FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 107427. January 25, 2000]

JAMES R. BRACEWELL, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. ULANDU

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us is a petition to affirm the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 58, in LRC Case No. M-77,[1] which was reversed by respondent Court of
Appeals in its Decision dated June 29, 1992 in CA-G.R. CV No. 26122.[2]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent court on
September 30, 1992.[3]

The controversy involves a total of nine thousand six hundred fifty-seven (9,657)
square meters of land located in Las Pias, Metro Manila. The facts show that
sometime in 1908, Maria Cailles, married to James Bracewell, Sr., acquired the
said parcels of land from the Dalandan and Jimenez families of Las Pias; after
which corresponding Tax Declarations were issued in the name of Maria Cailles.
On January 16, 1961, Maria Cailles sold the said parcels of land to her son, the
petitioner, by virtue of a Deed of Sale which was duly annotated and registered
with the Registry of Deeds of Pasig, Rizal. Tax Declarations were thereafter issued
in the name of petitioner, cancelling the previous Tax Declarations issued to Maria
Cailles.
On September 19, 1963, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of
Pasig, Rizal an action for confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141.[4] The case was docketed as L.R.C. Case No.4328.
On February 21, 1964, the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General,
opposed petitioners application on the grounds that neither he nor his predecessors-
in-interest possessed sufficient title to the subject land nor have they been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same for at
least thirty (30) years prior to the application, and that the subject land is part of the
public domain.[5]

The registration proceedings were meanwhile suspended on account of an action

filed by Crescencio Leonardo against Maria Cailles before the then Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal. The case was finally disposed of by this Court in G.R. No.
5263 where the rights of Maria Cailles were upheld over those of the oppositor
Leonardo.[6]

On March 26, 1985, the entire records of the registration case were forwarded to
the Makati Regional Trial Court[7] where it was docketed as Land Registration
Case No. M-77. The Solicitor General resubmitted his opposition to the application
on July 22, 1985,[8] this time alleging the following additional grounds: (1) the
failure of petitioner to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; and
(2) that the tax declarations attached to the complaint do not constitute acquisition
of the lands applied for. Manikx

On May 3, 1989, the lower court issued an Order granting the application of
petitioner.[9] The Solicitor General promptly appealed to respondent Court which,
on June 29, 1992, reversed and set aside the lower courts Order.[10] It also denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of September 30,
1992.[11]

Hence, the instant Petition anchored upon the following grounds -

"I. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED in finding that the commencement of
thirty 30) year period mandated under Sec. 48 (b ) shall commence only on March
27, 1972 in accordance with the classification made by the Bureau of Forestry in
First (1st) Indorsement dated August 20, 1986.

II. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed an ERROR in DRAWING

conclusion and inference that prior to the declaration by the Bureau of Forestry in
Marc 27; 1972, the parcels of land sought to be registered by Applicant was part of
the forest land or forest reserves.

III. The Honorable Court of Appeals ERRED and failed to consider VESTED
RIGHTS of the applicant-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest land occupied
from 1908."[12]

The controversy is simple. On one hand, petitioner asserts his right of title to the
subject land under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, having by
himself and through his predecessors-in-interest been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject parcels of land,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since 1908. On the other hand
it is the respondents position that since the subject parcels of land were only
classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972,[13] petitioner did not have
any title to confirm when he filed his application in 1963. Neither was the requisite
thirty years possession met.

We agree with respondents.

In Republic vs. Doldol,[14] the requisites to acquire title to public land were laid
down, as follows --

"x x x. The original Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded
b R.A. No. 1942 which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period of
occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on
January 25, 1977. As amended, Section 48(b) now reads: Maniks

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force
majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter." (italicized in the original)

Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act
requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and
(b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the same must be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public
Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the
land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued."

Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that the land
is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents that petitioner
failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his application are alienable or
disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively shown by the government that the
same were only classified as alienable or disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus,
even granting that petitioner and his predecessors-in-interest had occupied the
same since 1908, he still cannot claim title thereto by virtue of such possession
since the subject parcels of land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable
of private appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain.[15]
A similar situation existed in the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals,[16] where a
homestead patent issued to the petitioners predecessor-in-interest was cancelled on
the ground t at at the time it was issued, the subject land was still part of the public
domain. In the said case, this Court ruled as follows --

"Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states
that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State (Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 219 SCRA 340). Manikan

Hence, the burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of

lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration. The applicant
must show that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. This
petitioners failed to do.

We have stated earlier that at the time the homestead patent was issued to
petitioners predecessor-in-interest, the subject land belong to the inalienable and
undisposable portion of the public domain. Thus, any title issued in their name by
mistake or oversight is void ab initio because at the time the homestead parent was
issued to petitioners, as successors-in-interest of the original patent applicant, the
Director of Lands was not then authorized to dispose of the same because the area
was not yet classified as disposable public land. Consequently, the title issued to
herein petitioners by the Bur au of Lands is void ab initio."

Prior to March 27, 1972, when the subject parcels of land were classified as
inalienable or indisposable, therefore, the same could not be the subject of
confirmation of imperfect title. There can be no imperfect title to be confirmed
over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable.[17] In the absence of such
classification, the land remains unclassified public land until released therefrom
and open to disposition.[18] Indeed, it has been held that the rules on the
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply unless and until the land classified as
forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form
part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[19]

Neither has petitioner shown proof that the subject Forestry Administrative Order
recognizes private or vested rights under which his case may fall. We only find on
record the Indorsement of the Bureau of Forest Development[20] from which no
indication of such exemption may be gleaned.

Having found petitioner to have no cause of action for his application for
confirmation of imperfect title, we see no need to discuss the other errors raised in
this petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.2/17/00 9:46

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-38314 June 25, 1974

BELEN S. RODRIGUEZ and JOSE S. SANTOS, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FEDERICO ALIKPALA (Presiding Judge, Branch XXII, Court of First
Instance of Manila), FEDERICO TOLENTINO and FELISA TOLENTINO,
respondents.

Santos, Santos & Cunanan Law Office for petitioners.

Prospero A. Crescini & Associates for respondents.

CASTRO, J.:p

Failing to levy on the properties of the respondents Federico and Felisa Tolentino
because of a prohibitory judgment rendered by the respondent Court of First
Instance of Manila in civil case 85998, the petitioners Belen S. Rodriguez and Jose
S. Santos, Jr., have come to this Court on appeal by certiorari.

On August 19, 1971 the petitioner Rodriguez, assisted by her counsel, the
petitioner Santos, filed an action, docketed as civil case 204601, with the city court
of Manila against the spouses Manuel and Fe Rebollado for recovery of the sum of
P5,320 plus interest, attorney's fees and costs. A writ of preliminary attachment
was issued and served on the Rebollados at their store in Divisoria market. Fe
Rebollado immediately communicated with the petitioner Santos, and later with
the latter's client, the petitioner Rodriguez, to plead for time before the attachment
was to be effectively enforced. Rodriguez agreed to cause the suspension of the
attachment writ on condition that Fe Rebollado's parents, the now respondents
Federico and Felisa Tolentino, would bind themselves, jointly and severally with
the Rebollado's, to pay the entire obligation subject of the suit. Felisa Tolentino
who was then present agreed to this proposal, and so the petitioner Santos, at the
request of the petitioner Rodriguez, drew up a motion for judgment on a
compromise embodying the terms of the agreement of the parties. On the basis of
the said motion, the city court, on August 14, 1971, rendered judgment, as follows:

Parties herein submitted the following compromise agreement and prayed that
judgment be rendered in accordance there with:

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT

xxx xxx xxx

1. That the defendants admit all the material allegations in the plaintiff's complaint
and acknowledged their indebtedness to the plaintiff in the total amount of
P5,980.00, which amount includes expenses of litigation;

2. That in consideration of defendants acknowledging their said indebtedness and

confessing judgment therefor, plaintiff has allowed defendants some consideration
by allowing them to pay their above-stated account in the following manner, to
wit:

a) the sum of P200.00 shall be paid upon the signing of this compromise
agreement;

b) the remaining balance shall be paid in installment basis at the rate of P100.00 a
week, payable every Saturday beginning August 28, 1971 and every Saturday of
the week thereafter until fully paid.

3. That in order to secure the prompt payment of the said obligations of the
defendants, Federico Tolentino and Felisa Tolentino hereby bind themselves to pay
jointly and severally with the defendants the said obligations, and in the event of
default on the part of the defendants to pay any of the said installments when the
same is already due, the judgment which may be rendered by virtue hereof as to
full amount remaining unpaid, may likewise be executed as against the properties
of Federico Tolentino and Felisa Tolentino;

4. That failure on the part of the defendants to pay any one of the installments as
above-scheduled shall render the remaining balance unpaid immediately due and
demandable and the plaintiff shall then be entitled to the execution of the judgment
which may be rendered by virtue hereof;

WHEREFORE, judgment by COMPROMISE is hereby rendered pursuant to the

foregoing agreement, enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties.

The Rebollado's subsequently failed to comply with the terms of the compromise,
thus prompting the petitioner Rodriguez to ask the city court for a writ of execution
not only against the Rebollados but as well against the Tolentino's. When this was
granted; and later affirmed over the opposition of the Tolentino's, the latter brought
an action for certiorari in the respondent Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as civil case 85998, to enjoin the city court from enforcing any writ of
execution against them. On December 20, 1973, after hearing duly had, the
respondent court rendered judgment excluding the Tolentinos from the effects of
the writ of execution granted by the city court in civil case 204601. It is this
judgment that is the subject of the present appeal.

In excluding the Tolentino's from the effects of the judgment on a compromise

rendered by the city court, the respondent court invokes two reasons: first, the
dispositive portion of the judgment quoted above cannot be executed because it
does not explicitly enjoin the Tolentino's to pay, jointly and severally with the
Rebollado's, the amount due to the plaintiff; and second, the city court never
acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the Tolentino's and, therefore, the latter
cannot be bound by the judgment rendered in civil cue 204601.
The respondent court is in error on both counts.

1. The dispositive portion of the judgment in civil case 204601 of the city court
approving the compromise and "enjoining strict compliance thereto by the parties"
is adequate for purposes of execution. It is not unusual for the body of a judgment
on a compromise to merely quote the words of the agreement that spell out the
respective rights and obligations of the parties, since it is both unnecessary and
improper for the court to still make preliminary adjudication of the facts and the
law involved in the case.1 These rights and obligations, although not reproduced in
the dispositive portion of the judgment in obvious avoidance of repetition, are
understood to constitute the terms under which execution may issue. Decisions of
similar tenor, import and form have in the past been given effect by this Court.2

2. There is no question in the mind of the respondent court that the Rebollado's and
the Tolentinos freely and voluntarily entered into the compromise agreement
which became the basis of the judgment of the city court. Be it remembered that
neither the Rebollado's nor the Tolentino's question the existence of the
indebtedness of the Rebollados or the amount thereof. The respondent court heard
the testimonies of the witnesses first hand and accorded no credence to the version
of the Rebollado's and the Tolentino's that Manuel and Fe Rebollado and Felisa
Tolentino were made to sign the motion for a judgment on a compromise without
being permitted to read its contents and, further, that Felisa Tolentino was induced
to sign, too, the name of her husband without any authority from the latter. The
respondent court analyzed the evidence at length and found that the involvement of
the Tolentino's in the compromise agreement arose out of their natural filial
concern for their daughter Fe whose inventories at Divisoria market were under
imminent threat of levy and seizure. The respondent court, moreover, brooks no
doubt, and we concur with it, that both the Rebollado's and the Tolentino's
understood the plain unequivocal terms of the compromise agreement. And by
assuming the roles of co-movants in the motion for a judgment on a compromise,
the Tolentino's actively instigated the city court into giving its judicial imprimatur
to the said agreement as well as their participation therein. Under the
circumstances, the Tolentino's are estopped from denying the very authority they
have invoked.3
Moreover, because they signed and executed the compromise agreement willingly
and voluntarily, and, in a manner of speaking, with their eyes wide open, they
should be bound by its terms. A person cannot, to paraphrase Justice Alejo
Labrador, repudiate the effects of his voluntary acts simply because they do not
suit him. In the very words of Justice Labrador, "in a regime of law and order,
repudiation of an agreement validly entered into can not be made without any
ground or reason in law or in fact for such repudiation."4

And even if we assume that estoppel does not apply in this case, we nonetheless
cannot shunt aside the principle of equity that jurisdiction over a person not
formally or originally a party to a litigation may nevertheless be acquired, under
proper conditions, thru the voluntary appearance of that person before the court.
Thus, judgment may be directed against one who, although not a formal party in
the case, has assumed or participated in the defense.5 By coming forward with the
original litigants in moving for a judgment on a compromise and, furthermore, by
assuming such interest in the final adjudication of the case as would place them in
unequivocal liability, together with the Rebollado's, to the plaintiff therein, the
Tolentino's effectively submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the city court.
They were and are thus subject to its judgment.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo of December 20, 1973 is reversed, and the
order of the city court of November 26, 1971 in civil case 264601, directing the
release of the writ of execution against the Rebollado spouses and the Tolentino
spouses, is hereby affirmed, with costs against the respondents Federico and Felisa
Tolentino.

Makalintal, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Esguerra and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-47847 : July 31, 1981.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MANUELA PASTOR, Respondents.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.:

By this petition for review on certiorari, the Director of Lands seeks to set aside
the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. No. 59853-R affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas in LRC Case No. N-893
granting the application for registration under R.A. 496 of thirteen cranad(13)
parcels of land in the name of herein private respondent Manuela Pastor.
It appears that on May 8, 1974, respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of
First Instance of Batangas LRC Case No. N-893, an application for confirmation of
imperfect title over thirteen cranad(13) lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan,
Batangas City.
The application shows that seven cranad(7) of the lots, specifically Lots Nos.
9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9330-A, 9330-C, 9402-A and 9402-D were allegedly
inherited by respondent Manuela Pastor from her parents Rafael Pastor and Natalia
Quinio who died on July 1, 1938 and July 12, 1908, respectively. The other
six cranad(6) lots, namely Lots Nos. 9402-B, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and
9360 were allegedly inherited by respondent from her aunt Rosario Pastor who
died on January 13, 1950 without any surviving heir except respondent herein. In
her application, the respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest had
been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession
of the lots under claim of ownership for more than thirty cranad(30) years.
On June 24, 1974 the application was amended to correct the description of two
lots.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application on the ground that
applicant Manuela Pastor and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title in fee
simple nor imperfect title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law, as amended,
over the lots in question.
No other persons filed opposition to the application.
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration
court, issued an order of general default with the exception of the Director of
Lands, and then proceeded to hear the applicant, her witnesses, and oppositor
Director of Lands.
During the hearings, the applicant presented as her witnesses her nephew Antonio
M. Pastor, and Geodetic Engineer Quirino P. Clemeneo. Applicant Manuela Pastor
testified on her behalf that she has remained the owner and possessor of the lots in
question; that her possession has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse
against the whole world and in the concept of owner; that she had paid the taxes
thereon; and that the said lots were planted to sugar cane.
Witness Antonio M. Pastor corroborated in all material respects the testimony of
his aunt Manuela Pastor.
The Geodetic Engineer, Quirino P. Clemeneo, testified that he conducted the
survey of some of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of
Lands on the others. He found that the lots did not encroach upon private and
public lands.
As part of her documentary evidence, applicant Manuela Pastor presented the
certifications of the Treasurer of Batangas City showing payments of the real estate
tax on the lots from 1965 to 1974 cranad(Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4 and J-5) and
official receipts of payments of real estate tax on the same lots for
1975 cranad(Exhibits K, K-1 and K-2).
Apart from the foregoing, applicant presented, however, a certification from the
Land Registration Commission cranad(Exhibit L) stating that Lot No. 9330 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas, was declared public land in
Cadastral Case No. 41, LRC Cad. Record No. 1706. She likewise submitted
another certification from the Land Registration Commission cranad(Exhibit L-1)
to the effect that Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402 of the Cadastral
Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas, were the subject of a decision in Cad.
Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No. 1712, although no decree of registration has as
yet been issued.
On August 6, 1975 the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
“From the evidence presented, it has been established that as early as in the year
1913, the original owners of the seven cranad(7) parcels of land located in the
barrio of Gulod, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9330-A, 9330-C, 9186-A,
9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A and 9402-D, as reflected in the plan Csd-12122 Sheet
1 cranad(Exhibit ‘E’), were spouses Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio. Natalia
Quinio died on July 12, 1908. Since then, Rafael Pastor possessed the said lots
peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely against the whole world and in the
concept of owner up to his death in 1938. After the death of Rafael Pastor on July
1, 1938, Manuela Pastor, the applicant herein, being the only child and sole
heiress, came into possession and ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From
1938 when the applicant inherited the said lots from her deceased parents and up to
the present, she has remained the owner and possessor thereof; that her possession
over the said lots has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the
whole world and in the concept of owner up to the present; that the applicant had
paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon before the Japanese Occupation; that
the said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were no
tenants but paid workers were provided with huts for their use therein; that there
were no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon. The other six cranad(6)
lots located in the barrio of Pallocan, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9397-
B, 9397-D, 9367, 9360, 9402-B and 9402-E, as reflected in the plans marked as
Exhibits ‘E’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘H-1’, ‘H-1-a’ and ‘H-2’, were originally owned by the
applicant’s aunt, Dra. Rosario Pastor; that the latter possessed the said lots
peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely against the whole world and in the
concept of owner up to her death in 1950; that after the death of Dra. Rosario
Pastor on January 13, 1950, the applicant, Manuela Pastor, being the only niece
and sole heiress, came into possession and ownership thereof by way of
inheritance. From 1950 when the said applicant inherited the said lots from her
deceased aunt and up to the present, she has remained the owner and possessor
thereof; that her possession over the said lots has been peaceful, public, open,
continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to the
present; that the applicant had paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon; that the
said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were no
tenants but paid workers were provided with huts for their use therein; that there
were no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon.
“Evidence further shows that the late Rafael Pastor and Dra. Rosario Pastor, are
brother and sister. Dra. Pastor died single and without issue; that applicant,
Manuela Pastor, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and
up to the present have been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and
uninterrupted possession over the said thirteen cranad(13) lots in question; that said
lots were covered by tax declarations in the name of herein applicant, as shown in
the Assessment Certificate issued by the City Assessor of Batangascranad(Exhibit
‘1’), and the taxes thereon have been paid by the applicant cranad(Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-
1’, ‘J-5’, ‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘K-2’); that there were no lien or incumbrance affecting
said lots. Furthermore, applicant testified that she did not claim any portion of the
road which bounded the lots in question, nor the portion of the creeks or river; that
any of the said lots were not within any reservation of any kind.
“As required by this Court, the applicant submitted the following:
“(a) a certification of the Land Registration Commission that Lot No. 9330 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas Record No. 1706 was declared ‘public land’ in the
decision rendered thereon. It is further certified that copy of said decision relative
to the aforementioned lot is not available in this Commission cranad(Exhibit
‘L’); cranad(b) a certification of the Land Registration Commission, that no
decrees of registration have as yet been issued to lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367 and
9397 and 9402 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas cranad(Exh. ‘L-1’);
and cranad(c) a certification issued by officer-in-charge Records Division of the
Bureau of Lands to the effect that the thirteen cranad(13) lots situated in Barrios
Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City, are not covered by any kind of public land,
application or patentcranad(Exh. ‘M’).
“All the documentary exhibits of applicant were submitted in evidence as offered,
there being no objection on the part of the oppositor. Oppositor Director of Lands
through City Fiscal of Batangas did not offer any contradictory evidence.
“Indisputably and by highly credible evidence, the applicant gave more than ample
proof of her rights to the grant of title over the properties in question. By herself
and through her predecessors-in-interest, the applicant has been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the
thirteen cranad(13) parcels of land up to the present — all for the requisite period
of time and under a bona fide claim of ownership which entitle her to confirmation
of title over the properties subject of this application.
“. cra . finding the application for confirmation and grant to title under Act 496 as
amended, to be well-founded and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient and
requisite under the law, the Court hereby decrees the registration of:
“x x x
“in favor of applicant, MANUELA PASTOR
. cra .” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(pp. 49-60, Record on Appeal, p. 45, rec.).
Not, satisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance, petitioner Director of
Lands appealed the same to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:
‘First Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF
MANUELA PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED
IMPERFECT TITLE TO LOTS NO. 9330-A AND 9330-C DESPITE EVIDENCE
ADDUCED BY APPLICANT HERSELF THAT SAID LOTS WERE
DECLARED PUBLIC LAND IN A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.’
‘Second Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF
MANUELA PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED
IMPERFECT TITLE TO LOTS NO. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A, 9402-B,
9402-D, 9402-E, 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and 9360 DESPITE EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED BY APPLICANT HERSELF THAT A DECISION RESPECTING
SAID LOTS HAD BEEN RENDERED IN A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL
PROCEEDING.’
‘Third Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS ADEQUATE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE OF MANUELA PASTOR
TO THE THIRTEEN cranad(13) LOTS SUBJECT OF THE
APPLICATION’cralaw cranad(pp. 11-12, rec.).
On February 9, 1978 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming in toto the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Hence, this petition.
I
Substantially, the same issues, as raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals, are
brought before US.
Petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral Case No.
41 cranad(Exhibit L) declaring Lot No. 9330 — from which Lots Nos. 9330-A and
9330-C were derived — constitutes res adjudicata as to the nature of the lots in
question and therefore, a bar to appellee’s application.
Additionally, petitioner also argued that:
“Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B and 9186-D of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, were
derived from Lot No. 9186. Lots Nos. 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D and 9402-E were
derived from Lot No. 9402. Lots Nos. 9397-B and 9397-D were derived from Lot
No. 9397.
“As shown by applicant’s Exhibit L-1, Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402
were the subject of a decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No.
1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been issued therein.
“The certificate, Exhibit L-1, is dated June 4, 1975. The decision of the lower court
was rendered more than two months later, on August 6, 1975. Thus, on the basis of
Exhibit L, the decision of the cadastral court might already be final when the
appealed decision was rendered. If such be the case, the decision of the cadastral
court constitutes res adjudicata and it is a bar to the present land registration
proceeding under Act No. 496 cranad(Lopez v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589;
Section 1. paragraph cranad(f), Rule 16, Rules of Court).
“Assuming that the decision of the cadastral court was not yet final when the
appealed decision was rendered, it was nevertheless, litis pendentia which, under
Section 1, paragraph cranad(e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, is likewise a bar to
the present proceeding for land registration case under Act No. 496.
“Either way, whether the decision of the cadastral court in Cad. Case No. 43 had
become final or not, the present proceeding for land registration under Act No. 496
cannot prosper because of the principles of res adjudicata and litis
pendentia” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(pp. 15-16, rec.).
WE find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions of petitioner. It is clear
from the evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the Court of First
Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the oppositor Director of
Lands, petitioner herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of
res adjudicata with respect to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of
oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind, is a procedural infirmity which cannot
be cured on appeal. Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in no
uncertain language, provides that:
“SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. — Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived; . cra .”
All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are
deemed waived cranad(Santiago, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al., L-15237, May 31, 1963,
8 SCRA 157, 162; Torreda vs. Boncaros, L-39832, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA
247, 253).
Thus, the defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a motion to dismiss or
in an answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial
or on appeal cranad(Phil. Coal Miner’s Union vs. CEPOC, et al., L-19007, April
30, 1964, 10 SCRA 784, 789).
But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res adjudicata was properly raised
by petitioner herein, WE still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at
all to speak of. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to
the application of respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral
proceeding declaring a lot public land is not the final decree contemplated in
Sections 38 and 40 of the Land Registration Act.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the
same applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the
same land, provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains
alienable and disposable cranad(now sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).
With respect to Cadastral Case No. 43, the evidence on record is too scanty to
sustain the view of the petitioner that the decision rendered therein constitutes res
adjudicata, or in the absence of finality thereof, litis pendentia. On the contrary,
private respondent has amply shown that no final decree whatsoever was issued in
connection with said cadastral case, even as it is not known in whose favor said
decision was rendered. As found by the Court of Appeals:
“Again, we sustain the appellee. There is an ambiguity as to what was adjudicated
in Case No. 43. If the lots in question were in that case awarded to a third party, the
latter should have intervened in this case. But no private party has challenged the
application for registration” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(p. 30, rec.).
II
Finally, petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that “there is no substantial
evidence to show that she cranad(private respondent Manuela Pastor) and her
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lots sought to be titled for a
period of at least thirty cranad(30) years and in the manner provided in Section 48,
as amended, of the Public Land Law.”
WE find no merit in the foregoing argument of petitioner. The uncontradicted
testimony of private respondent Manuela Pastor, which was further corroborated
by the testimony of Antonio Pastor, conclusively established beyond doubt that the
respondent, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up
to the present, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the lots in question under a bona fide claim of ownership.
Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by private respondent also show
that the lots have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent
Manuela Pastor cranad(Exhibit ‘I’), and the taxes thereon have been paid by said
respondent herein cranad(Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’ to ‘J-5’, ‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘K-2’). And
finally, Geodetic Engineer Quirino Clemeneo, who conducted the survey of some
of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands, testified that
the thirteen cranad(13) lots in question did not encroach upon public or private
lands. All these are unmistakable indicia that respondent Manuela Pastor has
performed and complied with all the conditions essential to entitle her to a
confirmation of her imperfect title over the thirteen cranad(13) lots subject of her
application.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
AFFIRMED, AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee cranad(Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ.,concur.
Section 22. Any citizen of lawful age of the Philippines, and any such citizen not
of lawful age who is a head of a family, and any corporation or association of
which at least sixty per centum of the capital stock or of any interest in said capital
stock belongs wholly to citizens of the Philippines, and which is organized and
constituted under the laws of Philippines, and corporate bodies organized in the
Philippines authorized under their charters to do so; may purchase any tract of
public agricultural land disposable under this Act, not to exceed one hundred and
forty-four hectares in the case of an individual and one thousand and twenty-four
hectares in that of a corporation or association, by proceeding as prescribed in this
chapter: Provided, That partnerships shall be entitled to purchase not to exceed one
hundred and forty-four hectares for each member thereof. But the total area so
purchased shall in no case exceed the one thousand and twenty-four hectares
authorized in this section for associations and corporations.