Chapter I administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE (Police Power)
Ynot v. IAC
FACTS:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of
carabaos (EO 626). To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which
not only banned the movement of carabaos from interprovinces but as well
as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting
6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation of EO
626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to
be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by
EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is
unconstitutional. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a
valid exercise of police power in order to promote general welfare so as to
curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO
626-A ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The
movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a
subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot should be given to
defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred before
they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an
invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law
and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner
of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense
and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are
granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily
taken.
Ermita Malate v. City of Manila 20 SCRA 849 (1967)
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, and one of its
members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for the prohibition of Ordinance
4670 on June 14, 1963 to be applicable in the city of Manila.
They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers of the Manila
City Board to regulate due to the fact that hotels were not part of its
regulatory powers. They also asserted that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance was unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
violative of due process insofar because it would impose P6,000.00 license
fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
motels; there was also the requirement that the guests would fill up a form
specifying their personal information.
There was also a provision that the premises and facilities of such hotels,
motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection from city
authorites. They claimed this to be violative of due process for being vague.
The law also classified motels into two classes and required the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The
petitioners also invoked the lack of due process on this for being arbitrary.
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours.
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the hotel.
The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic cancellation of the
license of the hotels that violated the ordinance.
The lower court declared the ordinance unconstitutional.
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due
process clause?
RULING:
No. Judgment reversed.
"The presumption is towards the validity of a law.” However, the Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear
invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation.
O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case was in the scope of
police power. As underlying questions of fact may condition the
constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid
in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings
and the stipulation of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the
judgment against the ordinance set aside.”
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely
enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals, particularly
fornication and prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for
purpose other than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of
the city government."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view
of the requirements of due process, equal protection and other applicable
constitutional guaranties, however, the power must not be unreasonable or
violative of due process.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It has a
standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a
procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance
from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason,
obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out
and unfairness avoided.
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances," decisions based on such a
clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles
of our society." Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrase.
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to
the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of
cases than in the former, and aside from applying the well-known legal
principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive,
or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with such
discretion. Eg. Sale of liquors.
Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement the state’s police
power.
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage
clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power measure.
On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to
twice every 24 hours- It was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for
the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-
being.
Laurel- The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and
authority in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and
order and happiness for all.
The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle,
unlike in the sole case of People v Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to
some extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of
intervention even in contractual relations affected with public interest.
What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were
freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of
governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the
liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope
of regulatory measure is wider.
On the law being vague on the issue of personal information, the
maintenance of establishments, and the “full rate of payment”- Holmes-
“We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
City of Manila vs Judge Laguio
FACTS:
On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars,
motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was
notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate
Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market
such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers
that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit their
operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of Police
Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the
purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of
the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the
procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In
the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
JMM Productions vs Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Due to the death of one Maricris Sioson in 1991, Cory banned the
deployment of performing artists to Japan and other destinations. This was
relaxed however with the introduction of the Entertainment Industry
Advisory Council which later proposed a plan to POEA to screen and train
performing artists seeking to go abroad. In pursuant to the proposal POEA
and the secretary of DOLE sought a 4 step plan to realize the plan which
included an Artist’s Record Book which a performing artist must acquire
prior to being deployed abroad. The Federation of Talent Managers of the
Philippines assailed the validity of the said regulation as it violated the right
to travel, abridge existing contracts and rights and deprives artists of their
individual rights. JMM intervened to bolster the cause of FETMOP. The
lower court ruled in favor of EIAC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the regulation by EIAC is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of the lower court. The regulation is a valid exercise of
police power. Police power concerns government enactments which
precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order
enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners
to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does
not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably.
The welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was
paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and
absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to “high risk”
destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further
underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of
screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic
skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately
prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It
cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for
exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies.
Ichong vs Hernandez
FACTS:
The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail Business). Its
purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships,
or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by
Filipinos, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are
allowed to continue their business, unless their licenses are
forfeited in accordance with law, until their death or voluntary
retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten years after the approval
of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this
Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail
business for violation of the laws on nationalization, economic
control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry.
  provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually
engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
retail business reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.

Lao Ichong, in his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by
corporations and partnerships affected by the Act, filed an action to declare alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the
it unconstitutional for the ff: reasons: legislature’s target in the enactment of the Act.
1. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and
deprives them of their liberty and property without due process The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the distinction between the
alien and the national as a trader. The alien is naturally lacking in that spirit
2. the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily stays and
makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the
3. the Act violates international and treaty obligations
State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
4. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their
retail business thru hereditary succession While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the
needs of the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the
ISSUE: State.

WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the
people on whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of
HELD:
pernicious designs and practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic
The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens control on the nation’s economy endangering the national security in times
the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and of crisis and emergency.
fundamental differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify
the legislative classification adopted.
Espina v. Exec. Sec. Zamora
RATIO:
The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among FACTS:
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and On March 7, 2000, President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act
liabilities enforced. (R.A.) 8762, also known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It
expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which absolutely prohibited foreign nationals
The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class from engaging in the retail trade business. R.A. 8762 now allows them to do
are treated alike. so under four categories.
R.A. 8762 also allows natural-born Filipino citizens, who had lost their
citizenship and now reside in the Philippines, to engage in the retail trade
business with the same rights as Filipino citizens.
On October 11, 2000, petitioners, all members of the House of
Representatives, filed the present petition, assailing the constitutionality of
R.A. 8762 on the following grounds:
The law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution
which enjoins the State to place the national economy under the control of
Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of opportunities, promote
industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise
against unfair competition and trade policies.
The implementation of R.A. 8762 would lead to alien control of the retail
trade, which taken together with alien dominance of other areas of
business, would result in the loss of effective Filipino control of the
economy.
Foreign retailers like Walmart and K-Mart would crush Filipino retailers and
sari-sari store vendors, destroy self-employment, and bring about more
unemployment.
The World Bank-International Monetary Fund had improperly imposed the
passage of R.A. 8762 on the government as a condition for the release of
certain loans.
There is a clear and present danger that the law would promote monopolies
or combinations in restraint of trade.
Respondents Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, Jr., Trade and Industry
Secretary Mar Roxas, National Economic and Development Authority
(NEDA) Secretary Felipe Medalla, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Gov. Rafael
Buenaventura, and Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Lilia
Bautista countered that:
Petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They cannot invoke
the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the
disbursement of public funds.
The petition does not involve any justiciable controversy.
Petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of
R.A. 8762. Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution are not self-
executing provisions that are judicially demandable.
The Constitution mandates the regulation but not the prohibition of foreign
investments. It directs Congress to reserve to Filipino citizens certain areas
of investments upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the
national interest so dictates. But the Constitution leaves to the discretion of
the Congress whether or not to make such reservation. It does not prohibit
Congress from enacting laws allowing the entry of foreigners into certain
industries not reserved by the Constitution to Filipino citizens.
ISSUES:
Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge
the constitutionality of R.A. 8762
Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional
POLITICAL LAW: Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party
to come to a court of justice and make such a challenge.
HELD:
Legal standing or locus standi refers to the right of a party to come to a
court of justice and make such a challenge. More particularly, standing
refers to his personal and substantial interest in that he has suffered or will
suffer direct injury as a result of the passage of that law.

Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade
Liberalization Act prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either
as taxpayers or as legislators. Still the Court will resolve the question they
raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional plaintiffs
when the public interest so requires or the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
POLITICAL LAW: The declarations of principles and state policies in the
Constitution are not self-executing.
As the Court explained in Tanada v. Angara, the provisions of Article II of the
1987 Constitution, the declarations of principles and state policies, are not
self-executing. Legislative failure to pursue such policies cannot give rise to
a cause of action in the courts.
Furthermore, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires
the development of a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it does not impose a policy
of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply
to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic
policies and ensure that Filipinos are given preference in all areas of
development.
More importantly, Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution gives
Congress the discretion to reserve to Filipinos certain areas of investments
upon the recommendation of the NEDA and when the national interest
requires. Thus, Congress can determine what policy to pass and when to
pass it depending on the economic exigencies. It can enact laws allowing the
entry of foreigners into certain industries not reserved by the Constitution
to Filipino citizens. In this case, Congress has decided to open certain areas
of the retail trade business to foreign investments instead of reserving them
exclusively to Filipino citizens. The NEDA has not opposed such policy.
Certainly, it is not within the province of the Court to inquire into the
wisdom of R.A. 8762 save when it blatantly violates the Constitution. But as
the Court has said, there is no showing that the law has contravened any
constitutional mandate. The Court is not convinced that the implementation
of R.A. 8762 would eventually lead to alien control of the retail trade
business. Petitioners have not mustered any concrete and strong argument
to support its thesis. The law itself has provided strict safeguards on foreign
participation in that business. Thus -
First, aliens can only engage in retail trade business subject to the categories
above-enumerated; Second, only nationals from, or juridical entities formed
or incorporated in countries which allow the entry of Filipino retailers shall
be allowed to engage in retail trade business; and Third, qualified foreign
retailers shall not be allowed to engage in certain retailing activities outside
their accredited stores through the use of mobile or rolling stores or carts,
the use of sales representatives, door-to-door selling, restaurants and sari-
sari stores and such other similar retailing activities.
US vs TORIBIO
FACTS:
Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao, residing in the town of Carmen
in the province of Bohol. The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit from
the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in
violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the
slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for
human consumption.
The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1) prohibiting is the
slaughter of large cattle in the municipal slaughter house without a permit
given by the municipal treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the
municipality of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he slaughtered his
carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act constitutes a taking of property for public
use in the exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing for the
compensation of owners, and it is an undue and unauthorized exercise of
police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their
private property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle, is an undue and unauthorized exercise of police
power.
RULING:
It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.
The Supreme court Said sections 30 and 33 of the Act prohibit and penalize
the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of
large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30
Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more
constructions, that construction should be adopted which will most tend to
give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and promote the object
for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected
which would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to
defeat the object which the legislator sought to attain by its enactment
The Supreme Court also said that if they will follow the contention of
Toribio it will defeat the purpose of the law.
The police power rests upon necessity and the right of self-protection and if
ever the invasion of private property by police regulation can be justified,
The Supreme Court think that the reasonable restriction placed upon the
use of carabaos by the provision of the law under discussion must be held to
be authorized as a reasonable and proper exercise of that power.
The Supreme Court cited events that happen in the Philippines like an
epidemic that wiped 70-100% of the population of carabaos.. The Supreme
Court also said that these animals are vested with public interest for they
are fundamental use for the production of crops. These reasons satisfy the
requesites of a valid exercise of police power
The Supreme court finally said that article 1147 is not an exercise of the
inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the
taking of caraboes for public purpose; it just serve as a mere regulation for
the consumption of these private properties for the protection of general
welfare and public interest.
Velasco vs Villegas
Facts:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Ordinance 4964, prohibiting barbershop
to conduct massaging customers in a separate room or in any room in the
same building where the operator of the barbershop and the room of
massaging is the same. The contention being that it amounts to a
deprivation of property of petitioners-appellants of their means of
livelihood without due process of law. Lower Court dismissed the petition
for declaratory relief.
Issue:
Whether or not Ordinance 4964 is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
Decision affirmed. Order 4964 is a police power measure in order to
forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of
separate rooms for massage of customers.
 Agustin vs Edu
FACTS:
This case is a petition assailing the validity or the constitutionality of a Letter
of Instruction No. 229, issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos, requiring
all vehicle owners, users or drivers to procure early warning devices to be
installed a distance away from such vehicle when it stalls or is disabled. In
compliance with such letter of instruction, the Commissioner of the Land
Transportation Office issued Administrative Order No. 1 directing the
compliance thereof.
This petition alleges that such letter of instruction and subsequent
administrative order are unlawful and unconstitutional as it violates the
provisions on due process, equal protection of the law and undue
delegation of police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Letter of Instruction No. 229 and the subsequent
Administrative Order issued is unconstitutional
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled for the dismissal of the petition. The statutes in
question are deemed not unconstitutional. These were definitely in the
exercise of police power as such was established to promote public welfare
and public safety. In fact, the letter of instruction is based on the
constitutional provision of adopting to the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of the land. The letter of instruction
mentions, as its premise and basis, the resolutions of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the discussions on traffic safety
by the United Nations - that such letter was issued in consideration of a
growing number of road accidents due to stalled or parked vehicles on the
streets and highways.
Taxicab Operators vs Board of Transportation
FACTS:
Petitioner Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic
corporation composed of taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates
of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs within the City of Manila and to
any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
On October 10, 1977, respondent Board of Transportation (BOT) issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which reads:
SUBJECT: Phasing out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis
On January 27, 1981, petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, docketed as
Case No. 80-7553, seeking to nullify MC No. 77-42 or to stop its
implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier
models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration,
they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
ISSUES:
A. Did BOT and BLT promulgate the questioned memorandum circulars in
accord with the manner required by Presidential Decree No. 101, thereby
safeguarding the petitioners’ constitutional right to procedural due process?
B. Granting arguendo, that respondents did comply with the procedural
requirements imposed by Presidential Decree No. 101, would the
implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners’ constitutional rights to.
(1) Equal protection of the law;
(2) Substantive due process; and
(3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and
standard?
HELD:
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from
the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of
its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit
all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society. It may also
regulate property rights. In the language of Chief Justice Enrique M.
Fernando “the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded”.
Bautista v. Juinio
FACTS:
Bautista is assailing the constitutionality of LOI 869 issued in 1979 which
classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI further banned these
vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am
Monday. Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as
bigger cars consume more oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory
as it made an assumption that H and EH cars are heavy on petroleum
consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil
consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car
while others who have smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that
there is no rational justification for the ban being imposed on vehicles
classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those owned by
them fall within such category.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the LOI violates equal protection.
HELD:
The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention.
The classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront
to reason. The ideal situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all,
that none be placed outside the sphere of its coverage. Only thus could
chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that
serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of
law. The actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot
approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach that it
does not take into account the realities of the situation. . . . To assure that
the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory
measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely
affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause
only if they can show that the governmental act assailed, far from being
inspired by the attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit
of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in
the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges
conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical
are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest.
Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City and MMDA
FACTS:
The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City
Government of Quezon City and the Metro Manila Development Authority
stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining to Construction of Arcades, and
the clearing of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he
was able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey commercial building,
which was situated along EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a
Business/Commercial Zone by the Quezon City Council. The Quezon City
Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the construction of
Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not
require the properties located at the Quezon City - San Juan boundary, and
commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle Street to construct the arcades,
moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his
property, already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the
ordinance. MMDA on April 28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under
Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property had to be demolished, if he did not
clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with, and so
the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls.” Gancayco then
filed a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to prohibit the demolition of his
property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that
Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the
declaration of nullity of the ordinance and payment for damages.
MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of an ordinance
that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the presumption of
constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council, taking to
note that the Mayor signed the ordinance.
The RTC, however, declared that the Ordinance was unconstitutional,
invalid and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the
CA partly granted the appeal, with the contention that the ordinance was to
be modified; it was constitutional because the intention of the ordinance
was to uplift the standard of living, and business in the commercial area, as
well as to protect the welfare of the general public passing by the area,
however the injunction against the enforcement and implementation of the
ordinance is lifted.
With that decision, the MMDA and Gancayco filed Motions for
Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as both parties have no new issues
raised. Therefore they petitioned to the Court.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the wing wall of Gancayco’s property can be constituted as
a public nuisance. Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish
Gancayco’s property.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. The court decided
that the wing wall of Gancayco’s building was not a nuisance per se, as
under Art. 694 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, nuisance is defined as any
act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything
else that (1) injures of endangers the health or safety of the others; (2)
annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards decency or
morality; (4) obstruct or interferes with the free passage of any public
highway or street, or any body of water; or (5) hinders or impairs the use of
property.
A nuisance may be a nuisance per se or a nuisance per accidens. A nuisance
per se are those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property
and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity. As
Gaycanco was able to procure a building permit to construct the building, it
was implied that the city engineer did not consider the building as such of a
public nuisance, or a threat to the safety of persons and property.
The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of
Metro Manila, and was not supposed to act with Police Power as they were
not given the authority to do such by the constitution, nor was it expressed
by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA acted on
its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s property, and was solely
liable for the damage.
 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of
Agrarian Reform
FACTS:
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e.,
Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and
Human Rights includes a call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian
reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform
program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of
other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was
enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-
farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987,
President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership
in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their
payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics
for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988.
This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments,
nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought
exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The
Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their
landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves
have shown willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be
exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to belong to a
different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27,
EO 228, and 229) on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands
for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred
that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due
process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be
paid for their land in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred
that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in
bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program,
must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a
different class exempt from the agrarian reform program. Under the
law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things
similar to each other in certain particulars and different from each other in
these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated
must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities
imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different
class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a
substantial distinction between these two classes of owners that is clearly
visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing
for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect by
the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the
detriment of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is
right in classifying small landowners as part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power
lodged in the courts. However, there is no law which prohibits
administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In
fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner
and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both
parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers
and if the landowner agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What
is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation determined
by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not
agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body, then
it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final
determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept
in traditional exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a
revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions
of pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything
is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient money hence,
bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
DECS v. San Diego
FACTS:
San Diego, private respondent graduate of UE (Zoology), took NMAT 3 times
and flunked 3 times. The fourth time he will take NMAT, he was rejected by
DECS and DCEM for the rule that:
“A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After
three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the
NMAT for the fourth time”.
Ramon Guevarra then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, to compel his admission to the test. He invoked his constitutional
rights to academic freedom and quality education.
By agreement of the parties, herein defendant was allowed to take the
NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of his petition.
In an amended petition filed with leave of court, San Diego squarely
challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972,
containing the above-cited rule. The additional grounds raised were due
process and equal protection. Respondent Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong
ruled that the MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972 was invalid and held that
the petitioner had been deprived of his right to pursue a medical education
through an arbitrary exercise of the police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not NMAT “three-flunk-rule” order is valid and constitutional.
RULING:
Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical
profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the
challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The
Constitution provides that “ every citizen has the right to choose a
profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable
admission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply invoke
the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one
must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise.
Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.
VILLANUEVA vs. CASTANEDA
FACTS:
In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218
authorizing 24 members of Fernandino United Merchants and Traders
Association to construct permanent stalls and sell in the subject property
within the vicinity of the public market. The Resolution was protested and
Civil Case No. 2040 was filed. CFI issued writ of preliminary injunction
to prevent the construction of stalls.
While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution No.
29 which declared the subject area as a parking place and as the public plaza
of the municipality. CFI decided Civil Case No. 2040 and held that the
subject land was public in nature and was beyond the commerce of man.
The preliminary injunction was made permanent.
The decision was apparently not enforced, for the petitioners were
not evictedfrom the place. They were assigned specific areas and were
made to pay daily fees to the municipal government for use of the area.
On January 12, 1982 (more than 13 years after CFI decision), the Association
of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition for
theimmediate implementation of Resolution No. 29, to restore the subject
property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza.
After investigation was conducted by the municipal attorney, Macalino,
officer‐in-charge of the office of the mayor, issued a resolution ordering the
demolition of the stalls in the subject area.
Petitioners filed a petition for prohibition with the CFI, which was denied.
Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the SC. Petitioners
argued that they had right to occupy the area by virtue of lease contracts
entered into with the municipal government, and later, by virtue of space
allocations made in their favor for which they paid daily fees. The
municipality denied that they entered into said agreements. It argued that
even if the leases were valid, the same could be terminated at will because
rent was collected daily.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the
property.
HELD:
No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the
subject of lease or any other contractual undertaking. The town plaza
cannot be used for the construction of market stalls, specially of residences,
and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to abatement
according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be
devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general.
They are outside the common of man and cannot be disposed of or
even leased by the municipality to private parties.
Applying this well-settled doctrine, we rule that the petitioners had no right
in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in
remaining there now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts.
Since the occupation of the place by the vendors, it had deteriorated to the
prejudice of the community. Stalls, being made of flammable materials,
became a potential fire trap; access to and from the market was obstructed;
there were aggravated health and sanitation problems; flow of traffic was
obstructed; stallholders in the public market were deprived of a sizable
volume of business; the people were deprived of the use of the place as a
public plaza.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners
are covered by the police power as delegated to the municipality under the
general welfare clause. This authorizes the municipal council "to enact such
ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may
be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the municipality
and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
This authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of
Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could
have effectively terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police
power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a
contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public interest suffers a
congenital infirmity in that itcontains an implied reservation of the
police power as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be
activated at any time to change the provisions of the contract, or even
abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the general welfare.
Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject
to and limited by the paramount police power.
The CFI judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petition for prohibition. Petition dismissed.
PRC v. De Guzman
FACTS:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of
successful examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of
Medicines observed that the grades of the 79 Fatima College of
Medicine successful examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in
the two (2) most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and
Obstetrics and Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as
physicians of all the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. Compared
with other examines from other schools, the results of those from Fatima
were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other.
The NBI Investigation found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access
to the test questions.”
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus
before the RTC of Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to
practice medicine. Meanwhile on July 21, 1993, the Board of medicine
issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of immorality, dishonest
conduct, fraud and deceit and recommended that the test results of the
Fatima Examinees be nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering
the PRC to allow the respondents to take the physician’s oath and to
register them as physicians. The same was appealed by the PRC to the Court
of Appeals which sustained the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition.
RULING:
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession
or pursuit of an occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary,
despotic or oppressive manner. However, the regulating body has the right
to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their
exercise may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to
safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and general
welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the Board
of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of
medicine, the qualifications of the candidates for the board examination,
the scope and conduct of the examinations, the grounds for the denying of
the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the
licensing authority to be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short,
he shall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The
petition is therefore granted.
DIDIPIO v. GOZU
FACTS:
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with
foreign companies when it comes to either technical or financial large scale
exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law RA 7942 or the
Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco
Mining Co, an Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC)
to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and N. Vizcaya including Brgy
Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs.
Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is
unconstitutional and it constitutes unlawful taking of property. In seeking to
nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40 as
unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No.
7942 and Section 107 of DAO 96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and
unjust “taking” of private property for private purpose in contradiction with
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private
property shall not be taken except for public use and the corresponding
payment of just compensation. They assert that public respondent DENR,
through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, cannot,
on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land
without payment of just compensation.
Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76
is not a taking provision but a valid exercise of the police power and by
virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the
people. This government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for
the public good and that this adjustment curtails some potential for the use
or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents concluded
that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the
government to regulate by purchase.”
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.
HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent
domain. They are;
(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;
(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;
(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected;
(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the
property.
In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there
is taking involved but it is not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942
provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of the DENR RR. To
wit,
Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface
owner, occupant, or concessionaire as a consequence of such operations
shall be properly compensated as may be provided for in the implementing
rules and regulations.
Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any
damage done to the property of the surface owners, occupant, or
concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or as a
result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in
104 above shall be properly and justly compensated.
Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent
domain to exercise entry, acquisition and use of private lands.
City Government of QC vs Judge Ericta & Himlayang Pilipino
FACTS:
Quezon City enacted an ordinance entitled “ORDINANCE REGULATING THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL
TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF”.
The law basically provides that at least six (6) percent of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at
least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. QC justified the law by invoking police power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ordinance is valid.
HELD:
The SC held the law as an invalid exercise of police power. There is no
reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of
the total area of all private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals, good order, safety,
or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building
or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the
burden to private cemeteries.
Dela Cruz v. Paras
FACTS:
Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance
violates their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance
would close out their business. That the hospitality girls they employed are
healthy and are not allowed to go out with customers. Judge Paras however
lifted the TRO he earlier issued against Ord. 84 after due hearing declaring
that Ord 84. is constitutional for it is pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN
ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER
TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF
CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police
power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they
were deprived of due process.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the

exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a
lawful occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ord 84
which is further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD:

The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and
not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of
validity. SC had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general
powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as consistency with
the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping
exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable
end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field.
Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The
purpose sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of
the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not prohibit the
business of cabarets.