th
125. HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING CORP. vs.
LEY CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Facts:
Ley Construction and Development Corporation (LCDC) filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages with the RTC of Makati against Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation (Hyatt) claiming that Hyatt reneged in its obligation to
transfer 40% of the pro indiviso share of a real property in Makati in favor of LCDC
despite LCDC’s full payment of the purchase price of P2,634,000.00; and that Hyatt
failed to develop the said property in a joint venture, despite LCDC’s payment of 40%
of the pre-construction cost. LCDC filed amended complaints impleading Princeton
Development Corporation (Princeton) and Yu He Ching (Yu) President of Hyatt as
additional defendants claiming that Hyatt sold the subject property to Princeton in
fraud of LCDC and alleging that LCDC paid the purchase price of P2, 634,000.00 to
Hyatt through Yu.
LCDC filed notices to take the depositions of Yu; Pacita Tan Go, Account Officer of
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC); and Elena Sy, Finance Officer of
Hyatt. Hyatt also filed notice to take deposition of Manuel Ley, President of LCDC,
while Princeton filed notice to take the depositions of Manuel and Janet Ley. The RTC
ordered the deposition-taking to proceed.
However, at the scheduled deposition of Elena Sy, Hyatt and Yu prayed that all
settings for depositions be disregarded and pre-trial be set instead, contending that
the taking of depositions only delay the resolution of the case. The RTC agreed and
on the same day ordered all depositions cancelled and pre-trial to take place.
LCDC moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied due to the following reasons
1) said depositions will only delay the early termination of the case; 2) had the Court
set the case for pre-trial conference and trial thereafter, the case would have been
terminated earlier; 3) what the parties would like to elicit from their deponents would
probably be elicited at the pre-trial conference; 4) no substantial rights of the parties
would be prejudiced, if pre-trial conference is held, instead of deposition.
On the scheduled date of the pre-trial, LCDC filed an Urgent Motion to Suspend
th
Proceedings Due to Pendency of Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals (12
Division), which sought to annul the order regarding the cancellation of the
deposition-taking. RTC denied plaintiff’s motion to suspend proceedings and gave
LCDC two (2) options: enter into a pre-trial conference, advising plaintiff that what it
would like to obtain at the deposition may be obtained at the pre-trial conference; and,
terminate the pre-trial conference and apply for deposition later on.
The pre-trial proceeded as scheduled and with the refusal of LCDC to enter into pre-
trial, Hyatt, Yu and Princeton moved to declare LCDC non-suited which the RTC
granted.
For LCDC’s failure to enter into pre-trial conference without any valid reason the
complaint and the counterclaims were dismissed by the RTC.
LCDC filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied compelling it file an
th
appeal with CA (7 Division).
CA’s 12 Division denied LCDC’s petition for certiorari declaring that the granting of
the petition and setting aside of the RTC Orders are manifestly pointless considering
that the complaint itself had already been dismissed.
th
Meanwhile CA’s 7 Division finds the appeal meritorious and remanded the case to
the RTC for further hearing and to proceed with the deposition taking.
Hyatt and Princeton filed their respective motions for reconsideration which the CA
denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in remanding the case to the trial court and order the
deposition-taking to proceed.
Ruling:
No. A deposition should be allowed; absent any showing that taking it would prejudice
any party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to
make discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise
relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the
bounds of law. It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial
proceedings of examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be
observed by the trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if
summons have been served, and without such leave if an answer has been
submitted; and provided further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists
(Section 4, Rule 23, Rules of Court). The rules on discovery should not be unduly
restricted; otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining
the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.
Sec. 1, Rule 23 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Depositions pending action, when may be taken.---- By
leave of court after jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or
over property which is the subject of the action, or without such leave
after an answer has been served, the testimony of any person, whether
a party or not, may be taken, at the instance of any party, by deposition
upon oral examination or written interrogatories. The attendance of
witnesses may be compelled by the use of a subpoena as provided in
Rule 21. Depositions shall be taken only in accordance with these
Rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only
by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes. (Emphasis
supplied).
LCDC complied with the above quoted provision as it made its notice to take
depositions after the answers of the defendants have been served, thus, erred in
canceling the previously scheduled depositions.

While it is true that depositions may be disallowed by trial courts if the examination is
conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the
person who is the subject of the inquiry, or when the inquiry touches upon the
irrelevant or encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege, such
circumstances, however are absent in the case at bar.
The taking of depositions would not cause unnecessary duplicity even though the
intended deponents shall also be called as witnesses during trial, as explained in
Fortune Corp. v. Court of Appeals:
The availability of the proposed deponent to testify in court does not
constitute “good cause” to justify the court’s order that his deposition shall
not be taken. That the witness is unable to attend or testify is one of the
grounds when the deposition of a witness may be used in court during the
trial. But the same reason cannot be successfully invoked to prohibit the
taking of his deposition.
x x x Under the concept adopted by the new Rules, the deposition serves the double
function of a method of discovery - with use on trial not necessarily contemplated -
and a method of presenting testimony. Accordingly, no limitations other than
relevancy and privilege have been placed on the taking of depositions, while the use
at the trial is subject to circumscriptions looking toward the use of oral testimony
wherever practicable.
In Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court held:
What is chiefly contemplated is the discovery of every bit of information
which may be useful in the preparation for trial, such as the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts; those relevant facts
themselves; and the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things. Hence, “the
deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment.
No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude
a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to
proper litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge
whatever facts he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery
procedure simply advances the stage at which the disclosure can be
compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the
possibility, of surprise.
The trial court erred in forcing LCDC to choose only from the options given by the trial
court and in dismissing the complaint upon LCDC’s refusal to choose either of the
two.
The information LCDC seeks to obtain through the depositions, may not be obtained
at the pre-trial conference, as the said deponents are not parties to the pre-trial
conference.
As also pointed out by the CA:
x x x To unduly restrict the modes of discovery during trial, would defeat the very
purpose for which it is intended, as a pre-trial device. By then, the issues would have
been confined only on matters defined during pre-trial. The importance of the modes
of discovery cannot be gainsaid in this case in view of the nature of the controversy
involved and the conflicting interest claimed by the parties.
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real matters of dispute
between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation
for trial.
Further, in Republic v. Sandiganbayan the Court explained that:
The truth is that “evidentiary matters” may be inquired into and learned by
the parties before the trial. Indeed, it is the purpose and policy of the law
that the parties - before the trial if not indeed even before the pre-trial -
should discover or inform themselves of all the facts relevant to the action,
not only those known to them individually, but also those known to their
adversaries; in other words, the desideratum is that civil trials should not be
carried on in the dark; and the Rules of Court make this ideal possible
through the deposition- discovery mechanism set forth in Rules 24 to 29.
The experience in other jurisdictions has been the ample discovery before
trial, under proper regulation, accomplished one of the most necessary ends
of modern procedure; it not only eliminates unessential issues from trials
thereby shortening them considerably, but also requires parties to play the
game with the cards on the table so that the possibility of fair settlement
before trial is measurably increased.
The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve (1) as a
device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and clarify the
basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining the facts
relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of
the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said trials are carried
on in the dark.
In this case, the information sought to be obtained through the depositions of Elena
and Pacita are necessary to fully equip LCDC in determining what issues will be
defined at the pre-trial. Without such information before pre-trial, LCDC will be forced
to prosecute its case in the dark --- the very situation which the rules of discovery
seek to prevent. Indeed, the rules on discovery seek to make trial less a game of
blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to
the fullest practicable extent. DENIED.
126. San Luis v. Hon. Rojas & BERDEX Int’t Inc.
G.R. 159127 March 3, 2008
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by Ramon Gerardo B. San Luis
seeking to set aside the Resolutions of Sept 11, 2002 & May 20, 2003 of CA
in CA-G.R. SP No. 72596
BERDEX filed a complaint for sum of money in RTC Pasig. It is a foreign corp.
organized in the US with principal office in California. It is only suing only to
enforce its rights by virtue of an isolated transaction.
In June 1997, San Luis received money which were meant partly as advances or loan
and partly for the purchase of 40% shares of SEANET & SEABEST Corp.
However, no shares were transferred to BERDEX and San Luis retained the
shares.
Parties agreed to treat this as a loan. San Luis proposed to pay the loan within 3
years. BERDEX agrees with the agreement that in case of non-payment of
any installment shall render the whole loan due and demandable.
San Luis refused to sign the formal contract. He confirmed such loan to BERDEX’s
auditors on Aug 8, 2000. He only paid 20KUSD and no further payment was
made despite repeated demands.
BERDEX prayed that the RTC order to pay amount of 150,335.75USD plus interest
until fully paid and attorney’s fees.
San Luis filed an Answer saying that he is engaged in trading of seafoods. He
received 141,944.71USD with instructions that he deduct 23,748USD
representing his commission in their other transaction. The money was
intended to buy 70% of the outstanding shares of SEANET on behalf of
BERDEX and the balance is for the advances as SEANET’s stockholder,
which he complied.
In view of substantial losses of SEANET and San Luis’ desire to maintain good
business with BERDEX, San Luis offered that the amounts received be paid
by Fuegomar Traders Inc (corp. he put up & substantially owned) engaged
in the same line with SEANET. Fuegomar will buy the cost the stock
investment of BERDEX in SEANET. While the documentation was being
finalized, San Luis gave 20KUSD to BERDEX on behalf of Fuegomar.
BERDEX, however, claimed that its investment in SEANET was his personal
loan and the 20K paid was maliciously interpreted as petitioner’s admission
of personal liability.
Pre Trial conference was terminated and case was set for trial.
BERDEX filed a MOTION (to authorize deposition-taking through written
interrogatives) alleging that the initial presentation of its evidence is set on
May 3, 2002; that however, all its witnesses are Americans who reside and
hold office in US. One of the witnesses are of advance age and to travel to
PH may be extremely difficult if not dangerous. There was a perceived
danger after 9-11-2002. It alleged that written interrogatories are ideal since
the factual issues are already few and that such mode of deposition taking
will save precious judicial and government time and will prevent needless
delays in the case.
San Luis opposed and commented: If indeed there was an oral contract and San Luis
was liable to BERDEX for the amount he received from the latter, the
documents attached to BERDEX's complaint did not support its claim, but
rather supported his position. There is a very strict standard in proving an
oral contract. Taking the deposition through written interrogatories would
deprive the court of the opportunity to observe the general bearing and
demeanor of witnesses.
San Luis’ right to cross-examine the witnesses will be prejudiced, since he will be
limited to cross-interrogatories which will severely limit not only scope but
spontaneity of his cross-examination.
He also stated that it would create doubt on the witnesses whether they will adhere to
the PH laws on perjury.
He argues that it will not necessarily save time but in fact may lengthen the trial, as
both parties will both have the right to review and to object to interrogatories.
The travel claim is frivolous since BERDEX did not present evidence that US
prohibited its citizen to travel to PH. Even though if there is a prohibition, it is
not binding to our legal system. Old age is not a valid reason.
RTC granted the MOTION as it found the same appropriate and sanctioned by the
rules on deposition-taking. San Luis’ MR was denied.
San Luis filed with CA a petition for certiorari with TRO and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. CA made a resolution dated Sept 11, 2002 to dismiss the petition
citing Sec3 Rule 46 in relation to Sec1 Rule 65 for non-compliance:
• No affidavit of service was attached
• 2 annexes (Annex H & J) were blurred
• Pleadings filed before the respondent court are not attached.
CA denied the MR in a Resolution dated on May 20, 2003. It stated that non
compliance with the requirements as a result of misapprehension and unfamiliarity
with the rules. In any case, SC Admin Circular No. 3-96 states that subsequent
compliance shall not warrant a reconsideration.
Issue: whether Section 1, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court allows a non-resident
foreign corporation the privilege of having all its witnesses, all of whom are
foreigners, to testify through deposition upon written interrogatories taken
outside the Philippines to prove an oral contract
1. WON CA erred in dismissing the case? YES
2. WON RTC’s grant to the MOTION amounts to grave abuse of discretion?
NO
Ratio:
• Regarding deposition of foreign corporation:
o The rule does not make any distinction or restriction as to who can
avail of deposition. The fact that private respondent is a non-resident
foreign corporation is immaterial. The rule clearly provides that the
 testimony of any person may be taken by deposition upon oral
examination or written interrogatories, at the instance of any party.
Depositions serve as a device for ascertaining the facts relative to the
issues of the case. The evident purpose is to enable the parties,
consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent the
said trials from being carried out in the dark.
o Citing the case of Dasmarinas Garments v. Reyes:
§ Depositions may be used without the deponent being
actually called to the witness stand by the proponent,
under certain conditions and for certain limited
purposes. These exceptional situations are governed
by Section 4, Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.
§ Sec 4 par C allows the use of deposition: “The
deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may
be used by any party for any purpose if the court
finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness
if out of the province and at a greater distance than
fifty (50) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing,
or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his
absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition;”
• Regarding the ruling of CA:
o Anent petitioner's failure to attach the affidavit of service, we find the same
not fatal to the petition since it showed that copies of the petition were
personally served on the RTC and private respondent's counsel on
September 3, 2002 as evidenced by the parties' official receiving stamps
appearing opposite their names. By analogy, we have held that the non-
attachment of the affidavit of service is not fatal to the petition when the
registry receipts attached to the petition clearly show that respondents
were served copies of the petition; that the demands of substantial justice
were satisfied by the actual receipt of the petition.
o We likewise find satisfactory the explanation advanced by petitioner with
respect to the blurred copies of the annexes attached to the petition.
Moreover, we find that Annexes “H” and “J” are not necessary for the
resolution of the issue brought before the CA, i.e., whether the RTC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in granting private respondent's MOTION
(To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written Interrogatories).
o As to the non-attachment to the petition of the pleadings filed in the RTC,
we find that the documents attached to the petition -- to wit: private
respondent's MOTION (To Authorize Deposition-Taking Through Written
Interrogatories), petitioner's opposition, petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration and private respondent's opposition -- show that they
contained the relevant facts of the case and the respective arguments of
the parties on which the CA could have based its resolution on the merits
of the issue brought before it. Thus, there was no need to attach all other
pleadings filed in the RTC. Nonetheless, petitioner had submitted all the
pleadings when he filed his motion for reconsideration.
• Regarding the grant of RTC of BERDEX’s MOTION (LENGTHY
DISCUSSION BUT RELEVANT AND POSSIBLE TANUNGIN)
o Thus, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC
in granting private respondent's MOTION (To Allow Deposition-
Taking Through Written Interrogatories) considering private
respondent's allegation in its MOTION that its witnesses are all
Americans residing in the U.S. This situation is one of the
exceptions for its admissibility under Section 4(c)(2), Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court, i.e., that the witness resides at a distance of more
than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing,
or is out of the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition.
o Petitioner insists that Dasmariñas does not constitute a precedent
in the instant case as the facts are substantially different; to wit: (1)
in Dasmariñas, plaintiff filed a motion to take deposition through
written interrogatories of two witnesses abroad after it had already
presented its first witness, while in the present case, private
respondent will not present a single witness to testify in court but
only the witnesses’ depositions; (2) in Dasmariñas, the existence of
the contract involved was not in issue at all, while in the present
case, petitioner denied the existence of the alleged contract of loan
and private respondent has not presented any documentary
evidence to support its claim.
§ We do not agree
§ The situation in Dasmariñas is the same as in the instant
case since in both cases, it was already during the trial
stage that the deposition through written interrogatories
was sought to be taken. It does not matter whether one
witness for the plaintiff had already testified since
the Dasmariñas ruling did not make such testimony in
court a condition to grant the deposition of the two other
witnesses. Also, in Dasmariñas, the plaintiff sued
defendant to recover a certain sum of money which was
the same as in the instant case as private respondent was
suing petitioner for collection of sum of money.
o Petitioner claims that the right to take depositions upon written
interrogatories in lieu of oral testimony in open court would result in
grave injustice to him, as private respondent is seeking to establish
the existence of an oral contract which requires stricter standard in
proving the same.
§ We find such argument untenable.
 § While there are limitations to the rules of discovery, even leave of court if an answer has been submitted; and
when permitted to be undertaken without leave and provided, further, that a circumstance for their admissibility
without judicial intervention, such limitations inevitably exists.
arise when it can be shown that the examination is being o We also find no merit in petitioner's claim that his right to cross-
conducted in bad faith; or in such a manner as to annoy, examine private respondent's witnesses will be curtailed since
embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry; or petitioner is fully accorded the opportunity for cross-examination
when the inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or under Section 25, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court
encroaches upon the recognized domains of privilege. o Petitioner contends that since private respondent will have the
o It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to testimonies of its witnesses in another jurisdiction, the sanction of
be accorded a broad and liberal treatment and should not be penalty for perjury under our laws would not apply to them; and
unduly restricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant petitioner may not be able to enforce its own claim against private
and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within respondent, since it is domiciled in a foreign country and does not
the bounds of law. Otherwise, the advantage of a liberal discovery appear to have any assets in the Philippines. We will not venture to
procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of make any determination on this matter, as it would be premature,
litigation would be defeated. In fact, we find nothing in the rules on conjectural or anticipatory. We must only deal with an existing case
deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract as alleged by or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination,
petitioner. not one that is conjectural or merely anticipatory.
o In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude
the determination of its probative value at the appropriate time. The WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated September 11,
admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of 2002 and May 20, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72596
evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, the Orders dated May 9, 2002 and July
and competence while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence 3, 2002 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in Civil Case No. 68530
already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. stand.
o Petitioner argues that to allow such deposition-taking will prevent
the RTC from observing the witnesses' demeanor and credibility;
and that petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses would be
curtailed if not denied as he is limited to cross-interrogatories and
re-cross interrogatories based on written interrogatories.
§ We are not persuaded.
§ Depositions are allowed as a departure from the accepted
and usual judicial proceedings of examining witnesses in
open court, where their demeanor could be observed by
the trial judge; and the procedure is not on that account
rendered illegal nor is the deposition, thereby taken,
inadmissible. It precisely falls within one of the exceptions
where the law permits such a situation, i.e., the use of a
deposition in lieu of the actual appearance and testimony
of the deponent in open court and without being subject to
the prying eyes and probing questions of the
Judge. Depositions are consistent with the principle of
promoting just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action or proceeding. Depositions are allowed
provided the deposition is taken in accordance with the
applicable provisions of the Rules of Court; that is, with
leave of court if the summons have been served, without
127 Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA Hon Priscila Agana, and Vivien Soriguez function. It does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has already been
alleged in the pleadings.
FACTS o RFA clearly shows that it contains the same material averments in
his Answer to respondent's Complaint in the trial court.
• Petitioner terminated the security services of private respondent Vivien S.
- Respondent cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Answer of
Soriguez alleging that it was dissatisfied with the latter's services because
petitioner just because she failed to have her response to the request placed
she failed to prevent and promptly investigate a theft case which occurred in
under oath since these are the very matters she raises in her verified
its Cebu plant site.
1
Complaint in the court below. The following allegations specifically contained
• private respondent instituted an action with the RTC for collection of unpaid therein are self-evident
fees for her security services rendered to petitioner.
o Petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was justified because
9. That, in compliance thereto (sic) (referring to the request for
private respondent was answerable for the losses it incurred arising
investigation), herein plaintiff, through her authorized
from the theft attributable to her fault. Petitioner thus claimed that
representative, went at (sic) the place and conducted the necessary
there was legal set-off or compensation regarding the unpaid fees
investigation and found out that the herein plaintiff was not
due private respondent and the amount of the stolen articles owned
responsible for those alleged losses simply because of the
by petitioner.
following, to wit:
• Petitioner then sent private respondent a Request for Admission (RFA) by
the latter of her responsibility of the theft that occurred.
Those alleged losses like Blower, Oil Filter, transmission and others
• Thereafter private respondent thru counsel filed a Manifestation and Reply to
were taken and brought outside the guarded place by certain
the Request for Admission. It was not under oath.
Danny Baterna, driver of defendant, as reflected in the Log Book of
• Petitioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment positing that private
the plaintiff . . .
respondent impliedly admitted the matters set forth in the Request for
Admission by failing to respond under oath as required under Sec. 2, Rule
26, of the Rules of Court. - private respondent need not reply to the Request for Admission because her
o contended that the manifestation and reply not being verified was Complaint itself controverts the matters set forth in the Answer of petitioner
ineffectual and thus should be stricken off the records. Private which were merely reproduced in the RFA.
respondent countered that her reply although not under oath - Since the answer of private respondent to the request is no longer required
effectively denied the matters set forth in the request. in the instant case, it therefore becomes unnecessary to dwell on the issue
of the propriety of an answer that is not under oath (Even assuming that a
response to the request is needed, private respondent had already
RTC: ruled in favor of private respondent. MR of pet denied. Elevated to CA in a
substantially complied with the requirement of the law when she specifically
special civil action for certiorari. DENIED.
denied the material allegations of the petitioner in her Manifestation and
Reply to the Request for Admission.)
ISSUE: o reply that is not under oath is merely a formal and not a substantive
defect. This procedural lapse may be dispensed with if the
Whether private respondent may be considered to have impliedly admitted
circumstances call for the dispensing of the rule in the interest of
the matters referred to in the request when she filed a manifestation and reply that
justice.
was not under oath?
- PET DENIED.
HELD: NO.

- The Request for Admission of petitioner does not fall under Rule 26 of the
Rules. As we held in Po v. CA and Briboneria v. CA, Rule 26 as a mode of
discovery contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend to shed
light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in a pleading. That is its primary
128. PAJARILLAGA VS CA
G.R. NO. 163515 : October 31, 2008
TOPIC: Deposition- when it may be availed of
PONENTE: Justice Quisunbing
FACTS:
1. Private respondent Thomas T. Kalangeg filed with the RTC of
Bontoc, Mt. Province, Branch 36, a complaint for a sum of money with
damages against petitioner Isidro T. Pajarillaga.
2. On March 10, 1997, private respondent presented his first witness. At the
next scheduled hearing on August 8, 1997, neither petitioner nor his counsel
appeared despite notice. Upon private respondent’s motion, the trial court
allowed him to present his remaining two witnesses subject to petitioner’s
cross-examination on the next scheduled hearing on September 2, 1997.
But when the case was called on that date, petitioner and his counsel were
again absent. Upon private respondent’s motion, the trial court declared
petitioner to have waived his right of cross-examination and allowed private
respondent to make a formal offer of evidence, which the trial court admitted.
3. The trial court scheduled petitioner’s presentation of evidence but the
petitioner moved to reset the hearing. The TC granted the motion.
4. Five days before the scheduled hearing, the petitioner filed a Motion for
Leave of Court to Take the Deposition of the Defendant Upon Written
Interrogatories
a. Petitioner resides in Manila which is more than four hundred (400)
kilometers from Bontoc, Mt. Province;
b. Petitioner is suffering from an illness which prohibits him from doing
strenuous activities.
5. Private respondent opposed the motion.
6. On December 15, 1997, neither petitioner nor his counsel again appeared.
Nonetheless, the trial court reset the case to January 12, 1998 for the
presentation of petitioner’s evidence.
7. In an Order dated January 29, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s
motion. Petitioner’s MR: denied.
8. CA affirmed.
a. Denial of petitioner’s motion was not tainted with grave abuse of
discretion since the trial court gave petitioner full opportunity to
present his evidence.
b. Petitioner’s motion came much too late in the proceedings since
private respondent has already rested his case
c. The medical certificate which petitioner submitted to validate his
allegation of illness merely contained a remark that the “patient is
advised to avoid strenuous activity.” It did not state that the travel
from Manila to Mt. Province for the scheduled hearings was too
strenuous to endanger petitioner’s health.
The threats to petitioner’s life by private respondent’s relatives were belatedly alleged
only in his motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether the taking of petitioner’s deposition by written interrogatories is
proper and should have been granted by the court.
HELD: NO.
RATIO:
Deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery, the primary function of which is to
supplement the pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute
between the parties and affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation
for trial. It should be allowed absent any showing that taking it would prejudice any
party. It is accorded a broad and liberal treatment and the liberty of a party to make
discovery is well-nigh unrestricted if the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant
and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law.
It is allowed as a departure from the accepted and usual judicial proceedings of
examining witnesses in open court where their demeanor could be observed by the
trial judge, consistent with the principle of promoting just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding; and provided it is taken in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules of Court, i.e., with leave of court if summons have
been served, and without such leave if an answer has been submitted; and provided
further that a circumstance for its admissibility exists.
There is nothing in the Rules of Court or in jurisprudence which restricts a deposition
to the sole function of being a mode of discovery before trial. Under certain conditions
and for certain limited purposes, it may be taken even after trial has commenced and
may be used without the deponent being actually called to the witness stand. There is
no rule that limits deposition-taking only to the period of pre-trial or before it; no
prohibition exists against the taking of depositions after pre-trial. There can be no
valid objection to allowing them during the process of executing final and executory
judgments, when the material issues of fact have become numerous or complicated.
There is really nothing objectionable, per se, with petitioner availing of this discovery
measure after private respondent has rested his case and prior to petitioner’s
presentation of evidence. To reiterate, depositions may be taken at any time after the
institution of any action, whenever necessary or convenient. But when viewed vis the
several postponements made by petitioner for the initial presentation of his
evidence, his timing is suspect.
The records show that petitioner stopped attending the hearings after private
respondent presented his first witness. Petitioner offered no excuse for his and his
counsel’s absences. Moreover, the trial court has set four (4) hearing dates for the
initial presentation of his evidence. But he merely moved for its resetting without
invoking the grounds.
Petitioner has not sufficiently shown an “exceptional” or “unusual” case for us to grant
leave and reverse the trial and appellate courts.
Under Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, depositions may be used for
the trial or for the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding, under
the following
§ (c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party,
may be used by any party for any purpose if the court
finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness
resides at a distance more than one hundred (100)
kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the
Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was
procured by the party offering the deposition; or (3) that
 the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age,
sickness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party
offering the deposition has been unable to procure the
attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon
application and notice, that such exceptional
circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest
of justice and with due regard to the importance of
presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court,
to allow the deposition to be used.
• Petitioner’s claim of illness: the medical certificate submitted by petitioner
merely contained a remark that the “patient is advised to avoid strenuous
activity.” It was not alleged that the travel from Manila to Mt. Province for the
scheduled hearings was too strenuous to endanger petitioner’s health.
While the rules on discovery are liberally constructed so as to ascertain truth and to
expedite the disposal of cases, the trial court may disallow a deposition if there are
valid reasons for so ruling.
129 SPOUSES VICENTE AFULUGENCIA and LETICIA AFULUGENCIA,
Petitioners, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. and EMMANUEL L.
ORTEGA, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff, Province
of Bulacan, Respondents.
DOCTRINE:
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness
stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.
This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure
of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the
adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
FACTS:
Petitioners, spouses Vicente and Leticia Afulugencia, filed a Complaint for nullification
of mortgage, foreclosure, auction sale, certificate of sale and other documents, with
damages, against respondents Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co. (Metrobank) and
Emmanuel L. Ortega (Ortega) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City
Metrobank is a domestic banking corporation existing under Philippine laws, while
Ortega is the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Malolos RTC.
After the filing of the parties’ pleadings and with the conclusion of pre-trial, petitioners
filed a Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum to require
Metrobank’s officers to appear and testify as the petitioners’ initial witnesses during
the August 31, 2006 hearing for the presentation of their evidence-in-chief, and to
bring the documents relative to their loan with Metrobank, as well as those covering
the extrajudicial foreclosure and sale of petitioners’ 200-square meter land in
Meycauayan, Bulacan covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20411.
Metrobank filed an Opposition arguing that for lack of a proper notice of hearing, the
Motion must be denied; that being a litigated motion, the failure of petitioners to set a
date and time for the hearing renders the Motion ineffective and pro forma; that
pursuant to Sections 1 and 611 of Rule 25 of the Rules, Metrobank’s officers – who
are considered adverse parties – may not be compelled to appear and testify in court
for the petitioners since they were not initially served with written interrogatories; that
petitioners have not shown the materiality and relevance of the documents sought to
be produced in court; and that petitioners were merely fishing for evidence.
Petitioners submitted a Reply stating that the lack of a proper notice of hearing was
cured by the filing of Metrobank’s Opposition; that applying the principle of liberality,
the defect may be ignored; that leave of court is not necessary for the taking of
Metrobank’s officers’ depositions; that for their case, the issuance of a subpoena is
not unreasonable and oppressive, but instead favorable to Metrobank, since it will
present the testimony of these officers just the same during the presentation of its
own evidence; that the documents sought to be produced are relevant and will prove
whether petitioners have paid their obligations to Metrobank in full, and will settle the
issue relative to the validity or invalidity of the foreclosure proceedings; and that the
Rules do not prohibit a party from presenting the adverse party as its own witness.
RTC – Denied Motion for Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum for
failure to follow procedural requirements – mere scrap of paper. Spouses then filed
petition for certiorari (65) with CA.
CA – Dissmissed petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN
REQUIRING NOTICE AND HEARING (SECS. 4 AND 5, RULE 15, RULES OF
COURT) FOR A MERE MOTION FOR SUBPOENA OF RESPONDENT BANK’S
OFFICERS WHEN SUCH REQUIREMENTS APPLY ONLY TO DEPOSITION
UNDER SEC. 6, RULE 25, RULES OF COURT.
HELD:
On the procedural issue, it is quite clear that Metrobank was notified of the Motion for
Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum Ad Testificandum; in fact, it filed a timely
Opposition thereto. The technical defect of lack of notice of hearing was thus cured by
the filing of the Opposition.
As officers of the adverse party Metrobank are being compelled to testify as the
calling party’s main witnesses; likewise, they are tasked to bring with them documents
which shall comprise the petitioners’ principal evidence. This is not without significant
consequences that affect the interests of the adverse party, as will be shown below.
As a rule, in civil cases, the procedure of calling the adverse party to the witness
stand is not allowed, unless written interrogatories are first served upon the latter.
This is embodied in Section 6, Rule 25 of the Rules, which provides –
Sec. 6. Effect of failure to serve written interrogatories.
Unless thereafter allowed by the court for good cause shown and to prevent a failure
of justice, a party not served with written interrogatories may not be compelled by the
adverse party to give testimony in open court, or to give a deposition pending appeal.
One of the purposes of the above rule is to prevent fishing expeditions and needless
delays; it is there to maintain order and facilitate the conduct of trial. It will be
presumed that a party who does not serve written interrogatories on the adverse party
beforehand will most likely be unable to elicit facts useful to its case if it later opts to
call the adverse party to the witness stand as its witness. Instead, the process could
be treated as a fishing expedition or an attempt at delaying the proceedings; it
produces no significant result that prior written interrogatories might bring.
Besides, since the calling party is deemed bound by the adverse party’s testimony, documents prior to the signing of the loan agreement, and while the loan was
compelling the adverse party to take the witness stand may result in the calling party outstanding, in violation of the law.
damaging its own case. Otherwise stated, if a party cannot elicit facts or information
useful to its case through the facility of written interrogatories or other mode of
discovery, then the calling of the adverse party to the witness stand could only serve
to weaken its own case as a result of the calling party’s being bound by the adverse
party’s testimony, which may only be worthless and instead detrimental to the calling
party’s cause.

Another reason for the rule is that by requiring prior written interrogatories, the court
may limit the inquiry to what is relevant, and thus prevent the calling party from
straying or harassing the adverse party when it takes the latter to the stand.

Thus, the rule not only protects the adverse party from unwarranted surprises or
harassment; it likewise prevents the calling party from conducting a fishing expedition
or bungling its own case. Using its own judgment and discretion, the court can hold its
own in resolving a dispute, and need not bear witness to the parties perpetrating
unfair court practices such as fishing for evidence, badgering, or altogether ruining
their own cases. Ultimately, such unnecessary processes can only constitute a waste
of the court’s precious time, if not pointless entertainment.

In the present case, petitioners seek to call Metrobank’s officers to the witness stand
as their initial and main witnesses, and to present documents in Metrobank’s
possession as part of their principal documentary evidence. This is improper.
Petitioners may not be allowed, at the incipient phase of the presentation of their
evidence-in-chief at that, to present Metrobank’s officers – who are considered
adverse parties as well, based on the principle that corporations act only through their
officers and duly authorized agents – as their main witnesses; nor may they be
allowed to gain access to Metrobank’s documentary evidence for the purpose of
making it their own. This is tantamount to building their whole case from the evidence
of their opponent. The burden of proof and evidence falls on petitioners, not on
Metrobank; if petitioners cannot prove their claim using their own evidence, then the
adverse party Metrobank may not be pressured to hang itself from its own defense.

It is true that under the Rules, a party may, for good cause shown and to prevent a
failure of justice, be compelled to give testimony in court by the adverse party who
has not served written interrogatories. But what petitioners seek goes against the very
principles of justice and fair play; they would want that Metrobank provide the very
evidence with which to prosecute and build their case from the start. This they may
not be allowed to do.

Finally, the Court may not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of such a
move by petitioners. As one of their causes of action in their Complaint, petitioners’
claim that they were not furnished with specific documents relative to their loan
agreement with Metrobank at the time they obtained the loan and while it was
outstanding. If Metrobank were to willingly provide petitioners with these documents
even before petitioners can present evidence to show that indeed they were never
furnished the same, any inferences generated from this would certainly not be useful
for Metrobank. One may be that by providing petitioners with these documents,
Metrobank would be admitting that indeed, it did not furnish petitioners with these