply to the
instant petition because at the pre-trial conference held therein, the
petitioner submitted to the discretion of the court as to the correct
valuation, private respondents stated that they have no objections and are
in conformity with the price of P30.00 per square meter as reasonable
compensation for their land and the City Assessor informed the court of
the current market and appraisal values of the properties in the area and
the factors to be considered in the determination of such. The parties
presented their documentary exhibits. In effect, therefore, the parties
themselves agreed to submit to a judicial determination on the matter of
just compensation and that judgment be rendered based thereon. In the
instant case, no pre-trial was conducted; the proceedings were still at that
state where the provisional value was yet to be determined; and the
parties made no agreement on just compensation.
Quezon City v. Ericta
Facts: QC passed an Ordinance regulating the establishment, maintenance and
operation of private memorial type cemetery or burial ground within the
jurisdiction of QC. Section 9 of the Ordinance provides that at least 6% of the total
area of a memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers & have been residents of QC for at least 5 years prior to
their death. Seven years after the enactment of the Ordinance, the QC Council
passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer to stop any further selling of
memorial parks in QC where the owners have failed to donate the required 6%
cemetery space. The City Engineer notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. that the
Ordinance would be enforced, so Himlayan filed a petition with the CFI seeking to
annul Sec 9 of the Ordinance. CFI declared Sec 9 null and void. MR: denied
Issue: WON the ordinance is authorized under QC Charter and a valid exercise of
police power. NO.
 Restatement of certain basic principles: Occupying the forefront in the bill
of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of
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life, liberty or property without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1
subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three
inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the
property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3)
taxation. These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as
necessary attributes of sovereignty.
 Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public
welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'
(Quoted in Political Law by Tanada and Carreon, V-11, p. 50). It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of
the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for
injury sustained in consequence thereof (12 C.J. 623). It has been said that
police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the
most insistent, and always one of the least limitable of the powers of
government (Ruby vs. Provincial Board, 39 PhiL 660; Ichong vs. Hernandez,
1,7995, May 31, 1957). This power embraces the whole system of public
regulation (U.S. vs. Linsuya Fan, 10 PhiL 104). The Supreme Court has said
that police power is so far-reaching in scope that it has almost become
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very
existence of the state itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in
its scope. Being coextensive with self-preservation and survival itself, it is
the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the most
essential insistent and illimitable Especially it is so under the modern
democratic framework where the demands of society and nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions. The field and scope of
police power have become almost boundless, just as the fields of public
interest and public welfare have become almost all embracing and have
transcended human foresight. Since the Courts cannot foresee the needs
and demands of public interest and welfare, they cannot delimit
beforehand the extent or scope of the police power by which and through
which the state seeks to attain or achieve public interest and welfare.
(Ichong vs. Hernandez, L-7995, May 31, 1957).
 The police power being the most active power of the government and the
due process clause being the broadest station on governmental power, the
conflict between this power of government and the due process clause of
the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
 It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually
exercised in the form of mere regulation or restriction in the use of liberty
or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does not involve
the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to
destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an
illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms.
 It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964
of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation.
It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law,
nay, even without compensation.
 There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6)
percent of the total area of an private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal
corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private cemeteries.
 The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries
is not covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial of the
dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their
burial in a proper place subject to the provisions of general law regulating
burial grounds and cemeteries. When the LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337
provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang panlungsod may "provide
for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed
by law or ordinance" it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city
owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct public
cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to
the present. Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for
streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities from the land they
sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health,
and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended
to insure the development of communities with salubrious and wholesome
environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are made to pay
by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to home-
owners.
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 As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause
or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express
provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause
has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch
it to cover this particular taking. Moreover, the questioned ordinance was
passed after Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. had incorporated. received necessary
licenses and permits and commenced operating. The sequestration of six
percent of the cemetery cannot even be considered as having been
impliedly acknowledged by the private respondent when it accepted the
permits to commence operations.
City of Manila v. Arellano College
Facts: Section 1 of Republic Act No. 267 authorizes cities and municipalities to
contract loans from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Philippine
National Bank, and/or other entity or person at the rate of interest not exceeding
eight per cent annum for the purpose of purchasing or expropriating homesites
within their respective territorial jurisdiction and reselling them at cost to residents
of the said cities and municipalities. The court below ruled that this provision
empowers cities to purchase but not to expropriate lands for the purpose of
subdivision and resale, and so dismissed the present action, which seeks to
condemn, for the purpose just stated, several parcels of land having a combined
area of 7,270 square meters and situated on Legarda Street, City of Manila.
Issue: WON Act 267 empowers cities to expropriate as well as to purchase lands for
homesites. YES.
 The word "expropriating," taken singly or with the text, is susceptible of
only meaning. But this power to expropriate is necessarily subject to the
limitations and conditions noted in the decisions above cited. (See below.)
The National Government may not confer its instrumentalities authority
which itself may not exercise.
 Guido vs. Rural Progress Administration: extent of the Philippine
Government's power to condemn private property for resale: It has been
truly said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to
take the property of one citizen and transfer it to another, even for a full
compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is
claiming a despotic power, and one inconsistent with every just principle
and fundamental maxim of a free government.
 In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and
land that embraces a whole town, or large section of a town or city, bears
direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the
large number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic
reform secured by the condemnation, clothes the expropriation with
public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to
abolish economic slavery, feudalistic practices, endless conflicts between
landlords and tenants, and other evils inimical to community prosperity
and contentment and public peace and order.
 Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to applied in
determining whether the use is public or not, some go so far in the
direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public use is synonymous
with public benefit, public utility, or public advantage, and to authorize the
exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit,
etc., especially where the interest involved are of considerable magnitude.
 In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by condemnation. The
highest court of New York State has ruled that slum clearance and erection
of houses for low-income families were public purpose for which New York
City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. and
this decision was followed by similar ones in other states. The underlying
reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of congested areas and
unsanitary dwellings diminished the potentialities of epidemics, crime and
waste, prevents the spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas,
enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding communities,
and promote the safety and welfare of the public in general.
 The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons
and their families does not insure to the benefit of the public to a degree
sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings
at bar have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid
of any consideration of public peace and order, or other public advantage.
 No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and
what is not can made; each case has to be judged according to its peculiar
circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the
case under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for
public convenience or public use. If upheld, this case would open the gates
to more oppressive expropriations. If this expropriation be constitutional,
we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be
expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion
of it. to make the analogy closer, we find no reason why the Rural Progress
Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing
and area of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for
resale to its occupations or those who want to build thereon.
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 Viewed from another angle, the case at bar is weaker for the condemnor. comparison with the preparation of a young men and young women for
In the first place, the land that is the subject of the present expropriation is useful citizenship and for service to the government and the community, a
only one-third of the land sought to be taken in the Guido case, and about task which the government alone is not in a position to undertake. As the
two-thirds of that involved in the Borja condemnation proceeding. In the Rural Progress Administration, the national agency lands for resale as
second place, the Arellano Colleges' land is situated in a highly commercial homesites and to which the petition to purchase the land in question on
section of the city and is occupied by persons who are not bona fide behalf of the occupants was referred by the President, turning down the
tenants. Lastly, this land was brought by the defendant for a university site occupants request after proper investigation, commented that "the
to take the place of rented buildings that are unsuitable for schools of necessity of the Arellano Law College to acquire a permanent site of its
higher learning. own is imperative not only because denial of the same would hamper the
 To authorize the condemnation of any particular land by a grantee of the objectives of that educational institution, but it would likewise be taking a
power of eminent domain, a necessity must exist for the taking thereof for property intended already for public benefit." The Mayor of the City of
the proposed uses and purposes. In City of Manila vs. Manila Chinese Manila himself confessed that he believes the plaintiff is entitled to keep
Community, this Court, citing American decision, laid done this rule: The this land.
very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land. "So great is the regard of the law for private
property that it will not authorize the least violation of it, even for the
public good, unless there exist a very great necessity thereof." Necessity
within the rule that the particular property to be expropriated must be
necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a reasonable or practical
necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to the public with
the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and
property owner consistent with such benefits.
 But measured even by this standard, and forgetting for a moment the
private character of the intended use, necessity for the condemnation has
not been shown. The land in question has cost the owner P140,000. The
people for whose benefit the condemnation is being undertaken are so
poor they could ill afford to meet this high price, unless they intend to
borrow the money with a view to disposing of the property later for a
profits. Cheaper lands not dedicated to a purpose so worthy as a school
and more suited to the occupants' needs and means, if really they only
want to own their own homes, are plenty elsewhere. On the other hand,
the defendant not only has invested a considerable amount for its property
but had the plans for construction ready and would have completed the
project a long time ago had it not been stopped by the city authorities. And
again, while a handful of people stand to profits by the expropriation, the
development of a university that has a present enrollment of 9,000
students would be sacrificed. Any good that would accrue to the public
from providing homes to a few families fades into insignificance in
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City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila

Facts: The City of Manila alleged that for the purpose of constructing the extension
of Rizal Avenue, Manila , it is necessary for it to acquire ownership of certain parcels
of land situated in Binondo, some of which were owned and used by the Chinese
Community of Manila for cemetery purposes. The Chinese Community of Manila
denied that it was necessary or expedient that the said parcels be expropriated for
street purposes; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered
a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the
plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places
of the dead; that it had a Torrens title for the lands in question; that the lands in
question had been used by the defendant for cemetery purposes; that a great
number of Chinese were buried in said cemetery; that if said expropriation be
carried into effect, it would disturb the resting places of the dead, would require
the expenditure of a large sum of money in the transfer or removal of the bodies to
some other place or site and in the purchase of such new sites, would involve the
destruction of existing monuments and the erection of new monuments in their
stead, and would create irreparable loss and injury to the defendant and to all
those persons owning and interested in the graves and monuments which would
have to be destroyed; that the plaintiff was without right or authority to
expropriate said cemetery or any part or portion thereof for street purposes; and
that the expropriation, in fact, was not necessary as a public improvement.
The theory of the plaintiff is, that once it has established the fact, under the law,
that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire;
that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of
the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire
into the advisible purpose of purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions
concerning the necessities therefor; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land
involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by
the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for
its value.

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Issue: WON the courts may inquire into, and hear proof upon, the necessity of the
expropriation? YES.
 It cannot be denied, if the legislature under proper authority should grant
the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some
specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to
inquire into the purpose of that legislation. If, upon the other hand,
however, the legislature should grant general authority to a municipal
corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts
have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above
quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly
presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether
the purpose was, in fact, public.
 The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal
corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the
question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or
authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. In the present case
there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City
of Manila : First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must
be public.
 The legislative department of the government was rarely undertakes to
designate the precise property which should be taken for public use. It has
generally, like in the present case, merely conferred general authority to
take land for public use when a necessity exists therefor. We believe that it
can be confidently asserted that, under such statute, the allegation of the
necessity for the appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is
competent for the courts to decide.
 "It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the
courts in exercising the power of eminent domain, either as to the nature
of the use or the necessity to the use of any particular property. For if the
use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the legislature
cannot authorize the taking of private property against the will of the
owner, notwithstanding compensation may be required."
 But, as long as there is a constitutional or statutory provision denying the
right to take land for any use other than a public use, it occurs to us that
the question whether any particular use is a public one or not is ultimately,
at least, a judicial question. The legislative may, it is true, in effect declare
certain uses to be public, and, under the operation of the well-known rule
that a statute will not be declared to be unconstitutional except in a case
free, or comparatively free, from doubt, the courts will certainly sustain
the action of the legislature unless it appears that the particular use is
clearly not of a public nature.
 Article 349 of the Civil Code provides that: "No one may be deprived of his
property unless it be by competent authority, for some purpose of proven
public utility, and after payment of the proper compensation. Unless this
requisite (proven public utility and payment) has been complied with, it
shall be the duty of the courts to protect the owner of such property in its
possession or to restore its possession to him, as the case may be."
 The very foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not
follow, the taking of the land.
 The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to
exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the
legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is
exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by
the general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to
inquire into.
 The City of Manila can only expropriate private property. It is a well known
fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery
used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the
latter is used only by a family, or a small portion of the community or
neighborhood. Where a cemetery is open to public, it is a public use and
no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general
authority. The cemetery in question seems to have been established under
governmental authority by the Spanish Governor-General. The cemetery in
question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in
the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make
the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course,
the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of
Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public
property.
 Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in
question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the
same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent
lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every
purpose of the plaintiff.
Camarines Sur v. CA (supra, see p. 51)
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Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation
Facts: Pursuant to Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 93-95, Series of 1993, the
Municipality of Parañaque filed a Complaint for expropriation against V.M. Realty
Corporation over two parcels of land. Allegedly, the complaint was filed "for the
purpose of alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing
homes for the homeless through a socialized housing project." Parenthetically, it
was also for this stated purpose that petitioner, pursuant to its Sangguniang Bayan
Resolution No. 577, Series of 1991, previously made an offer to enter into a
negotiated sale of the property with private respondent, which the latter did not
accept.
RTC: gave due course to petition and authorized petitioner to take possession of
the subject property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to
15 percent of its fair market value based on its current tax declaration. VM alleged
that (a) the complaint failed to state a cause of action because it was filed pursuant
to a resolution and not to an ordinance as required by the LGC and (b) the cause of
action, if any, was barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Case dismissed, MR
denied.
CA: affirmed.
Issues: 1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council has the same
force and effect of an ordinance. NO
 Pque: a resolution approved by the municipal council for the purpose of
initiating an expropriation case "substantially complies with the
requirements of the law" because the terms "ordinance" and "resolution"
are synonymous for "the purpose of bestowing authority [on] the LGU
through its chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in
court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain." Article 36, Rule VI
of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC: "If the LGU fails to
acquire a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a resolution of
the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to initiate expropriation
proceedings."
 The Court disagrees. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the exercise thereof
to LGUs, other public entities and public utilities. An LGU may therefore
exercise the power to expropriate private property only when authorized
by Congress and subject to the latter's control and restraints, imposed
"through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this
case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of
eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise. It provides
as follows: Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. A LGU may, through its chief
executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless
a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such
offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the LGU may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the
current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided,
finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be
determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time
of the taking of the property.
 Essential requisites for the exercise the power of eminent domain: (1) An
ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local
chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent
domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property. (2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,
purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the landless. (3)
There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9,
Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. (4) A valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
 In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise the power of
eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of the municipal council. Thus,
there was no compliance with the first requisite that the mayor be
authorized through an ordinance. Pque cites Camarines Sur vs. CA to show
that a resolution may suffice to support the exercise of eminent domain by
an LGU. This case, however, is not in point because the applicable law at
that time was BP 337, the previous LGC, which had provided that a mere
resolution would enable an LGU to exercise eminent domain. In contrast,
RA 7160, 31 the present LGC which was already in force when the
Complaint for expropriation was filed, explicitly required an ordinance for
this purpose.
 A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law,
but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
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lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general
and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently — a third reading is necessary
for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian members.
 If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a
mere resolution, it would have simply adopted the language of the
previous LGC. But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
LGC, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically requires that the local chief
executive act pursuant to an ordinance. Indeed, "[l]egislative intent is
determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its
express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal
interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation
would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an injustice." In the
instant case, there is no reason to depart from this rule, since the law
requiring an ordinance is not at all impossible, absurd, or unjust.
 Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation
of a fundamental or private right of the people. Accordingly, the manifest
change in the legislative language — from "resolution" under BP 337 to
"ordinance" under RA 7160 — demands a strict construction. "No species
of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and is guarded by
the Constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold
of inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right and, for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without his
consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be enlarged by doubtful
interpretation."
 Pque relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which
requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain.
This is clearly misplaced, because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself,
surely prevails over said rule which merely seeks to implement it. It is
axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and cannot be
amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Besides, what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the
wording of the implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also
requires that, in exercising the power of eminent domain, the chief
executive of the LGU act pursuant to an ordinance.
 In this ruling, the Court does not diminish the policy embodied in Section 2,
Article X of the Constitution, which provides that "territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy." It merely upholds the law as
worded in RA 7160. We stress that an LGU is created by law and all its
powers and rights are sourced therefrom. It has therefore no power to
amend or act beyond the authority given and the limitations imposed on it
by law. Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an
LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" domain, since it must conform
to the limits imposed by the delegation, and thus partakes only of a share
in eminent domain. 38 Indeed, "the national legislature is still the principal
of the LGUs, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it."
2. WON the complaint states a cause of action. NO.
 In its Brief filed before Respondent Court, petitioner argues that its
Sangguniang Bayan passed an ordinance on October 11, 1994 which
reiterated its Resolution No. 93-35, Series of 1993, and ratified all the acts
of its mayor regarding the subject expropriation.
 This argument is bereft of merit. In the first place, petitioner merely
alleged the existence of such an ordinance, but it did not present any
certified true copy thereof. In the second place, petitioner did not raise
this point before this Court. In fact, it was mentioned by private
respondent, and only in passing. In any event, this allegation does not cure
the inherent defect of petitioner's Complaint for expropriation filed on
September 23, 1993. It is hornbook doctrine that in a motion to dismiss
based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, the
question submitted before the court for determination is the sufficiency of
the allegations in the complaint itself. Whether those allegations are true
or not is beside the point, for their truth is hypothetically admitted by the
motion. The issue rather is: admitting them to be true, may the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer of the complaint?
 The fact that there is no cause of action is evident from the face of the
Complaint for expropriation which was based on a mere resolution. The
absence of an ordinance authorizing the same is equivalent to lack of cause
of action. Consequently, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible
error in affirming the trial court's Decision which dismissed the
expropriation suit.
3. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal of case is not
applicable when public interest is primarily involved. YES.
 Eminent Domain Not Barred by Res Judicata. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals and the trial court, all the requisites for the application of
res judicata are present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on
the merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical interests,
subject matter and cause of action, which has been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over it.
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 However, RJ which finds application in generally all cases and proceedings,
cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to expropriate private
property. The very nature of eminent domain, as an inherent power of the
State, dictates that the right to exercise the power be absolute and
unfettered even by a prior judgment or res judicata. The scope of eminent
domain is plenary and, like police power, can "reach every form of
property which the State might need for public use." "All separate interests
of individuals in property are held of the government under this tacit
agreement or implied reservation. Notwithstanding the grant to
individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact idea of
property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of the
people in their sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the
possession of the property whenever the public interest requires it." Thus,
the State or its authorized agent cannot be forever barred from exercising
said right by reason alone of previous non-compliance with any legal
requirement.
 While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right of the State
to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to specific issues decided in a
previous case. For example, a final judgment dismissing an expropriation
suit on the ground that there was no prior offer precludes another suit
raising the same issue; it cannot, however, bar the State or its agent from
thereafter complying with this requirement, as prescribed by law, and
subsequently exercising its power of eminent domain over the same
property. By the same token, our ruling that petitioner cannot exercise its
delegated power of eminent domain through a mere resolution will not
bar it from reinstituting similar proceedings, once the said legal
requirement and, for that matter, all others are properly complied with.
Parenthetically and by parity of reasoning, the same is also true of the
principle of "law of the case." In Republic vs. De Knecht, the Court ruled
that the power of the State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not
diminished by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property
to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the parties. The
State or its authorized agent may still subsequently exercise its right to
expropriate the same property, once all legal requirements are complied
with. To rule otherwise will not only improperly diminish the power of
eminent domain, but also clearly defeat social justice.
City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo
Facts: The City of Cebu filed in Civil Case No. CEB-14632 a complaint for eminent
domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo for a public
purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an
access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue
and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City. The lots are the
most suitable site for the purpose. The total area sought to be expropriated is 1,624
square meters with an assessed value of P1,786.400. Petitioner deposited with the
Philippine National Bank the amount of P51,156 representing 15% of the fair
market value of the property to enable the petitioner to take immediate possession
of the property pursuant to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The Dedamos filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint because the purpose for which their property was
to be expropriated was not for a public purpose but for benefit of a single private
entity, the Cebu Holdings, Inc. Cebu could simply buy directly from them the
property at its fair market value if it wanted to, just like what it did with the
neighboring lots. Besides, the price offered was very low in light of the
consideration of P20,000 per square meter, more or less, which petitioner paid to
the neighboring lots. Finally, the Dedamos alleged that they have no other land in
Cebu City. Cebu filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to
Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial court.
The parties executed and submitted to the trial court an Agreement wherein they
declared that they have partially settled the case and in consideration thereof they
agreed: 1. That the SECOND PARTY hereby conforms to the intention to [sic] the
FIRST PARTY in expropriating their parcels of land in the above-cited case as for
public purpose and for the benefit of the general public;
2. That the SECOND PARTY agrees to part with the ownership of the
subject parcels of land in favor of the FIRST PARTY provided the latter will pay just
compensation for the same in the amount determined by the court after due notice
and hearing;
3. That in the meantime the SECOND PARTY agrees to receive the amount
of ONE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS
(1,786,400.00) as provisional payment for the subject parcels of land, without
prejudice to the final valuation as maybe determined by the court;
4. That the FIRST PARTY in the light of the issuance of the Writ of
Possession Order dated September 21, 1994 issued by the Honorable Court, agreed
to take possession over that portion of the lot sought to be expropriated where the
house of the SECOND PARTY was located only after fifteen (15) days upon the
receipt of the SECOND PARTY of the amount of P1,786,400.00;
5. That the SECOND PARTY upon receipt of the aforesaid provisional
amount, shall turn over to the FIRST PARTY the title of the lot and within the lapse
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of the fifteen (15) days grace period will voluntarily demolish their house and the
other structure that may be located thereon at their own expense;
6. That the FIRST PARTY and the SECOND PARTY jointly petition the
Honorable Court to render judgment in said Civil Case No. CEB-14632 in accordance
with this AGREEMENT;
7. That the judgment sought to be rendered under this agreement shall be
followed by a supplemental judgment fixing the just compensation for the property
of the SECOND PARTY after the Commissioners appointed by this Honorable Court
to determine the same shall have rendered their report and approved by the court.
Pursuant to said agreement, the trial court appointed three commissioners to
determine the just compensation of the lots sought to be expropriated. The
commissioners were Palermo M. Lugo, who was nominated by petitioner and who
was designated as Chairman; Alfredo Cisneros, who was nominated by
respondents; and Herbert E. Buot, who was designated by the trial court. The
parties agreed to their appointment. Thereafter, the commissioners submitted their
report, which contained their respective assessments of and recommendation as to
the valuation of the property.
On the basis of the commissioners' report and after due deliberation thereon, the
trial court rendered its decision ordering Cebu to pay the Dedamos P24,865.930.00
representing the compensation mentioned in the Complaint. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration on the ground that the commissioners' report was
inaccurate since it included an area which was not subject to expropriation. More
specifically, it contended that Lot No. 1528 contains 793 square meters but the
actual area to be expropriated is only 478 square meters. The remaining 315 square
meters is the subject of a separate expropriation proceeding in Civil Case No. CEB-
8348, then pending before Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. The
commissioners submitted an amended assessment for the 478 square meters of Lot
No. 1528 and fixed it at P12,824.10 per square meter, or in the amount of
P20,826,339.50. The assessment was approved as the just compensation thereof by
the trial court in its Order of 27 December 1996. Accordingly, the dispositive portion
of the decision was amended to reflect the new valuation.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as
CA-G.R. CV No. 59204. Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the
amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. The just compensation should be
based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. CA Affirmed RTC.
Issue: WON just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of
the complaint. It asserts that it should be, which in this case should be 17
September 1993 and not at the time the property was actually taken in 1994,
pursuant to the decision in NPC vs. CA
 Dedamos: Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the decision of the trial
court because (1) the trial court decided the case on the basis of the
agreement of the parties that just compensation shall be fixed by
commissioners appointed by the court; (2) petitioner did not interpose any
serious objection to the commissioners' report of 12 August 1996 fixing the
just compensation of the 1,624-square meter lot at P20,826,339.50; hence,
it was estopped from attacking the report on which the decision was
based; and (3) the determined just compensation fixed is even lower than
the actual value of the property at the time of the actual taking in 1994.
 Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from
sovereignty. It is the Government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a
compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose.9
However, the Government must pay the owner thereof just compensation
as consideration therefor. In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the
point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19
of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:
SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its
chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of
eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the
poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to
the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however,
That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was
not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may
immediately take possession of the property upon the filing of the
expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper
court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on
the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.
 NPC Ruling misread! We did not categorically rule in that case that just
compensation should be determined as of the filing of the complaint. We
explicitly stated therein that although the general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the value of the property as of the
date of the filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an exception: where
this Court fixed the value of the property as of the date it was taken and
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not at the date of the commencement of the expropriation proceedings."
Also, the trial court followed the then governing procedural law on the
matter, which was Section 5 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which
provided as follows: SEC. 5. Ascertainment of compensation. – Upon the
entry of the order of condemnation, the court shall appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken. The order of appointment shall designate the time and
place of the first session of the hearing to be held by the commissioners
and specify the time within which their report is to be filed with the court.
 More than anything else, the parties, by a solemn document freely and
voluntarily agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound by the report of the
commission and approved by the trial court. The agreement is a contract
between the parties. It has the force of law between them and should be
complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and 1315 of the Civil Code
explicitly provides: Art. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the
force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with
in good faith. Art. 1315. Contracts are perfected by mere consent, and
from that moment the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of
what has been expressly stipulated but also to all the consequences which,
according to their nature, may be in keeping with good faith, usage and
law.
 Furthermore, during the hearing on 22 November 1996, petitioner did not
interpose a serious objection. It is therefore too late for petitioner to
question the valuation now without violating the principle of equitable
estoppel. Estoppel in pais arises when one, by his acts, representations or
admissions, or by his own silence when he ought to speak out,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe
certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief,
so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the
existence of such facts. Records show that petitioner consented to
conform with the valuation recommended by the commissioners. It cannot
detract from its agreement now and assail correctness of the
commissioners' assessment.
 Finally, while Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just
compensation shall be determined at the time of the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over R.A. 7160, which
is a substantive law.
Hagonoy Market Vendors Ass’n v. Municipality of Hagonoy
Facts: On October 1, 1996, the Sangguniang Bayan of Hagonoy, Bulacan, enacted an
ordinance, Kautusan Blg. 28, which increased the stall rentals of the market vendors
in Hagonoy. Article 3 provided that it shall take effect upon approval. The subject
ordinance was posted from November 4-25, 1996. In the last week of November,
1997, the petitioner’s members were personally given copies of the approved
Ordinance and were informed that it shall be enforced in January, 1998. On
December 8, 1997, the petitioner’s President filed an appeal with the Secretary of
Justice assailing the constitutionality of the tax ordinance. Petitioner claimed it was
unaware of the posting of the ordinance. Respondent opposed the appeal. It
contended that the ordinance took effect on October 6, 1996 and that the
ordinance, as approved, was posted as required by law. Hence, it was pointed out
that petitioner’s appeal, made over a year later, was already time-barred.
The Secretary of Justice dismissed the appeal on the ground that it was filed out of
time, i.e., beyond 30 days from the effectivity of the Ordinance on October 1, 1996,
as prescribed under Section 187 of the 1991 LGC. Citing the case of Tañada vs.
Tuvera, the Secretary of Justice held that the date of effectivity of the subject
ordinance retroacted to the date of its approval in October 1996, after the required
publication or posting has been complied with, pursuant to Section 3 of said
ordinance. After its motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner appealed to
the Court of Appeals. Petitioner did not assail the finding of the Secretary of Justice
that their appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period. Instead, it urged that
the Secretary of Justice should have overlooked this “mere technicality” and ruled
on its petition on the merits. Unfortunately, its petition for review was dismissed
by the Court of Appeals for being formally deficient as it was not accompanied by
certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice.
Undaunted, the petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was denied.
Issues: 1. WON the CA was correct in dismissing the petition for review for
petitioner’s failure to attach certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice. YES.
 In its Motion for Reconsideration before the Court of Appeals, the
petitioner satisfactorily explained the circumstances relative to its failure
to attach to its appeal certified true copies of the assailed Resolutions of
the Secretary of Justice, thus: during the preparation of the petition on
October 21, 1998, it was raining very hard due to (t)yphoon “Loleng.”
When the petition was completed, copy was served on the Department of
Justice at about (sic) past 4:00 p.m. of October 21, 1998, with (the)
instruction to have the Resolutions of the Department of Justice be
stamped as “certified true copies. However, due to bad weather, the
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person in charge (at the Department of Justice) was no longer available to
certify to (sic) the Resolutions. “The following day, October 22, 1998, was
declared a non-working holiday because of (t)yphoon “Loleng.” Thus,
petitioner was again unable to have the Resolutions of the Department of
Justice stamped “certified true copies.” In the morning of October 23,
1998, due to time constraint(s) , herein counsel served a copy by personal
service on (r)espondent’s lawyer at (sic) Malolos, Bulacan, despite the
flooded roads and heavy rains. However, as the herein counsel went back
to Manila, (official business in) government offices were suspended in the
afternoon and the personnel of the Department of Justice tasked with
issuing or stamping “certified true copies” of their Resolutions were no
longer available. “To avoid being time-barred in the filing of the (p)etition,
the same was filed with the Court of Appeals “as is.”
 CA erred in dismissing petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was
formally deficient. It is clear from the records that the petitioner exerted
due diligence to get the copies of its appealed Resolutions certified by the
Department of Justice, but failed to do so on account of typhoon “Loleng.”
Under the circumstances, respondent appellate court should have
tempered its strict application of procedural rules in view of the fortuitous
event considering that litigation is not a game of technicalities
2. WON the appeal was time-barred. YES.
 The applicable law is Section 187 of the 1991 LGC which
provides: “SEC. 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of
Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. - The procedure for the approval of local tax
ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with
the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall
be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof:
Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on
appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That
such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the
effectivity of the ordinance and accrual and payment of the tax,
fee or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty
(30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-
day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings.
 The aforecited law requires that an appeal of a tax ordinance or
revenue measure should be made to the Secretary of Justice
within thirty (30) days from effectivity of the ordinance and even
during its pendency, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance
shall not be suspended. In the case at bar, Municipal Ordinance
No. 28 took effect in October 1996. Petitioner filed its appeal
only in December 1997, more than a year after the effectivity of
the ordinance in 1996. Clearly, the Secretary of Justice correctly
dismissed it for being time-barred. At this point, it is apropos to
state that the timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their
legal remedies before competent courts is not a “mere
technicality” that can be easily brushed aside. The periods
stated in Section 187 of the LGC are mandatory. Ordinance No.
28 is a revenue measure adopted by the municipality of Hagonoy
to fix and collect public market stall rentals. Being its lifeblood,
collection of revenues by the government is of paramount
importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and
provision of basic services to its inhabitants are largely derived
from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the
validity of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a
considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a time limit
for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures
and tax ordinances.
4. WON the period to appeal should be counted not from the time the
ordinance took effect in 1996 but from the time its members were
personally given copies of the approved ordinance in November 1997. NO
 Petitioner insists that it was unaware of the approval and
effectivity of the subject ordinance in 1996 on two (2) grounds:
first, no public hearing was conducted prior to the passage of the
ordinance and, second, the approved ordinance was not posted.
 Petitioner’s bold assertion that there was no public hearing
conducted prior to the passage of Kautusan Blg. 28 is belied by
its own evidence. In petitioner’s two (2) communications with
the Secretary of Justice, it enumerated the various objections
raised by its members before the passage of the ordinance in
several meetings called by the Sanggunian for the purpose.
These show beyond doubt that petitioner was aware of the
proposed increase and in fact participated in the public hearings
therefor. The respondent municipality likewise submitted the
Minutes and Report of the public hearings conducted by the
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Sangguniang Bayan’s Committee on Appropriations and Market
on February 6, July 15 and August 19, all in 1996, for the
proposed increase in the stall rentals.
 Petitioner cannot gripe that there was practically no public
hearing conducted as its objections to the proposed measure
were not considered by the Sangguniang Bayan. To be sure,
public hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow
interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or
ordinance. These views, however, are not binding on the
legislative body and it is not compelled by law to adopt the
same. Sanggunian members are elected by the people to make
laws that will promote the general interest of their constituents.
They are mandated to use their discretion and best judgment in
serving the people. Parties who participate in public hearings to
give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect
that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers.
 On the issue of publication or posting, Section 188 of the LGC
provides: “Section 188. Publication of Tax Ordinance and
Revenue Measures. Within ten (10) days after their approval,
certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax
ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for
three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation;
Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities
where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same
may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly
accessible places.”
 Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan,
presented evidence which clearly shows that the procedure for
the enactment of the assailed ordinance was complied with.
Municipal Ordinance No. 28 was enacted by the Sangguniang
Bayan of Hagonoy on October 1, 1996. Then Acting Municipal
Mayor Maria Garcia Santos approved the Ordinance on October
7, 1996. After its approval, copies of the Ordinance were given
to the Municipal Treasurer on the same day. On November 9,
1996, the Ordinance was approved by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. The Ordinance was posted during the period from
November 4 - 25, 1996 in three (3) public places, viz: in front of
the municipal building, at the bulletin board of the Sta. Ana
Parish Church and on the front door of the Office of the Market
Master in the public market. Posting was validly made in lieu of
publication as there was no newspaper of local circulation in the
municipality of Hagonoy. This fact was known to and admitted
by petitioner. Thus, petitioner’s ambiguous and unsupported
claim that it was only “sometime in November 1997” that the
Provincial Board approved Municipal Ordinance No. 28 and so
the posting could not have been made in November 1996 was
sufficiently disproved by the positive evidence of respondent
municipality. Given the foregoing circumstances, petitioner
cannot validly claim lack of knowledge of the approved
ordinance. The filing of its appeal a year after the effectivity of
the subject ordinance is fatal to its cause.
**Even on the substantive points raised, the petition must fail. Section 6c.04 of the
1993 Municipal Revenue Code and Section 191 of the LGC limiting the percentage
of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals. Neither can it be
said that the rates were not uniformly imposed or that the public markets included
in the Ordinance were unreasonably determined or classified. To be sure, the
Ordinance covered the three (3) concrete public markets: the two-storey Bagong
Palengke, the burnt but reconstructed Lumang Palengke and the more recent
Lumang Palengke with wet market. However, the Palengkeng Bagong Munisipyo or
Gabaldon was excluded from the increase in rentals as it is only a makeshift,
dilapidated place, with no doors or protection for security, intended for transient
peddlers who used to sell their goods along the sidewalk.
Republic v. CA
Facts: Petitioner instituted expropriation proceedings covering contiguous land
situated along MacArthur Highway, Malolos, Bulacan, to be utilized for the
continued broadcast operation and use of radio transmitter facilities for the “Voice
of the Philippines” project. Petitioner, through the Philippine Information Agency,
took over the premises after the previous lessee, the “Voice of America,” had
ceased its operations thereat. The national government failed to pay to herein
respondents the compensation pursuant to the foregoing decision, such that a little
over five years later, respondents filed a manifestation with a motion seeking
payment for the expropriated property. In the meantime, President Estrada issued
Proclamation No. 22, transferring 20 hectares of the expropriated property to the
Bulacan State University for the expansion of its facilities and another 5 hectares to
be used exclusively for the propagation of the Philippine carabao. The remaining
portion was retained by the PIA. The Santos heirs remained unpaid, and no action
was taken on their case until petitioner filed its manifestation and motion to permit
the deposit in court of the amount of P4,664,000.00 by way of just compensation
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for the expropriated property of the late Luis Santos subject to such final
computation as might be approved by the court. This time, the Santos heirs,
opposing the manifestation and motion, submitted a counter-motion to adjust the
compensation from P6.00 per square meter previously fixed in the 1979 decision to
its current zonal valuation pegged at P5,000.00 per square meter or, in the
alternative, to cause the return to them of the expropriated property.
Assailing the finding of prescription by the trial court, petitioner here posited that a
motion which respondents had filed on 17 February 1984, followed up by other
motions subsequent thereto, was made within the reglementary period that
thereby interrupted the 5-year prescriptive period within which to enforce the 1979
judgment. Furthermore, petitioner claimed, the receipt by respondents of partial
compensation in the sum of P72,683.55 on 23 July 1984 constituted partial
compliance on the part of petitioners and effectively estopped respondents from
invoking prescription expressed in Section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
In opposing the petition, respondents advanced the view that pursuant to Section
6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, the failure of petitioner to execute the judgment,
dated 26 February 1979, within five years after it had become final and executory,
rendered it unenforceable by mere motion. The motion for payment, dated 09 May
1984, as well as the subsequent disbursement to them of the sum of P72,683.55 by
the provincial treasurer of Bulacan, could not be considered as having interrupted
the five-year period, since a motion, to be considered otherwise, should instead be
made by the prevailing party, in this case by petitioner. Respondents maintained
that the P72,683.55 paid to them by the provincial treasurer of Bulacan pursuant to
the 1984 order of the trial court was part of the initial deposit made by petitioner
when it first entered possession of the property in 1969 and should not be so
regarded as a partial payment. Respondents further questioned the right of PIA to
transfer ownership of a portion of the property to the Bulacan State University even
while the just compensation due the heirs had yet to be finally settled.
Issue: WON the expropriated property may be returned. NO.
 The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an
ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any
property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose.
Fundamental to the independent existence of a State, it requires
no recognition by the Constitution, whose provisions are taken
as being merely confirmatory of its presence and as being
regulatory, at most, in the due exercise of the power. In the
hands of the legislature, the power is inherent, its scope
matching that of taxation, even that of police power itself, in
many respects. It reaches to every form of property the State
needs for public use and, as an old case so puts it, all separate
interests of individuals in property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation vesting upon the sovereign the
right to resume the possession of the property whenever the
public interest so requires it.
 The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the
nature of the expropriation proceedings. Expropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any
conflicting interest in the property. Thus, by filing the action, the
condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking title
and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title
or interest in the property, not to prove a right to possession,
but to prove a right to compensation for the taking.
 Obviously, however, the power is not without its limits: first, the
taking must be for public use, and second, that just
compensation must be given to the private owner of the
property. These twin proscriptions have their origin in the
recognition of the necessity for achieving balance between the
State interests, on the one hand, and private rights, upon the
other hand, by effectively restraining the former and affording
protection to the latter. In determining “public use,” two
approaches are utilized - the first is public employment or the
actual use by the public, and the second is public advantage or
benefit. It is also useful to view the matter as being subject to
constant growth, which is to say that as society advances, its
demands upon the individual so increases, and each demand is a
new use to which the resources of the individual may be
devoted.
 The expropriated property has been shown to be for the
continued utilization by the PIA, a significant portion thereof
being ceded for the expansion of the facilities of the Bulacan
State University and for the propagation of the Philippine
carabao, themselves in line with the requirements of public
purpose. Respondents question the public nature of the
utilization by petitioner of the condemned property, pointing out
that its present use differs from the purpose originally
contemplated in the 1969 expropriation proceedings. The
argument is of no moment. The property has assumed a public
character upon its expropriation. Surely, petitioner, as the
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condemnor and as the owner of the property, is well within its
rights to alter and decide the use of that property, the only
limitation being that it be for public use, which, decidedly, it is.
 In insisting on the return of the expropriated property,
respondents would exhort on the pronouncement in Provincial
Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda. de Villaroya where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the alternative remedy of recovery of
the property there in question. It might be borne in mind that
the case involved the municipal government of Sorsogon, to
which the power of eminent domain is not inherent, but merely
delegated and of limited application. The grant of the power of
eminent domain to local governments under Republic Act No.
7160 cannot be understood as being the pervasive and all-
encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of
government. For local governments to be able to wield the
power, it must, by enabling law, be delegated to it by the
national legislature, but even then, this delegated power of
eminent domain is not, strictly speaking, a power of eminent, but
only of inferior, domain or only as broad or confined as the real
authority would want it to be.
 The exercise of such rights vested to it as the condemnee indeed
has amounted to at least a partial compliance or satisfaction of
the 1979 judgment, thereby preempting any claim of bar by
prescription on grounds of non-execution. In arguing for the
return of their property on the basis of non-payment,
respondents ignore the fact that the right of the expropriatory
authority is far from that of an unpaid seller in ordinary sales, to
which the remedy of rescission might perhaps apply. An in rem
proceeding, condemnation acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title is in the public under a new
and independent title; thus, by giving notice to all claimants to a
disputed title, condemnation proceedings provide a judicial
process for securing better title against all the world than may be
obtained by voluntary conveyance.
 Private respondents, although not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property, deserve to be paid promptly on the yet
unpaid award of just compensation already fixed by final
judgment of the Bulacan RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00 per
square meter, with legal interest thereon at 12% per annum
computed from the date of "taking" of the property, i.e., 19
September 1969 (institution of condemnation proceedings) ,
until the due amount shall have been fully paid.
Estanislao v. Costales
Facts: The Sangguniang Panglunsod of Zamboanga City passed Ordinance No. 44
which imposes a P0.01 tax per liter of softdrinks produced, manufactured, and/or
bottled within the city. The Minister of Finance sent a letter to the Sanggunian
suspending the effectivity of the Ordinance on the ground that it contravenes Sec
19 (a) of the Local Tax Code. Zamboanga appealed the suspension in the RTC.
RTC: the tax imposed by the Ordinance is not among those that the Sanggunian may
impose under the Local Tax Code, but upheld its validity saying that the Finance
Minister did not act on it w/in 120 days from receipt of the petition.
Finance Secretary appealed.
Issue: WON Ordinance 44 is valid. NO.
 A city, like Zamboanga, may impose, in lieu of the graduated
fixed tax prescribed under Section 19 of the Local Tax Code, a
percentage tax on the gross sales for the preceding calendar year
of non-essential commodities at the rate of not exceeding two
per cent and on the gross sales of essential commodities at the
rate of not exceeding one per cent.
 The Ordinance is ultra vires as it is not within the authority of the
City to impose said tax. The authority of the City is limited to the
imposition of a percentage tax on the gross sales or receipts of
said product which, being non-essential, shall be at the rate of
not exceeding 2% of the gross sales or receipts of the softdrinks
for the preceding calendar year. The tax being imposed under
said Ordinance is based on the output or production and not on
the gross sales or receipts as authorized under the Local Tax
Code.
 Even if the Secretary of Finance failed to review or act on the
Ordinance within the prescribed period of 120 days it does not
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follow as a legal consequence thereof that an otherwise invalid
ordinance is thereby validated.
 Much less can it be interpreted to mean that the Secretary of
Finance can no longer act by suspending and/or revoking an
invalid ordinance even after the lapse of the 120-day period. All
that the law says is that after said period, the tax ordinance shall
remain in force. The prescribed period for review is only
directory and the Secretary of Finance may still review the
ordinance and act accordingly even after the lapse of the said
period provided he acts within a reasonable time.
 Consequently even after the prescribed period has lapsed,
should the Secretary of Finance, upon review, find that the tax or
fee levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive,
confiscatory, or not among those that the particular local
government may impose in the exercise of its power in
accordance with this Code; or when the tax ordinance is, in
whole or in part, contrary to the declared national economic
policy; or when the ordinance is discriminatory in nature on the
conduct of business or calling or in restraint of trade, the
Secretary of Finance may certainly suspend the effectivity of
such ordinance and revoke the same, without prejudice to the
right to appeal to the courts within 30 days after receipt of the
notice of suspension. The same rule should apply to the
provincial and city treasurers, as the case may be, under Section
44 of the Local Tax Code.
 Ordinance No. 44: null and void. Any taxes paid under protest
thereunder should be accordingly refunded to the taxpayers
concerned.
Philippine Petroleum Corporation v. Municipality of Pililia
Facts: PPC is engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock which is a
petroleum product with its refinery plant in Malaya, Pililia, Rizal. Sec. 142 (NIRC of
1939): Manufactured oils and other fuels are subject to specific tax. PD 231: Local
Tax Code: Municipality may impose taxes on business, except those for which fixed
taxes are provided on manufacturers, importers or producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and
compounders of liquors, distilled spirits, and/ or wines. Finance Secretary issued
Provincial Circular No. 26-73 which directed all LGU treasurers to refrain from
collecting any local tax imposed in old or new ordinances in the business of
manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing or dealing in petroleum products subject to
specific tax under the NIRC; and Provincial Circular No. 26 A-73: Instructed
treasurers to stop collecting any local tax imposed on the businesses of
manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in, petroleum products subject to
the specific tax under the NIRC pursuant to ordinances enacted before or after the
effectivity of the Local Tax Code on 1 July 1973. Municipality of Pililia imposed
Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 (Pililia Tax Code) Sec 9&10 imposed a tax on
business, except for those which fixed taxes are provided in the LTC on
manufacturers, importers or producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind
or nature, including brewers, distillers, rectifiers, and compounders of liquors,
distilled spirits, and/ or wines as well as mayor’s permit, sanitary inspection fee and
storage permit fee for flammable, combustible, or explosive substances
On April 13, 1974, P.D. 436 was promulgated increasing the specific tax on
lubricating oils, gasoline, bunker fuel oil, diesel fuel oil and other similar petroleum
products levied under Sections 142, 144 and 145 of the NIRC, as amended, and
granting provinces, cities and municipalities certain shares in the specific tax on
such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products.
The questioned Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1 was reviewed and approved by the
Provincial Treasurer of Rizal on January 13, 1975 (Rollo, p. 143), but was not
implemented and/or enforced by the Municipality of Pililla because of its having
been suspended up to now in view of Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73 and 26 A-73.
Provincial Circular No. 6-77 dated March 13, 1977 was also issued directing all city
and municipal treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on
flammable or combustible materials imposed under the local tax ordinance of their
respective locality, said fee partaking of the nature of a strictly revenue measure or
service charge. On June 3, 1977, P.D. 1158 otherwise known as the NIRC of 1977
was enacted, Section 153 of which specifically imposes specific tax on refined and
manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels.
Enforcing the provisions of the above-mentioned ordinance, the respondent filed a
complaint against PPC for the collection of the business tax from 1979 to 1986;
storage permit fees from 1975 to 1986; mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees
from 1975 to 1984. PPC, however, have already paid the last-named fees starting
1985.
RTC: PPC to pay business tax, storage permit fee, mayor’s permit fee, sanitary
inspection fee, as well as costs of suit. MR denied.
Issue: WON PPC whose oil products are subject to specific tax under the NIRC, is still
liable to pay tax on business and storage fees, and mayor's permit and sanitary
inspection fee unto Pililla based on Municipal Ordinance No. 1.
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 PPC: (a) Provincial Circular No. 2673 declared as contrary to
national economic policy the imposition of local taxes on the
manufacture of petroleum products as they are already subject
to specific tax under the NIRC; (b) the above declaration covers
not only old tax ordinances but new ones, as well as those which
may be enacted in the future; (c) both Provincial Circulars (PC)
26-73 and 26 A-73 are still effective, hence, unless and until
revoked, any effort on the part of the respondent to collect the
suspended tax on business from the petitioner would be illegal
and unauthorized; and (d) Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the
imposition of local taxes on petroleum products. PC No. 26-73
and PC No. 26 A-73 suspended the effectivity of local tax
ordinances imposing a tax on business under Section 19 (a) of
the Local Tax Code (P.D. No. 231), with regard to manufacturers,
retailers, wholesalers or dealers in petroleum products subject to
the specific tax under the NIRC NIRC, in view of Section 22 (b) of
the Code regarding non-imposition by municipalities of taxes on
articles, subject to specific tax under the provisions of the NIRC.
 There is no question that Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1
imposing the assailed taxes, fees and charges is valid especially
Section 9 (A) which according to the trial court "was lifted in toto
and/or is a literal reproduction of Section 19 (a) of the Local Tax
Code as amended by P.D. No. 426." It conforms with the
mandate of said law. But P.D. No. 426 amending the Local Tax
Code is deemed to have repealed Provincial Circular Nos. 26-73
and 26 A-73 issued by the Secretary of Finance when Sections 19
and 19 (a), were carried over into P.D. No. 426 and no
exemptions were given to manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers,
or dealers in petroleum products.
 Well-settled is the rule that administrative regulations must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law. In case of discrepancy
between the basic law and an implementing rule or regulation,
the former prevails. As aptly held by the court a quo: Necessarily,
there could not be any other logical conclusion than that the
framers of P.D. No. 426 really and actually intended to terminate
the effectivity and/or enforceability of Provincial Circulars Nos.
26-73 and 26 A-73 inasmuch as clearly these circulars are in
contravention with Sec. 19 (a) of P.D. 426-the amendatory law to
P.D. No. 231. That intention to terminate is very apparent and in
fact it is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms in the
effectivity and repealing clause of P.D. 426
 Furthermore, while Section 2 of P.D. 436 prohibits the imposition
of local taxes on petroleum products, said decree did not amend
Sections 19 and 19 (a) of P.D. 231 as amended by P.D. 426,
wherein the municipality is granted the right to levy taxes on
business of manufacturers, importers, producers of any article of
commerce of whatever kind or nature. A tax on business is
distinct from a tax on the article itself. Thus, if the imposition of
tax on business of manufacturers, etc. in petroleum products
contravenets a declared national policy, it should have been
expressly stated in P.D. No. 436.
 The exercise by local governments of the power to tax is
ordained by the present Constitution. To allow the continuous
effectivity of the prohibition set forth in PC No. 26-73 (1) would
be tantamount to restricting their power to tax by mere
administrative issuances. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987
Constitution, only guidelines and limitations that may be
established by Congress can define and limit such power of local
governments. Thus:
 Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges
subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy . . .
 Provincial Circular No. 6-77 enjoining all city and municipal
treasurers to refrain from collecting the so-called storage fee on
flammable or combustible materials imposed in the local tax
ordinance of their respective locality frees petitioner PPC from
the payment of storage permit fee.
 The storage permit fee being imposed by Pililla's tax ordinance is
a fee for the installation and keeping in storage of any
flammable, combustible or explosive substances. Inasmuch as
said storage makes use of tanks owned not by the municipality of
Pililla, but by petitioner PPC, same is obviously not a charge for
any service rendered by the municipality as what is envisioned in
Section 37 of the same Code.
 Section 10 (z) (13) of Pililla's Municipal Tax Ordinance No. 1
prescribing a permit fee is a permit fee allowed under Section 36
of the amended Code.
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 As to the authority of the mayor to waive payment of the
mayor's permit and sanitary inspection fees, the trial court did
not err in holding that "since the power to tax includes the
power to exempt thereof which is essentially a legislative
prerogative, it follows that a municipal mayor who is an
executive officer may not unilaterally withdraw such an
expression of a policy thru the enactment of a tax." The waiver
partakes of the nature of an exemption. It is an ancient rule that
exemptions from taxation are construed in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
Tax exemptions are looked upon with disfavor. Thus, in the
absence of a clear and express exemption from the payment of
said fees, the waiver cannot be recognized. As already stated, it
is the law-making body, and not an executive like the mayor,
who can make an exemption. Under Section 36 of the Code, a
permit fee like the mayor's permit, shall be required before any
individual or juridical entity shall engage in any business or
occupation under the provisions of the Code.
 However, since the Local Tax Code does not provide the
prescriptive period for collection of local taxes, Article 1143 of
the Civil Code applies. Said law provides that an action upon an
obligation created by law prescribes within ten (10) years from
the time the right of action accrues. The Municipality of Pililla
can therefore enforce the collection of the tax on business of
petitioner PPC due from 1976 to 1986, and NOT the tax that had
accrued prior to 1976.
 PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the MODIFICATION that business
taxes accruing PRIOR to 1976 are not to be paid by PPC (because
the same have prescribed) and that storage fees are not also to
be paid by PPC (for the storage tanks are owned by PPC and not
by the municipality, and therefore cannot be a charge for service
by the municipality), the assailed DECISION is hereby AFFIRMED.
Floro Cement Corp. v. Gorospe
Facts: Municipality of Lugait, Misamis Oriental filed a complaint for collection of
manufacturer’s and exporter’s taxes plus surcharges against Floro Cement
Corporation. Lugait based it on Municipal Ordinance No. 5 (Municipal Revenue
Code), passed pursuant to PD 231; and Ordinance No. 10.
Floro’s defense: not liable since the plaintiff’s power to levy fees on “Mines, Mining
Corporations and Mineral Products” was limited by Sec. 52 of PD 463, and that it
was granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a certificate of
tax exemption for a period of 5 years, which covers all taxes except income tax.
Issues: 1. WON cement is a mineral product. NO.
 this Court has consistently held that it is not a mineral product
but rather a manufactured product. While cement is composed
of 80% minerals, it is not merely an admixture or blending of raw
materials, as lime, silica, shale and others. It is the result of a
definite process-the crushing of minerals, grinding, mixing,
calcining adding of retarder or raw gypsum In short, before
cement reaches its saleable form, the minerals had already
undergone a chemical change through manufacturing process.
2. WON PPC may claim exemption from paying manufacturer’s and
exporter’s taxes. NO.
 the power of taxation is a high prerogative of sovereignty, the
relinquishment is never presumed and any reduction or
diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate, must be
strictly construed, and the same must be coached in clear and
unmistakable terms in order that it may be applied. More
specifically stated, the general rule is that any claim for
exemption from the tax statute should be strictly construed
against the taxpayer. He who claims an exemption must be able
to point out some provision of law creating the right; it cannot
be allowed to exist upon a mere vague implication or inference.
It must be shown indubitably to exist, for every presumption is
against it, and a well-founded doubt is fatal to the claim. The
petitioner failed to meet this requirement.
 As held by the lower court, the exemption mentioned in Sec. 52
of P.D. No. 463 refers only to machineries, equipment, tools for
production, etc., as provided in Sec. 53 of the same decree. The
manufacture and the export of cement does not fall under the
said provision for it is not a mineral product. It is not cement that
is mined only the mineral products composing the finished
product.
 Furthermore, by the parties' own stipulation of facts submitted
before the court a quo, it is admitted that Floro Cement
Corporation is engaged in the manufacturing and selling,
including exporting of cement. As such, and since the taxes
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sought to be collected were levied on these activities pursuant to
Sec. 19 of P.D. No. 231, Ordinances Nos. 5 and 10, which were
enacted pursuant to P.D. No. 231 and P.D. No. 426, respectively,
properly apply to petitioner Floro Cement Corporation.
Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA
Facts: The Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan adopted Resolution No. 9
which solicits a 1% donation from thresher operators who apply for a “permit to
thresh” within the municipality’s jurisdiction to help finance the construction of the
municipality’s Sports and Nutrition Center. Such 1% shall come from the value of
the palay threshed by them in the area. To implement the resolution, Municipal
Treasurer Mapagu prepared an agreement to donate for signature of all
thresher/owner/ operators applying for a mayor’s permit. Jurado sent his agent to
the Treasurer’s office to pay the license fee for thresher operators. Mapagu refused
to accept payment and required Jurado to first secure a mayor’s permit. Mayor
Tuzon said that Jurado should first comply with Res 9 and sign the agreement
before the permit could be issued. Jurado ignored the requirement and sent his
license fee payment through postal money order. His payment was returned on the
ground that he failed to comply with Res 9. Jurado filed a special civil action for
mandamus w/ damages to compel the issuance of the mayor’s permit and license
and a petition for declaratory judgment against Res 9 and the implementing
agreement for being illegal either as a donation/tax measure
RTC: Upheld Res 9 and implementing agreement, and dismissed claims for damages
CA: Affirmed validity of Res 9 and implementing agreement, but found Mayor Tuzon
and Treasurer Mapagu to have acted maliciously and in bad faith when they denied
Jurado’s application.
Issue: WON the tax measure contravenes the limitations on the taxing powers of
LGUs under Sec 5 of the LGC.
 SC will not rule on validity of Res 9 and the implementing
agreement because the issue has not been raised as an assigned
error.
 However, it observes that that CA said no more than Res 9 was
passed by the Sangguniang Bayan in the lawful exercise of its
legislative powers in pursuance to (1) Art. XI, Sec. 5 1973 Consti
“subject to such limitation as may be provided by law” and (2)
Art. 4, Sec. 29 of PD 231 “…the barrio council may solicit monies,
materials, and other contributions from … private agencies and
individuals”. The SC said that this was an oversimplification. The
CA failed to offer any explanation for its conclusion nor does it
discuss its own concept of the nature of the resolution.
 If Res. 9 is claimed to be a “solicitation”: Implementing
agreement makes the “donation”obligatory and a condition
precedent to the issuance of a mayor’s permit. Therefore, it goes
against the nature of a donation.
 If it is to be considered as a tax ordinance, it must be shown to
have been enacted in accordance with the requirements of the
Local Tax Code. It would include the holding of a public hearing
on the measure, its subsequent approval by the Secretary of
Finance, in addition to the requisites for publication of
ordinances in general
Drilon v. Lim
Facts: Pursuant to Sec 187, LGC1, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of
four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known
as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions
contrary to law and public policy. In Manila’s petition for certiorari, the Manila RTC
sustained the ordinance. It also declared Section 187 of the LGC as unconstitutional
since it vests in the Justice Secretary the power of control over LGUs in violation of
the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution.
Justice Secretary: It is constitutional and the procedural requirements for the
enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the LGC had indeed not been observed.
Issue: WON Sec 187 of the LGC is constitutional. YES.
1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public
Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the
purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the
date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of
suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied
therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the
sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
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 Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if
warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds.
When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is
not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he
did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should
be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable
as a basis for its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it
was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he
did in reviewing the said measure was determine if the
petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with
law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of
tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city government
under the LGC. As we see it, that was an act not of control but of
mere supervision.
 An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act
undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to
do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The
supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does
he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only
to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own
manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this
matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the
opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no
more nor less than this, and so performed an act not of control
but of mere supervision.
 Taule v. Santos cited in the decision has no application here
because the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local
Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga
Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by
constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not
supervision or control.
 Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local
Autonomy Act, which provided in its Section 2 as follows: A tax
ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its
passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided,
however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to
suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and
twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust,
excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to
declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary
exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be
suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty
days within which period the local legislative body may either
modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file
an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the
tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended,
shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative
body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as
the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to
exist.
 That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the
effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee
levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory.
Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise of
judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of
whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had
been observed; hence, it would smack of control rather than
mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this
Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the
same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted to do is
ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure,
without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on
this matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila
Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the inclusion
therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds
affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of the
tax measure.
 The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code is another matter. In
his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no
written notices of public hearings on the proposed Manila
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Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required

by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the LGC nor were
copies of the proposed ordinance published in three successive
issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art.
276(a). No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory
public hearings had been held. Neither were copies of the
measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in
accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the LGC. Finally, the Manila
Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and
disseminated among the people for their information and
guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.
 Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the
procedural requirements had been observed in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not
been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only
because he had given it only five days within which to gather and
present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later
submitted to the trial court.
 To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the
motion of the respondents and called for the elevation to it of
the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these
exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural
requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public
hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits
G-1 to 17. The minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M,
M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the proposed Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos
ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard
on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved Facts: MCIAA was created by RA 6958 which provided that it be exempted from
ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the payment of realty taxes. The Office of the Treasurer of Cebu City demanded
Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown payment for realty taxes on several parcels of land belonging to MCIAA. MCIAA
by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3. objected, claiming that it is exempt from payment of reality taxes. It also said that
 The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as as it is an instrumentality of the government performing governmental functions, it
approved but this omission does not affect its validity, is exempted as provided for by Sec. 133 of the LGC. The City insisted that MCIAA is
considering that its publication in three successive issues of a not tax exempt as its exemption had been withdrawn by Sections 193 and 234 of
newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has the same code. MCIAA paid the tax account under protest but it filed a petition for
also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has been declaratory relief saying that the powers of LGUs do not extend to the levy of taxes
translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the or fees of any kind on an instrumentality of the national government. TC: dismissed
approval of local development plans and public investment the petition for declaratory relief. MR denied.
programs of the local government unit and not to tax MCIAA: It is a GOCC mandated to perform functions in the same category as an
ordinances. instrumentality of the government and it is an attached agency of the DOTC. Thus,
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it may stand in the same footing as an agency or instrumentality of the national
government. Hence, its tax exemption privilege under its charter cannot be
considered as withdrawn with the passage of the LGC because Sec 133 specifically
states that the taxing powers of LGUs shall not extend to the levy of taxes or fees or
charges of any kind on the national government, its agencies or instrumentalities.
Cebu has no power nor authority to impose realty taxes upon it based on Sec 133 of
the LGC, cites Basco v. PAGCOR. In relation to Section 234, of the LGC that the
legislature meant to exclude instrumentalities of the national government from the
taxing power of the local government units.
Cebu: as local a government unit and a political subdivision, it has the power to
impose, levy, assess, and collect taxes within its jurisdiction. Such power is
guaranteed by the Constitution and enhanced further by the LGC. While it may be
true that under its Charter MCIAA was exempt from the payment of reality taxes,
this exemption was withdrawn by Sec. 234 of the LGC. Sec. 234 does not
distinguish between GOCCs performing governmental and purely proprietary
functions.
Issue 1. WON MCIAA is exempt from paying taxes. NO.
 As a general rule, the power to tax is an incident of sovereignty
and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no
limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the
constituency who are to pay it. Nevertheless, effective
limitations thereon may be imposed by the people through their
Constitutions. Our Constitution, for instance, provides that the
rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable and Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation. So potent indeed is
the power that it was once opined that "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy." Verily, taxation is a destructive
power which interferes with the personal and property for the
support of the government. Accordingly, tax statutes must be
construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor
of the taxpayer. But since taxes are what we pay for civilized
society, or are the lifeblood of the nation, the law frowns against
exemptions from taxation and statutes granting tax exemptions
are thus construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayers and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority. A claim of exemption
from tax payment must be clearly shown and based on language
in the law too plain to be mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is
the rule, exemption therefrom is the exception. However, if the
grantee of the exemption is a political subdivision or
instrumentality, the rigid rule of construction does not apply
because the practical effect of the exemption is merely to reduce
the amount of money that has to be handled by the government
in the course of its operations.
 The power to tax is primarily vested in the Congress; however, in
our jurisdiction, it may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no
longer merely by virtue of a valid delegation as before, but
pursuant to direct authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of
the Constitution. Under the latter, the exercise of the power may
be subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress
may provide which, however, must be consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomy.
 There can be no question that under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6958
the petitioner is exempt from the payment of realty taxes
imposed by the National Government or any of its political
subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities. Nevertheless, since
taxation is the rule and exemption therefrom the exception, the
exemption may thus be withdrawn at the pleasure of the taxing
authority. The only exception to this rule is where the exemption
was granted to private parties based on material consideration
of a mutual nature, which then becomes contractual and is thus
covered by the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
 The LGC, enacted pursuant to Section 3, Article X of the
constitution provides for the exercise by local government units
of their power to tax, the scope thereof or its limitations, and the
exemption from taxation.
 Section 133 of the LGC prescribes the common limitations on the
taxing powers of local government units. The "taxes, fees or
charges" referred to are "of any kind", hence they include all of
these, unless otherwise provided by the LGC. The term "taxes" is
well understood so as to need no further elaboration, especially
in the light of the above enumeration. The term "fees" means
charges fixed by law or Ordinance for the regulation or
inspection of business activity, while "charges" are pecuniary
liabilities such as rents or fees against person or property.
 Among the "taxes" enumerated in the LGC is real property tax,
which is governed by Section 232. Section 234 of LGC provides
for the exemptions from payment of real property taxes and
withdraws previous exemptions therefrom granted to natural
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and juridical persons, including government owned and
controlled corporations, except as provided therein. These
exemptions are based on the ownership, character, and use of
the property. Thus; (a) Ownership Exemptions. Exemptions from
real property taxes on the basis of ownership are real properties
owned by: (i) the Republic, (ii) a province, (iii) a city, (iv) a
municipality, (v) a barangay, and (vi) registered cooperatives. (b)
Character Exemptions. Exempted from real property taxes on the
basis of their character are: (i) charitable institutions, (ii) houses
and temples of prayer, and (iii) non profit or religious
cemeteries. (c) Usage exemptions. Exempted from real property
taxes on the basis of the actual, direct and exclusive use to which
they are devoted are: (i) all lands buildings and improvements
which are actually, directed and exclusively used for religious,
charitable or educational purpose; (ii) all machineries and
equipment actually, directly and exclusively used or by local
water districts or by government-owned or controlled
corporations engaged in the supply and distribution of water
and/or generation and transmission of electric power; and (iii) all
machinery and equipment used for pollution control and
environmental protection.
 Section 193 of the LGC is the general provision on withdrawal of
tax exemption privileges. On the other hand, the LGC authorizes
local government units to grant tax exemption privileges.
 Reading together Section 133, 232 and 234 of the LGC, we
conclude that as a general rule, as laid down in Section 133 the
taxing powers of local government units cannot extend to the
levy of inter alia, "taxes, fees, and charges of any kind of the
National Government, its agencies and instrumentalties, and
local government units"; however, pursuant to Section 232,
provinces, cities, municipalities in the Metropolitan Manila Area
may impose the real property tax except on, inter alia, "real
property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions except when the beneficial used thereof
has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable
person", as provided in item (a) of the first paragraph of Section
234.
 As to tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently
enjoyed by natural or juridical persons, including government-
owned and controlled corporations, Section 193 of the LGC
prescribes the general rule, viz., they are withdrawn upon the
effectivity of the LGC, except upon the effectivity of the LGC,
except those granted to local water districts, cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. No. 6938, non stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, and unless otherwise
provided in the LGC. The latter proviso could refer to Section
234, which enumerates the properties exempt from real
property tax. But the last paragraph of Section 234 further
qualifies the retention of the exemption in so far as the real
property taxes are concerned by limiting the retention only to
those enumerated there-in; all others not included in the
enumeration lost the privilege upon the effectivity of the LGC.
Moreover, even as the real property is owned by the Republic of
the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions covered by
item (a) of the first paragraph of Section 234, the exemption is
withdrawn if the beneficial use of such property has been
granted to taxable person for consideration or otherwise. Since
the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon
the effectivity of the LGC, exemptions from real property taxes
granted to natural or juridical persons, including government-
owned or controlled corporations, except as provided in the said
section, and the petitioner is, undoubtedly, a government-
owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its exemption
from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its charter, R.A. No.
6958, has been withdrawn. Any claim to the contrary can only be
justified if the petitioner can seek refuge under any of the
exceptions provided in Section 234, but not under Section 133,
as it now asserts, since, as shown above, the said section is
qualified by Section 232 and 234. In short, the petitioner can no
longer invoke the general rule in Section 133 that the taxing
powers of the local government units cannot extend to the levy
of: (o) taxes, fees, or charges of any kind on the National
Government, its agencies, or instrumentalities, and local
government units.
 In light of the petitioner's theory that it is an "instrumentality of
the Government", it could only be within be first item of the first
paragraph of the section by expanding the scope of the terms
Republic of the Philippines" to embrace . . . . . .
"instrumentalities" and "agencies" or expediency we quote: (a)
real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, or any of
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the Philippines, or any of its political subdivisions except when
the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person. This view does not persuade us.
In the first place, the petitioner's claim that it is an
instrumentality of the Government is based on Section 133(o),
which expressly mentions the word "instrumentalities"; and in
the second place it fails to consider the fact that the legislature
used the phrase "National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities" "in Section 133(o),but only the phrase
"Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivision "in
Section 234(a).
 The terms "Republic of the Philippines" and "National
Government" are not interchangeable. The former is boarder
and synonymous with "Government of the Republic of the
Philippines" which the Administrative Code of the 1987 defines
as the "corporate governmental entity though which the
functions of the government are exercised through at the
Philippines, including, saves as the contrary appears from the
context, the various arms through which political authority is
made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to the
autonomous reason, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivision or other forms of local government." These
autonomous regions, provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions" are the political subdivision.
 On the other hand, "National Government" refers "to the entire
machinery of the central government, as distinguished from the
different forms of local Governments." The National Government
then is composed of the three great departments the executive,
the legislative and the judicial.
 An "agency" of the Government refers to "any of the various
units of the Government, including a department, bureau, office
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled
corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein;"
while an "instrumentality" refers to "any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy; usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered
institutions and government-owned and controlled
corporations".
 If Section 234(a) intended to extend the exception therein to the
withdrawal of the exemption from payment of real property
taxes under the last sentence of the said section to the agencies
and instrumentalities of the National Government mentioned in
Section 133(o), then it should have restated the wording of the
latter. Yet, it did not Moreover, that Congress did not wish to
expand the scope of the exemption in Section 234(a) to include
real property owned by other instrumentalities or agencies of
the government including government-owned and controlled
corporations is further borne out by the fact that the source of
this exemption is Section 40(a) of P.D. No. 646, otherwise known
as the Real Property Tax Code, which reads:
Sec 40. Exemption from Real Property Tax. — The exemption shall
be as follows: (a) Real property owned by the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its political subdivisions and any
government-owned or controlled corporations so exempt by is
charter: Provided, however, that this exemption shall not apply to
real property of the above mentioned entities the beneficial use
of which has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a
taxable person.
 Note that as a reproduced in Section 234(a), the phrase "and any
government-owned or controlled corporation so exempt by its
charter" was excluded. The justification for this restricted
exemption in Section 234(a) seems obvious: to limit further tax
exemption privileges, especially in light of the general provision
on withdrawal of exemption from payment of real property taxes
in the last paragraph of property taxes in the last paragraph of
Section 234. These policy considerations are consistent with the
State policy to ensure autonomy to local governments 33 and the
objective of the LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful
local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them
effective partners in the attainment of national goals. The power
to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues
to finance and support myriad activities of local government
units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion
of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress,
and prosperity of the people. It may also be relevant to recall
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that the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax exemption
privileges granted to government-owned and controlled
corporations and all other units of government were that such
privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in
the tax treatment of similarly situated enterprises, and there was
a need for this entities to share in the requirements of the
development, fiscal or otherwise, by paying the taxes and other
charges due from them.
Secretary of Finance v. Ilarde
Facts: Cabaluna failed to pay land taxes. A breakdown of the computation of the
delinquent taxes and penalties on his lots and residential house as reflected in the
various receipts issued by the City Treasurer's Office of Iloilo City, shows that more
than twenty-four percent (24%) of the delinquent taxes were charged and collected
by way of penalties. Cabaluna paid his land taxes and the corresponding receipts
were issued to him by the City Treasurer's Office with the notation "paid under
protest." Cabaluna filed a formal letter of protest with the City Treasurer of Iloilo
City wherein he contends that the City Treasurer's computation of penalties was
erroneous since the rate of penalty applied exceeded twenty-four percent (24%) in
contravention of Section 66 of P.D. No. 464, otherwise known as the Real Property
Tax Code, as amended. In response, however, Assistant City Treasurer Tulio, for and
in behalf of the City Treasurer of Iloilo, turned down private respondent's protest,
citing Sec. 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury
Regulations No. 2-85 of the then Ministry (now Department) of Finance. which
reads: Sec. 4. Computation of Penalties on Delinquent Real Property Taxes. – (a)
Unless condoned, wholly or partially, in a duly approved resolution of the Local
Sanggunian, delinquent real property taxes shall be subject to penalty at the rate of
two per cent (2%) for every month of delinquency, provided that the total penalty
for one tax year shall not exceed twenty-four percent (24%). (b) Failure to pay on
time at least the first quarter installment of the real property tax shall constitute a
waiver on the part of the property owner or administrator to avail of the privilege
granted by law for him to pay without penalty his annual realty tax obligation in
four (4) equal installment on or before the end of every quarter of the tax year.
Accordingly, if the portion of the real property tax due for the first quarter of tax
year is not paid on or before the thirty-first day of March of the same year, the
penalty shall be reckoned from the first day of January at the rate of two per cent
(2%) for every month of delinquency on the basis of the total amount due for the
entire year and not only on the amount due for the said first quarter of the tax year.
(c) The penalty of two percent (2%) per month of delinquency, or twenty-four
percent (24%) per annum, as the case may be, shall continue to be imposed on the
unpaid tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time that it is paid
for in full.
Cabaluna filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages on 06 July 1993
before the sala of respondent Judge, assailing Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-
85 and Local Treasury Regulations No. 2-85 which, according to him, flouted Section
66 of P.D. No. 464 which fixed the maximum penalty for delinquency in the
payment of real estate taxes at 24% of the delinquent tax.
RTC: Section 4(c) of Joint Assessment Regulation No. 1-85 and Local Treasury
Regulation No. 2-85 null and void. Penalty that should be imposed for delinquency
in the payment of real property taxes should be two per centum on the amount of
the delinquent tax for each month of delinquency or fraction thereof, until the
delinquent tax is fully paid but in no case shall the total penalty exceed twenty-four
per centum of the delinquent tax as provided for in Section 66 of P.D. 464
otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code.
Issue: WON Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations
No. 2-85 are valid. NO.
 The subject Regulations must be struck down for being
repugnant to Section 66 of P.D. No. 464 or the Real Property Tax
Code, which provides: “That in no case shall the total penalty
exceed twenty-four per centum of the delinquent tax. The rate
of penalty for tax delinquency fixed herein shall be uniformly
applied in all provinces and cities.”
 Upon the other hand, Section 4(c) of the challenged Joint
Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations
No. 2-85 issued by respondent Secretary (formerly Minister) of
Finance provides that "the penalty of two percent (2%) per
month of delinquency or twenty-four percent (24%) per annum
as the case may be, shall continue to be imposed on the unpaid
tax from the time the delinquency was incurred up to the time
that the delinquency is paid for in full." As adeptly observed by
the trial court, the penalty imposed under the assailed
Regulations has no limit inasmuch as the 24% penalty per annum
shall be continuously imposed on the unpaid tax until it is paid
for in full unlike that imposed under Section 66 of the Real
Property Tax Code where the total penalty is limited only to
twenty-four percent of the delinquent tax.
* The secretary anchors his claim on EO73 "The Minister of Finance shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement this Executive Order."
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E.O. No. 73 did not touch at all on the topic of amendment of rates of delinquent
taxes or the amendment of rates of penalty on delinquent taxes. Neither did E.O.
No. 1019 directly or indirectly vest upon the Department of Finance the right to
fiddle with the rates of penalty to be assessed on delinquency taxes as contained in
the Real Property Tax Code.
Despite the promulgation of E.O. No. 73, P.D. No. 464 in general and Section 66 in
particular, remained to be good law. NO repeal by implication itcab! Assuming
argumenti that E.O. No. 73 has authorized the petitioner to issue the objected
Regulations, such conferment of powers is void for being repugnant to the well-
encrusted doctrine in political law that the power of taxation is generally vested
with the legislature. The power delegated to the executive branch, in this case the
Ministry of Finance, to lay down implementing rules must, nevertheless, be
germane to the general law it seeks to apply. The implementing rules cannot add to
or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement.
* the fact that private respondent Cabaluna was responsible for the issuance and
implementation of Regional Office Memorandum Circular No. 04-89 which
implemented Joint Assessment Regulations No. 1-85 and Local Treasury Regulations
No. 2-85 does not put him in estoppel from seeking the nullification of said
Regulations at this point.
Benguet Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment Appeals
Facts: BC seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the CBAA of May 28, 1991, as
well as the Resolution of July 1, 1991, denying its motion for reconsideration, which
affirmed the decision of respondent Local Board of Assessment Appeals of the
Province of Benguet declaring as valid the tax assessments made by the Municipal
Assessor of Itogon, Benguet, on the bunkhouses of petitioner occupied as dwelling
by its rank and file employees based on Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 and 10454. The
Provincial Assessor of Benguet, through the Municipal Assessor of Itogon, assessed
real property tax on the bunkhouses of petitioner Benguet Corporation occupied for
residential purposes by its rank and file employees under Tax Declarations Nos.
8471 (effective 1985) and 10454 (effective 1986). According to the Provincial
Assessor, the tax exemption of bunkhouses under Sec. 3 (a), P.D. 745 2 (Liberalizing
2
"Section 3. Pursuant to the above incentive, such domestic corporations and partnerships shall enjoy
tax exemption on: (a) real estate taxes on the improvements which will be used exclusively for housing
their employees and workers . . ."
the Financing and Credit Terms for Low Cost Housing Projects of Domestic
Corporations and Partnerships) , was withdrawn by P.D. 19553 (Withdrawing,
Subject to Certain Conditions, the Duty and Tax Privileges Granted to Private
Business Enterprises and/or Persons Engaged in Any Economic Activity, and Other
Purposes). Petitioner appealed the assessment on Tax Declarations Nos. 8471 and
10454 to the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) of the Province of Benguet,
docketed as LBAA Cases Nos. 42 and 43, respectively. Both were heard jointly.
Meanwhile, the parties agreed to suspend hearings in LBAA Cases Nos. 42 and 43 to
await the outcome of another case, LBAA Case No. 41, covering Tax Declaration No.
3534 (effective 1984), which involved the same parties and issue until the appeal
was decided by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). On July 15, 1986,
CBAA handed down its decision in LBAA Case No. 41 holding that the buildings of
petitioner used as dwellings by its rank and file employees were exempt from real
property tax pursuant to P.D. 745. Thereafter, the proceedings in LBAA Cases Nos.
42 and 43 proceeded after which a decision was rendered affirming the taxability of
subject property of petitioner. On appeal, CBAA sustained the decision holding that
the realty tax exemption under P.D. 745 was withdrawn by P.D. 1955 and E.O. 93,
so that petitioner should have applied for restoration of the exemption with the
Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB) The decision of CBAA clarified that Case No.
41 was different because it was effective prior to 1985, hence, was not covered by
P.D. 1955 nor by E.O. 93. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied with
CBAA holding that petitioner's "classification" of P.D. 745 is unavailing because P.D.
1955 and E.O. 93 do not discriminate against the so-called "social statutes". Hence,
this petition.
SC: should be read in connection with Ministry Order No. 39-84, Sec. 1 (d), of the
then Ministry of Finance, which took effect October 15, 1984, states: "Section 1.
The withdrawal of exemptions from, or any preferential treatment in, the payment
of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges as provided for under Presidential
Decree No. 1955, does not apply to exemptions or preferential treatment
embodied in the following laws: . . . (d) The Real Property Tax Code . . ."
Executive Order No. 93, promulgated December 17, 1986, is also to the same effect.
Both P.D. 1955 and F.O. 93 operate as wholesale withdrawal of tax incentives
granted to private entities so that the government may re-examine existing tax
3
"Section 1. The provisions of any special or general law to the contrary notwithstanding, all exemptions
from or any preferential treatment in the payment of duties, taxes, fees, imposts and other charges
heretofore granted to private business enterprises and/or persons engaged in any economic activity are
hereby withdrawn, except those enjoyed by the following: . . . (e)
Those that will be approved by the President of the Philippines upon the recommendation of the
Minister of Finance,"
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APO | Local Governments Case Digests
exemptions and restore through the "review mechanism" of the Fiscal Incentives
Review Board only those that are consistent with declared economic policy. Thus
wise, the chief revenue source of the government will not be greatly, if not
unnecessarily, eroded since tax exemptions that were granted on piecemeal basis,
and which have lost relevance to existing programs, are eliminated.
Issues: 1. WON respondent Assessors may validly assess real property tax on the
properties of petitioner considering the proscription in The Local Tax Code (P.D 231)
and the Mineral Resources Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. 463) against
imposition of taxes on mines by local governments. YES.
 On the first issue, petitioner contends that local government
units are without any authority to levy realty taxes on mines
pursuant to Sec. 52 of P.D. 463, which states: Sec. 52. Power to
Levy Taxes on Mines Mining Operations and Mineral Products.
Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, no province, city,
municipality, barrio or municipal district shall levy and collect
taxes, fees, rentals, royalties or charges of any kind whatsoever
on mines, mining claims, mineral products, or any operation,
process or activity connected, therewith, and Sec. 5 (m) of The
Local Tax Code, as amended by P.D. 426 (reiterated in Secs. 17
[d] and 22 [c], same Code), which provides: Sec. 5. Common
limitations on the taxing powers of local governments. The
exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities
and barrios shall not extend to the imposition of the following: . .
. (m) Taxes on mines, mining operations; and minerals, mineral
products, and their by-products when sold domestically by the
operator.
 The Solicitor General observes that the petitioner is estopped
from raising the question of lack of authority to issue the
challenged assessments inasmuch as it was never raised before,
hence, not passed upon by, the municipal and provincial
assessors, LBAA and CBAA. This observation is well taken. The
rule that the issue of jurisdiction over subject matter may be
raised anytime, even during appeal, has been qualified where its
application results in mockery of the tenets of fair play, as in this
case when the issue could have been disposed of earlier and
more authoritatively by any of the respondents who are
supposed to be experts in the field of realty tax assessment. As
We held in Suarez v. Court of Appeals: . . . It is settled that any
decision rendered. without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may
be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.
The only exception is where the party raising the issue is barred
by estoppel.
 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy: While petitioner could have prevented the
trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by
seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead involved the
very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative
relief from it. What is more, they participated in the trial of the
case by cross-examining respondent. Upon the premises,
petitioner cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an
inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to
which they had submitted themselves voluntarily
 Aguinaldo Industries Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals:"To allow a litigant to
assume a different posture when he comes before the court and
challenge the position he had accepted at the administrative
level, would be to sanction a procedure whereby the court which
is supposed to review administrative determinations would not
review, but determine and decide for the first time, a question
not raised at the administrative forum. This cannot be permitted,
for the same reason that underlies the requirement of prior
exhaustion of administrative remedies to give administrative
authorities the prior opportunity to decide controversies within
its competence, and in much the same way that, on the judicial
level, issues not raised in the lower court cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal."
 Besides, the special civil action of certiorari is available to pass
upon the determinations of administrative bodies where patent
denial of due process is alleged as a consequence of grave abuse
of discretion or lack of jurisdiction, or question of law is raised
and no appeal is available. In this case, petitioner may not
complain of denial of due process since it had enough
opportunity, but opted not, to raise the issue of jurisdiction in
any of the administrative bodies to which the case may have
been brought.
 BC: realty taxes are local taxes because they are levied by local
government units; citing Sec. 39 of P.D. 464, which provides: Sec.
39. Rates of Levy. The provincial, city or municipal board or
council shall fix a uniform rate of real property tax applicable to
their respective localities . . .
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 While local government units are charged with fixing the rate of
real property taxes, it does not necessarily follow from that
authority the determination of whether or not to impose the tax.
In fact, local governments have no alternative but to collect taxes
as mandated in Sec. 38 of the Real Property Tax Code, which
states: Sec. 38. Incidence of Real Property Tax. There shall be
levied, assessed and collected in all provinces, cities and
municipalities an annual ad valorem tax on real property, such as
land, buildings, machinery and other improvements affixed or
attached to real property not hereinafter specifically exempted."
 It is thus clear from the foregoing that it is the national
government, expressing itself through the legislative branch, that
levies the real property tax. Consequently, when local
governments are required to fix the rates, they are merely
constituted as agents of the national government in the
enforcement of the Real Property Tax Code. The delegation of
taxing power is not even involved here because the national
government has already imposed realty tax in Sec. 38 above-
quoted, leaving only the enforcement to be done by local
governments.
 The challenge of petitioner against the applicability of Meralco
Securities Industrial Corporation v. Central Board of Assessment
Appeals, et al., 3 is unavailing, absent any cogent reason to
overturn the same. Thus "Meralco Securities argues that the
realty tax is a local tax or levy and not a tax of general
application. This argument is untenable because the realty tax
has always been imposed by the lawmaking body and later by
the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his lawmaking
powers, as shown in Sections 342 et seq. of the Revised
Administrative Code, Act No. 3995, Commonwealth Act No 470
and Presidential Decree No. 464. "The realty tax is enforced
throughout the Philippines and not merely in a particular
municipality or city but the proceeds of the tax accrue to the
province, city, municipality and barrio where the realty taxed is
situated (Sec. 86, P.D. No. 464). In contrast, a local tax is imposed
by the municipal or city council by virtue of the Local Tax Code,
Presidential Decree No. 231, which took effect on July 1, 1973
(69 O.G. 6197)."
 Consequently, the provisions of Sec. 52 of the Mineral Resources
Development Decree of 1974 (P.D. 463), and Secs. 5 (m), 17 (d)
and 22 (c) of The Local Tax Code (P.D. 231) cited by petitioner are
mere limitations on the taxing power of local government units,
they are not pertinent to the issue before Us and, therefore,
cannot and should not affect the imposition of real property tax
by the national government.
2. WON the real tax exemption granted under P.D. 745 (promulgated July
15, 1975) was withdrawn by P.D. 1955 (took effect October 15, 1984) and
E.O. 93. YES.
 Court held that it has no recourse but to apply the express
provision of P.D. No. 1955 and rule in favor of the withdrawal of
the real property tax exemption provided under P.D. No. 745.
 As regards the second issue, petitioner, which claims that E.O. 93
does not repeal social statutes like P.D. 745, in the same breath
takes refuge in Sec. 1 (e) of the same E.O. 93, to wit: Section 1.
The provisions of any general or special law to the contrary
notwithstanding, all tax and duty incentives granted to
government and private entities are hereby withdrawn except: . .
. (e) those conferred under the four basic codes, namely: . . . (iv)
the Real Property Tax Code, as amended . . . in relation to Sec. 40
of the Real Property Tax Code, which provides: Sec. 40.
Exemptions from Real Property Tax. The exemption shall be as
follows: . . . (g) Real property exempt under other laws, and
concluding that P.D. 745 is one of the "other laws" referred to.
 We do not agree. If We are to sanction this interpretation, then
necessarily all real properties exempt by any law would be
covered, and there would be no need for the legislature to
specify "Real Property Tax Code, as amended", instead of stating
clearly "realty tax exemption laws". Indubitably, the intention is
to limit the application of the "exception clause" only to those
conferred by the Real Property Tax Code. This is not only a logical
construction of the provisions but more so in keeping with the
principle of statutory construction that tax exemptions are
construed strictly against taxpayers, hence, they cannot be
created by mere implication but must be clearly provided by law.
Non-exemption, in case of doubt, is favored.
 Quite obviously, the exception in Sec. 1 (e), (iv), of E.O. 93, refers
to "those conferred under . . . Real Property Tax Code, as
amended", and that the exemption claimed by petitioner is
granted not by the Real Property Tax Code but by P.D. 745.
When Sec. 40 (g) of the Property Tax Code provides that "[T]he
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exemption shall be as follows: . . . Real Property exempt under
other laws". the Code merely recognizes realty tax exemptions
provided by other laws, otherwise, it may unwittingly repeal
those "other laws".
 The argument of petitioner that P.D. 745 is a social statute to
give flesh to the Constitutional provisions on housing, hence, not
covered by P.D. 1955, was squarely met by respondent CBAA in
its Resolution of July 1, 1991, to which We fully agree "The
phrase 'any special or general law' explicitly indicates that P.D.
No. 1955 did not distinguish between a social statute and an
economic or tax legislation. Hence, where the law does not
distinguish, we cannot distinguish.
 In view thereof, we have no recourse but to apply the express
provision of P.D. No. 1955 and rule in favor of the withdrawal of
the real property tax exemption provided under P.D. No. 745.
We also find without merit the contention of Petitioner-Appellan
t that B.P. No. 391 (Investment Incentives Policy Act of 1983) is
the source and reason for the existence of P.D. No. 1955;
therefore, the scope of P.D. No. 1955 is limited to investment
incentives. Although Section 20 of said B.P. which authorizes the
President to restructure investment incentives
systems/legislation s to align them with the overall economic
development objectives is one of the declared policies of P.D.
No. 1955, its primary aim is the formulation of national recovery
program to meet and overcome the grave emergency arising
from the current economic crisis. Hence, it cannot be maintained
that its provisions apply only to investment incentives. Besides,
even granting that its scope is limited, it is noted that P.D. No.
745 also speaks of investment incentives in Sections 2 and 3
thereof . . ."
National Development Co. v. Cebu City
Facts: Proclamation No. 430 was issued by the President which reserved Block no.
4, Reclamation Area No. 4, of Cebu City, consisting of 4,599 square meters, for
warehousing purposes under the administration of National Warehousing
Corporation. Subsequently, a warehouse with a floor area of 1,940 square meters
more or less, was constructed thereon. NWC dissolved, NDC took over.
Commencing 1948, Cebu assessed and collected from NDC real estate taxes on the
land and the warehouse thereon. By the first quarter of 1970, a total of
P100,316.31 was paid by NDC of which only P3,895.06 was under protest. On 20
March 1970, NDC wrote the City Assessor demanding full refund of the real estate
taxes paid claiming that the land and the warehouse standing thereon belonged to
the Republic and therefore exempt from taxation. Cebu did not acquiesce in the
demand, hence, the present suit filed 25 October 1972 in the Court of First Instance
of Manila.
CFI: Cebu to refund the real estate taxes paid by NDC for the parcel of land covered
by Presidential Proclamation No. 430 of August 10, 1939, and the warehouse
erected thereon from and after October 25, 1966
CA: certified the case to SC as one involving pure questions of law, pursuant to Sec.
17, R.A. 296.
Issue: WON NDC is exempted from payment of the real estate taxes on the land
reserved by the President for warehousing purposes as well as the warehouse
constructed thereon, and in the affirmative, whether NDC may recover in refund
unprotested real estate taxes it paid from 1948 to 1970.
 Section, 3 par. (a), of the Assessment Law, on which NDC claims
real estate tax exemption, provides —Section 3. Property
exempt from tax. — The exemptions shall be as follows: (a)
Property owned by the United States of America, the
Commonwealth of the Philippines, any province, city,
municipality at municipal district . . .
 The same opinion of NDC was passed upon in National
Development Co. v. Province of Nueva Ecija where We held that
its properties were not comprehended in Sec. 3, par (a), of the
Assessment Law. In part, We stated: 1. Commonwealth Act No.
182 which created NDC contains no provision exempting it from
the payment of real estate tax on properties it may acquire . . .
There is justification in the contention of plaintiff-appellee that . .
. [I]t is undeniable that to any municipality the principal source of
revenue with which it would defray its operation will came from
real property taxes. If the National Development Company would
be exempt from paying real property taxes over these
properties, the town of Gabaldon will be deprived of much
needed revenues with which it will maintain itself and finance
the compelling needs of its inhabitants 2. Defendant-appellant
NDC does not come under classification of municipal or public
corporation in the sense that it may sue and be sued in the same
manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense, it is
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an entity different from the government, defendant corporation
may be sued without its consent, and is subject to taxation. In
the case NDC vs. Jose Yulo Tobias, 7 SCRA 692, it was held that . .
. plaintiff is neither the Government of the Republic nor a branch
or subdivision thereof, but a government owned and controlled
corporation which cannot be said to exercise a sovereign
function. it is a business corporation, and as such, its causes of
action are subject to the statute of limitations. . . . That plaintiff
herein does not exercise sovereign powers — and, hence, cannot
invoke the exemptions thereof –– but is an agency for the
performance of purely corporate, proprietary or business
functions, is apparent from its Organic Act (Commonwealth Act
182, as amended by Commonwealth Act 311) pursuant to
Section 3 of which it "shall be subject to the provisions of the
Corporation Law insofar as they are not inconsistent" with the
provisions of said Commonwealth Act, "and shall have the
general powers mentioned in said" Corporation Law, and, hence,
"may engage in commercial, industrial, mining, agricultural, and
other enterprises which may be necessary or contributory to the
economic development of the country, or important in the public
interest," as well as "acquire, hold, mortgage and alienate
personal and real property in the Philippines or elsewhere; . . .
make contracts of any kind and description" , and "perform any
and all acts which a corporation or natural persons is authorized
to perform under the laws now existing or which may be enacted
hereafter."
 We find no compelling reason why the foregoing ruling, although
referring to lands which would eventually be transferred to
private individuals, should not apply equally to this case.
 NDC cites Board of Assessment Appeals, Province of Laguna v.
Court of Tax Appeal and National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NWSA). In that case, We held that properties of
NWSA, a GOCC, were exempt from real estate tax because Sec.
3, par (c), of R.A. 470 did not distinguish between those
possessed by the government in sovereign/governmen
tal/political capacity and those in private/proprietary
/patrimonial character.
 The conflict between NDC v. Nueva Ecija, supra, and BAA v. CTA
and NWSA, supra, is more superficial than real. The NDC decision
speaks of properties owned by NDC, while the BAA ruling
concerns properties belonging to the Republic. The latter case
appears to be exceptional because the parties therein stipulated
1. That the petitioner National Waterworks and Sewerage
Authority (NAWASA) is a public corporation created by virtue of
Republic Act. No. 1383, and that it is owned by the Government
of the Philippines as well as all property comprising waterworks
and sewerage systems placed under it (Emphasis supplied).
There, the Court observed: "It is conceded, in the stipulation of
facts, that the property involved in this case "is owned by the
Government of the Philippines. " Hence, it belongs to the
Republic of the Philippines and falls squarely within letter of the
above provision."
 In the case at bar, no similar statement appears in the stipulation
of facts, hence, ownership of subject properties should first be
established. For, while it may be stated that the Republic owns
NDC, it does not necessary follow that properties owned by NDC,
are also owned by Republic — in the same way that stockholders
are not ipso factoowners of the properties of their corporation.
 The Republic, like any individual, may form a corporation with
personality and existence distinct from its own. The separate
personality allows a GOCC to hold and possess properties in its
own name and, thus, permit greater independence and flexibility
in its operations. It may, therefore, be stated that tax exemption
of property owned by the Republic of the Philippines "refers to
properties owned by the Government and by its agencies which
do not have separate and distinct personalities (unincorporated
entities).
 The foregoing discussion does not mean that because NDC, like
most GOCC's engages in commercial enterprises all properties of
the government and its unincorporated agencies possessed in
propriety character are taxable. Similarly, in the case at bar, NDC
proceeded on the premise that the BAA ruling declared all
properties owed by GOCC's as properties in the name of the
Republic, hence, exempt under Sec. 3 of the Assessment Law.
 To come within the ambit of the exemption provided in Art. 3,
par. (a), of the Assessment Law, it is important to establish that
the property is owned by the government or its unincorporated
agency, and once government ownership is determined, the
nature of the use of the property, whether for proprietary or
sovereign purposes, becomes immaterial. What appears to have
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been ceded to NWC (later transferred to NDC), in the case before
Us, is merely the administration of the property while the
government retains ownership of what has been declared
reserved for warehousing purposes under Proclamation No. 430.
 Incidentally, the parties never raised the issued the issue of
ownership from the court a quo to this Court. A reserved land is
defined as a "[p]ublic land that has been withheld or kept back
from sale or disposition. " The land remains "absolute property
of the government." The government "does not part with its
title by reserving them (lands), but simply gives notice to all the
world that it desires them for a certain purpose." Absolute
disposition of land is not implied from reservation; it merely
means "a withdrawal of a specified portion of the public domain
from disposal under the land laws and the appropriation thereof,
for the time being, to some particular use or purpose of the
general government." As its title remains with the Republic, the
reserved land is clearly recovered by the tax exemption
provision.
 Cebu: reservation of the property in favor of NWC or NDC is a
form of disposition of public land which, subjects the recipient
(NDC ) to real estate taxation under Sec. 115 of the Public Land
Act. as amended by R.A. 436.
 As We view it, the effect of reservation under Sec. 83 is to
segregate a piece of public land and transform it into non-
alienable or non-disposable under the Public Land Act. Section
115, on the other hand, applies to disposable public lands.
Clearly, therefore, Sec. 115 does not apply to lands reserved
under Sec. 83. Consequently, the subject reserved public land
remains tax exempt.
 As regards the warehouse constructed on a public reservation, a
different rule should apply because "[t]he exemption of public
property from taxation does not extend to improvements on the
public lands made by pre-emptioners, homesteaders and other
claimants, or occupants, at their own expense, and these are
taxable by the state . . ." Consequently, the warehouse
constructed on the reserved land by NWC (now under
administration by NDC), indeed, should properly be assessed real
estate tax as such improvement does not appear to belong to
the Republic.
 Since the reservation is exempt from realty tax, the erroneous
tax payments collected by Cebu should be refunded to NDC. This
is in consonance with Sec. 40, par. (a) of the former Real
Property Tax Code which exempted from taxation real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political
subdivisions, as well as any GOCC so exempt by its charter.
 As regards the requirement of paying under protest before
judicial recourse, CEBU argues that in any case NDC is not
entitled to refund because Sec. 75 of R.A. 3857, the Revised
Charter of the City of Cebu, requires paymentunder protest
before resorting to judicial action for tax refund; that it could not
have acted on the first demand letter of NDC of 20 May 1970
because it was sent to the City Assessor and not to the City
Treasurer; that, consequently, there having been no appropriate
prior demand, resort to judicial remedy is premature; and, that
even on the premise that there was proper demand, NDC has yet
to exhaust administrative remedies by way of appeal to the
Department of Finance and/or Auditor General before taking
judicial action.
 NDC exempt from real estate tax on the reserved land but liable
for the warehouse erected thereon.
Province of Tarlac v. Judge Alcantara
Facts: Tarlac Enterprises is the owner of a parcel of land, an ice drop factory, a
machinery shed all located at Mabini, Tarlac, Tarlac, machinery of Diesel Elect.. Sets.
Real estate taxes of the aforesaid properties from 1974 to December 31, 1982, in
the total amount of P532,435.55 including principals and penalties has not been
paid. Tarlac now prays for payment as well as damages and costs of suit. TE moved
to dismiss. LC denied. MR denied. Thereafter, Tarlac set the auction sale of TE's
properties to satisfy the real estate taxes due. This prompted TE to file a motion
praying that petitioner be directed to desist from proceeding with the public
auction sale. LC: issued an order granting said motion to prevent mootness of the
case considering that the properties to be sold were the, subjects of the complaint.
TE’s answer: demands for the payment of, real property taxes had been made but it
refused to pay the same for the reason that under Sec. 40, paragraph (g) of PD 464
in relation to P.D. No.. 551, as amended, it was exempt from paying said tax. It also
raised as affirmative defenses that the complaint stated no cause of action and that
the claims had been waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished or barred by the
statute of limitations.
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LC: dismissed the complaint. It ruled that P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts private
respondent from paying the real property taxes demanded, it being a grantee of a
franchise to generate, distribute and sell electric current for light. The court held
that in lieu of said taxes, private respondent had been required to pay two percent
(2%) franchise tax in line with the intent of the law to give assistance to operators
such as the private respondent to enable the consumers to enjoy cheaper rates.
Butuan Sawmill, Inc. v. City of Butuan: the court ruled that local-governments are
without power to tax the electric companies already subject to franchise tax unless
their franchise allows the imposition of additional tax. MR: denied.
ISSUE: WON TE is exempt from the payment of real property tax under Sec. 40 (g) of
P.D. No. 464 in relation to P.D. No. 551, as amended. NO.
 Sec. 40(g) of P.D. No. 464, the Real Property Tax Code: SEC. 40.
Exemptions from Real Property Tax. - The exemption shall be as
follows:(g) Real property exempt under other laws. TE contends
that the "other laws" referred to in this Section is P.D. No. 551
(Lowering the Cost to Consumers of Electricity by Reducing the
Franchise Tax Payable by Electric Franchise Holders and the Tariff
on Fuel Oils for the Generation of Electric Power by Public
Utilities). Its pertinent provisions state: SECTION 1. Any provision
of law or local ordinance to the contrary notwithstanding, the
franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate,
distribute and sell electric current for light, heat and power shall
be two (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of
electric current and from transactions incident to the generation,
distribution and sale of electric current.
 Such franchise tax shall be payable to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative on or
before the twentieth day of the month following the end of each
calendar quarter or month as may be provided in the respective
franchise or pertinent municipal regulation and shall, any
provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to the contrary
notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes assessments of whatever
nature imposed by any national or authority on earnings,
receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and
sale of electric current."
 P.D. No. 551 was amended on December 19. 1975 by P.D. No.
852 10 with the insertion of the phrase "and for the
manufacture, distribution and sale of city gas" between the
phrases ". . . light, heat and power" and "shall be two (2%) . . . ."
 We do not agree with the lower court that the phrase "in lieu of
all taxes and assessments of whatever nature" in the second
paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 551 expressly exempts private
respondent from paying real property taxes. As correctly
observed by the petitioner, said proviso is modified and
delimited by the phrase "on earnings, receipts. income and
privilege of generation, distribution and sale" which specifies the
kinds of taxes and assessments which shall not be collected in
view of the imposition of the franchise tax. Said enumerated
items upon which taxes shall not be imposed, have no relation at
all to, and are entirely different from. real properties subject to
tax.
 If the intention of the law is to exempt electric franchise
grantees from paying real property tax and to make the two (2%)
percent franchise tax the only imposable tax, then said
enumerated items would not have been added when P.D. No.
852 was enacted to amend P.D. No. 551. The legislative authority
would have simply stopped after the phrase "national or local
authority" by putting therein a period. On the contrary, it went
on to enumerate what should not be subject to tax thereby
delimiting the extent of the exemption.
 We likewise do not find merit in private respondent's contention
that the real properties being taxed, viz., the machinery for the
generation and distribution of electric power, the building
housing said machinery, and the land on which said building is
constructed, are necessary for the operation of its business of
generation, distribution and sale of electric current and,
therefore, they should be exempted from taxation. Private
respondent apparently does not quite comprehend the
distinction among the subject matters or objects of the taxes
involved. It bears emphasis that P.D. No. 551 as amended by P.D.
No. 852 deals with franchise tax and tariff on fuel oils and the
"earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation,
distribution and sale of electric current" are the items exempted
from taxation by the imposition of said tax or tariff duty. On the
other hand, the collection complaint filed by petitioner specified
only taxes due on real properties. While P.D. No. 551 was
intended to give "assistance to the franchise holders by reducing
some of their tax and tariff obligations, " to construe said decree
as having granted such franchise holders exemption from
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payment of real property tax would unduly extend the ambit of  Lower court erred in exempting TE from paying real property tax
exemptions beyond the purview of the law. on its properties which are enumerated in the complaint.
 The annexes attached to private respondent's comment on the However, in its decision, the lower court found that private
petition to prove by contemporaneous interpretation its claimed respondent owns only three real properties consisting of the
tax exemption are not of much help to it. Department Order No. parcel of land, machinery shed and machinery, noticeably
35-74 dated September 16, 1974 regulating the implementation omitting the ice drop factory mentioned in its complaint by the
of P.D. No. 551 merely reiterates the "in lieu of all taxes" proviso. petitioner. In view, however, of the petitioner's failure to assign
Local Tax Regulations 3-75 12 issued by then Secretary of such omission as an error, the same should be considered
Finance Cesar Virata and addressed to all Provincial and City waived.
Treasurers enjoins strict compliance with the directive that "the
franchise tax imposed under Local Tax Ordinances pursuant to
Section 19 of the Local Tax Code, as amended, shall be collected
from business holding franchises but not from establishments
whose franchise contains the in lieu of all taxes' proviso,"
thereby clearly indicating that said proviso exempts taxpayers
like private respondent from paying the franchise tax collected
by the provinces under the Local Tax Code. Lastly, the letter of
the then BIR Acting Commissioner addressed to the Matic Law
Office granting exemption to the latter's client from paying the
"privilege tax which is an excise tax on the privilege of engaging
in business" clearly excludes realty tax from such exemption.
 We also find misplaced the lower court's and the private
respondent's reliance on Butuan Sawmill. v. City of Butuan. In
that case, the questioned tax is a tax on the gross sales or
receipts of said sawmill while the tax involved herein is a real
property tax. The City of Butuan is categorically prohibited
therein by Sec. 2(j) of the Local Autonomy Act from imposing
"taxes of any kind…on person paying franchise tax." On the other
hand, P.D. No. 551 is not as all-encompassing as said provision of
the Local Autonomy Act for it enumerates the items which are
not taxable by virtue of the payment of franchise tax.
 It has always been the rule that "exemptions from taxation are Casiño v. CA
construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in
favor of the taxing authority" primarily because "taxes are the Facts: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Gingoog passed Resolution 49 which
lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain availability classified certain areas, including Casiño’s coliseum which was licensed as a cockpit.
is an imperious need." Thus, to be exempted from payment of The classification led to the cancellation of Casiño’s license to operate such cockpit.
taxes, it is the taxpayer's duty to justify the exemption "by words The ordinance provides that changes in the zoning ordinance as a result of the
too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be review by the Local Review Committee shall be treated as an amendment provided
misinterpreted. Private respondent has utterly failed to that such is carried out through a resolution of three fourths vote of the SP. Said
discharge this duty. amendments shall take effect only after approval and authentication by the HSRC.
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On August 13, 1985, Resolution No. 378, Code Ordinance, Series of 1985,
reclassified Block 125 as within the recreational zone, thus allegedly amending
Resolution No. 49. Nine (9) members of the said SP, participated, with four (4)
members voting for the amendment, while four (4) voted against, and with one (1)
abstention. The vice-mayor, as presiding officer, broke the deadlock by voting for
the amendment. When Resolution No. 378 was transmitted to then City Mayor
Miguel Paderanga for approval, he returned the same to the SP within ten days,
without any action, stating that his approval thereof was not necessary since it did
not involve a disposition of city government funds, as provided by Section 180 of
the LGC and Section 14 of the charter of Gingoog City. By virtue of said Resolution
No. 378, Mayor Lugod, issued to petitioner the aforestated permit to operate a
cockpit dated April 2, 1986, which was renewed by another permit issued on
January 5, 1987. Gingoog Gallera protested the operation of Coliseum before the
Philippine Gamefowl Commission. The protest was founded on the fact that no
certificate of registration had as yet been issued by the PGC, although city mayor's
permits were issued to petitioner. On April 11, 1986, the PGC, through OIC Orog
sent a telegram to the Station Commander of Gingoog City to suspend in the
meantime the operation of the cockpit. On April 24, 1986, the PGC eventually sent a
telegram to the city mayor to stop any cockfight in the Coliseum in view of its
failure to register with the PGC. Thereafter, an action for prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction was filed by Gallera before the RTC against
petitioner, on the ground that Resolution No. 378, purportedly amending zoning
Ordinance No. 49, is invalid. It asserted that the classification of Coliseum's site as
still within the residential zone of Gingoog City was accordingly maintained and
unchanged, thereby rendering the mayor's permits issued to the latter null and void
for being in violation of Section 6 of the Rules and Regulations of the PGC. On April
25, 1986, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining petitioner
to desist from operating the Coliseum until the PGC shall have finally decided the
controversy between petitioner and private respondent Gallera.
RTC: declared the aforesaid mayor's permits null and void and ordered Casiño and
all persons representing him or acting in his behalf from further operating the
cockpit in question.
MR denied.
Issues: 1. WON the PGC controls the operations of the Don Romulo Rodriguez
Coliseum with respect to the local/ordinary cockfights during Sundays, holidays and
fiestas in Gingoog City, despite the fact that the Mayor of Gingoog City issued a
mayor's permit for 1986 and 1987 with the concurrence of the sangguniang
panlungsod. YES.
 PGC has the power not of control but only of review and
supervision. This power was validly exercised by said commission
over Coliseum when it sought to stop the former's operations
through the local officials. It did not whimsically order the
suspension and the consequent stoppage of Coliseum's
operations. Rather, PGC only exercised its power of review over
the acts performed by the local authorities in relation to or
which affect the exercise of its functions.
 The power of review is exercised to determine whether it is
necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate and to see to it
that he performs his duties in accordance with law. This the PGC
did by bringing to the attention of the local authorities the non-
compliance by petitioner with the rules involved in this case
which we find reasonable and necessary in the discharge of the
regulatory functions of PGC. PGC may, for that purpose and as it
did here, indicate its disapproval of the acts of the local officials
concerned to stress and perform its role with respect to the
regulation of cockpits.
 The decision of the First Division of this Court in Gingoog Gallera,
Inc. vs. PGC is not "diametrically opposed to" the decision
rendered in this case in regard to the primacy of the
power/authority between the local officials of the City of
Gingoog and the PGC. Both decisions are in accord with one
another. The decision of the First Division that it is the
Municipal/City Mayor with the authorization of the Sangguniang
Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the
operation of ordinary cockpits is of the same tenor and effect as
the decision of this case as can be seen in the following
wordings: The task of granting licenses to operate cockpits is
lodged with City and Municipal Mayor with the concurrence of
their respective Sanggunians. This is specifically granted to them
by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1802-A which states: Sec. 4. City and
Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective
Sanggunians shall have the authority to license and regulate
regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and
supervision.
 While this Court agrees with the movant that a mayor's permit/
license is a condition precedent to the issuance of the PGC
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Registration Certificate, in the case at bar, the city mayor's
permits issued to movant were null and void as they were
granted pursuant to Resolution No. 578 which never took effect
because of non-compliance with the procedure prescribed in
Resolution No. 49. And because of the nullity of the Mayor's
permit, the Registration Certificate No. C-86816 issued to
movant is likewise null and void. The spring cannot rise higher
than its source
2. WON the mayor's permits issued by the Mayor of Gingoog City for the
years 1986 and 1987 are null and void because Resolution 378 did not
amend Section 6.44 of Resolution 49, Code Ordinance of 1984, the three-
fourths (3/4) votes not having been obtained in passing said Resolution
378. YES.
 Petitioner: legal because the same was passed by the sanggunian
by a majority of five affirmative votes as against four negative
votes. He contends that the three-fourths vote requirement
under Section 6.44, Resolution No. 49, aside from its being
merely a formal requirement, is an enactment of the sanggunian
which is ultra vires.
 SC: Resolution No. 378 was declared invalid by the Court of
Appeals for failure to comply with the required votes necessary
for its validity. Although the charter of the City of Gingoog and
the LGC require only a majority for the enactment of an
ordinance, Resolution No. 49 cannot be validly amended by the
resolution in question without complying with the categorical
requirement of a three-fourths vote incorporated in the very
same ordinance sought to be amended. The pertinent provisions
in the aforesaid city charter and the LGC obviously are of general
application and embrace a wider scope or subject matter. In the
enactment of ordinances in general, the application of the
aforementioned laws cannot be disputed. Undeniably, however,
Section 6.44 of said ordinance regarding amendments thereto is
a specific and particular provision for said ordinance and
explicitly provides for a different number of votes. Where there
is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general
one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what
is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be
operative, and the general statement must be taken to affect
only such cases within its language as are not within the
provisions of the particular enactment.
 In the instant case, although the general law on the matter
requires a mere majority, the higher requisite vote in Resolution
No. 49 shall govern since municipal authorities are in a better
position to determine the evils sought to be prevented by the
inclusion or incorporation of particular provisions in enacting a
particular statute and, therefore, to pass the appropriate
ordinance to attain the main object of the law. This more
stringent requirement on the necessary votes for amendments
to Resolution No. 49 apparently forestalled the apprehended
contingency for, to borrow the words of respondent court, "in an
apparent attempt to get rid of this legal stumbling block (the
prohibition against a cockpit in a residential zone under
Proclamation 49), the Sangguniang Panglunsod of Gingoog City
passed Resolution No. 378, Code Ordinance, series of 1985," . . .
"thereby reclassifying Block 125 into a recreational zone."
Withal, it is legally permissible, as exceptions to the general
provisions on measures covered by city charters and the LGC,
that the vote requirement in certain ordinances may be specially
provided for, as in the case of Section 6.44 of Resolution No. 49,
instead of the usual majority Vote.
 Block 125 where Coliseum is located remains classified as a
residential area, hence the operation of a cockpit therein is
prohibited. This weighty consideration, which should actually be
the principal basis for the nullification by respondent court of the
two mayor's permits issued.
 In the case at bar, there was no registration certificate issued,
much less authorization to operate given by the PGC to the
private respondent-appellant, a condition precedent before a
grant of mayors permit or license to conduct cockfighting.
Therefore, the mayor's permits issued to private respondent are
null and void. Obviously, the PGC did not grant the private
respondent-appellant the proper registration certificate to
operate his cockpit because the same was not constructed
within the appropriate areas as prescribed in zoning laws or
ordinances of Gingoog City pursuant to Section 6 of Rules and
Regulation of the PGC.
Gamboa v. Aguirre
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Facts: In the 1995 elections, Coscolluela, Gamboa, Jr. and Aguirre, Jr., and Araneta
were elected Negros Occidental Governor, Vice-Governor and SP members,
respectively. Sometime in August of 1995, the governor designated Gamboa as
Acting Governor for the duration of the former's official trip abroad until his return.
When the SP held its regular session on September 6, 1995, Aguirre and Araneta
questioned the authority of petitioner to preside therein in view of his designation
as Acting Governor and asked him to vacate the Chair. Gamboa, however, refused
to do so. In another session, seven (7) members of the SP voted to allow petitioner
to continue presiding while four (4) others voted against with one (1) abstention.
On September 22, 1995, A&A filed before the lower court a petition for declatory
relief and prohibition. In the meantime, on October 2, 1995, the Governor re-
assumed his office. Later, the trial court rendered a decision and declared petitioner
as "temporarily legally incapacitated to preside over the sessions of the SP during
the period that he is the Acting Governor." Aggrieved, Gamboa filed a petition for
review raising the issue earlier mentioned.
Issue: WON an incumbent Vice-Governor, while concurrently the Acting Governor,
continue to preside over the sessions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
 Sec. 49(a) and 466(a) (1) of the LGC provide that the Vice-
Governor shall be the presiding officer of the SP. In addition to
such function, he "become(s)" the Governor and "assume(s)" the
higher office for the unexpired term of his predecessor, in case
of "permanent vacancy" therein. When the vacancy, however, is
merely temporary, the Vice-Governor "shall automatically
exercise the powers (subject to certain limitations) and perform
the duties and functions" of the Governor. It may be noted that
the code provides only for modes of succession in case of
permanent vacancy in the office of the Governor and the Vice-
Governor (whether single or simultaneously) as well as in case of
a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor. But, no such
contingency is provided in case of temporary vacancy in the
office of the Vice-Governor, just like the 1983 LGC.
 It is correct that when the Vice-Governor exercises the "powers
and duties" of the Office of the Governor, he does not assume
the latter office. He only "acts" as the Governor but does not
"become" the Governor. His assumption of the powers, duties
and functions of the provincial Chief Executive does not create a
permanent vacuum or vacancy in his position as the Vice-
Governor. Necessarily, he does not relinquish nor abandon his
position and title as Vice-Governor by merely becoming an
Acting Governor, (not Governor) or by merely exercising the
powers and duties of the higher officer. But the problem is, while
in such capacity, does he temporarily relinquish the powers,
functions, duties and responsibilities of the Vice-Governor,
including the power to preside over the sessions of the SP? LGC
silent, but YES. A Vice-Governor who is concurrently an Acting
Governor is actually a quasi-Governor. This means, that for
purposes of exercising his legislative prerogatives and powers, he
is deemed as a non-member of the SP for the time being. By
tradition, the offices of the provincial Governor and Vice-
Governor are essentially executive in nature, whereas plain
members of the provincial board perform functions partaking of
a legislative character. This is because the authority vested by
law in the provincial boards involves primarily a delegation of
some legislative powers of Congress. Unlike under the old Code,
where the Governor is not only the provincial Chief Executive,
but also the presiding officer of the local legislative body, the
new Code delineated the union of the executive-legislative
powers in the provincial, city and municipal levels except in the
Barangay. Under R.A. 7160, the Governor was deprived of the
power to preside over the SP and is no longer considered a
member thereof. This is clear from the law, when it provides
that "local legislative power shall be vested in the SP," which is
"the legislative body of the province," and enumerates therein
membership consisting of the: Vice-Governor, as presiding
officer, regular elective SP members, three elective sectoral
representatives, and those ex-officio members, namely president
of the provincial chapter of the liga ng mga barangay, president
of the panlalawigang pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan,
president of the provincial federation of sangguniang members
of municipalities and component cities. None being included in
the enumeration, the Governor is deemed excluded applying the
rule in legal hermeneutics that when the law enumerates, the
law necessarily excludes. On the contrary, local executive power
in the province is vested alone in the Governor. 13 Consequently,
the union of legislative-executive powers in the office of the local
chief executive under the former Code has been disbanded, so
that either department now comprises different and non-
intermingling official personalities with the end in view of
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ensuring a better delivery of public service and provide a system
of check and balance between the two.
 It has been held that if a Mayor who is out of the contrary is
considered "effectively absent", the Vice-Mayor should discharge
the duties of the mayor during the latter's absence. This doctrine
should equally apply to the Vice-Governor since he is similarly
situated as the Vice-Mayor. Although it is difficult to lay down a
definite rule as to what constitutes absence, yet this term should
be reasonably construed to mean "effective" absence, that is,
one that renders the officer concerned powerless, for the time
being, to discharge the powers and prerogatives of his office.
There is no vacancy whenever the office is occupied by a legally
qualified incumbent. A sensu contrario, there is a vacancy when
there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise at
present the duties of the office. By virtue of the foregoing
definition, it can be said that the designation, appointment or
assumption of the Vice-Governor as the Acting Governor creates
a corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-
Governor during such contingency. Considering the silence of the
law on the matter, the mode of succession provided for
permanent vacancies, under the new Code, in the office of the
Vice-Governor may likewise be observed in the event of
temporary vacancy occurring in the same office. This is so
because in the eyes of the law, the office to which he was
elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise
the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
 Being the Acting Governor, the Vice-Governor cannot continue
to simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter office, since
the nature of the duties of the provincial Governor call for a full-
time occupant to discharge them. Such is not only consistent
with but also appears to be the clear rationale of the new Code
wherein the policy of performing dual functions in both offices
has already been abandoned. To repeat, the creation of a
temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a
corresponding temporary vacancy in the office of the Vice-
Governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue of such
temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an "inability" on the
part of the regular presiding officer (Vice Governor) to preside
during the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the
remedy set in Article 49(b) of the LGC — concerning the election
of a temporary presiding officer. The continuity of the Acting
Governor's (Vice Governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP
is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. Under Section
49(b), "(i)n the event of the inability of the regular presiding
officer to preside at the sanggunian session, the members
present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among
themselves a temporary presiding officer."
Garcia v. COMELEC
Facts: In its Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the
Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with RA 7227. On May 24, 1993, petitioners
filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 and sought to allow the inclusion of Morong
subject to certain conditions. The municipality of Morong did not take any action on
the petition within 30 days after its submission. Petitioners then resorted to their
power of initiative under the LGC. They started to solicit the required number of
signatures to cause the repeal of said resolution. Unknown to the petitioners,
however, the Vice Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan ng
Morong, wrote a letter dated June 11, 1993 to the Executive Director of COMELEC
requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative and/or referendum
because the exercise will just promote divisiveness, counter productivity and
futility. In its session of July 6, 1993, the COMELEC en banc resolved to deny the
petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is "merely a resolution
(pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance." On July 13, 1993, the COMELEC en
banc further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the
authentication of signatures being gathered by petitioners. COMELEC opposed the
petition. Through the Solicitor General, it contends that under the LGC, a resolution
cannot be the subject of a local initiative. The same stance is assumed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong.
Issue: WON Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an initiative.
Resp: under the LGC, only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. section 120,
Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I: Local initiative is the legal process whereby the
registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend
any ordinance.
SC: The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as
appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 32 of Article VI: "The Congress
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shall, as early as possible, provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose and enact laws or
approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or local
legislative body . . ." An act includes a resolution. Black: defines an act as "an
expression of will or purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature,
including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments,
resolves, awards, and determinations . . . ." It is basic that a law should be
construed in harmony with and not in violation of the constitution.
 In Re Guarina that "if there is doubt or uncertainty as to the
meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are obscure,
or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that interpretation will be adopted which will
avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be
necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent import of the language used."
 The constitutional command to include acts (i.e., resolutions) as
appropriate subjects of initiative was implemented by Congress
when it enacted Republic Act No. 6735 entitled "An Act Providing
for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating
Funds Therefor." Thus, its section 3(a) expressly includes
resolutions as subjects of initiatives on local legislations, viz: Sec.
3. Definition of Terms: For purposes of this Act, the following
terms shall mean; (a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to
propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and
enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.
 There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely: a.1. Initiative on
the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing
amendments to the Constitution. a.2. Initiative on statutes which
refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition
proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or
barangay law, resolution, or ordinance.
 Section 16: "Limitations Upon Local Legislative Bodies ” Any
proposition on ordinance or resolution approved through the
system of initiative and referendum as herein provided shall not
be repealed, modified or amended, by the local legislative body
concerned within six (6) months from the date therefrom.
 On January 16, 1991, the COMELEC also promulgated its
Resolution No. 2300 entitled "In Re Rules and Regulations
Governing the Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and
Initiative and Referendum, on National and Local Laws." It
likewise recognized resolutions as proper subjects of initiatives.
Section 5, Article I of its Rules states: "Scope of power of
initiative” The power of initiative may be exercised to amend the
Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional,
provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance.."
 There can hardly be any doubt that when Congress enacted
Republic Act No. 6735 it intend resolutions to be proper subjects
of local initiatives. Respondents do not give any reason why
resolutions should not be the subject of a local initiative.
 Distinction between a resolution and an ordinance: a resolution
is used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion
which is to have only a temporary effect while an ordinance is
intended to permanently direct and control matters applying to
persons or things in general. Thus, resolutions are not normally
subject to referendum for it may destroy the efficiency necessary
to the successful administration of the business affairs of a city.
 In the case at bench, however, it cannot be argued that the
subject matter of the resolution of the municipality of Morong
merely temporarily affects the people of Morong for it directs a
permanent rule of conduct or government. The inclusion of
Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone has far
reaching implications in the governance of its people. This is
apparent from a reading of section 12 of Republic Act No. 7227
entitled "An Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating the Bases
Conversion and Development Authority For This Purpose,
Providing Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes."
 Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the
social, political, and economic existence of the people of Morong
by the inclusion of their municipality in the Subic Special
Economic Zone, it is but logical to hear their voice on the matter
via an initiative. It is not material that the decision of the
municipality of Morong for the inclusion came in the form of a
resolution for what matters is its enduring effect on the welfare
of the people of Morong.
 Through an initiative, the people were also endowed with the
power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local
legislative body. Article VI: Sec. 1. The legislative power shall be
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vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provisions on initiative and
referendum. Sec. 32. The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the
exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part
thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body after the
registration of a petition therefor signed by at least ten per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every
legislative district must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters thereto.
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC
Facts: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted the BCDA (RA 7227) which provided
for the creation of the Subic Economic Zone. In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of RA 7227,
to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the
Office of the President. On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their
companions filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong
acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et al. by promulgating
Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines
so amend certain provisions of RA 7227. Not satisfied, and within 30 days from
submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to their power initiative
under the LGC Sec. 122 paragraph (b) which provides that if no favorable action
thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through their duly
authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative,
giving notice thereof to the sangguniang concerned. On July 6, 1993, respondent
Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied the petition for
local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject thereof
was merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13,
1993, public respondent Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. 93-1676)
further directed its Provincial Election Supervisor to hold action on the
authentication of signatures being solicited by private respondents. On August 15,
1993, private respondents instituted a petition for certiorari and mandamus before
this Court against the Commission on Elections and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as it
disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang
10, Serye 1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the
Provincial Election Supervisor of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of
the required number of signatures in support of the initiative and the gathering of
signatures. On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of
the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the
SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic
Naval Base, including Grande Island and that portion of the former naval base
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong. On June 18, 19956,
respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a "Calendar of
Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the
scheduled Referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the
Comelec promulgated the assailed Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and
guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan". On
July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia,
that public respondent "is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that proposes
an amendment of a national law. . . .
Issues: 1. WON a bar by final judgment exists.
 Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in
Enrique T. Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al. on
"the very issue raised in (the) petition: whether or not there can
be an initiative by the people of Morong, Bataan on the subject
proposition ” the very same proposition, it bears emphasizing,
the submission of which to the people of Morong, Bataan is now
sought to be enjoined by petitioner.
 SC: The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a
municipal resolution as contra-distinguished from an ordinance
may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or referendum.
The sole issue presented by the pleadings was the question of
"whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can be the
subject of a valid initiative or referendum"
 In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of
a municipal resolution as the form by which these two new
constitutional prerogatives of the people may be validly
exercised. What is at issue here is whether Pambayang
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Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form
and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in
fine, whether the Comelec acted properly and juridically in
promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848.
 WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848. YES.
 To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an
INITIATIVE but Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM
only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution 11 as reproduced in
the footnote below, the word "referendum" is repeated at least
27 times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers, "Referendum
Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the
description "referendum". To repeat, not once was the word
"initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And yet,
this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
 "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through
an election called for the purpose. 3 systems: 1. Initiative on the
Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to
the Constitution; 2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a
petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and 3. Initiative
on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact
a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution
or ordinance.
 "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through
a proposition sent to Congress or the local legislative body for
action.
 "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject
a legislation through an election called for the purpose. It may be
of two classes, namely: 1. Referendum on statutes which refers
to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or part thereof,
passed by Congress; and 2. Referendum on local law which refers
to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution or ordinance
enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
 Cruz: Initiative - "power of the people to propose bills and laws,
and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly." referendum - "is the right reserved to the
people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been
passed by a legislative body and which in most cases would
without action on the part of electors become a law."
 LGC: Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered
voters of local government unit may directly propose, enact, or
amend any ordinance. Local referendum is the legal process
whereby the registered voters of the local government units may
approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the
sanggunian. The local referendum shall be held under the control
and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case of
provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities
and thirty (30) days in case of baranggays. The Comelec shall
certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum.
 SC: initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly
either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the
law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they
want to amend or modify one already existing. Under Sec. 13 of
R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to
enact the proposal. If it refuses/neglects to do so within thirty
(30) days from its presentation, the proponents through their
duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their
power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the local legislative
body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect the
number of signed conformities within the period granted by said
statute, the Commission on Elections "shall then set a date for
the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be
submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit
concerned .
 On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body
submits to the registered voters of its territorial jurisdiction, for
approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly
enacted or approved by such law-making authority. Said
referendum shall be conducted also under the control and
direction of the Commission on Elections.
 While initiative is entirely the work of the electorate,
referendum is begun and consented to by the law-making body.
Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected
representatives, while referendum consists merely of the
electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or
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enacted by a legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting
in an initiative are understandably more complex than in a
referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either
"Yes" of "No" in the ballot.
 From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for
the Comelec to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority
thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of
votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to
the people is in the proper form and language so it may be easily
understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially
true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated,
and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts,
each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be
exercised that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject
shall be submitted to the electorate," although "two or more
propositions may be submitted in an initiative".
 In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its
powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot
control or change the substance or the content of legislation. In
the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so
already) issue relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the
orderly exercise of these "people-power" features of our
Constitution.
 WON Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities are
Ultra Vires.
 SC: premature! The municipal resolution is still in the proposal
stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people reject it,
then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is
only when the people have voted for it and it has become an
approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can
be enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is
merely a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon
a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts
may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions
or cases.
Ortiz v. Posadas
Facts: Seven of the thirteen members present, including the president, of the
municipal council of Tabaco, Albay, voted in favor of Ordinance No. 25, concerning
cockpits, and six members voted against the ordinance, with three members
absent.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is valid. NO.
 Section 224 of the Administrative Code reads as follows: Journal
of Proceedings ” Majorities necessary for transaction of business.
” The council shall keep a journal of its own proceedings. The
ayes and noes shall be taken upon the passage of all ordinances,
upon all propositions to create any liability against the
municipality, and upon any other proposition, upon the request
of any member, and they shall be entered upon the journal. The
affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the
municipal council shall be necessary to the passage of any
ordinance or of any proposition creating indebtedness; but other
measures, except as otherwise specially provided, shall prevail
upon the majority vote of the members present at any meeting
duly called and held.
 The law is clear. It needs only application, not interpretation.
While the Spanish text may be ambiguous, the English text which
governs is not. The law is entirely consistent in context. The ayes
and noes are taken upon (1) the passage of all ordinances, (2) all
propositions to create any liability against the municipality, and
(3) any other proposition, upon the request of any member. The
same idea is carried into the succeeding sentence. For the
passage of (1) any ordinance or (2) any proposition creating
indebtedness , the affirmative vote of a majority of all the
members of the municipal council shall be necessary. Other
measures prevail upon the majority vote of the members
present "Creating indebtedness" refers to "proposition" and not
to "ordinance." The contention that only ordinances creating
indebtedness require the approval of a majority of all the
members of the municipal council, is devoid of merit.
 Corroborative authority is really superfluous. Nevertheless we
would invite attention to the case of McLean vs. City of East St.
Louis ([1906], 222 Ill., 510). Section 13 of the Act for the
incorporation of cities and villages in the State of Illinois
provided: "The yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of
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all ordinances and on all propositions to create any liability
against the city, or for the expenditure or appropriation of its
money, and in all other cases at the request of any member,
which shall be entered on the journal of its proceedings; and the
concurrence of a majority of all the members elected in the city
council shall be necessary to the passage of any such ordinance
or proposition: Provided, it shall require two-thirds of all the
aldermen elect to sell any city or school property" Commenting
on this provision of law, the Supreme Court of Illinois, through
Justice Cartwright, observed: Some of the counsel for appellee
argue that section 13 relates only to ordinances and propositions
creating a liability against a city or providing for the expenditure
or appropriation of its money, and that all other ordinances may
be passed by a majority of a quorum. They say that it is not
unusual for courts, in the construction of statutes, to substitute
one word for another where the plain meaning of the statute will
justify it, and that by eliminating some words and substituting
others this section will express what they think was the intention
of the legislature. It is the rule that where the intention of the
legislature is ascertained with reasonable certainty and it
appears that words have been used inconsistent with such
intention, a word erroneously used for another may be
eliminated and the proper word substituted. Where the context
affords the means of correcting a mistake in the use of language,
the correction may be made for the purpose of giving effect to
the intention plainly manifested in the act as a whole. But we do
not agree with the theory that the legislature, in this instance,
intended to limit the requirement of a majority vote to
ordinances creating a liability or appropriating money. In our
opinion, to make the changes suggested would be merely
juggling with the words of the statute to give it a different
meaning from that which was intended. The law requires that
the yeas and nays shall be taken upon the passage of all
ordinances, and the concurrence of a majority of the legislative
body is necessary to their passage. We recognized that
construction of the statute in Hibbard & Co. vs. City of Chicago,
173 Ill., 91. If a proposition not in the form of an ordinance
creates any liability or provides for the expenditure or
appropriation of money, the requirement is the same, while as
to other propositions, whether the yeas and nays are entered
upon the journal or not, the majority of a quorum is sufficient.
 The basic idea of the legislative body to make impossible the
approval of ordinances or of propositions creating indebtedness
by minority votes of municipal councils, at meetings hastily
called is wise. Legislative intention should be effectuated.
Section 2224 of the Administrative Code, requiring in mandatory language the
affirmative vote of a majority of all the members of the municipal council for the
passage of any ordinance, whether or not an ordinance creating indebtedness, an
ordinance passed by less than that majority is invalid. Ordinance No. 25 of Tabaco,
Albay, is void.
City of Manila v. Laguio
Facts: The Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) built and opened
Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
with the DOTC as a hotel. MTDC filed a petition for declaratory relief against the
City of Manila, Lim (mayor), Atienza (vice-mayor), and the members of the city
council of Manila, praying that the Ordinance they enacted which prohibited motels
and inns be declared unconstitutional. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment
or operation of businesses providing amusement, services, or entertainment where
women are used as tools in entertainment and which tend to disturb the
community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and moral
welfare of the community in the Ermita-Malate area. Such businesses include sauna
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, clubs, dance halls, motels and inns.
MTDC: Motels and inns should not have been prohibited as they are not
establishments for amusement or entertainment; neither were they services or
facilities for entertainment and did not use women as tools, etc. Also, the
Ordinance was unconstitutional and void because (1) The City Council has no power
to prohibit the operation of motels as the LGC granted only the power to regulate
the establishment, operation and maintenance of motels, etc. (2) It is violative of
PD 499 which declared portions of the Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone,
with restrictions (3) It is not a proper exercise of police power as there is no relation
to legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected, (4) It is an ex post facto
law, and (5) It violates MTDC’s constitutional rights, confiscatory and is an invasion
of property rights, also violates the equal protection clause.
Manila: The City Council had the power to prohibit certain forms of entertainment
in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community, as provided in
Sec. 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the LGC. Kwong Sing vs. City of Manila: power of regulation
includes the power to control, govern, and restrain places of exhibition and
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amusement. This is also in conjunction with its police power as found in Revised
Charter of Manila.
Judge Laguio issued an ex-parte TRO against the enforcement of the Ordinance.
After trial, he rendered a decision enjoining the City of Manila from implementing
the Ordinance. The City of Manila then filed a petition assailing the Decision
rendered by Laguio.
Issue: WON the Ordinance is unconstitutional. YES.
 To be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following
substantive requirements: (1) It must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) Must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) Must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) Must not prohibit
but may regulate trade; (5) Must be general and consistent with
public policy; (5) Must not be unreasonable.
 As regards the first criterion, there are 2 requirements: It must
pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of
consistency with prevailing laws. LGUs are able to legislate only
by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of
legislative power from Congress. The delegate cannot be
superior to the principal.
 The means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of
its purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on
the constitutional guarantees of a person's fundamental right to
liberty and property. Motel patrons who are single and
unmarried may invoke this right to autonomy to consummate
their bonds in intimate be it stressed that their sexual conduct
within the motel's premises consensual sexual behavior does not
contravene any fundamental state policy as contained in the
Constitution. Adults have a right to choose to forge such
relationships with others in the confines of their own private
lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. Their right to
liberty under the due process clause gives them the full right to
engage in their conduct without intervention of the government,
as long as they do not run afoul of the law. Liberty should be the
rule and restraint the exception.
 Liberty in the constitutional sense not only means freedom from
unlawful government restraint; it must include privacy as well, if
it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone it is
the most comprehensive of rights and is the beginning of all
freedom and the right most valued by civilized men. The right to
privacy is a constitutional right, the invasion of which should be
justified by a compelling state interest.
 The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of
its police power as found in Sec. 16 of the LGC. This police
power, while far-reaching, is subordinate to constitutional
limitations the exercise must be reasonable and for the public
good. The Ordinance violates the 1987 Constitution, the relevant
provisions of which are Art. II, Secs. 5 and 14, and Art. III, Secs. 1
and 9.
 To be constitutional, the exercise of police power, not only must
it appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident
that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the
means employed for its accomplishment. In this case, the means
employed is oppressive and unreasonable.
 The Ordinance was enacted to address and arrest the social ills
purportedly spawn as it substantially divests the respondent of
the beneficial use of its property. The Ordinance in Section 1
forbids the running of the enumerated businesses in the Ermita-
Malate area and in Section 3 instructs its owners/operators to
wind up business operations or to transfer outside the area or
convert said businesses into allowed businesses. An ordinance
which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be
used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and
must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property
rights of individuals.
 The City of Manila cannot take refuge in classifying the measure
as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid
exercise of police power, which limits a "wholesome" property to
a use which cannot reasonably be made of it constitutes the
taking of such property without just compensation. Private
property which is not noxious or intended for noxious purposes
may not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation.
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 Distinction should be made between destruction from necessity
and eminent domain. Property taken in the exercise of police
power is destroyed because it is noxious or intended for a
noxious purpose while the property taken under the power of
eminent domain is intended for a public use or purpose and is
therefore "wholesome." If it be of public benefit that a
wholesome property remains unused or relegated to a particular
purpose, then certainly the public should bear the cost of
reasonable compensation for the condemnation of private
property for public used by the establishments in the Ermita-
Malate area.
 The closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion
into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable
relation to the accomplishment of its purposes. The City Council
instead should regulate human conduct that occurs inside the
establishments, but not to the detriment of liberty and privacy
which are covenants, premiums and blessings of democracy.
 Due process furnishes a standard to which governmental action
should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty, or
property is valid.
 The Ordinance fails to set up any standard to guide or limit the
petitioners' actions. It in no way controls or guides the discretion
vested in them. It provides no definition of the establishments
covered by it and it fails to set forth the conditions when the
establishments come within its ambit of prohibition. The
Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted
power to close down establishments.
 Ordinances placing restrictions upon the lawful use of property
must, in order to be valid and constitutional, specify the rules
and conditions to be observed and conduct to avoid; and must
not admit of the exercise, or of an opportunity for the exercise,
of unbridled discretion by the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the
standards to ascertain which establishments "tend to disturb the
community," "annoy the inhabitants," and "adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community." There are no
comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying
out its provisions.
 Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others. Legislative bodies are
allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification
is reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of
the people without violating the equal protection clause. The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:1) It must be based on substantial distinctions. 2) It
must be germane to the purposes of the law. 3) It must not be
limited to existing conditions only. 4) It must apply equally to all
members of the class.
 According to the SC: (1) No substantial distinctions between
motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses, and other
similar establishments. All are commercial establishments
providing lodging. The classification is thus invalid (similar
subjects are not similarly treated) and arbitrary (it does not rest
on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the
purpose of the Ordinance) (2) No logic for prohibiting the
business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but
not outside of this area. (3) The standard "where women are
used as tools for one of the hinted entertainment" is also
discriminatory as prostitution ills the Ordinance is not a
profession exclusive aims to banish to women. Both men and
women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. This
discrimination based on gender violates equal protection as it is
not substantially related to important government objectives.
 As to consistency with prevailing laws: (1) The Ordinance
contravenes the LGC. Under the LGC, LGUs are empowered to
regulate, and not prohibit the establishments enumerated in Sec.
1 of the Ordinance. The power of the City Council to regulate by
ordinances the establishment, operation, and maintenance of
motels, hotels and other similar establishments is found in
Section 458 (a) 4 (iv), while its power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of any entertainment
or amusement facilities, and to prohibit certain forms of
amusement or entertainment is provided under Section 458 (a) 4
(vii). Clearly, then, the only power of the City Council to legislate
relative to these establishments is to regulate them to promote
the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities the
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power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment,
operation and maintenance of such establishments. The word
regulate includes the power to control, govern, and restrain, but
it should not be construed as synonymous with suppress or
prohibit. As a general rule when a municipal corporation is
specifically given authority or power to regulate or to license and
regulate the liquor traffic, power to prohibit is impliedly
withheld.
 Congress unequivocably specified the establishments and forms
of amusement or entertainment subject to regulation among
which are beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses,
lodging houses, and other similar establishments (Section 458 (a)
4 (iv)), public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna baths,
massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or
amusement (Section 458 (a) 4 (vii)). This enumeration therefore
cannot be included as among "other events or activities for
amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to
disturb the community or annoy the inhabitants" or "certain
forms of amusement or entertainment" which the City Council
may suspend, suppress or prohibit.
 The rule is that the City Council has only such powers as are
expressly granted to it and those which are necessarily implied
or incidental to the exercise thereof. By reason of its limited
powers and the nature thereof, said powers are to be construed
strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the
terms used in granting said powers must be construed against
the City Council. Moreover, it is a general rule in statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others.
 Also, the Code being a later expression of the legislative will
must necessarily prevail and override the earlier law, the Revised
Charter of Manila. As between two laws on the same subject
matter, which are irreconcilably inconsistent, that which is
passed later prevails, since it is the latest expression of legislative
will. In addition, Section 534(f) of the Code states that "All
general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or
parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of
this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." Thus,
submitting to petitioners' interpretation that the Revised Charter
of Manila empowers the City Council to prohibit motels, that
portion of the Charter stating such must be considered repealed
by the Code as it is at variance with the latter's provisions
granting the City Council mere regulatory powers.
 Manila also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one
which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
It cannot be said that motels are injurious to the rights of
property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate
business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a
hearing conducted for that purpose. A motel is not per se a
nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial
intervention.
 The City Council was conferred powers to prevent and prohibit
certain activities and establishments in Section 458 (1) (v). If it
were the intention of Congress to confer upon the City Council
the power to prohibit the establishments enumerated in Section
1 of the Ordinance, it would have so declared in uncertain terms
by adding them to the list of the matters it may prohibit under
the above-quoted Section. The Ordinance now vainly attempts
to lump these establishments with houses of ill-repute and
expand the City Council's powers in the second and third clauses
of Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code in an effort to overreach its
prohibitory powers. It is evident that these establishments may
only be regulated in their establishment, operation and
maintenance.
 It is important to distinguish the punishable activities from the
establishments themselves. That these establishments are
recognized legitimate enterprises can be gleaned from another
Section of the Code. Section 131 under the Title on Local
Government Taxation expressly mentioned proprietors or
operators of massage clinics, sauna, Turkish and Swedish baths,
hotels, motels and lodging houses as among the "contractors"
defined in paragraph (h) thereof. The same Section also defined
"amusement" as a "pleasurable diversion and entertainment,"
"synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun;" and
"amusement places" to include "theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks
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admission to entertain oneself by seeing or viewing the show or
performances." Thus, it can be inferred that the Code considers
these establishments as legitimate enterprises and activities. (2)
The Ordinance also contravenes the provisions of P.D. 499. As
correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the
residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The
decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of
commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage
depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station,
light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The
rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and
effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to
enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to
the general law.
Perez v. de la Cruz
Facts: In 1968 during a private conference held at the office of the petitioner Naga
vice-mayor Perez with 7 councilors , the matter of selecting the secretary of the
municipal board of the city as well as the chairmen of the various standing
committees came up for discussion. At the indication by the 4 Nacionalista Party
councilors of their desire to vote for a particular person as secretary of the board
and to hold the chairmanship of the committee on markets for one of them, Perez
expressed her intention to vote, in the deliberation of such matters, to create a tie
vote and to then exercise her power to break such deadlock. The four aforesaid
councilors filed with the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur a petition for
prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to prevent Perez from casting her
vote in the selection of the secretary of the municipal board and in the choice of
chairmen and members of the different standing committees, except in the event
of a tie vote, and from voting on any legislative proposal or measure or in any
proceeding of the said board except when the members thereof are equally
divided. Respondents alleged that the vice-mayor of Naga City is not a member of
the municipal board but only its presiding officer. A writ was issued hence vice-
mayor Perez assailed the issuance of the writ as undue interference in matters
purely legislative in character, at the same time that she denied the existence of a
threatened invasion of the rights of the four councilors. Subsequently, Liberal
councilors passed an amendment to the Rules of Procedure of the Naga municipal
board granting the chairman thereof the right to vote as a member, and as
presiding officer the right to vote again in case of a tie.
Issues: 1. WON the vice-mayor of Naga city, besides being the presiding officer of
the municipal board, also a member thereof? NO.
 upon approval of Republic Act 2259 3 making elective the offices
of mayor, vice-mayor and councilors in chartered cities, the
position of vice-mayor, among others was created. Thus section
3 of said law provides: The position of Vice-Mayor is hereby
created in chartered cities which at present have no position for
Vice-Mayor by provision of their corporate charters: Provided,
That the Vice-Mayor shall be the presiding officer of the City
Council or Municipal Board in all chartered cities.
 Perez now contends that since under the Naga City charter the
mayor was the presiding officer of the municipal board, and
since under Republic Act 2259 creating the position of vice-
mayor who was made the presiding officer, the vice-mayor
simply replaced the mayor as "presiding officer" of the municipal
board, the vice-mayor acquired all the rights and prerogatives of
the presiding officer under the charter, one of which is
"membership in the municipal board."
 Quiem v. Seriña: the silence of Rep. Act 2259 on whether the
vice-mayor, the presiding officer, is a member of the board, was
not enough ground for excluding the vice-mayor from
membership in the board. But the legal setting and premises in
Quiem are widely disparate from those in the case at bar. In the
first place, in Quiem we found that "by express legal mandate,
the vice-mayor of Cagayan de Oro City is a member of the board"
because "that city's original charters calls for an appointive Vice-
Mayor who 'shall be a member of the Municipal Board'." In the
case at bar, however, in contrast with sec. 11 of Republic Act 521
creating the city of Cagayan de Oro which explicitly made the
vice-mayor a member of the municipal board, section 11 of
Republic Act 305 creating the City of Naga failed to provide even
for the position of vice-mayor. In the second place, Republic Act
1325, 10 particularly section 1 thereof, amending the Cagayan de
Oro charter, expressly reiterated that the vice-mayor "shall be a
member of the Municipal Board;" as such similar statutory basis
can be cogently invoked for the petitioner Perez.
 Bagasao, et al. vs. Tumangan: the vice-mayor "as the presiding
officer of the Municipal Board of the City of Cabanatuan is a
member thereof" and "he may exercise his right to vote as a
member on any proposed ordinance, resolution or motion." But
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we so held because "both the unamended and amended
provisions of section 11 of the Charter of the City of Cabanatuan
provide that the presiding officer of the Municipal Board is a
member thereof. And as we have re repeatedly stated, there is
no provision whatever in Republic Act 305 creating the City of
Naga that provides for the position of vice-mayor; and the
amendatory provisions of Republic Act 2259 making the vice-
mayor the presiding officer of the municipal board does not
make him a constituent member thereof.
 Paragraph (g) of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure adopted by the
municipal board of Naga City, which recites: (g) The chairman
cannot vote, except in case of a tie. However, a member of the
Board acting as chairman may vote as a member and as
chairman to break a tie.
 The petitioner insists, however, that the above provision was
amended by the 6th municipal board, headed by her, to read as
follows: (g) The Chairman, as member of the Board can vote and
as a Presiding Officer may vote again in case of a tie. In the same
manner, a member of the Board acting as chairman, may vote as
a member and as Chairman, to break the tie. Such insistence is a
sheer exercise in futility because (1) the amended rule
presupposes that the chairman is a "member of the Board" — an
assumption that is without legal basis; (2) the said amendatory
rule was passed on March 5, 1968, almost two months after the
filing on January 15, 1968, by the private respondents of their
petition in civil case 6504, that is, pendente lite; and (3) although
on the date the said amendment was passed, that restraining
order dated February 20, 1968 of the Court of Appeals was in
force, there was no quorum in the board, as the four
respondents councilors had walked out of the session hall,
leaving only the three Liberal Party councilors and the petitioner.
The proposed amendment was, therefore, a complete nullity.
 Petitioner’s theory that since the mayor of Naga City, who was a
member of the municipal board under Rep. Act 305, was
replaced by the vice-mayor as presiding officer thereof, the vice-
mayor must, perforce, be deemed a member of the municipal
board. Pressing her bid, she asserts that Republic Act 2259
effected a mere change in the officer who will preside the
meetings of the board, and since the vice-mayor replaced the
mayor as "presiding officer" thereof, the vice-mayor acquired all
the rights and prerogatives of the presiding officer, one of which
is membership in the board. This contention finds no support
either in law or logic. For, section 3 of Rep. Act 2259 simply
installs the vice-mayor as the presiding officer of the board in all
chartered cities. It does not install the vice-mayor as a member
thereof. This is especially true in the case of Naga where the
position of vice-mayor (whether appointive or elective) was
originally not even provided for in its charter — the official next-
in-rank to the mayor being the city treasurer.
2. WON she can vote twice: to create a deadlock and then to break it. NO.
 The petitioner now argues that as vice-mayor she merely stepped into the
shoes of the mayor as presiding officer of the board, and since the mayor
was considered a member thereof, she too became a member entitled to
the same rights, powers and prerogatives of voting as the mayor. There is
no gainsaying the fact that prior, to the approval of Rep. Act 2259, the
mayor of a municipality was a member of the municipal council, 25 besides
being the presiding officer thereof, but his right to vote could be exercised
only in "case of a tie." 26 Certainly, the vice-mayor who merely stepped
into the shoes of the mayor could have no greater power than that
possessed by the mayor who could not create a tie vote and then break it.
3. WON the judge has jurisdiction to issue the writ of prohibitory injunction against
Perez. YES.
 The petitioner's final contention is that as a legislative official, performing
legislative functions, she is not subject to any prohibitory process by the
courts. She invokes Vera, et al. vs. Avelino, et al. (77 Phil. 192) where we
held: Petitioners pray for a writ of prohibition. Under the law, prohibition
refers only to proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or person
exercising functions, judicial or ministerial. As respondents do not exercise
such kind of functions, theirs being legislative, it is clear that the dispute
falls beyond the scope of such special remedy.
 Invocation of this ruling is completely inapposite. The doctrine therein laid
down is based on the principle of separation of powers and cheeks and
balances and is not applicable to local governments. Moreover, executives
at the local or municipal level are vested with both legislative and
sometimes judicial functions, in addition to their purely executive duties.
By explicit statutory command, courts are given authority to determine the
validity of municipal proceedings. It is not disputed that the present
proceeding for prohibition has for its objective to prevent the petitioner
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from "participating in the election of Secretary of the Board, chairmanship
of different committees and in voting in other legislative matters,
proposals and proceedings, other than to break a tie." It is our view that
the petitioner, in insisting to exercise the right to vote twice in the
municipal board, acted without jurisdiction and power to do so, and may
be validly prevented and restrained by a writ of prohibition.
 In reply to the petitioner's assertion that the acts sought to be restrained
are mere "probable individual actuations" beyond the reach of a
prohibitory writ, suffice it to state that prohibition is essentially a
"preventive remedy" and is "not intended to provide for a remedy for acts
already accomplished." Withal, petitioner's threat of voting twice in the
municipal board was not an empty or meaningless gesture, for the record
shows that on March 5, 1968, soon after the writ complained of was lifted
by the Court of Appeals through the latter's restraining order of February
20, 1968, the petitioner proceeded to act by voting twice for the approval
of an alleged amendment to the rules of procedure of the municipal board.
Homeowners Association of the Philippines v. Municipal Board of Manila
Facts: The City of Manila passed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841 which regulates
rentals of lots and buildings for residential purposes. The Homeowners' Association
of the Philippines, Inc. and its President sought to nullify the ordinance. CFI:
ordinance is ultra vires, unconstitutional, illegal and void ab initio.
LC: struck down the questioned ordinance upon the ground that the power to
"declare a state of emergency ... exclusively pertains to Congress"; that "there is no
longer any state of emergency" which may justify the regulation of house rentals;
that said ordinance constitutes an unreasonable and unjustified limitation on the
use of private properties and arbitrarily encroaches on the constitutional rights of
property owners"; that the power of the City of Manila to "regulate the business of
... letting or subletting of lands and buildings" does not include the authority to
prohibit what is forbidden in said ordinance; and that the same cannot be deemed
sanctioned by the general welfare clause in the City Charter.
Issue: WON the Ordinance is valid. NO.
 The authority of municipal corporations to regulate is essentially
police power. Inasmuch as the same generally entails a
curtailment of the liberty, the rights and/or the property of
persons, which are protected and even guaranteed by the
Constitution, the exercise of police power is necessarily subject
to a qualification, limitation or restriction demanded by the
regard, the respect and the obedience due to the prescriptions
of the fundamental law, particularly those forming part of the
Constitution of Liberty, otherwise known as the Bill of Rights —
the police power measure must be "reasonable". In other words,
individual rights may be adversely affected by the exercise of
police power to the extent only — and only to the extent — that
may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public
interest or public welfare. If such demands are brought about by
a state of emergency, the interference upon individual rights,
resulting from the regulations adopted to meet the situation,
must be, by and large, co-extensive, co-equal or co-terminous
with the existence thereof. And, since an emergency is by nature
temporary in character, so must the regulations promulgated
therefor be. In the language of Justice Holmes,"circumstances
may so change in time or differ in space as to clothe with such an
interest what at other times or in other places would be a matter
of purely private concern."
 As a consequence a law or ordinance affecting the rights of
individuals, as a means to tide over a critical condition, to be
valid and legal, must be for a "definite" period of time, the length
of which must be "reasonable", in relation to the nature and
duration of the crisis it seeks to overcome or surmount.
 The practical reason for the requirement that a statute passed to
meet a given emergency, should limit the period of its effectivity,
is that, otherwise, a new and different law would be necessary to
repeal it, and said period would, accordingly, be "unlimited,
indefinite, negative and uncertain", so that "that which was
intended to meet a temporary emergency may become a
permanent law", because "Congress might not enact the repeal,
and, even if it would, the repeal might not meet with the
approval of the President, and the Congress might not be able to
override the veto". In line with the basic philosophy underlying
the authority to affect individual rights, this Court felt that
Commonwealth Act No. 671, otherwise known as the Emergency
Powers Act, was meant to be and "became inoperative when
Congress met in regular session on May 25, 1946," and that
Executive Orders Nos. 62, 192, 225 and 226 — promulgated
subsequently thereto — "were issued without authority of law",
because, otherwise, said emergency regulations would purport
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to be in force for an indefinite and unlimited period of time, and, Rule 64 — the interpretation of which should be harmonized
hence, would be unconstitutional. with said Section 23 of Rule 3 — affected neither the jurisdiction
 The same considerations impelled the Court to invalidate of the trial court nor the validity of the proceedings therein, in
Executive Order Nos. 545 and 546, issued on November 10, connection with the present case. Thus, in San Buenaventura vs.
1952. Indeed, otherwise "the result would be obvious Municipality of San Jose, we held: that the requirement
unconstitutionality", by making permanent a law intended to regarding notification to the Provincial Fiscal of the pendency of
afford a relief for a temporary emergency, the length of which an action involving the validity of a municipal ordinance, as
should be "fixed in the law itself and not dependent upon the provided in Sec. 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court (now See. 4,
arbitrary or elastic will of either Congress or the President". Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court), is not jurisdictional; and
 The powers of municipal corporations delegated thereto by the failure on the part of petitioner to notify the Provincial Fiscal will
National Government cannot escape the inherent limitations to not be a sufficient ground to throw the case out of court. We
which the latter — as the source of said powers — is subject. believe the purpose of the above-quoted rule is simply to give
Then, again, since our law on municipal corporations is, in the Provincial Fiscal, who is the legal officer of the local
principle, patterned after that of the United States, the rule governments, a chance to participate in the deliberation to
therein, to the effect that "in a proper case, emergency determine the validity of a questioned municipal ordinance
legislation, limited in time, may be enacted under the police before the competent court. If it appears, however, that the
power" of a municipal corporation, should be considered a part ordinance in question is patently illegal, as in the present case,
of our legal system. and the matter had already been passed upon by a competent
 Appellant assails the validity of the proceedings in the lower court, the requirements of Sec. 5 of Rule 66 of the Rules of Court
court upon the round that, although petitioners herein had (now See. 4 of Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court) may be
assailed Municipal Ordinance No. 4841, not merely as ultra vires, dispensed with.
but, also, as unconstitutional, the Solicitor General had been
neither heard nor notified in connection therewith, in violation
of Section 4 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
 It should be noted, however, that appellant did not raise this
question or invoke said Section 4, either in his answer or in a
motion to dismiss in the lower court. Upon the other hand, the
City Fiscal of Manila was notified therein. In fact, he filed a
memorandum, apart from the memorandum submitted by
counsel for appellant herein. Neither did his motion for
reconsideration of the appealed decision touch upon said
question, which was raised, for the first time, in a "supplement"
to said motion for reconsideration.
 At any rate, the determination of the question whether or not
the Solicitor General should be required to appear "in any action
involving the validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or executive
order, rules or regulation" is a matter left to the "discretion" of
the Court, pursuant to Section 23 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
Inasmuch as said requirement is not mandatory, but
discretionary, non-compliance therewith and with Section 4 of
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Morata v. Go

Facts: Victor and Flora Go filed a complaint with the CFI against Julius and Ma. Luisa
Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages. The parties are all residents
of Cebu City. The Moratas filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds the failure of
the complaint to allege prior availment by the Gos of the barangay conciliation
process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a certification by the Lupon
or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had been reached by the
parties. The motion was opposed. MTD denied. MR denied.

Issue: WON the Katarungang Pambarangay law apply to cases heard by the Regional
Trial Courts. YES.
 SECTION 6. No complaint, petition, action for proceeding involving any
matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for
adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties before
the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement has
been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary
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attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has
been repudiated. However, the parties may go directly to court in the
following cases: [1] Where the accused is under detention; [2] Where a
person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty calling for habeas
corpus proceedings; [3] Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as
preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property and
support pendente lite; and [4] Where the action may otherwise be barred
by the Statute of Limitations
 Section 2 of the law defines the scope of authority of the Lupon thus:
Subject matters for amicable settlement.—The Lupon of each barangay
shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except: [1]
Where one party is the government ,or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof; [2] Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions; [3] Offenses
punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00; [4] Offenses where there is no private offended party; [5] Such
other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the
Minister of Local Government.
 Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law,
the Lupon has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes
involving parties who actually reside in the same city or municipality. The
law, as written, makes no distinction whatsoever with respect to the
classes of civil disputes that should be compromised at the barangay level,
in contradistinction to the limitation imposed upon the Lupon by
paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over criminal
cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law
employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage We
should neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary
precept in statutory construction that "where the law does not distinguish,
We should not distinguish.
 By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the
barangay, the animosity generated by protracted court litigations between
members of the same political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and
cooperation, is avoided. It must be borne in mind that the conciliation
process at the barangay level is likewise designed to discourage
indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged
dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it.
Thus, to say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively
cognizable by the inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it
would make the law a self-defeating one. For what would stop a party, say
in an action for a sum of money or damages, as in the instant case, from
bloating up his claim in order to place his case beyond the jurisdiction of
the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory requirement of P.D.
1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the congestion of
dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts where the
log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not
have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
 There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon
"the authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same
city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious
intendment was to grant to the Lupon as broad and comprehensive an
authority as possible as would bring about the optimum realization of the
aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be half-met and easily
thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling within
the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
 Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to
cases cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in
Section 3 thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit: However, all disputes
which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
Barangay where the real property or and part thereof is situated.
 The authority of the Lupon is clearly established in Section 2 of the law;
whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent judge, deal
with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards
obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and
municipal courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or
actions for nullification or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards
issued by the Lupon, regardless of the amount involved or the nature of
the original dispute. But there is nothing in the context of said sections to
justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in other types of
cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
 Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22
issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando: “Effective upon your receipt
of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community
Development that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions
have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential Decree No. 1508,
otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in
implementation of the barangay system of settlement of disputes, you are
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hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons.
 It is significant that the above-quoted circular embodying the directive "to
desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions and proceedings in
cases falling within the authority of said Lupons," has been addressed not
only to judges of city and municipal courts, but also to all the judges of the
courts of first instance, circuit criminal courts, juvenile and domestic courts
and courts of agrarian relations, now known as regional trial courts under
B.P. No. 129. The said circular was noted by president Ferdinand E. Marcos
in a Letter of Implementation, dated November 12, 1979, the first
paragraph of which reads as follows: "with the view to easing up the log-
jam of cases and solving the backlogs in the case of dockets of all
government offices involved in the investigation, trial and adjudication of
cases, it is hereby ordered that immediate implementation be made by all
government officials and offices concerned of the system of amicably
settling disputes at the barangay level as provided for in the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law [Presidential Decree No. 1508]."
 The conciliation process at the barangay level, prescribed by P.D. 1508 as a
pre-condition for filing a complaint in court, is compulsory not only for
cases falling under the exclusive competence of the metropolitan and
municipal trial courts, but for actions cognizable by the regional trial courts
as well.
Uy v. Contreras
Facts: Uy subleased from Atayde the other half of the second floor of a building
located at corner Reposo and Oliman Streets, Makati. She operated and maintained
therein a beauty parlor. The sublease contract expired. However, the Uy was not
able to remove all her movable properties. An argument arose between the Uy and
Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the subleased premises her
remaining movable properties such as cabinets, shelves, frames, a mirror, a
shampoo bowl, and an airconditioning casing. The argument degenerated into a
scuffle between the petitioner, on the one hand, and Atayde and several of
Atayde's employees, including private respondent Javier on the other. The private
respondent had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries inflicted on
them by Uy. They then filed a complaint with the barangay captain of Valenzuela,
Makati. The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the barangay captain,
but only Uy appeared. The confrontation was reset. The Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal filed two informations for slight physical injuries against Uy.
Judge Contreras ordered the petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of
her witnesses. Uy submitted the required counter-affidavits where she specifically
alleged the prematurity of the filing of the criminal cases for failure to undergo
conciliation proceedings as she and the private respondents are residents of
Manila. She also attached to it a certification by the barangay captain of Valenzuela,
Makati, that there was an ongoing conciliation between the parties. Uy then filed
an MTD for non-compliance with the requirement of P.D. No. 1508 on prior referral
to the Lupong Tagapamayapa and pursuant to Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure. MTD denied, MR denied.
Issue:WON it is mandatory for the parties herein to submit to the mediation of the
katarungang pambarangay before a case in court. YES.
 The law on the katarungang pambarangay was originally governed by P.D.
No. 1508, now repealed by LGC. Three new features: (1) It increased the
authority of the lupon in criminal offenses from those punishable by
imprisonment not exceeding thirty days or a fine not exceeding P200.00 in
P.D. No. 1508 to those offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
one year or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. (2) As to venue, it provides
that disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are
employed or at the institution where such parties are enrolled for study,
shall be brought in the barangay where such workplace or institution is
located. (3) It provides for the suspension of the prescriptive periods of
offenses during the pendency of the mediation, conciliation, or arbitration
process.
 Paragraph (c) of Section 410 of the law, however, suffers from some
ambiguity when it provides that the prescriptive periods "shall resume
upon receipt by the complainant of the complaint or the certificate of
repudiation or of the certification to file action issued by the lupon or
pangkat secretary." What is referred to as receipt by the complainant of
the complaint is unclear; obviously, it could have been a drafting oversight.
Accordingly, in the above quoted Section 11 of the Rules and Regulations
issued by the Secretary of Justice, the phrase "the complaint or" is not
found, such that the resumption of the running of the prescriptive period
shall, properly, be from receipt by the complainant of the certificate of
repudiation or the certification to file action issued by the lupon or the
pangkat secretary. Such suspension, however, shall not exceed sixty days.
 The first feature has necessarily broadened the jurisdiction of the lupon
and if the mediation and conciliation process at that level would be
effectively pursued, few cases would reach the regular courts, justice
would be achieved at less expense to the litigants, cordial relationships
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among protagonists in a small community would be restored, and peace
and order therein enhanced.
 The second feature, which is covered by paragraph (d), Section 409 of the
LGC, also broadens the authority of the lupon in the sense that appropriate
civil and criminal cases arising from incidents occurring in workplaces or
institutions of learning shall be brought in the barangay where such
workplace or institution is located. That barangay may not be the
appropriate venue in either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of the said
section. This rule provides convenience to the parties. Procedural rules
including those relating to venue are designed to insure a fair and
convenient hearing to the parties with complete justice between them as a
result. Elsewise stated, convenience is the raison d'etre of the rule on
venue.
 The third feature is aimed at maximizing the effectiveness of the
mediation, conciliation, or arbitration process. It discourages any
intentional delay of the referral to a date close to the expiration of the
prescriptive period and then invoking the proximity of such expiration as
the reason for immediate recourse to the courts. It also affords the parties
sufficient time to cool off and face each other with less emotionalism and
more objectivity which are essential ingredients in the resolution of their
dispute. The sixty-day suspension of the prescriptive period could spell the
difference between peace and a full-blown, wearisome, and expensive
litigation between the parties.
 While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the LGC of 1991, the
jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a pre-
condition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its
provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
 Peregrina vs. Panis: Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de
Borromeo vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508
makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent
for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that condition
precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's cause of action and
make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on the ground of lack of cause
of action or prematurity. The condition is analogous to exhaustion of
administrative remedies, or the lack of earnest efforts to compromise suits
between family members, lacking which the case can be dismissed. The
parties herein fall squarely within the ambit of P.D. No. 1508. They are
actual residents in the same barangay and their disputes does not fall
under any of the excepted cases."
 Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so in
Garces vs. Court of Appeals: prior recourse to the conciliation procedure
required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement, non-
compliance with which would deprive a court of its jurisdiction either over
the subject matter or over the person of the defendant. Where, however,
the fact of non-compliance with and non-observance of such procedure
has been seasonably raised as an issue before the court first taking
cognizance of the complaint, dismissal of the action is proper. The precise
technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of P.D. 1508
where applicable is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies; the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of
pre-maturity; the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss.
 There were, of course, cases where this Court ruled that the failure of the
defendant to seasonably invoke non-referral to the appropriate lupon
operated as a waiver thereof. Furthermore, when such defect was initially
present when the case was first filed in the trial court, the subsequent
issuance of the certification to file action by the barangay, which
constituted substantial compliance with the said requirement, cured the
defect.
 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure: Sec. 18 Cases requiring referral to
the Lupon for conciliation under the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1508 where there is no showing of compliance with such requirement,
shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after such
requirement shall have been complied with. This provision shall not apply
to criminal cases where the accused was arrested without a warrant.
 In the proceeding before the court a quo, the petitioner and the
respondent had in mind only P.D. No. 1508. The petitioner further invoked
the aforequoted Section 18. None knew of the repeal of the decree by the
LGC of 1991. Even in her instant petition, the petitioner invokes the decree
and Section 18 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. However, the
private respondents, realizing the weakness of their position under P.D.
No. 1508 since they did refer their grievances to what might be a wrong
forum under the decree, changed tack. In their Comment, they assert that
on 20 April 1993 Atayde "filed a complaint against petitioner before the
barangay council of Barangay Valenzuela, Makati, in compliance with the
requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law under the LGC." Yet, in
a deliberate effort to be cunning or shrewd, which is condemnable for it
disregards the virtue of candor, they assert that the said law is not
applicable to their cases before the court a quo because (a) the petitioner
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and respondent Atayde are not residents of barangays in the same city or
municipality; (b) the law does not apply when the action, as in the said
cases, may otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations; and (c) even
assuming that the law applies insofar as Atayde is concerned, she has
substantially complied with it.
 The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal should have exerted
enough diligence to inquire from the private respondents if prior referral
to the lupon was necessary before filing the informations.
 Respondent judge did not do any better. His total unawareness of the LGC
of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on the Katarungang
pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial notice thereof,
ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, courts
are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the official acts of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines." We have
ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. 21 He should have
applied the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the LGC. Had he
done so, this petition would not have reached us and taken valuable
attention and time which could have been devoted to more important
cases.
 In view of the private respondents' failure to appear at the first scheduled
mediation on 28 April 1993 for which the mediation was reset to 26 May
1993, no complaint for slight physical injuries could be validly filed with the
MTC of Makati at any time before such date. The filing then of Criminal
Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234 with the said court on 11 May 1993 was
premature and, pursuant to paragraph (a), Section 412 of the LGC,
respondent Judge Contreras should have granted the motion to dismiss
the criminal cases. He cannot justify its denial by taking refuge under
Section 6 of P.D. No. 1508 (more properly, Section 412(b)(4) of the LGC)
which states that the parties may go directly to court where the action is
about to prescribe. This is because, as earlier stated, pursuant to
paragraph (c), Section 410 of the Code, the prescriptive period was
automatically suspended for a maximum period of sixty days from 23 April
1993 when the private respondents filed their complaints with the lupon
of Valenzuela Makati.
 Moreover, having brought the dispute before the lupon of barangay
Valenzuela, Makati, the private respondents are estopped from disavowing
the authority of the body which they themselves had sought. Their act of
trifling with the authority of the lupon by unjustifiably failing to attend the
scheduled mediation hearings and instead filing the complaint right away
with the trial court cannot be countenanced for to do so would wreak
havoc on the barangay conciliation system.
 Granting arguendo that the petitioner did inflict the alleged physical
injuries, the offense for which she may be liable would only be slight
physical injuries under paragraph (2), Article 266 of the Revised Penal
Code, considering that per the medical certificates 22 the injuries
sustained by the private respondents would "heal" in nine days "in the
absence of complication" and there is no showing that the said injuries
incapacitated them for labor or would require medical attendance for such
period. The penalty therefor would only be "arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos and censure." These penalties are light under Article
25 of the Revised Penal Code and would prescribe in two months pursuant
to Article 90.
 Accordingly, since the slight physical injuries charged in Criminal Cases Nos.
145233 and 145234 were allegedly inflicted on 17 April 1993, the
prescriptive period therefor would have expired two months thereafter.
Nevertheless, its running was tolled by the filing of the private
respondents' complaints with the lupon of Valenzuela, Makati, on 23 April
1993 and automatically suspended for a period of sixty days, or until 22
June 1993. If no mediation or conciliation could be reached within the said
period of suspension and, accordingly, a certification to file action is
issued, the private respondents would still have fifty-six days within which
to file their separate criminal complaints for such offense. Evidently, there
was no basis for the invocation by the respondent judge of the exception
provided for in paragraph (b), Section 412 of the LGC.
 Neither are we persuaded by the reasoning of the respondent Judge that
the petitioner "had already waived the right to a reconciliation
proceedings before the barangay of Valenzuela, Makati, considering that
the accused and the complainant are residents of different barangays."
The petitioner did not waive the reconciliation proceedings before the
lupon of Valenzuela, Makati; she submitted to it and attended the
scheduled conciliation on 28 April 1993 and invoked the pre-condition of
referral to the lupon in her counter-affidavit.
 Nor would this Court accept the contention of the private respondent that
the parties could not agree on a compromise and that they had to request
the barangay captain to issue a certification to file action. The request is
dated 23 June 1993, or nearly one and a half months after Criminal Cases
Nos. 145233 and 145234 were filed with the court a quo. Evidently, this
was done to support their contention in the said court that, in any event,
there was substantial compliance with the requirement of referral to the
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lupon. It must be stressed that the private respondents, after failing to
appear at the initial confrontation and long after the criminal cases were
filed, had no right to demand the issuance of a certification to file action.
 The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing
to dismiss Criminal Cases Nos. 145233 and 145234.
 Parties to disputes cognizable by the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust
the remedies provided by that law, government prosecutors should
exercise due diligence in ascertaining compliance with it, and trial courts
should not hesitate to impose the appropriate sanctions for non-
compliance thereof.
Wingarts v. Mejia
Facts: Administrative complaints were filed against Judge Mejia in connection with
3 criminal cases decided by him. One of them is Crim. Case 2664 which was filed by
Col. Munar against Johan Wingarts for grave threats. Initially, Judge Mejia took
cognizance of the case and issued a warrant of arrest against Wingart. However, he
later dismissed the same and indorsed it to the barangay official concerned for
barangay conciliation. In the present case, Wingarts charges Judge Mejia with
incompetence, ignorance of the law and abuse of authority for taking cognizance of
Crim Case 2664 and issuing a warrant of arrest despite the lack of prior barangay
conciliation. In its Memorandum, the Office of the Court Administrator made the
following findings:that under Art. 408(c), Chapter 7, Title One, Book III, LocGov
Code, offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 1 year or a fine not
exceeding P5,000 require prior barangay conciliation. that the crime of grave
threats falls within the purview of this section. that Art. 412(a) likewise provided
the following: CONCILIATION - (a) Precondition to filing of Complaint in Court - No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority
of the lupon shall be filled (SIC) or instituted directly in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation between
the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon secretary or pangkat
secretary as attested to by the lupon or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement
has been repudiated by the parties thereto. The Court Administrator later
concluded the following: "Had respondent Judge observed the mandate of the
aforequoted provision of law he could have remanded the case to the lupon instead
of taking cognizance thereof and prematurely issuing the warrant of arrest against
the accused. Such an actuation, however, does not appear to be tainted with malice
or evil intent. As can be gleaned from the records, respondent Judge dismissed
Criminal Case No. 2664 in his Order of April 16, 1993 upon motion of the defense
counsel. This notwithstanding, administrative sanction is warranted against
respondent Judge.
Issue: WON Judge Mejia is liable for incompetence and gross ignorance of the law
for taking cognizance of the case when such was not first submitted to the
Katarungang Pambarangay for conciliation. YES.
 Although there is no clear proof of malice, bad faith, bias or partiality on
his part, Judge Mejia should have exercised the requisite prudence,
especially under the environmental circumstances of the aforesaid criminal
case where personal liberty was involved. He should have carefully
examined all relevant facts and issues and avoided the improvident
issuance of the warrant of arrest without a circumspect review of the case
which, after all, did not exhibit abstruse factual matters or complicated
legal questions. The present controversy could have been avoided had he
kept faith with the injunction that a member of the bench must
continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential
developments because the learning process in law never ceases. Absence
of bad faith & fact that Judge Mejia subsequently issued an order to recall
the warrant of arrest mitigates but will not altogether exculpate him from
the charge. Judge Mejia was order to pay a P2,000 fine with stern warning.
 Judges are directed to desist from improvidently receiving and desultorily
acting on complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings in cases falling
within the authority of the Lupon Tagapamayapa. Proceedings before the
lupon are a precondition to the filing of any action or proceeding in court
or other government office. Such an initiatory pleading, if filed without
compliance with the precondition, may be dismissed on motion of any
interested party on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action.
Corpuz v. CA
Facts: Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent
Alvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, for recovery of
possession of the room being occupied by the latter, which Corpuz' children
allegedly needed for their own use. Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants
of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who, in May 1988, decided to sell his property to the
tenants. Due to economic difficulties, however, Alvarado and the other lessees
executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" granting Barredo the right to sell his house to any
person who can afford to purchase the same. Consequently, Barredo sold his house
to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale, a tenancy relationship was
established between Corpuz and Alvarado. In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written
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notice to Alvarado demanding that he vacate the room which he was occupying
because the children of Corpuz needed it for their own use. Alvarado refused to
vacate the room as demanded, prompting Corpuz to seek his ejectment. In his
answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged "Affidavit of
Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute was
not referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa. Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be
without merit, the MTC of Manila handed down on a decision ordering Alvarado to
vacate the room. On appeal, the RTC reversed and decided that the purported sale
between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a controversy pending before the
National Housing Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first by said agency. It
also concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado and Barredo
was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for unlawful
detainer, and ruled that Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from the subject
premises. MR denied. CA affirmed. MR denied.
Issues: 1. WON Corpuz' unlawful detainer suit filed before the MTC against
Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of the case lodged in the NHA
impugning the sale of said property
2. WON the "Affidavit of Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was authentic
 It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment
cases. As the law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible entry
and unlawful detainer cases is the physical or material possession over the
real property, that is, possession de facto.
 Refugia v.CA: "In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this
Court, in making a distinction between the reception of evidence and the
resolution of the issue of ownership, held that the inferior court may look
into the evidence of title or ownership and possession de jure insofar as
said evidence would indicate or determine the nature of possession. It
cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by declaring who
among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property,
because the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on
ownership which is not sanctioned in the summary action for unlawful
detainer. With this as a premise and taking into consideration the
amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, it may be suggested
that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatory power
over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment
suit."
 Since the present petition involves the issue of possession intertwined with
the issue of ownership (i.e., the controversy pending in the NHA), the
doctrinal pronouncement in Refugia is applicable.
 The prevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale,
title or document do not abate any ejectment action respecting the same
property.
 Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations, et al. v. CA:
outlined the following cases involving the annulment of the title or
document over the property which should not be considered in the
abatement of an ejectment suit, to wit: "Neither do suits for annulment of
sale, or title, or document affecting property operate to abate ejectment
actions respecting the same property. Clearly, the underlying reason for
the above rulings is for the defendant not to trifle with the ejectment suit,
which is summary in nature, by the simple expedient of asserting
ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending before the NHA for the
annulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the
"Affidavit of Joint Waiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of
the ejectment suit merely for the purpose of determining who has a better
possessory right among the parties.
 It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We have ruled
that a judgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall
it be conclusive as to the facts therein found in a case between the same
parties upon a different cause of action involving possession.
 Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the
ejectment suit was not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by
Presidential Decree No. 1508.
 We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general
short sentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held in Dui v. Court of
Appeals that failure of a party to specifically allege the fact that there was
no compliance with the Barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a
waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado's answer reveals that no
reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, which is deemed
a mere general averment.
 In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the lower court had already acquired over the subject matter and
the parties therein.
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Bonifacio Law Office v. Bellosillo

Facts: In a letter-complaint dated August 28, 1997, Atty. Ricardo M. Salomon Jr. of
the Bonifacio Law Office charged then acting Judge Reynaldo B. Bellosillo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 34, with ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of discretion, and obvious partiality. Salomon assails the Order dated
April 2, 1996 referring the said ejectment case back to the barangay for conciliation
proceedings despite the fact that it was alleged in the verified complaint, that the
matter had already been referred to the barangay and that a copy of the
Certification to File Motion was attached [to] the verified complaint as ANNEX E
thereof. Bewildered with such Order, he tried to talk with respondent judge but
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was prevented to do so because of the strict and extremely tight ‘cordon sanitaire’
of the latter. He then inquired from the respondent’s branch clerk of court the
reason behind such order and he was advised that perhaps he should submit the
minutes of the hearings held in the barangay. Following said advice, he filed a
compliance with respondent’s court attaching therewith a copy of his complaint
filed before the barangay and the minutes of the proceedings held thereat. After
the filing of said compliance, no action was taken by the court despite the fact that
the case falls under the Rule on Summary Procedure and respondent judge has still
to come up with a determination as to whether summons should be issued or not.
He then inquired personally with the court about the status of the case and he was
told that no action could be taken unless the Order of April 2, 1996 had been
complied with. Dismayed by the Court’s insistence of referring the case to the
barangay though it had already gone through all the requisite proceedings thereat,
he decided not to pursue the case and filed a notice to withdraw complaint dated
August 20, 1996. Said withdrawal however was denied by respondent on the basis
of the action already taken thereon as contained in the questioned Order dated
April 2, 1996. He then filed a Notice of Dismissal but the same was still unacted
upon by respondent. It was only after a year from the time the complaint was filed
that respondent ordered that summons be served on defendants. When
defendants failed to file an Answer, he (complainant) filed a Motion to Render
Judgment in accordance with the provisions of Sec.5 of the Rule on Summary
Procedure. However, instead of rendering judgment, respondent merely required
defendants to comment on the motion to render judgment. After defendants filed
their comment, respondent still did not act on the said motion. The inordinate delay
of respondent on acting upon said case has caused him so much suffering as his
family is forced to rent a house to live in at a monthly rental rate of P19,000.00.
Respondent’s argument: In all cases where there is failure of settlement of
mediation proceedings before the Barangay Chairman, it is necessary that the
Pangkat be constituted by the parties from the Lupon members in order that they
may have a second opportunity to amicably settle their dispute. It is a mandatory
duty of the Barangay Chairman to set the meeting of the parties for the constitution
of the Pangkat upon failure of parties to amicably settle otherwise there is no
compliance with the requirements of P.D. 1508, now Sec. 412, 1991 LGC. In the
case of complainant, it appears from the records thereof that there was premature
issuance of the Certificate to File Action considering that there is no proof to show
that the Pangkat was duly constituted before the said certificate was issued.
Moreover, the belated submission by complainant of the Minutes of Proceedings
before the Barangay Chairman, which was inaccurate and difficult to decipher
glaringly reveals the non-compliance of complainant with the requirement of the
aforecited law.
Issue: WON Judge was correct inreferring the case back to the barangay for
conciliation proceedings. YES.
 Complainant contends that he has complied with the mandatory barangay
conciliation proceedings as evidenced by the Certification to File Action
attached to the Complaint for ejectment. The records, however, reveal
that such Certification was improperly and prematurely issued. In what
appears to be a pre-printed standard form thereof, the “x” before the
second enumerated statement clearly shows that no personal
confrontation before a duly constituted Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo took
place. Respondent’s position that the Pangkat was not constituted, and
that no face to face conciliation of the parties had taken place before it is
substantiated by the Minutes submitted by complainant. Evidently,
complainant failed to complete the barangay conciliation proceedings. We
also note that the Complaint before the barangay was dated February 16,
1996. Records show that the hearing was scheduled for February 26, 1996
and was reset for February 29, 1996. And yet, the Certification to File
Action [8] was issued on March 1, 1996, less than fifteen days after the
first scheduled hearing before the barangay chairman.
 Section 410 (b) of the LGC is quoted hereunder: “Mediation by lupon
chairman. – Upon receipt of the complaint, the lupon chairman shall within
the next working day summon the respondent(s), with notice to the
complainant(s) for them and their witnesses to appear before him for a
mediation of their conflicting interests. If he fails in his mediation effort
within fifteen (15) days from the first meeting of the parties before him, he
shall forthwith set a date for the constitution of the pangkat in accordance
with the provisions of this Chapter.”
 Administrative Circular No. 14-93 provides: “In order that the laudable
purpose of the law may not be subverted and its effectiveness undermined
by indiscriminate, improper and/or premature issuance of certifications to
file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries, attested by the
Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines are hereby
issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before
them coming from the Barangay. “[II] 4. If mediation or conciliation efforts
before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful, there having been no
agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410-{b}, Revised Rule Katarungang
Pambarangay Law; Sec. 1,c,[1], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules),
or where the respondent fails to appear at the mediation proceeding
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before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8,a, Rule VI, Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance of
this stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for
him to constitute the Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or
arbitration proceedings shall be held. III. All complaints and/or
informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court shall be carefully read
and scrutinized to determine if there has been compliance with prior
Barangay conciliation procedure under the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, as a pre-
condition to judicial action, particularly whether the certification to file
action attached to the records of the case comply with the requirements
hereinabove enumerated in part II; (Emphasis and italics supplied) IV. A
case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation
which is a pre-condition for formal adjudication x x x may be dismissed
upon motion of the defendant/s or the court may suspend proceedings
upon petition of any partyand refer the case motu proprio to the
appropriate Barangay authority.
 Evidently, the barangay failed to exert enough effort required by law to
conciliate between the parties and to settle the case before it. Hence,
respondent judge was not incorrect in remanding the case to it for
completion of the mandated proceedings. We cannot fault him for seeking
to promote the objectives of barangay conciliation and for taking to heart
the provisions of Supreme Court Circular No. 14-93. His referral of the
case back to the barangay cannot be equated with gross ignorance of the
law. Neither does it constitute grave abuse of discretion or obvious
partiality.
 Thereafter, complainant filed a Motion praying that the proceedings
already held before the barangay be considered as substantial compliance
with the requirements of the law. Acting on the Motion, respondent judge
issued the summons and opted to continue with the court proceedings
without insisting on strict compliance with the mandated barangay
proceedings. He did so after noting that complainant was apparently not
making any move to complete the barangay proceedings after the case had
been remanded to the barangay, and that the case fell under the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
 Section 18 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, however, provides that
such cases may be revived only after the requirement for conciliation has
been complied with. Nevertheless, respondent judge’s error is judicial in
nature and cannot be corrected in administrative proceedings. At any rate,
because he chose to continue with the proceedings of the case, and
because respondents failed to answer the ejectment Complaint on time,
he should have rendered judgment within thirty (30) days from the
expiration of the period to file an answer. This action is required under the
Rules on Summary Proceedings, which state: “Sec. 6. Effect of failure to
answer. - Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the
period above provided, the court, motu proprio, or on motion of the
plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein
 “Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment. – Within thirty (30) days after receipt of
the last affidavits and position papers, or the expiration of the period for
filing the same, the court shall render judgment.”
Mendova v. Afable
Facts: In an affidavit-complaint dated July 1, 1999, Abraham L. Mendova charged
Judge Crisanto B. Afable of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San Julian–Sulat,
Eastern Samar, with ignorance of the law relative to Criminal Case No. 2198-98,
“People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, vs. Roberto Q. Palada, Accused,” for slight
physical injuries. Complainant Mendova alleged in his affidavit-complaint that on
February 18, 1998 he filed with the Office of the Barangay Chairman of Poblacion
San Julian, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Robert
Palada. Barangay Chairman Ronie D. Quintua, in his Certification dated April 19,
1999, [1] confirmed such fact. Pangkat Chairman Eufemia L. Cabago also certified in
an undated “Minutes In Settling Disputes” that the case was set for hearing on
March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement.
On May 4, 1998, complainant filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of San
Julian–Sulat, Eastern Samar a complaint for slight physical injuries against Palada,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 2198-98. On November 3, 1998, respondent judge
rendered his Decision dismissing the case on the ground of prescription, thus:
"Complaint in this case dated April 20, 1998 was filed with this Court on May 4,
1998. The affidavits of complainant as well as prosecution witness Melvin C.
Quiloña were subscribed and sworn to before the undersigned also on May 4, 1998.
“The alleged offense took place on February 15, 1998. From the date of the
commission of the alleged offense, more than two months have elapsed.
“This is for slight physical injuries and is therefore a light offense. “Under Art. 89 of
the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by presciption of the
crime. “Article 90 of the same Code provides that light offenses prescribe in two
months. This being a light offense, the same should be considered as already
having prescribed because the case against the accused was filed after two months.
“LET, THEREFORE, this case be DISMISSED, the crime having already prescribed.
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“SO ORDERED.” On July 7, 1999, complainant filed with the Office of the Court
Administrator an administrative complaint against respondent judge. He alleged
that in dismissing the case, respondent judge showed his ignorance of the law when
he did not apply the provisions of Section 410(c) of Republic Act No. 7160 (The
LGC), which state: Section 410. Procedure for Amicable Settlement (c) Suspension
of prescriptive period of offenses. – While the dispute is under mediation,
conciliation or arbitration, the prescriptive periods for offenses and causes of action
under existing laws shall be interrupted upon filing of the complaint with the
Punong Barangay. The prescriptive periods shall resume upon receipt by the
complainant of the complaint or the certificate of repudiation or of the certification
to file action issued by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary: Provided, however, That
such interruption shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the complaint
with the punong barangay." Complainant further alleged that respondent's conduct
caused him injury and grave injustice. In his comment dated September 13, 1999,
respondent admitted that his Decision being assailed by complainant “was wrong.”
According to him, “(w)hen I rendered the questioned decision, what entered my
mind was the rule on prescription as provided under the Revised Penal Code. There
was a mental lapse on my part caused by heavy workload,” as he was likewise
designated the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Llorente-Hernani, Eastern Samar. He
begged for kindness and understanding, stating that he has been a trial judge for 10
years and that this is the “first kind of mistake” he has ever committed.
In its Evaluation and Recommendation, the Office of the Court Administrator,
through Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño, found respondent guilty
as charged and recommended that he be fined P3,000.00 with a warning that a
commission of similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Both parties filed their
respective manifestations that they are willing to have the case so decided. In his
manifestation, respondent judge made the additional comment that the
complainant did not allege bad faith or malice on his (respondent’s) part in
rendering the questioned decision.
Issue: 1. WON respondent Judge is liable for dismissing the case on the ground of
prescription.
 It is axiomatic, as this Court has repeatedly stressed, that an administrative
complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous
order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available,
such as a motion for reconsideration, or an appeal. For, obviously, if
subsequent developments prove the judge’s challenged act to be correct,
there would be no occasion to proceed against him at all. Besides, to hold
a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision
he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment
and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would
be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment. It is only where the error is so gross, deliberate
and malicious, or incurred with evident bad faith that administrative
sanctions may be imposed against the erring judge.
 Flores vs. Abesamis: “As everyone knows, the law provides ample judicial
remedies against errors or irregularities being committed by a Trial Court
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. The ordinary remedies against errors or
irregularities which may be regarded as normal in nature (i.e., error in
appreciation or admission of evidence, or in construction or application of
procedural or substantive law or legal principle) include a motion for
reconsideration (or after rendition of a judgment or final order, a motion
for new trial), and appeal. The extraordinary remedies against error or
irregularities which may be deemed extraordinary in character (i.e.,
whimsical, capricious, despotic exercise of power or neglect of duty, etc.)
are inter alia the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus, or a motion for inhibition, a petition for change of venue, as
the case may be. “Now, the established doctrine and policy is that
disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against Judges are not
complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for, these judicial
remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. Resort to and exhaustion of
these judicial remedies, as well as the entry of judgment in the
corresponding action or proceeding, are pre-requisites for the taking of
other measures against the persons of the judges concerned, whether of
civil, administrative, or criminal nature. It is only after the available judicial
remedies have been exhausted and the appellate tribunals have spoken
with finality, that the door to an inquiry into his criminal, civil or
administrative liability may be said to have opened, or closed. “Flores
(complainant) resorted to administrative prosecution (or institution of
criminal actions) as a substitute for or supplement to the specific modes of
appeals or review provided by law from court judgments or orders, on the
theory that the Judges’ orders had caused him ‘undue injury.’ This is
impermissible, as this Court has already more than once ruled. Law and
logic decree that ‘administrative or criminal remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is
available, and must wait on the result thereof. Indeed, since judges must
be free to judge, without pressure or influence from external forces or
factors, they should not be subject to intimidation, the fear of civil,
criminal or administrative sanctions for acts they may do and dispositions
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they may make in the performance of their duties and functions; and it is
sound rule, which must be recognized independently of statute, that
judges are not generally liable for acts done within the scope of their
jurisdiction and in good faith; and that exceptionally, prosecution of a
judge can be had only if ‘there be a final declaration by a competent court
in some appropriate proceeding of the manifestly unjust character of the
challenged judgment or order, and x x x also evidence of malice or bad
faith, ignorance or inexcusable negligence, on the part of the judge in
rendering said judgment or order’ or under the stringent circumstances set
out in Article 32 of the Civil Code.
 In the present case, we noticed from the records before us that the
complainant did not bother at all to file a motion for reconsideration of
respondent judge’s decision dismissing the criminal case. No reason was
advanced by complainant why he failed to do so. Thus, following our
settled pronouncements cited above, his instant administrative complaint
is premature.
 According to complainant, Robert Palada committed the crime of slight
physical injuries on February 15, 1998. On February 18, 1998, complainant
filed his complaint with the Office of the Barangay Chairman at Poblacion,
San Julian, Eastern Samar. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 410(c) of
The LGC, quoted earlier, such filing interrupted the prescriptive period [8]
and started to run again upon receipt by the complainant of the
Certification to File Action issued by the Pangkat Secretary. Here, records
fail to show when complainant received the Barangay Certification to File
Action. The undated certification he submitted merely states that the case
was set for hearing before the barangay on March 16, 22 and 29, 1998, but
the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. When he filed on May
4, 1998 Criminal Case No. 2198-98 for slight physical injuries with
respondent's court, until the dismissal of the case on November 3, 1998,
he still failed to present proof of his receipt of the Barangay Certification to
File Action. Clearly, he cannot now fault respondent judge for dismissing
the case on the ground of prescription.
ALU v. Letrondo-Montejo
Facts: The President of the Philippines declared December 4, 1992 a "special day"
for the holding of election for Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) throughout the nation.
Employees, pursuant to their CBA subsequently filed claims for the payment to
them of holiday pay for that day. Private respondent, however, refused their claims
on the ground that December 4, 1992 was not a regular holiday within the
contemplation of the CBA.
Issue: WON the Sangguniang Kabataan Election Day considered a regular holiday for
purpose of the CBA.
 We hold that it is and that, in denying petitioner's claim, respondent
Voluntary Arbitrator denied members of petitioner union substantial
justice as a result of her erroneous interpretation of the CBA, thereby
justifying judicial review.
 First. The Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) is part of the local government
structure. The LGC (Rep. Act. No. 7160) creates in every barangay a
Sangguniang Kabataan composed of a chairman, seven (7) members, a
secretary and a treasurer. 3 The chairman and the seven members are
elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan, which is composed of citizens of the
Philippines residing in the barangay for at least six (6) months, who are
between the ages of 15 and 21 and who are registered as members. The
chairman of the SK is an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Baranggay
with the same powers duties, functions and privileges as the regular
members of the Sangguniang Barangay. 5 The President of the Pederasyon
ng mga Sangguniang Kabataan, which is imposed of the SK chairmen of the
sangguniang kabataan of the barangays in the province, city, or
municipality, is an ex officio member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
Sangguniang Panlungsod, and Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, as the Solicitor
General points out, the election for members of the SK may properly be
considered a "local election" within the meaning of Art. VII, sec 3 of the
CBA and the day on which it is held to be a holiday, thereby entitling
petitioners members at the AMS Farming Corp. to the payment of holiday
on such day.
 Second. The Voluntary Arbitrator held, however, that the election for
members of the SK cannot be considered a local election as the election
for Governors , Vice Governors, Mayors and Vice Mayors and the various
local legislative assemblies (sanggunians) because the SK election is
participated in only by the youth who are between the ages of 15 and 21
and for this reason the day is not a nonworking holiday. To begin with, it is
not true that December 4, 1992 was not a nonworking holiday. It was a
nonworking holiday and this was announced in the media. 7 In
Proclamation No. 118 dated December 2, 1992 President Ramos declared
the day as "a special day through the country on the occasion of the
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections" and enjoined all "local government units
through their respective Chief Local Executives [to] extend all possible
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assistance and support to ensure the smooth conduct of the general
elections."
 A "special day" is a "special day", as provided by the Administrative Code
of 1987. 8 On the other hand, the term "general elections" means, in the
context of SK elections, the regular elections for members of the SK, as
distinguished from the special elections for such officers. 9
 Moreover, the fact that only those between 15 and 21 take part in the
election for members of the SK does not make such election any less a
regular local election. The Constitution provides, for example, for the
sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives of, among others,
women and youth. 10 Only voters belonging to the relevant sectors can
take part in the election of their representatives. Yet it cannot be denied
that such election is a regular national election and the day set for its
holding, a holiday.
 Third. Indeed, the CBA provision in question merely reiterates the
provision on paid holidays. Whether in the context of the CBA or the Labor
Code, December 4, 1992 was a holiday for which holiday pay should be
paid by respondent employer.
Mercado v. Board of Election Supervisors
Facts: Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed winner in the 4 December 1992 election for
chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. The proclamation was
made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET) acting as the Board of Canvassers, on
the basis of its tally which showed Mercado winning by one vote over his rival,
private respondent Crisanto P. Pangilinan. Mercado' s victory was, however, short-
lived. Immediately after Mercado's proclamation as the winner by the BET,
Pangilinan filed a formal protest questioning the results of the election. He alleged
that the BET Chairman, drinking gin and Coke during the counting, had invalidated
some votes without consulting the other board members. The BES ordered .the
reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK Chairman. The
recount reversed the earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was
thereupon proclaimed the duly elected SK Chairman by the BES, which issued for
that purpose its own Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation. Mercado then filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas City a petition for certiorari and
mandamus praying for the annulment of Pangilinan's proclamation by the BES, and
for the issuance of an order to compel the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) to recognize him as the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay
Mabalor and to allow him to take his oath of office and discharge his duties as such.
In his petition docketed as Civil Case No. 3565, Mercado assailed the jurisdiction of
the BES to act on the protest filed by Pangilinan as the ground cited therein was
allegedly in the nature of an election protest properly cognizable by the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordance with Section 252 of the
Omnibus Election Code. He further claimed that, assuming that the BES has
jurisdiction over the protest, the grounds raised therein were deemed waived by
Pangilinan's failure to invoke them at the level of the BET, and that the BES acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
the petitioner of due process when it ordered the reopening of the ballot box and
the recounting of the votes without affording him the opportunity to be heard.
In its Order dated 13 January 1993, the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of
jurisdiction, The trial court stated that it was not aware of any law by which it could
act on the matters raised in Mercado's petition since Resolution No. 2499 of the
COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction over controversies affecting
Sangguniang Kabataan elections; constituting instead the BES, which is under
COMELEC jurisdiction , as the final arbiter of all election controversies within its
level. Mercado moved for a reconsideration of the dismissal order. He argued that
the RTC was competent to act on his petition because (a) one mode of seeking
judicial review is through the writ of certiorari which may be issued by the RTC
under B.P. Blg. 129;(b) under its Resolutions Nos. 2499 and 2520, the COMELEC was
to provide only technical assistance in the conduct of the SK election and therefore
could not grant any relief from the action of the BES; moreover, under said
Resolution No. 2499, no appeal to a higher administrative level wash allowed from
the action of the BES and (c) the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
did not apply to the case at bar, the jurisdictional and due process issues raised
therein being legal in nature. Unconvinced, the RTC, in its Order dated 2 March
1993, denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It ruled that the
reopening of the ballot box for Barangay Mabalor and the recounting of the votes
cast therein were perfectly within the ambit of the BES's authority, and that
Mercado should have gone to the DILG which has direct control and supervision of
the SK elections.
Issue: WON the BES may take cognizance of Pangilinan’s protest
 SK history: the SK was initially organized by P.D. No. 684 (15 April 1975) as
the Kabataang Barangay (KB), a youth organization composed of all
barangay residents who were less than 18 years of age which aims to
provide its members with the opportunity to express their views and
opinions on issues of transcendental importance. Its affairs were
administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay
youth leaders, who should at least be 15 years of age or over but less than
18 The then Secretary of Local Government and Community Development
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was authorized to promulgate the implementing rules and regulations.
Pursuant to P.D. No. 1191 (1 September 1977), the Pambansang Katipunan
ng Kabataang Barangay ng Pilipinas was constituted as "a body corporate"
with "the powers and attributes of a corporation" and placed directly
under the Office of the President. Its affairs were to be administered by
the Executive Committee which was empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations governing the KB. This youth organization was recognized in
B.P. Blg. 337 (The LGC), 2 which raised the maximum age requirement of
the members from 18 to 21. Under R.A. No. 7160 (The LGC), the Kabataang
Barangay was changed to the Sangguniang Kabataan. 3 It remains as a
youth organization in every barangay, composed of a chairman and seven
members to be elected by the katipunan ng kabataan, and the secretary
and the treasurer to be appointed by the SK chairman with the
concurrence of the SK. 4 The katipunan ng kabataan is composed of all
citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the barangay for at least six
months who are 15 but not more than 21 and who are duly registered in
the list of the SK or in the official barangay list in the custody of the
barangay secretary. The chairman, upon assumption of office, shall
automatically become an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay
 Under subparagraph (5), paragraph (e) Article 203, Rule XXVII of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the LGC 7 the conduct and administration
of the elections for sangguniang kabataan members shall be governed by
the rules promulgated by the COMELEC.Pursuant to such authority and for
purposes of the SK election authorized under Section 532 of R.A. No. 7160,
the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2499 which closely followed the
pattern set in the Constitution of the Kabataang Barangay providing for a
Board of Election Supervisors and Board of Election Tellers, with the
former having direct general supervision in the conduct of such election
and as the final arbiter of all election protests. Article V of Resolution No.
2499 expressly provides: There shall be created aboard of election
supervisors (BES) in every city or municipality composed of the following:
a) city/municipal local government operations officer as chairman; b)
city/municipal election officer as member; and c) city/municipal secretary
as member. The board shall have direct general supervision in the conduct
of elections for sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shall act as final
arbiter in the resolution of all election protests. No pre-proclamation cases
shall be allowed on matters relating to the election of sangguniang
kabataan chairman and members.
 The petitioner contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is illegal and
unconstitutional because it makes the BES the final arbiter of election
contests involving the SK in contravention of Section 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code which vests in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial
court original jurisdiction over such contests and, on a more fundamental
ground, in contravention of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution
which lodges on. such courts exclusive original jurisdiction over contests
involving elective barangay officials.
 This contention is without merit for it assumes that the SK election is an
election involving elective barangay officials within the purview of the
aforesaid statutory and constitutional provisions.
 Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of paragraph
(2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials
refer to the elective barangay officials under the pertinent laws in force at
the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the ratification
of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
LGC, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong
barangay and the six sangguniang bayan members. 9 They were to be
elected by those qualified to exercise the right of suffrage. 10 They are also
the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines on election of barangay officials. Metropolitan and
municipal trial courts had exclusive original The jurisdiction over contests
relating to their election . The decisions of these courts were appealable to
the Regional Trial Courts.
 The Court recognizes the consequences of the quasi-judicial acts
performed by the BES pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2499 under the operative fact doctrine; thus, we hold that the Regional
Trial Court is competent to review the decision of the BES in election
controversies within its level. As correctly stated by the petitioner, it is a
basic principle in administrative law that the absence of a provision for the
review of an administrative action does not preclude recourse to the
courts.
 It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising
quasi-judicial or legislative power there is an underlying power in the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose
of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction
and protect substantial rights of parties affected by its decisions. it is part
of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
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Garvida v. Sales
Facts: Petitioner applied for membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan but was
denied such as she was already 21 years and 10 months old. She filed a "Petition for
Inclusion as Registered Kabataang Member and Voter" with the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, Bangui-Pagudpud-Adams-Damalneg, Ilocos Norte. The court found her
qualified. The Board of Election Tellers appealed, but the RTC judge inhibited
himself by reason of his close relation with her. Petitioner filed her certificate of
candidacy for the position of Chairman, Sangguniang Kabataan. Election Officer
Dionisio F. Rios, per advice of Provincial Election Supervisor Noli Pipo, disapproved
petitioner's certificate of candidacy again due to her age. Petitioner, however,
appealed to COMELEC Regional Director Filemon A. Asperin who set aside the order
of respondents and allowed petitioner to run. Rios issued a memorandum to
petitioner informing her of her ineligibility and giving her 24 hours to explain why
her certificate of candidacy should not be disapproved. Earlier and without the
knowledge of the COMELEC officials, private respondent Florencio G. Sales, Jr., a
rival candidate for Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan, filed with the COMELEC
en banc a "Petition of Denial and/or Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy"
against petitioner Garvida for falsely representing her age qualification in her
certificate of candidacy. That same day Rios issued the memorandum to petitioner,
the COMELEC en banc issued an order directing the Board of Election Tellers and
Board of Canvassers of Barangay San Lorenzo to suspend the proclamation of
petitioner in the event she won in the election. Petitioner won. In accordance with
the May 2, 1996 order of the COMELEC en banc, the Board of Election Tellers did
not proclaim petitioner as the winner. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari was
filed on May 27, 1996. On June 2, 1996, however, the Board of Election Tellers
proclaimed petitioner the winner for the position of SK chairman, Barangay San
Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte. The proclamation was "without prejudice to any
further action by the Commission on Elections or any other interested party." On
July 5, 1996, petitioner ran in the Pambayang Pederasyon ng mga Sangguniang
Kabataan for the municipality of Bangui, Ilocos Norte. She won as Auditor and was
proclaimed one of the elected officials of the Pederasyon.
Issue: WON the cancellation of her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she
has exceeded the age requirement to run as an elective official of the SK is valid.
YES.
 The Katipunan ng Kabataan was originally created by PD 684 in 1975 as the
Kabataang Barangay, a barangay youth organization composed of all
residents of the barangay who were at least 15 years but less than 18 years
of age. The Kabataang Barangay sought to provide its members a medium
to express their views and opinions and participate in issues of
transcendental importance. Its affairs were administered by a barangay
youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders who were actual
residents of the barangay and were at least 15 years but less than 18 years
of age. In 1983, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, then the LGC, raised the
maximum age of the Kabataang Barangay members from "less than 18
years of age" to "not more than 21 years of age." The LGC changed the
Kabataang Barangay into the Katipunan ng Kabataan. It, however,
retained the age limit of the members laid down in B.P. 337 at 15 but not
more than 21 years old. The affairs of the Katipunan ng Kabataan are
administered by the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) composed of a chairman
and seven (7) members who are elected by the Katipunan ng Kabataan.
 Membership in the Katipunan ng Kabataan is subject to specific
qualifications laid down by the LGC: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) an actual
resident of the barangay for at least six months; (c) 15 but not more than
21 years of age; and (d) duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang
Kabataan or in the official barangay list. Section 428 of the Code requires
that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan must be: (a) a
Filipino citizen; (b) a qualified voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan; (c) a
resident of the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
election; (d) at least 15 years but not more than 21 years of age on the
day of his election; (e) able to read and write; and (f) must not have been
convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.
 A member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan may be a qualified voter in the
May 6, 1996 SK elections if he is: (a) a Filipino citizen; (b) 15 but not more
than 21 years of age on election day, i.e., the voter must be born between
May 6, 1975 and May 6, 1981, inclusive; and (c) a resident of the
Philippines for at least one (1) year and an actual resident of the barangay
at least six (6) months immediately preceding the elections. A candidate
for the SK must: (a) possess the foregoing qualifications of a voter; (b) be
a resident in the barangay at least one (1) year immediately preceding the
elections; and (c) able to read and write.
 Except for the question of age, petitioner has all the qualifications of a
member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and a candidate for the
Sangguniang Kabataan. Petitioner's age is admittedly beyond the limit set
in Section 3 [b] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824. Petitioner, however,
argues that Section 3 [b] of Resolution No. 2824 is unlawful, ultra vires and
beyond the scope of Sections 424 and 428 of the LGC. She contends that
the Code itself does not provide that the voter must be exactly 21 years of
age on election day. She urges that so long as she did not turn twenty-two
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(22) years old, she was still twenty-one years of age on election day and
therefore qualified as a member and voter in the Katipunan ng Kabataan
and as candidate for the SK elections.
 A closer look at the LGC will reveal a distinction between the maximum age
of a member in the Katipunan ng Kabataan and the maximum age of an
elective SK official. Section 424 of the Code sets a member's maximum age
at 21 years only. There is no further provision as to when the member
shall have turned 21 years of age. On the other hand, Section 428 provides
that the maximum age of an elective SK official is 21 years old "on the day
of his election." The addition of the phrase "on the day of his election" is
an additional qualification. The member may be more than 21 years of age
on election day or on the day he registers as member of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan. The elective official, however, must not be more than 21 years
old on the day of election. The distinction is understandable considering
that the Code itself provides more qualifications for an elective SK official
than for a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan. Dissimilum dissimilis est
ratio. The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances
showing that the legislature intended a distinction or qualification.
 The qualification that a voter in the SK elections must not be more than 21
years of age on the day of the election is not provided in Section 424 of the
LGC. In fact the term "qualified voter" appears only in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824. Since a "qualified voter" is not necessarily an elective
official, then it may be assumed that a "qualified voter" is a "member of
the Katipunan ng Kabataan." Section 424 of the Code does not provide
that the maximum age of a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan is
determined on the day of the election. Section 3 [b] of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2824 is therefore ultra vires insofar as it sets the age limit
of a voter for the SK elections at exactly 21 years on the day of the
election.
 The provision that an elective official of the SK should not be more than 21
years of age on the day of his election is very clear. The LGC speaks of
years, not months nor days. When the law speaks of years, it is
understood that years are of 365 days each. One born on the first day of
the year is consequently deemed to be one year old on the 365th day after
his birth -- the last day of the year. In computing years, the first year is
reached after completing the first 365 days. After the first 365th day, the
first day of the second 365-day cycle begins. On the 365th day of the
second cycle, the person turns two years old. This cycle goes on and on in
a lifetime. A person turns 21 years old on the 365th day of his 21st 365-
day cycle. This means on his 21st birthday, he has completed the entire
span of 21 365-day cycles. After this birthday, the 365-day cycle for his
22nd year begins. The day after the 365th day is the first day of the next
365-day cycle and he turns 22 years old on the 365th day.
 The phrase "not more than 21 years of age" means not over 21 years, not
beyond 21 years. It means 21 365-day cycles. It does not mean 21 years
and one or some days or a fraction of a year because that would be more
than 21 365-day cycles. "Not more than 21 years old" is not equivalent to
"less than 22 years old," contrary to petitioner's claims. The law does not
state that the candidate be less than 22 years on election day.
 In P.D. 684, the law that created the Kabataang Barangay, the age
qualification of a barangay youth official was expressly stated as "at least
fifteen years of age or over but less than eighteen." This provision clearly
states that the youth official must be at least 15 years old and may be 17
years and a fraction of a year but should not reach the age of eighteen
years. When the LGC increased the age limit of members of the youth
organization to 21 years, it did not reenact the provision in such a way as
to make the youth "at least 15 but less than 22 years old." If the intention
of the Code's framers was to include citizens less than 22 years old, they
should have stated so expressly instead of leaving the matter open to
confusion and doubt.
 The general rule is that an elective official of the Sangguniang Kabataan
must not be more than 21 years of age on the day of his election. The only
exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his
incumbency. Section 423 [b] of the Code allows him to serve the
remaining portion of the term for which he was elected. According to
Senator Pimentel, the youth leader must have "been elected prior to his
21st birthday." Conversely, the SK official must not have turned 21 years
old before his election. Reading Section 423 [b] together with Section 428
of the Code, the latest date at which an SK elective official turns 21 years
old is on the day of his election. The maximum age of a youth official must
therefore be exactly 21 years on election day. Section 3 [b] in relation to
Section 6 [a] of COMELEC Resolution No. 2824 is not ultra vires insofar as it
fixes the maximum age of an elective SK official on the day of his election.
 In the case at bar, petitioner was born on June 11, 1974. On March 16,
1996, the day she registered as voter for the May 6, 1996 SK elections,
petitioner was twenty-one (21) years and nine (9) months old. On the day
of the elections, she was 21 years, 11 months and 5 days old. When she
assumed office on June 1, 1996, she was 21 years, 11 months and 20 days
old and was merely ten (10) days away from turning 22 years old.
Petitioner may have qualified as a member of the Katipunan ng Kabataan
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but definitely, petitioner was over the age limit for elective SK officials set
by Section 428 of the LGC and Sections 3 [b] and 6 of Comelec Resolution
No. 2824. She was ineligible to run as candidate for the May 6, 1996
Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
 The requirement that a candidate possess the age qualification is founded
on public policy and if he lacks the age on the day of the election, he can
be declared ineligible. In the same vein, if the candidate is over the
maximum age limit on the day of the election, he is ineligible. The fact that
the candidate was elected will not make the age requirement directory,
nor will it validate his election. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility.
 The ineligibility of petitioner does not entitle private respondent, the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996
elections, to be declared elected. A defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office. Moreover, despite his claims, private respondent has
failed to prove that the electorate themselves actually knew of petitioner's
ineligibility and that they maliciously voted for her with the intention of
misapplying their franchises and throwing away their votes for the benefit
of her rival candidate.
 Neither can this Court order that pursuant to Section 435 of the LGC
petitioner should be succeeded by the Sangguniang Kabataan member
who obtained the next highest number of votes in the May 6, 1996
elections. Section 435 applies when a Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman
"refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, is convicted of a felony,
voluntarily resigns, dies, is permanently incapacitated, is removed from
office, or has been absent without leave for more than three (3)
consecutive months."
 The question of the age qualification is a question of eligibility. Being
"eligible" means being "legally qualified; capable of being legally chosen."
Ineligibility, on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office.
Ineligibility is not one of the grounds enumerated in Section 435 for
succession of the SK Chairman.
 To avoid a hiatus in the office of SK Chairman, the Court deems it
necessary to order that the vacancy be filled by the SK member chosen by
the incumbent SK members of Barangay San Lorenzo, Bangui, Ilocos Norte
by simple majority from among themselves. The member chosen shall
assume the office of SK Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term,
and shall discharge the powers and duties, and enjoy the rights and
privileges appurtenant to said office.
Montesclaros v. COMELEC
Facts: On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros sent a letter
to the Comelec, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6,
2002. Montesclaros also urged the Comelec to respond to her letter within 10 days
upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief. On February 20,
2002, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Comelec Chairman, wrote identical letters to the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on
the SK and Barangay elections. In his letters, the Comelec Chairman intimated that
it was “operationally very difficult” to hold both elections simultaneously in May
2002. Instead, the Comelec Chairman expressed support for the bill of Senator
Franklin Drilon that proposed to hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and
postpone the SK elections to November 2002. Ten days lapsed without the Comelec
responding to the letter of Montesclaros. Subsequently, petitioners received a copy
of Comelec En Banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5, 2002 recommending to
Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding the
Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled.
On March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed their
respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the Bicameral
Conference Committee (“Bicameral Committee” for brevity) of the Senate and the
House came out with a Report recommending approval of the reconciled bill
consolidating Senate Bill No. 2050 [14] and House Bill No. 4456. [15] The Bicameral
Committee’s consolidated bill reset the SK and Barangay elections to July 15, 2002
and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but not more than 18
years of age. On March 11, 2002, petitioners filed the instant petition.
On March 11, 2002, the Senate approved the Bicameral Committee’s consolidated
bill and on March 13, 2002, the House of Representatives approved the same. The
President signed the approved bill into law on March 19, 2002.
Issues:
1. WON there exists a justiciable controversy. NO.
 The Court’s power of judicial review may be exercised in constitutional
cases only if all the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal
and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3)
the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
 In the instant case, there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of
the power of judicial review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of
the May 6, 2002 SK elections, petitioners are nevertheless amenable to a
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resetting of the SK elections to any date not later than July 15, 2002. RA
No. 9164 has reset the SK elections to July 15, 2002, a date acceptable to
petitioners. With respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore
no actual controversy requiring judicial intervention.
 Petitioners’ prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed
bill lowering the membership age in the SK does not present an actual
justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no
duty legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal
effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to
declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that
would be in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act
of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states –
“Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.”
 Thus, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality
of a proposed bill. The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only
after a law is enacted, not before.
 Under the separation of powers, the Court cannot restrain Congress from
passing any law, or from setting into motion the legislative mill according
to its internal rules. Thus, the following acts of Congress in the exercise of
its legislative powers are not subject to judicial restraint: the filing of bills
by members of Congress, the approval of bills by each chamber of
Congress, the reconciliation by the Bicameral Committee of approved bills,
and the eventual approval into law of the reconciled bills by each chamber
of Congress. Absent a clear violation of specific constitutional limitations
or of constitutional rights of private parties, the Court cannot exercise its
power of judicial review over the internal processes or procedures of
Congress. The Court has also no power to dictate to Congress the object or
subject of bills that Congress should enact into law. The judicial power to
review the constitutionality of laws does not include the power to
prescribe to Congress what laws to enact. The Court has no power to
compel Congress by mandamus to enact a law allowing petitioners,
regardless of their age, to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 SK
elections. To do so would destroy the delicate system of checks and
balances finely crafted by the Constitution for the three co-equal,
coordinate and independent branches of government.
2. WON the postponement of the SK elections amounted to a grave abuse of
discretion. NO.
 RA No. 9164 is now the law that prescribes the qualifications of candidates
and voters for the SK elections. This law also fixes the date of the SK
elections. Petitioners have not shown that the Comelec acted illegally or
with grave abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the
postponement of the SK elections. The very evidence relied upon by
petitioners contradict their allegation of illegality. The evidence consist of
the following: (1) Comelec en banc Resolution No. 4763 dated February 5,
2002 that recommended the postponement of the SK elections to 2003;
(2) the letter of then Comelec Chairman Benipayo addressed to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate;
and (3) the Conference Committee Report consolidating Senate Bill No.
2050 and House Bill No. 4456.
 The Comelec exercised its power and duty to “enforce and administer all
laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall” and to “recommend to Congress
effective measures to minimize election spending.” The Comelec’s acts
enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
These acts cannot constitute proof, as claimed by petitioners, that there
“exists a connivance and conspiracy (among) respondents in contravention
of the present law.”
 The 1987 Constitution imposes upon the Comelec the duty of enforcing
and administering all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
elections. Petitioners failed to prove that the Comelec committed grave
abuse of discretion in recommending to Congress the postponement of the
May 6, 2002 SK elections. The evidence cited by petitioners even establish
that the Comelec has demonstrated an earnest effort to address the
practical problems in holding the SK elections on May 6, 2002. The
presumption remains that the decision of the Comelec to recommend to
Congress the postponement of the elections was made in good faith in the
regular course of its official duties.
 Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Public
respondents having acted strictly pursuant to their constitutional powers
and duties, we find no grave abuse of discretion in their assailed acts.
3. WON the exclusion of persons 18-21 from the SK was unconstitutional. NO.
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 Under RA No. 9164, Congress merely restored the age requirement in PD
No. 684, the original charter of the SK, which fixed the maximum age for
membership in the SK to youths less than 18 years old. Petitioners do not
have a vested right to the permanence of the age requirement under
Section 424 of the LGC. Every law passed by Congress is always subject to
amendment or repeal by Congress. The Court cannot restrain Congress
from amending or repealing laws, for the power to make laws includes the
power to change the laws.
 The Court cannot also direct the Comelec to allow over-aged voters to vote
or be voted for in an election that is limited under RA No. 9164 to youths
at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those
who have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Youths from 18 to 21 years
old as of May 6, 2002 are also no longer SK members, and cannot
participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Congress will have to decide
whether to enact an amendatory law. Petitioners’ remedy is legislation,
not judicial intervention.
 Petitioners have no personal and substantial interest in maintaining this
suit. A party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some
personal right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled. A party must
also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By “real interest” is meant
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or
future, contingent, subordinate, or inconsequential interest.
 In the instant case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred
by law on those who were at least 15 but not more than 21 years old.
Now, with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on
the date of the SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The
new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific age group. Not
falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of
the SK and are no longer qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK
elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and substantial
interest in the SK elections.
 This petition does not raise any constitutional issue. At the time
petitioners filed this petition, RA No. 9164, which reset the SK elections
and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted
into law. After the passage of RA No. 9164, petitioners failed to assail any
provision in RA No. 9164 that could be unconstitutional. To grant
petitioners’ prayer to be allowed to vote and be voted for in the July 15,
2002 SK elections necessitates assailing the constitutionality of RA No.
9164. This, petitioners have not done. The Court will not strike down a
law unless its constitutionality is properly raised in an appropriate action
and adequately argued.
4. WON SK membership is a property right. NO.
 Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK
membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in
the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK
membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based
on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or
from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right
protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right
conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or
even withdraw the statutory right.
 A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states,
a “[P]ublic office is a public trust.” No one has a vested right to any public
office, much less a vested right to an expectancy of holding a public office.
In Cornejo v. Gabriel, decided in 1920, the Court already ruled: ”Again, for
this petition to come under the due process of law prohibition, it would be
necessary to consider an office a “property.” It is, however, well settled
that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional
guaranties of due process of law, but is a public trust or agency. The basic
idea of the government is that of a popular representative government,
the officers being mere agents and not rulers of the people, one where no
one man or set of men has a proprietary or contractual right to an office,
but where every officer accepts office pursuant to the provisions of the law
and holds the office as a trust for the people he represents.”
 Petitioners, who apparently desire to hold public office, should realize
from the very start that no one has a proprietary right to public office.
While the law makes an SK officer an ex-officio member of a local
government legislative council, the law does not confer on petitioners a
proprietary right or even a proprietary expectancy to sit in local legislative
councils. The constitutional principle of a public office as a public trust
precludes any proprietary claim to public office. Even the State policy
directing “equal access to opportunities for public service” cannot bestow
on petitioners a proprietary right to SK membership or a proprietary
expectancy to ex-officio public offices.
 Moreover, while the State policy is to encourage the youth’s involvement
in public affairs, this policy refers to those who belong to the class of
people defined as the youth. Congress has the power to define who are
the youth qualified to join the SK, which itself is a creation of Congress.
Those who do not qualify because they are past the age group defined as
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the youth cannot insist on being part of the youth. In government service,
once an employee reaches mandatory retirement age, he cannot invoke
any property right to cling to his office. In the same manner, since
petitioners are now past the maximum age for membership in the SK, they
cannot invoke any property right to cling to their SK membership.
5. WON the postponement of the SK elections would allow the incumbent SK
officers to perpetuate themselves in power, depriving other youths of the
opportunity to serve in elective SK positions. NO.
 This argument deserves scant consideration. While RA No. 9164 contains a
hold-over provision, incumbent SK officials can remain in office only until
their successors have been elected or qualified. On July 15, 2002, when
the SK elections are held, the hold-over period expires and all incumbent
SK officials automatically cease to hold their SK offices and their ex-officio
public offices.
Munez v. Ariño
Facts: Mayor Irisari of Loreto, Agusan del Sur summoned to his office herein
complainant Apolinario S. Muñez for conference respecting a land dispute which
Muñez had with one Tirso Amado. As complainant failed to attend the conference,
Mayor Irisari issued a warrant of arrest against him on December 27, 1989. The
warrant was served and by virtue of it complainant was brought before Mayor
Irisari, although no investigation was later conducted.Complainant filed a complaint
against Mayor Irisari for grave misconduct and usurpation of judicial function with
the Office of the Ombudsman as well as administrative complaint for violation of
the Constitution, misconduct in office and abuse of authority with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur. After preliminary investigation, the investigating
officer of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a case for usurpation of judicial
function against Mayor Asuero Irisari in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Loreto,
Agusan del Sur. Originally raffled to the judge of that court, the criminal case was
later assigned to respondent Judge Ciriaco Ariño on account of the inhibition of the
first judge. Accused Irisari moved to quash the information on the ground that the
acts complained of did not constitute a crime under the law. He contended that
under Sec. 143(3) of the former LGC (Batas Pambansa Blg. 337), mayors were
authorized to issue warrants of arrest. Judge Ariño denied the motion to quash on
the ground that the power of mayors to issue warrants of arrest had ceased to exist
as of February 2, 1987 when the Constitution took effect. For its part the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, acting on the administrative complaint against the
mayor, found him guilty of misconduct in office and abuse of authority and
accordingly ordered him suspended for eight (8) months without pay. On appeal,
however, the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) reversed on the
ground that what the mayor had issued to the complainant, although denominated
"Warrant of Arrest," was actually just an invitation or a summons. Mayor Irisari filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order of denial of respondent judge, invoking
the resolution of the DILG. Judge Ariño reconsidered his previous order and
dismissed the case. Respondent said in his order: The accused, in his Motion for
Reconsideration, asserts that since the question about the warrant of arrest issued
against Apolinario Muñez has been resolved in an administrative proceedings as not
the warrant of arrest contemplated by law, it would follow then that this case now
before this Court against the accused be dismissed. The Court finds that the subject
matter in this case and that in the administrative complaint arose from one and the
same incident and it involved the same parties. Courts are not bound by the
findings of administrative agencies like the DILG as in this case if such findings are
tainted with unfairness and there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error. The
Court believes that the resolution by the administrative agency in DLG-AC-60-91 is
not tainted with unfairness and arbitrariness neither it shows arbitrary action or
palpable and serious error, therefore, it must be respected (Mangubat vs. de
Castro, G.R. 33892; July 28, 1988; Blue Bar Coconut Philippines vs. Tantuico, Jr., et
al., G.R. 47051, July 29, 1988, Cuerdo vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. 84592, October
27, 1988). Upon receipt of this order, complainant Muñez sent two letters dated
July 5 and 12, 1933 to the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission charging respondent
Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment for dismissing
the case against Mayor Irisari. The matter was indorsed to the Office of the
Ombudsman which, as already stated, referred it to this Court for possible
disciplinary action against respondent judge.
Issue: WON the Judge may be held administratively liable. YES.
 The acts alleged in the information constitute a crime. Under Art. 241 of
the Revised Penal Code, the crime of usurpation of judicial authority
involves the following elements: (1) that the offender is an officer of the
executive branch of the government; and (2) that he assumes judicial
powers, or obstructs the execution of any order or decision rendered by
any judge within his jurisdiction. These elements were alleged in the
information. Mayor Irisari was an officer of the executive branch.
 It is not true that what he had issued against the complainant was not a
warrant of arrest. It was. In plain terms it stated: “You are hereby
requested/ordered to effect the arrest of Apolinario Muñez of Poblacion,
Loreto, Agusan del Sur, for his refusal to acknowledge the Summons dated
December 26, 1989, and bring him before the Office of the Municipal
Mayor to answer an inquiry/investigation in connection with the complaint
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of one Tirso Amado held pending before this Office.” (Sgd) ASUERO S.
IRISARI, Municipal Mayor. For and in the absence of the Municipal Circuit
Judge.
 Any one reading the warrant could not have been mistaken that it was a
warrant for the arrest of the complainant Apolinario Muñez. As a matter of
fact Mayor Irisari justified his order on the basis of Sec. 143(3) of the
former LGC which expressly provided that in cases where the mayor may
conduct preliminary investigation, the mayor shall, upon probable cause
after examination of witnesses, have the authority to order the arrest of
the accused." This provision had, however, been repealed by Art. III, Sec. 2
of the 1987 Constitution
 Ponsica v. Ignalaga: No longer does the mayor have at this time the power
to conduct preliminary investigations, much less issue orders of arrest.
Section 143 of the LGC, conferring this power on the mayor has been
abrogated, rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took
effect on February 2, 1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino
people. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution pertinently provides
that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional
proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of
determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of
arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this
being evidenced by the elimination in the present Constitution of the
phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found
in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution - who, aside from
judges, might conduct preliminary investigation and issue warrants of
arrest or search warrants.
 That there was no pending criminal case against the complainant did not
make the order against him any less an order of arrest, contrary to the
opinion of DILG.
 On the other hand, the issuance of the warrant when there was before him
no criminal case, but only a land dispute as it is now being made to appear,
only made it worse for the mayor, for it would then appear that he
assumed a judicial function which even a judge could not have done. All
the more, therefore, respondent judge should not have dismissed the
criminal case against the mayor.
 It cannot be pretended that Mayor Irisari merely intended to invite or
summon Muñez to his office because he had precisely done this the day
before he issued the warrant of arrest, and he ordered the arrest of
complainant because the latter had refused to appear before him. The
summons issued by Mayor Irisari shows clearly that he understood the
difference between a summons and a warrant of arrest. The summons
read: “You are hereby demanded to appear before the Office of the
Municipal Mayor on 27 December 1989 at around 9:30 A.M. then and
there to answer in an inquiry/investigation in connection with a certain
complaint of Mr. Tirso Amado lodged in this office.
 Indeed, respondent had previously denied the motion to dismiss which the
accused Mayor Irisari had filed on the ground that the authority invoked by
him as basis for his warrant of arrest had been abrogated by the
Constitution. He subsequently reversed himself on the ground that the
decision of the DILG, finding Mayor Irisari not guilty, "must be respected."
He said, "Courts are not bound by findings of administrative agencies like
the DILG as in this case if such findings are tainted with unfairness and
there is arbitrary action or palpable serious error." Since the DILG decision
was not so tainted, "therefore, it must be respected."
 Judge Ciriaco Ariño should have known that the case of Mayor Irisari was
not before him on review from the decision of an administrative agency
and, therefore, there was no basis for applying the rule on substantiality of
evidence. What was before him was a criminal case and he should have
considered solely the facts alleged in the information in resolving the
motion to dismiss of the accused.
Greater Balanga Development Corporation (supra)
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Lim and Garayblas v. CA

Facts: On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed before the trial court a petition for
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila.
Bistro filed the case because policemen under Lim’s instructions inspected and
investigated Bistro’s license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its
staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro’s night club and restaurant
operations. Lim also refused to accept Bistro’s application for a business license, as
well as the work permit applications of Bistro’s staff, for the year 1993. TC: issued
first assailed TRO, after hearing, court granted Bistro’s application for a writ of
prohibitory preliminary injunction. Despite the trial court’s order, Lim still issued a
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closure order on Bistro’s operations, even sending policemen to carry out his
closure order. Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the
policemen who stopped Bistro’s operations. At the hearing of the motion for
contempt, Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that Lim would respect the
court’s injunction. Lim, acting through his agents and policemen, again disrupted
Bistro’s business operations. Meanwhile, Lim filed a motion to dissolve the
injunctive order and to dismiss the case. Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to
inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the
statutory power of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and
licenses. This statutory power is expressly provided for in Section 11 (l), Article II of
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3 (iv) of the
LGC. TC denied. Lim filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus against Bistro and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that the trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the
writ of prohibitory preliminary injunction. CA denied. MR denied. Manila City
Ordinance No. 778314 took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western
Police District Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which
order the police implemented at once.
Issue: WON Lim, as Mayor of the City of Manila, properly closed down the
operations of Bistro. NO.
 The authority of mayors to issue business licenses and permits is beyond
question. The law expressly provides for such authority. Section 11 (l),
Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, reads: The general
duties and powers of the mayor shall be: (l) To grant and refuse municipal
licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the
conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts prohibited by law or
municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of such
licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have
been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general interest." On
the other hand, Section 455 (3) (iv) of theLGC provides: (b) For efficient,
effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general
welfare of the City and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code,
the City Mayor shall: (iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke
the same for any violation of the condition upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance."
 From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor
to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary
power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the
power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses.
The laws specifically refer to the "violation of the condition(s)" on which
the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to
issue such licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor
must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that
the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be
heard.
 True, the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private
commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their
licenses and permits. However, the mayor has no power to order a police
raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating
these commercial establishments. Lim acted beyond his authority when he
directed policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club and the Exotic Garden
Restaurant. Such act of Lim violated Ordinance No. 771618 which expressly
prohibits police raids and inspections, to wit: No member of the Western
Police District shall conduct inspection of food and other business
establishments for the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and regulations,
inspecting licenses and permits, and/or enforcing internal revenue and
customs laws and regulations. This responsibility should be properly
exercised by Local Government Authorities and other concerned agencies."
 Lim has no authority to close down Bistro’s business or any business
establishment in Manila without due process of law. Lim cannot take
refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the LGC. There
is no provision in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor
authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice
and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due
process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given
Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the
conditions of its licenses and permits.
 The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be
exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of
the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power
cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In the instant
case, we find that Lim’s exercise of this power violated Bistro’s property
rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.
 Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its
business license or permits. Still, Lim closed down Bistro’s operations even
before the expiration of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim
also refused to accept Bistro’s license application for 1993, in effect
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denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal
prerequisites.
Disomancop v. Datumanong
Facts: RA 6734, "An Act Providing for An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao," was enacted and signed into law. Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao,
Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, pursuant to a plebiscite became the ARMM. In accordance with
R.A. 6734, then President Aquino issued E.O. 426, "Placing the Control and
Supervision of the Offices of the Department of Public Works and Highways within
the ARMM under the Autonomous Regional Government, and for other purposes."
ARMM was formally organized on 6 November 1990. President Corazon C. Aquino
flew to Cotabato, the seat of the Regional Government, for the inauguration. At
that point, she had already signed 7 EOs devolving to ARMM the powers of 7
cabinet departments, namely: (1) local government; (2) labor and employment; (3)
science and technology; (4) public works and highways; (5) social welfare and
development; (6) tourism; and (7) environment and national resources. Nearly nine
years later, then DPWH Secretary Vigilar issued D.O. 119, which provides that a
DPWH Marawi Sub-District Engineering Office shall have jurisdiction over all
national infrastructure projects and facilities under the DPWH within Marawi City
and the province of Lanao del Sur. The headquarters of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office shall be at the former quarters of the Marawi City Engineering
Office. Personnel of the above-mentioned Sub-District Engineering Office shall be
made up of employees of the National Government Section of the former Marawi
City Engineering Office who are now assigned with the Iligan City Sub-District
Engineering Office as may be determined by the DPWH Region XII Regional
Director. Almost 2 years later, then President Estrada approved and signed into law
R.A. 8999 which constituted the City of Marawi and the municipalities comprising
the First District of the Province of Lanao del Sur into an engineering district to be
known as the First Engineering District of the Province of Lanao del Sur. Congress
later passed R.A. 9054, "An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act
No. 6734, entitled An Act Providing for the ARMM, as Amended." Like its
forerunner, R.A. 9054 contains detailed provisions on the powers of the Regional
Government and the retained areas of governance of the National Government.
R.A. 9054 lapsed into law. It was ratified in a plebiscite. The province of Basilan and
the City of Marawi also voted to join ARMM on the same date. R.A. 6734 and R.A.
9054 are collectively referred to as the ARMM Organic Acts. On 23 July 2001,
petitioners Disomangcop and Dimalotang addressed a petition to then DPWH
Secretary Datumanong, seeking the revocation of D.O. 119 and the non-
implementation of R.A. 8999. No action, however, was taken on the petition.
Issues: 1. WON petitioners have legal standing. YES.
 Legal standing or locus standi is defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct
injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The
term "interest" means a material interest, an interest in issue affected by
the decree, as distinguished from a mere interest in the question involved,
or a mere incidental interest.
 A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show
"not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in
immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some
indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or is about to be, denied
some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about
to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of.
 But following the new trend, this Court is inclined to take cognizance of a
suit although it does not satisfy the requirement of legal standing when
paramount interests are involved. In several cases, the Court has adopted
a liberal stance on the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people.
 In the instant case, petitioner Disomangcop holds the position of Engineer
IV. When he filed this petition, he was the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
District Engineer of the First Engineering District of DPWH-ARMM, Lanao
del Sur. On the other hand, petitioner Dimalotang is an Engineer II and
President of the rank and file employees also of the First Engineering
District of DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur. Both are charged with the duty
and responsibility of supervising and implementing all public works
projects to be undertaken and being undertaken in Lanao del Sur which is
the area of their jurisdiction.
 It is thus not far-fetched that the creation of the Marawi Sub-District
Engineering Office under D.O. 119 and the creation of and appropriation of
funds to the First Engineering District of Lanao del Sur as directed under
R.A. 8999 will affect the powers, functions and responsibilities of the
petitioners and the DPWH-ARMM. As the two offices have apparently
been endowed with functions almost identical to those of DPWH-ARMM
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur, it is likely that petitioners are in
imminent danger of being eased out of their duties and, not remotely,
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even their jobs. Their material and substantial interests will definitely be
prejudiced by the enforcement of D.O. 119 and R.A. 8999. Such injury is
direct and immediate. Thus, they can legitimately challenge the validity of
the enactments subject of the instant case.
2. WON R.A. 8999 is constitutional.
 The challenged law never became operative and was superseded or
repealed by a subsequent enactment. The ARMM Organic Acts are
deemed a part of the regional autonomy scheme. While they are classified
as statutes, the Organic Acts are more than ordinary statutes because they
enjoy affirmation by a plebiscite. Hence, the provisions thereof cannot be
amended by an ordinary statute, such as R.A. 8999 in this case. The
amendatory law has to be submitted to a plebiscite.
 The first ARMM Organic Act, R.A. 6074, as implemented by E.O. 426,
devolved the functions of the DPWH in the ARMM which includes Lanao
del Sur (minus Marawi City at the time)38 to the Regional Government. By
creating an office with previously devolved functions, R.A. 8999, in
essence, sought to amend R.A. 6074. The amendatory law should
therefore first obtain the approval of the people of the ARMM before it
could validly take effect. Absent compliance with this requirement, R.A.
8999 has not even become operative.
 From another perspective, R.A. 8999 was repealed and superseded by R.A.
9054. Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part
of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. Of course, the intention to repeal must be clear and
manifest. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when
the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are clearly
inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be
reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that
one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.
 R.A. 9054 is anchored on the 1987 Constitution. It advances the
constitutional grant of autonomy by detailing the powers of the ARG
covering, among others, Lanao del Sur and Marawi City, one of which is its
jurisdiction over regional urban and rural planning. R.A. 8999, however,
ventures to reestablish the National Government's jurisdiction over
infrastructure programs in Lanao del Sur. R.A. 8999 is patently inconsistent
with R.A. 9054, and it destroys the latter law's objective.
 Clearly, R.A. 8999 is antagonistic to and cannot be reconciled with both
ARMM Organic Acts, R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054. The kernel of the
antagonism and disharmony lies in the regional autonomy which the
ARMM Organic Acts ordain pursuant to the Constitution. On the other
hand, R.A. 8999 contravenes true decentralization which is the essence of
regional autonomy.
 Regional Autonomy Under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054: The 1987 Constitution
mandates regional autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the
cry for a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy.42 According to
Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the Committee which drafted the
provisions, it "is an indictment against the status quo of a unitary system
that, to my mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in our country
. . . our varying regional characteristics are factors to capitalize on to attain
national strength through decentralization. The idea behind the
Constitutional provisions for autonomous regions is to allow the separate
development of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions. These
cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to flourish.
 Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness of the Philippine
society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and even religious diversities. It
strives to free Philippine society of the strain and wastage caused by the
assimilationist approach. Policies emanating from the legislature are
invariably assimilationist in character despite channels being open for
minority representation. As a result, democracy becomes an irony to the
minority group.
 The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in the case of the Filipino
Muslims and the Cordillera people who have been fighting for it. Their
political struggle highlights their unique cultures and the unresponsiveness
of the unitary system to their aspirations. The Moros' struggle for self-
determination dates as far back as the Spanish conquest in the Philippines.
Even at present, the struggle goes on. Perforce, regional autonomy is also a
means towards solving existing serious peace and order problems and
secessionist movements. Parenthetically, autonomy, decentralization and
regionalization, in international law, have become politically acceptable
answers to intractable problems of nationalism, separatism, ethnic conflict
and threat of secession.
 However, the creation of autonomous regions does not signify the
establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of the Republic, as it can
be installed only "within the framework of this Constitution and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines." Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination
exercised by the local government unit vis-à-vis the central government.
 The objective of the autonomy system is to permit determined groups,
with a common tradition and shared social-cultural characteristics, to
develop freely their ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be
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in charge of their own business. This is achieved through the establishment
of a special governance regime for certain member communities who
choose their own authorities from within the community and exercise the
jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide internal
community affairs.
 Decentralization is a decision by the central government authorizing its
subordinates, whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise
authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by subnational units.
It is typically a delegated power, wherein a larger government chooses to
delegate certain authority to more local governments. Federalism implies
some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may also
decentralize. Decentralization differs intrinsically from federalism in that
the sub-units that have been authorized to act (by delegation) do not
possess any claim of right against the central government.
 Decentralization comes in two forms—deconcentration and devolution.
Deconcentration is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer of
functions or the delegation of authority and responsibility from the
national office to the regional and local offices. This mode of
decentralization is also referred to as administrative decentralization.
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes political decentralization, or the
transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of
certain functions from the central government to local government units.
This is a more liberal form of decentralization since there is an actual
transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater autonomy
to local government units in cognizance of their right to self-government,
to make them self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and
technical capabilities.
 The diminution of Congress' powers over autonomous regions was
confirmed in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals: "the omission (of "as may be
provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from Congress and to break Congress' 'control'
over local government affairs." This is true to subjects over which
autonomous regions have powers, as specified in Sections 18 and 20,
Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly not included therein are
powers over certain areas. Worthy of note is that the area of public works
is not excluded and neither is it reserved for the National Government.
More importantly, Congress itself through R.A. 9054 transferred and
devolved the administrative and fiscal management of public works and
funds for public works to the ARG. Unless approved by the Regional
Assembly, no public works funds allocated by the central government or
national government for the Regional Government or allocated by the
Regional Government from its own revenues may be disbursed,
distributed, realigned, or used in any manner.
 The aim of the Constitution is to extend to the autonomous peoples, the
people of Muslim Mindanao in this case, the right to self-determination—a
right to choose their own path of development; the right to determine the
political, cultural and economic content of their development path within
the framework of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippine
Republic.80 Self-determination refers to the need for a political structure
that will respect the autonomous peoples' uniqueness and grant them
sufficient room for self-expression and self-construction.
 In treading their chosen path of development, the Muslims in Mindanao
are to be given freedom and independence with minimum interference
from the National Government. This necessarily includes the freedom to
decide on, build, supervise and maintain the public works and
infrastructure projects within the autonomous region. The devolution of
the powers and functions of the DPWH in the ARMM and transfer of the
administrative and fiscal management of public works and funds to the
ARG are meant to be true, meaningful and unfettered. This unassailable
conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus, reached at the Constitutional
Commission and ratified by the entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality
of decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel of deliverance for
Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate unity of Muslims and Christians in this
country.
 With R.A. 8999, however, this freedom is taken away, and the National
Government takes control again. The hands, once more, of the
autonomous peoples are reined in and tied up.
 The challenged law creates an office with functions and powers which, by
virtue of E.O. 426, have been previously devolved to the DPWH-ARMM,
First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur. E.O. 426 clearly ordains the
transfer of the control and supervision of the offices of the DPWH within
the ARMM, including their functions, powers and responsibilities,
personnel, equipment, properties, and budgets to the ARG. Among its
other functions, the DPWH-ARMM, under the control of the Regional
Government shall be responsible for highways, flood control and water
resource development systems, and other public works within the ARMM.
Its scope of power includes the planning, design, construction and
supervision of public works. According to R.A. 9054, the reach of the
Regional Government enables it to appropriate, manage and disburse all
public work funds allocated for the region by the central government.
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 The use of the word "powers" in E.O. 426 manifests an unmistakable case
of devolution. In this regard, it is not amiss to cite Opinion No. 120, S.
199182 of the Secretary of Justice on whether the national departments or
their counterpart departments in the ARG are responsible for
implementation of roads, rural water supply, health, education, women in
development, agricultural extension and watershed management.
Referring to Section 2, Article V of R.A. 6734 which enumerates the powers
of the ARG, he states:It is clear from the foregoing provision of law that
except for the areas of executive power mentioned therein, all other such
areas shall be exercised by the Autonomous Regional Government ("ARG")
of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. It is noted that programs
relative to infrastructure facilities, health, education, women in
development, agricultural extension and watershed management do not
fall under any of the exempted areas listed in the abovequoted provision
of law. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that all these spheres of executive
responsibility have been transferred to the ARG.
 Reinforcing the above view are the various executive orders issued by the
President providing for the devolution of the powers and functions of
specified executive departments of the National Government to the ARG.
These are E.O. Nos. 425 (Department of Labor and Employment, Local
Government, Tourism, Environment and Natural Resources, Social Welfare
and Development and Science and Technology), 426 (Department of Public
Works and Highways), 459 (Department of Education, Culture and Sports)
and 460 (Department of Agriculture). The execution of projects on
infrastructure, education, women, agricultural extension and watershed
management within the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
normally fall within the responsibility of one of the aforementioned
executive departments of the National Government, but by virtue of the
aforestated EOs, such responsibility has been transferred to the ARG.
 E.O. 426 was issued to implement the provisions of the first ARMM
Organic Act, R.A. 6734—the validity of which this Court upheld in the case
of Abbas v. Commission on Elections.83 In Section 4, Article XVIII of said
Act, "central government or national government offices and agencies in
the autonomous region which are not excluded under Section 3, Article
IV84 of this Organic Act, shall be placed under the control and supervision
of the Regional Government pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the
oversight committee."
 Evidently, the intention is to cede some, if not most, of the powers of the
national government to the autonomous government in order to
effectuate a veritable autonomy. The continued enforcement of R.A. 8999,
therefore, runs afoul of the ARMM Organic Acts and results in the recall of
powers which have previously been handed over. This should not be
sanctioned, elsewise the Organic Acts' desire for greater autonomy for the
ARMM in accordance with the Constitution would be quelled. It bears
stressing that national laws are subject to the Constitution one of whose
state policies is to ensure the autonomy of autonomous regions. (Section
25, Article II of the 1987 Constitution)
 R.A. 8999 has made the DPWH-ARMM effete and rendered regional
autonomy illusory with respect to infrastructure projects. The
Congressional Record shows, on the other hand, that the "lack of an
implementing and monitoring body within the area" has hindered the
speedy implementation, of infrastructure projects.85 Apparently, in the
legislature's estimation, the existing DPWH-ARMM engineering districts
failed to measure up to the task. But if it was indeed the case, the problem
could not be solved through the simple legislative creation of an
incongruous engineering district for the central government in the ARMM.
As it was, House Bill No. 995 which ultimately became R.A. 8999 was
passed in record time on second reading (not more than 10 minutes),
absolutely without the usual sponsorship speech and debates.86 The
precipitate speed which characterized the passage of R.A. 8999 is difficult
to comprehend since R.A. 8999 could have resulted in the amendment of
the first ARMM Organic Act and, therefore, could not take effect without
first being ratified in a plebiscite. What is more baffling is that in March
2001, or barely two (2) months after it enacted R.A. 8999 in January 2001,
Congress passed R.A. 9054, the second ARMM Organic Act, where it
reaffirmed the devolution of the DPWH in ARMM, including Lanao del Sur
and Marawi City, to the Regional Government and effectively repealed R.A.
8999.
3. WON DO 119 is constitutional.
 DPWH Department Order No. 119: D.O. 119 creating the Marawi Sub-
District Engineering Office which has jurisdiction over infrastructure
projects within Marawi City and Lanao del Sur is violative of the provisions
of E.O. 426. The Executive Order was issued pursuant to R.A. 6734—which
initiated the creation of the constitutionally- mandated autonomous
region87 and which defined the basic structure of the autonomous
government.88 E.O. 426 sought to implement the transfer of the control
and supervision of the DPWH within the ARMM to the Autonomous
Regional Government. In particular, it identified four (4) District
Engineering Offices in each of the four (4) provinces, namely: Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.89 Accordingly, the First
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Engineering District of the DPWH-ARMM in Lanao del Sur has jurisdiction
over the public works within the province.
 The office created under D.O. 119, having essentially the same powers, is a
duplication of the DPWH-ARMM First Engineering District in Lanao del Sur
formed under the aegis of E.O. 426. The department order, in effect, takes
back powers which have been previously devolved under the said
executive order. D.O. 119 runs counter to the provisions of E.O. 426. The
DPWH's order, like spring water, cannot rise higher than its source of
power—the Executive.
 E.O. No. 124, upon which D.O. 119 is based, is a general law reorganizing
the Ministry of Public Works and Highways while E.O. 426 is a special law
transferring the control and supervision of the DPWH offices within ARMM
to the Autonomous Regional Government. The latter statute specifically
applies to DPWH-ARMM offices. E.O. 124 should therefore give way to E.O.
426 in the instant case.
 In any event, the ARMM Organic Acts and their ratification in a plebiscite in
effect superseded E.O. 124. In case of an irreconcilable conflict between
two laws of different vintages, the later enactment prevails because it is
the later legislative will. Further, in its repealing clause, R.A. 9054 states
that "all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, and other issuances
or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Organic Act, are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly."93 With the repeal of E.O. 124 which is
the basis of D.O. 119, it necessarily follows that D.O. 119 was also
rendered functus officio by the ARMM Organic Acts.
Abbas v. COMELEC
Facts: The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in 13 provinces and nine 9
cities in Mindanao and Palawan in implementation of RA 6734, "An Act Providing
for an Organic Act for the ARMM." These consolidated petitions pray that the
Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting the
plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the
COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional. In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which the for the first
time provided for regional autonomy, Article X, section 15 of the charter provides
that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734
was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.
Issues: 1. WON certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of
the Tripoli Agreement.
 In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the
creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for
any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so
provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of
R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the
effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for
the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or
international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the
land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an
enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the
same class as the latter. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory
of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by
this Court that R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in
the granting of the reliefs sought.
2. WON majority refers to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in
all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or
both?
 If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a
majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite they would have so indicated.
Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his Constitution shall
take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this with the provision on
the creation of the autonomous region, which reads: The creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose,
provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably
in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec,
18, para, 2].
 It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made
to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will
of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso
underscores this. for if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was
to get the majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratification of the
Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
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when approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the
purpose."
 It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority
of votes approving the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as
in the individual constituent units.
 More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the
sense in which the vote requirement in the plebiscite provided under
Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they
ratified the Constitution.
3. WON only those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other
relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of
the autonomous region.
 Mama-o insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the
provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and
Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Cotabato, and not all of the 13
provinces and 9 cities included in the Organic Act, possess such
concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant
characteristics. By including areas which do not strictly share the same
characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded
the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has
prescribed to be limited.
 Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the
standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should
constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria,
the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes
is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of
this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law. This the
Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental
powers.
4. WON other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered.
 He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its
scope should be further broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim
areas in Mindanao in order for the other non-Muslim areas denies said
areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the
Constitution.
 Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional
provision he had earlier invoked. Any determination by Congress of what
areas in Mindanao should compromise the autonomous region, taking into
account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics, would necessarily carry with
it the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such determination by
Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the
autonomous region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose
wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.
 Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification. The Court
ruled that once class may be treated differently from another where the
groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of
equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having
been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth
by the Constitution itself.
5. WON RA 6734 violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of
religion.
 The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates
that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083]
and the Tribal Code (still be enacted) on the one had, and the national law
on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should
apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is
derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not
be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports
this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between
provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of
national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.
 As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable. In the present case, no actual controversy between real
litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of
national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This
being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is
merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim
Code and national law.
6. WON RA 6734 grants the President the power to merge regions.
 What is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative
regions, i.e. Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes
Administrative regions are not territorial and political subdivisions like
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays. While the power to merge
administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is
a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate
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the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments
[see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict between the
power of the President to merge administrative regions with the
constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger
expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not
to administrative regions.
7. WON provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight Committee
to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers,
appropriations, and properties vested upon the regional government by
the organic Act are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states
that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval
in a plebiscite, the requirement of organizing an Oversight committee
tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the
regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous
region.
 Under the constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only
on the result of the plebiscite. if the Organic Act is approved by majority of
the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation
of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned
provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an oversight Committee to supervise
the transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less
would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment
to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting
a smooth transition period for the regional government. The constitutional
objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no bases
therefor.
Pandi v. CA
Facts: Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and as Secretary of the
Department of Health of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, issued a
Memorandum designating Pandi, who was then DOH-ARMM Assistant Regional
Secretary, as Officer-in-Charge of the Integrated Provincial Health Office-Amai
Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH), Lanao del Sur. In the same Memorandum,
Macacua detailed Dr. Mamasao Sani, then the provincial health officer of the IPHO-
APGH, Lanao del Sur, to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City. Lanao del
Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan issued Office Order No. 07 designating
Saber also as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Sani filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Sur, Branch 10, Marawi City
challenging the August 9, 1993 Memorandum transferring him to the DOH-ARMM
Regional Office in Cotabato City , alleging that he is the holder of a permanent
appointment as provincial health officer of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. Saber
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for quo warranto with prayer for
preliminary injunction, claiming that he is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge
of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur. President Ramos issued Executive Order No. 133
transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the region to
the Regional Government of the ARMM. On November 6, 1993, Macacua, again in
her capacity as DOH-ARMM Secretary-Designate , issued a Memorandum
reiterating Pandi’s designation as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del
Sur, as well as Sani’s detail to the Regional Office of the DOH-ARMM in Cotabato
City . CA: Saber is the lawfully designated Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH,
Lanao del Sur, and that Governor Mahid Mutilan has the power and authority to
appoint the provincial health officer. CA maintained that the Organic Act of 1989
and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the LGC. CA interpreted Section
457 (b) and (d) of the ARMM Local Code to mean that it is the ARMM Regional
Governor, and not the Provincial Governor, who exercises a recommendatory
prerogative in the appointment of the provincial health officer.
Issues: 1. WON an incumbent provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur can be
assigned to another province and if so, who can order such assignment.
2. Who can designate the Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office of
Lanao del Sur - the Provincial Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health?
3. Who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer of Lanao del
Sur - the Provincial Governor, the Regional Governor or the ARMM
Secretary of Health?
First Period: Prior to the Organic Act of 1989
 The provincial health office was an agency of the Ministry of Health, and
the Minister of Health was the appointing power of provincial health
officers.
Second Period: After the Organic Act of 1989
 It was not until October 29, 1993, when then President Fidel V. Ramos
issued Executive Order No. 133, that the regional offices of the
Department of Health in the ARMM were placed under the supervision
and control of the Regional Government. Executive Order No. 133 was the
operative act that actually transferred the powers and functions of the
Department of Health, together with its regional personnel, equipment,
properties, and budgets, to the Regional Government.
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 Thus, until the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133, the Secretary of
Health of the National Government continued to appoint provincial health
officers in the ARMM, with the authority to assign a provincial health
officer to any province within the region. This was the state of the law
after the passage of the Organic Act of 1989 until the effectivity of
Executive Order No. 133.
Third Period: After the LGC of 1991
 Unlike the 1984 LGU Code, the 1991 LGU Code made, for the first time, the
provincial health officers one of the officials of the provincial government
to be appointed by the provincial governor if his salary came mainly from
provincial funds.
 Even after the passage of the 1991 LGU Code, the Secretary of Health
continued to be the appointing power of provincial health officers who
remained national government officials. The Secretary of Health also
continued to exercise the authority to assign provincial health officers to
any province within the region. This situation, however, was only
temporary, arising from the need for a phased transfer of the personnel,
equipment, properties and budgets of the Department of Health in the
ARMM to the Regional Government pursuant to Section 4, Article XIX of
the Organic Act of 1989.
 On October 29, 1993, Executive Order No. 133 was issued, finally
transferring the powers and functions of the Department of Health in the
autonomous region to the Regional Government.
 The devolved powers under the Organic Act of 1989, as implemented by
Executive Order No. 133, included the power of supervision and control
over provincial health officers, as well as the power to appoint provincial
health officers. The power of supervision and control, previously exercised
by the Secretary of Health, carried with it the authority to assign provincial
health officers to any province within the region pursuant to Section 17 of
Executive Order No. 119. Assignment within a region of personnel
appointed to a region is an administrative matter exercised by the head of
office who is vested with the power of supervision and control over the
office.
 Upon the effectivity of Executive Order No. 133, the administrative
authority of the Secretary of Health to assign provincial health officers to
any province within a region was transferred to the ARMM Secretary of
Health as the regional counterpart of the national Secretary of Health. This
transfer of administrative authority to the Regional Secretary was essential
to insure the continuation of vital health services to residents in the
ARMM. On the other hand, the power to appoint provincial health officers,
previously conferred by law on the Secretary of Health, was devolved to
the Regional Governor.
 The power to appoint provincial health officers is one that the Regional
Assembly could thus grant by law to the Regional Secretary of Health.
However, the Regional Assembly has not enacted a law authorizing the
Regional Secretary of Health to appoint provincial health officers. Since the
power to appoint must be expressly conferred by law, and cannot be
implied from the power of supervision and control, this ruled out the
Regional Secretary of Health as the appointing power of provincial health
officers. Significantly, the power to appoint provincial health officers is not
one of the powers transferred to the Regional Secretary of Health under
Executive Order No. 133. There could be no gap or lacuna in the devolution
of powers from the National Government to the Regional Government
because the exercise of these powers was essential to the maintenance of
basic services for the general welfare.
Fourth Period: After the ARMM Local Code
 Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer in the ARMM,
previously a regional official, has also become a provincial government
official, catching up with the status of provincial health officers outside of
the ARMM. The Regional Governor appoints the provincial health officer
from a list of three recommendees of the Provincial Governor. The ARMM
Local Code provides that the salary of the provincial health officer shall be
paid from regional funds.
 The ARMM Local Code also states that if the salary of the provincial health
officer comes mainly from provincial funds, the Provincial Governor is the
appointing power. The power of the Regional Governor to appoint
provincial officials applies only to provincial officials "paid by regional
funds."
 Section 459 of the ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the
power to exercise supervision and control over all provincial government
officials. The conversion of the provincial health officer from a regional
government official to a provincial government official under Section 457
of the ARMM Local Code placed the provincial health officer under the
supervision and control of the Provincial Governor. Consequently, with the
passage of the ARMM Local Code the Regional Secretary of Health lost the
authority to assign provincial health officers to other provinces within the
region.
 The state of the law after the enactment of the ARMM Local Code became
more favorable to Provincial Governors, at least with respect to the
appointment and assignment of provincial health officers. While before
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the appointment of provincial health officers was solely the prerogative of
the Regional Governor, now a Provincial Governor has the power to
recommend three nominees. The Regional Governor can appoint only from
among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor even though the
salary of the provincial health officer comes from regional funds. Likewise,
while before the Regional Secretary of Health could assign provincial
health officers to other provinces within the region, this authority of the
Regional Secretary ceased to exist. Since a provincial health officer was
now appointed to a specific province, he could no longer be assigned to
another province without his consent. Moreover, the Provincial Governor
now exercises supervision and control over the provincial health officer
who has become a provincial government official. Finally, if the provincial
government assumes payment of the salary of the provincial health officer,
then the Provincial Governor becomes the appointing power of such
provincial official.
Fifth Period: The Organic Act of 2001
 The passage of the Organic Act of 2001 means that the powers and
functions of a Provincial Governor under the 1991 LGU Code are now
enjoyed, as a minimum, by a Provincial Governor in the ARMM. Thus, the
Provincial Governor appoints the provincial health officer if the latter’s
salary comes from provincial funds. If the provincial health officer’s salary
comes mainly from regional funds, then the ARMM Local Code applies, in
which case the Regional Governor is the appointing power but he must
appoint only from among the three nominees of the Provincial Governor.
Moreover, the Provincial Governor exercises supervision and control over
the provincial health officer because the ARMM Local Code has classified
him as a provincial government official. This is now the present state of the
law on the appointment of provincial health officers in the ARMM.
 Re: Saber: Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mahid M. Mutilan designated
Saber as Officer-in-Charge of the IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur, on September
15, 1993. On this date the provincial health officer of Lanao del Sur was
still a national government official paid entirely from national funds. The
provincial health officer was still appointed by the national Secretary of
Health to a region and not to a province. The Secretary of Health exercised
supervision and control over the provincial health officer. The Secretary of
Health was also the official authorized by law to assign the provincial
health officer to any province within the region. Indisputably, on
September 15, 1993, Provincial Governor Mutilan had no power to
designate Saber as Officer-in-Charge of IPHO-APGH, Lanao del Sur.
Consequently, the designation of Saber as such Officer-in-Charge is void.
 The Court of Appeals’ reliance on Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code as
Provincial Governor Mutilan’s authority to appoint Saber is misplaced.
Section 478 of the 1991 LGU Code, which provides that "[T]he
appointment of a health officer shall be mandatory for provincial, city and
municipal governments, " is not a grant of power to governors and mayors
to appoint local health officers. It is simply a directive that those
empowered to appoint local health officers are mandated to do so. In
short, the appointment of local health officers, being essential for public
services, is a mandatory obligation on the part of those vested by law with
the power to appoint them.
 Re: Sani: Sani was appointed provincial health officer by then Secretary of
Health Alfredo R.A. Bengzon on January 1, 1988. Sani was appointed
provincial health officer in Region XII since at that time Executive Order No.
119, the charter of the Department of Health, expressly stated that
provincial health officers were to be appointed to a region. The Secretary
of Health, upon recommendation of the Regional Director, could assign
provincial health officers to any province within the region.
 Consequently, Sani cannot claim any security of tenure as provincial health
officer of Lanao del Sur because he was never appointed to that office.
 Macacua, in her capacity as Regional Director and ARMM Secretary of
Health, detailed Sani to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City
on August 9, 1993. As of that date, the powers and functions of the
Department of Health were not yet transferred to the Regional
Government, and the Secretary of Health of the National Government still
exercised the power to assign the provincial health officers in the ARMM.
Consequently, the August 9, 1993 directive of Macacua detailing or
assigning Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato City is void.
 The second detail or assignment of Sani to the Regional Office in Cotabato,
issued on November 6, 1993, is within the authority of Macacua as
Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, the second detail of Sani is valid.
 Re: Pandi: The designation dated August 9, 1993 is void since the Regional
Secretary at that time did not yet exercise supervision and control over the
provincial health offices of the ARMM. However, the designation of Pandi
on November 6, 1993 is valid since at that time Executive Order No. 133
had already been issued vesting in the Regional Secretary of Health
supervision and control over all functions and activities of the Department
of Health in the ARMM. The designation of Pandi, however, while valid is
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only temporary in nature, good until a new designation or a permanent
appointment is made.
 As Regional Secretary of Health, Macacua was, as of November 6, 1993,
the official vested by law to exercise supervision and control over all
provincial health offices in the ARMM. The Regional Secretary, by virtue of
Executive Order No. 133, assumed the administrative powers and
functions of the Secretary of Health of the National Government with
respect to provincial health offices within the ARMM. The official
exercising supervision and control over an office has the administrative
authority to designate, in the interest of public service, an Officer-in-
Charge if the office becomes vacant. Macacua, therefore, had the authority
on November 6, 1993 to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial
health office of Lanao del Sur pending the appointment of the permanent
provincial health officer. After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the
Regional Secretary of Health lost the authority to make such a designation.
 Under the ARMM Local Code, the provincial health officer became for the
first an official of the provincial government even though he is appointed
by the Regional Governor and draws his salary from regional funds. The
ARMM Local Code vests in the Provincial Governor the power to "exercise
general supervision and control over all programs, projects, services, and
activities of the provincial government." Upon the effectivity of the ARMM
Local Code, the power of supervision and control over the provincial health
officer passed from the Regional Secretary to the Provincial Governor.
From then on the Provincial Governor began to exercise the administrative
authority to designate an Officer-in-Charge in the provincial health office
pending the appointment of a permanent provincial health officer.
Ordillo v. COMELEC
Facts: The people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and
Kalinga Apayao and the city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite held pursuant
to RA 6766. The COMELEC results showed that the creation of the Region was
approved only by a majority of 5,899 votes in only the Ifugao Province and was
overwhelmingly rejected by 148,676 votes in the rest of the provinces and city
abovementioned. Sec of Justice: considering the proviso that only the provinces and
city voting favorably shall be included in the CAR, the province of Ifugao, being the
only province which voted favorably legally constitutes the CAR. As a result of this,
Congress enacted RA 6861 which set the elections in the CAR. Ordillo et al then filed
a petition with the COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of the Organic Act for
the Region. The president issued AO 160 declaring that the Cordillera Executive
Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and other offices created under EO220 are
abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act. The petitioners maintain
that there can be no valid CAR as the Constitution and RA 6766 require that the said
region be composed of more than one constituent unit. They pray that the court
declare COMELEC Res. No. 2259 AO 160, and RA6861 as null and void, and restrain
the respondents from implementing the same. They also pray that it declare EO 220
constituting the CEB and the CRA and other offices to be still in force and effect
until another organic law for the Autonomous Region shall have been enacted and
duly ratified.
Issue: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably
for the creation of the CAR can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.
NO.
 Art. X Sec. 15 of 1987 Constitution: There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and
distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures,
and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines.
 The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
This is supported by the fact that the 13 regions into which the Philippines
is divided for administrative purposes are groupings of contiguous
provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it
must join other provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas.
 RA 6766 shows that Congress never intended that a single province may
constitute the autonomous region. Otherwise, we would be faced with the
absurd situation of having two sets of provincial officials and another set of
regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over
exactly the same small area. Such will result in an awkward predicament
where there will be two legislative bodies: the Cordillera Assembly and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, exercising their legislative powers over the
province of Ifugao.
 RA 6766 provides for a Regional Planning and Developmental Board which
has a provincial counterpart, the Provincial Planning and Developmental
Coordinator. If it takes only one person in the provincial level to perform
such functions while it takes an entire board to perform the same in the
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regional level, it could only mean that a larger area must be covered at the
regional level. The law also provides an allocation for 10MPhp for its initial
organizational requirements. Such cannot be construed as funding only a
lone and small province. Moreover, the province of Ifugao makes up only
11% of the total population of the areas which were enumerated in the
law.
 This case must be distinguished from the Abbas case which laid down the
rule on the meaning of majority: what is required by the Constitution is a
simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual
constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent
units put together, as well as the individual constituent units. There is
nothing in the Abbas case that deals with the issue on whether an
autonomous region could exist despite the fact that only one province or
city is to constitute it.
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA (supra)
MMDA v. Bel-Air (supra)
MMDA v. Garin
Facts: Dante O. Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) for parking illegally
along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila. His driver's license was also confiscated.
Shortly before the expiration of the TVR's validity, the Garin addressed a letter to
then MMDA Chairman Oreta requesting the return of his driver's license, and
expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Receiving no immediate
reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction
contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f)
of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring
motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of
the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The
respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional
prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the
MMDA to fix and impose unspecified – and therefore unlimited - fines and other
penalties on erring motorists. In support of his application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, Garin alleged that he suffered and continues to suffer great and
irreparable damage because of the deprivation of his license and that, absent any
implementing rules from the Metro Manila Council, the TVR and the confiscation of
his license have no legal basis. For its part, the MMDA, represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General, pointed out that the powers granted to it by Sec. 5(f) of RA
7924 are limited to the fixing, collection and imposition of fines and penalties for
traffic violations, which powers are legislative and executive in nature; the judiciary
retains the right to determine the validity of the penalty imposed. It further argued
that the doctrine of separation of powers does not preclude "admixture" of the
three powers of government in administrative agencies. The MMDA also refuted
Garin's allegation that the Metro Manila Council, the governing board and policy
making body of the petitioner, has as yet to formulate the implementing rules for
Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 and directed the court's attention to MMDA
Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001 dated 15 April 1995. Respondent Garin,
however, questioned the validity of MMDA Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001,
as he claims that it was passed by the Metro Manila Council in the absence of a
quorum. RTC: issued a temporary restraining order extending the validity of the TVR
as a temporary driver's license for twenty more days. A preliminary mandatory
injunction was granted, and the MMDA was directed to return the respondent's
driver's license. RTC decision: a. There was indeed no quorum in that First Regular
Meeting of the MMDA Council held on March 23, 1995, hence MMDA
Memorandum Circular No. TT-95-001, authorizing confiscation of driver's licenses
upon issuance of a TVR, is void ab initio. b. The summary confiscation of a driver's
license without first giving the driver an opportunity to be heard; depriving him of a
property right (driver's license) without DUE PROCESS; not filling (sic) in Court the
complaint of supposed traffic infraction, cannot be justified by any legislation (and
is) hence unconstitutional.
Issues: 1. WON a license to operate a motor vehicle is a privilege that the state may
withhold in the exercise of its police power. YES.
 The petitioner correctly points out that a license to operate a motor
vehicle is not a property right, but a privilege granted by the state, which
may be suspended or revoked by the state in the exercise of its police
power, in the interest of the public safety and welfare, subject to the
procedural due process requirements.
 State ex. Rel. Sullivan: "the legislative power to regulate travel over the
highways and thoroughfares of the state for the general welfare is
extensive. It may be exercised in any reasonable manner to conserve the
safety of travelers and pedestrians. Since motor vehicles are instruments
of potential danger, their registration and the licensing of their operators
have been required almost from their first appearance. The right to
operate them in public places is not a natural and unrestrained right, but a
privilege subject to reasonable regulation, under the police power, in the
interest of the public safety and welfare. The power to license imports
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further power to withhold or to revoke such license upon noncompliance
with prescribed conditions."
 Commonwealth v. Funk: "Automobiles are vehicles of great speed and
power. The use of them constitutes an element of danger to persons and
property upon the highways. Carefully operated, an automobile is still a
dangerous instrumentality, but, when operated by careless or incompetent
persons, it becomes an engine of destruction. The Legislature, in the
exercise of the police power of the commonwealth, not only may, but
must, prescribe how and by whom motor vehicles shall be operated on the
highways. One of the primary purposes of a system of general regulation
of the subject matter, as here by the Vehicle Code, is to insure the
competency of the operator of motor vehicles. Such a general law is
manifestly directed to the promotion of public safety and is well within the
police power."
 The common thread running through the cited cases is that it is the
legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and
responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be
operated on the state highways.
2. WON the MMDA is vested with police power. NO.
 Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,
we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA
with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are
administrative in nature. Tracing the legislative history of RA 7924 creating
the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit
or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its
predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact
ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an
ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was
invalid.
 Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested
by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all
manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances,
either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they
shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for
the subjects of the same. Having been lodged primarily in the National
Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not
possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may
delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as
the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units
(LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative
powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.
 Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in LGC. A local government is
a "political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and
has substantial control of local affairs." Local government units are the
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which exercise police
power through their respective legislative bodies. Metropolitan or Metro
Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the
passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared
as a "special development and administrative region" and the
administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed
under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus: the
powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management,
monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.
There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power,
let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been
delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local
government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers
the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development
authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies
and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's
organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
metropolitan area.
 Clearly, the MMDA is not a political unit of government. The power
delegated to the MMDA is that given to the Metro Manila Council to
promulgate administrative rules and regulations in the implementation of
the MMDA's functions. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances
and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the
metropolis.
3. WON Sec. 5(f) grants the MMDA with the duty to enforce existing traffic
rules and regulations. YES.
 Section 5 of RA 7924 enumerates the "Functions and Powers of the Metro
Manila Development Authority." The contested clause in Sec. 5(f) states
that the petitioner shall "install and administer a single ticketing system,
fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violations of
traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or nonmoving in nature, and
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confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers' licenses in the enforcement of

such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and P.D. No.
1605 to the contrary notwithstanding," and that "(f)or this purpose, the
Authority shall enforce all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manila,
through its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the
PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units, duly licensed security
guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be
delegated certain authority, subject to such conditions and requirements
as the Authority may impose."
 Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the
legislature or those agencies to whom legislative powers have been
delegated (the City of Manila in this case), the petitioner is not precluded –
and in fact is duty-bound – to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers'
licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic
management, as well as the administration and implementation of all
traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic
education programs.

League of Cities v. COMELEC

Facts: 11th Congress: 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities were enacted.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
12th Congress: RA 9009 which amended Sec. 450 of the LGC by increasing the
annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20
million to P100 million was enacted. The rationale for the amendment was to
restrain, in the words of Sen. Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert
into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite
the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. After the effectivity of RA
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9009, the House adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought to exempt from the
P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood
bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
13th Congress: JR 29 was re-adopted as JR 1 and was forwarded to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Sen.Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their
respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million
income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of
Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the
cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7
June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law without the President’s signature. The
Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the
voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their
municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also
lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285
of the LGC.
Issues: 1. WON RA 9009 violates the principle of non-retroactivity. NO
 Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009.
RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress.
The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which
became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke
the principle of non-retroactivity of laws. This basic rule has no application
because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied
retroactively but prospectively.
2. WON RA 9009 violates Sec 10 Art X of the Constitution.
 The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must
follow the criteria established in the LGC and not in any other law. There is
only one LGC. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the LGC all
the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of
a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other
law, like the Cityhood Laws. The criteria prescribed in the LGC govern
exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of
the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to
insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the
same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the LGC. Any
derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the LGC violates
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
 RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the LGC to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This
took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the LGC required
that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100
million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA
9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement.
 In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent
municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress
when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the
effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from
the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the LGC, as amended
by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the LGC and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
 There can be no resort to extrinsic aids — like deliberations of Congress —
if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts
determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within
the law’s four corners. If the language of the law is plain, clear and
unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms.
If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or
injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction
like the legislative history of the law.
 Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the LGC, did not
provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even
to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when
Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA
9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and
unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must
meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond
the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA
9009.
 True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent
municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the
matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this
intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such
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exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of
respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA
9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the LGC. The Constitution
requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city,
including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the LGC.
Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in
any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that
does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the LGC.
3. WON the Cityhood Laws violate Sec 6Art X of the Constitution.
 Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the LGC are
essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to
all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution
provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by
law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
 If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and
discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national
taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20
million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in
national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The
criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450
of the LGC, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by
law, are material in determining the “just share” of local government units
in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income
criterion in Section 450 of the LGC, they prevent the fair and just
distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution.
4. WON the deliberations of unapproved bills by the 11th Congress may be
used as basis for those approved by the 12th . NO
 Congress is not a continuing body. The unapproved cityhood bills filed
during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the
adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations
conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became
worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings
and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the
13th or subsequent Congresses.
 The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved
bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of
that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the
next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in
2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one
again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first
time, from the filing to the approval.
 The deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood
bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on
the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities,
have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in
construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses.
5. WON the equal protection clause was violated.
 If Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption
to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such
exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal
protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the LGC,
could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification.
However, Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not
contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws,
which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in
the LGC as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
 Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in
Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The
exemption provision merely states, “Exemption from Republic Act No.
9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement
prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.” This one sentence exemption
provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating
the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.
 Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that
municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100
million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy
the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the
fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th
Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification
between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100
million income requirement.
 To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on
substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government
objective which is the purpose of the law, [23] not limited to existing
conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court
has ruled:
 The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid
classification under the following conditions:
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1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same
class.
 There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending
cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending
bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a
material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the
purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the
11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a
municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress
might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have
pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of
a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of
the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting
into cities.
 Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed
that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for
exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they
been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their
own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual
income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into
cities if their income is less than P100 million.
 The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the
exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA
9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the
requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing
conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v.
Ten Eyck, where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in
business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to
newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court
held: We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory
law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those
presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples
are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those
entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt
those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or
laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting
existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since,
on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest
of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic
advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as
against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do
not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health
or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it
was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the
absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible
situations which might justify the discrimination. The classification is
arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection
of the law.
 In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the
16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the
filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress – as
against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the
effectivity of RA 9009.
 Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates
the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities
cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.
Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws,
even if it were written in Section 450 of the LGC, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
Reyes dissent:
1.The cityhood laws do not violate Section 10, Article X of the 1987
Constitution.
 Sec 10 mandatory. The use of the word "shall" in a constitutional provision
is generally considered as a mandatory command, though the word "shall"
may receive a permissive interpretation when necessary to carry out the
true intent of the provision where the word is found. Thus, it is not always
the case that the use of the word "shall" is conclusive. However, a reading
of Section 10, Article X cannot be construed as anything else but
mandatory.
 The intent of R.A. No. 9009, which amended Section 450 of the LGC, is to
exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement of
P100,000,000.00. Thus, the cityhood laws, which merely carry out the
intent of R.A. No. 9009, are in accordance with the "criteria established in
the LGC," pursuant to Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The
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cityhood laws contain a uniformly worded exemption clause, which states:
"Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The city of [___] shall be exempt
from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009."
 What Congress had in mind is not at all times accurately reflected in the
language of the statute. Thus, the literal interpretation of a statute may
render it meaningless; and lead to absurdity, injustice, or contradiction.105
When this happens, and following the rule that the intent or the spirit of
the law is the law itself, resort should be had to the principle that the spirit
of the law controls its letter. Not to the letter that killeth, but to the spirit
that vivifieth. Hindi ang letra na pumapatay, kung hindi ang diwa na
nagbibigay buhay.
 The purpose of the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 can be seen in the
sponsorship speech of Senator Pimentel on Senate Bill No. 2157.
Noteworthy is his statement that the basis for the proposed increase from
P20,000,000.00 to P100,000,000.00 in the income requirement for
municipalities and cluster of barangays wanting to be converted into cities
is the "mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities," and
in order that the country "will not be a nation of all cities and no
municipalities."
 The deliberations of Congress are necessary to ferret out the intent of the
legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9009. It is very clear that Congress intended
that the then pending cityhood bills would not be covered by the income
requirement of P100,000,000.00 imposed by R.A. No. 9009. It was made
clear by the Legislature that R.A. No. 9009 would not have any retroactive
effect.
 It then becomes clear that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption
clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of the Legislature of not
giving retroactive effect to R.A. No. 9009. In fact, not only do the legislative
records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the
income requirement of P100,000,000.00 imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
Congress has now made its intent express in the cityhood laws.
 Petitioners and petitioners-intervention were not able to discharge their
onus probandi of overcoming the presumption of constitutionality
accorded to the cityhood laws.
2. The cityhood laws do not violate the equal protection clause under Section
1, Article III of the Constitution by granting special treatment to
respondent municipalities in exempting them from the minimum income
requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
 In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same
effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills
seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. The
proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness.
Based on these data, it is clear that all the 12 municipalities under
consideration are qualified to become cities prior to RA 9009. All of them
satisfy the mandatory requirement on income and one of the two optional
requirements of territory.
 The classification rests on substantial distinctions. What distinguishes
respondent municipalities from other municipalities is that the latter had
pending cityhood bills before the passage of R.A. No. 9009. In the words of
Senator Lim, the peculiar conditions of respondent municipalities, which
led to their exemption from the increased P100,000,000.00 income
requirement of R.A. No. 9009, is that the imposition of a much higher
income requirement on those that were qualified to become cities before
the enactment of R.A. No. 9009 was "unfair; like any sport - changing the
rules in the middle of the game." Thus, "fairness dictates that they should
be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove that
they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria
set forth under the LGC prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009." Truly,
the peculiar conditions of respondent municipalities, which are actual and
real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification.
 The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of
respondent municipalities from the P100,000,000.00 income requirement
of R.A. No. 9009 was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and
justice were accorded to respondent municipalities, as their cityhood bills
were not enacted by Congress in view of intervening events and for
reasons beyond their control. The equal protection clause does not merely
prohibit Congress from passing discriminatory laws. The equal protection
clause also commands Congress to pass laws which would positively
promote equality or reduce existing inequalities. This was what Congress
actually did in enacting the cityhood laws. These laws positively promote
equality and reduce the existing inequality between respondent
municipalities and the "other thirty-two (32) municipalities" whose
cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress.
 The classification is not limited to existing conditions only. The non-
retroactive effect of R.A. No. 9009 is not limited in application to
conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for
all time as long as the conditions set there exist. It is applicable as long as
the concerned municipalities have filed their respective cityhood bills
before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9009, and qualify for conversion into city
under the original version of Section 450 of the LGC.
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 The common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the
non-retroactive effect of R.A. No. 9009. It is not a declaration of certain
rights but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with
the non-retroactive effect of R.A. No. 9009.
 Curiously, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention do not question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 9009. In fact, they use R.A. No. 9009 to argue
for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws. This is absurd,
considering that the cityhood laws only expressed the intent of R.A. No.
9009 to exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement
of P100,000,000.00.
 An analogy may be found in the Constitution. Citizenship may be granted
to those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Citizenship,
however, is denied to those who, although born before January 17, 1973,
of Filipino mothers, did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
age of majority.155 In like manner, Congress has the power to carry out
the intent of R.A. No. 9009 by making a law which exempts municipalities
from the P100,000,000.00 income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009
if their cityhood laws were pending when R.A. No. 9009 was passed, and
were compliant with the income threshold requirement of P20,000,000.00
imposed by then Section 450 of the LGC.
 Even if the classification of the cityhood laws is limited to existing
conditions only, this does not automatically mean that they are
unconstitutional. The general rule is that a classification must not be based
on existing conditions only. It must also be made for future acquisitions of
the class as other subjects acquire the characteristics which form the basis
of the classification. The exception is when the statute is curative or
remedial, and thus temporary.
 Here, the cityhood laws are curative or remedial statutes. They seek to
prevent the great injustice which would be committed to respondent
municipalities. Again, the cityhood laws are not contrary to the spirit and
intent of R.A. No. 9009 because Congress intended said law to be
prospective, not retroactive, in application. Indeed, to deny respondent
municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the other thirty-
two (32) municipalities when they are under the same circumstances, is
tantamount to denying respondent municipalities the protective mantle of
the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-
intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation
of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another
violation of the equal protection clause. That the Court cannot sustain.
 The classification applies equally to all members of the same class. The
cityhood laws, in carrying out the clear intent of R.A. No. 9009, apply to
municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of R.A.
No. 9009 and were compliant with then Section 450 of the LGC that
prescribed an income requirement of P20,000,000.00.
**Summing Up
Majority’s ground for unconstitutionality:
(1) applying R.A. No. 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because R.A. No. 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills
became laws more than five (5) years later;
 cityhood bills were pending before the passage of R.A. No. 9009. Congress
was well aware of such fact. Thus, Congress intended the hiked income
requirement in R.A. No. 9009 not to apply to the cityhood bills which
became the subject cityhood laws. This is the context of the reference to
the prospective application of the said R.A. Congress intended the cityhood
laws in question to be exempted from the income requirement of
P100,000,000.00 imposed by R.A. No. 9009.
(2) the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the
creation of a city in the LGC and not in any other law;
 The second point is specious. It overlooks that R.A. No. 9009 is now Section 450
of the LGC. The cityhood laws also merely carry out the intent of R.A. No. 9009 to
exempt respondent municipalities from the income requirement of
P100,000,000.00.
(3) the cityhood laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they
prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units;
 The third needs clarification. Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution speaks for
itself. While it is true that local government units shall have a "just share" in the
national taxes, it is qualified by the phrase "as determined by law."
(4) the intent of members of Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the
coverage of R.A. No. 9009 remained an intent and was never written into law;
 Congress meant not to incorporate its intent in what eventually became R.A. No.
9009. To recall, Senate President Franklin Drilon asked if there would be an
appropriate language to be crafted which would reflect the intent of Congress.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel gave a categorical answer: "I do not think it is necessary
to put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the
interpretation of this bill."
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(5) the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by R.A. No. 9009, were compliant with the income threshold of P20,000,000.00 under the old Section
for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain, and unambiguous, needing 450 of the LGC. Respondent municipalities are covered by the twin criteria. Thus,
no resort to any statutory construction; petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention cannot hardly claim the cityhood laws
 Neither is the fifth item persuasive. The dissent admits that courts may resort to are unconstitutional on the ground they violate the criteria established in the LGC.
extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law if the Neither may they claim that the cityhood laws violate the equal protection clause of
literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility, or injustice. the Constitution. Congress is given the widest latitude in making classifications and
in laying down the criteria. Separation of powers prevents the Court from prying
(6) the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or into the wisdom or judgment of Congress. Even if the Court did, there is no
resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress unreasonable classification here, much less grave abuse of discretion.
because it is not a continuing body; and The intent of Congress - to avert the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be
 It is immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and converted into cities and to prevent this nation from becoming a nation of all cities
deliberations conducted during the 11th or 12th Congress may still be used as and no municipalities - is preserved.
extrinsic aids or reference because the same cityhood bills which were filed before
the passage of R.A. No. 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress.
 It does not matter if the officers of each Congress or the authors of the
bills are different. In the end, the rationale for exempting the cityhood bills
from the P100,000,000.00 income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009
remains the same: (1) the cityhood bills were pending before the passage
of R.A. No. 9009, and (2) respondent municipalities were compliant with
the P20,000,000.00 income requirement imposed by the old Section 450 of
the LGC, which was eventually amended by R.A. No. 9009.
 What should not be overlooked is that the cityhood laws enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality. Petitioners and petitioners-in-
intervention bear the heavy burden of overcoming such presumption.
However, the majority does exactly the opposite. It shifts the onus
probandi to respondent municipalities to prove that their cityhood laws
are constitutional. That is violative of the basic rule of evidence.

(7) even if the exemption in the cityhood laws were written in Section 450 of the
LGC, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal
protection clause because the exemption is based solely on the fact that the 16
municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when R.A. No. 9009
was enacted.
 The exemption on the 16 municipalities is not only based on the fact that they
had pending cityhood bills when R.A. No. 9009 was enacted. Aside from complying
with the territory and population requirements of the LGC, these municipalities also
met the P20,000,000.00 income threshold of the old Section 450 of the LGC.

** intent of R.A. No. 9009 is clear. Congress intended to exempt municipalities (1)
that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of R.A. No. 9009; and (2) that
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Caasi v. CA

Facts: Merito Miguel won in the 1988 mayoral elections in Bolinao, Pangasinan.
Petitions were filed seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he holds a green
card issued to him by the US Immigration Service which would mean that he his a
permanent resident of the United States, and not of Bolinao. COMELEC dismissed
the petitions on the ground that possession of a green card by Miguel does not
sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines. On the
contrary, despite his green card, he has sufficiently indicated his intention to
continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections
in said municipality. Commissioner Badoy’s dissent: A green card holder being a
permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having
admitted that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This
respondent has not done. Miguel’s opponent, Caasi also filed a petition for quo
warranto. Miguel filed an MTD which was denied by the RTC. CA ordered the RTC to
dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case on the ground
that the COMELEC has already ruled on his qualifications.

Issues: 1. WON a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the
United States
 Consti: Article XI, Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant
of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.

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 Omnibus Election Code: SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
 Court took note of: a.in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien
Registration" Miguel's answer regarding his "Length of intended stay (if
permanently, so state)," was “Permanently." b. on its face, the green card
that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice
and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent Merito C.
Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. c. On the
back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is
printed:Alien Registration Receipt Card. Person identified by this card is
entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States."
 Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States
in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his
children or his doctor there; he entered the limited States with the
intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an
immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that application of
his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
 Immigration: removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating
the entering into a country with the intention of residing in it.
 Immigrant: person who removes into a country for the purpose of
permanent residence. However, statutes sometimes give a broader
meaning to the term "immigrant."
 As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance
to the U.S., the country in which he resides. This is in return for the
protection given to him during the period of his residence therein. Aliens
reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in
general entitled to the protection of the laws with regard to their rights of
person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. In
general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to
remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution with regard to
their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal
responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that
no state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due
process of law, or deny to any person the equal protection of the law, and
the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood
by following the ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the
protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law.
 Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any
public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire
the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be
dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the
status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public
office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
 The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
Blg. 881), which provides: Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective
office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with
the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'
2. WON Miguel waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to
the U.S.A. prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
 To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in
the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his
green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without
such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec.
68, Omnibus Election Code).
 Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of
this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such
before he ran for election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18,
1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate
for that office.
 Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office
for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is
one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public office must
possess. Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
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permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a
period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the
Philippines in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that
municipality on January 18, 1988.
 In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are
permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to
hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens
who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or
purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens
of a foreign country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest
and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here,
they must keep another eye on their duties under the laws of the foreign
country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent
residents thereof.
 Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent
residence in the United States, he never really intended to live there
permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to
come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have this
Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false
pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States but
kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will
not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit
from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.
 Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the
U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his
occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant status
should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence
that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered
his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that
he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto
was null and void.
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
Facts : Rodriguez won against Marquez for the gubernatorial post in Quezon
province. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo warranto
before the COMELEC. Marquez revealed that Rodriguez left the United States
where a charge, filed on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter before
the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and
attempted grand theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a "fugitive from
justice" which is a ground for his disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of
the LGC. The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’ quo warranto petition in a resolution of
February 2, 1993, and likewise denied a reconsideration thereof. Marquez
challenged the COMELEC dismissal via petition for certiorari. In the May 8, 1995
election, Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of
governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez' candidacy via petition for
disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that
Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice." This petition for disqualification was filed by
Marquez on April 11, 1995 when Rodriguez' petition for certiorari (112889) — from
where the April 18, 1995 MARQUEZ Decision sprung — was still then pending
before the Court. On May 7, 1995 and after the promulgation of the MARQUEZ
Decision, the COMELEC promulgated a Consolidated Resolution for EPC No. 92-28
(quo warranto case) and SPA No. 95-089 (disqualification case).
Issue: WON Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" as contemplated by Section 40(e)
of the LGC based on the alleged pendency of a criminal charge against him.
 Fugitive from justice: A person, who, having committed a crime, flees from
jurisdiction of the court where crime was committed or departs from his
usual place of abode and conceals himself within the district (Black’s Law)
 Objective facts sufficient to constitute flight from justice are: (a) a person
committed a 'crime' or has been charged for the commission thereof; and
(b) thereafter, leaves the jurisdiction of the court where said crime was
committed or his usual place of abode.
 Filing of charges prior to flight is not always an antecedent requirement to
label one a 'fugitive from justice.’ Mere commission of a 'crime' without
charges having been filed for the same and flight subsequent thereto
sufficiently meet the definition. Attention is directed at the use of the
word 'crime' which is not employed to connote guilt or conviction for the
commission thereof. Justice Davide's separate opinion in G.R. No. 112889
elucidates that the disqualification for being a fugitive does not involve the
issue of the presumption of innocence, the reason for disqualification
being that a person 'was not brought within the jurisdiction of the court
because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he was brought within the
jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted, he has successfully
evaded service of sentence because he had jumped bail or escaped. The
disqualification then is based on his ‘flight from justice.’
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 State v. Richter: The simple fact that they (person who have committed
crime within a state) are not within the state to answer its criminal process
when required renders them, in legal intendment, fugitives from justice.
 THE MERE FACT THAT THERE ARE PENDING CHARGES IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THAT PETITIONER RODRIGUEZ IS IN THE PHILIPPINES MAKE
PETITIONER A 'FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE.'
 Marquez decision: includes not only those who flee after conviction to
avoid punishment but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution." The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction.
And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or
punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.
 Rodriguez' case just cannot fit in this concept. There is no dispute that his
arrival in the Philippines from the US on June 25, 1985, as per certifications
issued by the Bureau of Immigrations dated April 27and June 26 of
1995,[4] preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles
Court on November 12, 1985 and of the issuance on even date of the
arrest warrant by that same foreign court, by almost five (5) months. It
was clearly impossible for Rodriguez to have known about such felony
complaint and arrest warrant at the time he left the US, as there was in
fact no complaint and arrest warrant — much less conviction — to speak of
yet at such time. What prosecution or punishment then was Rodriguez
deliberately running away from with his departure from the US? The very
essence of being a "fugitive from justice" under the MARQUEZ Decision
definition, is just nowhere to be found in the circumstances of Rodriguez.
 "The circumstantial fact that it was seventeen (17) days after Rodriguez'
departure that charges against him were filed cannot overturn the
presumption of good faith in his favor. The same suggests nothing more
than the sequence of events which transpired. A subjective fact as that of
petitioner's purpose cannot be inferred from the objective data at hand in
the absence of further proof to substantiate such claim. In fact, the
evidence of petitioner Rodriguez sufficiently proves that his compulsion to
return to the Philippines was due to his desire to join and participate
vigorously in the political campaigns against former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. For indeed, not long after petitioner's arrival in the country, the
upheaval wrought by the political forces and the avalanche of events
which occurred resulted in one of the more colorful events in Philippine
history. The EDSA Revolution led to the ouster of former Pres. Marcos and
precipitated changes in the political climate. And being a figure in these
developments, petitioner Rodriguez began serving his home province as
OIC-Board Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan ng Quezon in 1986.
Then, he was elected Governor in 1988 and continues to be involved in
politics in the same capacity as re-elected Governor in 1992 and the
disputed re-election in 1995. Altogether, these landmark dates hem in for
petitioner a period of relentless, intensive and extensive activity of varied
political campaigns — first against the Marcos government, then for the
governorship. And serving the people of Quezon province as such, the
position entails absolute dedication of one's time to the demands of the
office.
 "Having established petitioner's lack of knowledge of the charges to be
filed against him at the time he left the United States, it becomes
immaterial under such construction to determine the exact time when he
was made aware thereof. While the law, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, does not countenance flight from justice in the instance that a
person flees the jurisdiction of another state after charges against him or a
warrant for his arrest was issued or even in view of the imminent filing and
issuance of the same, petitioner's plight is altogether a different situation.
When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his own,
homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed against him
while in the relative peace and service of his own country, the fact that he
does not subject himself to the jurisdiction of the former state does not
qualify him outright as a fugitive from justice. The severity of the law
construed in the manner as to require of a person that he subject himself
to the jurisdiction of another state while already in his country or else be
disqualified from office, is more apparent when applied in petitioner's
case. The criminal process of the United States extends only within its
territorial jurisdiction. That petitioner has already left said country when
the latter sought to subject him to its criminal process is hardly petitioner's
fault. In the absence of an intent to evade the laws of the United States,
petitioner had every right to depart therefrom at the precise time that he
did and to return to the Philippines. No justifiable reason existed to curtail
or fetter petitioner's exercise of his right to leave the United State and
return home. Hence, sustaining the contrary proposition would be to
unduly burden and punish petitioner for exercising a right as he cannot be
faulted for the circumstances that brought him within Philippine territory
at the time he was sought to be placed under arrest and to answer for
charges filed against him.
 "It must be noted that moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching
as to demand of political candidate the performance of duties and
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obligations that are supererogatory in nature. We do not dispute that an
alleged 'fugitive from justice' must perform acts in order not to be so
categorized. Clearly, a person who is aware of the imminent filing of
charges against him or of the same already filed in connection with acts he
committed in the jurisdiction of a particular state, is under an obligation
not to flee said place of commission. However, as in petitioner's case, his
departure from the United States may not place him under a similar
obligation. His subsequent knowledge while in the Philippines and non-
submission to the jurisdiction of the former country does not operate to
label petitioner automatically a fugitive from justice. As he was a public
officer appointed and elected immediately after his return to the country,
petitioner Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to the
service of his office. He could not have gone back to the United States in
the middle of his term nor could he have traveled intermittently thereto
without jeopardizing the interest of the public he serves. To require that
of petitioner would be to put him in a paradoxical quandary where he is
compelled to violate the very functions of his office."
 To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the
disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for any elective
local position under Section 40(e) of the LGC, should be understood
according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision. Intent to evade
on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that
there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge has already been
filed, at the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this
definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial
post.
De La Torre v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre via the instant petition for certiorari seeks
the nullification of two resolutions issued by the COMELEC allegedly with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in a case for disqualification
filed against petitioner before the COMELEC. The first assailed resolution dated May
6,1995 declared the petitioner disqualified from running for the position of Mayor
of Cavinti, Laguna in the last May 8,1995 elections, citing as the ground therefor,
Section 40(a) of the LGC which provides as follows: The following persons are
disqualified from running for any elective local position: (a) Those sentenced by
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment within two (2) years after serving
sentence. In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that: Documentary
evidence established that herein respondent (petitioner) was found guilty by the
Municipal Trial Court for violation of P.D. 1612, (otherwise known as the Anti-
fencing Law) in a Decision dated June 1, 1990. Respondent appealed the said
conviction with the Regional Trial Court , which however, affirmed respondent’s
conviction in a Decision dated November 14,1990. Respondent’s conviction
became final on January 18,1991. The second assailed resolution, dated August 28,
1995, denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In said motion, petitioner
claimed that Section 40 (a) of the LGC does not apply to his case inasmuch as the
probation granted him by the MTC on December 21, 1994 which suspended the
execution of the judgment of conviction and all other legal consequences flowing
therefrom, rendered inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.[4]
Issues: 1. WON the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
 Section 40 (a): “when the conviction by final judgment is for an offense
involving moral turpitude.” And in this connection, the Court has
consistently adopted the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary of “moral
turpitude” as: an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
 Not every criminal act, however, involves moral turpitude. It is for this
reason that “as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme
Court to determine”. In resolving the foregoing question, the Court is
guided by one of the general rules that crimes mala in se involve moral
turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita do not, the rationale of which was
set forth in “Zari v. Flores,” to wit: “It (moral turpitude) implies something
immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that it is punishable by law or not.
It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the act itself must be inherently
immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute fixes
the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not, however, include such acts
as are not of themselves immoral but whose illegality lies in their being
positively prohibited.”
 This guideline nonetheless proved short of providing a clear-cut solution,
for in “International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court admitted
that it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does
not exist by merely classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum
prohibitum. There are crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely
involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis, whether or not
a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a question of fact and
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frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of
the statute.
 Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D.1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) as: the act of
any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy,
receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and
sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
 Elements: 1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 2. The
accused who is not a principal or accomplice in the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item,
object or anything of value, which have been derived from the proceeds of
the said crime; 3. The accused knows or should have known that the said
article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 4. There is, on the part of
the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
 Moral turpitude is deducible from the third element. Actual knowledge by
the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen displays the same
degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which
animated the robbery or theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of
moral turpitude. And although the participation of each felon in the
unlawful taking differs in point in time and in degree, both the “fence” and
the actual perpetrator/s of the robbery or theft invaded one’s peaceful
dominion for gain - thus deliberately reneging in the process “private
duties” they owe their “fellowmen” or “society” in a manner “contrary to
accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good
morals.” The duty not to appropriate, or to return, anything acquired
either by mistake or with malice is so basic it finds expression in some key
provisions of the Civil Code on “Human Relations” and “Solutio Indebiti”
 The same underlying reason holds even if the “fence” did not have actual
knowledge, but merely “should have known” the origin of the property
received. In this regard, the Court held: “When knowledge of the
existence of a particular fact is an element of the offense, such knowledge
is established if a person is aware of the high probability of its existence
unless he actually believes that it does not exist. On the other hand, the
words ‘should know’ denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence
and intelligence would ascertain the fact in the performance of his duty to
another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists.”
2. WON a grant of probation affects Section 40 (a)’s applicability.
 Anent the second issue where petitioner contends that his probation had
the effect of suspending the applicability of Section 40 (a) of the LGC,
suffice it to say that the legal effect of probation is only to suspend the
execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which we
have heretofore declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling
squarely under the disqualification found in Section 40 (a), subsists and
remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation. In fact,
a judgment of conviction in a criminal case ipso facto attains finality when
the accused applies for probation, although it is not executory pending
resolution of the application for probation. Clearly then, petitioner’s
theory has no merit.
Magno v. COMELEC
Facts: A case was filed by private respondent on March 21, 2001 for the
disqualification of petitioner Nestor Magno as mayoralty candidate of San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija during the May 14, 2001 elections on the ground that petitioner was
previously convicted by the Sandiganbayan of four counts of direct bribery
penalized under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. It appears that on July 25,
1995, petitioner was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 3 months
and 11 days of arresto mayor as minimum to 1 year 8 months and 21 days of prision
correccional as maximum, for each of the four counts of direct bribery. Thereafter,
petitioner applied for probation and was discharged on March 5, 1998 upon order
of the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija. On May 7, 2001, the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) rendered a decision granting the petition of private
respondent and declaring that petitioner was disqualified from running for the
position of mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections based on Sec 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code. On May 10, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but
the same was denied by the COMELEC in its resolution dated May 12, 2001. Hence,
this petition.
Issue: WON petitioner was disqualified to run for mayor in the 2001 elections.
a. whether the crime of direct bribery involves moral turpitude
 Moral Turpitude: an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
(Black’s Law)
 Elements of Bribery: 1. the offender is a public officer; 2. the offender
accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
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through another; 3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in
consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is
his official duty to do; and 4. the act which the offender agrees to perform
or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.
 Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the
offender agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an
unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty in exchange for
some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general.
Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is
a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and good
morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
b. whether it is the Omnibus Election Code or the LGC that should apply in
this situation.
 There appears to be a glaring incompatibility between the five-year
disqualification period provided in Sec 12 of the Omnibus Election Code
and the two-year disqualification period in Sec 40 of the LGC. It should be
noted that the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) was approved on
December 3, 1985 while the LGC (RA 7160) took effect on January 1, 1992.
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict
between two laws, the later enactment must prevail, being the more
recent expression of legislative will. Legis posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant. In enacting the later law, the legislature is presumed to have
knowledge of the older law and intended to change it. Furthermore, the
repealing clause of Section 534 of RA 7160 or the LGC states that: (f) All
general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
 In accordance therewith, Section 40 of RA 7160 is deemed to have
repealed Section 12 of BP 881. Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and not the
other way around. When a subsequent law entirely encompasses the
subject matter of the former enactment, the latter is deemed repealed.
 David v. COMELEC: RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies
to local government units. Section 40 thereof specially and definitively
provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is
applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12 of BP 881 speaks
of disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the
election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of RA 7160, insofar as it
governs the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the
nature of a special law which ought to prevail.
 The intent of the legislature to reduce the disqualification period of
candidates for local positions from five to two years is evident. The
cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and give effect
to the intent of the law. The reduction of the disqualification period from
five to two years is the manifest intent.
 Therefore, although his crime of direct bribery involved moral turpitude,
petitioner nonetheless could not be disqualified from running in the 2001
elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) must yield to
Article 40 of the LGC. Petitioner’s disqualification ceased as of March 5,
2000 and he was therefore under no such disqualification anymore when
he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.
Lingating v. COMELEC
Facts: Miguel M. Lingating filed a disqualification case against respondent Cesar B.
Sulong as candidate for mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur in the May 14, 2001
elections, pursuant to §40(b) of the LGC, which disqualifies from running for any
elective local position “those removed from office as a result of an administrative
case. It appears that respondent Sulong had previously won as mayor of Lapuyan
on January 18, 1988. In the May 11, 1992, and again in the May 8, 1995 elections,
he was reelected. In a petition for disqualification, petitioner alleged that in 1991,
during his first term as mayor of Lapuyan, respondent Sulong, along with a
municipal councilor of Lapuyan and several other individuals, was administratively
charged with various offenses, and that, on February 4, 1992, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur found him guilty of the charges and ordered his
removal from office. Petitioner claimed that this decision had become final and
executory, and consequently the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, took
his oath as mayor vice respondent Sulong on March 3, 1992. Respondent Sulong
denied that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final and executory. He
averred that after receiving a copy of the decision on February 17, 1992, he filed a
motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal thereof on February 18, 1992;
that on February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan required Jim Lingating,
the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment on respondent Sulong’s motion for
reconsideration and/or notice of appeal; that the said complainant had not yet
complied therewith and his (respondent Sulong’s) motion had consequently
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remained pending. Respondent Sulong denied he had been removed from office by
virtue of the decision in AC No. 12-91. After the parties had filed their memoranda,
the case was submitted for resolution. Because the COMELEC was unable to render
judgment before the elections of May 14, 2001, respondent Sulong was voted for in
the elections, receiving 4,882 votes as against the 3,611 votes for petitioner. On
May 16, 2001, respondent Sulong was proclaimed by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Lapuyan as the duly elected mayor of that municipality. In a
resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC’s First Division declared respondent
Cesar B. Sulong disqualified. Respondent Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration
citing a certification, dated August 7, 2001, of Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga
del Sur (OIC) Wilfredo Cimafranca that the decision in AC No. 12-91 “has not
become final and executory as the final disposition thereof was overtaken by the
local elections of May 1992.” He reiterated his claim that at no time had he been
removed by virtue of the said decision. Petitioner filed an opposition contending,
among other things, that the fact that Zamboanga del Sur Governor Ariosa had
ordered the enforcement of the decision signified that respondent Sulong’s motion
for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal had not been given due course by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; and that respondent Sulong’s claim that he had not
been removed from office was belied by the fact that he (respondent Sulong)
brought charges against Vicente Imbing for Usurpation of Official Functions (I.S. No.
92-35), in support of which respondent Sulong attested under oath that Imbing had
succeeded him as mayor of Lapuyan. In a separate motion, petitioner prayed that
the resolution of August 1, 2001 be executed and that he be installed as mayor of
Lapuyan in view of private respondent’s disqualification. On August 30, 2001, the
COMELEC’s First Division denied petitioner’s motion for execution on the ground
that the disqualification of an elected candidate does not entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office vacated.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order. On April 4, 2002, the
COMELEC en banc issued its resolution subject of the petition in this case, reversing
the resolution, dated August 1, 2001, of its First Division insofar as it found
respondent Sulong disqualified from running as mayor. In the May 1992 elections,
respondent Sulong was re-elected mayor of Lapuyan, Zamboanga del Sur despite
the decision of the Sangguniang dismissing him from office. In the 1995 May
elections, respondent Sulong ran and won the mayoralty elections of Lapuyan,
Zamboanga del Sur. The COMELEC en banc also ruled that, in any event, respondent
Sulong was not entitled to occupy the office thus vacated. Hence, this petition by
Lingating.
Issue: WON an elective local executive officer, who is removed before the
expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a
candidate for a local elective position under §40(b) of the LGC.
 Reyes case: Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, in
which it was held that a public official could not be removed for
misconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelection
operated as a condonation of the officer’s previous misconduct to the
extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But that was
because in that case, before the petition questioning the validity of the
administrative decision removing petitioner could be decided, the term of
office during which the alleged misconduct was committed expired.
Removal cannot extend beyond the term during which the alleged
misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his
term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter
reelected [for] another term. This is the rationale for the ruling in the two
Aguinaldo cases. The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here,
. . . the decision in the administrative case, . . . was served on petitioner
and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed to
appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus validly removed from
office and, pursuant to §40(b) of the LGC, he was disqualified from running
for reelection.
 It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there
was no provision similar to §40(b) which disqualifies any person from
running for any elective position on the ground that he has been removed
as a result of an administrative case. The LGC of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160)
could not be given retroactive effect.
 However, Reyes cannot be applied to this case because it appears that the
1992 decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, finding respondent Sulong
guilty of dishonesty, falsification and malversation of public funds, has not
until now become final. The records of this case show that the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Sur rendered judgment in AC
No. 12-91 on February 4, 1992, a copy of which was received by
respondent Sulong on February 17, 1992; that on February 18, 1992, he
filed a “motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal;” that on
February 27, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, required Jim Lingating,
the complainant in AC No. 12-91, to comment; and that the complainant in
AC No. 12-91 has not filed a comment nor has the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan resolved respondent’s motion. The filing of his motion for
reconsideration prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from
becoming final.
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 While R.A. No. 7160 on disciplinary actions is silent on the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, the same cannot be interpreted as a
prohibition against the filing of a motion for reconsideration. Thus, it was
held[15] that a party in a disbarment proceeding under Rule 139-B, §12(c)
can move for a reconsideration of a resolution of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines although Rule 139-B does not so provide: Although Rule 139-B,
§12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its
text or history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be
filed . . . . Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before
[an appeal is] resort[ed] to . . . as a matter of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment [an] opportunity to
correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of
facts or misappreciation of evidence.
 There is thus no decision finding respondent guilty to speak of. As
Provincial Secretary of Zamboanga del Sur Wilfredo Cimafranca attested,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan simply considered the matter as having
become moot and academic because it was “overtaken by the local
elections of May [11,]1992.”
 Neither can the succession of the then vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente
Imbing, and the highest ranking municipal councilor of Lapuyan, Romeo
Tan, to the offices of mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, be considered
proof that the decision in AC No. 12-91 had become final because it
appears to have been made pursuant to §68[16] of the LGC, which makes
decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.
 Indeed, considering the failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to resolve
respondent’s motion, it is unfair to the electorate to be told after they
have voted for respondent Sulong that after all he is disqualified, especially
since, at the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the decision of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan had been rendered nearly ten years ago.
 Having come to the conclusion that respondent Sulong is not disqualified
from holding the position of mayor of Lapuyan, it is unnecessary to pass
upon petitioner’s contention that, as the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes, he is entitled to be installed as mayor
because the votes cast in favor of respondent Sulong were void.
Flores v. COMELEC
Facts: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as
the "Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent
Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged in
this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of
public funds by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the
office . . . ." Paragraph (d) reads: Chairman administrator — The President shall
appoint a professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority with a
compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex oficio chairman of the Board and who shall
serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That
for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the
City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority. Petitioners, who claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S.
Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, maintain that the proviso
in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following constitutional and statutory
provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "[n]o
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to
any public officer or position during his tenure," because the City Mayor of
Olongapo City is an elective official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec.
16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which provides that "[t]he President shall . . . .
appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and, (c) Sec. 261, par. (g),
of the Omnibus Election Code, which says: Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The
following shall be guilty of an election offense: . . . (g) Appointment of new
employees, creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases. —
During the period of forty-five days before a regular election and thirty days before
a special election, (1) any head, official or appointing officer of a government office,
agency or instrumentality, whether national or local, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, who appoints or hires any new employee, whether
provisional, temporary or casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon
prior authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant the authority
sought unless it is satisfied that the position to be filled is essential to the proper
functioning of the office or agency concerned, and that the position shall not be
filled in a manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the foregoing
provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case of urgent need: Provided,
however, That notice of the appointment shall be given to the Commission within
three days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in
violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2) Any government official who
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promotes, or gives any increase of salary or remuneration or privilege to any
government official or employee, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations . . . .for the reason that the appointment of respondent
Gordon to the subject posts made by respondent Executive Secretary on 3 April
1992 was within the prohibited 45-day period prior to the 11 May 1992 Elections.
Issue: WON proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the
mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
 Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution:No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.
 Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his
position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in
the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
 The section expresses the policy against the concentration of several public
positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-
time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services.
It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time job. Hence, a public
officer or employee, like the head of an executive department described in
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, and Anti-Graft
League of the Philippines, Inc. v. Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. No. 83815, 6 ". . . . should be allowed to attend to his duties
and responsibilities without the distraction of other governmental duties
or employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his efforts,
attention and energy among too many positions of responsibility, which
may result in haphazardness and inefficiency . . . ."
 In the case before us, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint
an elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government
posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA).
Since this is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent,
it needs no stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso
contravenes Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. Here, the fact
that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the
higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
 It is argued that Sec. 94 of the LGC (LGC) permits the appointment of a
local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his office. 8 But, the contention is fallacious. Section 94 of the
LGC is not determinative of the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, for no legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the
land. Moreover, since the constitutionality of Sec. 94 of LGC is not the
issue here nor is that section sought to be declared unconstitutional, we
need not rule on its validity. Neither can we invoke a practice otherwise
unconstitutional as authority for its validity.
 In any case, the view that an elective official may be appointed to another
post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office, ignores the
clear-cut difference in the wording of the two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art.
X-B, of the Constitution. While the second paragraph authorizes holding of
multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against appointment
or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are
particularly recognized in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head
of the economic and planning agency; 9 the Vice-President, who may be
appointed Member of the Cabinet; 10 and, a member of Congress who
may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
 The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-
B, was not accidental when drawn, and not without reason. It was
purposely sought by the drafters of the Constitution as shown in their
deliberation, thus — MR. MONSOD. In other words, what then
Commissioner is saying, Mr. Presiding Officer, is that the prohibition is
more strict with respect to elective officials, because in the case of
appointive officials, there may be a law that will allow them to hold other
positions. MR. FOZ. Yes, I suggest we make that difference, because in the
case of appointive officials, there will be certain situations where the law
should allow them to hold some other positions. The distinction being
clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second
paragraph cannot be extended to elective officials who are governed by
the first paragraph.
 It is further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the
position of Mayor of Olongapo City, hence, an excepted circumstance,
citing Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, where we stated that the
prohibition against the holding of any other office or employment by the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants during their tenure, as provided in Sec. 13, Art. VII, of the
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Constitution, does not comprehend additional duties and functions
required by the primary functions of the officials concerned, who are to
perform them in an ex officio capacity as provided by law, without
receiving any additional compensation therefor.
 This argument is apparently based on a wrong premise. Congress did not
contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically
attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably shows the
intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it been the legislative intent to make
the subject positions ex officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the
word "appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used.
 Even in the Senate deliberations, the Senators were fully aware that
subject proviso may contravene Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, but they
nevertheless passed the bill and decided to have the controversy resolved
by the courts. Indeed, the Senators would not have been concerned with
the effects of Sec. 7, first par., had they considered the SBMA posts as ex
officio.
 Petitioners also assail the legislative encroachment on the appointing
authority of the President. Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President
the power to appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive
Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law but to
appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
 As may be defined, an "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by
the person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the duties of
some office or trust," 17 or "[t]he selection or designation of a person, by
the person or persons having authority therefor, to fill an office or public
function and discharge the duties of the same. In his treatise, Philippine
Political Law, Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment
as "the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual
who is to exercise the functions of a given office." Considering that
appointment calls for a selection, the appointing power necessarily
exercises a discretion. According to Woodbury, J., "the choice of a person
to fill an office constitutes the essence of his appointment," and Mr. Justice
Malcolm adds that an "[a]ppointment to office is intrinsically an executive
act involving the exercise of discretion."
 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court: The
power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has
the right of choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment,
deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the
appointing power
 When Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an officer,
it (Congress) cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to
only one candidate. Once the power of appointment is conferred on the
President, such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of the officer,
Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the appointing authority,
directly or indirectly, of his discretion to pick his own choice. Consequently,
when the qualifications prescribed by Congress can only be met by one
individual, such enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular restriction on the
power of appointment.
 In the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled
with a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the
effectivity of R.A. 7227, the proviso nevertheless limits the appointing
authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent Mayor of Olongapo City.
Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is
precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint. Such
supposed power of appointment, sans the essential element of choice, is
no power at all and goes against the very nature itself of appointment.
While it may be viewed that the proviso merely sets the qualifications of
the officer during the first year of operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the
Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can
qualify. Accordingly, while the conferment of the appointing power on the
President is a perfectly valid legislative act, the proviso limiting his choice
to one is certainly an encroachment on his prerogative.
 Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all
throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he may however resign
first from his elective post to cast off the constitutionally-attached
disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment. As long
as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.
 Where, as in the case of respondent Gordon, an incumbent elective official
was, notwithstanding his ineligibility, appointed to other government
posts, he does not automatically forfeit his elective office nor remove his
ineligibility imposed by the Constitution. On the contrary, since an
incumbent elective official is not eligible to the appointive position, his
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appointment or designation thereto cannot be valid in view of his
disqualification or lack of eligibility.
 This provision should not be confused with Sec. 13, Art. VI, of the
Constitution where "(n)o Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government . . . during his term without forfeiting his seat . . . ." The
difference between the two provisions is significant in the sense that
incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts only after they have
been appointed to another government office, while other incumbent
elective officials must first resign their posts before they can be appointed,
thus running the risk of losing the elective post as well as not being
appointed to the other post. It is therefore clear that ineligibility is not
directly related with forfeiture of office. ". . . . The effect is quite different
where it is expressly provided by law that a person holding one office shall
be ineligible to another. Such a provision is held to incapacitate the
incumbent of an office from accepting or holding a second office and to
render his election or appointment to the latter office void or voidable
"Where the constitution, or statutes declare that persons holding one
office shall be ineligible for election or appointment to another office,
either generally or of a certain kind, the prohibition has been held to
incapacitate the incumbent of the first office to hold the second so that
any attempt to hold the second is void
 As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that
contravenes the Constitution cannot be sustained. He however remains
Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily
null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts,
though not those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and
justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and
third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . . under
color of a known election or appointment, void because the officer was not
eligible, or because there was a want of power in the electing or
appointing body, or by reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise,
such ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the public . . .
. [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.
Garvida v. Sales (supra, see p. 116)
Galido v. COMELEC
Facts: Galido and Galeon were candidates during the 18 January 1988 local
elections for the position of mayor in the Municipality of Garcia-Hernandez,
Province of Bohol. Galido was proclaimed duly-elected Mayor by the Municipal
Board of Canvassers. Galeon then filed an election protest before the RTC of Bohol.
After hearing, the said court upheld the proclamation of Galido as the duly-elected
Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez, by a majority of 11 votes. On appeal to the COMELEC,
RTC decision was reversed and Galeon was declared duly-elected mayor by a
plurality of 5 votes. MR denied. The COMELEC held that the fifteen (15) ballots in
the same precinct containing the initial "C" after the name "Galido" were marked
ballots and, therefore, invalid. The COMELEC said that where a word or a letter
recurs in a pattern or system to mark and identify ballots, the ballots containing the
same should be rejected as marked ballots. Galido filed a petition for certiorari and
injunction. SC dismissed for failure of petitioner to comply with par. 4 of the Court's
Circular No. 1-88 which requires that a petition shall contain a verified statement of
the date when notice of the questioned judgment, order or resolution was received
and the date of receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if any was
filed. MR denied. Galido filed petition for certiorari and injunction with prayer for a
restraining order which contains the same allegations and legal issues. TRO issued,
respondents required to file comment.
Issues: 1. WON final decisions of the COMELEC are appealable.
 The COMELEC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial,
and city officials and has appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving
elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction. (Article IX (C), Section 2 (2), paragraph 1 of the 1987
Constitution).
 The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the Commission on
Elections in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are
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final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude a recourse to this
Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari.
 MR. REGALADO: It is understood, however, that while these decisions with
respect to barangay and municipal officials are final and immediately
executory and, therefore, not appealable, that does not rule out the
possibility of an original special civil action for certiorari, prohibition, or
mandamus, as the case may be, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
 We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the questioned decision. It is settled that the function of a writ
of certiorari is to keep an inferior court or tribunal within the bounds of its
jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
 As correctly argued by public respondent COMELEC, it has the inherent
power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and
justice, and apply established jurisprudence in support of its findings and
conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on
its discretion, the exercise of which should not be controlled unless such
discretion has been abused to the prejudice of either party.
**The records disclose that private respondent had already assumed the position of
Mayor of Garcia-Hernandez as the duly-elected mayor of the municipality by virtue
of the COMELEC decision. The main purpose of prohibition is to suspend all action
and prevent the further performance of the act complained of. In this light, the
petition at bar has become moot and academic.
Rivera v. COMELEC
Facts: Rivera and Garcia II were candidates for the position of Mayor of Guinobatan,
Albay, during the local elections in January 1988. The Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed Rivera as the duly elected Mayor by a majority of 10 votes. Garcia filed
an election protest with the RTC. After due hearing, and upon considering the
report of a Revision Committee it had earlier created, the trial court found Garcia to
have obtained 6,376 votes as against Rivera's 6,222. Rivera appealed to the
COMELEC. The COMELEC sustained with modification (found Garcia leading by 153
instead of 154). MR denied, reaffirmed with modification (123 votes). Garcia
commenced to discharge the duties and functions of Mayor of Guinobatan on 10
October 1990, by virtue of a writ of execution implementing the COMELEC decision
of 6 September 1990. He continued as mayor until 10 November 1990 when he was
served notice of this Court's temporary restraining order, issued upon Rivera's
motion. Rivera filed the present petition on 5 October 1990 seeking annulment of
the COMELEC en banc decision rendered in favor of respondent Garcia. He also
prayed for the issuance of an order restraining the implementation of the said
judgment, arguing that the same had not yet become final and executory as of the
time this petition was filed. He cites Article IX-C, Section 2, Par. (2) of the 1987
Constitution, in relation to Part VII, Rule 39, Section 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. He also contends that since the COMELEC decision of 6 September 1990
has not yet become final and executory, the COMELEC has no authority to issue the
assailed order and writ of execution. Petitioner maintains further that he has a
period of thirty (30) days from 6 September 1990 or until 6 October 1990 within
which to elevate the COMELEC decision, on certiorari, to this Court, pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He submits that the
questioned COMELEC decision is not one that became final and executory unless
restrained by this Court as provided under Section 3, Rule 39 of the COMELEC Rules,
as said rule applies only to "decisions in pre-proclamation cases and petitions to
deny due course or to disqualify a candidate, and postpone or suspend elections."
Lastly, according to petitioner, Section 13(a) of Rule 18 (finality of Comelec
decisions or resolutions) and Section 1 of Rule 39 (review by the Supreme Court of
Comelec decisions, orders and rulings) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, should
be read in the context of Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution (Supreme Court
authority to review on certiorari a Comelec decision, order or ruling).
Upon the other hand, respondent Garcia contends that:
1. The Constitution declares the decisions of the COMELEC on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay officials to be final, executory and not
appealable (Article IX-C, Sec. 2, par. (2), second sentence, 1987 Constitution).
2. In an earlier petition for certiorari filed by Rivera with this Court, docketed as G.R.
No. 87046, charging the Regional Trial Court of grave abuse of discretion in Case No.
01-88, wherein the same issue now raised in this petition was raised by Rivera, this
Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit on 7 March 1989.
3. The supplemental ground raised by petitioner Rivera that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion "by not excluding from the total votes of
Garcia at least ten (10) votes which were misappreciated in Garcia's favor, outside
of those objected votes already ruled upon by the COMELEC" does not deserve any
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consideration. If true, it is an error in judgment, correctible by appeal, not by a
petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 65, Section 1, of the Rules of Court.
Issues: 1. WON the decisions of the COMELEC in election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay officials, being final and executory and not appealable,
preclude the filing of a special civil action of certiorari.
 Galido Case.
 Flores v. COMELEC: Obviously, the provision of Article IX-C, Section 2(2) of
the Constitution that "decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission
on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall
be final, executory, and not appealable" applies only to questions of fact
and not of law. That provision was not intended to divest the Supreme
Court of its authority to resolve questions of law as inherent in the judicial
power conferred upon it by the Constitution. We eschew a literal reading
of that provision that would contradict such authority.
2. WON the COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion.
 The main thrust of the present petition for certiorari is that the respondent
COMELEC en banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed
the decision of its First Division, promulgated on 2 May 1990, annulling the
proclamation of the petitioner as the duly elected Mayor of Guinobatan,
Albay and when it did not exclude from the total votes of Garcia at least
ten (10) votes which were allegedly misappreciated in Garcia's favor.
 We have closely scrutinized the challenged COMELEC decision and find
that the said decision was not arrived at capriciously or whimsically by
respondent COMELEC. A painstaking re-evaluation of the questioned 67
ballots was made by the COMELEC en banc. In fact, 14 ballots originally
adjudicated in Garcia's favor were overruled by the Commission en banc,
thus reducing the number of votes in his favor to 894 votes out of the
2,445 contested ballots. On the other hand, 16 ballots were added in
Rivera's favor, thus increasing the votes in his favor to 1,087 votes.
 Moreover, the appreciation and re-evaluation of ballots are factual
determinations. It is settled that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact
of administrative bodies are final unless grave abuse of discretion has
marred such factual determinations. We find none in this case.
Borja v. COMELEC
Facts: Capco was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of
law, upon the death of the incumbent, Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was
elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8,
1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30,
1998. On March 27, 1998, Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of
Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would
therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC ruled in favor of Borja and
declared Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros.
However, on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc, voting 5-2,
reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11,
1998 elections. The majority stated in its decision: In both the Constitution and the
LGC, the three-term limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official
was elected. It made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not
elected. Succession into office is not counted as 1 term for purposes of the
computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the LGC.
Capco won and was proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. This
is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated May 7, 1998, of
the COMELEC and to seed a declaration that Capco is disqualified to serve another
term as Mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Issue: WON a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by operation of law
and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that
office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
 Article X, §8 of the Constitution provides: The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
 This provision is restated in §43(b) of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160): No local
elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
 Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of term,
derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a
prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election, derived from
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the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish
to govern them be preserved.
 In discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the
assumption that the officials concerned were serving by reason of
reelection. Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is
that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern
them. To bar the election of a local official because he has already served
three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law
rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
 Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well
supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, §8 contemplates service
by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The
first sentence speaks of “the term of office of elective local officials” and
bars “such official[s]” from serving for more than three consecutive terms.
The second sentence, in explaining when an elective local official may be
deemed to have served his full term of office, states that “voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.” The term served must therefore be one “for which [the
official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of this provision is to
prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an
elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which
he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the official
he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the
term now withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its
expiration.
 There is a difference between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a
member of the House of Representatives who succeeds another who dies,
resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor
succeeds to the mayorship by operation of law. On the other hand, the
Representative is elected to fill the vacancy. In a real sense, therefore, such
Representative serves a term for which he was elected. As the purpose of
the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve
in Congress, his service of the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first
term. Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X,
§8 with regard to elective local officials, the case of a Representative who
succeeds another confirms the theory.
 Petitioner also cites Art. VII, §4 of the Constitution which provides for
succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of vacancy in
that office. After stating that “The President shall not be eligible for any
reelection,” this provision says that “No person who has succeeded as
President and has served as such for more than four years shall be
qualified for election to the same office at any time.” Petitioner contends
that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have
served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to the latter’s office and serves
for the remainder of the term.
 The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without
it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency by succession
would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office
for more than four years. The absence of a similar provision in Art. X, §8
on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the
two cases. It underscores the constitutional intent to cover only the terms
of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-
term limit on local elective officials, disregarding for this purpose service
by automatic succession.
 There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the
Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is ineligible
for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to
succeed the President in the event of the latter’s death, permanent
disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the
cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good graces of the
President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek
the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise choose as Vice-
President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event
it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the presidency for more than four
years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
 This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the LGC, he is the
presiding officer of the sanggunian and he appoints all officials and
employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions,
succession to mayorship in the event of vacancy therein being only one of
them. It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the
event of a vacancy in the Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he
also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of
vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in
that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
 To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
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have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
**Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the
death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he resigns and is
twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election.
Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and
subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired, he has not actually
served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art.
X, §8, voluntary renunciation of the office is not considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one “for which he was
elected.” Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased
and not he was elected. A cannot be considered to have completed one term. His
resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.
**Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that,
can he run for one more term in the next election? Yes, because he has served only
two full terms successively. In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection
because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification provisions
have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected
three consecutive times and that he has fully served three consecutive terms. In
the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms
notwithstanding his resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains
that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has
been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive
terms.
**Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves
a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the purpose of applying Art. X §8.
Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next
election? Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first
term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he
served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the
death , of the deceased mayor. To consider C in the third case to have served the
first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be
not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose
whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns out to be a bad mayor,
the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term.
But if, on the other hand, he proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the
people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for
reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of
applying the term limit. To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord
with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring
about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Lonzanida v. COMELEC
Facts: Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May
1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again
proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation in 1995 was however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who
filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a
decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure of elections. Accordingly, the
office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is hereby declared
vacant. On appeal, the COMELEC declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his favor totaling 1,720 votes as
against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the COMELEC issued a writ
of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which he obeyed, and Alvez
assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the May 11, 1998 elections
Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio. On April
21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to disqualify Lonzanida
from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground that he
had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner
Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the
COMELEC issued the questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification
upon a finding that Lonzanida had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San
Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore disqualified to run for the same post for the
fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanida's assumption of office by virtue of
his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated before the expiration
of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the three
term limit under the Constitution and the LGC. The finding of the COMELEC First
Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August 11,
1998.
Issue: WON Lonzanida's assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales
from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
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 Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides: The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law
shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
 Sec. 43 of the LGC (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule: No local elective
official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
 The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-
term limit which is now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution
was initially proposed to be an absolute bar to any elective local
government official from running for the same position after serving three
consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to
forestall the accumulation of massive political power by an elective local
government official in a given locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in
office. The delegates also considered the need to broaden the choices of
the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new
blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the
same office after a term of nine years. The mayor was compared by some
delegates to the President of the Republic as he is a powerful chief
executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political
dynasty. The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that
some local government officials run for office before they reach forty years
of age; thus to perpetually bar them from running for the same office after
serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of qualified
candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an
elective local government official should be barred from running for the
same post after three consecutive terms. After a hiatus of at least one
term, he may again run for the same office.
 Borja Case: This Court held that the two conditions for the application of
the disqualification must concur: 1) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and
2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. It stated: To
recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to
refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same
elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has
served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also
have been elected to the same position for the same number of times
before the disqualification can apply.
 It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May
1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995 elections he again ran for mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He assumed office
and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he
was ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated
November 13, 1997 on the election protest against the petitioner which
declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected mayor of San Antonio.
Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
 The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. - -
First, the petitioner cannot be considered as having been duly elected to
the post in the May 1995 elections, and second, the petitioner did not fully
serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the
contested ballots the COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that
petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections and his
previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason
of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation. It has been
repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation subsequently declared
void is no proclamation at all 5 and while a proclaimed candidate may
assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of
Canvassers he is only a presumptive winner who assumes office subject to
the final outcome of the election protest. 6 Petitioner Lonzanida did not
serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995 to March
1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed
office as presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by
the COMELEC when it decided with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May
1995 mayoral elections.
 Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration
of the term. The respondents' contention that the petitioner should be
deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because he
served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it
disregards the second requisite for the application of the disqualification,
i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive terms. The second sentence
of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, "Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
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interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was
elected. "The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any
attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of
office and at the same time respect the people's choice and grant their
elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated
his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary
renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution
issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
 Petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office
for the full term; hence, his assumption of office from 1995 to March 1998
cannot be counted as a term for purposes of computing the three term
limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding him disqualified on this
ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.
2. WON the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and his
then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly
extended the petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not
lawfully elected.
 Such delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific
allegation nor proof that the delay was due to any political maneuvering
on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover, protestant Alvez, was
not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election
protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a
motion for the execution of the regional trial court's decision declaring the
position of mayor vacant and ordering the vice-mayor to assume office
while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is not
here shown to have intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his
stay in office cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to
serve his chosen local government post in the succeeding mayoral election.
3. WON the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification after he was proclaimed winner.
 The instant petition for disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or
before the May 1998 elections and was resolved on May 21, 1998 or after
the petitioner's proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs.
COMELEC and Trinidad that the proclamation nor the assumption of office
of a candidate against whom a petition for disqualification is pending
before the COMELEC does not divest the COMELEC of jurisdiction to
continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
 Sec. 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that: any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
court or commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
 This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should
continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion
i.e., until judgment is rendered. The outright dismissal of the petition for
disqualification filed before the election but which remained unresolved
after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will
unduly reward the said candidate and may encourage him to employ
delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the petition until after he has
been proclaimed. The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had
assumed the position of mayor did not divest the COMELEC of authority
and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and eventually decide the
disqualification case.
 Aguam v. COMELEC: Time and again this Court has given its imprimatur on
the principle that COMELEC is with authority to annul any canvass and
proclamation which was illegally made. The fact that a candidate
proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the exercise of
such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a
valid proclamation. Since private respondent's petition before the
COMELEC is precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and
proclamation, we perceive that inquiry into this issue is within the area
allocated by the Constitution and law to COMELEC . . . Really, were a victim
of a proclamation to be precluded from challenging the validity thereof
after that proclamation and the assumption of office thereunder, baneful
effects may easily supervene.
 Purpose of a disqualification proceeding : to prevent the candidate from
running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of
the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been proclaimed
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elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and
may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation .
Adormeo v. COMELEC
Facts: Adormeo and Talaga were the only candidates who filed their certificates of
candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga was then
the incumbent mayor. Talaga was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full
term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998, he lost to
Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the
unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. On March 2, 2001, Adormeo filed
with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga
on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the
full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served the full term; and,
(3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term
of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended
that Talaga’s candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution which provides that the term of office of elective local
officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected. Talaga responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat
in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his
years as mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three
consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that his service from May
12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full
term, in the contemplation of the law and the Constitution.
The COMELEC found Talaga disqualified for the position of city mayor on the ground
that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his Certificate of
Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled. MR reversed COMELEC ruling
and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed only
as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the
recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included in the 3-
term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3)
consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an
interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City. On May 19,
2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected
Mayor of Lucena City.
Issue: WON COMELEC Talaga is qualified to run forMayor in Lucena City for the
2001 elections.
 Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city
mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the unexpired portion of
the term of office he served after winning a recall election, covering the
period May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is considered a full term. He posits
that to interpret otherwise, private respondent would be serving four (4)
consecutive terms of 10 years, in violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987
Constitution[4] and Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the LGC.
 Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of
Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998
and between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during Tagarao’s
incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3
consecutive terms.
 In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that private respondent
was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms having lost his third bid in
the May 11, 1998 elections, said defeat is an interruption in the continuity
of service as city mayor of Lucena.
 Borja Case: Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first
term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is
twice reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next
election? Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively. To
consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the
understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may
bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not
unduly curtailed.
 Lonzanida Case: Two conditions for the application of the disqualification
must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms.
 COMELEC’s ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3)
consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a private
citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the
1998 elections.
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 Patently untenable is petitioner’s contention that COMELEC in allowing
respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X,
Section 8 of 1987 Constitution.
 To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating that in interpreting
said provision that “if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired
term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered
one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed.” As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas’ comment is
pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local
government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress.
 Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as “voluntary
renunciation” for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said: The
second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states,
“Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which he was elected.” The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral
elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such
involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service
and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
Socrates v. COMELEC
Facts: On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay
officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates who assumed office
as Puerto Princesa’s mayor on June 30, 2001. The members of the PRA designated
Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as
interim chair of the PRA. PRA passed a resolution which declared its loss of
confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to
schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall
Resolution. On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition to nullify
and deny due course to the Recall Resolution. On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC
dismissed Socrates’ petition and gave due course to the Recall Resolution and
scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002. On August 21, 2002, the
COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution prescribing the calendar of activities
and periods of certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The
COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5, 2002 or
a period of 10 days. On August 23, 2002,. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor in the recall election. Adovo and Gilo filed a petition to disqualify
Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of
candidacy. Ollave and Manaay also. The petitions were all anchored on the ground
that “Hagedorn is disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive term, having
been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full
terms immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post.” In a
resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELEC dismissed for lack of
merit and declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC
also reset the recall election from September 7, 2002 to September 24, 2002. MR
denied. Hagedorn won and filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC
from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume office to give
effect to the will of the electorate.
Issues: 1. WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduling the recall election for mayor of
Puerto Princesa.
 Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
upholding the Recall Resolution despite the absence of notice to 130 PRA
members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The
COMELEC, however, found that on various dates, in the month of June
2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino
Dennis M. Socrates sent notices of the convening of the PRA to the
members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the LGC. Notices were likewise
posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. The
proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the
dissemination of the convening of the PRA.
 The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated
10 July 2002 certified that upon a ‘thorough and careful verification of the
signatures, majority of all members of the PRA concerned approved said
resolution.’ She likewise certified ‘that not a single member/signatory of
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the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and authenticity of their
signatures.’
 The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his
Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, ‘upon proper review, all
documents submitted are found in order.’
 The Acting Director IV, Region IV, found that the PRA was validly
constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved
Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates.’
2. WON Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto
Princesa on September 24, 2002.
 The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which states: The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,
shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.”
 This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160,
otherwise known as the LGC, which provides: No local elective official shall
serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term
for which the elective official was elected.”
 These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part
provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in
determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt
the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance
from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and
prevents the service before and after the interruption from being joined
together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
 After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to
the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no
longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent
election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after
three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
 The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after
only three years following his completion of two terms. The framers
expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the
immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election, during the six-
year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution
did not intend “the period of rest” of an elective official who has reached
his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
 In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September
24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third consecutive term
which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the
Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular
elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
 Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and
1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms as mayor of
Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the LGC, Hagedorn could no
longer run for mayor in the 2001 elections. The Constitution and the LGC
disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit,
from running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did
not run for mayor in the 2001 elections. Socrates ran and won as mayor of
Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor
on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the recall election of
September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest
opponent, Socrates.
 From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the
mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorn’s three
consecutive terms ended on June 30, 2001. Hagedorn’s new recall term
from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation
of his previous three consecutive terms as mayor. One cannot stitch
together Hagedorn’s previous three-terms with his new recall term to
make the recall term a fourth consecutive term because factually it is not.
An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24,
2002 which broke the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorn’s
service as mayor.
 Lonzanida Case: Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time
shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for
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the full term for which he was elected.” The clear intent of the framers of
the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s
choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely,
involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
 In Hagedorn’s case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office,
although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption in
the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require
the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The clear intent
is that interruption “for any length of time,” as long as the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local official’s continuity of
service.
 Adormeo Case: an interruption consisting of a portion of a term of office
breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. The issue in
Adormeo was whether Talaga’s recall term was a continuation of his
previous two terms so that he was deemed to have already served three
consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to
run in the 2001 elections, stating that the period from June 30, 1998 to
May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of
his service as mayor. Talaga’s recall term as mayor was not consecutive to
his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a
break of almost two years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
 In the instant case, we likewise hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn
was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his
recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his
previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo
and the instant case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the
interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant
case, the interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms. In
both cases, the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
 The period of time prior to the recall term, when another elective official
holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly,
Adormeo established the rule that the winner in the recall election cannot
be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of
counting the consecutiveness of an elective official’s terms in office.
Hagedorn’s recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of
Socrates. Hagedorn can only be disqualified to run in the September 24,
2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001,
for only then can the recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But
to consider Hagedorn’s recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting
to June 30, 2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last
September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as
consecutive or successive terms of office which historically and factually
are not.
 To make Hagedorn’s recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal
fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to choose their
leaders through popular elections. The concept of term limits is in
derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the leaders of their
own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest
possible effect to the sovereign will of the people.
 A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the
start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall
election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired
term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit.
 An elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than
nine consecutive years comprising of the recall term plus the regular three
full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the
recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the
inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
**Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor
of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive
terms as mayor which ended on June 30, 2001;
2. Hagedorn’s continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from
June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorn’s recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be
made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth consecutive term because
factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the
right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
Mendoza v. COMELEC
Osmeña v. COMELEC
Facts: RA 7056 (An Act Providing for the National and Local Elections in 1992, Pave
the Way for Synchronized and Simultaneous Elections Beginning 1995, and
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Authorizing Appropriations Therefor) was enacted. Suit was instituted by Governor
Osmeña, Governor Pagdanganan on behalf of the League of Governors of the
Philippines, Representatives Garcia, del Mar, Bacaltos, Cainglet, and Guanzon, by
way of a petition for Prohibition, mandamus and Injunction with temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of
said RA and the consequent expenditure of public funds and to compel the Comelec
to immediately and with all deliberate speed set up the machinery and make the
necessary preparation for the holding of synchronized national and local elections
on the second Monday of May, 1992. They pray for this Court to declare Republic
Act No. 7056 as unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid and inoperative because:
1. Republic Act 7056 violates the mandate of the Constitution for the holding of
synchronized national and local elections on the second Monday of May 1992.
2. Republic Act 7056, particularly the 2nd paragraph of Section 3 thereof, providing
that all incumbent provincial, city and municipal officials shall hold over beyond
June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall have been duly elected and
qualified violates Section 2, Article XVIII (Transitory Provision) of the Constitution.
3. The same paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act 7056, which in effect, shortens
the term or tenure of office of local officials to be elected on the 2nd Monday of
November, 1992 violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
4. Section 8 of Republic Act 7056, providing for the campaign periods for
Presidential, Vice-Presidential and Senatorial elections, violates the provision of
Section 9, Article IX under the title "Commission on Elections" of the Constitution.
5. The so-called many difficult if not insurmountable problems mentioned in
Republic Act 7056 to synchronized national and local elections set by the
Constitution on the second Monday of May, 1992, are not sufficient, much less,
valid justification for postponing the local elections to the second Monday of
November 1992, and in the process violating the Constitution itself. If, at all,
Congress can devise ways and means, within the parameters of the Constitution, to
eliminate or at least minimize these problems and if this, still, is not feasible, resort
can be made to the self-correcting mechanism built in the Constitution for its
amendment or revision. (pp. 4-5, Petition)
Similar claims have been made in the other cases mentioned in the caption.
The Court in its Resolution dated June 27, 1991 issued a restraining order, "ordering
the respondents and/or anyone acting in their place or stead, or by their authority,
to cease and desist from implementing Republic Act 7056, which provides among
others, for the holding of desynchronized national and local elections in 1992." (p.
29, Rollo) The Court also required respondents to comment on the petition within a
non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.
Commenting on the petition as required, the Solicitor General prays for the denial
of the petition arguing that the question raised by petitioners is political in nature
and therefore beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He stresses, citing National
Economic Protective Association v. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657, that petitioners failed to
show justification for the exercise of its judicial power, viz (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the
constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon
in order to decide the case. He also questions the legal standing of the petitioners,
who, he contends are merely asking for an advisory opinion from the Court, there
being no justiciable controversy for resolution.
On the merits of the case, the Solicitor General contends that Republic Act 7056 is a
valid exercise of legislative power by Congress and that the regular amending
process prescribed by the Constitution does not apply to its transitory provisions.
Issues: 1. WON the court may act on the matter at bar.
 What is before us is not a discretionary act of Congress or the Executive
that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is
involved here is the legality, not the wisdom of RA 7056. And even if we
were to assume that the issue presented before us is political in nature,
We would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers in proper cases even
political questions, provided naturally, that the question is not solely and
exclusively political (as when the Executive extends recognition to a foreign
government) but one which really necessitates a forthright determination
of constitutionality, involving as it does a question of national importance.
Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides: The judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
 Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
 The issue presented to us in the case at bar, is justiciable rather than
political. Even if the question were political in nature, it would still come
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within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred
upon us by Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, which includes
the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government. As for the other alleged procedural
flaws — lack of court standing, etc., assuming the existence of such flaws,
the same may be brushed aside, conformably with existing doctrine so that
the important constitutional issue raised may be addressed.
2. WON RA 7056 is constitutional.
 Article XVIII, Sec 2of the 1987 Constitution: The Senators, Members of the
House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992. Of the Senators
elected in the election in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest
number of votes shall serve for six year and the remaining twelve for three
years.
 Sec. 5. The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President
elected in the February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization
of elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992. The first regular
elections for President and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
 Terms of office of Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, the
local officials, the President and the Vice-President have been
synchronized to end on the same hour, date and year — noon of June 30,
1992.
 Term of synchronization is used synonymously as the phrase holding
simultaneously since this is the precise intent in terminating their Office
Tenure on the same day or occasion. This common termination date will
synchronize future elections to once every three years.
 The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election
prior to June 30, 1992 or more specifically as provided for in Article XVIII,
Sec. 5-on the second Monday of May, 1992.
 The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, is
fixed by the Constitution at three years (Sec. 8, Art. X). The incumbent local
officials were elected in January 1988. Therefore, their term would have
expired on February 2, 1991. But their term was adjusted to expire at noon
of June 30, 1992. The reason for the said adjustment, as well as those of
the Senators, members of the House of Representatives, President and
Vice-President, is the same — to synchronize the national and local
elections.
 Upon the other hand, and contrary to the express mandate of the 1987
Constitution, Republic Act 7056 provides for two (2) separate elections in
1992 as follows: Sec. 2. Start of Synchronization — To start the process of
synchronization of election in accordance with the policy hereinbefore
declared there shall be held: (a) An election for President and Vice-
President of the Philippines, twenty four (24) Senators and all elective
Members of the House of Representatives on the second Monday of May,
1992, and (b) An election of all provincial, city and municipal elective
officials on the second Monday of November, 1992. The purpose of
Republic Act 7056 is as stated in Section 1 thereof under the heading
"Statement of Policy" — to start, as much as practicable, the
synchronization of the elections so that the process can be completed in
the 1995 elections with the result that beginning 1995 there shall be only
one (1) simultaneous regular elections for national and local elective
officials every three (3) years.
 With the clear mandate of the 1987 Constitution to hold synchronized
(simultaneous) national and local elections in the second Monday of May,
1992, the inevitable conclusion would be that Republic Act 7056 is clearly
violative of the Constitution because it provides for the holding of a
desynchronized election. Stated differently, Republic Act 7056 particularly
Sections 1 and 2 thereof contravenes Article XVIII, Sections 2 and 5 of the
1987 Constitution.
 Other Consti provisions violated by RA 7056:
1. Section 2, Article XVIII of the Constitution which provides that the local
official first elected under the Constitution shall serve until noon of June
30, 1992. But under Sec. 3 of RA 7056, these incumbent local officials shall
hold over beyond June 30, 1992 and shall serve until their successors shall
have been duly elected and qualified. It has been held that It is not
competent for the legislature to extend the term of officers by providing
that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and qualified
where the constitution has in effect or by clear implication prescribed the
term and when the Constitution fixes the day on which the official term
shall begin, there is no legislative authority to continue the office beyond
that period, even though the successors fail to qualify with the time.
American Jurisprudence: the legislature cannot, by an act postponing the
election to fill an office the term of which is limited by the Constitution,
extend the term of the incumbent beyond the period as limited by the
Constitution.
2. Section 8, Article X of the Constitution which provides that: The term of
office of elective local officials, except barangay officials which shall be
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determined by law shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. But if the local election will be held on
the second Monday of November 1992 under RA 7056, those to be elected
will be serving for only two years and seven months, that is, from
November 30, 1992 to June 30, 1995, not three years as provided for by
the Constitution.
3. Section 9, Article IX of the Constitution provides that: Unless otherwise
fixed by the Commission in special cases, the election period shall
commence ninety days before the day of election and shall end thirty days
thereafter. Under this provision the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy
and the ensuing campaign period must be embraced or circumscribed
within that election period of ninety days, except when in special cases,
the Comelec (not Congress) alters the period. But RA 7056 provides for a
different campaign period, as follows: Sec. 8. (a) For President arid Vice-
Presidential elections one hundred thirty (130) days before the day of
election. (b) For Senatorial elections, ninety (90) days before the day of the
election, and (c) For the election of Members of the House of
Representatives and local elective provincial, city and municipal officials
forty-five (45) days before the day of the elections.
**All these — the postponement of the holding of a synchronized national and local
election from 1992 to 1995; the hold-over provision for incumbent local officials;
the reduction of the term of office of local officials to be elected on the second
Monday of November 1992 and the change in the campaign periods, are violative of
the 1987 Constitution.
**The contention of the Solicitor General that the method of amendment or
revision prescribed by the Constitution (Article XVIII) does not apply to the
Transitory Provisions because in the nature of things Transitory Provisions are to be
carried out as soon as practicable, and Congress can, in the exercise of its legislative
power enact the needed legislation, in this case RA 7056, deserves no consideration
at all. The 1987 Constitution has stated in clear and categorical language that "the
six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the
February 7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby
extended to noon of June 30, 1992 (Article XVIII, Sec. 5)." As discussed earlier, the
elections referred to, to be synchronized with the election of the President and
Vice-President on the second Monday of May 1992, is the election for Senators,
Members of the House of Representatives and local officials.
**Synchronization — as the act or result of synchronizing; concurrence of events or
motions in respect to time.
Synchronize — to happen or take place at the same time; to represent or arrange
event so as to indicate coincidence or co-existence; to cause to agree in time.
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Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC (supra, see p.150)

Menzon v. Petilla

Facts: On February 16, 1988, by virtue of the fact that no Governor had been
proclaimed in the province of Leyte, Secretary of Local Government Santos
designated Vice-Governor Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. On March 25, 1988,
Menzon, a senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was also designated by
Santos to act as the Vice-Governor for the province of Leyte. On May 29, 1989,
Provincial Administrator Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the
Department of Local Government Rubillar as to the legality of the appointment of
the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor of Leyte. In his reply letter dated June 22,
1989, Rubillar stated that since B.P. 337 has no provision relating to succession in
the Office of the Vice-Governor in case of a temporary vacancy, the appointment of
Menzon as the temporary Vice- Governor is not necessary since the Vice-Governor
who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could concurrently
assume the functions of both offices. As a result of the foregoing communications
between Quintero and Rubillar, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, in a special session
held on July 7, 1989, issued Resolution 505 where it held invalid the appointment of
the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte on the ground that there is no
permanent vacancy in said office since Petilla assumed the Office of the Vice-
Governor after he took his oath of office to said position. Menzon, through the
acting LDP Regional Counsel, Atty. Alegre, sought clarification from Undersecretary
Rubillar regarding the June 22, 1989 opinion. According to Rubillar, the peculiar
situation in the Province of Leyte, where the electoral controversy in the Office of
the Governor has not yet been settled, calls for the designation of the Sangguniang
Member to act as vice-governor temporarily. In view, of the clarificatory letter of
Rubillar, the Regional Director of the Department of Local Government, Region 8,
Salvatierra, on July 17, 1989, wrote a letter addressed to the Acting-Governor
Petilla, requesting the latter that Resolution No. 505 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be modified accordingly, as to previous actions made by his office and
those of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan which may have tended to discredit the
validity of Menzon's designation as acting vice-governor, including the payment of
his salary as Acting Vice-Governor, if he was deprived of such. On August 3, 1989,
the Regional Director wrote another letter to Acting-Governor Petilla, reiterating his
earlier request. Despite these several letters of request, the Acting Governor and
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the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, refused to correct Resolution 505 and
correspondingly to pay the petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of
Vice-Governor. Thus, on November 12, 1989, the Menzon filed before this Court a
petition for certiorari and mandamus. The petition sought the nullification of
Resolution No. 505 and for the payment of his salary for his services as the acting
Vice-Governor of Leyte. In the meantime, however, the issue on the governorship
of Leyte was settled and Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the
province of Leyte. During the pendency of the petition, more particularly on May
16, 1990, the provincial treasurer of Leyte, Florencio Luna allowed the payment to
the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte in the amount of
P17,710.00, for the actual services rendered by the petitioner as acting Vice-
Governor. On August 28, 1990, this Court dismissed the petition filed by Aurelio D.
Menzon. On September 6, 1990, Petilla, by virtue of the above resolution requested
Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the province of Leyte all
the emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-
Governor of Leyte. On September 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of our resolution. The motion prayed that this Court uphold the
petitioner's right to receive the salary and emoluments attached to the office of the
Vice-Governor while he was acting as such.
Issues: 1.WON there was a vacancy
 The law on Public Officers is clear on the matter. There is no vacancy
whenever the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. A sensu
contrario, there is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized
to assume and exercise at present the duties of the office.
 Applying the definition of vacancy to this case, it can be readily seen that
the office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the duly elected Vice-
Governor Leopoldo Petilla was appointed Acting Governor. In the eyes of
the law, the office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally
qualified person to exercise the duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
 There is no satisfactory showing that Leopoldo Petilla, notwithstanding his
succession to the Office of the Governor, continued to simultaneously
exercise the duties of the Vice-Governor. The nature of the duties of a
Provincial Governor call for a full-time occupant to discharge them. More
so when the vacancy is for an extended period. It was Petilla's automatic
assumption to the acting Governorship that resulted in the vacancy in the
office of the Vice-Governor. The fact that the Secretary of Local
Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill
up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary
had the discretion to ascertain whether or not the Provincial Governor
should devote all his time to that particular office. Moreover, it is doubtful
if the Provincial Board, unilaterally acting, may revoke an appointment
made by a higher authority.
2. WON the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make
temporary appointments. YES.
 Under the circumstances of this case (there had been no de jure
permanent Governor for the province of Leyte for about two years,
Governor Adelina Larrazabal, at that time, had not yet been proclaimed
due to a pending election case) and considering the silence of the LGC, the
Court rules that, in order to obviate the dilemma resulting from an
interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her
alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation.
Menzon’s temporary appointment valid.
 The records show that it was primarily for this contingency that
Undersecretary Rubillar corrected and reconsidered his previous position
and acknowledged the need for an acting Vice-Governor.
 It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy
that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with the filling of vacancies in
appointive positions. However, in the absence of any contrary provision in
the LGC and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent reason
why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may not be similarly
applied in the present case. The respondents contend that the provincial
board is the correct appointing power. This argument has no merit. As
between the President who has supervision over local governments as
provided by law and the members of the board who are junior to the vice-
governor, we have no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the
law provides otherwise.
 A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation under
the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of representation and
governance in their own local government.
 In a republican form of government, the majority rules through their
chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc., the
management of governmental affairs to that extent, may be hampered.
Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the delivery of basic
services to the people of Leyte if the Governor or the Vice-Governor is
missing.
 The appointment of the petitioner, moreover, is in full accord with the
intent behind the LGC. There is no question that Section 49 in connection
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with Section 52 of the LGC shows clearly the intent to provide for
continuity in the performance of the duties of the Vice-Governor.
 The LGC provides for the mode of succession in case of a permanent
vacancy. Section 49: In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-
Governor assumes the Office of the Governor, . . . refuses to assume office,
fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office the sangguniang panlalawigan . . . member who obtained the highest
number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume
the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor. . . .
 By virtue of the surroundings circumstance of this case, the mode of
succession provided for permanent vacancies may likewise be observed in
case of a temporary vacancy in the same office. In this case, there was a
need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is himself the member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes. The
Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary
appointment.
 Menzon must be paid his salary attached to his office, but only the
remainder. Even granting the President, acting through the Secretary of
Local Government possesses no power to appoint the petitioner, at the
very least, the petitioner is a de facto officer entitled to
compensation.There is no denying that the petitioner assumed the Office
of the Vice-Governor under color of a known appointment. The
respondents themselves acknowledged the validity of the petitioner's
appointment and dealt with him as such. It was only when the
controversial Resolution No. 505 was passed by the same persons who
recognized him as the acting Vice-Governor that the validity of the
appointment of the petitioner was made an issue and the recognition
withdrawn.
Docena v. Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar
Facts: Capito, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar died in
office. Secretary Santos of the DLG appointed Docena to succeed Capito on
November 19, 1990. The record does not show why, but on November 27, 1990,
Alar was appointed, also by Santos, to the position already occupied by Docena. On
December 18, 990, the SPES passed Resolution 75 recognizing Alar rather than
Docena as the legitimate successor of the late Board Member Capito. The following
day, the SPES was in effect reversed by Secretary Santos. This action was affirmed in
a First Indorsement dated January 4, 1991, signed by Head Executive Assistant
Agundo of the Department of Local Government. The reaction of the SPES was to
pass, Resolution No. 1 dated January 8, 1991, where it reiterated its previous
recognition of Alar and declared that "the recall order issued by Secretary Santos,
dated December 19, 1990, recalling the appointment of Atty. Alar has no legal basis
in fact and in law and issued to fit his whimsical, capricious and wishy-washy desires
to the detriment of decency and due process of law. On the same date, Provincial
Prosecutor Labrador had rendered an opinion that the recall order of Secretary
Santos was "void ab initio"' because Alar's right to the office "had become vested."
It is not clear if Secretary Santos agreed with these views, but at any rate he issued
on February 20, 1991, another recall order, this time addressed to Docena. Docena
then came to this Court in a petition for mandamus to compel the respondents to
recognize and admit him as a lawfully appointed member of the SPES and also seeks
to hold them officially and personally liable in damages for their refusal to do so in
spite of his clear title to the disputed office. TRO issued, enjoining both Docena and
Alar from assuming the office of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Eastern Samar.
Issue: 1. WON Docena may be recognized and properly admitted to office.
 Sec. 50. Permanent Vacancies in Local Sanggunians. — In case of
permanent vacancy in the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang
panlungsod, sangguniang bayan, or sangguniang barangay, the President
of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Minister of Local
Government, shall appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy in the
sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panlungsod; the governor,
in the case of sangguniang bayan members; or the city or municipal mayor,
in the case of sangguniang barangay members. Except for the sangguniang
barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the
sanggunian member who caused the vacancy, and shall serve the
unexpired term of the vacant office.
 The petitioner makes the point, and it has not been disputed by the
respondents, that both he and Capito ran for the provincial board in the
1988 elections under the banner of Lakas ng Bansa. Later, they both joined
the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino under the leadership of Speaker
Mitra, who administered the oath of office to him when he was appointed
to the SPES on November 19, 1990. Docena argues that he has a
preferential right to the disputed office even on equitable grounds because
he placed ninth in the election, next to Capito, compared to Alar who did
not even run for the office.
 From the tenor of the appointment extended to Docena on November 19,
1990, there is no question that it was intended to be permanent, to fill the
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permanent vacancy caused by Capito's death. As such, it was to be valid for
the unexpired portion of the term of the deceased member, who was
entitled to serve "until noon of June 30, 1992," in accordance with Article
XVIII, Section 2, of the Constitution.
 The said appointment had been accepted by Docena, who had in fact
already assumed office as member of the SPES as per certification of the
Provincial Secretary. For all legal intents and purposes, the petitioner's
appointment had already become complete and enforceable at the time it
was supposed to have been "superseded" by the appointment in favor of
Alar.
 The respondents are ambivalent about the power of the Secretary of Local
Government to recall his appointments. They described the appointment
as "whimsical, capricious and wishy-washy" but they had no similar
complaints about the recall of Docena's appointment although also
apparently indecisive. On the contrary, they maintained a deep silence
about this other recall and insisted simply that the subsequent
appointment of Alar had invalidated the earlier appointment of Docena. It
is noteworthy that absolutely no reason was given for the recall of
Docena's appointment (or for that matter, the recall of Alar's
appointment). It appears that after appointing Docena and later twice
sustaining his title to the office, Secretary Santos simply had a change of
heart and decided to award the position to Alar.
 Docena's appointment having been issued and accepted earlier, and the
petitioner having already assumed office, he could not thereafter be just
recalled and replaced to accommodate Alar. The appointment was
permanent in nature, and for the unexpired portion of the deceased
predecessor's term. Docena had already acquired security of tenure in the
position and could be removed therefrom only for any of the causes, and
conformably to the procedure, prescribed by the LGC. These requirements
could not be circumvented by the simple process of recalling his
appointment.
 Whatever gave the SPES the impression that the questioned appointments
were revocable at will can only be left to conjecture; what is certain is that
it was not based on careful legal study. The Provincial Prosecutor's opinion
that the office had "become vested" in Alar suffers from the same flaw and
a lack of understanding of the nature of a public office. Political rather than
legal considerations seem to have influenced the action of the provincial
government in rejecting the petitioner's claim despite its obvious merit.
2. WON mandamus is the proper action.
 The respondents also argue that the petitioner should have sought to
enforce his claimed right in a petition not for mandamus but for quo
warranto, as his purpose is to challenge Alar's title to the disputed office.
That is only secondary in this case. The real purpose of the present petition
is to compel the respondent SPES to recognize and admit Docena as a
member of the body by virtue of a valid appointment extended to him by
the Secretary of Local Government.
 Mandamus is employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty to
which the petitioner is entitled. In arguing that the recognition and
admission of the petitioner is not a ministerial duty, the respondents are
asserting the discretion to review, and if they so decide, reject, the
Secretary's appointment. They have no such authority. Faced with a strictly
legal question, they had no right and competence to resolve it in their
discretion. What they should have done was reserve their judgment on the
matter, leaving it to the courts of justice to decide which of the conflicting
claims should be upheld. As a local legislative body subject to the general
supervision of the President of the Philippines, the SPES had no discretion
to rule on the validity of the decisions of the Secretary of Local
Government acting as her alter ego.
 Even assuming that the proper remedy is a petition for quo warranto, the
Court may in its own discretion consider the present petition a. such and
deal with it accordingly. We find that as a petition for quo warranto, it
complies with the prescribed requirements, to wit, that it be filed on time
and by a proper party asserting title to the office also claimed by the
respondent. Acting thereon, we hold that Docena has proved his right to
the disputed office and could not be legally replaced by Alar.
3. WON damages may be claimed.
 The Court will make no award of damages, there being no sufficient proof
to overcome the presumption that the respondents have acted in good
faith albeit erroneously. Nevertheless, the petitioner is entitled to the
payment of the salaries and other benefits appurtenant to the office of a
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, from the time
of his assumption of office and until he is actually admitted or reinstated.
De Rama v. CA
Facts: Upon his assumption to the position of Mayor of Pagbilao, Quezon, de Rama
wrote a letter dated July 13, 1995 to the Civil Service Commission seeking the recall
of the appointments of fourteen (14) municipal employees. De Rama justified his
recall request on the allegation that the appointments of the said employees were
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“midnight” appointments of the former mayor Abeja, done in violation of Article
VII, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his term, a
President or Acting President shall not make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety. While the matter was pending
before the CSC, three of the employees filed with the CSC a claim for payment of
their salaries, alleging that although their appointments were declared permanent
by Gulim, Director II of the CSC Field Office based in Quezon, de Rama withheld the
payment of their salaries and benefits pursuant to Office Order No. 95-01, which
was issued on June 30, 1995, wherein the appointments of the said 14 employees
were recalled. The CSC found them entitled to their salaries. On April 30, 1996, the
CSC denied de Rama’s request for the recall of the appointments of the 14
employees, for lack of merit. The CSC also cited Rule V, Sections 9 and 10 of the
Omnibus Rules, and declared that the appointments of the said employees were
issued in accordance with pertinent laws. Thus, the same were effective
immediately, and cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing authority until
disapproved by the CSC. The CSC also dismissed petitioner’s allegation that these
were “midnight” appointments, pointing out that the Constitutional provision relied
upon by petitioner prohibits only those appointments made by an outgoing
President and cannot be made to apply to local elective officials. MR to CSC denied.
CA affirmed. MR denied.
Issue: WON de Rama validly recalled the appointments. NO.
 The records reveal that when the petitioner brought the matter of recalling
the appointments of the 14 before the CSC, the only reason he cited to
justify his action was that these were “midnight appointments” that are
forbidden under Article VII, Section 15 of the Constitution. However, the
CSC ruled, and correctly so, that the said prohibition applies only to
presidential appointments. In truth and in fact, there is no law that
prohibits local elective officials from making appointments during the last
days of his or her tenure. Petitioner certainly did not raise the issue of
fraud on the part of the outgoing mayor who made the appointments.
Neither did he allege that the said appointments were tainted by
irregularities or anomalies that breached laws and regulations governing
appointments. His solitary reason for recalling these appointments was
that they were, to his personal belief, “midnight appointments” which the
outgoing mayor had no authority to make.
 The fourteen (14) employees were duly appointed following two meetings
of the Personnel Selection Board held on May 31 and June 26, 1995. There
is no showing that any of the private respondents were not qualified for
the positions they were appointed to. Moreover, their appointments were
duly attested to by the Head of the CSC field office at Lucena City. By
virtue thereof, they had already assumed their appointive positions even
before petitioner himself assumed his elected position as town mayor.
Consequently, their appointments took effect immediately and cannot be
unilaterally revoked or recalled by petitioner.
 It has been held that upon the issuance of an appointment and the
appointee’s assumption of the position in the civil service, “he acquires a
legal right which cannot be taken away either by revocation of the
appointment or by removal except for cause and with previous notice and
hearing.” Moreover, it is well-settled that the person assuming a position
in the civil service under a completed appointment acquires a legal, not
just an equitable, right to the position. This right is protected not only by
statute, but by the Constitution as well, which right cannot be taken away
by either revocation of the appointment, or by removal, unless there is
valid cause to do so, provided that there is previous notice and hearing.
 Petitioner admits that his very first official act upon assuming the position
of town mayor was to issue Office Order No. 95-01 which recalled the
appointments of the private respondents. There was no previous notice,
much less a hearing accorded to the latter. Clearly, it was petitioner who
acted in undue haste to remove the private respondents without regard
for the simple requirements of due process of law. In doing so, he
overstepped the bounds of his authority. While he argues that the
appointing power has the sole authority to revoke said appointments,
there is no debate that he does not have blanket authority to do so.
Neither can he question the CSC’s jurisdiction to affirm or revoke the
recall.
 Rule V, Section 9 of the Omnibus Implementing Regulations of the Revised
Administrative Code specifically provides that “an appointment accepted
by the appointee cannot be withdrawn or revoked by the appointing
authority and shall remain in force and in effect until disapproved by the
Commission.” Thus, it is the CSC that is authorized to recall an
appointment initially approved, but only when such appointment and
approval are proven to be in disregard of applicable provisions of the civil
service law and regulations.
 Section 10 of the same rule provides: An appointment issued in accordance
with pertinent laws and rules shall take effect immediately upon its
issuance by the appointing authority, and if the appointee has assumed the
duties of the position, he shall be entitled to receive his salary at once
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without awaiting the approval of his appointment by the Commission. The
appointment shall remain effective until disapproved by the Commission.
In no case shall an appointment take effect earlier than the date of its
issuance.
 Section 20 of Rule VI also provides: Notwithstanding the initial approval of
an appointment, the same may be recalled on any of the following
grounds:(a) Non-compliance with the procedures/criteria provided in the
agency’s Merit Promotion Plan; (b) Failure to pass through the agency’s
Selection/Promotion Board; (c) Violation of the existing collective
agreement between management and employees relative to promotion;
or (d) Violation of other existing civil service law, rules and regulations
 The appointments of the private respondents may only be recalled on the
above-cited grounds. And yet, the only reason advanced by the petitioner
to justify the recall was that these were “midnight appointments.” The CSC
correctly ruled, however, that the constitutional prohibition on so-called
“midnight appointments,” specifically those made within two (2) months
immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the
President or Acting President.
 If ever there were other procedural or legal requirements that were
violated in implementing the appointments of the private respondents, the
same were not seasonably brought before the Civil Service Commission.
These cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
David v. COMELEC
Facts (first case): In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7,
Kalookan City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, David filed
on December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday
of May 1997. On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page
Comment siding with petitioner and praying that “the election scheduled on May
12, 1997 be held in abeyance.” The COMELEC filed a separate Comment, dated
February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On February 11, 1997, the Court issued a
Resolution giving due course to the petition and requiring the parties to file
simultaneous memoranda. It also requested former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr. to act as amicus curiae. It noted but did not grant petitioner’s Urgent Motion for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated January 31, 1997 (as well as his Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion to the same
effect, dated March 6, 1997). Accordingly, the parties filed their respective
memoranda. The Petition for Leave to Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by
Punong Barangay Rodson F. Mayor was denied as it would just unduly delay the
resolution of the case, his interest like those of all other barangay officials being
already adequately represented by Petitioner David who filed this petition as
“president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas.”
Facts (second case): On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon
City Chapter represented by its president Rillon filed a petition “to seek a judicial
review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: 1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160
which reads as follows: (c) The term of office of barangay officials and
members of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.’
2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the
barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No.
8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended to
defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections;” Comelec
Resolution 2880, promulgated on December 27, 1996 and referred to above,
adopted a “Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts for
the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections.” On the other hand, Comelec Resolution
2887 promulgated on February 5, 1997 moved certain dates fixed in Resolution
2880. Acting on the petition, the Court on February 25, 1997 required respondents
to submit their comment thereon. The Court further resolved to consolidate the
two cases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue. Respondent
Commission filed its Comment on March 6, 1997 and the Solicitor General, in
representation of the other respondent, filed his on March 6, 1997. Petitioner’s
Urgent Omnibus Motion for oral argument and temporary restraining order was
noted but not granted. The petition was deemed submitted for resolution by the
Court without need of memoranda.
Issues: 1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or
RA 6679? 7160.
 RA 7160, the LGC, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case
of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the
later enactment prevails. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it is the
later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the lawmakers knew the
older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the
legislators could not have known the newer one and hence could not have
intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil Code, laws
are repealed only by subsequent ones and not the other way around.
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Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was
fixed at “three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of
barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.” This provision is
clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states
that such “term shall be for five years.” Note that both laws refer to the
same officials who were elected “on the second Monday of May 1994.”
 RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the
candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the
punong barangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay
kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. On the
other hand, the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on the
barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate, separately from the
seven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters elect eight barangay
officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. Under
both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only seven kagawads, and not for
the barangay chairman.
 During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the
voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven
kagawads. If we agree with the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all the
punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex David
cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less
president of the national league of barangays which he purports to
represent in this petition. It then necessarily follows also that he is not
the real party-in-interest and on that ground, his petition should be
summarily dismissed.
 In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997,[33] Congress
appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding
of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189,
Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held
“immediately after the barangay elections in 1997.” These are clear and
express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials
shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
 In Paras vs. Comelec,[34] this Court said that “the next regular election
involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away,
the same having been scheduled in May, 1997.” This judicial decision, per
Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a “part of the legal system of the
Philippines.”
 Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a special law, should
prevail over RA 7160, an alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine of
generalia specialibus non derogant. Petitioners are wrong. RA 7160 is a
codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It
specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that “the term of office
of barangay officials shall be for three years.” It is a special provision that
applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the
second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision
cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correct in alleging that
RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating (without however
giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. It is a
special law insofar as it governs the term of office of barangay officials. In
its repealing clause, RA 7160 states that “all general and special laws which
are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.” There being a clear repugnance and
incompatibility between the two specific provisions, they cannot stand
together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in accordance with
its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the
subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed.
2. WON RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years
constitutional. YES.
 SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years, and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
 Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by
excepting barangay officials whose “term shall be determined by law”
from the general provision fixing the term of “elective local officials” at
three years, the Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits Congress from
legislating a three-year term for such officers. We find this theory rather
novel but nonetheless logically and legally flawed.
 Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from
fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the
determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific
limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion
to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. It
must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. To
strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and
unequivocal showing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the
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statute permits. The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this
burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.
 There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is
constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution -- limiting the term of
all elective local officials to three years, except that of barangay officials
which “shall be determined by law” -- was an amendment proposed by
Constitutional Commissioner Davide. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas,
S.J., the amendment was “readily accepted without much discussion and
formally approved.”
3. WON petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under
RA 7160.
 If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1)
Petitioner David should not have run and could not have been elected
chairman of his barangay because under RA 6679, there was to be no
direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes was to be automatically elected
barangay chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay
should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of
votes among the kagawads -- 150, which was much more than David’s 112;
(3) the electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one
punong barangay plus seven kagawads.
 In other words, following petitioners’ own theory, the election of
Petitioner David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga
petitioners was illegal.
 The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners’ theory is that barangay
officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they
ran for and were elected to, under the law governing their very claim to
such offices: namely, RA 7160, the LGC. Petitioners’ belated claim of
ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is
unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, “(i)gnorance of the
law excuses no one from compliance therewith.”
Alinsug v. RTC
Facts: Zonsayda Alinsug was a regular employee of the municipal government of
Escalante, Negros Occidental, when she received a permanent appointment as
Clerk III in the office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator of the
same municipality. On 10 June 1992, she received an order from the newly
proclaimed mayor Ponsica, detailing her to the Office of the Mayor. In compliance
with the order, she reported to said office the following day. On 19 June 1992,
Zonsayda absented herself from work allegedly to attend to family matters. She had
asked permission from the personnel officer but not from the mayor. On 23 June
1992, Mayor Ponsica issued Office Order No. 31, suspending Zonsayda for one
month and one day commencing on 24 June 1992 for "a simple misconduct . . .
which can also be categorized as an act of insubordination." The order also stated
that the suspension "carries with it forfeiture of . . . benefits such as . . . salary and
PERA and leave credits during the duration of its effectivity." Forthwith, Zonsayda
filed with the RTC a petition dated 07 July 1992, for "injunction with damages and
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction" against Mayor
Ponsica and the municipal treasurer. The petitioner alleged that since her family
supported Mayor Ponsica's rival in the 11 May 1992 elections, her suspension was
an act of "political vendetta". She further alleged that said respondents' acts were
"malicious, illegal, unwarranted, wrongful and condemnable." Mayor Ponsica and
the municipal treasurer filed an answer to the petition, through private practitioner
Lezama, alleging that the petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies and
that her suspension was in accordance with law. The foregoing elicited a motion
from the petitioner, praying that the answer be disregarded and expunged from the
record, and that the respondents be all declared in default on the ground that since
the respondents were sued in their official capacities, "not including their private
capacities," they should have been represented by either the municipal legal officer
or the provincial legal officer or prosecutor as provided for by Sec. 481 (b) [i] and [3]
of the LGC. It also cited Sec. 1 of Rep. Act No. 10 and Art. 177 of the Revised Penal
Code which penalizes usurpation of public authority. The respondents opposed the
motion. Manifesting that the municipality of Escalante has no legal officer, they
asserted that both the LGC and the Administrative Code of 1987 do not have any
provision "relative to the duty of any provincial legal officer or prosecutor to
represent a municipality or its officials in suits filed against them by an employee or
a private individual." They contended that it was "unnecessary to provide such a
provision because there are administrative and judicial rulings sustaining the
validity of the employment of a private counsel by municipal officials. Moreover,
since the petitioner prayed for the award of moral damages," on the strength of
this Court's ruling in Albuera v. Torrens, 3 their hiring of a private counsel was
justified. On 28 August 1992, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Daniel M. Villaflor
entered his appearance as "counsel for Rolando P. Ponsica and Patricio A. Alvarez in
their official capacities." With the filing of said notice at appearance, on 08
September 1992, the lower court issued an Order, denying petitioners motion to
declare the respondents in default and motion to expunge from the record
respondents' answer. Acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by the
petitioner, the lower court issued the Order of 16 November 1992, denying said
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motion on the thesis that since the appointment of a legal officer was optional on
the part of the municipal government (Art. 481, third paragraph, LGC) and the
municipality of Escalante had not, in fact, designated any such legal officer,
petitioner's move to declare respondents in default "for having retained a private
counsel" was not thereby legally sustainable.
Issues: 1. WON a private counsel may represent municipal officials sued in their
official capacities
 Sec. 443 (b) of the LGC provides that, in addition to the officials
enumerated in the first paragraph thereof, the mayor may appoint, among
other officials enumerated therein, a municipal legal officer. Section 481,
Article 11 of Title V of the Code which provides for the appointment of
local officials common to all municipalities, cities and provinces, states that
"(t)he appointment of a legal officer shall be mandatory for the provincial
and city governments and optional for the municipal government." The
same section specifies the functions of the legal officer, and one of them
being that he shall: (i) Represent the local government unit in all civil
actions and special proceedings wherein the local government unit or any
official thereof, in his official capacity, is a party: Provided, that in actions
or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a party adverse
to the provincial government or to another component city or
municipality, a special legal officer may be employed to represent the
adverse party.
 Indeed, it appears that the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a
municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case
involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within
the province.
 De Guia v. The Auditor General: the municipality's authority to employ a
private attorney is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal would be disqualified to serve and represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the
old Administrative Code as legal basis, the Court therein cited Enriquez, Sr.
v. Gimenez which enumerated instances when the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent in court a particular municipality; if and when
original jurisdiction of case involving the municipality is vested in the
Supreme Court, when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality in the same province, and
when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is
pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or otherwise.
 Ramos v. Court of Appeals: a municipality may not be represented by a
private law firm which had volunteered its services gratis, in collaboration
with the municipal attorney and the fiscal, as such representation was
violative Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code. This strict coherence to
the letter of the law appears to have been dictated by the fact that "the
municipality should not be burdened with expenses of hiring a private
lawyer" and that "the interests of the municipality would be best
protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations."
 However, it can happen that a government official, ostensibly acting in his
official capacity and sued in that capacity, is later held to have exceeded
his authority. On the one hand, his defense would have then been
underwritten by the people's money which ordinarily should have been his
personal expense. On the other hand, personal liability can attach to him
without, however, his having had the benefit of assistance of a counsel of
his own choice. In Correa v. CFI of Bulacan, the Court held that in the
discharge of governmental functions, "municipal corporations are
responsible for the acts of its officers, except if and when, the only to the
extent that, they have acted by authority of the law, and in conformity
with the requirements thereof." In such instance, this Court has sanctioned
that representation by private counsel.
 Albuera v. Torres: a provincial governor sued in his official capacity may
engage the services of private counsel when "the complaint contains other
allegations and a prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the
defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity."
 Urbano v. Chavez: The accused public official should not expect the State,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, to defend him for a wrongful
act which cannot be attributed to the State itself. In the same light, a
public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal
capacity inasmuch as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a
wrongful act, much less commit a crime.
 The key then to resolving the issue of whether a local government official
may secure the services of private counsel, in an action filed against him in
his official capacity, lies on the nature of the action and the relief that is
sought.
 In this case, the Alinsug claims moral and exemplary damages, as well as
litigation expenses. Moral damages cannot generally be awarded unless
they are the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. Exemplary
damages, on the other hand, are not awarded if the defendant had not
acted in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner nor in the absence of
gross or reckless negligence. A public official, who in the performance of
his duty acts in such fashion, does so in excess of authority, and his actions
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would be ultra vires that can thereby result in an incurrence of personal
liability.
Municipality of Pililia v. CA
Facts: On March 17, 1989, the RTC of Tanay, Rizal, Branch 80, rendered judgment in
Civil Case No. 057-T in favor of the Municipality of Pililla against PPC ordering it to
pay business taxes as well as storage, mayor’s permit, and sanitary inspection fees.
The SC affirmed with modification (1991 Pililia Case). This judgment became final
and executory on July 13, 1991 and the records were remanded to the trial court
for execution. On October 14, 1991, in connection with the execution of said
judgment, Atty. Mendiola filed a motion in behalf of plaintiff municipality for the
examination of defendant corporation's gross sales for the years 1976 to 1978 and
1984 to 1991 for the purpose of computing the tax on business imposed under the
Local Tax Code, as amended. On October 21, 1991, PPC filed a manifestation to the
effect that on October 18, 1991, Pililla Mayor Nicomedes Patenia received from it
the sum of P11M as full satisfaction of the above-mentioned judgment of the
Supreme Court, as evidence by the release and quitclaim documents executed by
said mayor. Accordingly, on October 31, 1991 the court below issued an order
denying plaintiff municipality's motion for examination and execution of judgment
on the ground that the judgment in question had already been satisfied. Thereafter,
on November 21, 1991 Atty. Mendiola filed a motion for reconsideration of the
court's aforesaid order of October 31, 1991, claiming that the total liability of
defendant corporation to plaintiff municipality amounted to P24M , while the
amount involved in the release and quitclaim executed by Mayor Patenia was only
P12M; and that the said mayor could not waive the balance which represents the
taxes due under the judgment to the municipality and over which judgment the law
firm of Atty. Mendiola had registered two liens for alleged consultancy services of
25% and attorneys' fees of 25% which, when quantified and added, amount to
more than P12 million. MR denied. On February 18, 1992, Atty. Mendiola, again
ostensibly in behalf of herein petitioner municipality, filed a petition for certiorari
with us, which petition we referred to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition.
On March 2, 1992 PPC filed a motion questioning Atty. Mendiola's authority to
represent petitioner municipality. Consequently, on March 31, 1992 the CA
dismissed the petition for having been filed by a private counsel in violation of law
and jurisprudence, but without prejudice to the filing of a similar petition by the
Municipality of Pililla through the proper provincial or municipal legal officer. The
Municipality filed an MR.
Issue: WON Atty. Mendoza has authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the
name of the Municipality of Pililla. NO.
 The matter of representation of a municipality by a private attorney has
been settled in Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, et al., and reiterated in
Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., where we ruled
that private attorneys cannot represent a province or municipality in
lawsuits.
 Section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code provides: The provincial
fiscal shall represent the province and any municipality or municipal
district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof original jurisdiction is
vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or
municipal district in question is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the same
province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any
political division thereof are opposed, the provincial fiscal shall act on
behalf of the province. When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve
any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a special
attorney may be employed by its council.
 Under the above provision, complemented by Section 3, Republic Act No.
2264, the Local Autonomy Law, only the provincial fiscal and the municipal
attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The
provision is mandatory. The municipality's authority to employ a private
lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial fiscal is
disqualified to represent it. For the aforementioned exception to apply, the
fact that the provincial fiscal was disqualified to handle the municipality's
case must appear on record. In the instant case, there is nothing in the
records to show that the provincial fiscal is disqualified to act as counsel
for the Municipality of Pililla on appeal, hence the appearance of herein
private counsel is without authority of law.
 The submission of Atty. Mendiola that the exception is broad enough to
include situations wherein the provincial fiscal refuses to handle the case
cannot be sustained. The fiscal's refusal to represent the municipality is
not a legal justification for employing the services of private counsel.
Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline employment, a
fiscal cannot refuse to perform his functions on grounds not provided for
by law without violating his oath of office. Instead of engaging the services
of a special attorney, the municipal council should request the Secretary of
Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal
who has declined to handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to
Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.
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 It is also significant that the lack of authority of herein counsel, Atty.
Mendiola, was even raised by the municipality itself in its comment and
opposition to said counsel's motion for execution of his lien, which was
filed with the court a quo by the office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
in behalf of said municipality.
 The contention of Atty. Mendiola that private respondent cannot raise for
the first time on appeal his lack of authority to represent the municipality
is untenable. The legality of his representation can be questioned at any
stage of the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, the issue of lack
of authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised
for the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for
services rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that case had
become final and executory and/or had been duly executed.
 Furthermore, even assuming that the representation of the municipality by
Atty. Mendiola was duly authorized, said authority is deemed to have been
revoked by the municipality when the latter, through the municipal mayor
and without said counsel's participation, entered into a compromise
agreement with herein private respondent with regard to the execution of
the judgment in its favor and thereafter filed personally with the court
below two pleadings entitled and constitutive of a "Satisfaction of
Judgment" and a "Release and Quitclaim".
 A client, by appearing personally and presenting a motion by himself, is
considered to have impliedly dismissed his lawyer. Herein counsel cannot
pretend to be authorized to continue representing the municipality since
the latter is entitled to dispense with his services at any time. Both at
common law and under Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a client
may dismiss his lawyer at any time or at any stage of the proceedings, and
there is nothing to prevent a litigant from appearing before the court to
conduct his own litigation.
 The client has also an undoubted right to compromise a suit without the
intervention of his lawyer. Even the lawyers' right to fees from their clients
may not be invoked by the lawyers themselves as a ground for
disapproving or holding in abeyance the approval of a compromise
agreement. The lawyers concerned can enforce their rights in the proper
court in an appropriate proceeding in accordance with the Rules of Court,
but said rights may not be used to prevent the approval of the compromise
agreement.
 The apprehension of herein counsel that it is impossible that the
municipality will file a similar petition, considering that the mayor who
controls its legislative body will not take the initiative, is not only
conjectural but without factual basis. Contrary to his pretensions, there is
presently a manifestation and motion pending with the trial court filed by
the aforesaid municipal mayor for the withdrawal of the "Satisfaction of
Judgment" and the "Release and Quitclaim" previously filed in the case
therein as earlier mentioned.
Ramos v. CA
Facts: On April 18, 1990, Ramos, Perez, Castillo, and the Baliuag Market Vendors
Association, Inc. filed a petition before the court a quo for the Declaration of Nullity
of Municipal Ordinances No. 91 (1976) and No. 7 (1990) and the contract of lease
over a commercial arcade to be constructed in the municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan.
On April 27, 1980, during the hearing on the petitioners' motion for the issuance of
preliminary injunction, the Provincial Fiscal appeared as counsel for respondent
Municipality of Baliuag, which opposed the petition. Whereupon, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued by the court a quo on May 9, 1990. Meanwhile,
on May 3, 1990, the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Attorney, Regalado, filed an
Answer on behalf of respondent municipality. At the pre-trial conference scheduled
on May 28, 1990, Atty. Romanillos appeared, manifesting that he was counsel for
respondent municipality. On the same date, and on June 15, 1990, respectively,
Atty. Romanillos filed a motion to dissolve injunction and a motion to admit an
Amended Answer with motion to dismiss. On June 18, 1990, Provincial Attorney
Regalado appeared as collaborating counsel of Atty. Romanillos. The Provincial
Fiscal did not appear. It was Atty. Romanillos who submitted the Reply to-
petitioners' Opposition to respondents' motion to dissolve injunction. It was also
Atty. Romanillos who submitted a written formal offer of evidence on July 17, 1990
for respondent municipality. During the hearing on August 10, 1990, petitioners
questioned the personality of Atty. Romanillos to appear as counsel for the
respondent municipality, which opposition was reiterated on August 15, 1990, and
was put in writing in petitioners' motion of August 20, 1990 to disqualify Atty.
Romanillos from appearing as counsel for respondent municipality and to declare
null and void the proceedings participated in and undertaken by Atty. Romanillos.
Meanwhile, Atty. Romanillos and Atty. Regalado filed a joint motion dated August
22, 1990 stating, among others, that Atty. Romanillos was withdrawing as counsel
for respondent municipality and that Atty. Regalado, as his collaborating counsel for
respondent municipality, is adopting the entire proceedings participated
in/undertaken by Atty. Romanillos. On September 19, 1990 respondent Judge
issued the Order now being assailed which, as already stated, denied petitioners'
motion to disqualify Atty. Romanillos as counsel for respondent municipality and to
declare null and void the proceedings participated in by Atty. Romanillos; and on
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the other hand, granted Atty. Regalado's motion 'to formally adopt the entire
proceedings including the formal offer of evidence'. MR denied. CA dismissed. MR
denied.
Issues: 1. WON a municipality may be represented in a suit against it by a private
counsel.
 Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. CA: private attorneys cannot represent a
province or municipality in lawsuits. The municipality's authority to employ
a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
 Alinsug v. RTC: Exceptions: the law allows a private counsel to be hired by a
municipality only when the municipality is an adverse party in a case
involving the provincial government or another municipality or city within
the province. This provision has its apparent origin in the ruling in De Guia
v. The Auditor General where the Court held that the municipality's
authority to employ a private attorney is expressly limited only to
situations where the provincial fiscal would be disqualified to serve and
represent it. With Sec. 1683 of the old Administrative Code as legal basis,
the Court therein cited Enriquez, Sr. v. Gimenez which enumerated
instances when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a
particular municipality; if and when original jurisdiction of case involving
the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court, when the municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality
in the same province, and when, in a case involving the municipality, he, or
his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved, as heir legatee, creditor or
otherwise.
 None of the foregoing exceptions is present in this case. It may be said that
Atty. Romanillos appeared for respondent municipality inasmuch as he was
already counsel of Kristi Corporation which was sued with respondent
municipality in this same case. The order of the trial court dated
September 19, 1990, stated that Atty. Romanillos "entered his appearance
as collaborating counsel of the provincial prosecutor and the provincial
attorney." This collaboration is contrary to law and hence should not have
been recognized as legal. The fact that the municipal attorney and the
fiscal are supposed to collaborate with a private law firm does not legalize
the latter's representation of the municipality of Hagonoy in Civil Case No.
5095-M. While a private prosecutor is allowed in criminal cases, an
analogous arrangement is not allowed in civil cases wherein a municipality
is the plaintiff."
2. WON the petitioners may be held in estoppels
 Petitioners cannot be held in estoppel for questioning the legality of the
appearance of Atty. Romanillos, notwithstanding that they questioned the
witnesses of respondent municipality during the hearing of its motion to
dissolve the preliminary injunction. Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. Court of
Appeals held that the legality of the representation of an unauthorized
counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. This Court stated
that: The legality of his representation can be questioned at any stage of
the proceedings. In the cases hereinbefore cited, the issue of lack of
authority of private counsel to represent a municipality was only raised for
the first time in the proceedings for the collection of attorney's fees for
services rendered in the particular case, after the decision in that case had
become final and executory and/or had been duly executed.
 Elementary fairness dictates that parties unaware of the unauthorized
representation should not be held in estoppel just because they did not
question on the spot the authority of the counsel for the municipality. The
rule on appearances of a lawyer is that until the contrary is clearly shown,
an attorney is presumed to be acting under authority of the litigant whom
he purports to represent. His authority to appear for and represent
petitioner in litigation, not having been questioned in the lower court, it
will be presumed on appeal that counsel was properly authorized to file
the complaint and appear for his client.
3. WON the adoption by Atty. Regalado of the proceedings participated in by
Atty. Romanillos validate such proceedings. YES.
 It does not appear that the adoption of proceedings participated in or
undertaken by Atty. Romanillos when he was private counsel— such as the
proceedings on the motion to dissolve the injunction, wherein petitioners
had even cross-examined the witnesses presented by Atty. Romanillos in
support of said motion and had even started to present their witnesses to
sustain their objection to the motion — would have resulted in any
substantial prejudice to petitioners' interest. To declare the said
proceedings null and void — notwithstanding the formal adoption thereof
by Atty. Regalado as Provincial Attorney of Bulacan who is authorized to
represent respondent municipality of Baliuag in court — and to require
trial anew to cover the same subject matter, to hear the same witnesses
and to admit the same evidence adduced by the same parties cannot
enhance the promotion of justice."
 Although a municipality may not hire a private lawyer to represent it in
litigations, in the interest of substantial justice however, we hold that a
municipality may adopt the work already performed in good faith by such
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private lawyer, which work is beneficial to it (1) provided that no injustice
is thereby heaped on the adverse party and (2) provided further that no
compensation in any guise is paid therefor by said municipality to the
private lawyer. Unless so expressly adopted, the private lawyer's work
cannot bind the municipality.
4. WON "Joint Motion" Need Not Comply with Rule 15.
 A motion to withdraw the appearance of an unauthorized lawyer is a non-
adversarial motion that need not comply with Section 4 of Rule 15 as to
notice to the adverse party. The disqualification of Atty. Romanillos was
what petitioners were really praying for when they questioned his
authority to appear for the municipality. The disqualification was granted,
thereby serving the relief prayed for by petitioners. Such being the case, no
"notice directed to the parties concerned and served at least 3 days before
the hearing thereof" need be given petitioners, the questioned motion not
being contentious. Besides, what petitioners were questioning as to lack of
authority was remedied by the adoption of proceedings by an authorized
counsel, Atty. Regalado. The action of the trial court allowing the motion of
respondent municipality effectively granted petitioners' motion to
disqualify Atty. Romanillos. In People vs. Leviste, we ruled that: "While it is
true that any motion that does not comply with the requirements of Rule
15 should not be accepted for filing and, if filed, is not entitled to judicial
cognizance, this Court has likewise held that where a rigid application of
the rule will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case. Litigations
should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicalities. As this Court held in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, ‘an order of
the court granting the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of
hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the
proceedings cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the
Case."'
 Rules of procedure are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to
suspend their operation.
Salalima v. Guingona
Facts: Sometime in 1993, several administrative complaints against the petitioners,
who were elective officials of the Province of Albay, were filed with the Office of the
President. Acting thereon, the President issued AO 94 creating an Ad Hoc
Committee to investigate the charges and to thereafter submit its findings and
recommendations. The Ad Hoc committee was composed of Undersecretary Victor
R. Sumulong of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
Assistant Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, and Presidential Assistant Angel V.
Saldivar. On 26 August 1994, after conducting hearings, the Ad Hoc Committee
submitted its report to the Office of the President. On 7 October 1994, the
President promulgated AO. 153 which meted out suspensions to the petitioners.
OP Case 5469:
Because of the refusal by the NPC to pay real property taxes assessed by Albay
covering the period from 11 June 1984 up to 10 March 1987 amounting to
P214,845,184.76, the Province sold at public auction the properties of NPC
consisting of geothermal power plants, buildings, machinery and other
improvements located at Tiwi and Daraga, Albay. The Province was the sole and
winning bidder at the auction sale. NPC failed to redeem its properties. It later filed
a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the auction sale
conducted by the Province. NPC claims, inter alia, that its properties are not subject
to real property tax. On 17 May 1989, the Province, through Atty. Romulo Ricafort,
the legal officer of the Province, filed it; comment on the NPC petition with the
Supreme Court. On 2 June 1989, the Albay Sangguniang Panlalawigan adopted
Resolution No. 129-89 authorizing respondent Governor to engage the services of a
Manila-based law firm to handle the case against NPC. On 25 August 1989, Atty.
Jesus R. Cornago entered his appearance with the Supreme Court as collaborating
counsel for the Province in G.R. No. 87479. The entry of appearance of Atty.
Cornago bore the conformity of respondent Governor. On 14 November 1989, Atty.
Antonio Jose F. Cortes of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm sent respondent Governor a
letter informing him that Atty. Jesus R. Cornago, as collaborating counsel for the
Province, has filed a memorandum with the Supreme Court, suggesting that a
retainer agreement be signed between the Province, on the one hand, and Atty.
Cornago and Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. On 8 January 1990, the Albay Sangguniang
Panlalawigan passed Resolution No. 01-90 authorizing respondent Governor to sign
and confirm the retainer contract with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Salalima
signed the retainer agreement. On 4 June 1990, the Supreme Court issued a
decision dismissing the NPC petition and upholding the validity of the auction sale
conducted by the province to answer for NPC's tax liabilities. Payments amounting
to P7,380,410.31 were made by the Province to Atty. Antonio Jose Cortes and Atty.
Jesus R. Cornago.
Issue: WON respondents have incurred administrative liability in entering into the
retainer agreement with Atty. Cornago and the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm and in
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making payments pursuant to said agreement for purposes of the case filed by NPC
with the Supreme Court against the province. YES.
 Sec. 481 of the LGC (RA. No. 7160) requires the appointment of a legal
officer for the province whose functions include the following: Represent
the local government unit in all civil actions and special proceedings
wherein the local government unit or any official thereof, in his official
capacity is a party; Provided, That, in actions or proceeding where a
component city or municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to another component city or municipality, a special legal
officer may be employed to represent the adverse party.
 Municipality of Bocaue, et al. v. Manotok: LGUs cannot be represented by
private lawyers and it is solely the Provincial Fiscal who can rightfully
represent them. Under the law, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan and his
assistants are charged with the duty to represent the province and any
municipality thereof in all civil actions.
 This ruling applies squarely to the case at hand because Sec. 481 of the
LGC is based on Sec. 1681 of the Revised Administrative Code which was
the subject of interpretation in the abovecited case.
 In hiring private lawyers to represent the Province of Albay, respondents
exceeded their authority and violated the abovequoted section of the LGC
and the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.
 Moreover, the entire transaction was attended by irregularities. First, the
disbursements to the lawyers amounting to P7,380,410.31 were
disallowed by the Provincial Auditor on the ground that these were made
without the prior written conformity of the Solicitor General and the
written concurrence of the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by COA
Circular No. 86-255 dated 2 April 1986.
 The respondents attempted to dispute this finding by presenting the
Solicitor General's conformity dated 15 July 3993. This conformity was,
however obtained after the disbursements were already made in 1990 and
1992. What is required by COA Circular No. 85-255 is a prior written
conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General.
 Another irregularity in the transaction concerns the lawyers. Resolution
No. 01-90 authorized the respondent Governor to sign and confirm a
retainer contract for legal services with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm at
202 E. Rodriguez Sr. Blvd., Quezon City. The retainer contract signed by
respondent Governor was, however, not only with the Cortes & Reyna Law
Firm but also with Atty. Jesus R. Cornago of Jamecca Building, 280 Tomas
Morato Avenue, Quezon City. In entering into a retainer agreement not
only with the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm but also with Atty. Jose R. Cornago,
respondent Governor exceeded his authority under Resolution No. 01-90.
 Complicating further the web of deception surrounding the transaction is
the fact that it was only Atty. Cornago who appeared as collaborating
counsel of record of the Province in the Supreme Court case (G R. No.
87479). Even the Solicitor General, in his letter to respondent Governor
dated 15 July 1993, noted that the Province is represented in the Supreme
Court by Attys. Ricafort Cornago and Glenn Manahan but not by the Cortes
& Reyna Law Firm. Furthermore, the memorandum with the Supreme
Court filed for the Province was signed by Atty. Cornago and not by the
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm. Consequently, the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm was
not counsel of record of the Province in G.R. No. 87479. And yet, six of the
ten checks paid by the Province and amounting to more than P3.6 million
were issued in favor of the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm through Atty. Antonio
Jose Cortes. In other words, respondents disbursed money to the Cortes &
Reyna Law Firm although the latter did not appear as counsel for the
Province in the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 87479.
 Finally, the attorney's fees agreed upon by respondent Salalima and
confirmed by the other respondents are not only unreasonable but also
unconscionable. The contingent fee of 18% of the "P214 million" claim of
the Province against NPC amounts to P38.5 million. The word
"unconscionable", as applied to attorney's fee, "means nothing more than
that the fee contracted for, standing alone and unexplained would be
sufficient to show that an unfair advantage had been taken of the client, or
that a legal fraud had been taken of the client, or that a legal fraud had
been perpetrated on him."
 The Province has a legal officer, Atty. Ricafort, who had already filed a
comment on NPC's petition against the Province. The comment filed by
Atty. Ricafort already covers the basic issues raised in the petition. When
Atty. Cornago filed an appearance and subsequently a memorandum for
the Province, the petition was already been given due course by the
Supreme Court and the only pleading to be filed by the parties before the
Court would issue its decision was a memorandum. Surely, one
memorandum could not be worth P38.5 million.
 Furthermore, the professional character and social standing of Atty.
Cornago are not such as would merit a P38.5 million fee for the legal
services rendered for the Province. During the hearing, respondent
Governor admitted that he had hired Atty. Cornago because they were
schoolmates at San Beda College. It is evident that respondent Governor
hired Atty. Cornago not on the basis of his competency and standing in the
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legal community but purely for personal reasons. Likewise, the standing of
the Cortes & Reyna Law Firm is not such as would merit P38.5 million for
one memorandum, which, in this case, it had not even filed because it was
not the counsel of record. Hence, considering the labor and time involved,
the skill and experience called for in the performance of the services and
the professional character and social standing of the lawyers, the
attorney's fee of P38.5 million is unconscionable. By allowing such
scandalously exorbitant attorney's fees which is patently disadvantageous
to the government, respondents betrayed a personal bias to the lawyers
involved and committed abuse of authority.
Issues: 1. WON the OP acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending
petitioners for periods ranging from 12-20 months.
 Sec. 66(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term
of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every administrative
offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent
so suspended as long as he meet the qualifications for the office.
 This provision sets the limits to the penalty of suspension. It should not
exceed six months or the unexpired portion of the term of office of the
respondent for every administrative offense. An administrative offense
means every act or conduct or omission which amounts to, or constitutes,
every of the grounds or disciplinary action.
 The offenses for which suspension may be imposed are enumerated in
Section 60 of the Code, which reads: Sec. 60. An elective local official may
be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any of the following
grounds: (a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; (b) Culpable
violation of the Constitution; (c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in
office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty; (d) Commission of any
offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at Least
prision mayor; (e) Abuse of authority; (f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen
(15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, sangguniang bayan,
and sangguniang barangay; (g) Acquisition for, or acquisition of, foreign
citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country;
and (h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other
laws. An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds
enumerated above by order of the proper court.
 Assuming then that the findings and conclusions of the Office of the
President in each of the subject four administrative cases are correct, it
committed no grave abuse of discretion in imposing the penalty of
suspension, although the aggregate thereof exceeded six months and the
unexpired portion of the petitioners' term of office. The fact remains that
the suspension imposed for each administrative offense did not exceed six
months and there was an express provision that the successive service of
the suspension should not exceed the unexpired portion of the term of
office of the petitioners. Their term of office expired at noon of 30 June
1995. And this Court is not prepared to rule that the suspension to the
petitioners' removal office.
2. WON the OP committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending Salalima,
who was reelected on 11 May 1992, for an alleged administrative offense
committed during his first term; and in suspending in the other petitioners,
some of whom were elected and others reelected on 11 May 1992, for an
alleged administrative offense committed in 1989
 We agree with the petitioners that Governor Salalima could no longer be
held administratively liable in C.P. Case No. 5450 in connection with the
negotiated contract entered into on 6 March 1992 with RYU Construction
for additional rehabilitation work at the Tabaco Public Market. Nor could
the petitioners be held administratively liable in O.P. Case No. 5469 for the
execution in November 1989 of the retainer contract with Atty. Jesus
Cornago and the Corte's and Reyna Law Firm. This is so because public
officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term, as held in Pascual vs. Provincial
Board of Nueva Ecija 17 and Aguinaldo vs. Santos. 18 In Pascual, this Court
ruled: We now come to one main issue of the controversy — the legality of
disciplining an elective municipal official for a wrongful act committed by
him during his immediately preceding term of office. In the absence of any
precedent in this jurisdiction, we have resorted to American authorities.
We found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to
differences in statutes and constitutional provisions, and also, in part, to a
divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the
subsequent election or appointment condones the prior misconduct. The
weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the rule denying the right
to remove one from office because of misconduct during a prior term, to
which we fully subscribe. Offenses committed, or acts done, during
previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this
is especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in
proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office,
and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the office
was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W.
2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S W. 2d 418; People ex rel. Bagshaw
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vs. Thompson, 130 P. 2d 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. to hound the former during his new term with administrative cases for acts
Shutler, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; alleged to have been committed during his previous term. His second term
State vs. Ward, 43 S.V. 2d. 217). The underlying theory is that each term is may thus be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the
separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a detriment of public service. This doctrine of forgiveness or condonation
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting cannot, however, apply to criminal acts which the reelected official may
off the right to remove him therefor (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. have committed during his previous term.
Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A.. (NS) 553. As held on Conant vs.  We thus rule that any administrative liability which petitioner Salalima
Brogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) might have incurred in the execution of the retainer contract in O.P. Case
553 —The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior No. 5469 and the incidents related therewith and in the execution on
to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the March 1992 of a contract for additional repair and rehabilitation works for
people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a the Tabaco Public Market in O.P. Case No. 5450 are deemed extinguished
man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his by his reelection in the 11 May 1992 synchronized elections. So are the
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or liabilities, if any, of petitioner members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason ng Albay, who signed Resolution No. 129 authorizing petitioner Salalima to
of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the people. enter into the retainer contract in question and who were reelected in the
 This Court reiterated this rule in Aguinaldo and explicitly stated therein: 1992 elections. This is, however, without prejudice to the institution of
Clearly then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for appropriate civil and criminal cases as may be warranted by the attendant
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re- circumstances. As to petitioners Victoria, Marcellana, Reyeg, Osia, and
election to office operates a condonation of the officer's previous Cabredo who became members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan only
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. after their election in 1992, they could not beheld administratively liable in
The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending O.P. case No. 5469, for they had nothing to do with the said resolution
against petitioners for acts he may have committed during the failed coup. which was adopted in April 1989 yet.
 However, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that Aguinaldo does
not apply because the case against the official therein was already pending
when he filed his certificate of candidacy for his reelection bid. It is of the
view that an official's reelection renders moot and academic an
administrative complaint against him for acts done during his previous
term only if the complaint was filed before his reelection. The fine
distinction does not impress us. The rule makes no distinction. As a matter
of fact, in Pascual the administrative complaint against Pascual for acts
committed during his first term as Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, was
filed only a year after he was reelected.
 The rule adopted in Pascual, qualified in Aguinaldo insofar as criminal cases
are concerned, is still a good law. Such a rule is not only founded on the
theory that an official's reelection expresses the sovereign will of the
electorate to forgive or condone any act or omission constituting a ground
for administrative discipline which was committed during his previous
term. We may add that sound public policy dictates it. To rule otherwise
would open the floodgates to exacerbating endless partisan contests
between the reelected official and his political enemies, who may not stop
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Ganzon v. CA (August 1991, supra, see p. 9)
Ganzon v. CA (November 1991)
Facts: Sometime in 1988, a series of 10 administrative complaints were filed by
various city officials, against petitioner Ganzon, the elected City Mayor of Iloilo City,
on various charges such as abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct and
others. In the course of the hearing of the administrative cases, Secretary Santos
issued against Ganzon 3 separate orders of preventive suspension, each of the
orders to last for a 60-day period. Petitioner assailed the validity of the said orders
by filing with the Court of Appeals 2 separate petitions for prohibition. On 7
September 1988 and 5 July 1990, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing
the petitions for lack of merit. Hence, Ganzon filed with this Court 2 separate
petitions assailing the decision. On 26 June 1990, we issued a TRO barring the
respondent Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining
the enforcement of the CA’s 2 decisions. However, it appears that even before the
promulgation on 5 August 1991 of the main decision, respondent Secretary Santos
had issued on 3 July 1991 against petitioner Ganzon another order of preventive
suspension in connection with an Administrative Case filed by Jopson. On 6 July
1991, Ganzon filed his "extremely urgent motion" (with supplemental motions later
filed) questioning the validity of the said last mentioned suspension order. This
Court issued a resolution dated 9 July 1991, requiring respondents to comment on
petitioner's urgent motion. After the main decision in the present petitions was
rendered by the Court on 5 August 1991, respondents filed motions dated, 9 and 29
August 1991 alleging therein that the issues raised in petitioner's motion (6 July
1991) were rendered moot and academic by the said decision, and seeking
clarification on whether it was still necessary to comply with this Court's resolutions
requiring respondents to file comment on petitioner's said motion of 6 July 1991.
Meanwhile, on 29 August 1991, respondent Santos issued a memorandum
addressed to petitioner Ganzon, in connection with the 5 August 1991 main
decision, stating therein that the third order of preventive suspension issued
against petitioner on 3 May 1990 shall be deemed in force and effect. On 30 August
1991, petitioner Ganzon filed with the CA a petition for mandamus, against
respondents. On the same day, petitioner filed in these petitions his "manifestation
and compliance," alleging that he had already fully served the suspension orders
issued against him, in compliance with the main decision of 5 August 1991, and that
he should be allowed to re-assume his office starting 4 September 1991.
Meanwhile, in reaction to the memorandum dated 29 August 1991 issued by
respondent Santos, petitioner filed a motion praying for the issuance of a TRO,
which motion was granted by the Court of Appeals. On 4 September 1991,
respondents filed with this Court a motion asking for the issuance of a restraining
order addressed to the CA and against the TRO. Granting respondents' motion, this
Court on 5 September 1991 issued a temporary restraining order directing the CA to
cease and desist from implementing the TRO it had issued dated 3 September 1991
immediately suspending the implementation of the order of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government dated 29 August 1991. On 9 September 1991,
petitioner Ganzon filed a motion to dissolve this Court's restraining order dated 5
September 1991. The records show that petitioner Ganzon, to this date, remains
suspended from office (as the elected Mayor of Iloilo City) and since the order of
preventive suspension dated 3 July 1991 (the fourth suspension order 3 ) was
issued against him by respondent Secretary; in other words, he has been serving
the said fourth suspension order which is to expire after a period of 60 days, or on 4
September 1991.
 First suspension: 11 August 1988, fully served. Second: 11 October 1988,
not served because its enforcement was restrained by an order of the RTC
upon petition of petitioner himself. Third: 3 May 1990, the main decision
states that petitioner is allowed to serve the duration of said third
suspension order. It would seem, therefore, that after petitioner has
served in full the third suspension order as decreed in the main decision,
he can then return to his official duties as Iloilo City Mayor. Fourth: 3 July
1991, issued even before the main decision of 5 August 1991 was
promulgated. (The records show, however, that petitioner has in fact fully
served the fourth suspension order, as admitted by respondents no less.
This will be discussed shortly; but any issue on its validity is now moot and
academic. Besides, it is clear that this fourth suspension order is not one of
the three orders covered by and subject of the main decision).
Third: May 4, 1990 May 18, 1990
SC: June 9, 1990 June 26, 1990 records show that he was then in office
discharging the functions of the Mayor of Iloilo City. Hence 46 days still
remain to be served as decreed by the main decision. If we follow the
mandate of such main decision which ordained that the third order be
served and that the temporary restraining order 16 against it be lifted, it
would follow that the remaining 46 days should be served starting 5
August 1991 (date of promulgation of main decision) until fully served.
Another way to serve the 46 days would be to begin serving it only on 4
September 1991 (the day after 3 September 1991 which was the last day
of service for the fourth suspension order), or until 20 October 1991 (the
46th day from 4 September 1990).
Fourth: July 5, 1991 September 3, 1991
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 However we take note of the fact that petitioner has already fully served
the 60-day fourth order of preventive suspension which started 5 July 1991
(that is, even before the main decision was rendered) and ended on 3
September 1991. Petitioner raises the issue of whether he could or should
be allowed to serve the third and the fourth orders "simultaneously". If we
allow his submission and accept "simultaneous service", it would mean the
following: that from 5 August 1991 (the date the TRO issued by this Court
was lifted) up to 3 September 1991 (the last day for serving the fourth
order), twenty-nine (29) days have elapsed; that these twenty-nine (29)
days which form part of his service for the fourth order can be also
credited to his favor by treating said twenty-nine (29) days as forming part
of his service of the third order; if this were so, he would need to serve
only seventeen (17) days more to complete the service of the third order;
said seventeen (17) days from 3 September 1991 will expire on 20
September 1991, which would be the last day for serving the third
suspension order.
Issues: 1. WON petitioner can be allowed the benefit of simultaneous service of
preventive suspensions.
 If simultaneous service of two (2) suspension orders is allowed, this would
work in favor of the petitioner (an elective local official) as the balance of
his third preventive suspension would, in effect, be reduced from 46 days
to 17 days. In the main decision, noting that successive suspensions have
been inflicted on Mayor Ganzon we stated that what "is intriguing is that
respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor
piecemeal — apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the
respondent Secretary could have pursued a consolidated effort." 17 Surely,
allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and
fourth suspensions will favor him, (and presumably the local constituency)
and certainly lessen if not offset the harsh effects of whatever motive may
be behind the intriguing action of the respondent Secretary in issuing
those successive suspension orders.
 LGC: Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension b) . . . that, any single preventive
suspension of local elective official shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days:
Provided, further that in the event that several administrative cases are
filed against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for
more than ninety (90) days within a single year on the same ground or
grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
 Since we can allow, as we here allow, under the bizarre circumstances of
this case, petitioner to serve the third and fourth orders simultaneously
(insofar as they overlap), this means that, as explained earlier, petitioner
shall serve only 17 days more (not 46 days) to complete the service of the
third order, that is, starting from 3 September 1991 and ending on 20
September 1991. Hence, as of this latter date, petitioner has complied with
the mandate of the main decision for he has already fully served the third
preventive suspension which ended on 20 September 1991.
 WON petitioner must also serve his second suspension.
 If we follow the decision which states that the three (3) suspensions are
affirmed, there appears to be no reason why the second order should not
be served for another 60-day period. However, there is no cogent reason
why, under the bizarre circumstances of this case — where the respondent
Secretary has chosen to impose preventive suspensions piecemeal, instead
of consolidating the several administrative cases of similar nature and
close vintage — we cannot allow the concept of simultaneous service to
apply to the second order (as we did in the third order). It would follow
then that the second order is also fully served to this date for the service of
said second order would have started on 5 August 1991 (when the main
decision was rendered as this was the time when this Court found and
affirmed the validity of the three (3) suspension orders, including the
second order). The 60-day period from 5 August 1991 expired on 4
October 1991.
 Existing Special Civil Action in the RTC deemed moot and academic. Under
the main decision of this Court, dated 5 August 1991, second preventive
suspension has been affirmed.
Artieda v. Santos (Consolidated with Ganzon v. CA, see above)
Espiritu v. Melgar
Facts: On April 11, 1991, Garing filed a complaint charging Mayor Melgar of Naujan
with grave misconduct, oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the
Constitution and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service.
According to the charge, Melgar, with abuse of official function, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the person of Garing, by boxing and kicking thereby inflicting upon the latter
physical injuries on different parts of his body and not being contented ordered his
arrest and detention in the municipal jail of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro without filing
any charges until he was released the following day. On April 22, 1991, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer
the complaint. Melgar alleged that Garing attended graduation ceremonies drunk
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and disrupted such ceremonies. Garing was momentarily placed in custody for his
own protection because he was drunk. An open knife (balisong) was taken from
him. I was likewise informed that after he had sobered up, he was told to go home,
but he refused to go and only did so the following morning. After evaluation, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro recommended, to the Provincial
Governor, that respondent be preventively suspended for forty-five (45) days
pending the investigation of the administrative complaint. On May 23, 1991, Mayor
Melgar filed a motion to dismiss the administrative complaint. It was opposed by
Garing. MTD dismissed. Meanwhile, pursuant to the recommendation of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Governor Espiritu placed Mayor Melgar under
preventive suspension. On June 3, 1991, Mayor Melgar received the Order of
Suspension. He forthwith filed a "Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction
with prayer for Restraining Order" in the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro
alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant, despotic and arbitrary abuse
of power" by the Governor. On June 24, 1991, RTC Judge Virola issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Order of
suspension against Mayor Melgar. Governor Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss
and/or for reconsideration which Judge Virola denied on July 16, 1991. Hence, this
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue: Won a provincial governor may suspend a municipal mayor.
 Section 63, Chapter IV of the LGC provides: Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension.
— (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Minister of Local
Government if the respondent is a provincial or city official, by the
provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal official, or by
the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay
official. (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at anytime after the
issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the
evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offense so
warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent could
influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive suspension shall not
extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension. (3) At the
expiration of sixty-days, the suspended official shall be deemed reinstated
in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against
him until its termination. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the
case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not
be counted in computing the time of the suspension.
 Clearly, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized by law to
preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan at anytime after the
issues had been joined and any of the following grounds were shown to
exist: 1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent
has committed the act or acts complained of; 2. When the evidence of
culpability is strong; 3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or 4.
When the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence.
 There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the charges
against him are heard and before he is given an opportunity to prove his
innocence. Preventive suspension is allowed so that the respondent may
not hamper the normal course of the investigation through the use of his
influence and authority over possible witnesses.
 Since respondent mayor believed that his preventive suspension was
unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought relief first
from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, not from the courts.
Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courts without exhausting
administrative remedies was premature. The regional trial court had no
jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No. R-5003 and gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the case.
 There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to the
seriousness of the charges, or as to whether they warrant disciplinary
action. However, as a general rule, the office or body that is invested with
the power of removal or suspension should be the sole judge of the
necessity and sufficiency of the cause. So, unless a flagrant abuse of the
exercise of that power is shown, public policy and a becoming regard for
the principle of separation of powers demand that the action of said
officer or body should be left undisturbed. However, in this particular case,
since the 60-day preventive suspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained
by the Temporary Restraining Order which we issued on August 6, 1991,
and therefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated in office
without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative investigation of
the charges against him.
Aguinaldo v. Santos
Facts: Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having
been elected to said position during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to
serve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oath sometimes around March
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1988. Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent Secretary
of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, to
petitioner requiring him to show cause why should not be suspended or remove
from office for disloyalty to the Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt
thereof. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and
culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by the Agateps and Mamba, mayors
of municipalities in Cagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed during
the coup. Petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively
participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the
cause of the rebel soldiers. On the basis thereof, respondent Secretary suspended
petitioner from office for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of the
formal investigation into the charges against him. The Secretary found petitioner
guilty and ordered his removal from office. While this case was pending before this
Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of
Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for his
disqualification were then filed against him, all based on the ground that he had
been removed from office by virtue of the March 19, 1990 resolution of respondent
Secretary. The COMELEC granted the petitions. On the same day, acting upon a
"Motion to Clarify" filed by petitioner, the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the
resolutions of the Commission becomes final and executory only after five (5) days
from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a candidate for governor
pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases with his Court.
Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with this
Court, seeking to nullify the resolution of the Commission ordering his
disqualification. The Court, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992, issued a TRO against
the Commission to cease and desist from enforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution
pending the outcome of the disqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing
of the votes and returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission was
ordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided the case. On June 9,
1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned case granting petition and
annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution of the Commission on the ground that the
decision of respondent Secretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending
review with this Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in the elections, the
resolution paved the way for his eventual proclamation as Governor of Cagayan.
Issues: 1. WON an officical may be punish for acts committed in a previous term
 Case Moot and academic because of Aguinaldo’s reelection.
 A public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct
committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a
condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting
off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no
application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may
have committed during the failed coup.
 WON the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or remove local
government official under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was
repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
 The power of respondent Secretary to remove local government officials is
anchored on both the Constitution and a statutory grant from the
legislative branch. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII (17)
and X (4) of the 1987 Constitution which vest in the President the power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices and the power
of general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that
the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the
President unless expressly rejected by him.
 The statutory grant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots,
having been enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XI
of the 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of which specifically provided as
follows: Sec. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a LGC which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its Members,
defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure
with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
power, functions, and duties of local government officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
However, any change in the existing form of local government shall not
take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite
called for the purpose.
 A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution,
which reads: Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a LGC which shall provided
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and
provide for the qualifications, election, appointment, and removal, term
and salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.
 Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact a LGC,
which provides for the manner of removal of local government officials, is
found in the 1973 Constitution as well as in the 1987 Constitution, then it
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can not be said that BP Blg. 337 was repealed by the effective of the
present Constitution.
 Bagabuyo v. Davide: that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the
effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as the proposed LGC
of 1991 is approved. The power of respondent Secretary of the
Department of Local Government to remove local elective government
officials is found in Secs. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337.
 As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondent
Secretary to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan,
We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 to show the fallacy of
the same, to wit —In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . .
refuses to assume office, fails to quality, dies or is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge
the functions of his office, the vice-governor . . . shall assume the office for
the unexpired term of the former.
 WON the alleged act of disloyalty committed by petitioner should be
proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and not be a mere
preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion
under the Revised Penal Code.
 Petitioner is not being prosecuted criminally under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, but administratively with the end in view of removing
petitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province for acts of
disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proof required is only
substantial evidence.
Reyes v. COMELEC
Facts: Reyes was the incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong, Oriental
Mindoro, having been elected to that office on May 11, 1992. On October 26, 1994,
an administrative complaint was filed against him with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan by Manalo. It was alleged, among other things, that petitioner exacted
and collected P50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong Public
Market; that certain checks issued to him by the National Reconciliation and
Development Program of the Department of Interior and Local Government were
never received by the Municipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of
the same officer; and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattle from
beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter had reared and fattened
the cattle for seven months. In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered his
removal from office. It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian had
terminated the proceedings in the case and was about to render judgment,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Regional
Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, alleging that the proceedings had been
terminated without giving him a chance to be heard. A TRO was issued by the court
on February 7, 1995, enjoining the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with
the case. As a result, the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be
served upon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the expiration of the
temporary restraining order and without any injunction being issued by the
Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the decision upon petitioner's
counsel in Manila. However, the latter refused to accept the decision. Subsequent
attempts to serve the decision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also
refused to accept the decision. On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order for
petitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn over the office to the
incumbent vice mayor. But service of the order upon petitioner was also refused.
Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of candidacy with the
Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong. On March 24, 1995,
private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as registered voter of Bongabong, sought the
disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor, citing the LGC of 1991 (R.A. No
.7160) which states: §40. Disqualification. — The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position: (b) Those removed from office as a
result of an administrative case. Nonetheless, because of the absence of any
contrary order from the COMELEC, petitioner Reyes was voted for in the elections
held on May 8, 1995. On May 9, 1995, the COMELEC's Second Division disqualified
Reyes. On May 10, 1995, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Bongabong,
apparently unaware of the disqualification of Reyes by the COMELEC, proclaimed
him the duly-elected mayor. MR denied. En banc: validly disqualified. Hence the
petition.
Issue: 1. WON decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, ordering Reyes removed
from office, is not yet final because he has not been served a copy thereof.
 Failure of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision
was due to the refusal of petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision.
As the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo, stated in
his certification, repeated attempts had been made to serve the decision
on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyes refused to receive
the decision.
 Rule 13, §§ 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service of final
orders and judgments either personally or by mail. Personal service is
completed upon actual or constructive delivery, which may be made by
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delivering a copy personally to the party or his attorney, or by leaving it in
his office with a person having charge thereof, or at his residence, if his
office is not known. 4 Hence service was completed when the decision was
served upon petitioner's counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995.
In addition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan certified,
service by registered mail was also made on petitioner Reyes. Although the
mail containing the decision was not claimed by him, service was deemed
completed five days after the last notice to him on March 27, 1995.
 If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasons attributable
to him, service is deemed completed and the judgment or decision will be
considered validly served as long as it can be shown that the attempt to
deliver it to him would be valid were it not for his or his counsel's refusal to
receive it.
 Indeed that petitioner's counsel knew that a decision in the administrative
case had been rendered is evident in his effort to bargain with the counsel
for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to have the decision served upon
him and his client while their petition for certiorari in the Regional Trial
Court was pending. His refusal to receive the decision may, therefore, be
construed as a waiver on his part to have a copy of the decision.
 Petitioner was given sufficient notice of the decision. Prudence required
that, rather than resist the service, he should have received the decision
and taken an appeal to the Office of the President in accordance with R.A.
No. 7160, § 67. 8 But petitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision
became final on April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon
petitioner.
 The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995, the
decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already become final and
executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial
Court did not prevent the administrative decision from attaining finality.
An original action of certiorari is an independent action and does not
interrupt the course of the principal action nor the running of the
reglementary period involved in the proceeding.
 Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during the
pendency of the certiorari proceedings, there must be a restraining order
or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court directed to the
lower court. In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order
was issued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction was
subsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issued expired after
20 days. From that moment on, there was no more legal barrier to the
service of the decision upon petitioner.
 Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served upon him because at
the hearing held on February 15, 1995 of the case which he filed in the
RTC, the counsel of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza,
agreed not to effect service of the decision of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan pending final resolution of the petition for certiorari.
 The alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes and the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan cannot bind the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. It
was illegal . And it would have been no less illegal for the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan to have carried it out because R.A. No. 7160, § 66 (a) makes it
mandatory that "[c]opies of the decision [of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan] shall immediately be furnished to respondent and/or
interested parties." It was the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's duty to serve it
upon the parties without unnecessary delay. To have delayed the service
of the decision would have resulted in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan's
failure to perform a legal duty. It, therefore, properly acted in having its
decision served upon petitioner Reyes.
2. WON election of petitioner rendered the administrative charges against
him moot and academic.
 Petitioner invokes the ruling in Aguinaldo v. COMELEC, which held that a
public official could not be removed for misconduct committed during a
prior term and that his reelection operated as a condonation of the
officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. But that was because in that case, before the
petition questioning the validity of the administrative decision removing
petitioner could be decided, the term of office during which the alleged
misconduct was committed expired. Removal cannot extend beyond the
term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public
official is not removed before his term of office expires, he can no longer
be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.
 The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, although
petitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in the
administrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in the action
he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision was served on
petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995, because
petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus
validly removed from office and, pursuant to § 40(b) of the LGC, he was
disqualified from running for reelection.
 At the time the Aguinaldo cases were decided there was no provision
similar to § 40(b) which disqualifies any person from running for any
elective position on the ground that he has been removed as a result of an
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administrative case. The LGC of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be given
retroactive effect. Said the Court in the first Aguinaldo case: The COMELEC
applied Section 40(b) of the LGC Republic Act 7160) which provides: Sec.
40. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position: (b) Those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case.
 Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992. There is no
provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the same
operates retroactively. 40(b) of the LGC is not applicable to the present
case.
 All in all, herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by this Sanggunian a
period of sixty one (61) days to file his verified answer however, he
resorted to dilatory motions which in the end proved fatal to his cause.
Veritably, he neither filed nor furnished the complainant a copy of his
answer. Failure of the respondent to file his verified answer within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the complaint shall be considered a waiver of his
rights to present evidence in his behalf ((1). Art. 126 of Rules and
Regulations implementing the LGC of 1991). All persons shall have the right
to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III of the Constitution).
 Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to file
his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the
complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he (petitioner)
would then have the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. But on
the date set, he failed to appear. He would say later that this was because
he had filed a motion for postponement and was awaiting a ruling thereon.
This only betrays the pattern of delay he employed to render the case
against him moot by his election.
3. WON COMELEC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the
disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.
 To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the
other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.
The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have
substantially changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results
under the circumstances.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Facts: Criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano,
Vice-Mayor Cañete and Sangguniang Panlungsod Member Mayol, all public officials
of Mandaue City, by Mandaue City Councilors Dionson and Bercede with the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas. Councilors Dionson and Bercede
averred that respondent officials, acting in conspiracy, had caused the alteration
and/or falsification of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allocated
appropriation therein from P3,494,364.57 to P7,000,000.00 without authority from
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue City. They moved for the preventive
suspension of respondent officials in the separately docketed administrative case.
Aside from opposing the motion for preventive suspension, respondent officials, on
05 August 1992, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the
Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the
administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the LGC of 1991,
the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local
officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with
the Office of the President.
Issue: 1. WON the Ombudsman has jurisdiction.
 The general investigatory power of the Ombudsman is decreed by Section
13 (1,) Article XI, of the 1987 Constitution, 14 thus: Sec. 13. The Office of
the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties: (1)
Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission
of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient;
 Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770: Administrative complaints. — The
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or
omissions which: 1. Are contrary to law or regulation; 2. Are unreasonable,
unfair, oppressive or discriminatory; 3. Are inconsistent with the general
course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law; 4. Proceed
from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts; 5. Are in the
exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or 6. Are
otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
 Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office
of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
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subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
 Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770: Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or
his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment, the evidence of guilt
is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves
dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the
respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against
him. The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated
by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without
pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of
the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in
computing the period of suspension herein provided.
 There is nothing in the LGC to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act.
The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent,
let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike
down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication
are not favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent
application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may
be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be
presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against
any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize
and give effect to all laws on the subject.
 Certainly, Congress would not have intended to do injustice to the very
reason that underlies the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution which "is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of
officialdom."
 Sections 61 and 63 of the present LGC run almost parallel with the
provisions then existing under the old code. Section 61 and Section 63 of
the precursor LGC of 1983, under the heading of "Suspension and
Removal," read: Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Complaints. — Verified
complaints against local elective officials shall be prepared as follows: (a)
Against any elective provincial or city official, before the Minister of Local
Government.
 Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. — (1) Preventive suspension may be
imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a
provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an
elective municipal official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the
respondent is an elective barangay official. (2) Preventive suspension may
be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is
reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act
or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when the
gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
suspension. (3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall
be deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of
the proceedings against him until its termination. However, if the delay in
the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time
of the delay shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension.
 The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose
preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that
time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became
concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770,
specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common
grant. The LGC of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change
from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the
substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the
Office of the President.
2. WON the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under Section 24 of
the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive
suspension provided by Section 63 of the LGC to even now maintain it’s
application.
 The two provisions govern differently. In order to justify the preventive
suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the
evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or
employee should involve dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges should warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office
would prejudice the case filed against him. The Ombudsman can impose
the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective
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or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in
imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days of preventive suspension
prescribed in the LGC of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time after
the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable
ground to believe that the respondent has committed the act or acts
complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong, (c) the gravity of
the offense so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent
could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of
the records and other evidence.
3. WON petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion when he caused the
issuance of the preventive suspension order without any hearing.
 The records reveal that petitioner issued the order of preventive
suspension after the filing (a) by respondent officials of their opposition on
the motion for preventive suspension and (b) by Mayor Ouano of his
memorandum in compliance with the directive of petitioner. Be that, as it
may, we have heretofore held that, not being in the nature of a penalty, a
preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation
after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard.
Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of
guilt or innocence.
 In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his
answer to the administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the
suspension was not a punishment or penalty for the acts of dishonesty and
misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such
investigation, the charges are established and the person investigated is
found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is removed or
dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in
suspending an officer pending his investigation and before the charges
against him are heard and be given an opportunity to prove his innocence.
 After a careful and honest scrutiny of the evidence submitted on record, at
this stage, it is the holding of this office that the evidence of guilt against
the respondents in the instant case is strong. There is no question that the
charge against the respondents involves dishonesty or gross misconduct
which would warrant their removal from the service and there is no
gainsaying the fact that the charge for falsification of veritable documents
like city ordinances are very serious charges that affect the very
foundations of duly established representative governments. Finally, it is
likewise the holding of this office at this stage that the continued stay in
office of respondents may prejudice the judicious investigation and
resolution of the instant case.
4. WON respondent official's petition for prohibition, being an application for
remedy against the findings of petitioner contained in his 21 September
1992 order, should not have been entertained by the trial court.
 The proscription in Section 14 of R.A. No. 6770 reads: Sec. 14. Restrictions.
— No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an
investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless
there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation
is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
 No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on
pure question of law.
 Section 27 of the law which prescribes a direct recourse to this Court on
matters involving orders arising from administrative disciplinary cases
originating from the Office of the Ombudsman; thus: In all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for
certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Salalima v. Guingona (supra, see p. 198)
Grego v. COMELEC
Facts: On October 31, 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff
by no less than this Court upon a finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint lodged by a certain Nena Tordesillas. Subsequently, Basco ran as a
candidate for Councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the
January 18, 1988, local elections. He won and, accordingly, assumed office. After his
term, Basco sought re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized national elections.
Again, he succeeded in his bid and he was elected as one of the six (6) City
Councilors. However, his victory this time did not remain unchallenged. In the midst
of his successful re-election, he found himself besieged by lawsuits of his opponents
in the polls who wanted to dislodge him from his position. All these challenges
were, however, dismissed, thus, paving the way for Basco's continued stay in office.
Despite the odds previously encountered, Basco remained undaunted and ran again
for councilor in the May 8, 1995, local elections seeking a third and final term. Once
again, he beat the odds by emerging sixth in a battle for six councilor seats. As in
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the past, however, his right to office was again contested. On May 13, 1995,
petitioner Grego, claiming to be a registered voter of Precinct No. 966, District II,
City of Manila, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification, praying for
Basco's disqualification, for the suspension of his proclamation, and for the
declaration of Romualdo S. Maranan as the sixth duly elected Councilor of Manila's
Second District. On the same day, the Chairman of the Manila City Board of
Canvassers (BOC) was duly furnished with a copy of the petition. The other
members of the BOC learned about this petition only two days later. The COMELEC
conducted a hearing of the case on May 14, 1995, where it ordered the parties to
submit simultaneously their respective memoranda. Before the parties could
comply with this directive, however, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco on May
17, 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila, placing sixth
among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath
of office before the Honorable Ma. Ruby Bithao-Camarista, Presiding Judge,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch I, Manila. In view of such proclamation, petitioner
lost no time in filing an Urgent Motion seeking to annul what he considered to be
an illegal and hasty proclamation made on May 17, 1995, by the Manila City BOC.
He reiterated Basco's disqualification and prayed anew that candidate Romualdo S.
Maranan be declared the winner. As expected, Basco countered said motion by
filing his Urgent Opposition to: Urgent Motion (with Reservation to Submit Answer
and/or Motion to Dismiss Against Instant Petition for Disqualification with
Temporary Restraining Order). On June 5, 1995, Basco filed his Motion to Dismiss
Serving As Answer pursuant to the reservation he made earlier. After the parties'
respective memoranda had been filed, the COMELEC's First Division resolved to
dismiss the petition for disqualification on October 6, 1995, ruling that "the
administrative penalty imposed by the Supreme Court on respondent Basco on
October 31, 1981 was wiped away and condoned by the electorate which elected
him" and that on account of Basco's proclamation on May 17, 1995, as the sixth
duly elected councilor of the Second District of Manila, "the petition would no
longer be viable." MR denied by COMELEC en banc. Hence, this petition.
Issues: 1. WON Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160 apply retroactively to those
removed from office before it took effect on January 1, 1992
 SEC. 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from
running for any elective local position (b) Those removed from office as a
result of an administrative case.
 Our refusal to give retroactive application to the provision of Section 40 (b)
is already a settled issue and there exist no compelling reasons for us to
depart therefrom. Well-settled is the principle that while the Legislature
has the power to pass retroactive laws which do not impair the obligation
of contracts, or affect injuriously vested rights, it is equally true that
statutes are not to be construed as intended to have a retroactive effect so
as to affect pending proceedings, unless such intent is expressly declared
or clearly and necessarily implied from the language of the enactment.
There is no provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that the
same operates retroactively.
2. WON private respondent's election to office as City Councilor of Manila in
the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections wipe away and condone the
administrative penalty against him, thus restoring his eligibility for public
office.
 At first glance, there seems to be a prima facie semblance of merit to
petitioner's argument. However, the issue of whether or not Basco's triple
election to office cured his alleged ineligibility is actually beside the point
because the argument proceeds on the assumption that he was in the first
place disqualified when he ran in the three previous elections. This
assumption, of course, is untenable considering that Basco was NOT
subject to any disqualification at all under Section 40 (b) of the LGC which,
as we said earlier, applies only to those removed from office on or after
January 1, 1992. In view of the irrelevance of the issue posed by petitioner,
there is no more reason for the Court to still dwell on the matter at length.
3. WON Basco circumvented the prohibition in Tordesillas against
reinstatement to any position in the national or local government,
including its agencies and instrumentalities, as well as government-owned
or controlled corporations.
 The Tordesillas decision did not bar Basco from running for any elective
position. As can be gleaned from the decretal portion of the said decision,
the Court couched the prohibition in this wise:
 In this regard, particular attention is directed to the use of the term
"reinstatement. " Under the former Civil Service Decree, 16 the law
applicable at the time Basco, a public officer, was administratively
dismissed from office, the term "reinstatement" had a technical meaning,
referring only to an appointive position. Thus: SEC. 24. Personnel Actions.
(d) Reinstatement. — Any person who has been permanently APPOINTED
to a position in the career service and who has, through no delinquency or
misconduct, been separated therefrom, may be reinstated to a position in
the same level for which he is qualified.
 The Rules on Personnel Actions and Policies issued by the Civil Service
Commission on November 10, 1975, 17 provides a clearer definition. It
reads: SEC. 7. Reinstatement is the REAPPOINTMENT of a person who was
previously separated from the service through no delinquency or
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misconduct on his part from a position in the career service to which he
was permanently appointed, to a position for which he is qualified."
 In light of these definitions, there is, therefore, no basis for holding that
Basco is likewise barred from running for an elective position inasmuch as
what is contemplated by the prohibition in Tordesillas is reinstatement to
an appointive position.
4. WON private respondent's proclamation as sixth winning candidate on
May 17, 1995, while the disqualification case was still pending
consideration by COMELEC, void ab initio.
 Section 20, paragraph (i) of Rep. Act 7166 reads: (i) The board of
canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by
the Commission after the latter has ruled on the objections brought to it
on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof
shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely
affect the results of the election.
 The inapplicability of the abovementioned provision to the present case is
very much patent on its face considering that the same refers only to a
void proclamation in relation to contested returns and NOT to contested
qualifications of a candidate.
 Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646 which states: Effect of Disqualification Case. —
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If
for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue
with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong."
 This provision, however, does not support petitioner's contention that the
COMELEC, or more properly speaking, the Manila City BOC, should have
suspended the proclamation. The use of the word "may" indicates that the
suspension of a proclamation is merely directory and permissive in nature
and operates to confer discretion. What is merely made mandatory,
according to the provision itself, is the continuation of the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest. Thus, in view of this discretion granted to
the COMELEC, the question of whether or not evidence of guilt is so strong
as to warrant suspension of proclamation must be left for its own
determination and the Court cannot interfere therewith and substitute its
own judgment unless such discretion has been exercised whimsically and
capriciously. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized
constitutional body charged with the enforcement and administration of
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough expertise in its
field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and even given
finality. The COMELEC has not found any ground to suspend the
proclamation and the records likewise fail to show any so as to warrant a
different conclusion from this Court. Hence, there is no ample justification
to hold that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion.
 Section 5, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure 25 states that:
Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. — . . . (H)is
proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received
the winning number of votes in such election.
 However, being merely an implementing rule, the same must not override,
but instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to
apply and implement. Administrative rules and regulations are intended to
carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law.
 Moreover, there is no reason why the Manila City BOC should not have
proclaimed Basco as the sixth winning City Councilor. Absent any
determination of irregularity in the election returns, as well as an order
enjoining the canvassing and proclamation of the winner, it is a mandatory
and ministerial duty of the Board of Canvassers concerned to count the
votes based on such returns and declare the result. This has been the rule
as early as in the case of Dizon v. Provincial Board of Canvassers of Laguna
28 where we clarified the nature of the functions of the Board of
Canvassers, viz.: "The simple purpose and duty of the canvassing board is
to ascertain and declare the apparent result of the voting. All other
questions are to be tried before the court or other tribunal for contesting
elections or in quo warranto proceedings. "
 Finally, the cases of Duremdes, Benito and Aguam, supra, cited by
petitioner are all irrelevant and inapplicable to the factual circumstances at
bar and serve no other purpose than to muddle the real issue. These three
cases do not in any manner refer to void proclamations resulting from the
mere pendency of a disqualification case.
 In Duremdes, the proclamation was deemed void ab initio because the
same was made contrary to the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
regarding the suspension of proclamation in cases of contested election
returns.
 In Benito, the proclamation of petitioner Benito was rendered ineffective
due to the Board of Canvassers' violation of its ministerial duty to proclaim
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the candidate receiving the highest number of votes and pave the way to
succession in office. In said case, the candidate receiving the highest
number of votes for the mayoralty position died but the Board of
Canvassers, instead of proclaiming the deceased candidate winner,
declared Benito, a mere second-placer, the mayor.
 Lastly, in Aguam, the nullification of the proclamation proceeded from the
fact that it was based only on advanced copies of election returns which,
under the law then prevailing, could not have been a proper and legal basis
for proclamation.
5. WON Romualdo S. Maranan, a seventh placer, be legally declared a
winning candidate.
 Obviously, he may not be declared a winner. In the first place, Basco
was a duly qualified candidate pursuant to our disquisition above.
Furthermore, he clearly received the winning number of votes which put
him in sixth place. The exception is predicated on the concurrence of two
assumptions, namely: (1) the one who obtained the highest number of
votes is disqualified; and (2) the electorate is fully aware in fact and in law
of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the
realm of notoriety but would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the
ineligible candidate. Both assumptions, however, are absent in this case.
Petitioner's allegation that Basco was well-known to have been disqualified
in the small community where he ran as a candidate is purely speculative
and conjectural, unsupported as it is by any convincing facts of record to
show notoriety of his alleged disqualification.
Joson v. Executive Secretary Torres
Facts: On September 17, 1996, private respondents filed with the Office of the
President a letter-complaint dated September 13, 1997 charging petitioner with
grave misconduct and abuse of authority. Private respondents alleged that in the
morning of September 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial
capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when petitioner
belligerently barged into the Hall; petitioner angrily kicked the door and chairs in
the Hall and uttered threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were
several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area. Private
respondents claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending
legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain
a loan of P150 million from the Philippine National Bank; that petitioner's acts were
intended to harass them into approving this loan; that fortunately, no session of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was held that day for lack of quorum and the
proposed legislative measure was not considered; that private respondents
opposed the loan because the province of Nueva Ecija had an unliquidated
obligation of more than P70 million incurred without prior authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan; that the provincial budget officer and treasurer had
earlier disclosed that the province could not afford to contract another obligation;
that petitioner's act of barging in and intimidating private respondents was a
serious insult to the integrity and independence of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
and that the presence of his private army posed grave danger to private
respondents' lives and safety. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or
removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva
Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of
the province. President Ramos noted that the situation of "12 Sep at the Session
Hall," i.e., the refusal of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to approve
the proposed loan, did not appear to justify "the use of force, intimidation or armed
followers." He thus instructed the then Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments (SILG) Robert Barbers to "[t]ake appropriate preemptive and
investigative actions," but to "[b]reak not the peace." Acting upon the instructions
of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of the case against him and
attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its annexes. In the same notice,
Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his] verified/sworn answer
thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with such documentary evidence that
[he] has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days from receipt." Immediately
thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned petitioner
and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The parties
entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and
order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing
cases that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence. The peace agreement
was not respected by the parties and the private respondents reiterated their
letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the letter-
complaint within fifteen days from receipt. Petitioner received a copy of this order
on November 13, 1996. On April 22, 1997, Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, then
Acting Secretary of the DILG, issued an order declaring petitioner in default and to
have waived his right to present evidence. Private respondents were ordered to
present their evidence ex-parte. Two days later, on April 24, 1997, the law firm of
Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, representing petitioner, filed with the DILG
an "Entry of Appearance with Motion for Time to File Answer Ad Cautelam."
Petitioner received a copy of the order of default on May 2, 1997. Through counsel,
he moved for reconsideration. On May 19, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez
reconsidered the order of default in the interest of justice. He noted the
appearance of petitioner's counsel and gave petitioner "for the last time" fifteen
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(15) days from receipt to file his answer. On June 23, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez
issued an order stating that petitioner's counsel, whose office is in Manila, should
have received a copy of the May 19, 1997 order ten days after mailing on May 27,
1997. Since petitioner still failed to file his answer, he was deemed to have waived
his right to present evidence in his behalf. Undersecretary Sanchez reinstated the
order of default and directed private respondents to present their evidence ex-
parte on July 15, 1997. The following day, June 24, 1997, petitioner, through
counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the letter-complaint
was not verified on the day it was filed with the Office of the President; and that the
DILG had no jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer
the complaint. On July 4, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Reconsideration" of the order of June 23, 1997 reinstating the order of default.
Petitioner also prayed that the hearing on the merits of the case be held in
abeyance until after the "Motion to Dismiss" shall have been resolved. On July 11,
1997, on recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres
issued an order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive
suspension for sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.
Secretary Barbers directed the Philippine National Police to assist in the
implementation of the order of preventive suspension. In petitioner's stead,
Secretary Barbers designated Vice-Governor Oscar Tinio as Acting Governor until
such time as petitioner's temporary legal incapacity shall have ceased to exist.
Forthwith, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of
Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default.
Meanwhile, the proceedings before the DILG continued. On August 20, 1997,
Undersecretary Sanchez issued an order denying petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss"
and "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration." In the same order, he required
the parties to submit their position papers within an inextendible period of ten days
from receipt after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. On
August 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the DILG a "Motion to Lift Order of Preventive
Suspension." On September 10, 1997, petitioner followed this with a "Motion to Lift
Default Order and Admit Answer Ad Cautelam."[21] Attached to the motion was
the "Answer Ad Cautelam"[22] and sworn statements of his witnesses. On the
other hand, complainants (private respondents herein) manifested that they were
submitting the case for decision based on the records, the complaint and affidavits
of their witnesses. In his Answer Ad Cautelam, petitioner alleged that in the
morning of September 12, 1996, while he was at his district office in the town of
Munoz, he received a phone call from Sangguniang Panlalawigan member Jose del
Mundo. Del Mundo, who belonged to petitioner's political party, informed him that
Vice-Governor Tinio was enraged at the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
who were in petitioner's party because they refused to place on the agenda the
ratification of the proposed P150 million loan of the province. Petitioner repaired
to the provincial capitol to advise his party-mates on their problem and at the same
time attend to his official functions. Upon arrival, he went to the Session Hall and
asked the members present where Vice-Governor Tinio was. However, without
waiting for their reply, he left the Hall and proceeded to his office. Petitioner
claimed that there was nothing in his conduct that threatened the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan or caused alarm to the employees. He said that like
Vice-Governor Tinio, he was always accompanied by his official security escorts
whenever he reported for work. He also alleged that the joint affidavit of Elnora
Escombien and Jacqueline Jane Perez was false. Escombien was purportedly not
inside the session hall during the incident but was at her desk at the office and
could not in any way have seen petitioner in the hall. To attest to the truth of his
allegations, petitioner submitted three (3) joint affidavits -- two (2) affidavits
executed by six (6) and ten (10) employees, respectively, of the provincial
government, and a third by four members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. On
September 11, 1997, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the
order of August 20, 1997 denying his motion to dismiss. The "Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration" was rejected by Undersecretary Sanchez on October 8, 1997.
Undersecretary Sanchez, however, granted the "Motion to Lift Default Order and to
Admit Answer Ad Cautelam" and admitted the "Answer Ad Cautelam" as
petitioner's position paper pursuant to the order of August 20, 1997. On October
15, 1997, petitioner filed a "Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation." Petitioner
prayed that a formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the
provisions of the LGC of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23; and that
this be held at the province of Nueva Ecija.[26] On October 29, 1997, petitioner
submitted a "Manifestation and Motion" before the DILG reiterating his right to a
formal investigation. In the meantime, on October 24, 1997, the Court of Appeals
dismissed petitioner's petition.
Issues: 1. WON the rules of procedure and evidence should be strictly applied in the
administrative proceedings.
 An administrative complaint against an erring elective official must be
verified and filed with the proper government office. A complaint against
an elective provincial or city official must be filed with the Office of the
President. A complaint against an elective municipal official must be filed
with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan while that of a barangay official must
be filed before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan.
 In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of
Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed
with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the
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letter-complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the
Code. He alleges that the complaint was not verified by private
respondents and was not supported by the joint affidavit of the two
witnesses named therein; that private respondents later realized these
defects and surreptitiously inserted the verification and sworn statement
while the complaint was still pending with the Office of the President.[38]
To prove his allegations, petitioner submitted: (a) the sworn statement of
private respondent Solita C. Santos attesting to the alleged fact that after
the letter-complaint was filed, Vice-Governor Tinio made her and the other
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan sign an additional page which
he had later notarized; and (b) the fact that the verification of the letter-
complaint and the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not indicate the
document, page or book number of the notarial register of the notary
public before whom they were made.
 We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence of the
document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing
officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries
may constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in
complying with the requirements for notarization and proper verification.
They may give grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission.[40]
But they do not indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or
intercalated after the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the
President. Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the
affidavit of Solita C. Santos. Private respondent Santos was one of the
signatories to the letter-complaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that she be
dropped as one of the complainants since she had just joined the political
party of petitioner Joson. She decided to reveal the intercalation because
she was disillusioned with the "dirty tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab
power from petitioner Joson.[41] Private respondent Santos cannot in any
way be considered an unbiased witness. Her motive and change of heart
render her affidavit suspect.
 Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when
submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The
requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself
when he acted on the complaint.
 Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is mainly
intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are
done in good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The
lack of verification is a mere formal defect. The court may order the
correction of the pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading
if the attending circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the
rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served.
2. WON the DILG Secretary has jurisdiction over the case.
 Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials is lodged in two authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the
Investigating Authority. This is explicit from A.O. No. 23, to wit: "Sec. 2.
Disciplining Authority. All administrative complaints, duly verified,
against elective local officials mentioned in the preceding Section shall be
acted upon by the President. The President, who may act through the
Executive Secretary, shall hereinafter be referred to as the Disciplining
Authority." Sec. 3. Investigating Authority. The Secretary of the Interior
and Local Government is hereby designated as the Investigating Authority.
He may constitute an Investigating Committee in the Department of the
Interior and Local Government for the purpose.The Disciplining Authority
may, however, in the interest of the service, constitute a Special
Investigating Committee in lieu of the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government."
 Pursuant to these provisions, the Disciplining Authority is the President of
the Philippines, whether acting by himself or through the Executive
Secretary. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the
Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an
Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the DILG, however, is not the
exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the
Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.
 The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against
elective local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over
local governments. Section 4, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
provides:"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component
cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to
component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units
are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions."
 The power of supervision means "overseeing or the authority of an officer
to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties." If the
subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. The President's power of general supervision means no more than
the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that
subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible
with discipline. And the power to discipline and ensure that the laws be
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faithfully executed must be construed to authorize the President to order
an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion
the good of the public service so requires.
 The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As
the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner
Joson's claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is
delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline.
 Moreover, the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints
is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political
agency. Thus: Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of
a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are
adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to
act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments,
and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive."
 This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President.The power
of control is provided in the Constitution, thus: "Sec. 17. The President
shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed."
 Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head
of the Executive Department, the President, however, may delegate some
of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the
Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf
of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the President's alter ego
in the matters of that department where the President is required by law
to exercise authority.
 When an administrative complaint is therefore filed, the Disciplining
Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his
verified answer within fifteen (15) days from notice. Upon filing of the
answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating
Authority for investigation.
 In the case at bar, petitioner claims that the DILG Secretary usurped the
power of the President when he required petitioner to answer the
complaint. Undisputably, the letter-complaint was filed with the Office of
the President but it was the DILG Secretary who ordered petitioner to
answer.
 Strictly applying the rules, the Office of the President did not comply with
the provisions of A.O. No. 23. The Office should have first required
petitioner to file his answer. Thereafter, the complaint and the answer
should have been referred to the Investigating Authority for further
proceedings. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing
of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a
preliminary assessment of the case.[62] The President found the complaint
sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The
judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the
absence of grave abuse of discretion.
3. WON the DILG erred in declaring him in default for filing a motion to
dismiss.
 It is true that a motion to dismiss is not a pleading prohibited under the
LGC of 1991 nor in A.O. No. 23. Petitioner, however, was instructed not to
file a motion to dismiss in the order to file answer. Thrice, he requested
for extension of time to file his answer citing as reasons the search for
competent counsel and the demands of his official duties. And thrice, his
requests were granted. Even the order of default was reconsidered and
petitioner was given additional time to file answer. After all the requests
and seven months later, he filed a motion to dismiss.
 Petitioner should know that the formal investigation of the case is required
by law to be finished within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time
of formal notice to the respondent. The extensions petitioner requested
consumed fifty-five (55) days of this period.[63] Petitioner, in fact, filed his
answer nine (9) months after the first notice. Indeed, this was more than
sufficient time for petitioner to comply with the order to file answer.
 The speedy disposition of administrative complaints is required by public
service. The efficiency of officials under investigation is impaired when a
case hangs over their heads. Officials deserve to be cleared expeditiously
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if they are innocent, also expeditiously if guilty, so that the business of
government will not be prejudiced.
4. WON the DILG erred in recommending to the Disciplining Authority his
preventive suspension during the investigation in view of Joson’s
inexcusable failure to file an answer.
 Preventive suspension is authorized under Section 63 of the LGC, viz: (a)
Preventive suspension may be imposed: (1) By the President, if the
respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an
independent component city; (b) Preventive suspension may be imposed
at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is strong,
and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence;
Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials
shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the
event that several administrative cases are filed against an elective official,
he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days
within a single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at
the time of the first suspension.
 Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any
time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong;
and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or
pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.
 Executive Secretary Torres found that all the requisites for the imposition
of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner's failure to
file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a
waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of
this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. The Executive
Secretary also found that the evidence of petitioner Joson's guilt was
strong and that his continuance in office during the pendency of the case
could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity
of the evidence against him.
5. WON the January 8, 1998 Resolution of the Executive Secretary finding
petitioner guilty as charged and imposing on him the penalty of suspension
from office for six (6) months from office without pay is valid
 Petitioner claims that the suspension was made without formal
investigation pursuant to the provisions of Rule 7 of A.O. No. 23. We offer
no objection and concur with the assertion of respondent that he has the
right for the conduct of formal investigation. However, before there shall
be a formal investigation, joinder of issues must already be present or
respondent's answer has already been filed. In the case at bar, the
admission of respondent's answer after having been declared in default
was conditioned on the fact of submission of position papers by the
parties, after which, the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent, instead of submitting his position paper filed his subject
motion while complainants manifested to forego the submission of
position paper and submit the case for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings on hand.
 Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit evidence one may have in support of one's defense. To be heard
does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process. Thus, when respondent failed to submit his position paper as
directed and insisted for the conduct of formal investigation, he was not
denied of his right of procedural process.
 The records show that on August 27, 1997, petitioner submitted his
Answer Ad Cautelam where he disputed the truth of the allegations that
he barged into the session hall of the capitol and committed physical
violence to harass the private respondents who were opposed to any move
for the province to contract a P150 million loan from PNB. In his Order of
October 8, 1997, Undersecretary Sanchez admitted petitioner's Answer Ad
Cautelam but treated it as a position paper. On October 15, 1997,
petitioner filed a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation. Petitioner
reiterated this motion on October 29, 1997. Petitioner's motion was
denied on November 11, 1997. Secretary Barbers found petitioner guilty
as charged on the basis of the parties' position papers. On January 8,
1998, Executive Secretary Torres adopted Secretary Barbers' findings and
recommendations and imposed on petitioner the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay.
 The rejection of petitioner's right to a formal investigation denied him
procedural due process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the
preliminary conference, the Investigating Authority shall summon the
parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This
provision does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to
determine whether a formal investigation would be conducted. The
records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. As
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respondent, he is accorded several rights under the law, to wit: "Sec. 65.
Rights of Respondent. -- The respondent shall be accorded full opportunity
to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, to confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor
through compulsory process of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum."
 An erring elective local official has rights akin to the constitutional rights of
an accused.These rights are essentially part of procedural due process.The
local elective official has the (1) right to appear and defend himself in
person or by counsel; (2) the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him; and (3) the right to compulsory attendance of
witness and the production of documentary evidence. These rights are
reiterated in the Rules Implementing the LGC and in A.O. No. 23. Well to
note, petitioner formally claimed his right to a formal investigation after
his Answer Ad Cautelam has been admitted by Undersecretary Sanchez.
 Petitioner's right to a formal investigation was not satisfied when the
complaint against him was decided on the basis of position papers. There
is nothing in the LGC and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in
A.O. No. 23 that provide that administrative cases against elective local
officials can be decided on the basis of position papers. A.O. No. 23 states
that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and
hearing.[72] A.O. No. 23 does not authorize the Investigating Authority to
dispense with a hearing especially in cases involving allegations of fact
which are not only in contrast but contradictory to each other. These
contradictions are best settled by allowing the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses. Position papers are often-times prepared with
the assistance of lawyers and their artful preparation can make the
discovery of truth difficult. The jurisprudence cited by the DILG in its order
denying petitioner's motion for a formal investigation applies to appointive
officials and employees. Administrative disciplinary proceedings against
elective government officials are not exactly similar to those against
appointive officials. In fact, the provisions that apply to elective local
officials are separate and distinct from appointive government officers and
employees. This can be gleaned from the LGC itself.
 The provisions for administrative disciplinary actions against elective local
officials are markedly different from appointive officials. The rules on the
removal and suspension of elective local officials are more stringent. The
procedure of requiring position papers in lieu of a hearing in administrative
cases is expressly allowed with respect to appointive officials but not to
those elected. An elective official, elected by popular vote, is directly
responsible to the community that elected him. The official has a definite
term of office fixed by law which is relatively of short duration. Suspension
and removal from office definitely affects and shortens this term of office.
When an elective official is suspended or removed, the people are
deprived of the services of the man they had elected. Implicit in the right
of suffrage is that the people are entitled to the services of the elective
official of their choice. Suspension and removal are thus imposed only
after the elective official is accorded his rights and the evidence against
him strongly dictates their imposition.
Conducto v. Monzon
Facts: On 30 August 1993, complainant filed a complaint with the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of San Pablo City against Maghirang, the barangay chairman of
Barangay III-E of San Pablo City, for abuse of authority, serious irregularity and
violation of law in that, among other things, Maghirang appointed his sister-in-law,
Florian, to the position of barangay secretary on 17 May 1989 in violation of Section
394 of the LGC. At the same time, complainant filed a complaint for violation of
Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code with the Office of the City Prosecutor against
Maghirang, which was, however, dismissed on 30 September 1993 on the ground
that Maghirang’s sister-in-law was appointed before the effectivity of the LGC of
1991, which prohibits a punong barangay from appointing a relative within the
fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity as barangay secretary. The order of
dismissal was submitted to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon. On 22
October 1993, complainant obtained Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 from Director Jacob
Montesa of the Department of Interior and Local Government, which declared that
the appointment issued by Maghirang to his sister-in-law violated paragraph (2),
Section 95 of B.P. Blg. 337, the LGC prior to the LGC of 1991. In its Revised
Resolution of 29 November 1993,[4] the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon dismissed the case, but ordered Maghirang to replace his sister-in-law as
barangay secretary. On 20 December 1993, complainant moved that the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon reconsider the order of 29 November 1993, in
light of Opinion No. 246, s. 1993 of Director Montesa. Acting on the motion,
Francisco Samala, Graft Investigation Officer II of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, issued an order[6] on 8 February 1994 granting the motion
for reconsideration and recommending the filing of an information for unlawful
appointment (Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code) against Maghirang. The
recommendation was duly approved by Manuel C. Domingo, Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon. In a 3rd indorsement dated 4 March 1994,[7] the Deputy Ombudsman
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for Luzon transmitted the record of the case to the Office of the City Prosecutor of
San Pablo City and instructed the latter to file the corresponding information
against Maghirang with the proper court and to prosecute the case. In his Order of
30 June 1995,[9] respondent judge denied the motion for suspension on the ground
that: [T]he alleged offense of UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENT under Article 244 of the
Revised Penal Code was committed on May 17, 1989, during [Maghirang’s] terms
(sic) of office from 1989 to 1994 and said accused was again re-elected as Barangay
Chairman during the last Barangay Election of May 9, 1994, hence, offenses
committed during previous term is (sic) not a cause for removal (Lizarez vs.
Hechanova, et al., G.R. No. L-22059, May 17, 1965); an order of suspension from
office relating to a given term may not be the basis of contempt with respect to
ones (sic) assumption of the same office under a new term (Oliveros vs. Villaluz,
G.R. No. L-34636, May 30, 1971) and, the Court should never remove a public
officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would
deprieve (sic) the people of their right to elect their officer. When the people have
elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct (sic),
if he had been guilty if any. MR denied. Complainant then moved that respondent
inhibit himself from Criminal Case No. 26240. In his order of 21 September
1995,[13] respondent voluntarily inhibited himself. The case was assigned to Judge
Adelardo S. Escoses per order of Executive Judge Bienvenido V. Reyes of the
Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City. On 15 October 1996, complainant filed his
sworn letter-complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator. In his comment
dated 14 February 1997, filed in compliance with the resolution of this Court of 27
January 1997, respondent asserted that he had been “continuously keeping abreast
of legal and jurisprudential development [sic] in the law” since he passed the 1955
Bar Examinations; and that he issued the two challenged orders “only after due
appreciation of prevailing jurisprudence on the matter,” citing authorities in
support thereof.
Issues: 1. WON a criminal offense for violation of Republic Act 3019 committed by
an elective officer during one term may be the basis of his suspension in a
subsequent term in the event of his reelection to office.
 Luciano vs. Provincial Governor: the cases of Pascual and Lizares are
authority for the precept that "a reelected public officer is no longer
amenable to administrative sanctions for acts committed during his former
tenure" but that as to criminal prosecutions, particularly, for violations of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as in the case at bar, the same are
not barred by reelection of the public officer, since, inter alia, one of the
penalties attached to the offense is perpetual disqualification from public
office and it "is patently offensive to the objectives and the letter of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act . . . that an official may amass wealth
thru graft and corrupt practices and thereafter use the same to purchase
reelection and thereby launder his evil acts."
 Punishment for a crime is a vindication for an offense against the State and
the body politic. The small segment of the national electorate that
constitutes the electorate of the municipality of Antipolo has no power to
condone a crime against the public justice of the State and the entire body
politic. Reelection to public office is not provided for in Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code as a mode of extinguishing criminal liability incurred by
a public officer prior to his reelection. On the contrary, Article 9 of the
Anti-Graft Act imposes as one of the penalties in case of conviction
perpetual disqualification from public office and Article 30 of the Revised
Penal Code declares that such penalty of perpetual disqualification entails
"the deprivation of the public offices and employments which the offender
may have held, even if conferred by popular election."
 It is manifest then, that such condonation of an officer's fault or
misconduct during a previous expired term by virtue of his reelection to
office for a new term can be deemed to apply only to his administrative
and not to his criminal guilt. As succinctly stated in then Solicitor General
(now Associate Justice) Felix Q. Antonio's memorandum for the State, "to
hold that petitioner's reelection erased his criminal liability would in effect
transfer the determination of the criminal culpability of an erring official
from the court to which it was lodged by law into the changing and
transient whim and caprice of the electorate. This cannot be so, for while
his constituents may condone the misdeed of a corrupt official by
returning him back to office, a criminal action initiated against the latter
can only be heard and tried by a court of justice, his nefarious act having
been committed against the very State whose laws he had sworn to
faithfully obey and uphold. A contrary rule would erode the very system
upon which our government is based, which is one of laws and not of
men."
 Aguinaldo v. Santos: a public official cannot be removed from
administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-
election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s previous
misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.
The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending
against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.
 Thus far, no ruling to the contrary has even rippled the doctrine
enunciated in the above-mentioned cases. If respondent has truly been
“continuously keeping abreast of legal and jurisprudential development
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[sic] in the law,” it was impossible for him to have missed or misread these
cases. What detracts from his claim of assiduity is the fact that he even
cited the cases of Oliveros v. Villaluz and Aguinaldo v. Santos in support of
his 30 June 1995 order. What is then evident is that respondent either did
not thoroughly read these cases or that he simply miscomprehended
them. The latter, of course, would only manifest either incompetence,
since both cases were written in plain and simple language thereby
foreclosing any possibility of misunderstanding or confusion; or deliberate
disregard of a long settled doctrine pronounced by this Court.
Pablico v. Villapando
Facts: On August 5, 1999, Maagad, and Fernandez, both members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of San Vicente, Palawan, filed with the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Palawan an administrative complaint against Villapando, then
Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, for abuse of authority and culpable violation of the
Constitution. Complainants alleged that Villapando, on behalf of the municipality,
entered into a consultancy agreement with Tiape, a defeated mayoralty candidate
in the May 1998 elections. They argue that the consultancy agreement amounted
to an appointment to a government position within the prohibited one-year period
under Article IX-B, Section 6, of the 1987 Constitution. However, according to
Villapando, he merely hired Tiape. He invoked Opinion No. 106, s. 1992, of the DOJ
stating that the appointment of a defeated candidate within one year from the
election as a consultant does not constitute an appointment to a government office
or position as prohibited by the Constitution. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan found Villapando guilty of the administrative charge and imposed on him
the penalty of dismissal from service. He appealed to the Office of the President
which, on May 29, 2000, affirmed the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Palawan. Pending respondent’s motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
Office of the President, or on June 16, 2000, petitioner Ramir R. Pablico, then Vice-
mayor of San Vicente, Palawan, took his oath of office as Municipal Mayor.
Consequently, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction and prayer for a
temporary restraining order, docketed as SPL Proc. No. 3462. The petition, seeks to
annul, inter alia, the oath administered to petitioner. The Executive Judge granted a
Temporary Restraining Order effective for 72 hours, as a result of which petitioner
ceased from discharging the functions of mayor. Meanwhile, the case was raffled to
Branch 95 which, on June 23, 2000, denied respondent’s motion for extension of
the 72-hour temporary restraining order. Hence, petitioner resumed his assumption
of the functions of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. On July 4, 2000, respondent
instituted a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals
seeking to annul: (1) the May 29, 2000 decision of the Office of the President; (2)
the February 1, 2000, decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan; and (3)
the June 23, 2000 order of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, Branch 95. On
March 16, 2001, the Court of Appeals8 declared void the assailed decisions of the
Office of the President and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Palawan, and ordered
petitioner to vacate the Office of Mayor of San Vicente, Palawan. A motion for
reconsideration was denied on April 23, 2001.10 Hence, the instant petition for
review.
Issue: WON local legislative bodies and/or the Office of the President, on appeal,
validly imposed the penalty of dismissal from service on erring elective local
officials.
 Moot and academic, but SC resolved to pass upon issue concerning the
application of certain provisions of the LGC of 1991.
 Section 60, last paragraph: An elective local official may be removed from
office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. It is
clear that the penalty of dismissal from service upon an erring elective
local official may be decreed only by a court of law.
 Salalima v. Guingona: the Office of the President is without any power to
remove elected officials, since such power is exclusively vested in the
proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of the
aforequoted Section 60.
 Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC, however, adds that – "(b) An elective local official may be removed
from office on the grounds enumerated in paragraph (a) of this Article [The
grounds enumerated in Section 60, LGC of 1991] by order of the proper
court or the disciplining authority whichever first acquires jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the other." The disciplining authority referred to pertains
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan and the Office of the
President.
 Salalima: this grant to the "disciplining authority" of the power to remove
elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight
Committee that prepared the Rules and Regulations. No rule or regulation
may alter, amend, or contravene a provision of law, such as the LGC.
Implementing rules should conform, not clash, with the law that they
implement, for a regulation which operates to create a rule out of
harmony with the statute is a nullity. Even Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel,
Jr., the principal author of the LGC of 1991, expressed doubt as to the
validity of Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the implementing rules.
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 The power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged
exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX, of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the LGC, insofar as it vests power on the
"disciplining authority" to remove from office erring elective local officials,
is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the LGC
of 1991. The law on suspension or removal of elective public officials must
be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power
of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith,
for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by
the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage.
Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the
disciplining authority. Where the disciplining authority is given only the
power to suspend and not the power to remove, it should not be
permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove.

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Evardone v. COMELEC
Facts: Evardone is the mayor of the Municipality of Sulat, Eastern Samar, having
been elected to the position during the 1988 local elections. He assumed office
immediately after proclamation. On 14 February 1990, Apelado, Aclan and Nival
filed a petition for the recall of Evardone with the Office of the Local Election
Registrar, Municipality of Sulat. COMELEC issued a resolution approving the
recommendation to hold on 14 July 1990 the signing of the petition for recall
against incumbent Mayor Evardone of the said Municipality. Evardone filed before
this Court a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for immediate issuance of
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. SC issued TRO ordering the
respondents to cease and desist from holding the signing of the petition for recall.
Central Office got it on the same day, but field agent got it 3 days later, a day after
the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO.
COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being
violative of the TRO. Apelado, et al., filed MR, denied. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari.
Issues: 1. WON COMELEC Resolution 2272 is constitutional. YES.
 Evardone: Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there
was, during the period material to this case, no LGC enacted by Congress
after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on
the subject of recall of elected government officials, there is no basis for
COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case
at bar is premature.
 COMELEC: The constitutional provision does not refer only to a LGC which
is in futurum but also in esse. It merely sets forth the guidelines which
Congress will consider in amending the provisions of the present LGC.
Pending the enactment of the amendatory law, the existing LGC remains
operative. The adoption of the 1987 Constitution did not abrogate the
provisions of BP No. 337, unless a certain provision thereof is clearly
irreconciliable with the provisions of the 1987 Constitution. In this case,
Sections 54 to 59 of Batas Pambansa No. 337 are not inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution. Hence, they are operative.
 Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution: all existing laws not
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until
amended, repealed or revoked. Republic Act No. 7160 providing for the
LGC of 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically
repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the
LGC of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old
LGC (B.P. Blg. 337) is still the law applicable to the present case.
 Constitutional Commission: pending the enactment of a new LGC under
the report of the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions,
the former LGC, which is Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 shall continue to be
effective until repealed by the Congress of the Philippines.
 Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the mechanism
for recall of local elective officials. Section 59 expressly authorizes the
respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election
on recall and in the exercise of such powers, promulgate the necessary
rules and regulations. The Election Code contains no special provisions on
the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a local official. Any
such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the rules on
special elections, unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the
COMELEC. Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent
COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.
 Resolution No. 2272 promulgated by respondent COMELEC is valid and
constitutional. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority
to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said
petition.
2. WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process
of the petition for recall held pursuant to Resolution No. 2272.
 Paredes v. Exec Sec where plebiscite was held before plea for restraining
order could be determined: petition became moot and academic.
 Evardone knew of the Notice of Recall filed by Apelado, et al. on or about
21 February 1990 as evidenced by the Registry Return Receipt; yet, he was
not vigilant in following up and determining the outcome of such notice.
Evardone alleges that it was only on or about 3 July 1990 that he came to
know about the Resolution of respondent COMELEC setting the signing of
the petition for recall on 14 July 1990. But despite his urgent prayer for the
issuance of a TRO, Evardone filed the petition for prohibition only on 10
July 1990.
 Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall
took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the
respondent COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was
undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election
Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by
this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the
6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the
petition for recall.
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 The right to recall is complementary to the right to elect or appoint. It is
included in the right of suffrage. It is based on the theory that the
electorate must maintain a direct and elastic control over public
functionaries. It is also predicated upon the idea that a public office is
"burdened" with public interests and that the representatives of the
people holding public offices are simply agents or servants of the people
with definite powers and specific duties to perform and to follow if they
wish to remain in their respective offices.
 Whether or not the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost
confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the
realm of politics where only the people are the judge. "Loss of confidence
is the formal withdrawal by an electorate of their trust in a person's ability
to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the same electorate.
The constituents have made a judgment and their will to recall the
incumbent mayor has already been ascertained and must be afforded the
highest respect. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat,
Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said
municipality is valid and has legal effect.
 However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation
provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states: Sec. 55. Who May Be
Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held.— (2) No recall
shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption
of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.
 The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election
prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII,
Sec. 5 — on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election
on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election
will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable LGC (B.P. Blg.
337)
Garcia v. COMELEC
Facts: Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11, 1992
elections. In the early evening of July 1993, some mayors, vice-mayors and
members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the
province met at the National Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At
about 12:30 A.M of the following day, July 2, 1993, they proceeded to the Bagac
town plaza where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. The PRA promulgated Resolution
1 for the recall of the incumbent provincial governor Garcia for loss of confidence.
Petitioners filed with the COMELEC a petition to deny due course to said Resolution
on the ground that the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural
requirement" laid down in Section 70 of the LGC. The COMELEC dismissed the
petition and scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ
of preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC.
Issues: 1. WON section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall
assembly initiate the recall of local elective officials is constitutional
 Recall is a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end
of his term of office. The people's prerogative to remove a public officer is
an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional
restraint, the power is implied in all governmental operations. Such power
has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public
affairs. Not undeservedly, it is frequently described as a fundamental right
of the people in a representative democracy.
 P: the right to recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the
electorate to reconfirm or withdraw their confidence on the official sought
to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes
the sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall
proceedings or not.
 There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the
people have the "sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a
recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let
alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the
adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate
given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact
a LGC which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective
mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates. The power given was to
select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections
are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not
straightjacketed to one particular mechanism of initiating recall elections.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall,
whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should be effective. Using
its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an
alternative mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former
mode of initiation by direct action of the people. Congress has made its
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choice as called for by the Constitution and it is not the prerogative of this
Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even
then, the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative
that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
law.
2. WON in passing Resolution 1, the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did
not only initiate the process of recall but had de facto recalled petitioner
Garcia from office, a power reserved to the people alone.
 P: The initiation of a recall through the PRA effectively shortens and ends
the term of the incumbent local officials. The PRA resolution of recall is the
re call itself.
 Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of recall
by the PRAC. They have embraced the view that initiation by the PRAC is
not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by the
PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives. It is not constitutionally impermissible for the people to
act through their elected representatives.
 More far out is petitioners' stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the
recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA resolution of recall
merely, starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole
process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution of recall that is
not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall its subject
official. Likewise, a PRA resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in
the election called for the purpose bears no effect whatsoever. The
initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official concerned to
appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he should be
allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign
judgment, the official concerned remains in office but his right to continue
in office is subject to question. This is clear in section 72 of the LGC which
states that "the recall of an elective local official shall be effective only
upon the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the
candidate receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election
on recall.
3. WON the law is violative of the Equal Protection Clause.
 A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it does
not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging to
the political minority. First to be considered is the politically neutral
composition of the preparatory recall assembly. Sec. 70 (b) of the Code.
Under the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory
recall assembly at the provincial level. Its membership is not apportioned
to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of its
members. Secondly, the preparatory recall assembly, at the provincial level
includes all the elected officials in the province concerned. Considering
their number, the greater probability is that no one political party can
control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that the only
ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of confidence of the
people. The members of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of
their political parties but as representatives of the people. By necessary
implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere differences in
political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages multi-party
system for the existence of opposition parties is indispensable to the
growth and nurture of democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted
cannot be faulted for discriminating against local officials belonging to the
minority.
 The fear that a preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a
political party and that it may use its power to initiate the recall of officials
of opposite political persuasions, especially those belonging to the
minority, is not a ground to strike down the law as unconstitutional. To be
sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there can be no escape
from the reality that all powers are susceptible of abuse. The mere
possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the grant of power to
an individual or entity. Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure
that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will
not be corrupted by extraneous influences.
 There is only one ground for the recall of local government officials: loss of
confidence. This means that the people may petition or the Preparatory
Recall Assembly may resolve to recall any local elective officials without
specifying any particular ground except loss of confidence. There is no
need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption against the
local elective officials who are the subject of any recall petition.
 Evardone vs. Commission on Elections: "loss of confidence" as a ground for
recall is a political question. In the words of the Court, "whether or not the
electorate of the municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent
mayor is a political question.
4. WON the resolution of the members of the PRA subverted the will of the
electorate of the province of Bataan who elected petitioner Garcia with a
majority of 12,500 votes.
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 Again, the contention proceeds from the erroneous premise that the
resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that
the resolution of recall is a mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to
subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The proposal will still be passed
upon by the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As this judgment has yet to be
expressed, it is premature to conclude that the sovereign will of the
electorate of Bataan has been subverted.
Garcia v. COMELEC (supra, see p.93)
Paras v. COMELEC
Facts: Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won
during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong
Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition
for recall, COMELEC resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing
on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. At least
29.30% of the registered voters signed. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall
election in view of petitioner’s opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set
anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding
of the recall election, petitioner filed before the RTC a petition for injunction. The
RTC issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to
explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the
barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval. In a resolution dated
January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election
on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for
injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a TRO and required the OSG to
comment on the petition. In view of the OSGl’s manifestation maintaining an
opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed
the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply.
Issue: WON the recall election may be barred by the SK elections.
 Section 74 (b), LGC: no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the
date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year immediately
preceding a regular local election
 P: the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the SK)
election was set on the first Monday of May 1996. Petitioner maintains
that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election
can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall
election.
 It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident
intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election
once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with
paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local
official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year
of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner’s interpretation of the
phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly
circumscribe the novel provision of the LGC on recall, a mode of removal of
public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if
the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years
from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
“regular local election”, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no
recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of
the LGC.
 In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the
legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a
statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
 It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should
be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. Thus, the interpretation
of Section 74 of the LGC, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be
in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the
Constitution to enact a LGC which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum.
 The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and
intent.
 Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local
government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the
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regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The
electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a
recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of
the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one
referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
 Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the
limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next
regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.
Malonzo v. COMELEC
Facts: Malonzo was duly elected as Mayor in the elections held on May 8, 1995,
winning over former mayor Asistio. Barely one year into his term, petitioner's office
as Mayor was put to serious question when on July 7, 1996, 1,057 Punong
Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan
chairmen, constituting a majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly of the City of Caloocan, met, and upon deliberation and election, voted
for the approval of Preparatory Recall Assembly Resolution No. 01-96, expressing
loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and calling for the initiation of recall
proceedings against him. Together with relevant documents, PRA Resolution No.
01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In response, Mayor
Malonzo filed a Petition with the respondent Commission alleging, principally, that
the recall process was deficient in form and substance, and therefore, illegally
initiated. The COMELEC found the petition devoid of merit and declared the recall
proceedings to be in order. Malonzo filed a Petition for Certiorari With Prayer For
Temporary Restraining Order and Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. SC
issued resolution ordering the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from
proceeding with the recall election projected on December 14, 1996, and directing
the respondents to file their respective Comments.
Issue: 1. WON the requirements for the holding of a recall election were duly
complied with.
 The matter of validity of notices to the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly was sufficiently considered by the respondent Commission, as in
response to petitioner's request for a technical examination of the recall
documents, the COMELEC directed its Election Records and Statistics
Department (ERSD) to resolve the matter of notices sent to the
Preparatory Recall Assembly members. The ERSD in turn performed its
task and reported its findings to the COMELEC.
 ERSD reported that there were a total of 1,927 notices sent, some
members being served two or three notices. The Notices were sent in
three modes; Personal, registered mail and by courier and they were in the
name of the PRA member, and addressed at his residence or office of
record.
 Personal services were acknowledged by receipts signed, if not by the
addressee himself, then, as indicated thereon, by his or her spouse,
nearest relative or a person of sufficient discretion in the member's
residence or office. Service by registered mail was evinced by the return
card duly signed by the addressee or by persons acting for him. There
were instances when notices were served but were refused, this fact noted
in the acknowledgment receipt by the server and his witnesses. The
circumstances being thus, we hold that there was complete service of the
notices as contemplated in Section 8, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which
provides: Section 8 - Completeness of Service - Personal service is
complete upon delivery. Service by ordinary mail is complete upon the
expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise
provides; Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the
addressee; but if he fails to claim his mail from the post office within five
(5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall take
effect at the expiration of such time.'
 That it was Alex David, President of the LIGA ng mga Barangay who sent
the notices is of no moment. We had earlier determined that as member
of the PRA, he can legally exercise the prerogatives attached to his
membership in the Preparatory Recall Assembly, sending notices to the
other members of its scheduled convening. It is evident from the foregoing
and, therefore, the Commission so holds that the requirements of notice
had been fully complied with.
 The issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in
nature, and the determination of the same is therefore a function of the
COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the
findings, the Court should not disturb the same. The factual findings of the
COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered
evidence, are conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a
substantiated attack on the validity of the same.
2. WON the initiation of the recall proceedings was infirm since it was
convened by the Liga ng mga Barangays. NO.
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 The Liga ng mga Barangay is undoubtedly an entity distinct from the
Preparatory Recall Assembly. It just so happens that the personalities
representing the barangays in the Liga are the very members of the
Preparatory Recall Assembly, the majority of whom met on July 7, 1996,
and voted in favor of the resolution calling for the recall of Mayor
Malonzo, after deliberation reported in the record, in accordance with the
existing law. Thus, the Punong Barangays and Sangguniang Barangay
members convened and voted as members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly of the City of Caloocan, and not as members of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. The recall proceedings, therefore, cannot be denied merit on
this ground.
 COMELEC: "The Minutes of the session of the Preparatory Assembly
indicated that there was a session held. Attendees constitute the majority
of all the members of the Preparatory Assembly, as we shall later on
establish. Rules of procedure, simple they may be were formulated.
Deliberations were conducted on the main issue, which was that of
petitioner's recall. The members were given the opportunity to articulate
on their resolve about the matter. More importantly, their sentiments
were expressed through their votes signified by their signatures and
thumbmarks affixed to the Resolution. No proof was adduced by
Petitioner to substantiate his claim that the signatures appearing thereon
represented a cause other than that of adopting the resolution. The law
on recall did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding. Neither did it demand
a specific procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the
provision that there should be a session called for the purpose of initiating
recall proceedings, attended by a majority of all the members of the
preparatory recall assembly, in a public place and that the resolution
resulting from such assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA
members."
 The charges of graft and corruption, violence and irregularities, before and
during the session of the preparatory recall assembly are largely
uncorroborated, and cannot override the substantiated findings of the
respondent COMELEC.
Claudio v. COMELEC
Facts: Jovito O. Claudio was the duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11,
1998 elections. He assumed office on July 1, 1998. Sometime during the second
week of May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered to discuss
the possibility of filing a petition for recall against Mayor Claudio for loss of
confidence. On May 19, 1999, at the residence of barangay chair Benjamin Lim, Jr.
in Barangay 11, Zone 4, Pasay City, several barangay chairs formed an ad hoc
committee for the purpose of convening the PRA. Richard Advincula, private
respondent in G.R. No. 140560 and petitioner in G.R. No. 140714, was designated
chair. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of barangay chairs,
kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No.
01, S-1999, entitled RESOLUTION TO INITIATE THE RECALL OF JOVITO O. CLAUDIO
AS MAYOR OF PASAY CITY FOR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE. In a letter dated June 29,
1999, Advincula, as chair of the PRA, invited the Mayor, Vice-Mayor, Station
Commander, and thirteen (13) Councilors of Pasay City to witness the formal
submission to the Office of the Election Officer on July 2, 1999 of the petition for
recall. As scheduled, the petition for recall was filed on July 2, 1999, accompanied
by an affidavit of service of the petition on the Office of the City Mayor. Pursuant to
the rules of the COMELEC, copies of the petition were posted on the bulletin boards
of the local COMELEC office, the City Hall, the Police Department, the public market
at Libertad St. and Taft Avenue, and at the entrance of the Sta. Clara Church on P.
Burgos St., all in Pasay City. Subsequently, a verification of the authenticity of the
signatures on the resolution was conducted by Ligaya Salayon, the election officer
for Pasay City designated by the COMELEC. In its resolution of October 18, 1999, the
COMELEC granted the petition for recall and dismissed the oppositions against it.
Hence, these petitions. Oral arguments were held in these cases in Baguio City on
April 4, 2000, after which the Court, by the vote of 8 to 6 of its members, 3 resolved
to dismiss the petition in G.R. No. 140560 for lack of showing that the COMELEC
committed a grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the Court unanimously
dismissed the petition in G.R. No. 140714 on the ground that the issue raised
therein had become moot and academic.
Issues: 1. WON the word "Recall" in Paragraph (b) of §74 of the LGC Includes the
Convening of the Preparatory Recall Assembly and the Filing by it of a Recall
Resolution.
 Recall is a process which begins with the convening of the preparatory
recall assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the
registered voters of a local government unit, and then proceeds to the
filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the verification
of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election,
and the holding of the election on the scheduled date.
 However, as used in paragraph (b) of §74, "recall" refers to the election
itself by means of which voters decide whether they should retain their
local official or elect his replacement. Several reasons can be cited in
support of this conclusion.
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 §74 deals with restrictions on the power of recall. It is in fact entitled
"Limitations on Recall." On the other hand, §69 provides that "the power
of recall . . . shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the
power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall
proceedings but the power to elect an official into office, the limitations in
§74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall proceedings. In other
words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers only to the recall election,
excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall
with the COMELEC, or the gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of
the voters for a petition for recall. Thus, there may be several PRAs held or
petitions for recall filed with the COMELEC — there is no legal limit on the
number of times such processes may be resorted to. These are merely
preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The limitations in
§74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the
registered voters. It is this — and not merely the preliminary steps
required to be taken to initiate a recall — which paragraph (b) of §74 seeks
to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from the
date of assumption of office of an elective local official.
 Garcia v. COMELEC: where two objections were raised against the legality
of PRAs: (1) that even the power to initiate recall proceedings is the sole
prerogative of the electorate which cannot be delegated to PRAs, and (2)
that by vesting this power in a PRA, the law in effect unconstitutionally
authorizes it to shorten the term of office of incumbent elective local
officials. Both objections were dismissed on the ground that the holding of
a PRA is not the recall itself. With respect to the first objection, it was held
that it is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the
Constitution gave to the people. With respect to the second objection, it
was held that a recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official
concerned before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he
should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their
sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office . . . ."
 If these preliminary proceedings do not produce a decision by the
electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to enjoy the
confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the
holding of a recall, except one year after the official's assumption of office,
cannot apply to such proceedings.
 The second reason why the term "recall" in paragraph (b) refers to recall
election is to be found in the purpose of the limitation itself. There are two
limitations in paragraph (b) on the holding of recalls: (1) that no recall shall
take place within one year from the date of assumption of office of the
official concerned, and (2) that no recall shall take place within one year
immediately preceding a regular local election.
 The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for
judging the performance of an elective local official. In the Bower case
cited by this Court in Angobung v. COMELEC, it was held that "The only
logical reason which we can ascribe for requiring the electors to wait one
year before petitioning for a recall election is to prevent premature action
on their part in voting to remove a newly elected official before having had
sufficient time to evaluate the soundness of his policies and decisions." The
one-year limitation was reckoned as of the filing of a petition for recall
because the Municipal Code involved in that case expressly provided that
"no removal petition shall be filed against any officer or until he has
actually held office for at least twelve months." But however the period of
prohibition is determined, the principle announced is that the purpose of
the limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for evaluating the
performance of an elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the
election is held outside the one-year period, the preliminary proceedings
to initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office
of a local official.
 It cannot be argued that to allow recall proceedings to be initiated before
the official concerned has been in office for one-year would be to allow
him to be judged without sufficient basis. As already stated, it is not the
holding of PRA nor the adoption of recall resolutions that produces a
judgment on the performance of the official concerned; it is the vote of the
electorate in the election that does. Therefore, as long as the recall
election is not held before the official concerned has completed one year
in office, he will not be judged on his performance prematurely.
 Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the
convening of the PRA for the purpose of discussing the performance in
office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict the
constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people
cannot just be asked on the day of the election to decide on the
performance of their officials. The crystallization and formation of an
informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first
limitation in paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the
exchange of ideas and opinions among citizens is to unduly curtail one of
the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to assume
that such assemblies will always eventuate in a recall election. To the
contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence in the incumbent.
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 Puno dissent: the purpose of the one-year period in paragraph (b) is to
provide the local official concerned a "period of repose" during which
"[his] attention should not be distracted by any impediment, especially by
disturbance due to political partisanship." Unfortunately, the law cannot
really provide for a period of honeymoon or moratorium in politics. From
the day an elective official assumes office, his acts become subject to
scrutiny and criticism, and it is not always easy to determine when criticism
of his performance is politically motivated and when it is not. The only
safeguard against the baneful and enervating effects of partisan politics is
the good sense and self restraint of the people and its leaders against such
shortcomings of our political system. A respite from partisan politics may
have the incidental effect of providing respite from partisanship, but that is
not really the purpose of the limitation on recall under the law. The
limitation is only intended to provide a sufficient basis for evaluating and
judging the performance of an elected local official. In any event, it is
argued that the judgments of PRAs are not "as politically unassailable as
recalls initiated directly by the people." Justice Puno cites the
"embarrassing repudiation by the people of [Kaloocan City's] Preparatory
Recall Assembly" when, instead of ousting Mayor Rey Malonzo, they
reelected him.
 It is no disparagement of the PRA that in the ensuing election the local
official whose recall is sought is actually reelected. Laws converting
municipalities into cities and providing for the holding of plebiscites during
which the question of cityhood is submitted to the people for their
approval are not always approved by the people. Yet, no one can say that
Congress is not a good judge of the will of the voters in the locality. In the
case of recall elections in Kaloocan City, had it been shown that the PRA
was resorted to only because those behind the move to oust the
incumbent mayor failed to obtain the signatures of 25% of the voters of
that city to a petition for his recall, there may be some plausibility for the
claim that PRAs are not as good a gauge of the people's will as are the 25 %
of the voters.
 Recalls initiated directly by 25% of the registered voters of a local
government unit cannot be more representative of the sentiments of the
people than those initiated by PRAs whose members represent the entire
electorate in the local government unit. Voters who directly initiate recalls
are just as vulnerable to political maneuverings or manipulations as are
those composing PRAs.
 The question here is not whether recalls initiated by 25% of the voters are
better. The issue is whether the one-year period of limitation in paragraph
(b) includes the convening of the PRA. Given that question, will convening
the PRA outside this period make it any more representative of the people,
as the petition filed by 25% of the registered voters is claimed to be?
 As the recall election in Pasay City is set on April 15, 2000, more than one
year after petitioner assumed office as mayor of that city, we hold that
there is no bar to its holding on that date.
2. WON the Phrase "Regular Local Election" in the Same Paragraph (b) of §74
of the LGC includes the Election Period for that Regular Election or Simply
the Date of Such Election.
 P: date set by the COMELEC for the recall election is within the second
period of prohibition in paragraph (b). He argues that the phrase "regular
local elections" in paragraph (b) does not only mean "the day of the
regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the election
period as well, which is normally at least forty five (45) days immediately
before the day of the election. Hence, he contends that beginning March
30, 2000, no recall election may be held.
 This contention is untenable. The law is unambiguous in providing that
"[n]o recall shall take place within . . . one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election." Had Congress intended this limitation to refer to
the campaign period, which period is defined in the Omnibus Election
Code, it could have expressly said so.
 P’s interpretation would severely limit the period during which a recall
election may be held. Actually, because no recall election may be held until
one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the
period from July 1 of the following year to about the middle of May of the
succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months and 15 days, more or
less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the
campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an
interpretation must be rejected, because it would devitalize the right of
recall which is designed to make local government units "more responsive
and accountable."
 Indeed, there is a distinction between election period and campaign
period. Under the Omnibus Election Code, unless otherwise fixed by the
COMELEC, the election period commences ninety (90) days before the day
of the election and ends thirty (30) days thereafter. Thus, to follow
petitioner's interpretation that the second limitation in paragraph (b)
includes the "election period" would emasculate even more a vital right of
the people.
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3.WON the Recall RESOLUTION was Signed by a Majority of the PRA and Duly
Verified.
 P: a majority of the signatures of the members of the PRA was not
obtained because 74 members did not really sign the recall resolution.
According to petitioner, the 74 merely signed their names on pages 94-104
of the resolution to signify their attendance and not their concurrence.
Petitioner claims that this is shown by the word "Attendance" written by
hand at the top of the page on which the signatures of the 74 begin.
 This contention has no basis. To be sure, this claim is being raised for the
first time in this case. It was not raised before the COMELEC, in which the
claim made by petitioner was that some of the names in the petition were
double entries, that some members had withdrawn their support for the
petition, and that Wenceslao Trinidad's pending election protest was a
prejudicial question which must first be resolved before the petition for
recall could be given due course.
 Although the word "Attendance" appears at the top of the page, it is
apparent that it was written by mistake because it was crossed out by two
parallel lines drawn across it. Apparently, it was mistaken for the
attendance sheet which is a separate document. It is absurd to believe that
the 74 members of the PRA who signed the recall resolution signified their
attendance at the meeting twice. It is more probable to believe that they
signed pages 94-104 to signify their concurrence in the recall resolution of
which the pages in question are part.
Adormeo v. COMELEC (supra, see p. 179)
Socrates v. COMELEC (supra, see p. 180)
Mendez v. Civil Service Commission
Facts: On June 7, 1984, then Acting Register of Deeds of Quezon City Coloyan filed
an administrative complaint against Mendez, a legal research assistant in the
Quezon City Office of the City Attorney, for Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty,
allegedly for having torn off a portion of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 209287
from the registry book of Quezon City and for having pocketed it. After three
months of investigation, then Quezon City Mayor Rodriguez dismissed the said
complaint against the petitioner for insufficiency of evidence. Coloyan appealed to
the MSPB which found Mendez guilty as charged and dismissed from the service.
Said decision was affirmed by the CSC on appeal. MR (Coloyan not proper party,
exoneration by the city mayor is unappealable pursuant to Section 37, paragraph
(b) of P.D. 807): denied, there is nothing in the said law which precludes an appeal
from the decision of the disciplining authorities to determine, among others,
whether the decision rendered is supported by the facts on record and the law.
Issue: WON Mendez has the right to appeal.
 Right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provision of law.
 A cursory reading of P.D. 807, otherwise known as "The Philippine Civil
Service Law" shows that said law does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from administrative charges.
 Section 37 paragraph (a): The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal
from office.
 Said provision must be read together with Section 39 paragraph (a) of P.D
805 which contemplates: Appeals, where allowable, shall be made by the
party adversely affected by the decision.
 The phrase "party adversely affected by the decision" refers to the
government employee against whom the administrative case is filed for
the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension,
demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office. In
the instant case, Coloyan who filed the appeal cannot be considered an
aggrieved party because he is not the respondent in the administrative
case below.
 Pursuant to Section 37 paragraph (b) of P.D. 807, the city mayor, as head
of the city government, is empowered to enforce judgment with finality on
lesser penalties like suspension from work for one month and forfeiture of
salary equivalent to one month against erring employees.
 By inference or implication, the remedy of appeal may be availed of only in
a case where the respondent is found guilty of the charges filed against
him. But when the respondent is exonerated of said charges, as in this
case, there is no occasion for appeal.
Macalingcag and Carlos v. Chang
Facts: On October 6, 1989, Carlos signed a formal administrative charge approved
by Macalincag for dishonesty, neglect of duty and acts prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. It was alleged that Chang disbursed funds inviolation of the
Omnibus Election Code, incurred cash overdrafts in violation of Sections 41 and 44
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of PD 477 and Section 4(3) of PD 1445, transferred the amount of P1,977,492.00
from the Treasurer/Cashier's safe to the Realty Tax Division's safe, thus subjecting
said municipal funds to possible loss; and that she continually failed to remit to the
Bureau of Treasury the national collection. The basis of the formal charge by
petitioner Carlos was the preliminary evaluation of the COA Report dated January
18, 1989 and the affidavit-complaints of Councilor Roberto Brillante dated April 27,
1989 and May 23, 1989. On the same date, October 5, 1989, petitioner Macalincag
issued an Order of Preventive Suspension against Chang. Also on October 6, 1989,
petitioner Macalincag sent a letter to the "Governor, Metro Manila Commission —
Attn: the Officer-in-Charge MMC Finance Office," seeking the implementation of
the Order of Preventive Suspension dated October 6, 1989 and recommending that
an Officer-in-Charge be immediately designated from the ranks of qualified
Municipal Treasurers and Assistant Municipal Treasurers in Metro Manila. By virtue
of the said letter, the Officer-in-Charge, MMC Finance Office furnished respondent
Chang, by ordinary mail, with a copy of the Order of Preventive Suspension also
dated October 6, 1989. On November 10, 1989, respondent Chang filed a petition
for prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati against petitioners Macalincag and Carlos. TRO on preventive
suspension granted. TC: denied Chang application for a writ of preliminary
injunction, and sustained the power of the Secretary of Finance to issue the Order
of Preventive Suspension. MR: Chang raised a new argument by invoking Section 8
Executive Order No. 392 entitled "Constituting the Metropolitan Manila Authority,
providing for its powers and functions and for other purposes.", application for a
writ of preliminary injunction granted. TC: respondents permanently desist from
enforcing the Order of Preventive Suspension. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.Second Division of this Court: denied the petition for having been filed out
of time but the same was reinstated in a resolution dated April 15, 1991. In the
resolution dated July 10, 1991, the Second Division of this Court gave due course to
the petition and required both parties to file their simultaneous memoranda.
Issue: 1. WON the Secretary of Finance has jurisdiction to issue an Order of
Preventive Suspension against the acting municipal treasurer of Makati, Metro
Manila.
 P: the Order of Preventive Suspension became effective upon receipt
thereof by respondent Chang and not upon the designation of an officer-
in-charge to replace him; that the Order of Preventive Suspension dated
October 6, 1989 became effective before the issuance of Executive Order
No. 392 and, therefore, can no longer be enjoined by reason of the alleged
transfer of the power to suspend from the Secretary of Finance to the
President of the Republic of the Philippines and that the power to suspend
and remove municipal officials is not an incident of the power to appoint.
 R: a government officer is not suspended until someone has assumed the
post and the officer subject of the suspension order has ceased performing
his official function; that the implementation of the questioned suspension
order was overtaken by the issuance of Executive Order No. 392 creating
the Metropolitan Manila Authority and that the power to discipline is
vested solely on the person who has the power to appoint.
 Preventive Suspension is governed by Sec. 41 of P.D. 807 or the Civil
Service Law which provides: Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension. — The proper
disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons
to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his
removal from service. Under the aforesaid law, designation of the
replacement is not a requirement to give effect to the preventive
suspension.
 LGC (BP 337) Sec. 156. TEMPORARY DISABILITY. — In the event of inability
of the treasurer to discharge the duties of his office on account of a trip on
official business, absence on leave, sickness, suspension, or other
temporary disability, the assistant municipal treasurer or, in his absence,
the treasury official next in rank in the municipality shall discharge the
duties of the office subject to existing laws. Section 233(2): Until otherwise
provided by law, nothing in this code shall be understood to amend or
repeal the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 824 and BP 20, and all
presidential decrees and issuances relevant to Metropolitan Manila and
the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and XII.
 Order of Preventive Suspension of respondent Chang became effective
upon his receipt thereof, which is presumed when he filed a complaint in
the trial court preventing the implementation of such Order of Suspension.
Otherwise stated, the designation of the OFFICER-IN-CHARGE to replace
respondent Chang is immaterial to the effectivity of the latter's
suspension. A contrary view would render nugatory the very purpose of
preventive suspension.
2. WON EO392 gave rise to the creation of the Metropolitan Manila Authority
and vested in the President of the Republic of the Philippines the power to
appoint municipal treasurers in Metro Manila.
 Sec. 8. All city and municipal treasurers, municipal assessors and their
assistants as well as other officials whose appointment is currently vested
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upon the Metropolitan Manila Commission shall be appointed by the
President of the Philippines, upon recommendation of the Council, subject
to the Civil Service law, rules and regulations.
 Before, the power to appoint the aforesaid public officials was vested in
the Provincial Treasurers and Assessors of the Municipalities concerned,
under P.D. No. 477 and later transferred to the Commissioner of Finance
under P.D. No. 921, but under both decrees, the power of appointment
was made subject to Civil Service Laws and the approval of the Secretary of
Finance.
 The intention of the aforesaid legislations to follow the Civil Service Laws,
Rules and Regulations is unmistakable. The power to discipline is
specifically vested under Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 in heads of departments,
agencies and instrumentalities, provinces and chartered cities who have
original jurisdiction to investigate and decide on matters involving
disciplinary action. Stated differently, they are the proper disciplining
authority referred to in Sec. 41 of the same law.The Office of the Municipal
Treasurer is unquestionably under the Department of Finance as provided
for in Sec. 3, P.D. No. 477. Hence, the Secretary of Finance is the proper
disciplining authority to issue the preventive suspension order. More
specifically acting Secretary of Finance, Macalincag, acted within his
jurisdiction in issuing the aforesaid order. Even assuming that the power to
appoint, includes the power to discipline as argued by Chang, acting
Secretary Macalincag as Secretary of Finance is an alter ego of the
President and therefore, it is within his authority, as an alter ego, to
preventively suspend respondent Chang.
Salalima v. Guingona (supra, see p.198)
Garcia v. Pajaro and the City of Dagupan
Facts: Garcia is a Revenue Collector appointed to that position by then City Mayor
Manaois. He was ordered suspended by City Treasurer Pajaro from June 1, 1990 to
March 15, 1992 and directed the withholding of his salary because of the Formal
Charge filed against him. Petitioner has been rating Unsatisfactory in his
performance for several semesters which is the reason a [Formal] Charge was filed
against petitioner received by him on June 1, 1990, 10:00 a.m. and, as a matter of
procedure, if the charge is a major offense, by civil service laws, he was preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days, also duly received by Mr. Garcia on June 4, 1990 at
2:00 p.m. Then an investigation was scheduled and a subpoena was issued to Mr.
Garcia to appear and testify on August 15, 1990 duly received by him on August 1,
1990, 8:55. Again Mr. Garcia did not Answer and refused to honor the subpoena to
submit himself for investigation. So he proceeded with ex-parte investigation and
gathered and submitted testimonies to support the allegations in the Formal
Charge then submitted the result of their findings to the Department of Finance for
decision. A Decision was promulgated by the Department of Finance on August 1,
1991. The matter of preventive suspension of Mr. Garcia was submitted to the
Regional Director, Bureau of Local Government Finance which was ‘favorably
approved’ by the Regional Director. CA: Pajaro was vested with legal power and
authority to institute disciplinary action against subordinate officers and
employees. Hence, this Petition.
Issues: 1. WON the City Treasurer may discipline Garcia. YES.
 under the old and the present LGCs, appointive officers and employees of
local government units are covered by the Civil Service Law; and such
rules, regulations and other issuances duly promulgated pursuant thereto,
unless otherwise specified. Moreover, the investigation and the
adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials
and employees, as well as their suspension and removal, shall be in
accordance with the Civil Service Law and rules and other pertinent laws.
 Administrative Code of 1987, specifically Book V on the civil service is the
primary law governing appointive officials and employees in the
government. Grounds for disciplining: 1) when the charge is serious and
the evidence of guilt is strong; (2) when the respondent is a recidivist and
(3) when the respondent is notoriously undesirable.
 The power to discipline is specifically granted by Section 47 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 to heads of departments, agencies and
instrumentalities, provinces and cities. On the other hand, the power to
commence administrative proceedings against a subordinate officer or
employee is granted by Section 34 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the said Administrative Code to the secretary of a department,
the head of office of equivalent rank, the head of a local government unit,
the chief of an agency, the regional director or a person with a sworn
written complaint.
 The city treasurer may institute, motu propio, disciplinary proceedings
against a subordinate officer or employee. Local Administrative
Regulations (LAR) No. 2-85,[22] which was issued by the Ministry of
Finance on March 27, 1985, authorized the minister (now secretary) of
finance, the regional director, and head of a local treasury or an
assessment office to start administrative disciplinary action against officers
or employees subordinate to them.
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 In the case at bar, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority
referred to in Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The term
“agency” refers to any of the various units of the government including a
department, a bureau, an office, an instrumentality, a government-owned
or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Respondent Pajaro, as the city treasurer, was the head of the Office of the
Treasurer; while petitioner, a senior revenue collector, was an officer
under him. Thus, the city treasurer is the proper disciplining authority who
could investigate petitioner and issue a preventive suspension order
against him.
 Petitioner’s contention that it is only the city mayor who may discipline
him is not persuasive. Section 455 of the 1991 LGC states that the city
mayor “may cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings
against any official or employee of the city.” This rule is not incongruent
with the provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code, which authorizes the
heads of agencies to discipline subordinate employees. Likewise, the old
LGC does not vest in city mayors the sole power to discipline and to
institute criminal or administrative actions against any officers or
employees under their jurisdiction. In fact, there is no provision under the
present LGC expressly rescinding the authority of the Department of
Finance to exercise disciplinary authority over its employees. By the same
token, there is nothing that prohibits the city treasurer from filing a
complaint against petitioner.
 As a corollary, the power to discipline evidently includes the power to
investigate. Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole, we explained the rationale for
preventive suspension as follows: not being in the nature of a penalty, a
preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation
after charges are brought and even before the charges are heard.
Naturally, such a preventive suspension would occur prior to any finding of
guilt or innocence.” Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative
investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are established and
the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then
he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore,
nothing improper in suspending an officer pending his investigation and
before the charges against him are heard and be given opportunity to
prove his innocence.”
 In the present case, Respondent Pajaro was authorized to issue the
assailed Preventive Suspension Order against petitioner, because the latter
was charged with gross neglect of duty, refusal to perform official duties
and functions, and insubordination -- grounds that allowed the issuance of
such Order, as provided by Section 51 of the 1987 Administrative Code.
Clearly, the city treasurer acted within the scope of his power when he
commenced the investigation and issued the assailed Order.
2. WON Garcia’s right to due process was violated, because he was not heard
during the administrative proceedings. NO.
 In an administrative proceeding, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side. Such process requires notice and an
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. One may be heard,
not solely by verbal presentation in an oral argument, but also -- and
perhaps even many times more creditably and practicably -- through
pleadings. So long as the parties are given the opportunity to explain their
side, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.
Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a person is
granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of an action or a ruling.
 In the case at bar, the administrative proceedings were conducted in
accordance with the procedure set out in the 1987 Administrative Code
and other pertinent laws. First, petitioner was furnished a copy of the May
30, 1990 formal charge against him. Second, Respondent Pajaro requested
the approval of the Order of Preventive Suspension in his June 1, 1990
letter addressed to the Bureau of Local Government Finance regional
director, who approved the Order in the First Indorsement dated June 4,
1990. Third, a subpoena dated July 31, 1990 was issued to petitioner
ordering him to testify during an investigation on August 15, 1990.
However, he admittedly refused to attend the investigation; thus, it was
conducted ex parte. Fourth, the Department of Finance affirmed
Respondent Pajaro’s findings in its August 1, 1991 Decision.
 Parties who choose not to avail themselves of the opportunity to answer
charges against them cannot complain of a denial of due process.[55]
Petitioner’s refusal to attend the scheduled hearings, despite due notice,
was at his own peril.
Javellana v. DILG and Santos
Facts: City Engineer Divinagracia filed an administrative case against Atty. Javellana,
an elected City Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental for continuously engaging
in the practice of law without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional
Director, Department of Local Government, as required by DLG Memorandum
Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same
department. Javellana also assails the constitutionality of Memorandum Circulars
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Nos. 80-38 and 90-on the ground that the Supreme Court has the sole and exclusive
authority to regulate the practice of law.
Issue: WON the DILG committed a grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned DLG Circulars Nos. 80-30 and 90-81 and in denying petitioner's motion
to dismiss the administrative charge against him.
 Complaints against public officers and employees relating or incidental to
the performance of their duties are necessarily impressed with public
interest for by express constitutional mandate, a public office is a public
trust. The complaint for illegal dismissal filed by Javiero and Catapang
against City Engineer Divinagracia is in effect a complaint against the City
Government of Bago City, their real employer, of which petitioner
Javellana is a councilman. Hence, judgment against City Engineer
Divinagracia would actually be a judgment against the City Government. By
serving as counsel for the complaining employees and assisting them to
prosecute their claims against City Engineer Divinagracia, the petitioner
violated Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 (in relation to Section 7[b-2] of
RA 6713) prohibiting a government official from engaging in the private
practice of his profession, if such practice would represent interests
adverse to the government.
 Petitioner's contention that Section 90 of the LGC of 1991 and DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the
Constitution is completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court's power and authority to prescribe rules
on the practice of law. The LGC and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81
simply prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts of
interest between the discharge of their public duties and the private
practice of their profession, in those instances where the law allows it.
 Section 90 of the LGC does not discriminate against lawyers and doctors. It
applies to all provincial and municipal officials in the professions or
engaged in any occupation. Section 90 explicitly provides that sanggunian
members "may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or
teach in schools expect during session hours." If there are some
prohibitions that apply particularly to lawyers, it is because of all the
professions, the practice of law is more likely than others to relate to, or
affect, the area of public service.
Osea v. Malaya
Facts: On November 20, 1997, petitioner filed a Protest Case with the Civil Service
Commission. She averred that she was appointed as Officer-in-Charge, Assistant
Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, by then Secretary Ricardo T.
Gloria of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, upon the endorsement
of the Provincial School Board of Camarines Sur; that despite the recommendation
of Secretary Gloria, President Fidel V. Ramos appointed respondent to the position
of Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur; that respondent's
appointment was made without prior consultation with the Provincial School Board,
in violation of Section 99 of the LGC of 1991. Hence, petitioner prayed that
respondent's appointment be recalled and set aside for being null and void. On
March 31, 1998, the Civil Service Commission issued Resolution No. 980699,
dismissing petitioner's protest-complaint. The Civil Service Commission found that
on September 13, 1996, President Ramos appointed respondent, who was then
Officer-in-Charge Schools Division Superintendent of Iriga City, as Schools Division
Superintendent without any specific division. Thus, respondent performed the
functions of Schools Division Superintendent in Iriga City. Subsequently, on
November 3, 1997, Secretary Gloria designated respondent as Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur, and petitioner as Schools Division Superintendent
of Iriga City. In dismissing petitioner's protest, the Civil Service Commission held
that Section 99 of the LGC of 1991 contemplates a situation where the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports issues the appointments, whereas respondent's
appointment was made by no less than the President, in the exercise of his
appointing power. Moreover, the designation of respondent as Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur and of petitioner as Schools Division
Superintendent of Iriga City were in the nature of reassignments, in which case
consultation with the local school board was unnecessary. MR: denied. CA:
dismissed.
Issues: 1. WON Sec 99 of the LGC is applicable.
 Clearly, the afore-quoted portion of Section 99 of the LGCof 1991 applies
to appointments made by the DECS. This is because at the time of the
enactment of the LGC, schools division superintendents were appointed by
the DECS to specific division or location. In 1994, the Career Executive
Service Board issued Memorandum Circular No. 21, Series of 1994, placing
the positions of schools division superintendent and assistant schools
division superintendent within the career executive service. Consequently,
the power to appoint persons to career executive service positions was
transferred from the DECS to the President. The appointment may not be
specific as to location. The prerogative to designate the appointees to their
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particular stations was vested in the DECS Secretary, pursuant to the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, was expressly made subject to
exigencies of the service, as provided in DECS Order No. 75, Series of 1996. further advice from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.16
 In the case at bar, the appointment issued by President Ramos in favor of Thus, her designation was temporary. In fact, there was a need to
respondent to the Schools Division Superintendent position on September recommend her to the President for appointment in a permanent capacity.
3, 1996 did not specify her station. It was Secretary Gloria who, in a Inasmuch as she occupied her position only temporarily, petitioner can be
Memorandum dated November 3, 1997, assigned and designated transferred or reassigned to other positions without violating her right to
respondent to the Division of Camarines Sur, and petitioner to the Division security of tenure. Indeed, petitioner has no vested right to the position of
of Iriga City. Schools Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur.
 Under the circumstances, the designation of respondent as Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur was not a case of appointment.
Her designation partook of the nature of a reassignment from Iriga City,
where she previously exercised her functions as Officer-in-Charge-Schools
Division Superintendent, to Camarines Sur. Clearly, therefore, the
requirement in Section 99 of the LGC of 1991 of prior consultation with the
local school board, does not apply. It only refers to appointments made by
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Such is the plain
meaning of the said law.
 The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is thus
applicable in this case. Where the words of a statute are clear, plain and
free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.
 Appointment should be distinguished from reassignment. An appointment
may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of
an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office. When
completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at
pleasure because of the nature of his office. On the other hand, a
reassignment is merely a movement of an employee from one
organizational unit to another in the same department or agency which
does not involve a reduction in rank, status or salary and does not require
the issuance of an appointment. In the same vein, a designation connotes
merely the imposition of additional duties on an incumbent official.
2. WON Petitioner has a vested right to the position of Schools Division
Superintendent of Camarines Sur, in view of her endorsement by the
Provincial School Board.
 Her qualification to the office, however, lacks one essential ingredient, i.e.,
her appointment thereto. While she was recommended by Secretary
Gloria to President Ramos for appointment to the position of Schools
Division Superintendent of Camarines Sur, the recommendation was not
acted upon by the President. Petitioner's designation as Officer-in-Charge,
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Basco v. PAGCOR (supra, see p. 2)
Ganzon v. CA (supra, see p. 9)
City of Cebu v. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority
Facts: The Osmeña Waterworks System was constructed through a sale of bonds as
authorized by the Philippine Legislature through Act 2009. By statute, the City of
Cebu came into existence as a political body corporate on 20 October 1936. The
newly created city absorbed the former municipality of Cebu. Among the general
powers granted to, and duties imposed upon, the legislative body of the City,
known as the Municipal Board, is that of providing for the maintenance of
waterworks for the purpose of supplying water to the inhabitants of the city, and
the purification of the source of supply and the places through which the same
passes, and to regulate the consumption and use of the water; to fix and provide
for the collection of rents therefor; and to regulate the construction, repair, and use
of hydrants, pumps, cisterns, and reservoirs. Sec. 17-x. Commonwealth Act
58).Pursuant to the aforesaid charter provision, the Municipal Board the City of
Cebu has been running and operating the Osmeña Waterworks System. Its
municipal Board provides for the budgetary expenses of the System and governs
the disposition of the System's revenue.On 16 November 1948, the Public Service
Commission granted plaintiff City a certificate of public convenience to operate and
maintain the Osmeña Waterworks System, subject to the terms and conditions
imposed therein. For the purpose of expanding the service to meet the water needs
of its increased population, the City of Cebu, on 11 December 1950 filed with the
Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources an application for the use of
water emanating from a natural spring in a private land belonging to the late Dr. Pio
Valencia, situated in Hagubiao, Consolacion, Cebu. The said application was in due
time approved by the department head. On 17 June 1955, defendant Authority was
created as a public corporation. (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 1383). Pursuant to its
charter, defendant shall own and/or have jurisdiction, supervision and control over
all territory now embraced by the Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas
now served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage and drainage
systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the
Philippines including those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Sections
of the Bureau of Public Works' (Sec. 1). Defendant was also given the power "to
acquire, purchase, hold, transfer, sell, lease, rent, mortgage, encumber, and
otherwise dispose of real and personal property including rights and franchises
within the Philippines, as authorized by the purposes for which the Authority was
created and reasonably and necessarily required for the transaction of the lawful
business of the same unless otherwise provided in this Act", and to exercise the
right of eminent domain for the purpose for which the Authority was created, in the
manner provided for by law for condemnation proceedings by the national,
provincial, and municipal governments; (Sec. 2, paragraphs [h] and [i]).
Lastly, the Act provides that "all existing government-owned waterworks and
sewerage systems in cities, municipalities and municipal districts, including springs
and other water sources, as well as the water-works and sewerage bonds, sinking
funds, and all indebtedness in general of the said Metropolitan Water District, and
government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems are transferred to the
National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority, and the Board is hereby authorized
and directed to receive and assume all such assets and liabilities or on behalf of the
said Authority, and in turn to pledge such assets as security for the payment of
waterworks and sewerage bonded debt" and that the net book value of the
properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water District and of government owned
waterworks and sewerage systems in cities, municipalities, or municipal districts,
and other government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems shall be received
by the Authority in payment for an equal value of the assets of the National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority. (Sec. 8).
Issue: WON RA 1383 constitutional.
 City of Baguio vs. The National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority: It is
clear that the State may, in the interest of national welfare, transfer to
public ownership any private enterprise upon payment of just
compensation. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that no person
can be deprived of his property except for public use and upon payment of
just compensation. There is an attempt to observe this requirement in
Republic Act No. 1383 when in providing for the transfer of appellee's
waterworks system to a national agency it was directed that the transfer
be made upon payment of an equivalent value of the property. Has this
been implemented? Has appellant actually transferred appellee any asset
of the NAWASA that may be considered just compensation for the
property expropriated? There is nothing in the record to show that such
was done. Neither is there anything to this effect in Office Memorandum
No. 7 issued by the NAWASA in implementation of the provision of
Republic Act No. 1383. The law speaks of assets of the NAWASA but they
are not specified. While the Act empowers the NAWASA to contract
indebtedness and issue bonds subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Finance when necessary for the transaction of its business (sec. 2, pa
(1),sec. 5, Act No. 1383), no such action has been taken to comply with
appellant's commitment in so far as payment of compensation of appellee
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is concerned. As to when such action should be taken no one knows. And
unless this aspect of the law is clarified and appellee is given its due
compensation, appellee cannot be deprived of its property even if
appellant desires to take over its administration in line with the spirit of
the law. We are therefore persuaded to conclude that the law, insofar as it
expropriates the waterworks in question without providing for an effective
payment of just compensation, violates our Constitution.
 Exactly the same situation obtains in the present case. Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 1383 (supra.) provides that "the net book value of the
properties and assets of the Metropolitan Water District and of
government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in cities,
municipalities of municipal districts, and other government-owned
waterworks and sewerage systems shall be received by the Authority in
payment for an equal value of the assets of the National Waterworks and
Sewerage Authority". In other words, all the properties and assets of the
Osmeña Waterworks System are transferred to the defendant NAWASA in
exchange for an equal value of the latter's assets. But what these assets
consist of, nothing concrete presently appears. All that is provided in
Section 8 is that NAWASA acquires all the assets and liabilities of all
government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the country. It is
an equal value of these unliquidated assets and liabilities that is supposed
to be given to plaintiff-appellee as payment of its System. Such, certainly,
is not a compensation that satisfies the Constitutional provisions.
 Cebu: waterworks involved herein is not a patrimonial property of the City
of Cebu but one for public use and, therefore, falls within the control of
the legislature. We find no merit in his contention. It must be remembered
that the Osmeña Waterworks System was established out of the
$125,000.00 loan extended to the municipality of Cebu by the U.S.
Government, payable within 30 years from the release thereof (Sec. 1, Act
2009), and which apparently was fully paid for by said municipality as
certified to by the Insular Treasurer (Exh. D). For its operation and
maintenance, the City of Cebu (Osmeña Waterworks System) applied for
and obtained a certificate of public convenience from the Public Service
Commission (Exh. E) and was made subject to the rates fixed and
regulations imposed by said body. The System owned properties which
appellee estimated at P10,000,000.00, although appellant claims it to be
worth only P1,000,000.00, and operates on a budget approved by its Board
of Directors (not by Congress), the disbursement of which was placed
under the supervision and custody of the City Treasurer (t.s.n., pp. 28-29).
The mere fact that the Buhisan basin where the water is collected stands
on a government reservation, and that the System was created to serve
the needs of the residents of said City (upon payment of certain rates from
which the System derives material gain), to our mind do not transform the
proprietary nature of appellee's ownership over the same to governmental
or public. The flaw in appellant's contention that the System is a public
works for public service is due to an apparent misapprehension that
because the System serves the public in a manner of speaking, it is, but
that token alone, necessarily for public service. The contention overlooks
the fact that only those of the general public who pay the required rental
or charge authorized and collected by the System, do make use of water.
In other words, the System serves all who pay the charges. It is open to the
public (in the sense, it is public service), but upon the payment only of a
certain rental (which makes it proprietary.) Article 424 of New Civil Code
cited by appellant makes clear distinction. It reads: ART. 424. Property for
public use, in the province, cities, municipalities, consist of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters,
promenades, public works for public service paid for by said provinces,
cities municipalities.
 All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
Thus, the term "public works for public service" must be interpreted,
following the principle of ejusdem generis, in the concept of the preceding
words "provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares,
fountains, public waters and promenades" which are used freely by all
without distinction. Hence, if the public works is not such free public
service, it is not within the purview the first paragraph, but of the second
paragraph of Article 424, and, consequently, patrimonial in character. And,
as already held by this Court, a municipal water system designed to supply
water to the inhabitants for profit is a corporate function of the
municipality
 Cases differ as to the public and private character of water works in some
respects, but the weight of authority, in so far as legislative control is
concerned, classes them as private affairs
 The consequential effect of such declaration is foreseeable, thus: Although
the state may regulate the service and rates of water plants owned and
operated by municipalities, such property is not employed for
governmental purposes and in the ownership operation thereof the
municipality acts in its proprietary capacity, free from legislative
interference
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 The water system of a city not being a property held for governmental
purposes is not subject to legislative control In the ownership and control
of a water system purchased by the city out of the proceeds of the loan
contracted for that purpose, the city acts in its proprietary character as
distinguished from its government capacity.
 Similarly, we cannot uphold appellant's theory that the transfer of
ownership of the Osmeña Waterworks System to another government
agency is a valid exercise of the police power of the State, because while
the power to enact laws intended to promote public order, safety, health,
morals and general welfare of society is inherent in every sovereign state,
such power is not without limitations, notable among which is the
constitutional prohibition against the taking of private property for public
use without just compensation. (Art. III, Sec. 1, Philippine Constitution.).
 No exercise of the police power can disregard the constitutional
guarantees in respect to the taking of private property, due process and
equal protection of the laws and it should not override the demands of
natural justice If a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the
public health, morals or safety, has no real or substantial reason to these
objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by fundamental law, it is
the duty of courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the
Constitution. Action in the nature of police regulation is void if against the
express provisions of the Constitution although otherwise within its
general power to make police regulations.
 Appellant also urges recognition of the right of the National Government
(through the National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority) to acquire the
Osmeña Waterworks System by eminent domain. This, we find to be
equally untenable, for one of the essential requisites to the lawful exercise
of this right is the payment to the owner of condemned property of just
compensation to be ascertained according to law. Needless to state in this
respect, that it is precisely for this reason, that is, lack of provision
regarding effective payment of just compensation, that Republic Act No.
1383 was declared violative of the Constitution, in the case of City of
Baguio vs. National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority.
Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga
Facts: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of Zamboanga
used to be the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province. On October 12,
1936, Commonwealth Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also provided that buildings and
properties which the province shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to
another place will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to
be fixed by the Auditor General. The properties and buildings referred to consisted
of 50 lots and some buildings constructed thereon, located in the City of
Zamboanga and covered individually by Torrens certificates of title in the name of
Zamboanga Province. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga Province was transferred
to Dipolog. Subsequently, or on June 16, 1948, Republic Act 286 was approved
creating the municipality of Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga
Province. On May 26, 1949, the Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor
General, pursuant to Commonwealth Act 39, fixed the value of the properties and
buildings in question left by Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00. On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the
province of Zamboanga into two: Zamboanga del Norte and Zamboanga del Sur. As
to how the assets and obligations of the old province were to be divided between
the two new ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided that the funds, assets and other
properties and the obligations of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided
equitably between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the Province of
Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the Philippines, upon the recommendation
of the Auditor General. Pursuant thereto, the Auditor General, on January 11, 1955,
apportioned the assets and obligations of the defunct Province of Zamboanga as
follows: 54.39% for Zamboanga del Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.
Zamboanga del Norte therefore became entitled to 54.39% of P1,294,244.00, the
total value of the lots and buildings in question, or P704,220.05 payable by
Zamboanga City. On March 17, 1959, the Executive Secretary, by order of the
President, issued a ruling holding that Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as
owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of the properties mentioned in Sec. 50 of
Commonwealth Act 39, and is entitled to the price thereof, payable by Zamboanga
City. This ruling revoked the previous Cabinet Resolution of July 13, 1951 conveying
all the said 50 lots and buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00, effective as
of 1945, when the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga Province was
transferred to Dipolog. The Secretary of Finance then authorized the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to deduct an amount equal to 25% of the regular internal
revenue allotment for the City of Zamboanga for the quarter ending March 31,
1960, then for the quarter ending June 30, 1960, and again for the first quarter of
the fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all aggregating P57,373.46, was credited
to the province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial payment of the P764,220.05 due
it. However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved amending Sec. 50
of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that aAll buildings, properties and assets
belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of the said City of
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Zamboanga. Consequently, the Secretary of Finance, on July 12, 1961, ordered the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to stop from effecting further payments to
Zamboanga del Norte and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of P57,373.46
taken from it out of the internal revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
Zamboanga City admits that since the enactment of Republic Act 3039, P43,030.11
of the P57,373.46 has already been returned to it. This constrained plaintiff-
appellee Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5, 1962, a complaint entitled
"Declaratory Relief with Preliminary Mandatory Injunction" in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga del Norte against defendants-appellants Zamboanga City,
the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It was prayed
that: (a) Republic Act 3039 be declared unconstitutional for depriving plaintiff
province of property without due process and just compensation; (b) Plaintiff's
rights and obligations under said law be declared; (c) The Secretary of Finance and
the Internal Revenue Commissioner be enjoined from reimbursing the sum of
P57,373.46 to defendant City; and (d) The latter be ordered to continue paying the
balance of P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25% of its internal revenue
allotments. On June 4, 1962, the lower court ordered the issuance of preliminary
injunction as prayed for. After defendants filed their respective answers, trial was
held. On August 12, 1963, judgment was rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039
unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte of its private
properties, consisting of 50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under
certificates of title in the name of the defunct province of Zamboanga; ordering
defendant City of Zamboanga to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P704,220.05
payment thereof to be deducted from its regular quarterly internal revenue
allotment equivalent to 25% thereof every quarter until said amount shall have
been fully paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance to direct defendant
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular quarterly
internal revenue allotment for defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the same
to plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte until said sum of P704,220.05 shall have been fully
paid; ordering plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte to execute through its proper officials
the corresponding public instrument deeding to defendant City of Zamboanga the
50 parcels of land and the improvements thereon under the certificates of title
upon payment by the latter of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full; dismissing
the counterclaim of defendant City of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the
preliminary mandatory injunction issued on June 8, 1962, pursuant to the order of
the Court dated June 4, 1962. No costs are assessed against the defendants.
Subsequently, but prior to the perfection of defendants' appeal, plaintiff province
filed a motion to reconsider praying that Zamboanga City be ordered instead to pay
the P704,220.05 in lump sum with 6% interest per annum. Over defendants'
opposition, the lower court granted plaintiff province's motion.
Issue: WON RA 3039 is unconstitutional.
 The validity of the law depends on the nature of the 50 lots and buildings
thereon in question. If the property is owned by the municipality (meaning
municipal corporation) in its public and governmental capacity, the
property is public and Congress has absolute control over it. But if the
property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The municipality cannot
be deprived of it without due process and payment of just compensation.
 The capacity in which the property is held is, however, dependent on the
use to which it is intended and devoted.
 ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities, and municipalities is divided
into property for public use and patrimonial property. ART. 424. Property
for public use, in the provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the
provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service paid for by
said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other property possessed by any
of them is patrimonial and shall be governed by this Code, without
prejudice to the provisions of special laws.
 Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question, except the
two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds, could be considered as
patrimonial properties of the former Zamboanga province. Even the capital
site, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be
considered patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall
under the phrase "public works for public service" for it has been held that
under the ejusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free and
indiscriminate use by anyone, just like the preceding enumerated
properties in the first paragraph of Art 424. 7 The playgrounds, however,
would fit into this category.
 Municipality of Catbalogan v. Director of Lands, and Municipality of
Tacloban v. Director of Lands: capitol site and the school sites in
municipalities constitute their patrimonial properties. This result is
understandable because, unlike in the classification regarding State
properties, properties for public service in the municipalities are not
classified as public. Assuming then the Civil Code classification to be the
chosen norm, the lower court must be affirmed except with regard to the
two (2) lots used as playgrounds.
 Norm obtaining under the principles constituting the law of Municipal
Corporations, all those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted
to public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial. Under
this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the property be held
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and, devoted for governmental purposes like local administration, public
education, public health, etc.
 HINUNANGAN V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS: where the municipality has
occupied lands distinctly for public purposes, such as for the municipal
court house, the public school, the public market, or other necessary
municipal building, we will, in the absence of proof to the contrary,
presume a grant from the States in favor of the municipality; but, as
indicated by the wording, that rule may be invoked only as to property
which is used distinctly for public purposes...."
 VIUDA DE TANTOCO V. MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO: municipal
properties necessary for governmental purposes are public in nature. Thus,
the auto trucks used by the municipality for street sprinkling, the police
patrol automobile, police stations and concrete structures with the
corresponding lots used as markets were declared exempt from execution
and attachment since they were not patrimonial properties.
 MUNICIPALITY OF BATANGAS VS. CANTOS: a municipal lot which had
always been devoted to school purposes is one dedicated to public use and
is not patrimonial property of a municipality.
 Following this classification, Republic Act 3039 is valid insofar as it affects
the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and
leprosarium sites and the high school playground sites — a total of 24 lots
— since these were held by the former Zamboanga province in its
governmental capacity and therefore are subject to the absolute control of
Congress.
 We noticed that the eight Burleigh lots above described are adjoining each
other and in turn are between the two lots wherein the Burleigh schools
are built, as per records appearing herein and in the Bureau of Lands.
Hence, there is sufficient basis for holding that said eight lots constitute
the appurtenant grounds of the Burleigh schools, and partake of the
nature of the same.
 Regarding the several buildings existing on the lots above-mentioned, the
records do not disclose whether they were constructed at the expense of
the former Province of Zamboanga. Considering however the fact that said
buildings must have been erected even before 1936 when Commonwealth
Act 39 was enacted and the further fact that provinces then had no power
to authorize construction of buildings such as those in the case at bar at
their own expense, 14 it can be assumed that said buildings were erected
by the National Government, using national funds. Hence, Congress could
very well dispose of said buildings in the same manner that it did with the
lots in question.
 But even assuming that provincial funds were used, still the buildings
constitute mere accessories to the lands, which are public in nature, and
so, they follow the nature of said lands, i.e., public. Moreover, said
buildings, though located in the city, will not be for the exclusive use and
benefit of city residents for they could be availed of also by the provincial
residents. The province then — and its successors-in-interest — are not
really deprived of the benefits thereof.
 But Republic Act 3039 cannot be applied to deprive Zamboanga del Norte
of its share in the value of the rest of the 26 remaining lots which are
patrimonial properties since they are not being utilized for distinctly,
governmental purposes.
 Moreover, the fact that these 26 lots are registered strengthens the
proposition that they are truly private in nature. On the other hand, that
the 24 lots used for governmental purposes are also registered is of no
significance since registration cannot convert public property to private.
 We are more inclined to uphold this latter view. The controversy here is
more along the domains of the Law of Municipal Corporations — State vs.
Province — than along that of Civil Law. Moreover, this Court is not
inclined to hold that municipal property held and devoted to public service
is in the same category as ordinary private property. The consequences are
dire. As ordinary private properties, they can be levied upon and attached.
They can even be acquired thru adverse possession — all these to the
detriment of the local community. Lastly, the classification of properties
other than those for public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under
Art. 424 of the Civil Code — is "... without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws." For purpose of this article, the principles, obtaining under
the Law of Municipal Corporations can be considered as "special laws".
Hence, the classification of municipal property devoted for distinctly
governmental purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code
classification in this particular case.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp & PAGCOR
Facts: PAGCOR leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there
during the Christmas season. The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 which prohibits the issuance of business permits and
cancels existing business permits to any establishment for the using and allowing to
be used its premises or portions thereof for the operation of casinos. Pryce assailed
the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as
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intervenor and supplemental petitioner. CA declared the ordinances invalid and
issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. MR denied.
Issue: WON Ordinance 3353 is unconstitutional.
 Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation: sustained the
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to
the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the
government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
 Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered
to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the LGC. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare
Clause. In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that
the Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants. This section also authorizes the
LGUs to regulate properties and businesses within their territorial limits in
the interest of the general welfare.
 P: the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of casinos
because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the
people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the
Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government
units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal
gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of
casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of
Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory
pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the LGC. Such interpretation is
consonant with the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II,
Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other
provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In
giving the LGUs the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other
social problems, the LGC has recognized the competence of such
communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to
promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of
the State.
 Valid Ordinance: 1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. 3) It must not be partial or
discriminatory. 4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. 5) It must be
general and consistent with public policy. 6) It must not be unreasonable.
 Under Sec. 458 of the LGC, LGUs are authorized to prevent or suppress,
among others, "gambling and other prohibited games of chance."
Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance which are not
prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should
be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with
which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the
word should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the
other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or suppressed.
 The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene
P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent
PAGCOR from exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this
misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869
for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory
is that the change has been made by the LGC itself, which was also enacted
by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been,
not really repealed by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the
sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of the
local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D. 1869 by the
LGC is permissible because one law can change or repeal another law.
 It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting
that the decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually
arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless for all intents and
purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize
and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be not only
prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only
discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall"
as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government
units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in
the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this
construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or
centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units
pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this
situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger
or a white elephant and will no longer be able to exercise its powers as a
prime source of government revenue through the operation of casinos.
 It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the
repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which
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painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts thereof which are
repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of
them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced below,
will disclose the omission: Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the "LGC," Executive Order No.
112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed. (b)
Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders,
instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the
barangay are hereby repealed. (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of
Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of
Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential
Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos.
381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and
rendered of no force and effect. (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby
repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded projects. (e) The following
provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of
Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of
Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16 of Presidential
Decree No. 972, as amended, and (f) All general and special laws, acts, city
charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
 Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly
presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, this Court explained: The cases
relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the
assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this intention must
be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient revelation of this
intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction
that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the
Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with
reference to which the question arises bear to each other the relation of
general to special.
 There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the
contrary, as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as
the source of funding in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A.
7309, creating a Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the
benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes,
and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis.
PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that
the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the LGC but has in fact been
improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal
problems of the government.
 It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute
against another in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must
exert every effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve
a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the
Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to
give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the
case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold
that under the LGC, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent
and suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those
allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws
must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.
 This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of
gambling, to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized
gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling,
if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that the Code authorizes
them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between
these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will
of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could,
by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop
the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A.
983.
 In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the
conclusion urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question
are valid. On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869,
which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the public policy
expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
 The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not
contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of
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the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative
powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
 Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life,
without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy. As it may
destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can
suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from
existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so
far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase
it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
 This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local
government units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the
Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning
to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control
of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes
the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of
the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By
and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
 Court holds that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games
of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been
modified by the LGC, which empowers the local government units to
prevent or suppress only those forms of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a
statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it
was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the
operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation
of casinos.
Solicitor General v. Metro Manila Authority
Facts: Malapira complained to the Court that when he was stopped for an alleged
traffic violation, his driver's license was confiscated in Quezon City. The Caloocan-
Manila Drivers and Operators Association then sent a letter to the Court asking who
should enforce the decision in the above-mentioned case, whether they could seek
damages for confiscation of their driver's licenses, and where they should file their
complaints. Other letters were received by the Court complaining against the
confiscation of driver's licenses. Still another complaint was received by the Court
for removal of a front license plate and driver’s license. The traffic enforcers
invoked Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1988, of Mandaluyong, authorizing the
confiscation of driver's licenses and the removal of license plates of motor vehicles
for traffic violations, and a memorandum dated February 27, 1991, from the District
Commander of the Western Traffic District of the Philippine National Police,
authorizing such sanction under certain conditions. Director General Nazareno of
the Philippine National Police assured the Court in his own Comment that his office
had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked vehicles
and that he had in fact directed full compliance with the above-mentioned decision
in a memorandum, copy of which he attached, entitled Removal of Motor Vehicle
License Plates and dated February 28, 1991. Tano-an, on the other hand, argued
that the Gonong decision prohibited only the removal of license plates and not the
confiscation of driver's licenses. On May 24, 1990, the Metropolitan Manila
Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, authorizing itself "to detach the
license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila."
On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a resolution on Ord 11: sec 2 which allows the
Metropolitan Manila Authority, thru the Traffic Operation Center, is authorized to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/unattended/abandoned motor
vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila appears to
be in conflict with the decision of the Court in the case at bar, where it was held
that the license plates of motor vehicles may not be detached except only under
the conditions prescribed in LOI 43. Additionally, the Court has received several
complaints against the confiscation by police authorities of driver's licenses for
alleged traffic violations, which sanction is, according to the said decision, not
among those that may be imposed under PD 1605. Comments required.
MMA: defended the said ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to
the powers conferred upon it by EO 392. It particularly cited Section 2 thereof
vesting in the Council (its governing body) the responsibility among others of:
1. Formulation of policies on the delivery of basic services requiring coordination or
consolidation for the Authority; and 2. Promulgation of resolutions and other
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issuances of metropolitan wide application, approval of a code of basic services
requiring coordination, and exercise of its rule-making powers. The Authority
argued that there was no conflict between the decision and the ordinance because
the latter was meant to supplement and not supplant the latter. It stressed that the
decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence
of a valid law or ordinance, which was why Ordinance No. 11 was enacted. The
Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but
only in a direct action challenging its validity.
SolGen: the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid exercise
of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated
existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits,
the removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic
violations in Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged
impropriety of examining the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to
its validity.
On October 24, 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General submitted a motion for the
early resolution of the questioned sanctions, to remove once and for all the
uncertainty of their validity. A similar motion was filed by the Metropolitan Manila
Authority, which reiterated its contention that the incidents in question should be
dismissed because there was no actual case or controversy before the Court.
The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the
validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally.
That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be
relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present
controversy. The Solicitor General notes that the practices complained of have
created a great deal of confusion among motorists about the state of the law on the
questioned sanctions. More importantly, he maintains that these sanctions are
illegal, being violative of law and the Gonong decision, and should therefore be
stopped. We also note the disturbing report that one policeman who confiscated a
driver's license dismissed the Gonong decision as "wrong" and said the police would
not stop their "habit" unless they received orders "from the top." Regrettably, not
one of the complainants has filed a formal challenge to the ordinances, including
Monsanto and Trieste, who are lawyers and could have been more assertive of their
rights.
Issue: WON MMA Ord 11 and Mandaluyong Ord 7 are valid. NO.
 MMA sustains Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, under the specific
authority conferred upon it by EO 392, while Ordinance No. 7, Series of
1988, is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause embodied in
the LGC. It is not disputed that both measures were enacted to promote
the comfort and convenience of the public and to alleviate the worsening
traffic problems in Metropolitan Manila due in large part to violations of
traffic rules.
 valid delegation of legislative power: 1) the completeness of the statute
making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard.
 Under the first requirement, the statute must leave the legislature
complete in all its terms and provisions such that all the delegate will have
to do when the statute reaches it is to implement it. What only can be
delegated is not the discretion to determine what the law shall be but the
discretion to determine how the law shall be enforced. This has been done
in the case at bar.
 As a second requirement, the enforcement may be effected only in
accordance with a sufficient standard, the function of which is to map out
the boundaries of the delegate's authority and thus "prevent the
delegation from running riot." This requirement has also been met. It is
settled that the "convenience and welfare" of the public, particularly the
motorists and passengers in the case at bar, is an acceptable sufficient
standard to delimit the delegate's authority.
 But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative
power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such
delegated power. The measures in question are enactments of local
governments acting only as agents of the national legislature. Necessarily,
the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the will of their
principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before
us, we apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by
the accepted principles governing municipal corporations.
 Elliot: a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent
with public policy.
 Gonong decision: measures under consideration do not pass the first
criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is
PD 1605 which does not allow either the removal of license plates or the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in
Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the
decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the
Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions. In fact, the
provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan
Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise
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discipline" traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties
as are herein prescribed," that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the
removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or at least
allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof
expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license
shall not be confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the
Metropolitan Manila Authority and all other local political subdivisions
comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of
Mandaluyong.
 The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing
law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by
virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature (except only that the power to create their own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are
mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot
contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case
before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a
statute. The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which was enacted by
the Metropolitan Manila Authority, that authorizes the Metropolitan
Manila Authority to impose the questioned sanction.
 Villacorta vs, Bernardo: the Court nullified an ordinance enacted by the
Municipal Board of Dagupan City for being violative of the Land
Registration Act. The powers of the board in enacting such a laudable
ordinance cannot be held valid when it shall impede the exercise of rights
granted in a general law and/or make a general law subordinated to a local
ordinance.
 To sustain the ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other
ordinances amending and so violating national laws in the guise of
implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing additional
requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of
contracts, to forestall fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the
exercise of freedom of speech, to reduce disorder; and so on. The list is
endless, but the means, even if the end be valid, would be ultra vires.
 The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD
1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact
actually prohibits. In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in
effect partially repeal the law.
 We here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies
only to the Metropolitan Manila area. It is an exception to the general
authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the Commissioner of Land
Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the country
with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned.
Manila Electric Co. v. City of Manila
Facts: On October 20, 1902, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 484,
section 1 of which authorizes the City of Manila to grant to the "person or persons
making the most favorable bid, as hereinafter provided, a franchise to construct
and maintain in the streets of Manila and its suburbs an electric street railway and a
franchise to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light, heat, and power
system in the City of Manila and its suburbs." By virtue of said Act, the City of
Manila passed on March 24, 1903, Ordinance No. 44 granting the franchise to one
Charles M. Swift, as the highest bidder. Said Act No. 484 and Ordinance No. 44 were
later amended by Act No. 1112 and Ordinances Nos. 70, 71, 144, 167, 192, 272,
490, 903, 988, 1162, 1244 and 1476, which deal with the sale and transfer of the
franchise of the Compañia de Tranvias de Filipinas to the plaintiff in April, 1904.
On March 27, 1903, the plaintiff, then known as "Manila Railways and Light
Company", acquired the said franchise from Charles M. Swift, together with all the
rights, privileges and obligations appurtenant thereto. The plaintiff has since then
established electric car lines along certain streets of the City of Manila and suburbs,
which have now and then been altered with the express consent either of the City
of Manila or of the Philippine Legislature. As grantee of the franchise, the plaintiff
corporation agreed to pay, and has to date been paying, to the City of Manila, 2 1/2
per cent "of the fares collected and tickets sold within the limits of the City of
Manila, and the same percentage of fares collected and tickets sold without the
said limits to the proper municipality or municipalities of the Province of Rizal." In
1927, the plaintiff applied for and obtained from the Public Service Commission
certificates of public convenience to operate as it did in 1929, an autobus service
along the streets, districts and suburbs of the City of Manila, not covered by its
electric car lines. Alleging that these autobus service was included in the franchise
granted the plaintiff, under Ordinance No. 44, the defendant and appellee City of
Manila collected from the plaintiff — who had to pay under protest — a tax of 2 1/2
per cent of the fares collected and ticket sold in its autobus lines within the City of
Manila from April, 1929 to November, 1932, amounting to P43,868.06. The present
action was instituted to recover this tax.
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The plaintiff issues transfer tickets which entitle the holder of regular fare to
transfer from a street car to an autobus and vice-versa without extra charge,
although this privilege is not extended to zone fare passengers.
Issue: WON the autobus business of the plaintiff is included in the franchise granted
to it by Ordinance No. 44 of the City of Manila, and in case it is, if the defendant has
any right to collect the tax of 2 1/2 per cent from the fares collected and tickets sold
in the business, as prescribed in said ordinance.
 Section 2 of Act No. 1112, amending Ordinance No. 44 of the City of
Manila, inserted between paragraphs 2 and 3 of the first part of said
ordinance, the following paragraph 2 (a): The Manila Electric Railroad and
Light Company shall be authorized to make excavations and constructions
for the purposes prescribed in Part One of said Ordinance Numbered
Forty-four, upon such further streets, thoroughfares, bridges, and public
places within the City of Manila as may, from time to time, be approved by
the Municipal Board.
 The purpose of this legal provision authorizing the Manila Electric
Company to make excavations and constructions upon further streets,
thoroughfares, bridges, and public places within the City of Manila, is no
other than the construction and maintenance of a net of electric car lines.
This broadening of the authorization cannot be construed as permitting
the plaintiff to establish autobus lines along the streets of Manila and
suburbs, not specified in the original authorization, because, as we have
already said, the purpose of the additional authorization was to enable the
plaintiff to construct and maintain a net of electric car lines in other streets
of Manila. Furthermore, to establish autobus lines, it is not necessary to
make excavations upon the streets. This is only required when laying out
rails for electric cars.
 Neither the letter nor the spirit of the law, therefore, authorizes that the
franchise granted the plaintiff by the City of Manila be construed to include
the establishment of autobus lines.
 It is true that in the case of the City of Manila vs. Public Service
Commission, this court, interpreting paragraph 4 of Act No. 484, which
authorizes the plaintiff, by virtue of its franchise, to modify, improve or
change its system of electric railways such as the progress of science and
the development of motive power may make reasonable and proper, said
that the plaintiff might abandon the use of electric cars and substitute
autobusses in their stead, which is a better means of transportation, and
under the franchise, the grantee is authorized to make improvements in its
system, with the approval of the City of Manila. That case dealt with the
substitution of autobus lines along the same streets and public
thoroughfares where electric car lines already existed. It was not the
intention of this court, and it has not so declared, that the Manila Electric
Company cannot establish autobus lines along streets and public
thoroughfares where electric railways have not yet been established.
 When public convenience so requires, the Philippine Legislature can
authorize other transportation companies to use the streets and public
thoroughfares where the Manila Electric Company has not established
electric railways, nor signified its intention to do so, since such
authorization does not violate the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's
franchise. Impliedly, this was done, when it created the office of the Public
Service Commission charged with the task of looking after the comfort of
the public as regards transportation, with power to grant a certificate of
public convenience to a company desiring to operate a passenger
transportation service, when, in its judgment, it will serve the interest of
the public. Like any other company engaged in passenger transportation,
the Manila Electric Company has the right to secure from the Public Service
Commission a certificate of public convenience authorizing it to establish
autobus lines for public transportation. This means of transportation being
distinct and different from the one authorized under the franchise granted
to it, the Manila Electric Company is not controlled is not controlled by that
franchise with respect to its autobus service, but by the law that regulate
the operation of land transportation companies rendering service to the
public. Neither can it be compelled to pay to the City of Manila the tax of 2
1/2 per cent of the fares collected and tickets sold within the city limits for
using autobusses, which have no relation at all with its electric railways
already existing or yet to be established. The fact that the Manila Electric
Company issues transfer ticket which permit purchasers of regular fares
(not zone fares) coming from outside the City of Manila, to transfer from a
street car to an autobus, and vice-versa, does not make plaintiff's autobus
system a part of its railway system since such issuance of transfer tickets is
only accident and not essential in the operation of its railway system
established under the authority of its franchise.
Laguna Lake Development Authority v. CA
Facts: RA 4850 was enacted creating the LLDA to carry out environmental
protection and ecology, navigational safety, and sustainable development. PD 813
amended the RA because of the concern for the rapid expansion of Metropolitan
Manila, the suburbs and the lakeshore towns of Laguna de Bay, combined with
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current and prospective uses of the lake for municipal-industrial water supply,
irrigation, fisheries, and the like. To more effectively perform the role of the
Authority, EO 927 further defined and enlarged the functions and powers of the
Authority and named and enumerated the towns, cities and provinces
encompassed by the term "Laguna de Bay Region". Section 29 of PD 813 defined
the term "Laguna Lake" in this manner: Whenever Laguna Lake or lake is used in
this Act, the same shall refer to Laguna de Bay which is that area covered by the
lake water when it is at the average annual maximum lake level of elevation 12.50
meters, as referred to a datum 10.00 meters below mean lower low water
(M.L.L.W). Lands located at and below such elevation are public lands which form
part of the bed of said lake.Then came Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991. The
municipalities in the Laguna Lake Region interpreted the provisions of this law to
mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive
jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters because of R.A.
7160. Municipal governments thereupon assumed the authority to issue fishing
privileges and fishpen permits. Big fishpen operators took advantage of the
occasion to establish fishpens and fishcages to the consternation of the Authority.
Unregulated fishpens and fishcages, as of July, 1995, occupied almost one-third of
the entire lake water surface area, increasing the occupation drastically from 7,000
hectares in 1990 to almost 21,000 hectares in 1995. The Mayor's permit to
construct fishpens and fishcages were all undertaken in violation of the policies
adopted by the Authority on fishpen zoning and the Laguna Lake carrying capacity.
To be sure, the implementation by the lakeshore municipalities of separate
independent policies in the operation of fishpens and fishcages within their claimed
territorial municipal waters in the lake and their indiscriminate grant of fishpen
permits have already saturated the lake area with fishpens, thereby aggravating the
current environmental problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake. Ramos then
issued instructions that all structures in the LdB not registered with the LLDA are
illegal. Reacting thereto, the affected fishpen owners filed injunction cases against
the Authority before various RTCs. The Authority filed motions to dismiss the cases
against it on jurisdictional grounds. The motions to dismiss were invariably denied.
Meanwhile, temporary restraining order/writs of preliminary mandatory injunction
were issued in Civil Cases Nos. 64124, 759 and 566 enjoining the Authority from
demolishing the fishpens and similar structures in question.
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction, G.R. Nos.
120865-71, were filed by the Authority with this court. CA: dismissed the
Authority's consolidated petitions, the Court of Appeals holding that: (A) LLDA is not
among those quasi-judicial agencies of government whose decision or order are
appealable only to the Court of Appeals; (B) the LLDA charter does vest LLDA with
quasi-judicial functions insofar as fishpens are concerned; (C) the provisions of the
LLDA charter insofar as fishing privileges in Laguna de Bay are concerned had been
repealed by the LGC of 1991; (D) in view of the aforesaid repeal, the power to grant
permits devolved to and is now vested with their respective local government units
concerned.
Issue: Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority
or the towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise
jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishery privileges is concerned?
 Section 4 (k) of the charter of the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
Republic Act No. 4850, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 813, and
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 927, cited above, specifically provide that
the Laguna Lake Development Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water for any projects or activities in
or affecting the said region, including navigation, construction, and
operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like. On the
other hand, Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of 1991, has granted to the
municipalities the exclusive authority to grant fishery privileges in
municipal waters. The Sangguniang Bayan may grant fishery privileges to
erect fish corrals, oyster, mussels or other aquatic beds or bangus fry area
within a definite zone of the municipal waters.
 We hold that the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160 do not necessarily
repeal the aforementioned laws creating the Laguna Lake Development
Authority and granting the latter water rights authority over Laguna de Bay
and the lake region.
 The LGC of 1991 does not contain any express provision which
categorically expressly repeal the charter of the Authority. It has to be
conceded that there was no intent on the part of the legislature to repeal
Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendments. The repeal of laws should be
made clear and expressed.
 It has to be conceded that the charter of the Laguna Lake Development
Authority constitutes a special law. Republic Act No. 7160, the LGC of
1991, is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the
enactment of a later legislation which is a general law cannot be construed
to have repealed a special law. It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction
that "a special statute, provided for a particular case or class of cases, is
not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and
application, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the
terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced
in the special law."
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 Where there is a conflict between a general law and a special statute, the
special statute should prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more
clearly than the general statute. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion. This is because implied repeals are not
favored and as much as possible, effect must be given to all enactments of
the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication. Thus, it has to be concluded
that the charter of the Authority should prevail over the LGC of 1991.
 Considering the reasons behind the establishment of the Authority, which
are environmental protection, navigational safety, and sustainable
development, there is every indication that the legislative intent is for the
Authority to proceed with its mission.
 We are on all fours with the manifestation of petitioner Laguna Lake
Development Authority that "Laguna de Bay, like any other single body of
water has its own unique natural ecosystem. The 900 km² lake surface
water, the eight (8) major river tributaries and several other smaller rivers
that drain into the lake, the 2,920 km² basin or watershed transcending the
boundaries of Laguna and Rizal provinces, greater portion of Metro Manila,
parts of Cavite, Batangas, and Quezon provinces, constitute one integrated
delicate natural ecosystem that needs to be protected with uniform set of
policies; if we are to be serious in our aims of attaining sustainable
development. This is an exhaustible natural resource — a very limited one
— which requires judicious management and optimal utilization to ensure
renewability and preserve its ecological integrity and balance." "Managing
the lake resources would mean the implementation of a national policy
geared towards the protection, conservation, balanced growth and
sustainable development of the region with due regard to the inter-
generational use of its resources by the inhabitants in this part of the
earth. The authors of Republic Act 4850 have foreseen this need when
they passed this LLDA law — the special law designed to govern the
management of our Laguna de Bay lake resources." "Laguna de Bay
therefore cannot be subjected to fragmented concepts of management
policies where lakeshore local government units exercise exclusive
dominion over specific portions of the lake water. The garbage thrown or
sewage discharged into the lake, abstraction of water therefrom or
construction of fishpens by enclosing its certain area, affect not only that
specific portion but the entire 900 km² of lake water. The implementation
of a cohesive and integrated lake water resource management policy,
therefore, is necessary to conserve, protect and sustainably develop
Laguna de Bay."
 The power of the local government units to issue fishing privileges was
clearly granted for revenue purposes. This is evident from the fact that
Section 149 of the New LGC empowering local governments to issue
fishing permits is embodied in Chapter 2, Book II, of Republic Act No. 7160
under the heading, "Specific Provisions On The Taxing And Other Revenue
Raising Power Of Local Government Units."
 On the other hand, the power of the Authority to grant permits for
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures is for the purpose of
effectively regulating and monitoring activities in the Laguna de Bay region
(Section 2, Executive Order No. 927) and for lake quality control and
management. 6 It does partake of the nature of police power which is the
most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of all State
powers including the power of taxation. Accordingly, the charter of the
Authority which embodies a valid exercise of police power should prevail
over the LGC of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
 There should be no quarrel over permit fees for fishpens, fishcages and
other aqua-culture structures in the Laguna de Bay area. Section 3 of
Executive Order No. 927 provides for the proper sharing of fees collected.
**LLDA: regulatory and quasi-judicial body in respect to pollution cases with
authority to issue a "cease and desist order" and on matters affecting the
construction of illegal fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures in
Laguna de Bay. The Authority's pretense, however, that it is co-equal to the
Regional Trial Courts such that all actions against it may only be instituted before
the Court of Appeals cannot be sustained. On actions necessitating the resolution of
legal questions affecting the powers of the Authority as provided for in its charter,
the Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction.
 Section 149 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the LGC of 1991,
has not repealed the provisions of the charter of the Laguna Lake
Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended. Thus, the
Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment
of fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities
situated therein and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its
charter vested on it. Removal from the Authority of the aforesaid licensing
authority will render nugatory its avowed purpose of protecting and
developing the Laguna Lake Region. Otherwise stated, the abrogation of
this power would render useless its reason for being and will in effect
denigrate, if not abolish, the Laguna Lake Development Authority. This, the
LGC of 1991 had never intended to do.
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Mondano v. Silvosa
Facts: Mosende filed a complaint against Mondano, mayor of the municipality of
Mainit, province of Surigao with the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee
accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter Caridad Mosende; and (2)
concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the conjugal
dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to
the respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action
and report. On 10 April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in
obedience to his summons and was served with a copy of the complaint filed by the
provincial governor with provincial board. On the same day, the provincial governor
issued AO 8 suspending the petitioner from office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board
proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin
the respondents from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative
case against him and for a declaration that the order of suspension issued by the
respondent provincial governor is illegal and without legal effect. On 4 May 1954
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after filing and approval of
a bond for P500.
Issue: WON the provincial governor may issue an order of suspension.
 Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be
provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Under
this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the
power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but
not of all local governments over which he has been granted only the
power of general supervision as may be provided by law.
 The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided
for in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, but he does not
have the same control of local governments as that exercised by him over
bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order
the investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any
bureau or office under his department is confined to bureaus or offices
under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local governments over
which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision
as may be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code are to be construed as conferring upon the
corresponding department head direct control, direction, and supervision
over all local governments and that for the reason he may order the
investigation of an official of a local government for malfeasance in office,
such interpretation would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1,
section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all
local governments" is to be construed as the same power granted to the
Department Head in section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code,
then there would no longer be a distinction or difference between the
power of control and that of supervision.
 In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. Such is the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of
the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No. 4007. The Congress has
expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and
investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for
neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration
of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges
touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such
charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he may
in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting
the official integrity of the officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised
Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be
exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . .
municipalities . . .. If it be construed that it does and such additional power
is the same authority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79
(c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power must
be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the
Constitution.
 Lacson vs. Roque: the power of the President to remove officials from
office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code
must be done "conformably to law;" and only for disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines he "may at any time remove a person from any position
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of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands)
Philippines." Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably
to law.
 In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive
Secretary requested immediate investigation, appropriate action and
report on the complaint indorsed to him, and called his attention to
section 2193 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for the
institution of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of
the provincial governor. If the indorsement of the Assistant Executive
Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial governor to
investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the
Executive, but the investigation to be conducted by him would not be that
which is provided for in sections 2188, 2189 and 2190 of the Revised
Administrative Code. The charges preferred against the respondent are not
malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of
the Revised Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have
nothing to do with the performance of his duties as mayor nor do they
constitute or involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any other
form of maladministration of office." True, they may involve moral
turpitude, but before the provincial governor and board may act and
proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by
the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even
the provincial fiscal cannot file an information for rape without a sworn
complaint of the offended party who is 28 years of age and the crime of
concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the
offended spouse.4 The charges preferred against the petitioner, municipal
mayor of Mainit, province of Surigao, not being those or any of those
specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
investigation of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and
illegal. The suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of
Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and without authority of law.
Hebron v. Reyes
Facts: In the general elections held in 1951, petitioner Bernardo Hebron, a member
of the Liberal Party, and respondent Eulalio D. Reyes, of the Nacionalista Party,
were elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of said municipality, for a term of
four (4) years, beginning from January 1, 1952, on which date they presumably
assumed the aforementioned offices. Petitioner discharged the duties and functions
of mayor continuously until May 22 or 24, 1954, when he received communication
that the President has decided to assume directly the investigation to the
administrative charges against him for alleged oppression, grave abuse of authority
and serious misconduct in office, and has designated the Provincial Fiscal of that
province as Special Investigator of the said charges. Hebron was also suspended
from office. The Vice-Mayor was directed to assume the office of Acting Mayor.
Thereupon, Reyes acted as mayor of Carmona and the Provincial Fiscal of Cavite
investigated the charges. After holding hearings in connection with said charges,
the provincial fiscal submitted his report thereon on July 15, 1954. Since then the
matter has been pending in the Office of the President for decision. Inasmuch as
the same did not appear to be forthcoming, and the term of petitioner, who
remained suspended, was about to expire, on May 13, 1955, he instituted the
present action for quo warranto, upon the ground that respondent was illegally
holding the Office of Mayor of Carmona, and had unlawfully refused and still
refused to surrender said office to petitioner, who claimed to be entitled thereto.
Respondent and the Solicitor General, who was allowed to intervene, filed their
respective answers admitting substantially the main allegations of fact in
petitioner's complaint, but denying the alleged illegality of petitioner's suspension
and alleging that respondent was holding the office of the mayor in compliance
with a valid and lawful order of the President. Owing to the nature and importance
of the issue thus raised, Dean Vicente G. Sinco of the College of Law, University of
the Philippines, and Professor Enrique M. Fernando, were allowed to intervene as
amici curiae. At the hearing of this case, the parties, as well as the Solicitor General
and said amici curiae, appeared and argued extensively. Subsequently, they filed
their respective memoranda, and, on September 2, 1955, the case became
submitted for decision. The case could not be disposed of, however, before the
close of said year, because the members of this Court could not, within the
unexpired portion thereof, reach an agreement on the decision thereon. Although
the term of office of petitioner herein expired on December 31, 1955, his claim to
the Office of Mayor of Carmona, Cavite, has not thereby become entirely moot, as
regards such rights as may have accrued to him prior thereto. For this reason, and,
also, because the question of law posed in the pleadings, concerns a vital feature of
the relations between the national government and the local governments, and the
Court has been led to believe that the parties, specially the executive department,
are earnestly interested in a clear-cut settlement of said question, for the same will,
otherwise, continue to be a constant source of friction, disputes and litigations to
the detriment of the smooth operation of the Government and of the welfare of
the people, the members of this Court deem it necessary to express their view
thereon, after taking ample time to consider and discuss full every conceivable
aspect thereof.
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Issue: WON a municipal mayor, not charged with disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines, may be removed or suspended directly by the President of the
Philippines, regardless of the procedure set forth in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code.
 under the present law, the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191
of the Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of the
municipal officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of
a clear and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to
municipal corporations — and none has been cited to us — said procedure
is exclusive; that the executive department of the national government, in
the exercise of its general supervision over local governments, may
conduct investigations with a view to determining whether municipal
officials are guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative action
referred to in said sections, as a means only to ascertain whether the
provincial governor and the provincial board should take such action; that
the Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial
governor and the provincial board to take said action, if the same is
warranted, and they failed to do so
 the provincial governor and the provincial board may not be deprived by
the Executive of the power to exercise the authority conferred upon them
in sections 2188 to 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code; that such
would be the effect of the assumption of those powers by the Executive;
that said assumption of powers would further violate section 2191 of the
same code, for the authority therein vested in the Executive is merely
appellate in character; that, said assumption of powers, in the case at bar,
even exceeded those of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in
whom original jurisdiction is vested by said sections 2188 to 2190, for,
pursuant thereto, "the preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall
not be for more than 30 days" at the expiration of which he shall be
reinstated, unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to his fault,
neglect or request, or unless he shall have meanwhile been convicted,
whereas petitioner herein was suspended "until the final determination of
the proceedings" against him, regardless of the duration thereof and cause
of the delay in its disposition;11 and that so much of the rule laid down in
Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior (67 Phil., 451) Villena vs. Roque (93
Phil., 363), as may be inconsistent with the foregoing views, should be
deemed, and, are hereby, reversed or modified accordingly.
Ganzon v. Kayanan
Facts: On August 25, 1956, Rosales lodged a verified complaint against Ganzon for
taking advantage of his public position. On September 13, 1956, the Executive
Secretary, by authority of the President, designated Kayanan to conduct the
investigation of said complaint pursuant to the provisions of Section 64(c) of the
RAC granting Kayanan all the powers given to an investigating officer by Sections 71
and 580 of the same Code. On September 18, 1956, respondent served a copy of
the complaint on petitioner and set the investigation of the charges on September
20, 1956. Petitioner, having filed a motion for postponement, respondent definitely
set the investigation for September 25 and 26, 1956. On September 24, 1956,
Ganzon instituted in the CFI an action for prohibition with preliminary injunction
questioning the authority of the President to order his investigation and praying
that respondent be enjoined to suspend and desist from proceeding with the
investigation and that, pending decision of the case on the merits, a preliminary
injunction be issued against respondent. On September 26, 1956, the lower court
declined to issue the writ and instead set the case for hearing on the merits on
September 28, 1956. At the hearing, both parties agreed to admit all the facts set
forth in the pleadings and submitted the case for decision. And on October 2, 1956,
the lower court rendered decision dismissing the petition. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner took the present appeal.
Issues: 1. WON the President of the Philippines has the power and authority under
our Constitution and the laws at present in force in this jurisdiction to investigate
the mayor of a city and, if found guilty, to take disciplinary action against him as the
evidence and law may warrant.
 Iloilo charter does not contain any provision as regards the procedure by
which he may be removed. Nevertheless, as this Court has once said, "the
rights, duties, and privileges of municipal officers (including city officials)
do not have to be embodied in the charter, but may be regulated by
provisions of general application specially if these are incorporated in the
same code of which the city organic law forms a part". The code herein
referred to is the Revised Administrative Code. The charter does not say
that he shall hold office at the pleasure of the President unlike similar
provisions appearing in other city charters. The idea is to give the mayor a
definite tenure of office not dependent upon the pleasure of the President.
If this were the case, he could be separated from the service regardless of
the cause or motive. But when he was given a definite tenure, the
implication is that he can only be removed for cause. An inferential
authority to remove at pleasure can not be deduced, since the existence of
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a defined term, ipso facto, negatives such an inference, and implies a
contrary presumption, i.e. that the incumbent shall hold office to the end
of his term subject to removal for cause.'
 64(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare
vacant the offices held by such removed officials. For disloyalty to the
(United States), the Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-General)
President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any
position of trust or authority under the Government of the (Philippine
Islands) Philippines. (c) To order, when in his opinion the good of the public
services requires, an investigation of any action or the conduct of any
person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official, committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted.
 SEC. 10. (1) The President shall have control of an the executive
departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.
 It may clearly be inferred from the above that the President may remove
any official in the government service "conformably to law" and to declare
vacant the office held by the removed official. And to this end, the
President may order "an investigation of any action or the conduct of any
person in the Government service, and in connection therewith to
designate the official committee, or person by whom such investigation
shall be conducted." Note that the provision refers to any official in the
government service, which must necessarily include the mayor of a
chartered city. It cannot therefore be disputed that in the particular case
under consideration the President is vested with the authority to order the
investigation of petitioner when in his opinion the good of the public
service so requires, and such being the case, petitioner cannot now
contend that the designation of respondent as the official to investigate
him in connection with the charges lodged against him by Rosales has been
done without the authority of law. This of course is upon the premise that
the charges involved in the investigation refer to those for which petitioner
may be suspended or removed under the law, a question which we will
take up later in this decision.
 Mondano v. Silvosa on Supervision v. Control. From distinction, it cannot
be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President over
local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as
postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code.
 Hebron v. Reyes: the procedure prescribed in sections 2188 to 2191 of the
Revised Administrative Code, for the suspension and removal of municipal
officials therein referred to, is mandatory; that, in the absence of a clear
and explicit provision to the contrary, relative particularly to municipal
corporations — and none has been cited to us — said procedure is
exclusive; that the executive department of the national government, in
the exercise of its general supervision over local government, may conduct
investigations with a view to determining whether municipal officials are
guilty of acts or omissions warranting the administrative action referred to
in said sections, as a means only to ascertain whether the provincial
governor and the provincial board should take such action; that the
Executive may take appropriate measures to compel the provincial
governor and the provincial board to take said action, if the same is
warranted, and they failed to do so; that the provincial governor and the
provincial board may not be deprived by the Executive of the power to
exercise the authority conferred upon them in sections 2188 to 2190 of the
Revised Administrative Code; that such would be the effect of the
assumption those powers by the Executive; that said assumption of
powers would further violate section 2191 of the same Code, for the
authority therein vested in the Executive is merely appellate in character;
that, said assumption of powers, in the case at bar, even exceeded those
of the Provincial Governor and Provincial Board, in whom original
jurisdiction is vested by said sections 2188 to 2190, for, pursuant thereto,
"the preventive suspension of a municipal officer shall not be for more
than thirty (30) days," at the expiration of which he shall be reinstated,
unless the delay in the decision of the case is due to his fault, neglect or
request, or unless he shall have meanwhile been convicted, whereas
petitioner herein was suspended "until the final determination of the
proceedings" against him, regardless of the of the duration thereof and the
cause of the delay in its disposition and that so much of the rule laid down
in Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior and Villena vs. Roque, as may be
inconsistent with the foregoing views, should be deemed, and, are hereby
reversed or modified accordingly.
2. For what cause or causes may the President order the investigation of
petitioner "conformably to law?
 Lacson vs. Roque: Considering that the position of mayor of a chartered
city may be fairly compared in category and stature with that of a
provincial governor, we are of the opinion that the former, by analogy,
may also be amenable to removal and suspension for the same causes as
the latter, which causes, under Section 2078 of the Revised Administrative
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Code, are: disloyalty, dishonesty, oppression and misconduct in office. And
considering the allegations in the complaint to the effect that petitioner
took advantage of his public position as mayor of Iloilo City in committing
the acts of violence and intimidation upon respondent in order to stop the
radio program he was then conducting in his station thus suppressing and
curtailing his right to free speech, we are of the opinion that said acts
constitute misconduct in office for which he may be ordered investigated
by the President within the meaning of the law. There is therefore no
plausible reason to disturb the decision rendered by the lower court which
we find to be in accordance with law.
Ganzon v. CA (supra, see p. 203)
Taule v. Santos
Facts: On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC)
of Catanduanes, composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents
of the Association of Barangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened
in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in attendance for the purpose of holding
the election of its officers. Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel,
Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of Virac, Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of
Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer
(PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A.
Manlapaz, Jr. and Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members.
When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its
members, the Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked
out. The election nevertheless proceeded. On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I.
Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. Santos, the
Secretary of Local Government, protesting the election of the officers of the FABC
and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it
was conducted. In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner
Ruperto Taule as President of the FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of
respondent Governor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said
respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election of FABC officers
which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his
appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being
the duly elected President of the FABC in Catanduanes. On August 4, 1989,
respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the
FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be
conducted as early as possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V
of the Department of Local Government. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied by respondent
Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989. In the petition for certiorari before
Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent Secretary dated
August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Issues: 1. WON the Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay
Councils.
 It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly
empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers.
19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon
the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer
it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations. There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision
expressly or even by necessary implication conferring upon the Secretary
of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election
protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An
understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over local
governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand.
 Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to
the exercise of general supervision "to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law." The general supervision is exercised by the
President through the Secretary of Local Government.
 In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or
modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for
that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to
wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local
government or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of
their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the
power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any
restraining authority over such body.
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 Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general
supervision of the President over local governments, We hold that
respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow
respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or
the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local
government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely
democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay
as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of
fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections
to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct
interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays
which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general
supervision over local governments.
 Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local
governments. This state policy is echoed in the Local Government Code
wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and social progress." To deny the
Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of the
elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed
state policy of promoting the autonomy of local governments.
 Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its
authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of
such issuances. To monitor means "to watch, observe or check. This is
compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local
governments which as earlier discussed is limited to checking whether the
local government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their
duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government
Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars,
rules and regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be
enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and
not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce
compliance with the DLG Circular. Any doubt therefore as to the power of
the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of
the greater autonomy of the local government.
 Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election
protest filed by respondent Governor and declaring the election of the
officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the respondent
Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not
having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the
FABC, the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional
Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the protest. 33
 The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09
which states that "whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied
with, the election shall be declared null and void by the Department of
Local Government and an election shall conduct and being invoked by the
Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on
July 3, 1989 after the June 18, 1989 elections of the FABC officers and it is
the rule in statutory construction that laws, including circulars and
regulations 34 cannot be applied retrospectively. Moreover, such provision
is null and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent
Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch as an administrative authority cannot
confer jurisdiction upon itself.
2. WON the Governor has the legal personality to file an election protest
 The Court finds that respondent Governor has the personality to file the
protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the
membership of the sangguniang panlalawigan consists of the governor, the
vice-governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents
of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial
federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan. As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the
respondent governor has an interest in the election of the officers of the
FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If the
president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable
circumstances and is allowed to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan the
official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to attacks as to their
validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to
question the regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
3. Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election
protest, WON he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction in nullifying the election
 As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that
the respondent Secretary has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify
the elections. Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of
the elections should now be resolved in order to prevent any unnecessary
delay that may result from the commencement of an appropriate action by
the parties.
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 The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply
with Section 2.4 of DLG Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the
incumbent FABC President or the Vice-President shall preside over the
reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule specifically
provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President who
shall preside over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its
ordinary signification, i.e., it must be imperative or mandatory and not
merely permissive, 37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other
interpretation. If it had been intended that any other official should
preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in the elections at the
town and city levels 38 as well as the regional level.. 39
 It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-
President presided over the meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina,
Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants. Thus,
there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On this
ground, the elections should be nullified.
 Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of
Election Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or
witness the canvassing of votes and proclamation of winners. The rules
confine the role of the Board of Election Supervisors/Consultants to merely
overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. This is consistent with
the provision in the Local Government Code limiting the authority of the
COMELEC to the supervision of the election.
 In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the
elections. There was direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in
the elections contrary to what is dictated by the rules. Worse, there was
no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of the
walk out staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC
Supervisor and the Provincial Treasurer. The objective of keeping the
election free and honest was therefore compromised.
 The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on
June 18, 1989 is null and void for failure to comply with the provisions of
DLG Circular No. 89-09.
 Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a
supplemental petition alleging that public respondent Local Government
Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated Augusto
Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to the sangguniang
panlalawigan of Catanduanes. By virtue of this memorandum, respondent
governor swore into said office Augusto Antonio on June 14, 1990.
 The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition 43 as
required by the resolution of the Court dated September 13,1990. In his
comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged
by petitioner as something immaterial to the petition. He argues that
Antonio's appointment was merely temporary "until such time that the
provincial FABC president in that province has been elected, appointed and
qualified." 44 He stresses that Antonio's appointment was only a remedial
measure designed to cope with the problems brought about by the
absence of a representative of the FABC to the "sanggunian ang
panlalawigan."
 Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides- (2) The
sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vice-
governor, elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of
the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial
federation who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.
 Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states: The sangguniang
panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the governor as
chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding officer pro
tempore, the elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the
appointive members consisting of the president of the provincial
association of barangay councils, and the president of the provincial
federation of the kabataang barangay.
 In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr. 45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded
provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the
composition of the sangguniang panlungsod, 46 declared as null and void
the appointment of private respondent Leoncio Banate Jr. as member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the
katipunang panlungsod ng mga barangay for he lacked the elegibility and
qualification required by law, not being a barangay captain and for not
having been elected president of the association of barangay councils. The
Court held that an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of
the sanggunian, even in an acting capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer, 47 the
appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as representative of the youth sector
to the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he
was never the president of the kabataang barangay city federation as
required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337.
 In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the
law is likewise explicit. To be appointed by the President of the Philippines
to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the president of the katipunang
panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by law. 48
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The appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as
to the basic qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang
panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or his alter ego, the
Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who
does not meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the
federation of barangay councils.
 Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of
the federation but he was not even present during the elections despite
notice. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a remedial measure
in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not
meet the basic qualification of being president of the federation, his
appointment to the sangguniang panlalawigan is not justified
notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary capacity.
If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of
the federation in the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent
FABC President in a hold-over capacity. For even under the guidelines, the
term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be from the
date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected
and qualified, without prejudice to the terms of their appointments as
members of the sanggunian to which they may be correspondingly
appointed. Since the election is still under protest such that no successor
of the incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no
choice but to have the incumbent FABC President sit as member of the
sanggunian. He could even have appointed petitioner since he was elected
the president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of
Antonio, allegedly the protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to
petitioner's charge of political interference by respondent Governor in the
organization. This should not be allowed. The barangays should be
insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give
true meaning to local autonomy.
Carpio v. Executive Secretary
Facts: Republic Act No. 6975 entitled "AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" was enacted. Carpio assails said
RA’s constitutionality. But in an en banc resolution dated December 27, 1990, th SC
simply required the public respondents to file their Comment, without however
giving due course to the petition and the prayer therein. Hence, the Act took effect
after fifteen days following its publication, or on January 1, 1991.
Issue: WON RA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its
power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus,
"control" remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National
Police Commission and the PNP were placed. NO.
 the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices to lay at rest petitioner's contention on the matter. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all
executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk 17 and has
been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 18 to mean
"the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said to
be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." Equally well
accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the
"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time and in person,
he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
 Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases
where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in
person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally,
the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and
the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive." Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly
exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his
authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department."
 Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are
placed under the reorganized Department of Interior and Local
Government is merely an administrative realignment that would bolster a
system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety
agencies created under the assailed Act, 24 the funding of the PNP being in
large part subsidized by the national government. Such organizational set-
up does not detract from the mandate of the Constitution that the national
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police force shall be administered and controlled by a national police
commission as at any rate, and in fact, the Act in question adequately
provides for administration and control at the commission level.
 Petitioner further asserts that in manifest derogation of the power of
control of the NAPOLCOM over the PNP, RA 6975 vested the power to
choose the PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police in the
Governors and Mayors, respectively; the power of "operational supervision
and control" over police units in city and municipal mayors; in the Civil
Service Commission, participation in appointments to the positions of
Senior Superintendent to Deputy Director-General as well as the
administration of qualifying entrance examinations; disciplinary powers
over PNP members in the "People's Law Enforcement Boards" and in city
and municipal mayors.
 Once more, we find no real controversy upon the foregoing assertions. It is
true that when the Constitutional Commissioners of 1986 provided that
the authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law, they intended that the day-to-day functions of
police work like crime, investigation, crime prevention activities, traffic
control, etc., would be under the operational control of the local
executives as it would not be advisable to give full control of the police to
the local executives. They reasoned that in the past, this gave rise to
warlordism, bossism, and sanctuaries for vices and abuses.
 It would appear then that by vesting in the local executives the power to
choose the officers in question, the Act went beyond the bounds of the
Constitution's intent. Not so. We find light in the principle of constitutional
construction that every presumption should be indulged in favor of
constitutionality and the court in considering the validity of the statute in
question should give it such reasonable construction as can be reached to
bring it within the fundamental law.
 \We agree, and so hold, with the view of the Solicitor General that "there
is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section
51 because under this very same provision, it is clear that the local
executives are only acting as representatives of the NAPOLCOM. . . . As
such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in
the exercise of their functions under that section. Thus, unless
countermanded by the NAPOLCOM, their acts are valid and binding as acts
of the NAPOLCOM." It is significant to note that the local officials, as
NAPOLCOM representatives, will choose the officers concerned from a list
of eligibles (those who meet the general qualifications for appointment to
the PNP) to be recommended by PNP officials. The same holding is true
with respect to the contention on the operational supervision and control
exercised by the local officials. Those officials would simply be acting as
representatives of the Commission.
 The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law
Enforcement Boards" (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is also
not in derogation of the commission's power of control over the PNP.
Pursuant to the Act, the Commission exercises appellate jurisdiction, thru
the regional appellate boards, over decisions of both the PLEB and the said
mayors. This is so under Section 20(c). Furthermore, it is the Commission
which shall issue the implementing guidelines and procedures to be
adopted by the PLEB for in the conduct of its hearings, and it may assign
NAPOLCOM hearing officers to act as legal consultants of the PLEBs. As a
disciplinary board primarily created to hear and decide citizen's complaints
against erring officers and members of the PNP, the establishment of
PLEBs in every city, and municipality would all the more help
professionalize the police force.
 Sec 12 gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national
police force does not fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the
President. This is necessarily so since the police force, not being integrated
with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. As a
civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject
to, the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.
 Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-
chief powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during
which the national police would gradually assume the civilian function of
safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the
President, to repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to
here state, in reiteration of the preponderant view, that the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed Forces. He remains a
civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision "represent
only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions
are clearly civil in nature." 31 His position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief
is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional principle that
"civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article II,
Section 3, 1987 Constitution)
 Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight
Committee" under Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of
some legislators as members (namely: the respective Chairmen of the
Committee on Local Government and the Committee on National Defense
and Security in the Senate, and the respective Chairmen of the Committee
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on Public Order and Security and the Committee on National Defense in
the House of Representatives) is an "unconstitutional encroachment upon
and a diminution of, the President's power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices."
 But there is not the least interference with the President's power of
control under Section 84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad
hoc or transitory body, established and tasked solely with planning and
overseeing the immediate "transfer, merger and/or absorption" into the
Department of the Interior and Local Governments of the "involved
agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with the phases of
implementation already laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once this is
carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease
altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it
exercises, decidedly do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution
of the power of control which properly belongs to the President. What is
more, no executive department, bureau or office is placed under the
control or authority, of the committee.
Drilon v. Lim (supra, see p. 76)
Bito-Onon v. Fernandez
Facts: Joel Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Tacras,
Narra, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of
Narra, Palawan. The private respondent, Elegio Quejano, Jr. on the other hand, is
the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is
the Municipal Liga Chapter President for the Municipality of Magsaysay, Palawan.
Both Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive Vice-
President in the August 23, 1997 election for the Liga ng Barangay Provincial
Chapter of the province of Palawan. Onon was proclaimed the winning candidate in
the said election prompting Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the
Board of Election Supervisors (BES), which was decided against him on August 25,
1997. Not satisfied with the decision of the BES, Quejano filed a Petition for Review
of the decision of the BES with the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City (RTC). On April 26, 1999, Onon filed a motion to dismiss the Petition
for Review raising the issue of jurisdiction. Onon claimed that the RTC had no
jurisdiction to review the decisions rendered by the BES in any post proclamation
electoral protest in connection with the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election of
officers and directors. In his motion to dismiss, Onon claimed that the Supplemental
Guidelines for the 1997 Liga ng mga Barangay election issued by the DILG on August
11, 1997 in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions
or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an ultra vires act and is void
for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act
of supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Liga's internal organization.
On June 22, 1999, the RTC denied Onon's motion to dismiss. In its order, the RTC
ratiocinated that the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government2 is vested with the power "to establish and prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision
of local government units and the promotion of local autonomy and monitor
compliance thereof by said units."3 The RTC added that DILG Circular No. 97-193
was issued by the DILG Secretary pursuant to his rule-making power as provided for
under Section 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the Administrative Code.4 Consequently, the
RTC ruled that it had jurisdiction over the petition for review filed by Quejada.
Motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was denied prompting the
petitioner to file the present petition.
Issue: WON the questioned provision in the MC was issued by the DILG secretary in
excess of his authority.
 The resolution of the present controversy requires an examination of the
questioned provision of Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and the
Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the 1997 General Elections of the
Liga ng mga Barangay Officers and Directors (Guidelines). The
memorandum circular reads, insofar as pertinent, as follows: "Any post-
proclamation protest must be filed with the BES within twenty-four (24)
hours from the closing of the election. The BES shall decide the same
within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof. The decision of the BES
shall be final and immediately executory without prejudice to the filing of a
Petition for Review with the regular courts of law."
 On the other hand, the GUIDELINES provides that the BES shall have the
following among its duties: "To resolve any post-proclamation electoral
protest which must be submitted in writing to this Board within twenty-
four (24) hours from the close of election; provided said Board shall render
its decision within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof; and provided
further that the decision must be submitted to the National Liga
Headquarters within twenty-four (24) hours from the said decision. The
decision of the Board of Election Supervisors in this respect shall be subject
to review by the National Liga Board the decision of which shall be final
and executory."
 Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary
pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all local
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government units which was delegated to the DILG Secretary by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992.13 The President's
power of general supervision over local government units is conferred
upon him by the Constitution.14 The power of supervision is defined as
"the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform
their functions in accordance with law."15 This is distinguished from the
power of control or "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter."
 On many occasions in the past, this court has had the opportunity to
distinguish the power of supervision from the power of control. In Taule vs.
Santos,17 we held that the Chief Executive wielded no more authority than
that of checking whether a local government or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. He cannot
interfere with local governments provided that the same or its officers act
within the scope of their authority. Supervisory power, when contrasted
with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority over such body.18 Officers in control
lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is
discretionary on his part to order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. Supervising officers merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, he may order the work done or re-done to conform to the
prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner for the doing of the
act. Does the President's power of general supervision extend to the liga
ng mga barangay, which is not a local government unit?
 We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the
Department of Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government
organization, being an association, federation, league or union created by
law or by authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected
government officials. The Local Government Code21 defines the liga ng
mga barangay as an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose
of determining the representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for
ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay
government administration and securing, through proper and legal means,
solutions thereto.22 The liga shall have chapters at the municipal, city,
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The municipal and
city chapters of the liga shall be composed of the barangay representatives
of the municipal and city barangays respectively. The duly elected
presidents of the component municipal and city chapters shall constitute
the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political subdivision chapter.
The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities, provincial chapters,
the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan political subdivision
chapters shall constitute the National Liga ng mga Barangay.
 The liga at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political
subdivision, and national levels directly elect a president, a vice-president
and five (5) members of the board of directors. The board shall appoint its
secretary and treasurer and create such other positions as it may deem
necessary for the management of the chapter. The ligas are primarily
governed by the provisions of the Local Government Code.25 However,
their respective constitution and by-laws shall govern all other matters
affecting the internal organization of the liga not otherwise provided for in
the Local Government Code provided that the constitution and by-laws
shall be suppletory to the provisions of Book III, Title VI of the Local
Government Code and shall always conform to the provisions of the
Constitution and existing laws.
 Having in mind the foregoing principles, we rule that Memorandum
Circular No. 97-193 of the DILG insofar as it authorizes the filing a Petition
for Review of the decision of the BES with the regular courts in a post
proclamation electoral protest is of doubtful constitutionality. We agree
with both the petitioner and the Solicitor General that in authorizing the
filing of the petition for review of the decision of the BES with the regular
courts, the DILG Secretary in effect amended and modified the GUIDELINES
promulgated by the National Liga Board and adopted by the LIGA which
provides that the decision of the BES shall be subject to review by the
National Liga Board. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an
exercise of the power of supervision but is an exercise of the power of
control, which the President does not have over the LIGA. Although the
DILG is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances,
the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring
compliance" by local government units of such issuances.27 To monitor
means "to watch, observe or check" and is compatible with the power of
supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited
to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers
thereof perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any
doubt as to the power of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs
should be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local
government.
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Issue: WON the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to DILG supervision.
National Liga ng mga Barangay v. Paredes
Facts: On 11 June 1997, Rayos, Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5,
District II, Caloocan City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and
damages before the RTC of Caloocan, alleging that David, Punong Barangay of
Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City and then president of the Liga Chapter of
Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga Barangay National Chapter, committed certain
irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng
mga Barangay elections in 1997. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining
the holding of the general membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of
Caloocan City on 14 June 1975. However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served
on herein petitioner David, and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan
was held as scheduled. Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-
Caloocan, and thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan. On 17 July 1997, respondent
Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.7 Rayos
alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections
held on 14 June 1997 by the members of the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their
Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.8 On 18 July 1997, the presiding judge granted the
TRO, enjoining therein respondents David, Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from
proceeding with the synchronized elections for the Provincial and Metropolitan
Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but only for the purpose of
maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not exceeding seventy-two
(72) hours. Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner David’s instance, Special Civil
Action (SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No.
C-508 pending before Branch 124. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July
1997, the DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an
Urgent Motion, invoking the President’s power of general supervision over all local
government units and seeking that the DILG pursuant to its delegated power of
general supervision, be appointed as the Interim Caretaker to manage and
administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of National Liga
Officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office.
 Bito-Onon v. Fernandez: Court ruled that the President’s power of the
general supervision, as exercised therein by the DILG Secretary as his alter
ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.
 Does the President’s power of general supervision extend to the liga ng
mga barangay, which is not a local government unit? We rule in the
affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of Justice
ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an
association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of
law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials.
The Local Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an
organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating,
articulating and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions
thereto.
 The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite
evident, whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga
is an aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by
their respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an
ex officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As
such, they enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular
municipal councilors, city councilors or provincial board members, as the
case may be. Thus, the Liga is the vehicle through which the barangay
participates in the enactment of ordinances and formulation of policies at
all the legislative local levels higher than the sangguniang barangay, at the
same time serving as the mechanism for the bottom-to-top approach of
development.
 In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG
as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum
Circular No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize
David as the National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to
the affairs of the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it even smacked
of superciliousness and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost
government agency which maintains coordination with, and exercises
supervision over local government units and its multi-level leagues. As
such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in its dealings
with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable role
played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the
promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than
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the full support and respect of the other agencies of government. As the
Court held in the case of San Juan v. Civil Service Commission,92 our
national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions
on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of liberty upon
which these provisions are based.
 When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim
caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively
removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested
control of the Liga on the DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILG’s prayer
for appointment as interim caretaker of the Liga "to manage and
administer the affairs of the Liga, until such time that the new set of
National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and assumed office"
reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga. Even
if said "caretakership" was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only
until a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a
conferment of control in derogation of the Constitution.
 With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga,
Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and
promulgated DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 dated 11 August
1997, where he laid down the supplemental guidelines for the 1997
synchronized elections of the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for
the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga Barangay;
scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter
elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-Caloocan
Chapter.
 These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and
constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the
Liga, but more importantly, of the barangay as an institution. The election
of Liga officers is part of the Liga’s internal organization, for which the
latter has already provided guidelines. In succession, the DILG assumed
stewardship and jurisdiction over the Liga affairs, issued supplemental
guidelines for the election, and nullified the effects of the Liga-conducted
elections. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was the power of control which
even the President does not have.
 Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent
Rayos as president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly
scheduled general Liga elections, although petitioner David’s term had not
yet expired. The DILG substituted its choice, who was Rayos, over the
choice of majority of the punong barangay of Caloocan, who was the
incumbent President, petitioner David. The latter was elected and had in
fact been sitting as an ex-officio member of the sangguniang panlungsod in
accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-Laws. Yet, the DILG extended
the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was aware that the
position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by Rayos
himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough
that the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made
use of the power with evident bias and partiality.
 As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the
DILG’s authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are
followed, but it cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the
discretion to modify or replace them. In this particular case, the most that
the DILG could do was review the acts of the incumbent officers of the Liga
in the conduct of the elections to determine if they committed any
violation of the Liga’s Constitution and By-laws and its implementing rules.
If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG
should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance
with the Liga’s own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines.
Neither had the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of
the Liga and replace them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
 Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to
control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego. In the Bito-Onon94 case,
this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, insofar as it
authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of the Board of
Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-proclamation
electoral protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect amended
the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga. Officers in control, lay
down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, it is
discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have
the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he
may order the work done or re-done to conform for to the prescribed
rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner the doing of the act. The
amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President
does not have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to
prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code
limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance by local government
units of such issuances. To monitor means to "watch, observe or check"
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and is compatible with the power of supervision of the DILG Secretary over
local governments, which is limited to checking whether the local
government unit concerned or the officers thereof perform their duties as
per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power of the DILG
Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of the
greater autonomy of the local government.
 In Taule,96 the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers
of katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils. In that case, a protest
was lodged before the Secretary of Local Government regarding several
irregularities in, and seeking the nullification of, the election of officers of
the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of
Catanduanes. Then Local Government Secretary Luis Santos issued a
resolution nullifying the election of officers and ordered a new one to be
conducted. The Court ruled: Construing the constitutional limitation on the
power of general supervision of the President over local governments, We
hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity
or regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent
Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the
Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government
officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-
partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic
component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest
autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be
conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct
interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays
which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general
supervision over local governments. All given, the Court is convinced that
the assailed order was issued with grave abuse of discretion while the acts
of the respondent Secretary, including DILG Memorandum Circulars No.
97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra vires, as they all
entailed the conferment or exercise of control — a power which is denied
by the Constitution even to the President.
Batangas v. Romulo
Facts: The Province of Batangas, represented by Governor Mandanas, filed the
present petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos
contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar
as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion
pesos (P5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the
release thereof.
Issue: WON the provisos in the GAAS of 1999-2001 relating to the LGSEF, as well as
the Oversight Committee’s Resolutions issued pursuant thereto are
unconstitutional and void
 Article II of the Constitution, the State has expressly adopted as a policy
that: Section 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local
governments.
 Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines
the President’s power over the LGUs to one of general supervision. This
provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. The
distinction between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon v. Lim: An
officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not
cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it
that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules,
nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are
not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform
to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing
the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the
rules are followed.
 The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted to flesh out the mandate
of the Constitution. The State policy on local autonomy is amplified in
Section 2 thereof: Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the
State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them
to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward
this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization
whereby local government units shall be given more powers, authority,
responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall
proceed from the National Government to the local government units.
 The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions violate the constitutional precept on local autonomy
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 Article X of the Constitution reads: Sec. 6. Local government units shall
have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall
be automatically released to them. When parsed, it would be readily seen
that this provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a “just share” in
the national taxes; (2) the “just share” shall be determined by law; and (3)
the “just share” shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
 The Local Government Code of 1991, among its salient provisions,
underscores the automatic release of the LGUs’ “just share” in this wise:
Sec. 18. Power to Generate and Apply Resources. Local government units
shall have the power and authority to establish an organization that shall
be responsible for the efficient and effective implementation of their
development plans, program objectives and priorities; to create their own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges which shall accrue
exclusively for their use and disposition and which shall be retained by
them; to have a just share in national taxes which shall be automatically
and directly released to them without need of further action; Sec. 286.
Automatic Release of Shares. (a) The share of each local government unit
shall be released, without need of any further action, directly to the
provincial, city, municipal or barangay treasurer, as the case may be, on a
quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of each quarter, and which
shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the
national government for whatever purpose. (b) Nothing in this Chapter
shall be understood to diminish the share of local government units under
existing laws.
 Automatic: involuntary either wholly or to a major extent so that any
activity of the will is largely negligible; of a reflex nature; without volition;
mechanical; like or suggestive of an automaton. As such, the LGUs are not
required to perform any act to receive the “just share” accruing to them
from the national coffers. As emphasized by the Local Government Code
of 1991, the “just share” of the LGUs shall be released to them “without
need of further action.” Construing Section 286 of the LGC, we held in
Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre: Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A
basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares
of LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than
the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the
release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days
after every quarter of the year and “shall not be subject to any lien or
holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose.” As a rule, the term “SHALL” is a word of command that must be
given a compulsory meaning. The provision is, therefore, IMPERATIVE.
 Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1,
1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation” in the country. Such withholding clearly
contravenes the Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is
equivalent to a holdback, which means “something held back or withheld,
often temporarily.” Hence, the “temporary” nature of the retention by the
national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
 In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in
times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all. The
latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal autonomy of local
governments. Concededly, the President was well-intentioned in issuing
his Order to withhold the LGUs’ IRA, but the rule of law requires that even
the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the
Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be carried out by
legal methods.
 The “just share” of the LGUs is incorporated as the IRA in the
appropriations law or GAA enacted by Congress annually. Under the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, a portion of the IRA
in the amount of five billion pesos was earmarked for the LGSEF, and these
provisos imposed the condition that “such amount shall be released to the
local government units subject to the implementing rules and regulations,
including such mechanisms and guidelines for the equitable allocations and
distribution of said fund among local government units subject to the
guidelines that may be prescribed by the Oversight Committee on
Devolution.” Pursuant thereto, the Oversight Committee, through the
assailed OCD resolutions, apportioned the five billion pesos LGSEF.
Significantly, the LGSEF could not be released to the LGUs without the
Oversight Committee’s prior approval. Further, with respect to the portion
of the LGSEF allocated for various projects of the LGUs (P1 billion for 1999;
P1.5 billion for 2000 and P2 billion for 2001), the Oversight Committee,
through the assailed OCD resolutions, laid down guidelines and
mechanisms that the LGUs had to comply with before they could avail of
funds from this portion of the LGSEF. The guidelines required (a) the LGUs
to identify the projects eligible for funding based on the criteria laid down
by the Oversight Committee; (b) the LGUs to submit their project proposals
to the DILG for appraisal; (c) the project proposals that passed the
appraisal of the DILG to be submitted to the Oversight Committee for
review, evaluation and approval. It was only upon approval thereof that
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the Oversight Committee would direct the DBM to release the funds for
the projects.
 To the Court’s mind, the entire process involving the distribution and
release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of
the IRA or “just share” of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its
distribution and release to the vagaries of the implementing rules and
regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned
by the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a flagrant violation of the
constitutional and statutory mandate that the “just share” of the LGUs
“shall be automatically released to them.” The LGUs are, thus, placed at
the mercy of the Oversight Committee.
 Where the law, the Constitution in this case, is clear and unambiguous, it
must be taken to mean exactly what it says, and courts have no choice but
to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. Moreover, as correctly posited by
the petitioner, the use of the word “shall” connotes a mandatory order. Its
use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with
the idea of discretion.
 Indeed, the Oversight Committee exercising discretion, even control, over
the distribution and release of a portion of the IRA, the LGSEF, is an
anathema to and subversive of the principle of local autonomy as
embodied in the Constitution. Moreover, it finds no statutory basis at all as
the Oversight Committee was created merely to formulate the rules and
regulations for the efficient and effective implementation of the Local
Government Code of 1991 to ensure “compliance with the principles of
local autonomy as defined under the Constitution.”[29] In fact, its creation
was placed under the title of “Transitory Provisions,” signifying its ad hoc
character. According to Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, the principal author
and sponsor of the bill that eventually became Rep. Act No. 7160, the
Committee’s work was supposed to be done a year from the approval of
the Code, or on October 10, 1992.[30] The Oversight Committee’s
authority is undoubtedly limited to the implementation of the Local
Government Code of 1991, not to supplant or subvert the same. Neither
can it exercise control over the IRA, or even a portion thereof, of the LGUs.
 That the automatic release of the IRA was precisely intended to guarantee
and promote local autonomy can be gleaned from the discussion between
Messrs. Jose N. Nolledo and Regalado M. Maambong, then members of
the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
 The concept of local autonomy was explained in Ganzon v. Court of
Appeals in this wise: As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy
‘means a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization.’ The Constitution, as we
observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the
national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by
political adherents, to “liberate the local governments from the
imperialism of Manila.” Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the central
administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a
regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local
governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however
limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to
enhance self-government.
 As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national
administration – but not power – to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy
is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
There is decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments ‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.’ At
the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to
‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no
control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
 Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of
political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to
be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart
its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization
of power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
 Local autonomy includes both administrative and fiscal autonomy. The
fairly recent case of Pimentel v. Aguirre[35] is particularly instructive. The
Court declared therein that local fiscal autonomy includes the power of the
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LGUs to, inter alia, allocate their resources in accordance with their own
priorities: Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having
administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal
autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have
the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their
equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government,
as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities. It extends to the preparation of their budgets, and local
officials in turn have to work within the constraints thereof. They are not
formulated at the national level and imposed on local governments,
whether they are relevant to local needs and resources or not.
 Further, a basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the constitutionally
mandated automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal
revenue. Following this ratiocination, the Court in Pimentel struck down as
unconstitutional Section 4 of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 372 which
ordered the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of ten percent of the
LGUs’ IRA “pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation.”
 In like manner, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001,
and the OCD resolutions constitute a “withholding” of a portion of the IRA.
They put on hold the distribution and release of the five billion pesos
LGSEF and subject the same to the implementing rules and regulations,
including the guidelines and mechanisms prescribed by the Oversight
Committee from time to time. Like Section 4 of A.O. 372, the assailed
provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions
effectively encroach on the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the LGUs and must
be struck down. They cannot, therefore, be upheld.
 The assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD
resolutions cannot amend Section 285 of the Local Government Code of
1991 Section 284 of the Local Government Code provides that, beginning
the third year of its effectivity, the LGUs’ share in the national internal
revenue taxes shall be 40%. This percentage is fixed and may not be
reduced except “in the event the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit" and only upon compliance with
stringent requirements set forth in the same section: Sec. 284.
Provided, That in the event that the national government incurs an
unmanageable public sector deficit, the President of the Philippines is
hereby authorized, upon recommendation of Secretary of Finance,
Secretary of Interior and Local Government and Secretary of Budget and
Management, and subject to consultation with the presiding officers of
both Houses of Congress and the presidents of the liga, to make the
necessary adjustments in the internal revenue allotment of local
government units but in no case shall the allotment be less than thirty
percent (30%) of the collection of the national internal revenue taxes of
the third fiscal year preceding the current fiscal year; Provided, further
That in the first year of the effectivity of this Code, the local government
units shall, in addition to the thirty percent (30%) internal revenue
allotment which shall include the cost of devolved functions for essential
public services, be entitled to receive the amount equivalent to the cost of
devolved personnel services.
 Thus, from the above provision, the only possible exception to the
mandatory automatic release of the LGUs’ IRA is if the national internal
revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the
collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be
automatically released shall be a proportionate amount of the collections
for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a
quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal
revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. In the instant case,
however, there is no allegation that the national internal revenue tax
collections for the fiscal years 1999, 2000 and 2001 have fallen compared
to the preceding three fiscal years.
 Section 285 then specifies how the IRA shall be allocated among the LGUs.
However, this percentage sharing is not followed with respect to the five
billion pesos LGSEF as the assailed OCD resolutions, implementing the
assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, provided for a
different sharing scheme. For example, for 1999, P2 billion of the LGSEF
was allocated as follows: Provinces – 40%; Cities – 20%; Municipalities –
40%.[39] For 2000, P3.5 billion of the LGSEF was allocated in this manner:
Provinces – 26%; Cities – 23%; Municipalities – 35%; Barangays – 26%.[40]
For 2001, P3 billion of the LGSEF was allocated, thus: Provinces – 25%;
Cities – 25%; Municipalities – 35%; Barangays – 15%.[41]
 The respondents argue that this modification is allowed since the
Constitution does not specify that the “just share” of the LGUs shall only be
determined by the Local Government Code of 1991. That it is within the
power of Congress to enact other laws, including the GAAs, to increase or
decrease the “just share” of the LGUs. This contention is untenable. The
Local Government Code of 1991 is a substantive law. And while it is
conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions therein, it may
not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the
Local Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in
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the appropriations law, because Congress cannot include in a general
appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted in a
separate legislation. A general appropriations bill is a special type of
legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums of money dedicated
to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit.[43] Any provision therein
which is intended to amend another law is considered an “inappropriate
provision.” The category of “inappropriate provisions” includes
unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are intended to amend
other laws, because clearly these kinds of laws have no place in an
appropriations bill.
 Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage
sharing therein, which are fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are
matters of general and substantive law. To permit Congress to undertake
these amendments through the GAAs, as the respondents contend, would
be to give Congress the unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal
autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in jeopardy every year. This,
the Court cannot sanction.
 It is relevant to point out at this juncture that, unlike those of 1999, 2000
and 2001, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003 do not contain provisos similar to
the herein assailed provisos. In other words, the GAAs of 2002 and 2003
have not earmarked any amount of the IRA for the LGSEF. Congress had
perhaps seen fit to discontinue the practice as it recognizes its infirmity.
Nonetheless, as earlier mentioned, this Court has deemed it necessary to
make a definitive ruling on the matter in order to prevent its recurrence in
future appropriations laws and that the principles enunciated herein would
serve to guide the bench, bar and public.
Feliciano v. COA
Facts: A Special Audit Team from COA Regional Office No. VIII audited the accounts
of LMWD. Subsequently, LMWD received a letter from COA dated 19 July 1999
requesting payment of auditing fees. As General Manager of LMWD, petitioner
sent a reply dated 12 October 1999 informing COA’s Regional Director that the
water district could not pay the auditing fees. Petitioner cited as basis for his action
Sections 6 and 20 of Presidential Decree 198 (“PD 198”)[2], as well as Section 18 of
Republic Act No. 6758 (“RA 6758”). The Regional Director referred petitioner’s
reply to the COA Chairman on 18 October 1999. On 19 October 1999, petitioner
wrote COA through the Regional Director asking for refund of all auditing fees
LMWD previously paid to COA. On 16 March 2000, petitioner received COA
Chairman Celso D. Gangan’s Resolution dated 3 January 2000 denying his requests.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on 31 March 2000, which COA denied
on 30 January 2001. On 13 March 2001, petitioner filed this instant petition.
Attached to the petition were resolutions of the Visayas Association of Water
Districts (VAWD) and the Philippine Association of Water Districts (PAWD)
supporting the petition.
Issue: 1. WON COA has the authority to audit LMWD.
 The Constitution and existing laws[4] mandate COA to audit all
government agencies, including government-owned and controlled
corporations (“GOCCs”) with original charters. An LWD is a GOCC with an
original charter. Section 2(1), Article IX-D of the Constitution provides for
COA’s audit jurisdiction, as follows: SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on
Audit shall have the power, authority and duty to examine, audit, and
settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or
pertaining to, the Government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or
instrumentalities, including government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a)
constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted
fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and
their subsidiaries; and (d) such non-governmental entities receiving
subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the government,
which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such
audit as a condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal
control system of the audited agencies is inadequate, the Commission may
adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit, as are
necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the
general accounts of the Government and, for such period as may be
provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other supporting papers
pertaining thereto.
 The COA’s audit jurisdiction extends not only to government “agencies or
instrumentalities,” but also to “government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters” as well as “other government-owned
or controlled corporations” without original charters.
2. WON LWDs are GOCCs with original charters.
 LWDs are not private corporations because they are not created under the
Corporation Code. LWDs are not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission. Section 14 of the Corporation Code states that
“[A]ll corporations organized under this code shall file with the Securities
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and Exchange Commission articles of incorporation x x x.” LWDs have no
articles of incorporation, no incorporators and no stockholders or
members. There are no stockholders or members to elect the board
directors of LWDs as in the case of all corporations registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The local mayor or the provincial
governor appoints the directors of LWDs for a fixed term of office. This
Court has ruled that LWDs are not created under the Corporation Code,
thus: From the foregoing pronouncement, it is clear that what has been
excluded from the coverage of the CSC are those corporations created
pursuant to the Corporation Code. Significantly, petitioners are not
created under the said code, but on the contrary, they were created
pursuant to a special law and are governed primarily by its provision.
 LWDs exist by virtue of PD 198, which constitutes their special charter.
Since under the Constitution only government-owned or controlled
corporations may have special charters, LWDs can validly exist only if they
are government-owned or controlled. To claim that LWDs are private
corporations with a special charter is to admit that their existence is
constitutionally infirm. Unlike private corporations, which derive their legal
existence and power from the Corporation Code, LWDs derive their legal
existence and power from PD 198 which expressly confers on LWDs
corporate powers. Section 6 of PD 198 provides that LWDs “shall exercise
the powers, rights and privileges given to private corporations under
existing laws.” Without PD 198, LWDs would have no corporate powers.
Thus, PD 198 constitutes the special enabling charter of LWDs. The
ineluctable conclusion is that LWDs are government-owned and controlled
corporations with a special charter.
 The phrase “government-owned and controlled corporations with original
charters” means GOCCs created under special laws and not under the
general incorporation law. There is no difference between the term
“original charters” and “special charters.”
 Petitioner’s contention that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution creates the
LWDs assumes that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to create
corporations. This is a patently baseless assumption. The Local
Government Code[17] does not vest in the Sangguniang Bayan the power
to create corporations.[18] What the Local Government Code empowers
the Sangguniang Bayan to do is to provide for the establishment of a
waterworks system “subject to existing laws.” Thus, Section 447(5)(vii) of
the Local Government Code provides: SECTION 447. Powers, Duties,
Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang bayan, as the
legislative body of the municipality, shall enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the
municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in
the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the municipality as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: (vii) Subject to
existing laws, provide for the establishment, operation, maintenance, and
repair of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants; regulate the construction, maintenance, repair and use of
hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protect the purity and quantity
of the water supply of the municipality and, for this purpose, extend the
coverage of appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage
area of said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the
reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in
connection with the water service; and regulate the consumption, use or
wastage of water;
 The Sangguniang Bayan may establish a waterworks system only in
accordance with the provisions of PD 198. The Sangguniang Bayan has no
power to create a corporate entity that will operate its waterworks system.
However, the Sangguniang Bayan may avail of existing enabling laws, like
PD 198, to form and incorporate a water district. Besides, even assuming
for the sake of argument that the Sangguniang Bayan has the power to
create corporations, the LWDs would remain government-owned or
controlled corporations subject to COA’s audit jurisdiction. The resolution
of the Sangguniang Bayan would constitute an LWD’s special charter,
making the LWD a government-owned and controlled corporation with an
original charter. In any event, the Court has already ruled in Baguio Water
District v. Trajano[19] that the Sangguniang Bayan resolution is not the
special charter of LWDs, thus: While it is true that a resolution of a local
sanggunian is still necessary for the final creation of a district, this Court is
of the opinion that said resolution cannot be considered as its charter, the
same being intended only to implement the provisions of said decree.
 Petitioner further contends that a law must create directly and explicitly a
GOCC in order that it may have an original charter. In short, petitioner
argues that one special law cannot serve as enabling law for several GOCCs
but only for one GOCC. Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution mandates
that “Congress shall not, except by general law,”[20] provide for the
creation of private corporations. Thus, the Constitution prohibits one
special law to create one private corporation, requiring instead a “general
law” to create private corporations. In contrast, the same Section 16
states that “Government-owned or controlled corporations may be
created or established by special charters.” Thus, the Constitution permits
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Congress to create a GOCC with a special charter. There is, however, no
prohibition on Congress to create several GOCCs of the same class under
one special enabling charter.
 The rationale behind the prohibition on private corporations having special
charters does not apply to GOCCs. There is no danger of creating special
privileges to certain individuals, families or groups if there is one special
law creating each GOCC. Certainly, such danger will not exist whether one
special law creates one GOCC, or one special enabling law creates several
GOCCs. Thus, Congress may create GOCCs either by special charters
specific to each GOCC, or by one special enabling charter applicable to a
class of GOCCs, like PD 198 which applies only to LWDs.
 Petitioner also contends that LWDs are private corporations because
Section 6 of PD 198[21] declares that LWDs “shall be considered quasi-
public” in nature. Petitioner’s rationale is that only private corporations
may be deemed “quasi-public” and not public corporations. Put
differently, petitioner rationalizes that a public corporation cannot be
deemed “quasi-public” because such corporation is already public.
Petitioner concludes that the term “quasi-public” can only apply to private
corporations. Petitioner’s argument is inconsequential.
 Petitioner forgets that the constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA’s
audit jurisdiction depends on the government’s ownership or control of a
corporation. The nature of the corporation, whether it is private, quasi-
public, or public is immaterial.
 The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over “government-
owned and controlled corporations with original charters,” as well as
“government-owned or controlled corporations” without original charters.
GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit, while GOCCs
without original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without
original charters refer to corporations created under the Corporation Code
but are owned or controlled by the government. The nature or purpose of
the corporation is not material in determining COA’s audit jurisdiction.
Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a
general or special law.
 The determining factor of COA’s audit jurisdiction is government
ownership or control of the corporation. In Philippine Veterans Bank
Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Bank,[22] the Court even
ruled that the criterion of ownership and control is more important than
the issue of original charter, thus:
 This point is important because the Constitution provides in its Article IX-B,
Section 2(1) that “the Civil Service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.” As the Bank is
not owned or controlled by the Government although it does have an
original charter in the form of R.A. No. 3518,[23] it clearly does not fall
under the Civil Service and should be regarded as an ordinary commercial
corporation. Section 28 of the said law so provides. The consequence is
that the relations of the Bank with its employees should be governed by
the labor laws, under which in fact they have already been paid some of
their claims.
 Certainly, the government owns and controls LWDs. The government
organizes LWDs in accordance with a specific law, PD 198. There is no
private party involved as co-owner in the creation of an LWD. Just prior to
the creation of LWDs, the national or local government owns and controls
all their assets. The government controls LWDs because under PD 198 the
municipal or city mayor, or the provincial governor, appoints all the board
directors of an LWD for a fixed term of six years.[24] The board directors of
LWDs are not co-owners of the LWDs. LWDs have no private stockholders
or members. The board directors and other personnel of LWDs are
government employees subject to civil service laws[25] and anti-graft laws.
 While Section 8 of PD 198 states that “[N]o public official shall serve as
director” of an LWD, it only means that the appointees to the board of
directors of LWDs shall come from the private sector. Once such private
sector representatives assume office as directors, they become public
officials governed by the civil service law and anti-graft laws. Otherwise,
Section 8 of PD 198 would contravene Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the
Constitution declaring that the civil service includes “government-owned
or controlled corporations with original charters.”
 If LWDs are neither GOCCs with original charters nor GOCCs without
original charters, then they would fall under the term “agencies or
instrumentalities” of the government and thus still subject to COA’s audit
jurisdiction. However, the stark and undeniable fact is that the
government owns LWDs. Section 45[27] of PD 198 recognizes government
ownership of LWDs when Section 45 states that the board of directors may
dissolve an LWD only on the condition that “another public entity has
acquired the assets of the district and has assumed all obligations and
liabilities attached thereto.” The implication is clear that an LWD is a
public and not a private entity.
 Petitioner does not allege that some entity other than the government
owns or controls LWDs. Instead, petitioner advances the theory that the
“Water District’s owner is the District itself.”[28] Assuming for the sake of
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argument that an LWD is “self-owned,”[29] as petitioner describes an
LWD, the government in any event controls all LWDs. First, government
officials appoint all LWD directors to a fixed term of office. Second, any
per diem of LWD directors in excess of P50 is subject to the approval of the
Local Water Utilities Administration, and directors can receive no other
compensation for their services to the LWD.[30] Third, the Local Water
Utilities Administration can require LWDs to merge or consolidate their
facilities or operations.[31] This element of government control subjects
LWDs to COA’s audit jurisdiction.
 Petitioner argues that upon the enactment of PD 198, LWDs became
private entities through the transfer of ownership of water facilities from
local government units to their respective water districts as mandated by
PD 198. Petitioner is grasping at straws. Privatization involves the transfer
of government assets to a private entity. Petitioner concedes that the
owner of the assets transferred under Section 6 (c) of PD 198 is no other
than the LWD itself.[32] The transfer of assets mandated by PD 198 is a
transfer of the water systems facilities “managed, operated by or under
the control of such city, municipality or province to such (water)
district.”[33] In short, the transfer is from one government entity to
another government entity. PD 198 is bereft of any indication that the
transfer is to privatize the operation and control of water systems.
 Finally, petitioner claims that even on the assumption that the government
owns and controls LWDs, Section 20 of PD 198 prevents COA from auditing
LWDs. [34] Section 20 of PD 198 provides: Sec. 20. System of Business
Administration. — The Board shall, as soon as practicable, prescribe and
define by resolution a system of business administration and accounting
for the district, which shall be patterned upon and conform to the
standards established by the Administration. Auditing shall be performed
by a certified public accountant not in the government service. The
Administration may, however, conduct annual audits of the fiscal
operations of the district to be performed by an auditor retained by the
Administration. Expenses incurred in connection therewith shall be borne
equally by the water district concerned and the Administration.
 Petitioner argues that PD 198 expressly prohibits COA auditors, or any
government auditor for that matter, from auditing LWDs. Petitioner
asserts that this is the import of the second sentence of Section 20 of PD
198 when it states that “[A]uditing shall be performed by a certified public
accountant not in the government service.”
 PD 198 cannot prevail over the Constitution. No amount of clever
legislation can exclude GOCCs like LWDs from COA’s audit jurisdiction.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution outlaws any scheme or devise to
escape COA’s audit jurisdiction, thus: Sec. 3. No law shall be passed
exempting any entity of the Government or its subsidiary in any guise
whatever, or any investment of public funds, from the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Audit.
 The framers of the Constitution added Section 3, Article IX-D of the
Constitution precisely to annul provisions of Presidential Decrees, like that
of Section 20 of PD 198, that exempt GOCCs from COA audit.
 There is an irreconcilable conflict between the second sentence of Section
20 of PD 198 prohibiting COA auditors from auditing LWDs and Sections
2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the Constitution vesting in COA the power to
audit all GOCCs. We rule that the second sentence of Section 20 of PD 198
is unconstitutional since it violates Sections 2(1) and 3, Article IX-D of the
Constitution.
3. WON the COA may properly charge auditing fees.
 Section 18 of RA 6758 prohibits COA personnel from receiving any kind of
compensation from any government entity except “compensation paid
directly by COA out of its appropriations and contributions.” Thus, RA
6758 itself recognizes an exception to the statutory ban on COA personnel
receiving compensation from GOCCs. In Tejada v. Domingo,[40] the Court
declared: There can be no question that Section 18 of Republic Act No.
6758 is designed to strengthen further the policy x x x to preserve the
independence and integrity of the COA, by explicitly PROHIBITING: (1) COA
officials and employees from receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses,
allowances or other emoluments from any government entity, local
government unit, GOCCs and government financial institutions, except
such compensation paid directly by the COA out of its appropriations and
contributions, and (2) government entities, including GOCCs, government
financial institutions and local government units from assessing or billing
other government entities, GOCCs, government financial institutions or
local government units for services rendered by the latter’s officials and
employees as part of their regular functions for purposes of paying
additional compensation to said officials and employees. The first aspect of
the strategy is directed to the COA itself, while the second aspect is
addressed directly against the GOCCs and government financial
institutions. Under the first, COA personnel assigned to auditing units of
GOCCs or government financial institutions can receive only such salaries,
allowances or fringe benefits paid directly by the COA out of its
appropriations and contributions. The contributions referred to are the
cost of audit services earlier mentioned which cannot include the extra
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emoluments or benefits now claimed by petitioners. The COA is further

barred from assessing or billing GOCCs and government financial
institutions for services rendered by its personnel as part of their regular
audit functions for purposes of paying additional compensation to such
personnel
 In Tejada, the Court explained the meaning of the word “contributions” in
Section 18 of RA 6758, which allows COA to charge GOCCs the cost of its
audit services: the contributions from the GOCCs are limited to the cost of
audit services which are based on the actual cost of the audit function in
the corporation concerned plus a reasonable rate to cover overhead
expenses. The actual audit cost shall include personnel services,
maintenance and other operating expenses, depreciation on capital and
equipment and out-of-pocket expenses. In respect to the allowances and
fringe benefits granted by the GOCCs to the COA personnel assigned to the
former’s auditing units, the same shall be directly defrayed by COA from its
own appropriations.
 COA may charge GOCCs “actual audit cost” but GOCCs must pay the same
directly to COA and not to COA auditors. Petitioner has not alleged that
COA charges LWDs auditing fees in excess of COA’s “actual audit cost.”
Neither has petitioner alleged that the auditing fees are paid by LWDs
directly to individual COA auditors. Thus, petitioner’s contention must fail.

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San Diego v. Municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
Facts: The municipality of Naujan issued Resolution 46 awarding the concession of
the Butas River and the Naujan Lake to San Diego. Contract: 5 years, from January
1, 1948 to December 31, 1952, lease of "the exclusive privilege of erecting fish
corrals along the Butas River beginning from its junction with the San Agustin River
up to the Naujan Lake itself," for annual rental of P26,300.00. Upon petition by the
lessee, however, the said council reduced the annual rental by 20% by virtue of
Resolution 59, series of 1949. On September 5, 1950, the lessee requested for a
five-year extension of the original lease period. The request was, for some time, left
pending before the municipal council, but on December 1, 1951, after the lessee
had reiterated his petition for extension, for the reason that the typhoon "Wanda",
which took place that month, destroyed most of his fish corrals, the council
adopted Resolution 222, series of 1951 extending the lease for another five (5)
years beginning January 1, 1952, with the express condition that the plaintiff would
waive the privilege to seek for reduction of the amount of rent which was to be
based on the original contract. After the resolution had been approved by the
Provincial Board of Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the lessee, on December 23,
1951, contracted for the extension of the period of the lease. The contract was
approved and confirmed on December 29, 1951 by Resolution 229, series of 1951,
of the municipal council of Naujan whose term was then about to expire. Pursuant
to the said contract, the lessee filed a surety bond of P52,000.00 and then
reconstructed his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake with bañgus fingerlings.
On January 2, 1952, the municipal council of Naujan, this time composed of a new
set of members, adopted Resolution 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222,
series of 1951. On the same date, the new council also passed Resolution 11,
revoking Resolution 229 of the old council which confirmed the extension of the
lease period. The lessee requested for reconsideration and recall of Resolution 3, on
the ground, among others, that it violated the contract executed between him and
the municipality on December 23, 1951, and, therefore, contrary to Article III,
section 1, clause 10 of the Constitution. The request, however, was not granted.
On September 4, 1952, the lessee instituted this proceedings in the court below
seeking to have Resolution 3, series of 1952, of the municipal council of Naujan,
declared null and void, for being unconstitutional, and praying for an order
enjoining the defendant municipality from conducting a public bidding for the
leasing of the Naujan fisheries to any person other than the plaintiff during the
period from January 1, 1953 to December 31, 1957.
Answering the complaint, the defendant asserted the validity of Resolution 3, series
of 1951, alleging by the way of special defense that the resolution authorizing the
original lease contract, reducing the lease rentals and renewing the lease are null
and void for not having been passed in accordance with law. Defendant further put
up a counterclaim for the amount representing the illegal reduction of 20% of the
original rentals, plus the sum of P2,191.60 per month beginning December 1, 1952
until the case shall have been terminated. After trial, the lower court rendered
judgment upholding the validity of the lease contract, as well at is extension, and
declaring Resolution 3, series of 1952, null and void. The municipality of Naujan has
taken this appeal.
Issue: WON Resolution No. 3, series of 1952, revoking Resolution 222, series of
1951, of the municipal council of Naujan is valid.
 The law (Sec. 2323 of the Revised Administrative Code) requires that when
the exclusive privilege of fishery or the right to conduct a fish-breeding
ground is granted to a private party, the same shall be let to the highest
bidder in the same manner as is being done in exploiting a ferry, a market
or a slaughterhouse belonging to the municipality. The requirement of
competitive bidding is for the purpose of inviting competition and to guard
against favoritism, fraud and corruption in the letting of fishery privileges
 There is no doubt that the original lease contract in this case was awarded
to the highest bidder, but the reduction of the rental and the extension of
the term of the lease appear to have been granted without previous public
bidding.
 Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al. vs. Delgado Bros., Inc.:the amendment to an
arrastre contract was declared null and void on the ground that it was
made without previous public bidding. In so declaring, this Court has
adopted the following opinion:. . . it is the opinion of the Court that the
said agreement .. executed and entered into without previous public
bidding, is null and void, and cannot adversely affect the rights of third
parties . . . and of the public in general. The Court agrees with the
contention of counsel for the plaintiffs that the due execution of a contract
after public bidding is a limitation upon the right of the contradicting
parties to alter or amend it without another public bidding, for otherwise
what would a public bidding be good for if after the execution of a contract
after public bidding, the contracting parties may alter or amend the
contract or even cancel it, at their will? Public biddings are held for the
protection of the public, and to give the public the best possible
advantages by means of open competition between the bidders. He who
bids or offers the best terms is awarded the contract subject of the bid,
and it is obvious that such protection and best possible advantages to the
public will disappear if the parties to a contract executed after public
bidding may alter or amend it without another previous public bidding.
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 While in that case we ruled that although the "arrastre contract" therein
questioned authorized the parties to alter or amend any of the terms
thereof, such authority must be considered as being subject to the
requirement of previous public bidding, a formality observed before the
original contract was awarded, with more reason should the rule requiring
such public bidding be strickly applied in the instant case where no such
authority to alter or amend the terms of the contract was reserved.
 Furthermore, it has been ruled that statutes requiring public bidding apply
to amendments of any contract already executed in compliance with the
law where such amendments alter the original contract in some vital and
essential particular Inasmuch as the period in a lease is a vital and essential
particular to the contract, we believe that the extension of the lease period
in this case, which was granted without the essential requisite of public
bidding, is not in accordance with law. And it follows the Resolution 222,
series of 1951, and the contract authorized thereby, extending the original
five-year lease to another five years are null and void as contrary to law
and public policy.
 We agree with the defendant-appellant in that the question Resolution 3 is
not an impairment of the obligation of contract, because the constitutional
provision on impairment refers only to contract legally executed. While,
apparently, Resolution 3 tended to abrogate the contract extending the
lease, legally speaking, there was no contract abrogated because, as we
have said, the extension contract is void and inexistent.
 The lower court, in holding that the defendant-appellant municipality has
been estopped from assailing the validity of the contract into which it
entered on December 23, 1951, seems to have overlooked the general rule
that —. . . the doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a
municipal corporation to validate a contract which it has no power to make
or which it is authorized to make only under prescribed conditions, within
prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner, although the
corporation has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully
performed his part of the agreement, or has expended large sums in
preparation for performance. A reason frequently assigned for this rule is
that to apply the doctrine of estoppel against a municipality in such case
would be to enable it to do indirectly what it cannot do directly. Also,
where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality executing it
cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded
away, controlled, or embarrassed its legislative or government powers.
 As pointed out above, "public biddings are held for the best protection of
the public and to give the public the best possible advantages by means of
open competition between the bidders." Thus, contracts requiring public
bidding affect public interest, and to change them without complying with
that requirement would indeed be against public policy. There is,
therefore, nothing to plaintiff-appellee's contention that the parties in this
case being in pari delicto should be left in the situation where they are
found, for "although the parties are in pari delicto, yet the court may
interfere and grant relief at the suit of one of them, where public policy
requires its intervention, even though the result may be that a benefit will
be derived by a plaintiff who is in equal guilt with defendant. But here the
guilt of the parties is not considered as equal to the higher right of the
public, and the guilty party to whom the relief is granted is simply the
instrument by which the public is served."
 In view of the foregoing, we hold that the municipal council of Naujan
acted aright in adopting Resolution 3, series of 1952, now in question. In
consonance with the principles enunciated above, Resolution 59, series of
1947, reducing the rentals by 20% of the original price, which was also
passed without public bidding, should likewise be held void, since a
reduction of the rental to be paid by the lessee is a substantial alternation
in the contract, making it a distinct and different lease contract which
requires the prescribed formality of public bidding.
 There seems to be no necessity of passing on the validity of Resolution 46,
series of 1947, for defendant-appellant, apparently, did not mean to have
it annulled, as may be seen from its prayer in the court below and also in
this appeal. At any rate, the validity of said resolution does not alter our
finding to the effect that Resolution 59, series of 1949, and Resolution 222,
series of 1951, are illegal and void; and that Resolution 3, series of 1952, is
valid.
Rivera v. Municipality of Malolos
Facts: Sometime in August 1949 the municipality of Malolos, Bulacan, called for bids
for the supply of road construction materials to repair the roads of the municipality.
At the public bidding held on 28 August 1949 for that purpose, the Rivera's bid was
the lowest. On the same day, 28 August 1949, the acting municipal treasurer
informed the petitioner that the contract had been awarded to him and requested
him to call at his office for the execution of the contract. On 31 August 1949 the
contract was signed by the municipal mayor in behalf of the municipality and the
petitioner. It was stipulated that for and in consideration of the sum of P19,235 the
petitioner was to furnish and deliver to the municipality of Malolos 2,700 cubic
meters of crushed adobe stone (cascajo) and 1,400 cubic meters of gravel. In
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compliance with the contract, the petitioner delivered crushed adobe stone and
gravel to the municipality at the places designated by the municipal mayor. On 29
July 1950 the petitioner wrote to the municipal treasurer, through the provincial
auditor, calling his attention to the fact that the sum of P19,339.56 due him as
payment for the value of crushed adobe stone and gravel delivered to the
municipality had not yet been paid and that as the fiscal year 1949-1950 had
already expired, he requested that the sum be included in the appropriations for
the incoming fiscal year 1950-1951 as an outstanding obligation. On 2 August 1950,
the principal clerk, acting in behalf of the municipal treasurer, informed the
petitioner that "The Municipal Council (had) agreed to put said amount as standing
obligation of the municipality authorizing payment and authorizing the Municipal
Treasurer to pay as soon as funds are available." On 16 October 1951 the municipal
council passed Resolution No. 68 ratifying the public bidding called by the municipal
treasurer for the supply of road construction materials, and the contract entered
into by the municipal mayor in behalf of the municipality on 31 August 1949. On 30
October 1951 the petitioner filed a complaint against the municipality of Malolos in
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan to collect the sum of P19,235 for the value of
crushed adobe stone and gravel delivered by the petitioner under the contract. On
8 May 1952 the petitioner amended his complaint. On 8 January 1954 the Court
dismissed the case without prejudice. On 11 January 1954 the petitioner sought the
intervention of the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee, which
forwarded the petitioner's claim through proper channels to the Office of the
Auditor General. On 14 January 1955 the Deputy Auditor General denied the
petitioner's claim on the ground that as there was no sum of money appropriated
to meet the obligation incurred before the execution of the contract, as required by
section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code, the said contract is void, as
provided in section 608 of the same Code; and that even if there was such sum
appropriated to meet such obligation, the alleged deliveries of crushed adobe stone
and gravel could no longer be verified by the Provincial Auditor of Bulacan or his
representative. On 1 March 1955, the petitioner requested the Deputy Auditor
General to reconsider his decision. On 5 March 1955, before the said officer could
take action on the request for reconsideration, the petitioner filed his notice of
appeal with the Office of the Auditor General, and this petition for review in this
Court. On 9 March 1955, on motion of the petitioner, this Court resolved to
suspend the service of notice upon the Auditor General pursuant to section 4, Rule
45, and granted the petitioner five days from receipt of notice of the action taken
by the Auditor General on his request for reconsideration, within which to file a
supplement to his petition for review. On 2 June 1955 the Deputy Auditor General
denied his request for reconsideration, reiterating the grounds previously relied
upon in his decision on 14 January 1954. On 21 June 1955 the petitioner filed a
supplement to his petition for review in this Court.
Issue: WON Rivera can properly claim from the municipality.
 The petitioner contends that the respondent should not be allowed to
invoke legal technicalities to delay or refuse payment after its municipal
council has acknowledged the indebtedness, because the respondent
municipality had received an annual allotment or a certain percentage of
the amount collected under the provisions of Act No. 3992, known as the
Motor Vehicle Law, out of which it could pay said indebtedness, and that
there is no issue as to the validity of the contract entered into by and
between the petitioner and the respondent, nor is there any question as to
the delivery by the petitioner and receipt by the respondent of the road
construction materials.
 Before a contract may be entered into validly by a municipality, the law
requires that there should be an appropriation of municipal funds to meet
the obligation validly passed by the municipal council and approved by the
municipal mayor. In answer to the statement of the Solicitor General that
there is no provision of law which authorizes a municipal mayor to enter
into a contract with a private contractor for furnishing the municipality
with public works materials, the petitioner cites sections 2165 and 2196 of
the Revised Administrative Code. Section 2165 provides that
"Municipalities . . . are endowed with the faculties of municipal
corporations to be exercised by and through their respective municipal
governments in conformity with law." "It shall be competent for them, in
their proper corporate name, . . . to contract and be contracted with, . . . ."
The power or authority conferred upon municipal corporations must be
exercised in conformity with law, and the law provides that such contracts
must be entered into by the district engineer.
 The petitioner contends, however, that section 1920 of the Revised
Administrative Code must be read in connection with sections 1912 and
1913 of the same Code and concludes that section 1920 does not abrogate
the general rule that a municipal council may designate an officer of the
municipal corporation to execute such a contract in behalf of the
municipality. Section 1912 refers to investigations and survey by the
district engineer for a proposed construction or repair of public works and
submission by him to the mayor to reports and estimates of the cost of
such construction or repair with his recommendations, and to the
preparation of plans and specifications for such public works and
supervision of the construction or repair of the same. The provisions of
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sections 1912 and 1913 of the Revised Administrative Code do not refer to
contracts entered into by the municipality for the supply of road
construction materials.
 If the law requires that before a contract involving the expenditure of
P2,000 or more may be entered into or authorized, the municipal treasurer
must certify to the officer entering into such contract that funds have been
duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to
cover the proposed contract is available for expenditure on account
thereof; 2 and that a purported contract entered into contrary to the
requirements just stated is wholly void, the petitioner's claim that there is
no longer any question as to the validity of the contract entered into by
and between the petitioner and the municipal mayor of Malolos is not
correct.
 Likewise, if the law provides that the provincial auditor or his
representative must check up the deliveries made by a contractor pursuant
to a contract lawfully and validly entered into, 3 and there was no such
check up, the petitioner's claim that there is no longer an issue as to
whether the road construction materials have been actually delivered by
the petitioner and received by the respondent is groundless. The Auditor
General is not in duty bound to pass and allow in audit the sum claimed by
the petitioner if he or his authorized representative did not check up the
delivery of the crushed adobe stone and gravel. To say that the purpose
and aim of this checking requirement is to forestall fraud and collusion is to
state what is obvious.
 The petitioner enlisted the aid of the Presidential Complaints and Action
Committee to request the Auditor General to pass in audit and authorize
the payment or the petitioner's claim. The Auditor General had no
alternative but to comply with the provisions of the law and as the
contract entered into by the municipal mayor of Malolos, Bulacan, was not
in accordance with law, the Auditor General was correct in denying the
petitioner's claim.
 Section 73, Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the Motor Vehicle Law, as
amended by section 2, Republic Act No. 314, invoked by the petitioner,
merely allocates 10 per cent of the money collected under its provisions to
the road and bridge funds of the different municipalities in proportion to
population, as shown in the latest available census, for the repair,
maintenance, and construction of municipal roads. This alone is not
sufficient appropriation and authority to disburse part of the 10 per cent
collected under the Motor Vehicle Law for the purpose of paying the claim
of the petitioner. And the section cited, as amended by section 5 of
Republic Act No. 917, approved on 20 June 1953, provides:
 Moneys collected under the provisions of this Act shall be deposited in a
special trust account in the National Treasury to constitute the Highway
Special Fund, which shall be apportioned and expended in accordance with
the provisions of the Philippine Highway Act of nineteen hundred and fifty-
three. Section 608 of the Revised Administrative Code affords the
petitioner a remedy.
Rivera v. Maclang
Facts: On August 19, 1949 the municipality of Malolos called for bids for furnishing
and delivering materials to be used in the maintenance and repair of barrio roads.
Rivera won in the bidding and was asked by the Municipal Treasurer to come to his
office for execution of the corresponding contract. On August 31, 1949 the contract
was signed by appellant and by Maclang in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of
Malolos. Pursuant thereto appellant subsequently delivered to the municipality
gravel and adobe stones valued at P19,235.00. On October 16, 1951 the Municipal
council of Malolos passed a resolution approving the contract, but in spite of
repeated demands by appellant the price of the materials was not paid.
In 1954 appellant sought the intervention of the Presidential Complaint and Action
Commission, which referred the matter to the General Auditing Office. That office
turned down the claim for payment, whereupon appellant filed in this Court a
petition for review, docketed as SC-G.R. No. L-8847. In its decision of October 31,
1957 this Court sustained the action of the General Auditing Office and held that
the contract in question was void as far as the municipal government of Malolos
was concerned on the ground that no money had been appropriated to meet the
obligation prior to the execution of the contract, as required by section 607 Revised
Administrative Code. However, in the same decision this Court indicated that
section 608 of the same Code afforded appellant a remedy. Consequently, he filed
the present action against defendant- appellee in his personal capacity pursuant to
the said provision. The trial court dismissed the complaint, stating that inasmuch as
in the previous case the contract entered into between appellant and the
Municipality of Malolos had been declared null and void by this Court, "it cannot
produce any legal effect for which thereafter no recovery can be made."
Issue: WON the dismissal is erroneous.
 Our ruling in the previous case is that the contract was null and void vis-a-
vis the Municipality of Malolos, by reason of noncompliance with the
requirement of section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
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states that "except in the case of a contract for supplies to be carried in
stock, no contract involving the expenditure by any province, municipality,
chartered city, or municipal district of two thousand pesos or more shall be
entered into or authorized until the treasurer of the political division
concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into such contract
that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the
amount necessary to cover the proposed contract is available for
expenditure on account thereof."
 It should be noted that the present action is against defendant- appellee in
his personal capacity on the strength of section 608 of the same code,
which provides as follows: SEC. 608.Void contract — Liability of officer. —
A purported contract entered into contrary to the requirements of the
next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer
assuming to make such contract shall be liable to the Government or other
contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the
transaction had been wholly between private parties."
 The position of defendant-appellee, as the officer who signed the contract
with appellant in violation of section 607, comes squarely under the
provision just quoted. His liability is personal, as if the transaction had
been entered into by him as a private party. We take it that the intention
of the law in this respect is to ensure that public officers entering into
transactions with private individuals calling for the expenditure of public
funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government may not be
the victim of ill-advised or improvident action by those assuming to
represent it.
. Municipal Code (Act No. 82) is so apparent and its private or corporate
Palafox v. Province of Ilocos Norte
Facts: a truck driver employed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran
over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work at the construction of a road.
Issue: WON the employee may be held liable.
 The Supreme Court in affirming the trial court's dismissal of the complaint
for damages held that the province could not be made liable because its
employee was in the performance of a governmental function the
construction and maintenance of roads and however tragic and
deplorable it may be, the death of Palafox imposed on the province no
duty to pay monetary consideration.
Mendoza v. De Leon
Facts: This is an action for damages against the individual members of the municipal
council of the municipality of Villasis, Pangasinan, for the revocation of the lease of
an exclusive ferry privilege awarded to the plaintiff under the provisions of Act. No.
1634 of the Philippine Commission. After user of a little more than one year, the
plaintiff was forcibly ejected under and in pursuance of a resolution adopted by the
herein defendants, awarding a franchise for the same ferry to another person.
Issue: WON the municipality may be sued for acts done in the exercise of its
corporate functions.
 Municipalities of the Philippine Islands organized under the Municipal
Code have both governmental and corporate or business functions. Of the
first class are the adoption of regulations against fire and disease,
preservation of the public peace maintenance of municipal prisons,
establishment of primary schools and post-offices, etc. Of the latter class
are the establishment of municipal waterworks for the use of the
inhabitants, the construction and maintenance of municipal
slaughterhouses, markets, stables, bathing establishments, wharves,
ferries, and fisheries. Act No. 1634 provides that the use of each fishery,
fish-breeding ground, ferry, stable, market, slaughterhouse belonging to
any municipality or township shall be let to the highest bidder annually or
for such longer period not exceeding five years as may have been
previously approved by the provincial board of the province in which the
municipality or township is located.
 The twofold character of the powers of a municipality, under our
powers so numerous and important that we find no difficulty in reaching
the conclusion that the general principles governing the liability of such
entities to private individuals as enunciated in the United States are
applicable to it. The distinction between governmental powers on the one
hand, and corporate or proprietary or business powers on the other, as the
latter class is variously described in the reported cases, has long been
recognized in the United States and there is no dissent from the doctrine.
 The municipality is not liable for the acts of its officers or agents in the
performance in the performance of its governmental functions.
Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character by being
delegated to the municipal government. Nor does the fact that such duties
are performed by such officers of the municipality which, for convenience,
the state allows the municipality to select, change their character. To
preserve the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and
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so on is to administer government, whether it be done by the central
government itself or is shifted to a local organization. And the state being
immune for injuries suffered by private individuals in the administration of
strictly governmental functions, like immunity is enjoyed by the
municipality in the performance of the same duties, unless it is expressly
made liable by statute.
 "The state cannot, without its consent expressed through legislation, be
sued for injuries resulting from an act done in the exercise of its lawful
governmental powers and pertaining to the administration of government.
. . . Municipal corporations are agents of the state in the exercise of certain
governmental powers. The preservation of the health and peace of its
inhabitants and fire protections afforded the property owner, are
governmental functions."
 A municipality is not exempt from liability for the negligent performance of
its corporate or proprietary or business functions. In the administration of
its patrimonial property, it is to be regarded as a private corporation or
individual 153113-13 so far as its liability to third persons on contract or in
tort is concerned. Its contracts, valid entered into, may be enforced and
damages may be collected from it for the torts of its officers or agents
within the scope of their employment in precisely the same manner and to
the same extent as those of private corporations or individuals. As to such
matters the principles respondeat superior applies. It is for these purposes
that the municipality is made liable to suits in the courts.
 "Municipal corporations are subject to be sued upon contracts and in tort.
In a previous chapter we have considered at length the authority of such
corporations to make contracts, the mode of exercising, and the effect of
transcending the power. This leaves but little to add in this place
respecting their liability in actions ex contractu. Upon an authorized
contract ---- that is, upon a contract within the scope of the charter or
legislative powers of the corporation and duly made by the proper officers
or agents ---- they are liable in the same manner and to the same extent as
private corporations or natural persons."
 The same author says in section 1647:"The rule of law is a general one,
that the superior or employer must answer civilly for the negligence or
want of skill of his agent or servant in the course or line of his
employment, by which another, who is free from contributory fault, is
injured. Municipal corporations, under the conditions herein stated, fall
within the operation of this rule of law, and are liable, accordingly, to civil
actions for damages when the requisite elements of liability coexist. To
create such liability, it is fundamentally necessary that the act done which
is injurious to others must be within the scope of the corporate powers as
prescribed by charter or positive enactment (the extent of which powers
all persons are bound, at their peril, to know); in other words, it must not
be ultra vires in the sense that it is not within the power or authority of the
corporation to act in reference to it under any circumstances. If the act
complained of necessarily lies wholly outside of the general or special
powers of the corporation as conferred in its charter or by statute, the
corporation can in no event be liable to an action for damages, whether it
directly commanded the performance of the act or whether it be done by
its officers without its express command; for a corporation cannot of
course, be impliedly liable to a greater extent than it could make itself by
express corporate vote or action."
 It often happens that the same agent or agency has both a governmental
and a corporate character. Such, for instance, are a municipal water
system designed both for protection against fire (a governmental function)
and to supply water to the inhabitants for profit (a corporate function) a
municipal light plant both for lighting the streets (a governmental function)
and for furnishing light to the inhabitants at a profit (a corporate function);
an agent who is at the same time a police officer and a caretaker of a
municipal toll bridge. It is, also, sometimes the case that considerable
difficulty is experienced in determining whether a particular municipal
duty is governmental or corporate.
 But questions such as these do not arise in the case at bar. Here it is clear
that the leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified
period of time is not a governmental but corporate function. Such a lease,
when validly entered into, constitutes a contract with the lessee which the
municipality is bound to respect. The matter is thus summed up by Dillon
on Municipal Corporations:"Ordinances made by municipalities under
charter or legislative authority, containing grants to water and light
companies and other public service corporations of the right to use the
street pipes, mains, etc., upon the condition of the performance of service
by the grantee, are, after acceptance and performance by the grantee,
contracts protected by the prohibition of the Federal Constitution against
the enactment of any State Law impairing the obligation of contracts."
 It seems clear, therefore, that under the provisions of the Municipal Code
and Act No. 1634, above referred to, the plaintiff had a vested right to the
exclusive operation of the ferry in question for the period of his lease.
Were the municipality a party to this action, it would be patent that a
judgment for damages against it for the rescission of the contract would be
proper. This, be it said, is the usual method of exacting damages, either ex
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contractu or ex delicto arising from the exercise of corporate powers of
municipalities. But the present action is against the members of the
municipal council personally, and the question arise: Are they liable? In
administering the patrimonial property of municipalities, the municipal
council occupies, for most purposes, the position of a board of directors of
a private corporation. In disposing of the local public utilities, if the term
may be used, such as the fishing and ferry rights, etc., they must exercise
considerable judgment. It requires some considerable amount of business
acumen to compel performance on the part of lessees of these privileges
in accordance with the terms of their leases and in a manner in which will
not cause the property to deteriorate. Questions must continually arise
which are not expressly provided for in the contracts and which must be
settled, if possible, in a manner that will preserve the just claims of the
municipality. Indeed, it is not at all improbable that on occasion the
councilors may have reason to believe that a particular contract has been
rescinded by the other party or has never been legally entered into, in
both of which cases, decisive steps must be taken to safeguard the interest
of the municipality. Thus, in Municipality of Moncada vs. Cajuigan (21 Phil.
Rep., 184), the lessee of a municipal fishery was evicted for failing to pay
his quarterly rents. The municipal authorities rightly held that the contract
was rescinded but forcibly evicted the lessee instead of resorting to the
courts. Hence, in an action by the municipality against the lessee and his
bondsmen to recover rent arrears, damages were allowed the lessee on his
counterclaim for the loss caused by the forcible eviction. Nevertheless, we
do not think the councilors could have been personally held liable for their
error in resorting to forcible eviction of the lessee. Theirs was an error of
judgment, and honest mistake on their part as to the rights of the
municipality in the premises. We think the rule of personal liability should
be with municipal councilors in such matters as it is with the directors or
managers of an ordinary private corporation.
 "Under the rule that directors are not liable for mistakes of judgment, it
follows naturally that they are not liable for the mismanagement of the
corporate affairs where such mismanagement is a mistake of judgment.
The wisdom of this rule is not only approved by common experience but by
law writers and all courts. A rule so rigid as to hold directors personally
liable for honest mistakes in corporate management would deter all
prudent business men from accepting such positions. The remedy of
stockholders in all such cases is by a change in the directory. . . . The rule is
that the courts will not interfere even in doubtful cases. But directors and
managing directors may be liable for mismanagement to warrant the
interposition of a court either as against the contemplated action of the
directors, or a majority of the stockholders, or to give relief by way of
damages after the action has been taken; a case must be made out which
plainly shows that such action is so far opposed to the true interests of the
corporation itself as to lead to the clear inference that no thus acting could
have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests, but
that he must have acted with an intent to subserve some outside purpose,
regardless of the consequences to the corporation, and in a manner
inconsistent with its interests."
 In the case at bar, there is not a scintilla of evidence that there was any
justifiable reason for forcibly evicting the plaintiff from the ferry which he
had leased. On the contrary, the defendant councilors attempted to justify
their action on the ground that the ferry which he was operating was not
the one leased to him; this in spite of the fact the vice-president had
personally placed him in possession of it more than a year before, and the
fact that he had operated this ferry for over a year, evidently with the
knowledge of the defendants. The evidence is so clear that the ferry of
which the plaintiff was dispossessed was the one which he had leased that
no reasonable man would entertain any doubt whatever upon the
question. Hence, we cannot say that in rescinding the contract with the
plaintiff, thereby making the municipality liable to an action for damages
for no valid reason at all, the defendant councilors were honestly acting for
the interests of the municipality. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the
defendants are liable jointly and severally for the damages sustained by
the plaintiff from the rescission of his contract of lease of the ferry
privilege in question. In reaching this conclusion, we have not failed to take
into consideration the rule enunciated in Dennison vs. The Moro Province
nor the distinction made by the courts in the United States between the
liability of a municipal corporation, made such by acceptance of a village or
city charter, and the involuntary quasi corporations known as counties,
towns, schools districts, and especially the townships of New England.
Upon the question of the amount of damages sustained, we accept the
findings of the lower court.
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme
Facts: At about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a collision occurred
involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate
of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned
by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La
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Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the
jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained
and four (4) others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries. On December 11,
1966, the private respondents instituted a complaint for damages against the Estate
of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of the
passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First
Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid
defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a
dump truck of petitioner. Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to
Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge and was subsequently docketed as
Civil Case No. 107-Bg. By virtue of a court order dated May 7, 1975, the private
respondents amended the complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular
employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants. Petitioner
filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-
suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of the
owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
In the course of the proceedings, the respondent judge issued the following
questioned orders: (1) Order dated November 4, 1975 dismissing the cross-claim
against Bernardo Balagot; (2) Order dated July 13, 1976 admitting the Amended
Answer of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and Bislig and setting the
hearing on the affirmative defenses only with respect to the supposed lack of
jurisdiction; (3) Order dated August 23, 1976 deferring the resolution of the
grounds for the Motion to Dismiss until the trial; (4) Order dated February 23, 1977
denying the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13, 1976 filed by the
Municipality and Bislig for having been filed out of time; (5) Order dated March 16,
1977 reiterating the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order of July 13,
1976; (6) Order dated July 26, 1979 declaring the case deemed submitted for
decision it appearing that parties have not yet submitted their respective
memoranda despite the court's direction; and (7) Order dated September 7, 1979
denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and or order to recall
prosecution witnesses for cross examination. TC: defendants Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and Alfredo Bislig are ordered to pay jointly and severally,
plaintiffs Juana Rimando-Baniña, Mrs. Priscilla B. Surell, Laureano Baniña, Jr., Sor
Marietta Baniña, Mrs. Fe B. Soriano, Montano Baniña, Orja Baniña and Lydia B.
Baniña the sums of P1,500.00 as funeral expenses and P24,744.24 as the lost
expected earnings of the late Laureano Baniña Sr., P30,000.00 as moral damages,
and P2,500.00 as attorney's fees. Costs against said defendants.The Complaint is
dismissed as to defendants Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot. MR,
MNT. MR denied. Finally, the respondent judge issued an order dated December 3,
1979 providing that if defendants municipality and Bislig further wish to pursue the
matter disposed of in the order of July 26, 1979, such should be elevated to a higher
court in accordance with the Rules of Court. Hence, this petition.
Issue: 1. WON the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
 In the case at bar, the respondent judge deferred the resolution of the
defense of non-suability of the State amounting to lack of jurisdiction until
trial. However, said respondent judge failed to resolve such defense,
proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and its driver. The respondent judge did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when in the exercise of its judgment it arbitrarily failed
to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the State in the guise of the
municipality. However, said judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction when
in his decision dated October 10, 1979 he held the municipality liable for
the quasi-delict committed by its regular employee.
 The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in
Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution, to wit: "the State may not be
sued without its consent." Stated in simple parlance, the general rule is
that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued.
Consent takes the form of express or implied consent. Express consent
may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent
of the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising
from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. A special law may be passed to
enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict, as in
Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands. Consent is implied when
the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the
level of the other contracting party, and also when the State files a
complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim.
 Municipal corporations, for example, like provinces and cities, are agencies
of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and
therefore should enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit. Nevertheless,
they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because
their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
 A distinction should first be made between suability and liability. "Suability
depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable
law and the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does
not necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be
held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded
by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the
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state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the
chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable."
2. WON the municipality is liable for the torts committed by its employee, the
test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver,
acting in behalf of the municipality, is performing governmental or
proprietary functions.
 Torio v. Fontanilla: the distinction of powers becomes important for
purposes of determining the liability of the municipality for the acts of its
agents which result in an injury to third persons.
 City of Kokomo v. Loy: "Municipal corporations exist in a dual capacity, and
their functions are twofold. In one they exercise the right springing from
sovereignty, and while in the performance of the duties pertaining thereto,
their acts are political and governmental. Their officers and agents in such
capacity, though elected or appointed by them, are nevertheless public
functionaries performing a public service, and as such they are officers,
agents, and servants of the state. In the other capacity the municipalities
exercise a private, proprietary or corporate right, arising from their
existence as legal persons and not as public agencies. Their officers and
agents in the performance of such functions act in behalf of the
municipalities in their corporate or individual capacity, and not for the
state or sovereign power.
 It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in
the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only
if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the
right to show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental
capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
 In the case at bar, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists
that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and
gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence
of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of
official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Hence, We rule that the driver of the dump truck
was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
 Palafox, et. al. v. Province of Ilocos Norte, the District Engineer, and the
Provincial Treasurer: that "the construction or maintenance of roads in
which the truck and the driver worked at the time of the accident are
admittedly governmental activities." After a careful examination of existing
laws and jurisprudence, We arrive at the conclusion that the municipality
cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who
was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the
death of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed
on the municipality no duty to pay monetary compensation.
Fernando et al v. CA and City of Davao
Facts: On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's
Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to bid was
issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and
Antonio Suñer, Jr. Bascon won the bid. On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified
and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on
November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead
inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of
Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional
Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's office investigated the case and
learned that the five victims entered the septic tank without clearance from it nor
with the knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was
found to be almost empty and the victims were presumed to be the ones who did
the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and
in his reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as `asphyxia' caused by the
diminution of oxygen supply in the body working below normal conditions. The
lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemmorrhagic areas and this was due to
their intake of toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the
waste matter inside the septic tank." TC: dismissed. IAC/CA: reversed. MR:reversed.
Issue: 1. WON Davao City guilty of negligence in the case at bar.
2. WON such negligence the immediate and proximate cause of deaths of
the victims hereof.
 Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of
the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Under the law, a person who by his omission causes
damage to another, there being negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done (Article 2176, New Civil Code).
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 To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of
another, a claimant must establish the relation between the omission and
the damage. He must drove under Article 2179 of the New Civil Code that
the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury.
 Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if
the claimant did not in any way contribute to the negligence of the
defendant. However, where the resulting injury was the product of the
negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern which acts
shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident.
 Petitioners fault the city government of Davao for failing to clean a septic
tank for the period of 19 years resulting in an accumulation of hydrogen
sulfide gas which killed the laborers. They contend that such failure was
compounded by the fact that there was no warning sign of the existing
danger and no efforts exerted by the public respondent to neutralize or
render harmless the effects of the toxic gas. They submit that the public
respondent's gross negligence was the proximate cause of the fatal
incident. We do not subscribe to this view. While it may be true that the
public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank
annually, such negligence was not a continuing one. Upon learning from
the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of
the public toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent
immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service.
Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr. Feliciano Bascon.
The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial
measures to meet the situation. It is likewise an undisputed fact that
despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since
1956, people in the market have been using the public toilet for their
personal necessities but have remained unscathed.
 The absence of any accident was due to the public respondent's
compliance with the sanitary and plumbing specifications in constructing
the toilet and the septic tank. Hence, the toxic gas from the waste matter
could not have leaked out because the septic tank was air-tight. The only
indication that the septic tank in the case at bar was full and needed
emptying was when water came out from it. Yet, even when the septic
tank was full, there was no report of any casualty of gas poisoning despite
the presence of people living near it or passing on top of it or using the
public toilet for their personal necessities. Petitioners made a lot of fuss
over the lack of any ventilation pipe in the toilet to emphasize the
negligence of the city government and presented witnesses to attest on
this lack. However, this strategy backfired on their faces. Their witnesses
were not expert witnesses. On the other hand, Engineer Demetrio
Alindada of the city government testified and demonstrated by drawings
how the safety requirements like emission of gases in the construction of
both toilet and septic tank have been complied with. He stated that the
ventilation pipe need not be constructed outside the building as it could
also be embodied in the hollow blocks as is usually done in residential
buildings. The petitioners submitted no competent evidence to
corroborate their oral testimonies or rebut the testimony given by Engr.
Alindada. We also do not agree with the petitioner's submission that
warning signs of noxious gas should have been put up in the toilet in
addition to the signs of "MEN" and "WOMEN" already in place in that area.
Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694
of the New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the
protection of the public. While the construction of these public facilities
demands utmost compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the
putting up of warning signs is not one of those requirements.
 In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic
gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless one removes
its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on
their own and without authority from the public respondent opened the
septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank
especially one which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent
person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The victims
are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of
service, who is presumed to know the hazards of the job. His failure,
therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their
safety was the proximate cause of the accident. The fatal accident in this
case would not have happened but for the victims' negligence. Thus, the
appellate court was correct to observe that: ". . . Could the victims have
died if they did not open the septic tank which they were not in the first
place authorized to open? Who between the passive object (septic tank)
and the active subject (the victims herein) who, having no authority
therefore, arrogated unto themselves, the task of opening the septic tank
which caused their own deaths should be responsible for such deaths. How
could the septic tank which has been in existence since the 1950's be the
proximate cause of an accident that occurred only on November 22, 1975?
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The stubborn fact remains that since 1956 up to occurrence of the accident
in 1975 no injury nor death was caused by the septic tank. The only
reasonable conclusion that could be drawn from the above is that the
victims death was caused by their own negligence in opening the septic
tank . . ."
 Petitioners further contend that the failure of the market master to
supervise the area where the septic tank is located is a reflection of the
negligence of the public respondent. We do not think so. The market
master knew that work on the septic tank was still forthcoming. It must be
remembered that the bidding had just been conducted. Although the
winning bidder was already known, the award to him was still to be made
by the Committee on Awards. Upon the other hand, the accident which
befell the victims who are not in any way connected with the winning
bidder happened before the award could be given. Considering that there
was yet no award and order to commence work on the septic tank, the
duty of the market master or his security guards to supervise the work
could not have started. Also, the victims could not have been seen working
in the area because the septic tank was hidden by a garbage storage which
is more or less ten (10) meters away from the comfort room itself. The
surreptitious way in which the victims did their job without clearance from
the market master or any of the security guards goes against their good
faith. Even their relatives or family members did not know of their plan to
clean the septic tank.
 Finally, petitioners insistence on the applicability of Article 24 of the New
Civil Code cannot be sustained. Said law states: "Art. 24. In all
contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence,
mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be
vigilant for his protection." We approve of the appellate court's ruling that
"(w)hile one of the victims was invited to bid for said project, he did not
win the bid, therefore, there is a total absence of contractual relations
between the victims and the City Government of Davao City that could give
rise to any contractual obligation, much less, any liability on the part of
Davao City." The accident was indeed tragic and We empathize with the
petitioners. However, the herein circumstances lead Us to no other
conclusion than that the proximate and immediate cause of the death of
the victims was due to their own negligence. Consequently, the petitioners
cannot demand damages from the public respondent.
Tuzon and Mapagu v. CA and Jurado (supra, see p. )
Torio v. Fintanilla
Facts: On October 21, 1958, the Municipal Council of Malasiqui, Pangasinan, passed
Resolution No. 159 whereby "it resolved to manage the 1959 Malasiqui town fiesta
celebration on January 21, 22, and 23, 1959." Resolution No. 182 was also passed
creating the "1959 Malasiqui Town Fiesta Executive Committee" which in turn
organized a subcommittee on entertainment and stage, with Jose Macaraeg as
Chairman. The council appropriated the amount of P100.00 for the construction of
2 stages, one for the "zarzuela" and another for the "cancionan". The "zarzuela"
entitled "Midas Extravanganza" was donated by an association of Malasiqui
employees of the Manila Railroad Company in Caloocan, Rizal. The troupe arrived in
the evening of January 22 for the performance and one of the members of the
group was Vicente Fontanilla. The program started at about 10:15 o'clock that
evening with some speeches, and many persons went up the stage. The "zarzuela"
then began but before the dramatic part of the play was reached, the stage
collapsed and Vicente Fontanilla who was at the rear of the stage was pinned
underneath. Fontanilla was taken to the San Carlos General Hospital where he died
in the afternoon of the following day. The heirs of Vicente Fontanilla filed a
complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 11, 1959 to
recover damages. TC: Executive Committee appointed by the municipal council had
exercised due diligence and care like a good father of the family in selecting a
competent man to construct a stage strong enough for the occasion and that if it
collapsed that was due to forces beyond the control of the committee on
entertainment, consequently, the defendants were not liable for damages for the
death of Vicente Fontanilla. The complaint was accordingly dismissed in a decision
dated July 10, 1962. CA reversed.
Issue: Is the celebration of a town fiesta an undertaking in the exercise of a
municipality's governmental or public function or is it of a private or proprietary
character?
 Holding of the town fiesta in 1959 by the municipality of Malasiqui
Pangasinan, was an exercise of a private or proprietary function of the
municipality.
 Chapter on Municipal Law of the Revised Administrative Code provides:
Section 2282. Celebration of fiesta. A fiesta may be held in each
municipality not oftener than once a year upon a date fixed by the
municipal council. A fiesta shall not be held upon any other date than that
lawfully fixed therefor, except when, for weighty reasons, such as
typhoons, inundations, earthquakes, epidemics, or other public calamities,
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the fiesta cannot be held in the date fixed, in which case it may be held at a
later date in the same year, by resolution of the council."
 This provision simply gives authority to the municipality to accelebrate a
yearly fiesta but it does not impose upon it a duty to observe one. Holding
a fiesta even if the purpose is to commemorate a religious or historical
event of the town is in essence an act for the special benefit of the
community and not for the general welfare of the public performed in
pursuance of a policy of the state. The mere fact that the celebration, as
claimed, was not to secure profit or gain but merely to provide
entertainment to the town inhabitants is not a conclusive test. For
instance, the maintenance of parks is not a source of income for the town,
nonetheless it is private undertaking as distinguished from the
maintenance of public schools, jails, and the like which are for public
service. There can be no hard and fast rule for purposes of determining
the true nature of an undertaking or function of a municipality; the
surrounding circumstances of a particular case are to be considered and
will be decisive. The basic element, however beneficial to the public the
undertaking may be, is that it is governmental in essence, otherwise, the
function becomes private or proprietary in character. Easily, no
governmental or public policy of the state is involved in the celebration of
a town fiesta.
2. WON under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner-municipality is
to be held liable for damages for the death of Vicente Fontanilla if that was
attributable to the negligence of the municipality's officers, employees, or
agents. YES.
 "Art. 2176, Civil Code: Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. . . ." "Art. 2180. Civil Code: The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omission, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible . . ."
 On this point, the Court of Appeals found and held that there was
negligence. The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Angel
Novado, a witness of the defendants (now petitioners), that a member of
the "extravaganza troupe" removed two principal braces located on the
front portion of the stage and used them to hang the screen or "telon",
and that when many people went up the stage the latter collapsed. This
testimony was not believed however by respondent appellate court, and
rightly so. According to said defendants, those two braces were "mother"
or "principal" braces located semi-diagonally from the front ends of the
stage to the front posts of the ticket booth located at the rear of the stage
and were fastened with a bamboo twine. That being the case, it becomes
incredible that any person in his right mind would remove those principal
braces and leave the front portion of the stage practically unsupported.
Moreover, if that did happen, there was indeed negligence as there was
lack of supervision over the use of the stage to prevent such an
occurrence. At any rate, the guitarist who was pointed to by Novado as the
person who removed the two bamboo braces denied having done so. The
Court of Appeals said. "Amor by himself alone could not have removed the
two braces which must be about ten meters long and fastened them on
top of the stage for the curtain. The stage was only five and a half meters
wide Surely, it would be impractical and unwieldy to use a ten meter
bamboo pole, much more two poles, for the stage curtain." The appellate
court also found that the stage was not strong enough considering that
only P100.00 was appropriate for the construction of two stages and while
the floor of the "zarzuela" stage was of wooden planks, the posts and
braces used were of bamboo material. We likewise observe that although
the stage was described by the petitioners as being supported by "24"
posts, nevertheless there were only 4 in front, 4 at the rear, and 5 on each
side. Where were the rest?
 The Court of Appeals thus concluded: "The court a quo itself attributed the
collapse of the stage to the great number of onlookers who mounted the
stage. The municipality and/or its agents had the necessary means within
its command to prevent such an occurrence. Having failed to take the
necessary steps to maintain the safety of the stage for the use of the
participants in the stage presentation prepared in connection with the
celebration of the town fiesta, particularly, in preventing nonparticipants
or spectators from mounting and accumulating on the stage which was not
constructed to meet the additional weight, the defendants-appellees were
negligent and are liable for the death of Vicente Fontanilla."
 The findings of the respondent appellate court that the facts as presented
to it establish negligence as a matter of law and that the Municipality
failed to exercise the due diligence of a good father of the family, will not
disturbed by Us in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion
or a gross misapprehension of facts. Liability rests on negligence which is
"the want of such care as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise
under the circumstances of the case."
 Thus, private respondents argue that the "Midas Extravaganza" which was
to be performed during the town fiesta was a "donation" offered by an
association of Malasiqui employees of the Manila Railroad Co. in Caloocan,
and that when the Municipality of Malasiqui accepted the donation of
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services and constructed precisely a "zarzuela stage" for the purpose, the
participants in the stage show had the right to expect that the Municipality
through its "Committee on entertainment and stage" would build or put
up a stage or platform strong enough to sustain the weight or burden of
the performance and take the necessary measures to insure the personal
safety of the participants. We agree.
 Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 1942, which was an action against the city
for injuries sustained from a fall when plaintiff was descending the steps of
the city auditorium. The city was conducting a "Know your City Week" and
one of the features was the showing of a motion picture in the city
auditorium to which the general public was invited and plaintiff Sanders
was one of those who attended. In sustaining the award for damages in
favor of plaintiff, the District Court of Appeal, Second district, California,
held inter alia that the "Know your City Week" was a "proprietary activity"
and not a "governmental one" of the city, that defendant owed to plaintiff,
an "invitee", the duty of exercising ordinary care for her safety, and
plaintiff was entitled to assume that she would not be exposed to a danger
(which in this case consisted of lack of sufficient illumination of the
premises) that would come to her through a violation of defendant's duty.
 We can say that the deceased Vicente Fontanilla was similarly situated as
Sanders. The Municipality of Malasiqui resolved to celebrate the town
fiesta in January of 1959; it created a committee in charge of the
entertainment and stage; an association of Malasiqui residents responded
to the call for the festivities and volunteered to present a stage show;
Vicente Fontanilla was one of the participants who like Sanders had the
right to expect that he would be exposed to danger on that occasion.
 Lastly, petitioner or appellant Municipality cannot evade responsibility
and/or liability under the claim that it was Jose Macaraeg who constructed
the stage. The municipality acting through its municipal council appointed
Macaraeg as chairman of the sub-committee on entertainment and in
charge of the construction of the "zarzuela" stage. Macaraeg acted merely
as an agent of the Municipality. Under the doctrine of respondent superior
mentioned earlier, petitioner is responsible or liable for the negligence of
its agent acting within his assigned tasks.
 ". . . when it is sought to render a municipal corporation liable for the act
of servants or agents, a cardinal inquiry is, whether they are the servants
or agents of the corporation. If the corporation appoints or elects them,
can control them in the discharge of their duties, can continue or remove
them, can hold them responsible f or the manner in which they discharge
their trust, and if those duties relate to the exercise of corporate powers,
and are for the peculiar benefit of the corporation in its local or special
interest, they may justly be regarded as its agents or servants, and the
maxim of respondent superior applies."
3. WON municipality councilors who enacted the ordinance and created the
fiesta committee are liable.
 The Court of Appeals held the councilors jointly and solidarily liable with
the municipality for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code which
provides that "any person suffering material or moral loss because a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the
latter."
 In their Petition for review the municipal councilors allege that the Court of
Appeals erred in ruling that the holding of a town fiesta is not a
governmental function and that there was negligence on their part for not
maintaining and supervising the safe use of the stage, in applying Article 27
of the Civil Code against them, and in not holding Jose Macaraeg liable for
the collapse of the stage and the consequent death of Vicente Fontanilla.
 We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in applying
Article 27 of the Civil Code against them, for this particular article covers a
case of non-feasance or non-performance by a public officer of his official
duty; it does not apply to a case of negligence or misfeasance in carrying
out an official duty. If We are led to set aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals insofar as these petitioners are concerned, it is because of plain
error committed by respondent court which however is not invoked in
petitioners' brief.
 Miguel v. CA: the Supreme Court is vested with ample authority to review
matters not assigned as errors in an appeal if it finds that their
consideration and resolution are indispensable or necessary in arriving at a
just decision in a given case, and that this is authorized under Sec. 7, Rule
51 of the Rules of Court. We believe that this pronouncement can well be
applied in the instant case.
 The Court of Appeals in its decision now under review held that the
celebration of a town fiesta by the Municipality of Malasiqui was not a
governmental function. We upheld that ruling. The legal consequence
thereof is that the Municipality stands on the same footing as an ordinary
private corporation with the municipal council acting as its board of
directors. It is an elementary principle that a corporation has a personality,
separate and distinct from its officers, directors, or persons composing it
and the latter are not as a rule co-responsible in an action for damages for
tort or negligence (culpa aquiliana) committed by the corporation's
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employees or agents unless there is a showing of bad faith or gross or
wanton negligence on their part.
 "The ordinary doctrine is that a Director, merely by reason of his office, is
not personally liable for the torts of his corporation; he must be shown to
have personally voted for or otherwise participated in them."
 "Officers of a corporation 'are not held liable for the negligence of the
corporation merely because of their official relation to it, but because of
some wrongful or negligent act by such officer amounting to a breach of
duty which resulted in an injury . . . To make an officer of a corporation
liable for the negligence of the corporation there must have been upon his
part such a breach of duty as contributed to, or helped to bring about, the
injury; that is to say, he must be a participant in the wrongful act."
"Directors who merely employ one to give n fireworks exhibition on the
corporate grounds are not personally liable for the negligent acts of the
exhibitor."
 On these principles We absolve the municipal councilors from any liability
for the death of Vicente Fontanilla. The records do not show that said
petitioners directly participated in the defective construction of the
"zarzuela" stage or that they personally permitted spectators to go up the
platform.
Teotico v. City of Manila
Facts: On January 27, 1958, at about 8:00 p.m., Teotico was at the corner of the Old
Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
waiting for a jeepney to take him down town. After waiting for about five minutes,
he managed to hail a jeepney that came along to a stop. As he stepped down from
the curb to board the jeepney, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered
and unlighted catchbasin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, his head
hit the rim of the manhole breaking his eyeglasses and causing broken pieces
thereof to pierce his left eyelid. As blood flowed therefrom, impairing his vision,
several persons came to his assistance and pulled him out of the manhole. One of
them brought Teotico to the Philippine General Hospital, where his injuries were
treated, after which he was taken home. In addition to the lacerated wound in his
left upper eyelid, Teotico suffered contusions on the left thigh, the left upper arm,
the right leg and the upper lip, apart from an abrasion on the right infra-patella
region. These injuries and the allergic eruptions caused by anti-tetanus injections
administered to him in the hospital, required further medical treatment by a private
practitioner who charged therefor P1,400.00. As a consequence of the foregoing
occurrence, Teotico filed, with the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint —
which was, subsequently, amended — for damages against the City of Manila, its
mayor, city engineer, city health officer, city treasurer and chief of police. As stated
in the decision of the trial court, and quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals,
"At the time of the incident, plaintiff was a practicing public accountant, a
businessman and a professor at the University of the East. He held responsible
positions in various business firms like the Philippine Merchandising Co., the A. U.
Valencia and Co., the Silver Swan Manufacturing Company and the Sincere Packing
Corporation. He was also associated with several civic organizations such as the
Wack Wack Golf Club, the Chamber of Commerce of the Philippines, Y's Men Club
of Manila and the Knight's of Rizal. As a result of the incident, plaintiff was
prevented from engaging in his customary occupation for twenty days. Plaintiff has
lost a daily income of about P50.00 during his incapacity to work. Because of the
incident, he was subjected to humiliation and ridicule by his business associates and
friends. During the period of his treatment, plaintiff was under constant fear and
anxiety for the welfare of his minor children since he was their only support. Due to
the filing of this case, plaintiff has obligated himself to pay his counsel the sum of
P2,000.00. "On the other hand, the defense presented evidence, oral and
documentary, to prove that the Storm Drain Section, Office of the City Engineer of
Manila, received a report of the uncovered condition of a catchbasin at the corner
of P. Burgos and Old Luneta Streets, Manila, on January 24, 1958, but the same was
covered on the same day; that again the iron cover of the same catchbasin was
reported missing on January 30, 1958, but the said cover was replaced the next day;
that the Office of the City Engineer never received any report to the effect that the
catchbasin in question was not covered between January 25 and 29, 1958; that it
has always been a policy of the said office, which is charged with the duty of
installation, repair and care of storm drains in the City of Manila, that whenever a
report is received from whatever source of the loss of a catchbasin cover, the
matter is immediately attended to, either by immediately replacing the missing
cover or covering the catchbasin with steel matting; that because of the lucrative
scrap iron business then prevailing, stealing of iron catchbasin covers was rampant;
that the Office of the City Engineer has filed complaints in court resulting from theft
of said iron covers; that in order to prevent such thefts, the city government has
changed the position and layout of catch basins in the City by constructing them
under the sidewalk with concrete cement covers and openings on the sides of the
gutter; and that these changes had been undertaken by the city from time to time
whenever funds were available." After appropriate proceedings the Court of First
Instance of Manila rendered the aforementioned decision sustaining the theory of
the defendants and dismissing the amended complaint, without costs.
On appeal taken by plaintiff, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
except insofar as the City of Manila is concerned, which was sentenced to pay
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damages in the aggregate sum of P6,750.00. Hence, this appeal by the City of
Manila.
Issue: 1. Is the case is governed by Section 4 of RA 409 (Charter of the City of
Manila) or Article 2189, CC.
 Sec 4, RA 409: "The city shall not be liable or held for damages or injuries
to persons or property arising from the failure of the Mayor, the Municipal
Board, or any other city officer, to enforce the provisions of this chapter, or
any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of said Mayor, Municipal
Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." 2189: "Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for
damages for the death of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of
the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and
other public works under their control or supervision."
 Manila maintains that the former provision should prevail over the latter,
because Republic Act 409 is a special law, intended exclusively for the City
of Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to the entire
Philippines.
 The Court of Appeals, however, applied the Civil Code, and, we think,
correctly. It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned,
Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general
legislation; but, as regards the subject- matter of the provisions above
quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating
the liability of the City of Manila for "damages or injury to persons or
property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions
of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting
to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil
Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and
municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by,
any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective condition of
roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their
control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability
arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof,
whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets, "in
particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective
condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
2. Won the City cannot be held liable for damages because the incident
involving him took place in a national highway and because the it has not
been negligent in connection therewith.
 Such is based upon an allegation of fact not made in the answer of the City.
Moreover, Teotico alleged in his complaint, as well as in his amended
complaint, that his injuries were due to the defective condition of a street
which is "under the supervision and control" of the City. In its answer to
the amended complaint, the City, in turn, alleged that "the streets
aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good condition
and regularly inspected and the storm drains and manholes thereof
covered, by the defendant City and its officers concerned" who "have been
ever vigilant and zealous in the performance of their respective functions
and duties as imposed upon them by law." Thus, the City had, in effect,
admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and
supervision. Moreover, the assertion to the effect that said avenue is a
national highway was made, for the first time, in its motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Such assertion
raised, therefore, a question of fact, which had not been put in issue in the
trial court, and can not be set up, for the first time, on appeal, much less
after the rendition of the decision of the appellate court, in a motion for
the reconsideration thereof.
 At any rate, under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets
belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality
have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance
would not necessarily detract from its "control or supervision" by the City
of Manila, under Republic Act 409. In fact Section 18(x) thereof provides:
Legislative powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following
legislative powers: (x) Subject to the provisions of existing law to
provide for the laying out, construction and improvement, and to regulate
the use of streets, avenues, alleys, sidewalks, wharves, piers, parks,
cemeteries, and other public places; to provide for lighting, cleaning, and
sprinkling of streets and public places; . . . to provide for the inspection of,
fix the license fees for and regulate the openings in the same for the laying
of gas, water, sewer and other pipes, the building and repair of tunnels,
sewers, and drains, and all structures in and under the same and the
erecting of poles and the stringing of wires therein; to provide for and
regulate cross-walks, curbs, and gutters therein; . . . to regulate traffic and
sales upon the streets and other public places; to provide for the
abatement of nuisances in the same and punish the authors or owners
thereof; to provide for the construction and maintenance, and regulate the
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use, of bridges, viaducts, and culverts; to prohibit and regulate ball playing,
kiteflying, hoop rolling, and other amusements which may annoy persons
using the streets and public places, or frighten horses or other animals; to
regulate the speed of horses and other animals, motor and other vehicles,
cars, and locomotives within the limits of the city; to regulate the lights
used on all such vehicles, cars, and locomotives; . . . to provide for and
change the location, grade, and crossing of railroads, and compel any such
railroad to raise or lower its tracks to conform to such provisions or
changes; and to require railroad companies to fence their property, or any
part thereof, to provide suitable protection against injury to persons or
property, and to construct and repair ditches, drains, sewers, and culverts
along and under their tracts, so that the natural drainage of the streets and
adjacent property shall not be obstructed."
 This authority has been neither withdrawn nor restricted by Republic Act
No. 917 and Executive Order No. 113, dated May 2, 1955, upon which the
City relies. Said Act governs the disposition or appropriation of the highway
funds and the giving of aid to provinces, chartered cities and municipalities
in the construction of roads and streets within their respective boundaries,
and Executive Order No. 113 merely implements the provisions of said
Republic Act No. 917, concerning the disposition and appropriation of the
highway funds. Moreover, it provides that "the construction, maintenance
and improvement of national primary, national secondary and national aid
provincial and city roads shall be accomplished by the Highway District
Engineers and Highway City Engineers under the supervision of the
Commissioner of Public Highways and shall be financed from such
appropriations as may be authorized by the Republic of the Philippines in
annual or special appropriation Acts."
 Then, again, the determination of whether or not P. Burgos Avenue is
under the control or supervision of the City of Manila and whether the
latter is guilty of negligence, in connection with the maintenance of said
road, which were decided by the Court of Appeals in the affirmative, is one
of fact, and the findings of said Court, thereon are not subject to our
review.
Abella v. City of Naga
Facts: The municipality of Naga by resolution ordered the closing of that part of a
municipal street which ran between the public market and the plaintiff's property,
and used the closed thoroughfare to expand the market. As a consequence of this
resolution, and immediately after the passage of the same, - says the agreement -
permanent, semi-permanent, as well as temporary constructions were allowed by
the defendant municipality of Naga along the sidewalk of Plaintiff's property and
abutting to said property, facing P. Prieto Street, and extending out in the middle of
the same street, hence depriving the plaintiff's property of access to said street, and
consequently retarding her reconstructions. "It was further stipulated "that if all the
damages is to be awarded the plaintiff, the same should not exceed the sum of
Three hundred pesos (P300)." Naga: "it acted and exercised its police power"
"prompted to preserve the peace and good order of the community and promote
the general welfare;" and this being the case, it believes that it is not liable for
damages.
Issue: WON Naga is liable.
 The municipality or city of Naga was not charged with any unlawful act, or
with acting without authority, or with invasion of plaintiff's property rights;
the basis of the lower court's decision in Section 2246 of the Revised
Administrative Code copied in appellant's brief, which provides that no
municipal road, street, etc. or any part thereof "shall be closed without
indemnifying any person prejudiced thereby."
 The question then for determination by the court below was reduced to
whether the plaintiff was prejudiced by defendant municipality's action.
That she was economically damaged, the stipulation of facts admits; and
that the indemnity assessed is within the bounds of the damages suffered,
there is no dispute. As a matter of fact, the damages awarded seem to be
nominal judged by the description of the plaintiff's interests adversely
affected by the conversion of P. Prieto Street into a market. The appeal is
absolutely without merit, and the appealed decision will be affirmed, with
costs against the appellant.
Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo
Facts: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the amount of
P42,966.40, being the purchase price of two strips of land, one on Calle J. M. Basa
consisting of 592 square meters, and the other on Calle Aldiguer consisting of 59
square meters, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for widening said
street. The Court of First Instance of Iloilo sentenced the said municipality to pay
the plaintiff the amount so claimed, plus the interest, and the said judgment was on
appeal affirmed by this court. On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo
was unable to pay the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution
issue against the property of the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff
attached two auto trucks used for street sprinkling, one police patrol automobile,
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the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and Mandurriao and the concrete
structures, with the corresponding lots, used as markets by Iloilo, Molo, and
Mandurriao. After notice of the sale of said property had been made, and a few
days before the sale, the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion which the Court of
First Instance praying that the attachment on the said property be dissolved, that
the said attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and violative of the
rights of the defendant municipality. Plaintiffs counsel objected o the fiscal's motion
but the court, by order of August 12, 1925, declared the attachment levied upon
the aforementioned property of the defendant municipality null and void, thereby
dissolving the said attachment.
Issue: WON the property levied upon is exempt from execution.
 The municipal law, section 2165 of the Administrative Code, provides that:
Municipalities are political bodies corporate, and as such are endowed
with the faculties of municipal corporations, to be exercised by and
through their respective municipal government in conformity with law.It
shall be competent for them, in their proper corporate name, to sue and
be sued, to contract and be contracted with, to acquire and hold real and
personal property for municipal purposes, and generally to exercise the
powers hereinafter specified or otherwise conferred upon them by law.
 For the purposes of the matter here in question, the Administrative Code
does not specify the kind of property that a municipality may acquire.
However, article 343 of the Civil Code divides the property of provinces
and towns (municipalities) into property for public use and patrimonial
property. According to article 344 of the same Code, provincial roads and
foot-path, squares, streets, fountains and public waters, drives and public
improvements of general benefit built at the expense of the said towns or
provinces, are property for public use. All other property possessed by the
said towns and provinces is patrimonial and shall be subject to the
provisions of the Civil Code except as provided by special laws.
 It is generally held that property owned by a municipality, where not used
for a public purpose but for quasi private purposes, is subject to execution
on a judgment against the municipality, and may be sold. This rule applies
to shares of stock owned by a municipal corporation, and the like. But the
mere fact that corporate property held for public uses is being temporarily
used for private purposes does not make it subject execution.
 If municipal property exempt from execution is destroyed, the insurance
money stands in lieu thereof and is also exempt. The members or
inhabitants of a municipal corporation proper are not personally liable for
the debts of the municipality, except that in the New England States the
individual liability of the inhabitant is generally maintained.
 The special concession of the right of usufruct in a public market cannot be
attached like any ordinary right, because that would be to permit a person
who has contracted with the state or with the administrative officials
thereof to conduct and manage a service of a public character, to be
substituted, without the knowledge and consent of the administrative
authorities, by one who took no part in the contract, thus giving rise to the
possibility of the regular course of a public service being disturbed by the
more or less legal action of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the
public interests.
 The privilege or franchise granted to a private person to enjoy the usufruct
of a public market cannot lawfully be attached and sold, and a creditor of
such person can recover his debt only out of the income or revenue
obtained by the debtor from the enjoyment or usufruct of the said
privilege, in the same manner that the rights of such creditors of a railroad
company can be exercised and their credit collected only out of the gross
receipts remaining after deduction has been made therefrom of the
operating expenses of the road. For the reasons contained in the
authorities above quoted we believe that this court would have reached
the same conclusion if the debtor had been municipality of Guinobatan
and the public market had been levied upon by virtue of the execution.
 It is evident that the movable and immovable property of a municipality,
necessary for governmental purpose, may not be attached and sold for the
payment of a judgment against the municipality. The supreme reason for
this rule is the character of the public use to which such kind of property is
devoted. The necessity for government service justifies that the property
of public of the municipality be exempt from execution just as it is
necessary to exempt certain property of private individuals in accordance
with section 452 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 Even the municipal income, according to the above quoted authorities, is
exempt from levy and execution. In volume 1, page 467, Municipal
Corporations by Dillon we find that: Municipal corporations are instituted
by the supreme authority of a state for the public good. They exercise, by
delegation from the legislature, a portion of the sovereign power. The
main object of their creation is to act as administrative agencies for the
state, and to provide for the police and local government of certain
designated civil divisions of its territory. To this end they are invested with
certain governmental powers and charged with civil, political, and
municipal duties. To enable them beneficially to exercise these powers and
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discharge these duties, they are clothed with the authority to raise
revenues, chiefly by taxation, and subordinately by other modes as by
licenses, fines, and penalties. The revenue of the public corporation is the
essential means by which it is enabled to perform its appointed work.
Deprived of its regular and adequate supply of revenue, such a corporation
is practically destroyed and the ends of its erection thwarted. Based upon
considerations of this character, it is the settled doctrine of the law that
only the public property but also the taxes and public revenues of such
corporations cannot be seized under execution against them, either in the
treasury or when in transit to it. Judgments rendered for taxes, and the
proceeds of such judgments in the hands of officers of the law, are not
subject to execution unless so declared by statute. The doctrine of the
inviolability of the public revenues by the creditor is maintained, although
the corporation is in debt, and has no means of payment but the taxes
which it is authorized to collect.
 Another error assigned by counsel for appellant is the holding of the court
a quo that the proper remedy for collecting the judgment in favor of the
plaintiff was by way or mandamus. While this question is not necessarily
included in the one which is the subject of this appeal, yet we believe that
the holding of the court, assigned as error by appellant's counsel, is true
when, after a judgment is rendered against a municipality, it has no
property subject to execution. This doctrine is maintained by Dillon
(Municipal Corporations, vol. 4, par. 1507, 5th ed.) based upon the
decisions of several States of the Union upholding the same principle and
which are cited on page 2679 of the aforesaid work. In this sense this
assignment of error, we believe, is groundless.
Municipality of Makati v. CA
Facts: The Municipality of Makati initiatied expropriation proceedings against
Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc., Home Building System & Realty
Corporation and one Arceli P. Jo. Attached to Makati’s complaint was a certification
that a bank account had been opened with the PNB Buendia Branch under
petitioner's name containing the sum of P417,510.00, made pursuant to the
provisions of PD 42. RTC appraised property at P5,291,666.00 and ordered
petitioner to pay amount minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00 which was
earlier released to Admiral. Admiral moved for the issuance of a writ of execution.
RTC granted and issued writ. A Notice of Garnishment dated January 14, 1988 was
served by sheriff Pastrana upon the manager of the PNB Buendia Branch. However,
he was informed that a "hold code" was placed on the account of petitioner.
Admiral filed motion, praying that an order be issued directing the bank to deliver
to sheriff the amount equivalent to the unpaid balance due under the RTC decision.
Petitioner filed a motion to lift the garnishment, on the ground that the manner of
payment of the expropriation amount should be done in installments which the
respondent RTC judge failed to state in his decision. Admiral filed its opposition to
the motion. Pending resolution of the above motions, petitioner filed on July 20,
1988 a "Manifestation" informing the court that private respondent was no longer
the true and lawful owner of the subject property because a new title over the
property had been registered in the name of Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. (PSB) RTC
issued an order requiring PSB to make available the documents pertaining to its
transactions over the subject property, and the PNB Buendia Branch to reveal the
amount in petitioner's account which was garnished by respondent sheriff. In
compliance with this order, PSB filed a manifestation informing the court that it had
consolidated its ownership over the property as mortgagee/purchaser at an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale held on April 20, 1987. After several conferences, PSB
and private respondent entered into a compromise agreement whereby they
agreed to divide between themselves the compensation due from the expropriation
proceedings. RTC approved the compromise agreement and ordered PNB Buendia
to release to PSB the sum of P4,953,506.45 which corresponds to the balance of the
appraised value of the subject property. Petitioner's motion to lift the garnishment
was denied. Petitioner filed MR, which was duly opposed by private respondent. On
the other hand, for failure of the manager of PNB Buendia to comply with the order
dated September 8, 1988, Admiral filed two succeeding motions to require the bank
manager to show cause why he should not be held in contempt of court. During the
hearings conducted for the above motions, the general manager of the PNB
Buendia Branch, a Mr. Antonio Bautista, informed the court that he was still waiting
for proper authorization from the PNB head office enabling him to make a
disbursement for the amount so ordered. For its part, petitioner contended that its
funds at the PNB Buendia Branch could neither be garnished nor levied upon
execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the
proper appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the
Philippines v. Palacio. Respondent trial judge issued an order dated December 21,
1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
doctrine enunciated in Republic v. Palacio did not apply to the case because
petitioner's PNB Account No. S/A 265-537154-3 was an account specifically opened
for the expropriation proceedings of the subject property pursuant to Pres. Decree
No. 42. Respondent RTC judge likewise declared Mr. Antonio Bautista guilty of
contempt of court for his inexcusable refusal to obey the order dated September 8,
1988, and thus ordered his arrest and detention until his compliance with the said
order. Petitioner and the bank manager of PNB Buendia Branch then filed separate
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petitions for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which were eventually
consolidated. In a decision promulgated on June 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals
dismissed both petitions for lack of merit, sustained the jurisdiction of respondent
RTC judge over the funds contained in petitioner's PNB Account No. 265-537154-3,
and affirmed his authority to levy on such funds. Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied by the Court of Appeals, petitioner now files the present
petition for review with prayer for preliminary injunction. On November 20, 1989,
the Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent RTC
judge, respondent sheriff, and their representatives, from enforcing and/or carrying
out the RTC order dated December 21, 1988 and the writ of garnishment issued
pursuant thereto. Private respondent then filed its comment to the petition, while
petitioner filed its reply. Petitioner not only reiterates the arguments adduced in its
petition before the Court of Appeals, but also alleges for the first time that it has
actually two accounts with the PNB Buendia Branch, to wit: (1) Account No. S/A
265-537154-3 — exclusively for the expropriation of the subject property, with an
outstanding balance of P99,743.94.(2) Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 — for
statutory obligations and other purposes of the municipal government, with a
balance of P170,098,421.72, as of July 12, 1989. Because the petitioner has
belatedly alleged only in this Court the existence of two bank accounts, it may fairly
be asked whether the second account was opened only for the purpose of
undermining the legal basis of the assailed orders of respondent RTC judge and the
decision of the Court of Appeals, and strengthening its reliance on the doctrine that
public funds are exempted from garnishment or execution as enunciated in
Republic v. Palacio. At any rate, the Court will give petitioner the benefit of the
doubt, and proceed to resolve the principal issues presented based on the factual
circumstances thus alleged by petitioner. Admitting that its PNB Account No. S/A
265-537154-3 was specifically opened for expropriation proceedings it had initiated
over the subject property, petitioner poses no objection to the garnishment or the
levy under execution of the funds deposited therein amounting to P99,743.94.
However, it is petitioner's main contention that inasmuch as the assailed orders of
respondent RTC judge involved the net amount of P4,965,506.45, the funds
garnished by respondent sheriff in excess of P99,743.94, which are public funds
earmarked for the municipal government's other statutory obligations, are
exempted from execution without the proper appropriation required under the
law. There is merit in this contention. The funds deposited in the second PNB
Account No. S/A 263-530850-7 are public funds of the municipal government.
Issue: WON the funds deposited may be levied.
 In this jurisdiction, well-settled is the rule that public funds are not subject
to levy and execution, unless otherwise provided for by statute. More
particularly, the properties of a municipality, whether real or personal,
which are necessary for public use cannot be attached and sold at
execution sale to satisfy a money judgment against the municipality.
Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing
the governmental activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt
from execution. The foregoing rule finds application in the case at bar.
Absent a showing that the municipal council of Makati has passed an
ordinance appropriating from its public funds an amount corresponding to
the balance due under the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987, less the sum
of P99,743.94 deposited in Account No. S/A 265-537154-3, no levy under
execution may be validly effected on the public funds of petitioner
deposited in Account No. S/A 263-530850-7.
 Nevertheless, this is not to say that private respondent and PSB are left
with no legal recourse. Where a municipality fails or refuses, without
justifiable reason, to effect payment of a final money judgment rendered
against it, the claimant may avail of the remedy of mandamus in order to
compel the enactment and approval of the necessary appropriation
ordinance, and the corresponding disbursement of municipal funds
therefor
 In the case at bar, the validity of the RTC decision dated June 4, 1987 is not
disputed by petitioner. No appeal was taken therefrom. For three years
now, petitioner has enjoyed possession and use of the subject property
notwithstanding its inexcusable failure to comply with its legal obligation
to pay just compensation. Petitioner has benefited from its possession of
the property since the same has been the site of Makati West High School
since the school year 1986-1987. This Court will not condone petitioner's
blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
proceedings it had in fact initiated. It cannot be over-emphasized that,
within the context of the State's inherent power of eminent domain, just
compensation means not only the correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" for the property owner is made to suffer the
consequence of being immediately deprived of his land while being made
to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss.
 The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised within the
bounds of fair play and justice. In the case at bar, considering that valuable
property has been taken, the compensation to be paid fixed and the
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municipality is in full possession and utilizing the property for public
purpose, for three (3) years, the Court finds that the municipality has had
more than reasonable time to pay full compensation.
 Court Resolved to ORDER petitioner Municipality of Makati to immediately
pay Philippine Savings Bank, Inc. and private respondent the amount of
P4,953,506.45. Petitioner is hereby required to submit to this Court a
report of its compliance with the foregoing order within a non-extendible
period of SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date of receipt of this resolution.
Pasay City Government v. CFI of Manila
Facts: V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates represented by Vicente David Isip entered into a
contract with the City of Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta.
Pursuant to the aforesaid contract, the respondent-appellee proceeded with the
construction of the new Pasay City Hall building as per duly approved plans and
specifications. The respondent-appellee accomplished under various stages of
construction the amount of work (including supplies and materials) equivalent to an
estimated value of P1,713,096.00 of the total contract price of P4,914,500.80. The
appellants paid only the total amount of P1,100,000.00 to the respondent-appellee
leaving an amount of P613,096.00 immediately due from the petitioner-appellants
to the respondent-appellee. Pasay failed to pay. Action for specific performance
with damages against herein petitioners-appellants before the respondent Court.
The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement which was submitted to the
Municipal Board of Pasay City for its consideration. Protracted pre-trial hearings
and conferences were held where the respondent Court suggested and advised that
"under the principle of quantum meruit, the plaintiff is forthwith entitled to at least
that which is due to him for defendants under the contract and that public interest
must perforce require the continuity of construction of a public work project,
instead of delaying its immediate completion by litigating upon technical grounds
which would undoubtedly redound to public detriment". The Municipal Board of
Pasay then enacted Ordinance No. 1012 which approved the Compromise
Agreement and also authorized and empowered the incumbent City Mayor Claudio
to represent the appellant Pasay City Government, subject to the final approval of
the respondent Court herein. Court approved the said Compromise Agreement
including a Manifestation and Addendum thereto. On April 10, 1969, the appellants
filed an urgent motion seeking a declaration of legality of the original contract and
agreement dated August 4, 1964 from the respondent Court. Court issued an order
declaring that the original contract is legal and valid. Court granted an order of
execution pursuant to which a writ of execution was issued. Application for and
notice of garnishment were made and effected upon the funds of appellant Pasay
City Government with the PNB. Pasay: premature, the 90-day stipulation has not
expired; the obligations were reciprocal, the contractor has not set up a new
performance bond; and Sheriff cannot garnish trust funds of the city. TC: Contractor
complied substantially, garnishment must proceed.
Issue: WON the CFI erred in refusing to quash the writ of execution it issued. YES.
 The two purposes of a compromise agreement are enunciated in Article
2028 of the New Civil Code, to wit: "A. 2028. A compromise is a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced." The first purpose - "to avoid a
litigation" - occurs when there is a threat of an impending litigation. At this
point, no case has yet reached the courts. The moment a case has been
filed in court then the second purpose - "to put an end to one already
commenced" - applies. In the herein case, We are concerned with the
second purpose. The latter purpose is given effect in Article 2037 of the
New Civil Code which reads: "Article 2037. A compromise has upon the
parties the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise."
 A compromise agreement not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs is a valid contract which is the law between the
parties themselves. A judgment on a compromise is a final and executor. It
is immediately executor in the absence of a motion to set the same aside
on the ground of fraud, mistake or duress.
 In fact in the herein case before Us, execution has already been issued.
Considering this in the light of Article 2041 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
"Art. 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the
compromise, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard
it as rescinded and insist upon his original demand."
 it is obvious that the respondent-appellee did not only succeed in
enforcing the compromise but said plaintiff-appellee likewise wants to
rescind the said compromise. It is clear from the language of the law,
specifically Article 2041 of the New Civil Code that one of the parties to a
compromise has two options: 1) to enforce the compromise; or 2) to
rescind the same and insist upon his original demand. The respondent-
appellee in the case herein before Us wants to avail of both of these
options. This can not be done. The respondent-appellee cannot ask for
rescission of the compromise agreement after it has already enjoyed the
first option of enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ of execution
resulting thereby in the garnishment of the Pasay City funds deposited
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with the Philippine National Bank which eventually was delivered to the
respondent-appellee.
 Upon the issuance of the writ of execution, the petitioner-appellants
moved for its quashal alleging among other things the exemption of the
government from execution. This move on the part of the petitioner-
appellant is at first glance laudable for "all government funds deposited
with the Philippine National Bank by any agency or instrumentality of the
government, whether by way of general or special deposit, remain
government funds and may not be subject to garnishment or levy
(Commissioner of Public Highways vs. San Diego, L-30098, 31 SCRA 616
[Feb. 18, 1970]). But, inasmuch as an ordinance has already been enacted
expressly appropriating the amount of P613,096.00 of payment to the
respondent-appellee, then the herein case is covered by the exception to
the general rule stated in the case of Republic vs. Palacio: "Judgments
against a State in cases where it has consented to be sued, generally
operate merely to liquidate and establish plaintiff's claim in the absence of
express provision; otherwise they cannot be enforced by processes of the
law; and it is for the legislature to provide for the payment in such manner
as sees fit."
 Having established that the compromise agreement was final and
immediately executory, and in fact as already enforced, the respondent
court was in error where it still entertained the supplemental complaint
filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the respondent Court had no
more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a decision has become
final and executory, the court no longer has the power and jurisdiction to
alter, amend or revoke, and its only power thereof is to order its
execution. After the perfection of an appeal, the trial court loses
jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot vacate the same.
 WE find no error in the order of the respondent Court dated July 23, 1969.
From the reading of the premises and provisions of the contract and
agreement which was "formally confirmed and officially approved by the
parties" in the compromise agreement later entered into by the same
parties, subject only to the enumerated changes and/or modifications, it is
obvious that the contracting parties envisioned a stage by stage
construction (on the part of the respondent-appellee) and payment (on
the part of the defendant-appellant).
 Sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of the Compromise Agreement, to wit: "B.
That immediately upon final approval hereof by this Honorable Court, the
plaintiff contractor will submit and file in favor of Pasay City Government a
new performance bond in the amount required by pertinent law, rules and
regulations, in proportion to the remaining value or cost of the unfinished
work of the construction as per approved plans and specifications . . ."
 Read together with the stage-by-stage construction and payment
approach, would inevitably lead to the conclusion that the parties to the
compromise contemplated a divisible obligation necessitating therefore a
performance bond "in proportion to" the uncompleted work.
 What is crucial in sub-paragraph B of paragraph 1 of the compromise
agreement are the words "in proportion." If the parties really intended the
legal rate of 20% performance bond to refer to the whole unfinished work,
then the provision should have required the plaintiff contractor to submit
and file a new performance bond to cover the remaining value/cost of the
unfinished work of the construction. Using the words in proportion then
significantly changed the meaning of the paragraph to ultimately mean a
performance bond equal to 20% of the next stage of work to be done.
 And, We note that in the Contract and Agreement, the respondent-
appellee was allowed to file a performance bond of P222,250.00 which is
but 5% of the total bid of P4,914,500.80. A security bond was likewise filed
with an amount of P97,290.00. The sum total of bond then filed was
P320,540.00 which is just 6.5% of the total bid. It is rather curious why all
of a sudden the petitioners-appellants are insisting on a 20% performance
bond of the entire unfinished work when they were quite content with a
bond just 5% of the entire work. For Us to allow the petitioners-appellants
to adamantly stick to the 20% performance bond would be tantamount to
allowing them to evade their obligation in the compromise agreement.
This cannot be allowed. The bond of a contractor for a public work should
not be extended beyond the reasonable intent as gathered from the
purpose and language of the instrument construed in connection with the
proposals, plans and specifications, and contract.
 The premium of the bond will be sizeable and will eat up the profit of the
contractor, who is faced with the fluctuation of prices of materials due to
inflation and devaluation. Right now, many contractors cannot proceed
with the implementation of their contracts because of the extraordinary
rise in cost of materials and labor. No contractor would be willing to bid for
public works contracts under the oppressive interpretation by petitioners-
appellants.
 Again, the respondent Court was correct in ruling that the submission of
the bond was not a condition precedent to the payment of P613,096.00 to
the plaintiff. Nowhere in the Contact and Agreement nor in the
Compromise Agreement could be found the fact that payment by the
petitioner-appellants of the amount of P613,096.00 was dependent upon
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the submission by the respondent-appellee of the performance bond. It
cannot be argued that reciprocal obligation was created in the
Compromise Agreement, for the obligation to pay on the part of the
petitioners-appellants was established several years ago when the
respondents-appellee finished some of the stages of construction. And,
this argument is already moot and academic, for the amount of
P613,096.00 has already been collected through execution and
garnishment upon the funds of Pasay City with the Philippine National
Bank. Inasmuch as the parties in the herein case have agreed in the
Compromise Agreement, to wit: "3. That within a similar period the
defendant Pasay City Government shall pay and remit to plaintiff
contractor an amount equivalent to three (3%) percent of the above
mentioned amount of SIX HUNDRED THIRTEEN NINETY-SIX PESOS
(P613,096.00), for and as adverse attorney's fees in this case; . . . "
Municipality of Paoay, Ilocos Norte v. Manaois
Facts: Teodoro Manaois having obtained a judgment against the municipality of
Paoay, Ilocos Norte in civil case No. 8026 of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Judge De Guzman of said province issued a writ of execution against
the defendant municipality. In compliance with said writ the Provincial Sheriff of
Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached certain properties. On July 26, 1949, the
Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte in representation of the municipality of Paoay, filed
a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan asking for the dissolution of
that attachment of levy. Judge De Guzman in his order of October 6, 1949, denied
the petition for the dissolution of the attachment; a MR also denied. Instead of
appealing from that order the municipality of Paoay has filed the present petition
for certiorari with the writ of preliminary injunction, asking that the order of
respondent Judge dated October 6, 1946, be reversed and that the attachment of
the properties of the municipality be dissolved.
Issue: WON properties may be levied.
 There can be no question that properties for public use held by municipal
corporation are not subject to levy and execution. The authorities are
unanimous on this point. This Court in the case of Viuda de Tantoco vs.
Municipal Council of Iloilo (49 Phil., 52) after citing Manresa, the works of
McQuillin and Dillon on Municipal Corporations, and Corpus Juris, held that
properties for public use like trucks used for sprinkling the streets, police
patrol wagons, police stations, public markets, together with the land on
which they stand are exempt from execution. Even public revenues of
municipal corporations destined for the expenses of the municipality are
also exempt from the execution. The reason behind this exemption
extended to properties for public use, and public municipal revenues is
that they are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are
created, and that to subject said properties and public funds to execution
would materially impede, even defeat and in some instances destroy said
purpose.
 Property however, which is patrimonial and which is held by municipality
in its proprietary capacity is treated by great weight of authority as the
private asset of the town and may be levied upon and sold under an
ordinary execution. The same rule applies to municipal funds derived from
patrimonial properties, for instance, it has been held that shares of stocks
held by municipal corporations are subject to execution. If this is true, with
more reason should income or revenue coming from these shares of stock,
in the form of interest or dividends, be subject to execution?
 The fishery or municipal waters of the town of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, which
had been parceled out or divided into lots and later let out to private
persons for fishing purposes at an annual rental are clearly not subject to
execution. In the first place, they do not belong to the municipality. They
may well be regarded as property of State. What the municipality of Paoay
hold is merely what may be considered the usufruct or the right to use said
municipal waters, granted to it by section 2321 of the Revised
Administrative Code. Grant of fishery. — A municipal council shall have
authority, for purposes of profit, to grant the exclusive privileges of fishery
or right to conduct a fish-breeding ground within any definite portion, or
area, of the municipal waters. "Municipal waters", as herein used, include
not only streams, lakes, and tidal waters, include within the municipality,
not being the subject of private ownership, but also marine waters include
between two lines drawn perpendicular to the general coast line from
points where the boundary lines of the municipality touch the sea at high
tide, and third line parallel with the general coast line and distant from it
three marine leagues. Where two municipalities are so situated on
opposite shores that there is less than six marine leagues of marine waters
between them the third line shall be a line equally distant from the
opposite shores of the respective municipalities.
 Now, is this particular usufruct of the municipality of Paoay over its
municipal waters, subject to execution to enforce a judgment against the
town? We are not prepared to answer this question in the affirmative
because there are powerful reasons against its propriety and legality. In
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the first place, it is not a usufruct based on or derived from an inherent
right of the town. It is based merely on a grant, more or less temporary,
made by the Legislature. Take the right of fishery over the sea or marine
waters bordering a certain municipality. These marine waters are
ordinarily for public use, open to navigation and fishing by the people. The
Legislature thru section 2321 of the Administrative Code, as already stated,
saw fit to grant the usufruct of said marine waters for fishery purpose, to
the towns bordering said waters. Said towns have no visited right over said
marine waters. The Legislature, for reasons it may deem valid or as a
matter of public policy, may at any time, repeal or modify said section
2321 and revoke this grant to coastal towns and open these marine waters
to the public. Or the Legislature may grant the usufruct or right of fishery
to the provinces concerned so that said provinces may operate or
administer them by leasing them to private parties.
 All this only goes to prove that the municipality of Paoay is not holding this
usufruct or right of fishery in a permanent or absolute manner so as to
enable it to dispose of it or to allow it to be taken away from it as its
property through execution.
 Another reason against subjecting this usufruct or right of fishery over
municipal waters, to execution, is that, if this were to be allowed and this
right sold on execution, the buyer would immediately step into the shoes
of the judgment-debtor municipality. Such buyer presumably buys only the
right of the municipality. He does not buy the fishery itself nor the
municipal waters because that belongs to the State. All that the buyer
might do would be to let out or rent to private individuals the fishery rights
over the lots into which the municipal waters had been parceled out or
divided, and that is, after public bidding. This, he must do because that is
the only right granted to the municipality by the Legislature, a right to be
exercised in the manner provided by law, namely, to rent said fishery lots
after public bidding. (See sec. 2323 of the Administrative Code in
connection with sec. 2319 of the same Code.) Then, we shall have a
situation rather anomalous to be sure, of a private individual conducting
public bidding, renting to the highest bidders fishery lots over municipal
waters which are property of the State, and appropriating the results to his
own private use. The impropriety, if not illegality, of such a contingency is
readily apparent. But that is not all. The situation imagined implies the
deprivation of the municipal corporation of a source of a substantial
income, expressly provide by law. Because of all this, we hold that the right
or usufruct of the town of Paoay over its municipal waters, particularly, the
forty odd fishery lots included in the attachment by the Sheriff, is not
subject to execution.
 But we hold that the revenue or income coming from the renting of these
fishery lots is certainly subject to execution. It may be profitable, if not
necessary, to distinguish this kind of revenue from that derived from taxes,
municipal licenses and market fees are provided for and imposed by the
law, they are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of
financing the governmental activities and functions of municipal
corporations. In fact, the real estate taxes collected by a municipality do
not all go to it. A portion thereof goes to the province, in the proportion
provided for by law. For the same reason, municipal markets are
established not only to provide a place where the people may sell and buy
commodities but also to provide public revenues for the municipality. To
many towns, market fees constitute the bulk of their assets and incomes.
These revenues are fixed and definite, so much so that the annual
appropriations for the expenses of the municipalities are based on these
revenues. Not so with the income derived form fisheries. In the first place,
the usufruct over municipal waters was granted by the Legislature merely
to help or bolster up the economy of municipal government. There are
many towns in the Philippines, specially in the interior, which do not have
municipal waters for fishery purpose and yet without much source of
revenue, they can function, which goes to prove that this kind of revenue
is not indispensable for the performance of governmental functions. In the
second place, the amount of this income is far from definite or fixed. It
depends upon the amounts which prospective bidders or lessees are
willing to pay. If fishing on these marine water, lakes and rivers in the
municipality is good, the bids would be high and the income would be
substantial. If the fish in these waters is depleted or, if for some reasons or
another, fishing is not profitable, then the income would be greatly
reduced. In other words, to many municipalities engaged in this business
of letting out municipal waters for fishing purposes, it is a sort of sideline,
so that even for fishing purposes, it is sort of sideline, so that even without
it the municipality may still continue functioning and perform its essential
duties as such municipal corporations.
 We call this activity of municipalities in renting municipal waters for fishing
purposes as a business for the reasons that the law itself (Sec. 2321,
Administrative Code already mentioned and quoted) allowed said
municipalities to engage in it for profit. And it is but just that a town so
engaged should pay and liquidate obligations contracted in connection
with said fishing business, with the income derived therefrom.
294