THIRD DIVISION revenue orders were issued pursuant to his power "to make
rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of
G.R. No. 113459 November 18, 2002
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA LEAL, respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Pursuant to Section 116 of Presidential Decree No. 1158, 1 (The
National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended [Tax
Code for brevity]), which provides:
"SEC. 116. Percentage tax on dealers in securities; lending
investors. – Dealers in securities shall pay a tax equivalent to
six (6%) per centum of their gross income. Lending investors
shall pay a tax equivalent to five (5%) per cent of their gross
income." (emphasis added)
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner, issued
Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 15-91 dated March
11, 1991,2 imposing 5% lending investor’s tax on pawnshops
based on their gross income and requiring all investigating units
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to investigate and
assess the lending investor’s tax due from them. The issuance
of RMO No. 15-91 was an offshoot of petitioner’s evaluation
that the nature of pawnshop business is akin to that of "lending
investors," which term is defined in Section 157 (u) of the Tax
Code in this wise:
"(u) Lending investors include all persons who make a practice
of lending money for themselves or others at interests."
Subsequently, petitioner issued Revenue Memorandum
Circular (RMC) No. 43-91 dated May 27, 1992,3 subjecting the
pawn ticket to the documentary stamp tax as prescribed in Title
VII of the Tax Code.
Adversely affected by those revenue orders, herein respondent
Josefina Leal, owner and operator of Josefina’s Pawnshop in
San Mateo, Rizal, asked for a reconsideration of both RMO No.
15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 but the same was denied with
finality by petitioner in its BIR Ruling No. 221-91 dated
October 30, 1991.4
Consequently, on March 18, 1992, respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal, a
petition for prohibition, docketed as Civil Case No. 849-
92,5 seeking to prohibit petitioner from implementing the
revenue orders.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a
motion to dismiss6 the petition on the ground that the RTC has
no jurisdiction to review the questioned revenue orders and to
enjoin their implementation. Petitioner contends that the subject
the provisions of internal revenue laws." 7 Thus, the case falls
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals, citing Section 7 (1) of Republic Act No. 1125. 8
The RTC, through then Presiding Judge Andres B. Reyes,
Jr.,9 issued an order on April 27, 199210 denying the motion to
dismiss, holding that the revenue orders are not assessments to
implement a Tax Code provision, but are "in effect new taxes
(against pawnshops) which are not provided for under the
Code," and which only Congress is empowered to impose.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court (now 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended),
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28824. Petitioner alleged that in
denying the motion to dismiss, the RTC Judge acted without or
in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
In its Decision dated December 23, 1993, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition "for lack of legal basis" 11 and ruled that
"the (RTC) order denying the motion to dismiss is subject to
immediate challenge before the Supreme Court (not the Court
of Appeals), which is the sole authority to determine and
resolve an issue purely of law pursuant to Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution."12 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals
resolved the case on the merits, sustaining the RTC ruling that
the questioned revenue orders are "new additional measures
which only Congress is empowered to impose." 13
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court raising the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS
JURISDICTION OVER A PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES
OF COURT WHERE THE AUTHORITY OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT TO REVIEW THE
SUBJECT REVENUE ORDERS IS BEING
QUESTIONED;
2. WHETHER IT IS THE RTC OR THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS WHICH HAS JURISDICTION
OVER THE INSTANT CASE.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that the Court of
Appeals has "original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction," pursuant to Section 9(1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioner thus claims that his petition for
certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the proper recourse to assail the RTC order
denying his motion to dismiss.
Petitioner’s contention is meritorious. The Court of Appeals
erred in holding that it has no jurisdiction over petitioner’s
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules.
Page 1 of 14
While this Court exercises original jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writ of certiorari (as well as the writs of
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus),14 such power is not exclusive to this Court but is
concurrent with the Court of Appeals15 and the Regional Trial
Courts.16 We reiterate our pronouncement on this issue in
Morales vs. Court of Appeals:17
"Under Section 9 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the Court of Appeals has
concurrent original jurisdiction with the Supreme Court
pursuant to Section 5 (1) of Article VIII of the Constitution and
Section 17 (1) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, and with the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 21 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129
to issue writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, habeas
corpus, and quo warranto. These are original actions, not modes
of appeals.
"Since what the petitioner filed in CA-G.R. SP No. 40670 was
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, the original
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals thereon is beyond doubt.
"This error of the Court of Appeals was due to its
misapplication of Section 5 (2) (c) of Article VIII of the
Constitution and of that portion of Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 vesting upon the Supreme Court exclusive
jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
certiorari as the law or rules of court may provide, final
judgments and decrees of inferior courts in all cases in which
the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue. It forgot that
this constitutional and statutory provisions pertain to the
appellate – not original – jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as
correctly maintained by the petitioner. An appellate jurisdiction
refers to a process which is but a continuation of the original
suit, not a commencement of a new action, such as that of a
special civil action for certiorari. The general rule is that a
denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash in criminal cases is
interlocutory and cannot be the subject of an appeal or of a
special civil action for certiorari. Nevertheless, this Court has
allowed a special civil action for certiorari where a lower court
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in denying a motion to dismiss or to quash.
The petitioner believed that the RTC below did so; hence, the
special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
appeared to be the proper remedy." (emphasis added)
Such concurrence of original jurisdiction among the Regional
Trial Court, the Court of Appeals and this Court, however, does
not mean that the party seeking any of the extraordinary writs
has the absolute freedom to file his petition in the court of his
choice. The hierarchy of courts in our judicial system
determines the appropriate forum for these petitions. Thus,
petitions for the issuance of the said writs against the first level
(inferior) courts must be filed with the Regional Trial Court and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of this Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these
writs should be allowed only where there are special and
important reasons therefor, specifically and sufficiently set
forth in the petition. This is the established policy to prevent
inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention, which
are better devoted to matters within its exclusive jurisdiction,
and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s
docket.18 Thus, it was proper for petitioner to institute the
special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the RTC order denying his motion to dismiss based on
lack of jurisdiction.
While the Court of Appeals correctly took cognizance of the
petition for certiorari, however, let it be stressed that the
jurisdiction to review the rulings of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue pertains to the Court of Tax Appeals, not to
the RTC.
The questioned RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 are
actually rulings or opinions of the Commissioner implementing
the Tax Code on the taxability of pawnshops. This is clear from
petitioner’s RMO No. 15-91, pertinent portion of which reads:
"A restudy of P.D. 114 (the Pawnshop Regulation Act) shows
that the principal activity of pawnshops is lending money at
interest and incidentally accepting a ‘pawn’ of personal
property delivered by the pawner to the pawnee as security for
the loan (Sec. 3, ibid.). Clearly, this makes pawnshop business
akin to lending investor’s business activity which is broad
enough to encompass the business of lending money at interest
by any person whether natural or juridical. Such being the case,
pawnshops shall be subject to the 5% lending investor’s tax
based on their gross income pursuant to Section 116 of the Tax
Code, as amended."19
Such revenue orders were issued pursuant to petitioner's powers
under Section 245 of the Tax Code, which states:
"SEC. 245. Authority of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate
rules and regulations. – The Secretary of Finance, upon
recommendation of the Commissioner, shall promulgate all
needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of
the provisions of this Code.
"The authority of the Secretary of Finance to determine articles
similar or analogous to those subject to a rate of sales tax under
certain category enumerated in Section 163 and 165 of this
Code shall be without prejudice to the power of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to make rulings or opinions
in connection with the implementation of the provisions of
internal revenue laws, including ruling on the classification of
articles of sales and similar purposes." (emphasis added)
Under Republic Act No. 1125 (An Act Creating the Court of
Tax Appeals [CTA for brevity]), as amended, such rulings of
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue are appealable to that
court, thus:
"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. – The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided -
Page 2 of 14
(1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other laws or part of law administered by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue;
x x x x x x x x x." (emphasis added)
"SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. – Any
person, association or corporation adversely affected
by a decision or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, or the Commissioner of Customs or any
provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals may
file an appeal in the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty
days after the receipt of such decision or ruling.
x x x x x x x x x." (emphasis added)
"SEC. 18. x x x. – No judicial proceedings against the
Government involving matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code, the Customs Law or
the Assessment Law shall be maintained, except as
herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been
previously filed with the Court of Tax Appeals and
disposed of in accordance with the provisions of this
Act.
x x x x x x x x x." (emphasis added)
This Court, in Rodriguez, etc. vs. Blaquera,
etc.,20 ruled:
"Plaintiff maintains that this is not an appeal from a
ruling of the Collector of Internal Revenue, but merely
an attempt to nullify General Circular No. V-148,
which does not adjudicate or settle any controversy,
and that, accordingly, this case is not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals.
"We find no merit in this pretense. General Circular
No. V-148 directs the officers charged with the
collection of taxes and license fees to adhere strictly to
the interpretation given by the defendant to the
statutory provisions abovementioned, as set forth in
the Circular. The same incorporates, therefore, a
decision of the Collector of Internal Revenue (now
Commissioner of Internal Revenue) on the manner of
enforcement of the said statute, the administration of
which is entrusted by law to the Bureau of Internal
Revenue. As such, it comes within the purview of
Republic Act No. 1125, Section 7 of which provides
that the Court of Tax Appeals ‘shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal x x x
decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in x x x
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other law or part of the law administered by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue.’ x x x." (emphasis
added)
In the same vein, we held in Meralco Securities Corporation vs.
Savellano,21 thus:
"Respondent judge has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case because the subject matter thereof clearly falls within the
scope of cases now exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125,
enacted June 16, 1954, granted to the Court of Tax Appeals
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, among
others, decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal
revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The law transferred to the
Court of Tax Appeals jurisdiction over all cases involving said
assessments previously cognizable by Courts of First Instance,
and even those already pending in said courts. The question of
whether of not to impose a deficiency tax assessment on
Meralco Securities Corporation undoubtedly comes within the
purview of the words "disputed assessments" or of "other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code…."
In the case of Blaquera, etc. vs. Rodriguez, etc.(103 Phil. 511
[1958]), this Court ruled that ‘the determination of the
correctness or incorrectness of a tax assessment to which the
taxpayer is not agreeable, falls within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Tax Appeals and not of the Court of First Instance, for
under the provisions of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, the
Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive appellate jurisdiction to
review, on appeal, any decision of the Collector of Internal
Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments and other
matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or
other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.’"
Here, as earlier mentioned, respondent Josefina Leal, being a
pawnshop owner, is assailing the revenue orders imposing 5%
lending investor’s tax on pawnshops issued by petitioner.
Clearly then, she should have filed her petition with the Court
of Tax Appeals, not the RTC. Indeed, the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the RTC order should have been
challenged before this Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly: (1)
the assailed Decision dated December 23, 1993 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28824 is SET ASIDE; (2) the Order
dated April 27, 1992 and the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
dated May 21, 1992 both issued by the RTC, Branch 75, San
Mateo, Rizal in Civil Case No. 849-92, are declared NULL and
VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction; and (3) Civil
Case No. 849-92 is ordered DISMISSED.SO ORDERED.Puno,
(Chairman), Panganiban, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Page 3 of 14
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 175723 February 4, 2014
THE CITY OF MANILA, represented by MAYOR JOSE
L. ATIENZA, JR., and MS. LIBERTY M. TOLEDO, in
her capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO, in her capacity
as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
112, Pasay City; SM MART, INC.; SM PRIME
HOLDINGS, INC.; STAR APPLIANCES CENTER;
SUPERVALUE, INC.; ACE HARDWARE
PHILIPPINES, INC.; WATSON PERSONAL CARE
STORES, PHILS., INC.; JOLLIMART PHILS., CORP.;
SURPLUS MARKETING CORPORATION and
SIGNATURE LINES, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside
the Resolutions1 dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87948.
The antecedents of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as
follows:
The record shows that petitioner City of Manila, through its
treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the
taxable period from January to December 2002 against private
respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Star
Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware
Philippines, Inc., Watsons Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc.,
Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and
Signature Lines. In addition to the taxes purportedly due from
private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the
Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment
covered the local business taxes petitioners were authorized to
collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of
the taxes assessed was a precondition for the issuance of their
business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay
the ₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.
On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed [with the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City] the complaint denominated
as one for "Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-
Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue
TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction"
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 04-0019-CFM before
public respondent's sala [at Branch 112]. In the amended
complaint they filed on February 16, 2004, private respondents
alleged that, in relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the
limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic
Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double taxation.
They further averred that petitioner city's Ordinance No. 8011
which amended pertinent portions of the RRCM had already
been declared to be illegal and unconstitutional by the
Department of Justice.2
In its Order3 dated July 9, 2004, the RTC granted private
respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC
denied it in its Order5 dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the
CA assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of
the RTC.6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA
dismissed petitioners' petition for certiorari holding that it has
no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since
appellate jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court
of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction
under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory
order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the
CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA
denied it in its Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I- Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals
gravely erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
II- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in enjoining by issuing a Writ of
Injunction the petitioners, their agents and/or
authorized representatives from implementing Section
21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as
amended, against private respondents.
III- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial
Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of
Injunction despite failure of private respondents to
make a written claim for tax credit or refund with the
City Treasurer of Manila.
IV- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial
Court gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction considering that under
Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as amended,
they are mere collecting agents of the City
Government.
Page 4 of 14
 V- Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court P
gravely abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or TOTAL: -
19,316,458.77
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Writ of Injunction
because petitioner City of Manila and its constituents
would result to greater damage and prejudice thereof.
(sic)8 Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under
Section 21, Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that
the instant petition should be denied for being moot and SO ORDERED.10
academic.
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records,
Upon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this the above Decision had already become final and executory per
Court discovered that a Decision9 in the main case had already the Certificate of Finality11 issued by the same trial court on
been rendered by the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive October 20, 2008. In fact, a Writ of Execution12 was issued by
portion of which reads as follows: the RTC on November 25, 2009. In view of the foregoing, it
clearly appears that the issues raised in the present petition,
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby which merely involve the incident on the preliminary injunction
renders JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic
defendant to grant a tax refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in
to Section 21 of the Revenue Code of the City of Manila as the main case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and that
amended for the year 2002 in the following amounts: the same decision is now final and executory. Well entrenched
is the rule that where the issues have become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering
P the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. 13
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc. -
11,462,525.02
In any case, the Court finds it necessary to resolve the issue on
To plaintiff SM Prime jurisdiction raised by petitioners owing to its significance and
- 3,118,104.63 for future guidance of both bench and bar. It is a settled
Holdings, Inc.
principle that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and
academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. 14
To plaintiff Star Appliances
- 2,152,316.54 However, before proceeding, to resolve the question on
Center
jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise address a
procedural error which petitioners committed.
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. - 1,362,750.34
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
To plaintiff Ace Hardware Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which
- 419,689.04
Phils., Inc. dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their
motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. There is no
dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature
To plaintiff Watsons Personal of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is
- 231,453.62
Care Health settled that in cases where an assailed judgment or order is
considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal.
Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition
Stores Phils., Inc. for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a continuation
of the appellate process over the original case.15
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils.,
- 140,908.54 Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a
Corp.
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action based on grave abuse of discretion
To plaintiff Surplus Marketing amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if
- 220,204.70 there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
Corp.
remedy in the ordinary course of law.16 As such, it cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal.17
To plaintiff Signature Mktg.
- 94,906.34
Corp. Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the
Rules of Court and in the interest of substantial justice, this
Page 5 of 14
Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for
certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which
to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of the rules.18 Considering that the present
petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an
error of judgment is averred, and because of the significance of
the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified
to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari
as a petition for review on certiorari.
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the
central issue in this case. The basic question posed before this
Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special
civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued
by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125
(RA 1125) creating the CTA and giving to the said court
jurisdiction over the following:
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in
cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law
or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in
cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or
other money charges; seizure, detention or release of
property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties
imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising
under the Customs Law or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of
Assessment Appeals in cases involving the assessment
and taxation of real property or other matters arising
under the Assessment Law, including rules and
regulations relative thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic
Act No. 9282 (RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the
jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its membership and elevating
its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special
jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act provides
thus:
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. - The CTA shall exercise:
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided:
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of
internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties
in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a
specific period of action, in which case the inaction
shall be deemed a denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional
Trial Courts in local tax cases originally decided or
resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases
involving liability for customs duties, fees or other
money charges, seizure, detention or release of
property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties
in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other laws administered by the
Bureau of Customs;
5. Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment
Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
over cases involving the assessment and taxation of
real property originally decided by the provincial or
city board of assessment appeals;
6. Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs
cases elevated to him automatically for review from
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are
adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the
Tariff and Customs Code;
7. Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in
the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or
article, and the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of
agricultural product, commodity or article, involving
dumping and countervailing duties under Section 301
and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code,
and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800,
where either party may appeal the decision to impose
or not to impose said duties.
b. Jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses as herein
provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses arising from violations of the National
Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code
Page 6 of 14
 and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue or the Bureau of Customs: Provided,
however, That offenses or felonies mentioned in this
paragraph where the principal amount of taxes and
fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is
less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) or where
there is no specified amount claimed shall be tried by
the regular Courts and the jurisdiction of the CTA shall
be appellate. Any provision of law or the Rules of
Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal
action and the corresponding civil action for the
recovery of civil liability for taxes and penalties shall
at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in the same proceeding by the CTA,
the filing of the criminal action being deemed to
necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action,
and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action will be recognized.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in criminal
offenses:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally decided by them,
in their respected territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.
c. Jurisdiction over tax collection cases as herein provided:
1. Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection
cases involving final and executory assessments for
taxes, fees, charges and penalties: Provides, however,
that collection cases where the principal amount of
taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties,
claimed is less than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the proper Municipal
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional
Trial Court.
2. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in tax collection
cases:
a. Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the
Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided
by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.
b. Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or
orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of their
appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective
jurisdiction.19
A perusal of the above provisions would show that, while it is
clearly stated that the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of
their original or appellate jurisdiction, there is no categorical
statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282,
which provides that th e CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for
certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in
local tax cases filed before it.
The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of
certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction which
must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and
cannot be implied from the mere existence of appellate
jurisdiction.20 Thus, in the cases of Pimentel v.
COMELEC,21 Garcia v. De Jesus,22 Veloria v.
COMELEC,23Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board v. Lubrica,24 and Garcia v. Sandiganbayan,25 this Court
has ruled against the jurisdiction of courts or tribunals over
petitions for certiorari on the ground that there is no law which
expressly gives these tribunals such power.26 It must be
observed, however, that with the exception of Garcia v.
Sandiganbayan,27 these rulings pertain not to regular courts but
to tribunals exercising quasi-judicial powers. With respect to
the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 824928 now provides that
the special criminal court has exclusive original jurisdiction
over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the same manner, Section 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution grants power to the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction, to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus. With respect to the Court of
Appeals, Section 9 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129)
gives the appellate court, also in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, the power to issue, among others, a writ of
certiorari,whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. As
to Regional Trial Courts, the power to issue a writ of certiorari,
in the exercise of their original jurisdiction, is provided under
Section 21 of BP 129.
The foregoing notwithstanding, while there is no express grant
of such power, with respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law and that judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be
fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of
determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling
Page 7 of 14
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested
with jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
Indeed, in order for any appellate court to effectively exercise
its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue,
among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive
jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can
reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also
such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid
of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason
why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.
Consistent with the above pronouncement, this Court has held
as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et
al.29 that "if a case may be appealed to a particular court or
judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or
body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction." 30 This principle
was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals,31 where the Court
stated that "a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by
appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower
court."32 The rulings in J.M. Tuason and De Jesus were
reiterated in the more recent cases of Galang, Jr. v.
Geronimo33 and Bulilis v. Nuez.34
Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 135 of the present Rules of Court
provides that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court
or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court
or officer.
If this Court were to sustain petitioners' contention that
jurisdiction over their certiorari petition lies with the CA, this
Court would be confirming the exercise by two judicial bodies,
the CA and the CTA, of jurisdiction over basically the same
subject matter – precisely the split-jurisdiction situation which
is anathema to the orderly administration of justice.35 The Court
cannot accept that such was the legislative motive, especially
considering that the law expressly confers on the CTA, the
tribunal with the specialized competence over tax and tariff
matters, the role of judicial review over local tax cases without
mention of any other court that may exercise such power. Thus,
the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that since appellate
jurisdiction over private respondents' complaint for tax refund
is vested in the CTA, it follows that a petition for certiorari
seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said
case should, likewise, be filed with the same court. To rule
otherwise would lead to an absurd situation where one court
decides an appeal in the main case while another court rules on
an incident in the very same case.
Stated differently, it would be somewhat incongruent with the
pronounced judicial abhorrence to split jurisdiction to conclude
that the intention of the law is to divide the authority over a local
tax case filed with the RTC by giving to the CA or this Court
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against interlocutory
orders of the RTC but giving to the CTA the jurisdiction over
the appeal from the decision of the trial court in the same case.
It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to
conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the CTA over
tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the
power to issue a writ of certiorari when necessary in aid of such
appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of
the CTA to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its
appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and
decisions of the RTC, in order to have complete supervision
over the acts of the latter.36
A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included
in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all
orders that will preserve the subject of the action, and to give
effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries with it
the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions
of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and
incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise
of that jurisdiction.1âwphi1 For this purpose, it may, when
necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which
might interfere with the proper exercise of its rightful
jurisdiction in cases pending before it.37
Lastly, it would not be amiss to point out that a court which is
endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers
which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within such
jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are
inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess them in
order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses
of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such
process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall
be of the same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent
powers of a court of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be
said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in
addition to those expressly conferred on them. These inherent
powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and
efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the
due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate,
convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted
powers; and include the power to maintain the court's
jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 38
Thus, this Court has held that "while a court may be expressly
granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive
legislation, implies the necessary and usual incidental powers
essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has
power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and
for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates." 39 Hence,
demands, matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or
Page 8 of 14
growing out of, the main action, and coming within the above
principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called
on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of
action, would not be within its cognizance.40

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably

concluded that the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of
petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued
by the RTC in a local tax case is included in the powers granted
by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction.

Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not

abandoning the rule that, insofar as quasi-judicial tribunals are
concerned, the authority to issue writs of certiorari must still be
expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be
implied from the mere existence of their appellate jurisdiction.
This doctrine remains as it applies only to quasi-judicial bodies.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Page 9 of 14
 G.R. No. 199422
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, Petitioner,
vs.
KEPCO ILIJAN CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Resolutions1 dated
July 27, 20112 and November 15, 20113 of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) En Banc.
The facts follow.
For the first4 and second5 quarters of the calendar year 2000,
respondent filed its Quarterly value-added tax (VAT) returns
with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). It also filed the
Application for Zero Rated Sales for calendar year 2000 which
was duly approved by the BIR.6
Thereafter, respondent filed with the BIR its claim for refund in
the amount of ₱49,569,448.73 representing input tax incurred
for the first and second quarters of the calendar year 2000 from
its importation and domestic purchases of capital goods and
services preparatory to its production and sales of electricity to
the National Power Corporation.7
Amount of Input VAT Claim
Less: Input VAT Pertaining to Non-Capital Goods
Input VAT Claim Pertaining to Capital Goods Purchases
Less: Not Properly Substantiated Input VAT
Per ICPA’s Findings
Per this Court’s Further Verfication
Refundable Input VAT on Capital Goods Purchases
There being no motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the abovementioned decision became final and executory and a
corresponding Entry of Judgment was issued on October 10, 2009. Thus, on February 16, 2010, the Court issued a Writ of
Execution, 14 the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
Petitioner did not act upon respondent's claim for refund or
issuance of tax credit certificate for the first and second quarters
of the calendar year 2000. Consequently, respondent filed a
Petition for Review8 on March 21, 2002, and an Amended
Petition for Review9 on September 12, 2003.
In her Answer, 10 petitioner alleged the following Special and
Affirmative Defenses: (1) respondent is not entitled to the
refund of the amounts prayed for; (2) the petition was
prematurely filed for respondent's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies; (3) respondent failed to show that the
taxes paid were erroneously or illegally collected; and (4)
respondent has no cause of action.
After the issues were joined, trial on the merits ensued.
Respondent, thereafter, filed its Memorand.um on September 1,
2008. For failure of petitioner to file the required Memorandum
despite notice, the CTA First Division issued a
Resolution11 dated September 12, 2008 submitting the case for
decision.
On September 11, 2009, the CTA First Division rendered a
Decision, 12 the dispositive portion 13 of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, THIS Court finds petitioner
entitled to a refund in the amount of ₱443,447,184.50,
representing unutilized input VAT paid on its domestic
purchases and importation of capital goods for the first and
second quarters of 2000, as computed below:
₱449,569,448.73
706,328.22
₱448,863,120.51
45,878.55
5,370,057.46
₱443,447,184.50
Page 10 of 14
You are hereby ORDERED to REFUND in favor of the
petitioner KEPCO ILIJAN CORPORATION, the amount of
₱443,447,184.50 representing unutilized input VAT paid on its
domestic purchases and importation of capital goods for the
first and second quarters of 2000, pursuant to the Decision of
this Court, promulgated on September 11, 2009, which has
become final and executory on October 10, 2009, by virtue of
the Entry of Judgment issued on said date.
The Sheriff of this Court is hereby directed to see to it that this
Writ is carried out by the Respondent and/or his agents, and
shall make the corresponding return/report thereon within thirty
(30) days after receipt of the Writ.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner alleges that she learned only of the Decision and the
subsequent issuance of the writ of March 7, 2011 when the
Office of the Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection
Group received a Memorandum from the Appellate Division of
the National Office recommending the issuance of a Tax Credit
Certificate in favor of the respondent in the amount of
₱443,447,184.50.
Accordingly, on April 11, 2011 petitioner filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the CTA En Banc, praying for the
following reliefs: (1) that the Decision dated September 11,
2009 of the CTA First Division in CTA Case No. 6412 be
annulled and set aside; (2) that the Entry of Judgment on
October 10, 2009 and Writ of Execution on February 16, 2010
be nullified; and (3) that the CTA First Division be directed to
re-open CTA Case No. 6412 to allow petitioner to submit her
memoranda setting forth her substantial legal defenses.
In opposition, respondent filed its Motion to Deny Due Course
(To The Petition for Annulment of Judgment), arguing, among
others, that petitioner is not lawfully entitled to the annulment
of judgment on the ground that the CTA En Banc is bereft of
jurisdiction to entertain annulment of judgments on the premise
that the Rules of Court, Republic Act No. (RA No.) 9282, 15 and
the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals do not expressly
provide a remedy on annulment of judgments.
On July 27, 2011, the CTA En Banc issued a
Resolution16 dismissing the petition. Petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
Resolution17 dated November 15, 2011.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises the following arguments to support her
petition:
I Revised Rules of the CTA) do not provide for such a scenario.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (EN BANC) HAS
JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT.
II
THE NEGLIGENCE COMMITTED BY PETITIONER'S
COUNSEL IS GROSS, PALPABLE AND CONSTITUTES
TOTAL ABANDONMENT QF PETITIONER'S CAUSE
WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO EXTRINSIC FRAUD.
III
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS (FIRST DIVISION) HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE ORIGINAL PETITION
FILED BY RESPONDENT.
IV
PETITIONER IS NOT BARRED BY LA CHES FROM
ASSAILING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF
TAX APPEALS (FIRST DIVISION) OVER THE PETITION
FILED BY RESPONDENT.18
Prefatorily, we first pass upon the issue of whether the CTA En
Banc has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioner.
Annulment of judgment, as provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules
of Court, is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. It is a recourse that presupposes the filing
of a separate and original action for the purpose of annulling or
avoiding a decision in another case. Annulment is a remedy in
law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled is rendered. 19 It is unlike a motion for reconsideration,
appeal or even a petition for relief from judgment, because
annulment is not a continuation or progression of the same case,
as in fact the case it seeks to annul is already final and
executory. Rather, it is an extraordinary remedy that is equitable
in character and is permitted only in exceptional cases.20
Annulment of judgment involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction, as expressly conferred on the Court of Appeals by
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 129, Section 9(2). It also
implies power by a superior court over a subordinate one, as
provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, wherein the
appellate court may annul a decision of the regional trial court,
or the latter court may annul a decision of the municipal or
metropolitan trial court.
But the law and the rules are silent when it comes to a situation
similar to the case at bar, in which a court, in this case the Court
of Tax Appeals, is called upon to annul its own judgment. More
specifically, in the case at bar, the CTA sitting en bane is being
asked to annul a decision of one of its divisions. However, the
laws creating the CTA and expanding its jurisdiction (RA Nos.
1125 and 9282) and the court's own rules of procedure (the
It is the same situation among other collegial courts. To
illustrate, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals may sit
and adjudicate cases in divisions consisting of only a number of
Page 11 of 14
members, and such adjudication is already regarded .as the
decision of the Court itself. 21 It is provided for in the
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 4(1) and BP Blg. 129,
Section 4, respectively. The divisions are not considered
separate and distinct courts but are divisions of one and the
same court; there is no hierarchy of courts within the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals, for they each remain as one
court notwithstanding that they also work in divisions. 22 The
Supreme Court sitting en banc is not an appellate court vis-a-
vis its divisions, and it exercises no appellate jurisdiction over
the latter.23 As for the Court of
Appeals en banc, it sits as such only for the purpose of
exercising administrative, ceremonial, or other non-
adjudicatory functions. 24
Thus, it appears contrary to these features that a collegial court,
sitting en banc, may be called upon to annul a decision of one
of its divisions which had become final and executory, for it is
tantamount to allowing a court to annul its own judgment and
acknowledging that a hierarchy exists within such court. In the
process, it also betrays the principle that judgments must, at
some point, attain finality. A court that can revisit its own final
judgments leaves the door open to possible endless reversals or
modifications which is anathema to a stable legal system.
Thus, the Revised Rules of the CTA and even the Rules of
Court which apply suppletorily thereto provide for no instance
in which the en banc may reverse, annul or void a final decision
of a division. Verily, the Revised Rules of the CTA provide for
no instance of an annulment of judgment at all. On the other
hand, the Rules of Court, through Rule 47, provides, with
certain conditions, for annulment of judgment done by a
superior court, like the Court of Appeals, against the final
judgment, decision or ruling of an inferior court, which is the
Regional Trial Court, based on the grounds of extrinsic' fraud
and lack of .jurisdiction. The Regional Trial Court, in turn, also
is empowered to, upon a similar action, annul a judgment or
ruling of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts within its
territorial jurisdiction. But, again, the said Rules are silent as to
whether a collegial court sitting en banc may annul a final
judgment of its own division.
As earlier explained, the silence of the Rules may be attributed
to the need to preserve the principles that there can be no
hierarchy within a collegial court between its divisions and
the en banc, and that a court's judgment, once final, is
immutable.
A direct petition for annulment of a judgment of the CTA to the
Supreme Court, meanwhile, is likewise unavailing, for the same
reason that there is no identical remedy with the High Court to
annul a final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals.
RA No. 9282, Section l puts the CTA on the same level as the
Court of Appeals, so that if the latter's final judgments may not
be annulled before the Supreme Court, then the CTA's own
decisions similarly may not be so annulled. And more
importantly, it has been previously discussed that am1ulment of
judgment is an original action, yet, it is not among the cases
enumerated in the Constitution's Article VIII, Section 5 over
which the Supreme Court exercises original jurisdiction.
Annulment of judgment also often requires an adjudication of
facts, a task that the Court loathes to perform, as it is not a trier
of facts. 25
Nevertheless, there will be extraordinary cases, when the
interest of justice highly demands it, where final judgments of
the Court of Appeals, the CTA or any other inferior court may
still be vacated or subjected to the Supreme Court's
modification, reversal, annulment or declaration as void. But it
will be accomplished not through the same species of original
action or petition for annulment as that found in Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court, but through any of the actions over which the
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction as specified in the
Constitution, like 65 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, the next query is: Did the CTA En Banc correctly deny
the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioner?
As earlier discussed, the petition designated as one for
annulment of judgment (following Rule 47) was legally and
procedurally infirm and, thus, was soundly dismissed by the
CTA En Banc on such ground. Also, the CTA could not have
treated the petition as an appeal or a continuation of the case
before the CTA First Division because the latter's decision had
become final and executory and, thus, no longer subject to an
appeal.
Instead, what remained as a remedy for the petitioner was to file
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, which could have been
filed as an original action before this Court and not before the
CTA En Banc. Certiorari is available when there is no appeal
or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, such as in the case at bar. Since the petition below
invoked the gross and palpable negligence of petitioner's
counsel which is allegedly tantamount to its being deprived of
due process and its day in court as party-litigant26 and, as it also
invokes lack of jurisdiction of the CTA First Division to
entertain the petition filed by private respondent since the same
allegedly fails to comply with the
reglementary periods for judicial remedies involving
administrative claims for refund of excess unutilized input VAT
under the National Internal Revenue Code (NJRC),27which
periods it claims to be jurisdictional, then the proper remedy
that petitioner should have availed of was indeed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65, an original or independent action
premised on the public respondent having acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, since
a certiorari petition is not a continuation of the appellate
process borne out of the original case but is a separate action
focused on actions that are in excess or wanting of
jurisdiction,28 then it cannot be filed in the same tribunal whose
actions are being assailed but is instead cognizable by a higher
tribunal which, in the case of the CTA, is this Court.29 In the
case involving petitioner, the petition could have been filed
directly with this Court, even without any need to file a motion
Page 12 of 14
for reconsideration with the CTA division or En Banc, as the
case appears to fall under one of the recognized exceptions to
the rule requiring such a motion as a prerequisite to filing such
petition.30
The office of a certiorari petition is detailed in the Rules of
Court, thus:
Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging
the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board
or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all
pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (la)
The writ of certiorari is an "extraordinary remedy" that is
justified in the "absence of an appeal or any plain speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw." 31 It may be
given due course as long as petitioners allege that they had no
appeal or any other efficacious remedy against the appellate
court's decision.32
Direct resort to this Court via a certiorari petition on the same
grounds as in this case has jurisprudential
precedents.1âwphi1 In one, We held that when the appellate
court's decision is void for lack of due process, the filing of a
petition for certiorari with this court without a motion for
reconsideration is justified. 33 This Court also has held that a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
available when the proceedings in question amount to depriving
the petitioner his day in court.34 It is true that certiorari is not a
substitute for appeal, but exempt from this rule is a case when
the trial court's decision or resolution was issued without
jurisdiction or with gr.ave abuse of discretion. 35 When a
fraudulent scheme prevents a party from having his day in
court or from presenting his case, the fraud is one that affects
and goes into the jurisdiction of the court. 36 A question as to
lack of jurisdiction of the respondent tribunal or agency is
properly the office of a petition for certiorari.
In any event, petitioner's failure to avail of this remedy and
mistaken filing of the wrong action are fatal to its case and
renders and leaves the CTA First Division's decision as indeed
final and executory. By the time the instant petition for review
was filed by petitioner with this Court on December 9, 2011,
more than sixty (60) days have passed since petitioner's alleged
discovery (on March 7, 2011) of its loss in the case as brought
about by the alleged negligence or fraud of its counsel.
Thus, the current discussion serves no further purpose other
than as merely a future guide to the bench and the bar when
confronted with a similar situation.
Although in select cases, this Court has asseverated that "it is
always within its power to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of
justice require it" and that the Rules of Court were conceived
and promulgated to set forth 'guidelines in the dispensation of
justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. 37 We have also equally
stressed that strict compliance with the rules of procedure is
essential to the administration of justice. 38
In this case, even if there was allegedly a deliberate effort from
petitioner's counsel to refuse to participate, despite notice, in the
conduct of the case after the filing of the Answer right up to the
issuance of the Writ of Execution against petitioner, 38 equally
apparent is the failure of petitioner and/or petitioner's
responsible subordinates to supervise the said counsel as well
as the conduct and progress of the case. Not only was there an
apparent negligence of counsel, 39 which binds the client, there
likewise appears to have been lapses on the part of the client -
the petitioner and the petitioner's responsible subordinates -
themselves. Equally oft-repeated is the rule that service made
upon the present counsel of record at his given address is
service to the client.40 Thus, it is harder to justify a relaxation
of the rules when the litigant itself suffers from inexcusable
neglect. It is an oft-repeated pronouncement that clients should
take the initiative of periodically checking the progress of their
cases, so that they could take timely steps to protect their
interest.41 Failing such, clients are left with more recourse
against the consequence of their and their counsel's omissions.
To prevent similar disadvantageous incidents against the
government in the future, the BIR is DIRECTED to
ADOPT mechanisms, procedures, or measures that can
effectively monitor the progress of cases being handled by its
counsels. Likewise, the Ombudsman is DIRECTED to
CONDUCT an in-depth investigation to determine who were
responsible for the apparent mishandling of the present case that
resulted in the loss of almost half-a-billion pesos, which the
government could have used to finance its much needed
infrastructure, livelihood projects, and other equally important
projects.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review
is hereby DENIED. The assailed Resolutions dated July 27,
2011 and November 15, 2011 of the Court of Tax Appeals En
Banc are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 13 of 14
Page 14 of 14