CHAPTER XIV - DUE PROCESS

IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

1. In general:

1. P vs. Terrobias, 103 SCRA 321

Presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties of the police authorities and Presumption of innocence resulting in acquittal as a result on
conflicting and inconsistent testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses:

Non-compliance of Section 21, Republic Act No. 9165, violates the

presumption of innocence on the part of the accused and therefore, he
should be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. RONALDO DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 186498,

March 26, 2010

On June 10, 2003, a confidential informant reported De Guzman’s drug pushing activities to Alcala,
Pangasinan’s Chief of Police, Sotero Soriano, Jr. Soriano immediately formed a team to conduct a buy-bust
operation. After a short briefing, the team proceeded to De Guzman’s house. Once there, the confidential
informant introduced appellant to Senior Police Officer (SPO)1 Daniel Llanillo, who was designated as poseur-
buyer. Llanillo tried to buy P200 worth of shabu. He handed two marked P100 bills to De Guzman, and the latter,
in turn, gave him two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing what was suspected as shabu. Thereafter,
Llanillo gave the prearranged signal to the rest of the team. Appellant was arrested and frisked. The team
recovered from De Guzman two packs of empty transparent sachets, three disposable lighters, and P3,380.00 in
cash, which included the marked money paid by SPO1 Llanillo. The team then brought De Guzman to the police
station in Alcala, Pangasinan.

At the police station, De Guzman and the items seized during the buy-bust operation were turned over to
the police investigator, SPO3 Eduardo Yadao. SPO3 Yadao entered the incident in the police blotter. He then
placed his initials on the packets of suspected shabu, which were later submitted to the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory in Urdaneta City. Confirmatory tests revealed that the substance in the packets that
appellant handed to SPO1 Llanillo was indeed shabu.

At the trial, appellant denied the charges against him. He claimed that, on the morning of June 10, 2003, he
was on the second floor of his house watching television when he was informed by his wife that police officers
were looking for him. He claimed that SPO1 Llanillo informed him about a report that he (De Guzman) was
repacking shabu, which he denied. Thereafter, the police officers frisked him and took the P3,000.00 from his
pocket. The police officers also searched the cabinet, where his television was, and found a lighter. Then, he was
handcuffed and brought to the police station.

After trial, the RTC rendered a decision, finding De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
R.A. No. 9165. He was sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

De Guzman elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on Petition for Review after the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that the police officers complied with the
mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165. In particular, he points to the fact that the seized items were not
marked immediately after his arrest; that the police officers failed to make an inventory of the seized items in his
presence or in the presence of his counsel and of a representative from the media and from the Department of
Justice (DOJ); and that no photographs were taken of the seized items and of appellant. Appellant also claims that
the unbroken chain of custody of the evidence was not established. Further, appellant contends that the failure of
the police officers to enter the buy-bust operation in the police blotter before the said operation, the lack of
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), and the failure to observe the requirements
of R.A. No. 9165 have effectively overturned the presumption of regularity in the performance of the police
officers’ duties.

HELD:
 2
A review of the records of this case reveals that circumstances warrant a reversal of the trial court’s
decision.

The Constitution mandates that an accused in a criminal case shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden with the burden to overcome such presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required.

Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing,
and the constitutional right to presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of
every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused.

When the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent
with innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail, and the court
must acquit.

The duty to prove the guilt of an accused is reposed in the State. Law enforcers and public officers have the
duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. This guarantee of the integrity of the evidence to be
used against an accused goes to the very heart of his fundamental rights.

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proven: (1) that the
transaction or sale took place; (2) that the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that
the buyer and seller were identified. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug. The delivery of the contraband to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping
officers and the accused. The presentation in court of the corpus delicti — the body or the substance of the crime –
establishes the fact that a crime has actually been committed.

Contrary to De Guzman’s contention, the trial court correctly found that the buy-bust transaction took
place. The buyer (SPO1 Llanillo) and seller (De Guzman) were both identified and the circumstances of how the
purported sale of the illegal drugs took place were clearly demonstrated. Thus, the prosecution successfully
established the first and third elements of the crime. However, there is a problem in the prosecution’s effort to
establish the integrity of the corpus delicti.

The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place
is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as
that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. The corpus delicti should be identified with unwavering exactitude.

The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts
concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 states:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and
essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in
the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Court finds that the apprehending officers failed to comply with the guidelines set under R.A. No.
9165 and its IRR.

SPO1 Llanillo himself admitted that the marking of the seized items was done in the police station and not
immediately after the buy-bust operation.
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The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately
explained. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact. The court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist.

Accordingly, non-compliance with the procedure shall not render void and invalid the seizure and custody
of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance is attended by justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. There must be proof that
these two (2) requirements were met before such non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope of the
proviso.

In this case, it was admitted that it was SPO3 Yadao, the assigned investigator, who marked the seized items, and
only upon seeing the items for the first time at the police station. Moreover, there was no physical inventory made
or photographs of the seized items taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR. There
was also no mention that representatives from the media and from the DOJ, and any elected official, were present
during this inventory. The prosecution never explained the reasons for these lapses.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit
be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the
time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in
which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses
would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and
no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. Indeed, it is from the testimony of
every witness who handled the evidence that a reliable assurance can be derived that the evidence presented in
court and that seized from the accused are one and the same.

Accordingly, the failure to establish, through convincing proof, that the integrity of the seized items has been
adequately preserved through an unbroken chain of custody is enough to engender reasonable doubt on the guilt of
an accused. Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole proof and an inability
after such investigation to let the mind rest upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded
by the law to convict a person charged with a crime, but moral certainty is required as to every proposition of
proof requisite to constitute the offense. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the
identity of the drug.

Indeed, the prosecution’s failure to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the
same one allegedly seized from appellant is fatal to the prosecution’s case.

Finally, the prosecution cannot find solace in its invocation of the presumption of regularity in the
apprehending officers’ performance of official duty.

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the
presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. Moreover, the failure to observe the
proper procedure negates the operation of the presumption of regularity accorded to police officers. As a general
rule, the testimonies of the police officers who apprehended the accused are accorded full faith and credit because
of the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly. But when the performance of their duties is
tainted with failure to comply with the procedure and guidelines prescribed, the presumption is effectively
destroyed.

Thus, even if the defense evidence is weak, the prosecution’s whole case still falls. The evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.

ELPIDIO BONDAD, JR. VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173804, EDecember 10, 2008

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

 4
Elpidio Bondad, Jr., y Burac (appellant) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City1[1] for violation of Section 5, paragraph 2(3), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No.
9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, allegedly committed as follows:2[2]

That on or about the 29th day of January 2004, in the City of Marikina, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly sell to poseur buyer 0.02 gram of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) contained in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet, a
dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.3[3] (Underscoring supplied)

He was likewise charged for violation of Section 11, par. 2(3), Article II also of R.A. No. 9165,
allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 29th day of January 2004, in the City of Marikina, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to possess
or otherwise use any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession direct custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained in two (2) heat-
sealed plastic sachets which gave positive result to the test for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu),
which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above-cited law.4[4] (Underscoring supplied)

At around 7:05 p.m. of January 29, 2004, while PO2 Ferdinand Brubio, PO1 Christopher Anos, and
PO1 Roberto Muega were at the Station Anti Illegal Drug Special Operations Task Force (SAIDSOTF),
Office of the Marikina City Police Station, PO2 Nelson Arribay arrived together with a confidential
informant. The confidential informant reported, among other things, about the rampant sale of shabu in a
billiard hall along Bonifacio Avenue, Barangka, Marikina City and named a certain alias “Jun” as the
vendor.

The Chief of the SAIDSOTF, P/Sr. Insp. Ramchrisen Haveria, Jr., at once formed a buy-bust team
composed of, among others, PO2 Ramiel Soriano and PO2 Dano who was designated as the poseur-buyer.
PO2 Dano was given a one hundred peso bill bearing Serial No. Q487945 to be used as buy-bust money. It
was agreed that PO2 Dano’s removal of his cap would signal that the buy-bust was consummated.

The conduct of a buy-bust operation was recorded in the police blotter and was coordinated with
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) which gave it control number NOC-012904-28.

The buy-bust team, together with the confidential informant, proceeded to 3 C’s billiard hall at the
corner of M. Cruz St. and Bonifacio Avenue in Barangka, Marikina City. On entering the hall, the
confidential informant pointed to appellant who was then holding a cue stick beside the billiard table as the
alias “Jun.” The confidential informant approached appellant and talked to him. Within minutes, appellant
approached PO2 Dano and asked him if he wanted to buy shabu, to which PO2 Dano answered “piso
lang.” Appellant at once took out a “Vicks” container from his right front pocket 5[5] which, when opened,
yielded heat-sealed plastic sachets containing substances suspected to be shabu. From the container,
appellant drew out one sachet in exchange for which PO2 Dano gave the marked one hundred peso bill. At
that instant, PO2 Dano removed his cap.

As the back-up police officers were closing-in, PO2 Dano grabbed appellant’s arm, identified
himself, and apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. Upon PO2 Dano’s order, appellant returned the
buy-bust money, handed the “Vicks” container, and gave his name as
Elpidio Burac Bondad, Jr.

Still at the place of arrest, PO2 Dano placed the markings “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04” on the
substance-filled sachet sold to him, and “EBB-ED, POS 1 and 2, 01/29/04” on the sachets that remained
inside the “Vicks” container.
The buy-bust team thereupon brought appellant and the seized items to the Marikina City Police
Station where a memorandum dated January 29, 20046[6] was prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Chief Haveria, Jr.,
addressed to the Chief of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, requesting for the conduct of

1 [1]
Rollo, pp. 73-74.
2 [2]
Records, p. 2.
3 [3]
Records, p. 2 - Information dated February 2, 2004.
4 [4]
Id. at p. 6.
5 [5]
No specification if it was a pocket of the shirt or of the pants.
6 [6]
Id. at p. 15
 5
laboratory examination on the seized items to determine the presence of dangerous drugs and their weight.
PO2 Dano also requested that appellant be subjected to a drug test.7[7]

The following day or on January 30, 2004, at 3:00 P.M., upon receipt of three sachets, a laboratory
examination was conducted thereon by Police Senior Inspector Annalee R. Forro, Forensic Chemical
Officer of the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office, who, in Physical Science Report No. D-
0094-04E8[8], recorded, among other things, the specimen submitted, her findings and conclusion as
follows:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Three (3) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings marked as A through C respectively,
each containing white crystalline substance with following recorded net weights and markings:

A = 0.02 gram “EBB-ED BUYBUST 01/29/04”

B = 0.02 gram “EBB-ED POSS 1 01/29/04”
C = 0.02 gram “EBB-ED POSS 2 01/29/04”

x-x-x x-x-x x-x-x

F I N D I N G S: x x x

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the tests for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

x-x-x x-x-x x-x-x

C O N C L U S I O N:

Specimens A through C contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. 9[9] (Italics and
emphasis in the original)
Denying the charges against him, appellant, a former police officer, claimed that he was framed up
and gave the following version:

On January 29, 2004, while he was playing inside 3 C’s billiard hall, PO2 Brubio, whom he knew
was a policeman, entered the billiard hall. After greeting PO2 Brubio in Bicolano, he continued playing
but PO2 Brubio suddenly handcuffed him and asked him “Sumama ka muna.” Another person who was at
his back pushed him out of the billiard hall in the course of which he felt PO2 Brubio reaching his
(appellant’s) right front pocket,10[10] drawing him to restrain the hand of PO2 Brubio, telling him “pera ko
yan!”

Aware that his son was inside the billiard hall, appellant summoned and handed him his wallet
containing P2,000. PO2 Brubio, however, took the wallet from his son, telling him “Huwag ka makialam
dito.” He was then made to board a car and taken to the Office of the SAIDSOTF at the police station.

Appellant’s defense was corroborated by his son Christian Jeffrey C. Bondad, and Roberto U. Mata
who was a “spotter” (referee) at the billiard hall at the time appellant was arrested.

Finding for the prosecution, the trial court convicted appellant in both charges, disposing as
follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds the accused ELPIDIO BONDAD,
JR. y BURAC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Sec. 11 par. 2(3), Art. II of R.A.
9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of TWELVE (12) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY and to pay the fine of THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP300,000.00) as
provided for in Sec. 11 par. 2(3), Art. II of RA 9165. The accused is likewise found guilty of the crime of
Violation of Sec. 5 Art. II of RA 9165 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (PhP500,00.00) pursuant to Sec. 5, Art. II of RA 9165

7 [7]
TSN, June 15, 2004, p. 41
8 [8]
Records, p. 17
9 [9]
Exhibit “C”, folder of exhibits, p. 2
10[10]
There is also no specification if it was a pocket of the shirt or the pants
 6
the methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is ordered confiscated in favor of the government for proper
destruction by the proper agency.

SO ORDERED.11[11] (Underscoring supplied)

By Decision of February 8, 2006,12[12] the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with
modification, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years, as maximum and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

SO ORDERED.13[13] (Underscoring supplied)

Specifically with respect to the charge of possession of shabu, the appellate court held:

The evidence for the prosecution fully proved beyond reasonable doubt the elements necessary to
successfully prosecute a case for illegal possession of a prohibited drug, namely, (a) the accused is in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug, (b) such possession is
not authorized by law and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed said drug.

Under Section 11, Par. 2 [3] of R.A. 9165, the mere act of possessing any dangerous drug
consummates the crime. There is no doubt that the charge of illegal possession of shabu was proven
beyond reasonable doubt since the accused-appellant knowingly possessed plastic sachets with white
crystalline granules, without legal authority at the time he was caught during the buy-bust operation. The
white crystalline granules found in his possession, upon laboratory examination, were positively identified
as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.14[14] (Italics in the original, underscoring
supplied)

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, appellant faulting the appellate court:

II. . . . IN ADMITTING THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE CLEAR

VIOLATION OF SECTION 21 (1) OF R.A. 9165;

As the resolution of the second assignment of error is determinative of whether there is still
necessity of segueing to the first and third assignments of error, it shall early on be passed upon.

Appellant claims that there was failure to follow the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165,
hence, it compromised the integrity and evidentiary value of the allegedly seized items.

Sec. 21 of R.A. No 9165 provides:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have
custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources or dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
persons/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who

11 [11]
CA rollo, p. 124.
12 [12]
Penned by Justice Amelita G. Tolentino with the concurrence of Justices Portia Aliño Hormachuelos and Vicente S.E. Veloso, CA rollo, pp. 232-
254.
13 [13]
Rollo, p. 68.
14 [14]
Id. at p. 66 (citations omitted)..
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shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof ; x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Appellant claims that no physical inventory and photographing of the drugs took place. A reading
of the testimony of the poseur-buyer, PO2 Dano indeed confirms appellant’s claim, viz:

Atty. Puentebella:
When you brought him to the police, it was there that the items taken from him were inventoried, is it not?

Witness:
We did not make inventory because we simply brought the evidence confiscated.

xxx

Atty. Puentebella:
You also did not take photographs of the items taken from the accused?

Witness:
Yes, sir.

Atty. Puentebella:
And you know for a fact that under the new drugs law, this is a requirement for the apprehending team to
do, is it not?

Pros. Gapuzan:
Counsel is asking for a conclusion of law. I will object.

Court:
Witness may answer the question.

Witness:
Yes, sir.

xxxx

Atty. Puentebella:
So it is very clear now Mr. Witness that at the time you apprehended the accused, you did not make an
inventory in the presence of the accused nor you did not [sic] make a photograph of the items seized in
the presence of the accused, an elective official, a representative from the Department of Justice, or the
media, that’s very clear?

Witness:
Yes, sir.

Atty. Puentebella:
Since you did not make any inventory, it follows that you did not require them to sign your inventory as
required by law?

Witness:
Yes, sir.15[16] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Clearly then, the apprehending police officers failed to comply with the above-quoted provision of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.

People v. Pringas holds, however:

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance
will not render an accused's arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of
utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
15 [16]
TSN, June 15, 2004, pp. 80-87.
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16[17]
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. (Citation
omitted, emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Court’s pronouncement in Pringas is based on the provision of Section 21(a) of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations17[18] of R.A. No. 9165, viz:

x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In the present case, by PO2 Dano’s claim, he immediately marked the seized items which were
brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. By his admission, however, he did not conduct an
inventory of the items seized. Worse, no photograph of the items was taken. There was thus failure
to faithfully follow the requirements of the law.

Parenthetically, unlike in Pringas, the defense in the present case questioned early on, during the
cross examination of PO2 Dano, the failure of the apprehending officers to comply with the inventory and
photographing requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 18[19], despite PO2 Dano’s awareness of such
requirements. And the defense raised it again during the offer of evidence by the prosecution, thus:

Atty. Puentebella:

xxxx

Exhibits “B” which is the brown envelope, “B-1”, “B-2” and “B-3” are objected to for being product of
irregular functions of police and therefore fruit of poisonous thinking [sic] and they are not admissible and
they were not photographed in the presence of the accused as provided for by Sec. 21, par.1, R.A.
9165;19[20] (emphasis supplied)

IN FINE, as the failure to comply with the aforesaid requirements of the law compromised the
identity of the items seized, which is the corpus delicti of each of the crimes charged against appellant,20[21]
his acquittal is in order.

This leaves it unnecessary to still dwell on the first and third assignments of error.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and appellant, Elpidio Bondad Jr., y Burac, is ACQUITED of the crimes charged.

PEOPLE VS. SAMUEL OBMIRANIS, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008

TINGA, J.:

This is an appeal filed by Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta (appellant) who was charged with violation of
Section 5 in relation to Section 26 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165. 21[1] He was allegedly caught in a buy-
bust operation by elements of the Manila Western Police District (MWPD) while offering to sell methyl
amphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug locally known as shabu. The criminal information filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 222[2] accused him as follows:

That on or about May 18, 2004, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, not having
been authorized by law to sell, trade, deliver or give away to another any dangerous drug, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly attempt to sell or offer for sale one (1) transparent plastic sachet
containing TWO POINT EIGHT ZERO ZERO (2.800) grams of white crystalline substance known as
“SHABU” containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

16 [17]
G.R. No. 175928. August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 828, 842-843
17[18]
Took effect on November 27, 2002.
18 [19]
Vide TSN, June 15, 2004, pp. 81-85.
19 [20]
TSN, August 10, 2004, pp. 6-7.
20 [21]
People v. Laxa, 414 Phil. 156, 170 (2001) citing People v. Rigodon, 238 SCRA 27 (1994).
21
22
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23[3]
Contrary to law.

At the pre-trial, both the prosecution and the defense stipulated on the qualification of Forensic
Chemist Elisa Reyes and, thus, both parties dispensed with her testimony. The prosecution further
admitted that the forensic chemist who analyzed the seized the confiscated substance—which yielded
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride content—did not have personal knowledge of the ultimate
source of the drug.24[4]

Appellant was brought to trial after having entered a negative plea. 25[5] The prosecution then
proceeded to prove the charge against him through the lone testimony of police officer Jerry Velasco
(Velasco). Velasco was the alleged leader of the raiding team that apprehended appellant on 18 May 2004
at the corner of G.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets in Sampaloc, Manila.26[6]

The narrative woven by Velasco established the following facts: On 17 May 2004, Police
Superintendent Marcelino Pedrozo (Pedrozo) of the MWPD organized a buy-bust team on the information
of a confidential informant that the latter was able to place an order for half a “bulto” of shabu with
appellant. Velasco was designated as the team leader and the poseur-buyer, with Police Officers Wilfredo
Cinco, Edgardo Palabay, Roberto Benitez and one27[7]confidential informant as members.28[8] Pedrozo gave
the team a marked 500-peso bill to be used as buy-bust money which was placed on top of a deck of boodle
money. The team informed the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) of the impending
operation,29[9] entered the same in the blotter 30[10] and proceeded to Bambang in G.Tuazon Street just before
12 a.m. of 18 May 2004—the appointed time and date that the confidential informant and appellant had
agreed to meet. The informant joined Velasco in his car, and they awaited the arrival of appellant at the
corner of G.Tuazon and Jhocson Streets.31[11] At around 12:30 a.m., appellant on board a car arrived at the
scene and seeing the informant he approached the latter. The informant introduced Velasco to appellant
and said that Velasco would like to buy one-half “bulto” of shabu. Velasco negotiated with appellant to
lower the price but the latter refused. Velasco then insisted that he must first see the merchandise.
Appellant went back to his car, took the item and brought it to Velasco. Velasco readily recognized the item
as a plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance. When appellant asked for payment, he seemed
to have recognized Velasco’s co-officer because he uttered the words, “May pulis yata.” At that point, he
was arrested just as he was trying to get back to his car.32[12]

According to Velasco, he was the one who effected the arrest but it was Cinco who seized the
plastic sachet from appellant. He further stated that immediately after the arrest, he and his team brought
the seized item to the police headquarters and there, in his presence, Cinco marked the same with the
initials “SOO.” At the trial, he identified the plastic sachet as that seized from appellant as well as the
marking made by Cinco on it. Furthermore, he admitted on cross-examination that there was no evidence
custodian designated and that he could not remember if the seized item had been inventoried and
photographed in the presence of the accused; that Cinco put the item in his pocket after the same was
recovered and did not mark it on the spot and that the markings made on the buy-bust money had not been
entered in the blotter.33[13]

The chemistry report issued at the instance of Pedrozo and signed by Forensic Chemical Officer
Maritess Mariano of the PNP Crime Laboratory revealed that the specimen supposedly seized from
appellant yielded positive of methylamphetamine hydrochloride content.34[14]

Taking the stand, appellant boldly asserted that he was merely framed up by the buy-bust team, and
strongly denied having transacted the alleged sale of shabu with Velasco and the confidential informant.
He claimed that he was taken by Velasco and his team not on 18 May 2004 but rather on 17 May 2004 at
7:00 p.m. along Santa Teresita Street, Sampaloc, Manila; 35[15] that he was there to see his girlfriend who
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was residing in that area; that when he was arrested by two men in civilian clothes, he was not committing
any crime; that he asked them why they were arresting him but neither of them gave an answer and instead
one of them grabbed him by his shoulder and ushered him inside a police car; that once inside the car, one
of the men pulled out a gun with which he hit his neck, kicked him and uttered, “Makulit ka ha, yuko!”;
that he asked them why they were doing that to him when in fact he merely told them to park their car
properly on the street; that they cuffed his hands at the back and the driver, Velasco, asked if he could give
them P200,000.00; that he answered he did not have that much money; that they drove the car around and
told him that if he could not give them the money then he must just find for them someone who sells drugs
in large-scale (“Magturo ka ng nagbebenta ng droga, iyong malakihan ha!”); that because he said he did
not know anyone who was into selling drugs, he was taken to the U.N. Avenue police headquarters; that he
was not detained at the headquarters but rather, he was brought to the second floor where the two arresting
officers demanded P50,000.00 from him; that the demand was then reduced to P30,000.00 in exchange for
the mitigation of his case.36[16] Olivia Ismael, another defense witness who introduced herself as a friend of
appellant’s girlfriend and who admitted having witnessed appellant’s arrest, corroborated the material
points of appellant’s testimony.37[17]

In its 23 February 2006 Decision, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and to pay a P500,000.00
fine without subsidiary imprisonment as well as the costs.38[18]

Appellant interposed an appeal with the Court of Appeals in which he reiterated that the
prosecution was unable to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt in view of the failure to
establish the chain of custody of the illegal drugs and that it was likewise unable to establish the
consummation of the alleged sale of drugs. 39[19] For its part, the People, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), posited that the fact that all the essential elements of a consummated sale of
dangerous drug had not been completely shown was immaterial because the charge involved a mere
attempt or offer to sell which had been duly established by the prosecution.40[20] It also maintained that the
chain of custody of the seized shabu had been duly established because the requirements in taking custody
of seized narcotics provided for in Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002 41[21] admit of
liberal interpretation.42[22]

In its 4 September 2007 Decision,43[23] the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the trial court’s
decision.

The appeal has to be granted.

In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the
offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt. In
prosecutions involving narcotics, the narcotic substance itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 44[27] It is
therefore of prime importance that in these cases, the identity of the dangerous drug be likewise established
beyond reasonable doubt.45[28] In other words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the
dangerous drug presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in
the first place. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.46[29]

Board Regulation No. 1, series of 2002 defines chain of custody as “the duly recorded authorized
movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or
laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic
laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.” As a method of authenticating evidence,
the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of the exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient

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47[30]
to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would thus
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized to the time it is
offered in court as evidence, such that every person who handled the same would admit how and from
whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. The same
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 48[31]
It is from the testimony of every witness who handled the evidence from which a reliable assurance can be
derived that the evidence presented in court is one and the same as that seized from the accused.

The prosecution evidence in the case at bar, however, does not suffice to afford such assurance. Of
all the people who came into direct contact with the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from appellant,
only Velasco was able to observe the uniqueness thereof in court. Cinco, who, according to Velasco, took
initial custody of the plastic sachet at the time of arrest and who allegedly marked the same with the initials
“SOO” at the police station, was not even presented in court to directly observe the uniqueness of the
specimen and, more importantly, to acknowledge the marking as his own. The same is true with respect to
the laboratory personnel who could have but nevertheless failed to testify on the circumstances under
which he received the specimen at the laboratory for analysis and testing, as well as on the conduct of the
examination which was administered on the specimen and what he did with it at the time it was in his
possession and custody. Aside from that, it was not reasonably explained why these same witnesses were
not able to testify in court. While indeed the prosecution and the defense had stipulated on the
qualification of the forensic chemist, dispensed with his testimony and admitted that said forensic chemist
had no personal knowledge of the ultimate source of the drug submitted for examination, nevertheless,
these stipulations and admission pertain only to a certain Elisa G. Reyes and not to Forensic Chemical
Officer Maritess Mariano who, based on the chemistry report, was the one who examined the contents of
the plastic sachet at the crime laboratory.

In view of these loopholes in the evidence adduced against appellant, it can be reasonably
concluded that the prosecution was unable to establish the identity of the dangerous drug and in effect
failed to obliterate the hypothesis of appellant’s guiltlessness.

Be that as it may, although testimony about a perfect chain does not always have to be the standard
because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody indeed becomes
indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is a narcotic substance. A unique
characteristic of narcotic substances such as shabu is that they are not distinctive and are not readily
identifiable as in fact they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. 49[32]
And because they cannot be readily and properly distinguished visually from other substances of the same
physical and/or chemical nature, they are susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination,50[33]
substitution and exchange—51[34] whether the alteration, tampering, contamination, substitution and
exchange be inadvertent or otherwise not.52[35] It is by reason of this distinctive quality that the condition of
the exhibit at the time of testing and trial is critical. 53[36] Hence, in authenticating narcotic specimens, a
standard more stringent than that applied to objects which are readily identifiable must be applied—a more
exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or contaminated or tampered
with.54[37]

The Court certainly cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the possibility of substitution, alteration or
contamination—whether intentional or unintentional—of narcotic substances at any of the links in the
chain of custody thereof especially because practically such possibility is great where the item of real
evidence is small and is similar in form to other substances to which people are familiar in their daily
lives.55[38] Graham v. State56[39] in fact acknowledged this danger. In that case, a substance later shown to be
heroin was excluded from the prosecution evidence because prior to examination, it was handled by two
police officers who, however, did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the
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time it was in their possession. The court in that case pointed out that the white powder seized could have
been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It thus declared that the state must be
able to show by records or testimony the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it
came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition.57[40]

Reasonable safeguards are provided for in our drugs laws to protect the identity and integrity
of narcotic substances and dangerous drugs seized and/or recovered from drug offenders. Section
2158[41] of R.A. No. 9165 materially requires the apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs to, [1] immediately after seizure and confiscation, [2] physically inventory and [3]
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who [4] shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The same requirements are also found in Section 2 59[42] of
its implementing rules60[43] as well as in Section 261[44] of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1,
series of 2002.62[45]

These guidelines, however, were not shown to have been complied with by the members of the buy-
bust team, and nothing on record suggests that they had extended reasonable efforts to comply with the
statutory requirements in handling the evidence. Velasco, the leader of the raiding team, himself admitted
that as soon as appellant was arrested, Cinco had taken custody of the plastic sachet of shabu, placed it in
his pocket and brought the same together with appellant to the police station. It was at the police station—
and not at the place where the item was seized from appellant—where according to him (Velasco), Cinco
had placed the initials “SOO” on the specimen. Velasco never even mentioned that the identifying mark on
the specimen was placed in appellant’s presence; he could not even remember whether or not the specimen
had been properly inventoried and photographed at least in appellant’s presence. Even more telling is the
fact that, as elicited from Velasco himself during his cross-examination, no evidence custodian had been
designated by the raiding team to safeguard the identity and integrity of the evidence supposedly seized
from appellant.63[46]

All these aforementioned flaws in the conduct of the post-seizure custody of the dangerous drug
allegedly recovered from appellant, taken together with the failure of the key persons who handled the
same to testify on the whereabouts of the exhibit before it was offered in evidence in court, militates
against the prosecution’s cause because it not only casts doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti but also
tends to discredit, if not totally negate, the claim of regularity in the conduct of official police operation.

What we can fairly assume is that the Court of Appeals had overlooked the significance of these
glaring details in the records of the case as it placed blind reliance right away on the credibility of Velasco’s
testimony and on the presumption of regularity and thereby it failed to properly account for the missing
substantial links in the chain of custody of the evidence.

It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must
be seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The presumption, in other words, obtains only where
nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard
conduct of official duty as provided for in the law. Otherwise, where the official act in question is
irregular on its face, an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. 64[48] There is indeed merit in the
contention that where no ill motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of
the buy-bust team, the presumption prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed their duty,
but the theory is correct only where there is no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular.
People v. Dulay65[49] and People v. Ganenas66[50] in fact both suggest that the presumption of regularity is
disputed where there is deviation from the regular performance of duty. Suffice it to say at this point that
the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just that—a mere presumption
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disputable by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding
truth.67[51]

It must be emphasized at this juncture that what can reasonably be presumed based on the records
of this case is that Velasco is aware of his duties and responsibilities as an agent of the government in its
anti-narcotics campaign. A member of the anti-narcotics division of the police since 1997, 68[52] Velasco can
be reasonably presumed to be adept in and mindful of the proper procedure in apprehending drug
offenders, securing and taking custody of the evidence obtained in police operations such as this one and
preserving the integrity of the evidence by protecting the chain of custody thereof. 69[53] However, for
reasons as obvious as intimated above, even this presumption is unworthy of credit.

All told, in view of the deviation by the buy-bust team from the mandated conduct of taking post-
seizure custody of the dangerous drug in this case, there is no way to presume that the members thereof had
performed their duties regularly. Even granting that we must blindly rely on the credibility of Velasco’s
testimony, still, the prosecution evidence would fall short of satisfying the quantum of evidence required to
arrive at a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as the evidence chain failed to solidly
connect appellant with the seized drug in a way that would establish that the specimen is one and the same
as that seized in the first place and offered in court as evidence. The Court cannot indulge in the
presumption of regularity of official duty if only to obliterate the obvious infirmity of the evidence
advanced to support appellant’s conviction. In Mallillin v. People,70[54] we categorically declared that the
failure of the prosecution to offer in court the testimony of key witnesses for the basic purpose of
establishing a sufficiently complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu and the irregularity which
characterized the handling of the evidence before the same was finally offered in court, materially conflict
with every proposition as to the culpability of the accused. For the same plain but consequential reason,
we will not hesitate to reverse the judgment of conviction in the present appeal.

One final word. In no uncertain terms must it be stressed that basic and elementary is the
presupposition that the burden of proving the guilt of an accused rests on the prosecution which must draw
strength from its own evidence and not from the weakness of the defense. The rule, in a constitutional
system like ours, is invariable regardless of the reputation of the accused because the law presumes his
innocence until the contrary is shown. In dubio pro reo. When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in
the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter of right.71[55]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02158
affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 2, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Samuel Obmiranis y Oreta is ACQUITTED on reasonable
doubt and is thus accordingly ordered released immediately from confinement, unless he is lawfully
confined for another offense.

JUNIE MALLILLIN Y. LOPEZ VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 172953 , April 30, 2008

THE FACTS:

On the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the RTC of Sorsogon City, Branch 52,
a team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in Barangay Tugos, Sorsogon City on 4
February 2003. The team was headed by P/Insp. Catalino Bolanos (Bolanos), with PO3 Roberto Esternon
(Esternon), SPO1 Pedro Docot, SPO1 Danilo Lasala and SPO2 Romeo Gallinera (Gallinera) as members.
The search—conducted in the presence of barangay kagawad Delfin Licup as well as petitioner himself,
his wife Sheila and his mother, Norma—allegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5)
empty plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.

Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

That on or about the 4th day of February 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in Barangay Tugos,
Sorsogon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, custody and control two (2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or]
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“shabu” with an aggregate weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing “shabu” residue,
without having been previously authorized by law to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented Bolanos, Arroyo
and Esternon as witnesses.

Taking the witness stand, Bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the circumstances
surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner after
the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered Esternon and
barangay kagawad Licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to
conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make sure
that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that the search
conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected shabu residue
contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets containing shabu which
fell off from one of the pillows searched by Esternon—a discovery that was made in the presence of
petitioner.72[10] On cross examination, Bolanos admitted that during the search, he was explaining its
progress to petitioner’s mother, Norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the search being
conducted by Esternon.

Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found “behind” the
door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on
the bed and forthwith called on Gallinera to have the items recorded and marked. 73[12] On cross, he
admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search because Bolanos was standing behind him in the
living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which
included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept;74[13] that he brought the seized items to the
Balogo Police Station for a “true inventory,” then to the trial court75[14] and thereafter to the laboratory.76[15]

Supt. Lorlie Arroyo (Arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized
items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed
that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance. 77[16] She further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered to
the laboratory by Esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that it
was not she but rather a certain Mrs. Ofelia Garcia who received the items from Esternon at the
laboratory .]

The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by the
police operatives. Petitioner testified that Esternon began the search of the bedroom with Licup and
petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared
to Bolanos that petitioner’s wife, Sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady
officer arrived to conduct the search of Sheila’s body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone
except Esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that Sheila was searched
by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a nearby store and
when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on Sheila’s body. 78[18] Sheila was
ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.

Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by Esternon to the
bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And as

72
[10]
TSN, 22 April 2003, pp. 6-9.
73
[12]
TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 6-7, 10.

74[13]
Id. at 16-17.

75[14]
TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 13-15.

76[15]
Id. at 9.
77
[16]
TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The results of the chemical analysis are embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-037-03. See records, p. 18.
78
[18]
TSN, 2 December 2003, pp. 6-10.
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he was doing as told, Esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that
instant, Esternon showed him “sachet of shabu” which according to him came from a pillow on the bed. 79
[20]
Petitioner’s account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by Norma, barangay
kagawad Licup and Sheila in their testimonies. Norma and Sheila positively declared that petitioner was
not in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by Esternon to the
store to buy cigarettes while Sheila was being searched by the lady officer. Licup for his part testified on
the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five empty
sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three minutes,
Esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets.]

On 20 June 2004 the trial court rendered its Decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day to
twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00. The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu was
found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioner’s animus possidendi sufficient to
convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises acts of
ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioner’s failure to ascribe ill motives to the
police officers to fabricate charges against him.

Hence, this Appeal.

HELD:

Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt . Be that as it may, the mere fact of
unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established with
the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence are removed.

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the
exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in
the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there
had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the
exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives.80[41] Graham vs. State81[42] positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroin—was handled by two police officers prior
to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit at the
time it was in their possession—was excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out that
the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It
ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at
least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to
determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory’s findings is inadmissible.82[43]

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they
are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly
close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody
79[20]
Id. at 11-12.
80[41]
Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.

81[42]
Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652.
82
[43]
Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.
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over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases—
by accident or otherwise—in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was
submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that
applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard
that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that
the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.

A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the
seized objects, only Esternon and Arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of the
evidence. Gallinera, to whom Esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording and
marking, as well as Garcia, the person to whom Esternon directly handed over the seized items for
chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the circumstances under
which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: Are the sachets
of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in court as
evidence?

The prosecution’s evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it was
Gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm whether the
exhibits were the same items handed over to him by Esternon at the place of seizure and acknowledge the
initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of Garcia who could have, but nevertheless failed, to
testify on the circumstances under which she received the items from Esternon, what she did with them
during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to Arroyo for analysis.

Given the foregoing deviations of police officer Esternon from the standard and normal procedure
in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance
by the trial court and the Court of Appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just that—a mere presumption disputable
by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth.83[52]
Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails
if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.84[53] In the present case the lack of conclusive
identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in the
manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates a
finding of guilt.

In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of proving
the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the accused, for
the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. 85[54] In dubio pro reo. When moral
certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably becomes a matter
of right.

The Equipoise Rule; Evidence of guilt and evidence of innocence are about even; effect of non-
presentation of forensic chemist who examined the shabu or marijuana—ground for acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MONALYN CERVANTES, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00476 which affirmed the April 23, 2004 Decision in Criminal Case No. 00-181929 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 53 in Manila. The RTC found accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 15, Article III of Republic Act No. (RA) 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.

The records show the following facts:

83[52]
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).

84[53]
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382 SCRA 419 (2002).
85
[54]
People v. Laxa, id.
 17
In an Information dated April 7, 2000, accused-appellant and three others were charged with
violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 (selling or distributing a regulated drug), allegedly committed as
follows:

That, on or about April 5, 2000, in the City of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, accused ISIDRO ARGUSON y ARENDELA, @ Tisoy, MONALYN [CERVANTES]
y SOLAR @ Mona, WILSON DEL MONTE @ Wilson and RICHARD REQUIZ @ Richard, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, acting in common accord, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, for the amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS,
Philippine Currency, sell, deliver and give away to a poseur-buyer, FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
POINT SEVENTY SIX (473.76) GRAMS OF METHAMPHETAMINE [HYDROCHLORIDE],
commonly known as shabu, a regulated drug, without authority of law or the corresponding license
therefor.

CONTRARY TO LAW.86[1]

Accused-appellant and her co-accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. In the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented in evidence the oral testimonies of William Todavia, PO3 Reynaldo Ramos of the
Philippine National Police Regional Office IV (PNP R-IV), and P/Sr. Inspector Lorna Tria, a forensic
chemical officer of the same regional office.

The People’s version of the incident, as summarized by the CA in the decision now on appeal, is as
follows:

On April 5, 2000, the Regional Special Operations Group IV (RSOG-IV), based at Camp Vicente
Lim in Calamba, Laguna, received a tip from a deep penetration agent (DPA) about a group of drug
traffickers led by Isidro Arguson operating in Cavite. Acting on this bit of information, a team led by SPO2
Geronimo Pastrana, PO3 Ramos, and PO2 Emerson Balosbalos arranged a buy-bust operation to be
conducted at Arguson’s rest house in Barangay Lambingan, Tanza, Cavite.87[2] Upon arriving at the rest
house, PO3 Ramos and PO2 Balosbalos, acting as poseur-buyers, were introduced by the DPA to Arguson
as the buyers of PhP 500,000 worth of shabu, simultaneously showing him a bundle of money. Since
Arguson did not have enough supply of shabu in the premises, he instructed the would-be-buyers to follow
him to Pasay City. For the purpose, he hired a vehicle owned by Todavia.
At about three o’clock in the afternoon of that day, in front of the McDonald’s branch in P. Ocampo
St., Pasay City,88[3] Arguson instructed the would-be-buyers to wait for someone who will come out from
the nearby Estrella St. Very much later, accused-appellant emerged from Estrella St. and approached PO3
Ramos to check if he still had the money. After being shown the money bundle, accused-appellant left,
only to return a few minutes later this time with Arguson, Wilson Del Monte, who was holding a black
plastic bag, and Richard Requiz. Arguson then took from Del Monte the bag, later found to contain 473.76
grams of shabu packed in six small self-sealing transparent bags, and handed it to PO2 Balosbalos, who in
turn gave him the bundle of boodle money. Finally, PO3 Ramos gave the pre-arranged signal to indicate the
consummation of the drug deal and introduced himself as policeman. Accused-appellant and her
scampering companions were later arrested and brought to and booked at Camp Vicente Lim.

The black plastic bag containing the six small self-sealing bags of white crystalline substance was
likewise taken to Camp Vicente Lim where PO3 Ramos prepared the booking sheets and arrest reports and
the request for a qualitative analysis of the seized items. Regional Crime Laboratory Office IV Chief
Inspector (C/I) Mary Jean Geronimo then conducted the standard physical and chemical examinations on
the specimen referred to her.

On April 6, 2000, C/I Geronimo prepared and completed Chemistry Report No. D-115800 on the
crystalline substance. Per her report, the substance tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.

Apart from the witnesses’ affidavits and other documents, the prosecution, in the hearing of March
4, 2002, offered in evidence the following exhibits, 89[4] inclusive of its sub markings, which, as may be
expected, were objected to by the defense: (a) Exhibit “B” – Chemistry Report No. D-115800 prepared by
C/I Geronimo; (b) Exhibit “C” – Memorandum of RSOG-IV dated April 5, 2000 to the Chief, Laboratory
Service, requesting for qualitative analysis of the contents of the six transparent plastic bags; (c) Exhibits
86[1]
Rollo, pp. 6-7.
87[2]
Id. at 5.
88 [3]
The McDonald’s branch in P. Ocampo St. was later determined to be in Manila.
89 [4]
Records, pp. 185-187.
 18
“D” and “D-1” to “D-6” – Black plastic bag with markings; and six (6) self-sealing transparent bags
allegedly containing the confiscated shabu; and (d) Exhibit “F” – Receipt of property seized signed by
PO2 Balosbalos and by Todavia and PO3 Ramos as witnesses.

The CA decision likewise summarized the defense’s account of what purportedly transpired, to wit:

Accused-appellant testified that after she did laundry works at her house in Estrella Street near F.B.
Harrison on April 4, 2000, her youngest child asked her to go to [McDonald’s], Vito Cruz branch, to buy
ice cream. When they arrived thereat at about 4:30 in the afternoon, there was a commotion going on in
front of the restaurant. She then saw a woman who alighted from a nearby van and pointed her out to her
companions, one of whom [was] an old man boarded her inside the van causing her to lose hold of her
child. Thereafter, two (2) younger male persons, whom she later came to know as DEL MONTE and
REQUIZ, were also boarded into the same van. They were taken to a cemetery where another vehicle came
and took them to Camp Vicente Lim, where she allegedly met ARGUSON for the first time.

On the other hand, accused DEL MONTE testified that he was a parking boy around Vito Cruz and
that on the day in question, while he was watching a vehicle near [McDonald’s], Vito Cruz branch, a
commotion happened near his post. As he moved backward from where he stood, he was suddenly
approached by a policeman who arrested him and boarded him inside a vehicle together with CERVANTES
and REQUIZ, whom he did not know prior to that incident.

For his part, accused REQUIZ testified that on the date and time in question, he was riding a
borrowed bicycle on his way to the Cultural Center, passing by F.B. Harrison St., when he bumped a
parked van, wherefrom a man alighted and cursed him, saying “pulis ako wag kang aalis dyan[!] ” The
man left and when he returned, accused CERVANTES was with him. Thereafter, he was boarded into the
van together with the other accused.90[5]

While not stated in the CA decision, Del Monte testified, like accused-appellant, that he was taken
to a cemetery somewhere in Cavite where the arresting officers lingered for an hour before bringing him to
Camp Vicente Lim.91[6] These testimonies remained uncontroverted.
Arguson died during the course
92[7]
of the trial resulting in the dismissal of the case against him.

On April 23, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Del Monte and Requiz but finding
accused-appellant guilty as charged and meting upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The fallo of the
RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding accused MONALYN CERVANTES Y SOLAR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Sec. 15, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended, and is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua and
to pay a fine in the amount of Php500,000.00; and

2. Finding the prosecution’s evidence insufficient to prove the guilt of accused WILSON DEL MONTE
and RICHARD REQUIZ beyond reasonable doubt, and who are hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.93[8]

On May 18, 2004, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal, pursuant to which the RTC
forwarded the records of the case to this Court.

Conformably with People v. Mateo,94[9] the Court directed the transfer of the case to the CA where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476. Before the appellate court, accused-appellant urged her
acquittal on the ground of “insufficiency of evidence,” particularly stating that the “forensic chemist who
actually conducted the laboratory examination on the specimens allegedly recovered from the accused was
not presented in court x x x [and] hence, there was no clear identification of the contents of the confiscated
sachets.”95[10]

90 [5]
Rollo, pp. 7-8.
91 [6]
TSN, January 20, 2003, pp. 10-11.
92 [7]
Rollo, p. 8.
93 [8]
CA rollo, p. 30. Penned by Judge Reynaldo A. Alhambra.
94 [9]
G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
95 [10]
CA rollo, pp. 81-82.
 19

By its Decision96[11] dated July 19, 2007, the CA, finding the elements necessary for the prosecution
of illegal sale of drugs97[12] to have sufficiently been satisfied and the identification of accused-appellant
having been established, affirmed her conviction.

The CA rejected accused-appellant’s lament about one Inspector Tria testifying on the
chemistry report she did not prepare. As the appellate court stressed, C/I Geronimo’s forensic report
“carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions [and] the entries
thereon x x are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” The CA added the observation that
absent any evidence overturning the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
functions, the probative value and admissibility of the forensic report prepared by C/I Geronimo,
who had resigned from the service, must be upheld even if she did not personally testify in court.

On August 17, 2007, accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal of the CA affirmatory decision.

On March 24, 2008, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired.
The parties manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already submitted,
thus veritably reiterating their principal arguments raised in the CA, which on the part of accused-appellant
would be:

THE [CA] GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE

OFFENSE CHARGED DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.

For its part, the People, thru the Office of the Solicitor General, counters that the prosecution has
established that the buy-bust transaction took place, has identified accused-appellant and her complicity in
Arguson’s illegal trade, and has presented the corpus delicti, as evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

After a circumspect study, the Court resolves to acquit accused-appellant, considering certain
circumstances engendering reasonable doubt as to her guilt.

We start off with the most basic, the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, PO3 Ramos,
who identified accused-appellant and described her role in the conspiracy to sell shabu. In the witness box,
PO3 Ramos testified that, after being told by Arguson to wait for someone who will come out from the
street whence Arguson would enter, accused-appellant emerged from said street, checked on the purchase
money, asked the operatives to wait, and later re-appeared. What happened next is captured by the
following answers of PO3 Ramos to the prosecutor’s questions:

Q: What did you see when Cervantes already returned? A: When Monalyn return the one holding the
plastic bag was Wilson, sir.

Q: Wilson? A: Yes, sir, together with Richard, Wilson, Arguson, they were four (4).

Atty. Cruz: Your honor, may we move to strike that out x x x.

Fiscal Formoso: That’s part of the answer x x x now, when all these accused here return with Monalyn
Cervantes, what happen[ed]?

A: Arguson took the plastic bag from Wilson, sir and handed it to Balosbalos, Balosbalos gave Arguson the
boodle money while I flash the signal x x x then we apprehended them.98[13]

As may be noted, PO3 Ramos categorically stated that Del Monte was among the four who
emerged with Arguson from a street. Without hesitation, PO3 Ramos pointed to Del Monte as the one
holding the plastic bag allegedly containing the prohibited substance until Arguson took it from him and
handed it over to PO2 Balosbalos. There is no suggestion that accused-appellant, while at the crime scene,
ever handled the merchandise or its container. Yet, the trial court acquitted Requiz and Del Monte, but
convicted accused-appellant, stating: “Clearly, accused Monalyn Cervantes’ complicity with accused Isidro

96 [11]
Rollo, pp. 4-10. Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and concurred in by Associate Justices Vicente Q. Roxas and Lucas P.
Bersamin.
97 [12]
(a) identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor.
98 [13]
TSN, October 23, 2001, pp. 12-16.
 20
99[14]
Arguson in the sale of shabu has been established by the testimony of PO3 Ramos.” But two
paragraphs later, the RTC went on to write:

x x x While PO3 Ramos testified that the bag was initially held by accused Del Monte and then
taken from him by accused Arguson, there is no other evidence which can support the charge of conspiracy
with Arguson and Cervantes x x x. The court does not find the evidence sufficient to pass the test of moral
certainty to find accused Del Monte liable as charged. Even if PO3 Ramos saw him to have held the bag
for Arguson, it could have been possible that he was merely asked by Cervantes or Arguson to carry the
bag.100[15]

Before us then is a situation where two persons––accused-appellant, a laundry woman; and Del
Monte, a car park boy, in the company of the ostensible pusher, Arguson, during the actual buy bust––are
being indicted, on the basis alone of the testimony of a witness, with confederating with each and several
others to sell shabu. The overt acts performed by accused-appellant, as indicia of conspiracy, consisted of
allegedly verifying whether the poseur-buyer still had the purchase money, disappearing from the scene
and then coming back with the principal player. On the other hand, Del Monte came accompanying
Arguson carrying the drug-containing plastic bag no less. As between the two acts performed, carrying the
bag would relatively have the more serious implication being in itself a punishable act of possession of
regulated drugs. Both offered the defenses of denial and instigation, each testifying that they just happened
to be near or passing by McDonald’s at about 4:30 in the afternoon of April 4, 2000 when they were
apprehended. But the trial court, in its observation that “it could have been possible that [Del Monte] was
merely asked by x x x Arguson to carry the bag,” extended to Del Monte the “benefit of the doubt,” a
benevolence denied to accused-appellant without so much of an acceptable explanation. Any reasonable
mind might ask: Why the contrasting treatment? Why consider PO3 Ramos as a highly credible eyewitness
as against accused-appellant, but an unreliable one as against Del Monte, when both accused are complete
strangers to the policeman?

To paraphrase an unyielding rule, if the inculpatory testimony is capable of two or more

explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused persons and the other consistent with their
guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.101[16]

But even if we were to cast aside the foregoing equipoise rule, a reversal of the appealed decision is
indicated on another but more compelling ground. We refer to the postulate that the prosecution, having
failed to positively and convincingly prove the identity of the seized regulated substance, is deemed to have
also failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt accused-appellant’s guilt. We shall explain.

In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drug, what is crucial is the identity of the buyer
and seller, the object and its consideration, the delivery of the thing sold, and the payment for it. Implicit in
these cases is first and foremost the identity and existence, coupled with the presentation to the court of the
traded prohibited substance, this object evidence being an integral part of the corpus102[17] delicti103[18] of the
crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug.104[19] There can be no such crime when nagging
doubts persist on whether the specimen submitted for examination and presented in court was what was
recovered from, or sold by, the accused.105[20] Essential, therefore, in appropriate cases is that the identity of
the prohibited drug be established with moral certainty. This means that on top of the key elements of
possession or sale, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same
substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that
needed to sustain a guilty verdict. And as we stressed in Malillin v. People, the “chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed.”106[21] So it is that in a slew of cases the Court has considered the
prosecution’s failure to adequately prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the
same one supposedly seized from the offending seller or possessor as ground for acquittal.107[22]

99 [14]
CA rollo, p. 28.
100 [15]
Id. at 28-29.
101 [16]
People v. Navarro, G.R. No. 173790, October 11, 2007, 535 SCRA 644, 653.
102 [17]
A Latin word which signifies “body.”
103 [18]
Literally body of the crime; in the legal sense, corpus delicti as referring to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or to the
substance of the crime; it does not refer to the actual physical evidence, such as ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom, the cadaver of the
person murdered, or the confiscated cases of blue seal cigarettes in the crime of smuggling. See Rimorin, Sr. v. People, G.R. No. 146481, April 30, 2003,
402 SCRA 393, 400.
104 [19]
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 10, 2008; citing Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007, 538 SCRA 611.
105 [20]
Valdez, supra note 19, at 628-629; citing People v. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 470.
106 [21]
G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632; citing American jurisprudence.
107 [22]
Valdez, supra; Ong, supra note 20.
 21
Sec. 1(b) of the Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, or the “Guidelines on the
Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment,” defines “chain of custody,” thusly:

“Chain of Custody” means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals x x x from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the
date and time when such transfer of custody [was] made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as
evidence, and the final disposition.108[23]

As a mode of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. In context, this would ideally include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the seizure of the prohibited drug up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that
everyone who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness’ possession, the condition in which it was received, and the
condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. 109[24] The need for the punctilious
observance of the chain-of-custody process in drug-related cases is explained in Malillin in the following
wise:

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to
obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real
evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or
trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains
in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and
exchange. In other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering––
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not––dictates the level of strictness in the
application of the chain of custody rule.

xxxx

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are
subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close
its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the
same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from other cases––by
accident or otherwise––in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted
for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to
cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails
a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original
item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. 110[25] (Emphasis
added.)

As the Court distinctly notes in this case, of the individuals who came into direct contact with or
had physical custody of the seized regulated items, only PO3 Ramos testified for the specific purpose of
identifying the evidence. In the witness box, however, he did not indicate how he and his companions, right
after the buy bust, handled the seized plastic bag and its contents. He did not name the duty desk officer at
Camp Vicente Lim to whom he specifically turned over the confiscated bag and sachets at least for
recording. What is on record is Exhibit “C,” which, as earlier described, is a memorandum 111[26] PO3 Ramos
prepared112[27] dated April 5, 2000 from the RSOG-IV Director to the Chief, PNP R-IV Crime Laboratory
Service, submitting for qualitative analysis the white crystalline substance confiscated by the buy-bust
group. Needless to stress, the unnamed person who delivered the suspected shabu and the recipient of it at
the laboratory were no-show in court to testify on the circumstances under which they handled the
specimen or whether other persons had access to the specimen before actual testing. And C/I Geronimo, the
analyzing forensic chemist, was not also presented. Then, too, no one testified on how the specimen was
cared after following the chemical analysis. As the Court observed aptly in People v. Ong, “[T]hese
questions should be answered satisfactorily to determine whether the integrity of the evidence was

108 [23]
In accordance with Sec. 21, Art. II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002 in relation to Sec. 81(b), Art. IX of RA 9165.
109 [24]
Malillin, supra note 21.
110 [25]
Id. at 633-634.
111 [26]
Records, p. 33.
112 [27]
TSN, October 23, 2001, p. 20.
 22
compromised in any way. Otherwise, the prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of
appellants beyond reasonable doubt.”113[28]

It cannot be overemphasized that Inspector Tria was really not part of the custodial chain. And she
did not as she could not, even if she wanted to, testify on whether or not the specimen turned over for
analysis and eventually offered in court as exhibit was the same substance received from Arguson.

Given the foregoing perspective, it is fairly evident that the police operatives trifled with the
procedures in the custody of seized prohibited drugs in a buy-bust operation, as embodied in Sec. 21(1),
Art. II of RA 9165, i.e., the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall:

immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the [drug] in the
presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof.114[29]

In this case, no physical inventory was made and no photograph taken nor markings made on the
seized articles at the crime scene. PO3 Ramos admitted as much, thus:

Q. Now, you were able to arrest all the accused here, after their arrest, what did you do? A. After
informing their rights and the reason why we arrest them we brought them immediately to our office in
Canlubang.

xxxx

Q. Now, what about this Shabu, who was in possession of this Shabu x x x when you left the place
and proceeded to Canlubang? A. PO2 Balosbalos, sir.

xxxx

Q. Now, when you reach your office, what did you do there? A. I made the booking sheet and I
requested for their medical/physical examination x x x.115[30]

Just as clear is the fact that the exacting chain of custody rule was not observed. Withal, there is no
reasonable assurance that no tampering or substitution occurred between the time the police seized
the black bag in P. Ocampo St. in Manila until its contents were tested in the laboratory of the PNP
R-IV headquarters in Canlubang, Laguna. In net effect, a heavy cloud of doubt hangs over the integrity
and necessarily the evidentiary value of the seized items. The prosecution cannot, thus, rightfully assert that
the six sachets seized from Arguson were the very same objects tested by C/I Geronimo and offered in
court in proving the corpus delicti.

Adding a negative dimension to the prosecution’s case is the non-presentation of C/I Geronimo and
the presentation in her stead of Inspector Tria to testify on the chemical report C/I Geronimo prepared.
While Inspector Tria can plausibly testify on the fact that C/I Geronimo prepared the chemical report in the
regular course of her duties, she, Inspector Tria, was incompetent to state that the specimen her former
colleague analyzed was in fact shabu and was the same specimen delivered to the laboratory for chemical
analysis.

To be sure, the Court, notably in People v. Bandang, has held that the non-presentation of the
forensic chemist in illegal drug cases is an insufficient cause for acquittal. In it, the accused persons were
convicted of illegal sale of shabu even if the forensic chemist who prepared the corresponding laboratory
report was not presented. Thus, we wrote:

x x x In People vs. Uy, we ruled that a forensic chemist is a public officer and as such, his report
carries the presumption of regularity in the performance of his function and duties. Corollarily, under
Section 44 of Rule 130, x x x entries in official records made in the performance of official duty are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Omero’s reports that the seven sachets of white crystalline
113 [28]
Supra note 20, at 490.
114[29]
The IRR of RA 9165 provides further, “non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.”
115 [30]
TSN, October 23, 2001, pp. 18-19.
 23
substance were “positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride” or shabu are, therefore, conclusive in the
absence of evidence proving the contrary, as in this case.

Second, it must be stressed that Atty. Enriquez raises his objection to the Initial Laboratory Report
and Chemistry Report No. D-1585-00 only now. He should have objected to their admissibility at the time
they were being offered. Otherwise, the objection shall be considered waived and such evidence will form
part of the records of the case as competent and admissible evidence. The familiar rule in this jurisdiction is
that the admissibility of certain documents x x x cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 116[31]
(Emphasis added.)

It should be pointed out, however, that the Bandang ruling was cast against a different backdrop
where: (1) the seized crystalline substance was the same item examined and tested positive for shabu and
presented in court, implying that the identity and integrity of prohibited drug was safeguarded throughout,
a circumstance not obtaining in this case; (2) there was a compelling reason for not presenting the
examining forensic chemist, i.e., the parties stipulated that the confiscated seven plastic bags have been
identified and examined and that the chemist stated in his report that the substance is positive for shabu. In
this case, C/I Geronimo’s resignation from the service is not, standing alone, a justifying factor for the
prosecution to dispense with her testimony; and (3) accused Bandang, et al. did not raise any objection to
the chemical report during trial, unlike here where accused-appellant objected to Inspector Tria’s
competency to testify on the Geronimo chemical report.

At any rate, Inspector Tria’s testimony on, and the presentation of, the chemistry report in question
only established, at best, the existence, due execution, and authenticity of the results of the chemistry
analysis.117[32] It does not prove compliance with the requisite chain of custody over the confiscated
substance from the time of seizure of the evidence. In this regard, the Court in effect stated in Malillin that
unless the state can show by records or testimony that the integrity of the evidence has not been
compromised by accounting for the continuous whereabouts of the object evidence at least between the
time it came into the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory, 118[33] then the
prosecution cannot maintain that it was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. So
it was that in People v. Kimura the Court said that in establishing the corpus delicti, proof beyond
reasonable doubt demands that “unwavering exactitude”119[34] be observed, a demand which may be
addressed by hewing to the chain-of-custody rule. Evidently, the prosecution has not proved that the
substance seized in front of the McDonald’s was the same substance adduced in evidence as an
indispensable element of corpus delicti of the crime, which failure produces a serious doubt as to accused-
appellant’s guilt.120[35]

Both the trial and appellate courts made much of the presumption of regularity in the performance
of official functions both with respect to the acts of PO3 Ramos and other PNP personnel at Camp Vicente
Lim. To a point, the reliance on the presumptive regularity is tenable. This presumption is, however,
disputable and may be overturned by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty; 121[36]
any taint of irregularity vitiates the performance and negates the presumption. And as earlier discussed, the
buy bust team committed serious lapses in the handling of the prohibited item from the very start of its
operation, the error of which the PNP R-IV command later compounded. The Court need not belabor this
matter anew.

Lest it be overlooked, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty always
yields to the presumption of innocence and does not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt. 122[37] We
held in one case:

The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming
accused-appellant’s conviction because, “[f]irst, the presumption is precisely just that—a mere
presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the
presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.”123[38]

116[31]
G.R. No. 151314, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 570, 586-587.
117 [32]
Sanchez, supra note 19.
118 [33]
Supra note 21, at 634.
119 [34]
G.R. No. 130805, April 27, 2004, 428 SCRA 51, 70.
120 [35]
Id.
121 [36]
Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443; citing Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).
122 [37]
People v. Cañete, G.R. No. 138400, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 411, 424.
123 [38]
People v. Tan, G.R. No. 129376, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 419, 444.
 24
For failure then of the prosecution to establish the guilt of accused-appellant beyond reasonable
doubt, she must perforce be exonerated from criminal liability. The facts and the law of the case call for
this kind of disposition.

But a final consideration. The Court is cognizant of the campaign of the police and other drug
enforcement agencies against the growing drug menace in the country. Unfortunately, their best
efforts, particularly successful honest-to-goodness buy-bust operations, sometimes still end up in the
acquittal of illegal drug manufacturers, distributors, pushers and/or lesser players, even when
nabbed in flagrante, simply because drug enforcement operatives tend to compromise the integrity
and evidentiary worth of the seized illegal items. This aberration is oftentimes in turn attributable to
the unfamiliarity of police operatives of extant rules and procedures governing the custody, control,
and handling of seized drugs. This is, thus, an opportune time to remind all concerned about these
rules and procedures and the guiding jurisprudence. And to put things in the proper perspective,
non-compliance with the legal prescriptions of the Dangerous Drugs Act, as amended, is, as we made
abundantly clear in People v. Sanchez, not necessarily fatal to the prosecution of drug-related cases;
that police procedures may still have some lapses. These lapses, however, must be recognized,
addressed, and explained in terms of their justifiable grounds, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved by the apprehending officer or
team.

To be forewarned is to be forearmed.

WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated July 19, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00476, affirming
that of the RTC, Branch 53 in Manila which found her guilty of violating Sec. 15, Art. III of RA 6425 and
imposed upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of PhP 500,000, is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Monalyn Cervantes y Solar is ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable
doubt and is accordingly immediately RELEASED from custody unless she is being lawfully held for
some lawful cause.

Presumption of innocence leads to the accused’s acquittal due to inconsistent testimonies of prosecution’s
witnesses

Inconsistent testimonies of prosecution’s witnesses entitles the accused to

acquittal based on his constitutional presumption of innocence.

ELY AGUSTIN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 158788, April 30, 2008

FACTS:

On October 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of spouses George and Rosemarie Gante in
Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to
P600,000.00.124[3] Forthwith, the spouses reported the matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a
search warrant with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. 125[4] The MTC issued Search Warrant
No. 5-95,126[5] directing a search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the perpetrators.
One of the target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime.

On October 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's house located in Sitio
Padual, Barangay Pug-os, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions
which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 1651-K, for violation of P.D. No. 1866 or Illegal Possession of Firearms, against petitioner before
the RTC.

Thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented eight witnesses namely: (1) P/Insp. Anselmo Baldovino127[7]
(P/Insp. Baldovino), a police investigator and the applicant for the search warrant; (2) Rosemarie Gante (Gante), the
victim of the robbery and private complainant; (3) Ignacio Yabes (Yabes), a Municipal Local Government Operations
Officer of the Department of Interior and Local Government who was the civilian witness to the search; (4) P/Supt.
Bonifacio Abian128[8] (P/Supt. Abian), Deputy Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police and part of the

124
125
126
127
128
 25
search team; (5) SPO4 Marino Peneyra (SPO4 Peneyra); (6) SPO1 Franklin Cabaya (SPO1 Cabaya); (7) SPO1 James
Jara (SPO1 Jara); and (8) SPO2 Florentino Renon (SPO2 Renon).

The prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant against
petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house.129[9] In particular, SPO1 Cabaya testified that
while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower shelf. 130[10] The gun is a .38 caliber
revolver131[11] with five live ammunitions,132[12] which he immediately turned over to his superior, P/Insp. Baldovino.133
[13]

Petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife Lorna assert that petitioner
does not own a gun.134[14] Lorna testified that she saw a “military” man planting the gun.135[15]

After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision136[16] dated July 7, 1999, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA, which rendered the assailed Decision 137[18] dated January 22, 2003,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:

WHEREFORE, except for the MODIFICATION reducing and changing the maximum of the prison term
imposed to Five (5) Years Four (4) Months and Twenty (20) Days, the appealed Decision is otherwise AFFIRMED.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review, on the principal ground that the CA gravely erred in finding that the
guilt of petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable doubt; and more specifically, in giving weight and credence to
the testimonies of the police officers who searched the house of the petitioner which are replete with material and
irreconcilable contradictions and in giving SPO1 Cabaya the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty
despite the claim of Lorna that the .38 caliber revolver was planted.

Petitioner insists that the trial court and the CA committed reversible error in giving little credence to his
defense that the firearm found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges material inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to failure by the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

The petition has merit.

The paramount issue in the present case is whether the prosecution established the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt; and in the determination thereof, a factual issue, that is, whether a gun was found in the house of
petitioner, must necessarily be resolved.

It is a well-entrenched rule that appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case wide open for review.138[20]

In convicting petitioner, the RTC relied heavily on the testimony of SPO1 Cabaya, who testified that he
discovered the subject firearm in a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside petitioner's
defense of denial and protestations of frame-up. The RTC justified giving full credence to Cabaya's testimony on the
principles that the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties regularly; that he had no ill motive to frame-
up petitioner; and that his affirmative testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative testimony.139[21]

Weighing these findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to prove its
case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the Court finds,
after a meticulous examination of the records that the lower courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged with. The RTC and the CA have overlooked
certain facts and circumstances that would have interjected serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the credibility of
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
 26
the witnesses for the prosecution.

The conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and conducted
the search, who “discovered” the gun, and who witnessed the “discovery” are material matters because they relate
directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to
which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.140[24] As
held in United States v. Estraña,141[25] a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or
strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the credit of any witness
who testifies.

The evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of its witnesses.
Especially damaged is the credibility of SPO1 Cabaya, none of whose declarations on material points jibes with those
of the other prosecution witnesses. In the face of the vehement and consistent protestations of frame-up by petitioner
and his wife, the trial court and the CA erred in overlooking or misappreciating these inconsistencies. The
inconsistencies are material as they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not SPO1 Cabaya really
found a firearm in the house of petitioner.

SPO1 Cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen, among whom were SPO1 Jara,
SPO4 Peneyra, SPO3 Bernabe Ocado (SPO3 Ocado) and another one whose name he does not remember.142[26] While
searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the door.143[27] He said that SPO1 Jara
was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he (Cabaya) saw the firearm; 144[28] and that he
picked up the gun, held it and showed it to SPO1 Jara. 145[29] He asserted that SPO2 Renon was not one of those who
went inside the house.146[30]

However, SPO1 Jara, the best witness who could have corroborated SPO1 Cabaya's testimony, related a
different story as to the circumstances of the firearm's discovery. SPO1 Jara testified that he merely conducted
perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the house. 147[32] SPO1 Jara testified that
he remained outside the house throughout the search, and when SPO1 Cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was
seven to eight meters away from him.148[33] He could not see the inside of the house and could see Cabaya only from
his chest up.149[34] He did not see the firearm at the place where it was found, but saw it only when Cabaya raised his
arm to show the gun, which was a revolver.150[35] He is certain that he was not with Cabaya at the time the latter
discovered the firearm.151[36] He further testified that SPO3 Ocado, who, according to SPO1 Cabaya was one of those
near him when he (Cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.152[37]

P/Insp. Baldovino testified that only SPO2 Renon conducted the search and entered the house together with
SPO1 Cabaya,153[38] directly contradicting SPO1 Cabaya's testimony that he, together with SPO1 Jara, SPO4 Peneyra,
SPO3 Ocado, and another one whose name he cannot recall, were inside the house when he discovered the gun 154[39]
and that SPO2 Renon did not enter the house of petitioner.155[40]

The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further muddled the prosecution evidence with more
inconsistencies as to matters material to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been found in the house of
petitioner. SPO4 Peneyra testified that Yabes stayed outside of the during the search;156[59] whereas SPO1 Jara testified
that Yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when SPO1 Cabaya raised it.157[60]

Although the Court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the weakest defenses, 158[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
 27
to prove,159[62] the lower courts the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to prove the guilt of petitioner
in the present case, seriously erred in ignoring beyond
reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing evidence160[63] was never intended to shift to the accused the burden of proof in
a criminal case.
As the Court held in People of the Philippines v. Ambih:161[64]

[W]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated, this claim assumes
importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is well to remember that the
prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but rather on its own proof which must be strong
enough to convince this Court that the prisoner in the dock deserves to be punished. The constitutional presumption
is that the accused is innocent even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
convict him.162[65] (Emphasis supplied)
In People of the Philippines v. Gonzales,163[66] the Court held that where there was material and unexplained
inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to inconsequential details but
to the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony given by
one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal
prosecution witness. The Court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer and adopt the
testimony of the other that is more plausible. In such a situation, both testimonies lose their probative value. The Court
further held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the same sale transaction, which
allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on the same occasion? We must conclude
that a reasonable doubt was generated as to whether or not the "buy-bust" operation ever took place.164[69]

In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses generate serious
doubt as to whether a firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution utterly failed to discharge its
burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt. The constitutional
presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been demolished and therefore petitioner should be acquitted of the
crime he was with.

Read also:

P. vs. Bernardino, January 28, 1991

1-a. P vs. Flores, 165 SCRA 71
1-b. Aguirre vs. P., 155 SCRA 337
1-c. P. vs. Guinto, 184 SCRA 287
1-d. P. vs. Solis, 182 SCRA 182
1-e. P. vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313
2. Alonso vs. IAC, 151 SCRA 552
3. P vs. Lopez, 74 SCRA 205
4. P vs. Quiason, 78 SCRA 513
5. P vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450
6. P vs. Poblador, 76 SCRA 634
7. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392

3. Presumption of innocence in general and in the order of trial

PEOPLE VS. DE LOS SANTOS, 355 SCRA 415

PEOPLE VS. SATURNO, 355 SCRA 578

What is the EQUIPOISE RULE?

A. If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts
the scale of justice in favor of the accused and he should be acquitted from the crime charged.

Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does
not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

Read:
159
160
161
162
163
164
 28

1. Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 SCRA 322

1. Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, July 10,l986

SACAY VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. L-66497-98,July 10, 1986

FACTS:

1. At the initial hearing, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was interrupted when the accused,
through counsel, admitted that he shot the deceased but claimed that it was done in self-defense and
fulfillment of duty. The prosecution then moved that the reverse procedure be adopted in view of the
admission that the accused shot the deceased. No objection was interposed by the accused or his counsel.

2. On appeal with the S.C. after he was convicted the accused later claims that there was a violation of the
order of trial provided for in Sec. 3, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. He also cites the case of Alejandro vs.
Pepito, 96 SCRA 322, wherein the S.C. ruled that : "It behooved the respondent Judge to have followed the
sequence of trial set forth x x x the form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest; the orderly
course of procedure requires that the prosecution should go forward and present all of its proof in the first
instance."

HELD:

The case of Alejandro vs. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as the accused in the case at bar did not
object to the procedure followed. In fact in the said Alejandro case, the Court also stated:

"It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Gaoiran, 17 Phil. 404 (l910), relied upon by the prosecution
and the trial Court, the defense has produced its proofs before the prosecution presented its case, and it was
held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. There is one radical difference, however,
since in that case no objection was entered in the Court below to the procedure followed in the presentation
of proof. In this case, the change in the order of trial made by respondent Judge was promptly and timely
objected to by the defense."

In fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure (Sec. 3e),
Rule 119)the said procedure is now expressly sanctioned. Thus:

"However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."

3.Sec. 3(3), Rule 119 , 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure , as amended.

4. Other cases -

Read:

1. P vs. Opida, June 13,1986

2. P vs. Tempongko, October 2,1986
3. P vs. Drammayo, 42 SCRA 59
4. P vs. Fernando, 145 SCRA 151
5. P vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597
6. Castillo vs. Filtex, September 30,1983
7. Dumlao vs. COMELEC, supra

5. Right to counsel-during trial

1. Reason behind the requirement

2. Obligation of the judge to an accused who appears in court without a lawyer to assist him

Read:

1. P vs. Holgado,85 Phil. 752

2. Delgado vs. CA, 145 SCRA 357
 29
3. P vs. Cuison, 193 Phil. 296

5-a. The right to be heard by himself and counsel during trial

Effect of the fact that accused was represented by a NON-LAWYER at the early part of the trial but a full-
pledged lawyer took over as his counsel when he presented his evidence. (Also important in your criminal
law as to the distinctions between robbery and grave coercion)

PEDRO CONSULTA VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 179462, February 12, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The Court of Appeals having, by Decision of April 23, 2007, 165[1] affirmed the December 9, 2004
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 convicting Pedro C. Consulta (appellant)
of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons, appellant filed the present petition.

The accusatory portion of the Information against appellant reads:

That on or about the 7th day of June, 1999, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry
away complainant’s NELIA R. SILVESTRE gold necklace worth P3,500.00, belonging to said
complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of P3,500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.166[2] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied)

From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is gathered:

At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private complainant Nelia R. Silvestre
(Nelia), together with Maria Viovicente (Maria) and Veronica Amar (Veronica), boarded a tricycle on their
way to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, appellant and his brother Edwin Consulta
(Edwin) blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the driver alighted and left. Appellant and Edwin at
once shouted invectives at Nelia, saying “Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya ka, kapal ng mukha
mo, papatayin ka namin.” Appellant added “Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala,
sinabihan na kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita.”

Appellant thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace with a crucifix pendant which, according to
an “alajera” in the province, was of 18k gold, and which was worth P3,500, kicked the tricycle and left
saying “Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses
lang kayo. Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong kahit kailan!”

Nelia and her companions immediately went to the Pembo barangay hall where they were advised
to undergo medical examination. They, however, repaired to the Police Station, Precinct 8 in Comembo,
Makati City and reported the incident. They then proceeded to Camp Crame where they were advised to
return in a few days when any injuries they suffered were expected to manifest.

Nine days after the incident or on June 16, 1999, Nelia submitted a medico-legal report and gave
her statement before a police investigator.

Denying the charge, appellant branded it as fabricated to spite him and his family in light of the
following antecedent facts:

He and his family used to rent the ground floor of Nelia’s house in Pateros. Nelia is his godmother.
The adjacent house was occupied by Nelia’s parents with whom she often quarreled as to whom the rental
payments should be remitted. Because of the perception of the parents of Nelia that his family was partial
towards her, her parents disliked his family. Nelia’s father even filed a case for maltreatment against him
which was dismissed and, on learning of the maltreatment charge, Nelia ordered him and his family to
move out of their house and filed a case against him for grave threats and another for light threats which
were dismissed or in which he was acquitted.
165 [1]
Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Lucas P. Bersamin; CA rollo,
pp. 166-176.
166 [2]
Records, p. 1.
 30

Appellant went on to claim that despite frequent transfers of residence to avoid Nelia, she would
track his whereabouts and cause scandal.

Appellant’s witness Darius Pacaña testified that on the date of the alleged robbery, Nelia, together
with her two companions, approached him while he was at Ambel Street in the company of Michael
Fontanilla and Jimmy Sembrano, and asked him (Pacaña) if he knew a bald man who is big/stout with a big
tummy and with a sister named Maria. As he replied in the affirmative, Nelia at once asked him to
accompany them to appellant’s house, to which he acceded. As soon as the group reached appellant’s
house, appellant, on his (Pacaña’s) call, emerged and on seeing the group, told them to go away so as not to
cause trouble. Retorting, Nelia uttered “Mga hayop kayo, hindi ko kayo titigilan.”

Another defense witness, Thelma Vuesa, corroborated Pacaña’s account.

The trial court, holding that intent to gain on appellant’s part “is presumed from the unlawful
taking” of the necklace, and brushing aside appellant’s denial and claim of harassment, convicted appellant
of Robbery, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused PEDRO C. CONSULTA guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the felony of Robbery with Intimidation of Persons defined and
penalized under Article 294, paragraph No. 5, in relation to Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven
(11) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances which attended the commission of the said crime.

The said accused is further ordered to pay unto the complainant Nelia Silvestre the amount of
P3,500.00 representing the value of her necklace taken by him and to pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED. (Italics in the original, underscoring supplied)

The appellate court affirmed appellant’s conviction with modification on the penalty.

In his present appeal, appellant raises the following issues:

(1) Whether or not appellant was validly arraigned;

(2) Whether or not appellant was denied due process having been represented by a fake lawyer during
arraignment, pre-trial and presentation of principal witnesses for the prosecution;

The first two issues, which appellant raised before the appellate court only when he filed his Motion
for Reconsideration of said court’s decision, were resolved in the negative in this wise:

On the matter of accused-appellant’s claim of having been denied due process, an examination of
the records shows that while accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyes, who “seems not
a lawyer,” during the early stages of trial, the latter withdrew her appearance with the conformity of the
former as early as July 28, 2000 and subsequently, approved by the RTC in its Order dated August 4, 2000.
Thereafter, accused-appellant was represented by Atty. Rainald C. Paggao from the Public Defender’s
(Attorney’s) Office of Makati City. Since the accused-appellant was already represented by a member of
the Philippine Bar who principally handled his defense, albeit unsuccessfully, then he cannot now be heard
to complain about having been denied of due process.167[3] (Underscoring supplied)

That appellant’s first counsel may not have been a member of the bar does not dent the proven fact
that appellant prevented Nelia and company from proceeding to their destination. Further, appellant was
afforded competent representation by the Public Attorneys’ Office during the presentation by the
prosecution of the medico-legal officer and during the presentation of his evidence. People v. Elesterio168[4]
enlightens:

“As for the circumstance that the defense counsel turned out later to be a non-lawyer, it is observed
that he was chosen by the accused himself and that his representation does not change the fact that
Elesterio was undeniably carrying an unlicensed firearm when he was arrested. At any rate, he has since
167 [3]
Rollo, p. 169
168 [4]
G.R. No. 63971, May 9, 1989, 173 SCRA 243, 249.
 31
been represented by a member of the Philippine bar, who prepared the petition for habeas corpus and the
appellant’s brief.” (Underscoring supplied)

EVEN IF THE DECISION OF CONVICTION IS ALREADY FINAL AND

EXECUTORY, THE CASE MAY STILL BE RE-OPENED IF THERE IS
GROSS-NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF ACCUSED’S COUNSEL
THEREBY VIOLATING HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS/COUNSEL.

JOHN HILARIO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 161070, April 14, 2008

THE FACTS:
Petitioner, together with one Gilbert Alijid (Alijid), was charged with two counts169[3] of Murder in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, Quezon City to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.

During trial, Atty. Raul Rivera of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO), counsel of Alijid, took over representing
petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel.

On December 5, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision 170[4] finding petitioner and his co-accused Alijid guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each count.

On May 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the RTC a Petition for Relief171[5] from
the Decision dated December 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. In his petition, petitioner contended that at the
time of the promulgation of the judgment, he was already confined at Quezon City Jail and was directed to be
committed to the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa; that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus
he instructed his lawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose his full trust and confidence to his
lawyer; that he had instructed his lawyer to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on
May 2, 2002, he was already incarcerated at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and learned from the grapevine
of his impending transfer to the Iwahig Penal Colony, Palawan; that believing that the notice of appeal filed by his
counsel prevented the Decision dated December 5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he instructed his
representative to get a copy of the notice of appeal from the RTC; that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in
defiance of his clear instructions; and that the RTC Decision showed that it was received by his counsel on February 1,
2002 and yet the counsel did not inform him of any action taken thereon.

I S S U E:

Whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance or failure of the petitioner's counsel
de oficio to seasonably file a Notice of Appeal, constitutes excusable negligence to entitle the undersigned detention
prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?

Whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and executory
judgment?

HELD:

Petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for the latter's
defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between counsel-client and cannot
be against the client who was prejudiced; that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation
considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from PAO, who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed
CA Resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the RTC of his petition for relief; that reliance
on technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an
affront to the policy promulgated by this Court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if
it will result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the best interest of justice for the CA to have directed the
petitioner to complete the records instead of dismissing the petition outright.

In his Comment, the OSG argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant the review of an appeal
from a final and executory judgment; that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed
final and not appealable; and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in futility,
169 [3]
Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91647-48.
170 [4]
Penned by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa, rollo, pp. 36-52.
171 [5]
Id. at 53-60.
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thus the RTC properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from judgment. The OSG further claims that notice to
counsel is notice to clients and failure of counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would not constitute
excusable negligence and therefore binding on the client.

We grant the petition.

A litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the
most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. 172[12] We have held in a civil case that to demand
as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system
into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has
no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.173[13] This finds application
specially if the liberty of a person is at stake. As we held in Telan v. Court of Appeals:

The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, especially so when as a
consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.

In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable.
Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.

xxxx

Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. The demand as much from ordinary
citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating monstrosity
where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but because he
does not know how to establish such right.

The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an on-going litigation,
it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company.

No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the right to counsel
exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.174[14] (Emphasis
supplied)

To repeat the ruling in Telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that
the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. 175[15] It
is even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief from
judgment with the RTC.

It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in Telan, the right of an accused person to be
assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process.

Cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served
better.176[16]

While as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have on some occasions relaxed this
rule. Thus, in Barnes v. Padilla177[17] we held:

However, this Court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a) matters of life,
liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d)
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e)
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be
unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.

172 [12]
See Telan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95026, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 534, 541.
173 [13]
Id.
174[14]
Id. at 540-541.
175 [15]
Id. at 541.
176 [16]
Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 11, at 781.
177 [17]
G.R. No. 160753, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675.
 33
Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or
even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself had already
declared to be final.

In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, speaking through the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco, had
occasion to state:

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not
to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always been, as they ought to be
guided by the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other
way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give way to the
realities of the situation.

Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.178[18]

Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must be avoided.179[21]

Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded
the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.180[22] However, instead of remanding the case to the CA for a
decision on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as not to further delay the final disposition of this case.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by law.
The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in Castro v. Court of Appeals181[27]
where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. While
this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due process, a
right guaranteed by the Constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss of the right to
appeal was due to the PAO lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner.

PEOPLE VS. NADERA, JR., 324 SCRA 490

Mendoza, J.

The cavalier attitude of Atty. Manolo Brotonel of the PAO cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in
[a] his refusal to cross-examine Oleby Nadera (the complainant for RAPE); [b] the manner in which he
conducted Maricris Nadera’s cross-examination; and [c] his failure not only to present evidence for the
accused but to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. Only the faithful performance by
counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accused’s right to due process
and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyer’s duty, especially that of a defense
counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his command to
protect and safeguard the accused’s fundamental rights.

It may be so that the defense counsel really found Oleby’s testimony to be believable. Nonetheless,
he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainant’s testimony to ensure that the accused’s
constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for naught. It
bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the words of the complainant against the accused, the two
being the only persons present during the commission of the crime. This is so because the complainant’s
testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the accused’s constitutional right
to be presumed innocent. This is where cross-examination becomes essential to test the credibility of the
witnesses, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct examination
testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial matters which create
178 [18]
Id. at 686-687.
179 [21]
Cusi-Hernandez v. Spouses Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).
180 [22]
Telan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 540-541; People of the Philippines v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950); Flores v. Judge Ruiz, 179
Phil. 351, 355 (1979); Delgado v. Court of Appeals, 229 Phil. 362, 366 (1986).
181
 34
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the constitutional right of the
accused to confront the witnesses against him. For unless proven otherwise to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, the accused is presumed innocent.

(NOTE: For your Legal & Judicial Ethics)

Atty. Brotonel as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no
matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the
more imperative because the life of the accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less
because he was counsel de oficio.

The Decision of the RTC convicting the accused is SET ASIDE and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

Read:

1. P vs. Dischoso, 96 SCRA 957

2. Read also:

PEOPLE VS. YAMBOT, G.R. NO. 120350, 343 SCRA 20, OCT. 30, 2000; PEOPLE VS. BANIHIT,
G.R. NO. 132045, 339 SCRA 86, AUG. 25, 2000.

Right to be Heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense.

In this case, the non-appearance of counsel for the accused on the scheduled hearing was not construed as
waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence for his defense. Denial of due process can be
successfully invoked where no valid waiver of rights had been made as in this case.

In another case, the accused-appellant validly waived his right to present evidence. This is in consonance
with the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished
without infringing on any public right, and without detriment to the community at large.

6. The right to be present during trial

Read:

1. Aquino vs. Military Commission, 63 SCRA 546

2. P vs. Judge, 125 SCRA 269
3. Waiver of the defendant's presence in a criminal prosecution,77 SCRA 430

The right to a speedy trial; not a case of; Requisites of double jeopardy;

DANTE TAN VS. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 173637, April 21, 2009

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision 182[1] dated 22 February 2006 and Resolution183[2]
dated 17 July 2006 issued by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 entitled, “People of the
Philippines v. Hon. Briccio C. Ygana, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 153, Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City and Dante Tan.”

The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed by the trial court due
to an alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Tan’s right to speedy trial. The assailed Resolution denied his
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Inhibit.

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:

182 [1]
Penned by Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta with Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Sesinando E. Villon,
concurring; rollo, pp. 90-100.
183 [2]
Id. at 102-112.
 35
On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the
People of the Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner) before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830, No.
119831 and No. 119832, all entitled, “People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan.”

Criminal Case No. 119830184[3] pertains to allegations that petitioner employed manipulative devises
in the purchase of Best World Resources Corporation (BW) shares. On the other hand, Criminal Cases No.
119831185[4] and No. 119832186[5] involve the alleged failure of petitioner to file with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) a sworn statement of his beneficial ownership of BW shares.

In two other related cases, two Informations were filed against a certain Jimmy Juan and Eduardo
G. Lim for violation of the Revised Securities Act involving BW shares of stock. These were docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829.

On the same day, the DOJ, through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Nilo C. Mariano, filed a
Motion for Consolidation praying that Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 be
consolidated together with Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No. 119829, which the trial court granted.

On 21 December 2000, Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832 were raffled off to
the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, presided by Judge Briccio C. Ygana. Criminal Cases No. 119828 and No.
119829 also went to the same court.

Petitioner was arraigned on 16 January 2001, and pleaded not guilty to the charges.187[6]

On 6 February 2001, the pre-trial was concluded, and a pre-trial order set, among other things, the
first date of trial on 27 February 2001.188[7]

Atty. Celia Sandejas of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), under the direct control
and supervision of Public Prosecutor Nestor Lazaro, entered her appearance for the People; Atty. Agnes
Maranan for petitioner Dante Tan; Atty. Sigfrid Fortun for Eduardo Lim, Jr.; and Atty. Rudolf Brittanico for
Jimmy Juan. State Prosecutors Susan Dacanay and Edna Villanueva later on took over as lawyers for the
People.

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the parties
agreed that Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No.
119830, and that petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor would the trial court
disapprove it.

Thereafter, the People presented evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832. On 18
September 2001, the prosecution completed the presentation of its evidence and was ordered by the RTC to
file its formal offer of evidence within thirty days.

After being granted extensions to its filing of a formal offer of evidence, the prosecution was able to
file said formal offer for Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 on 25 November 2003.189[8]

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the People’s
alleged failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the People for
failing to prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or
justification for the delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial,
which he had allegedly done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to have been substantially
prejudiced by this delay.

The prosecution opposed the Motion, insisting on its claim that the parties had an earlier agreement
to defer the trial of Criminal Case No. 119830 until after that of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, as the
presentation of evidence and prosecution in each of the five cases involved were to be done separately.
The presentation of evidence in Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, however, were done simultaneously,
because they involved similar offenses of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of stocks proscribed

184[3]
Id. at 228-230.
185[4]
Id. at 231-232.
186[5]
Id. at 233-235.
187[6]
Records, p. 194.
188[7]
Id. at 253-259.
189 [8]
Rollo, pp. 247-253.
 36
190[9] 191[10] 192[11]
under Rule 36(a)-1 in relation to Sections 32(a)-1 and 56 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 178,
otherwise known as the “Revised Securities Act.” Criminal Case No. 119830 pertains to alleged violation
of Section 27 (b),193[12] in relation to Section 56 of said act.

On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, ruled that the delays
which attended the proceedings of petitioner’s case (Criminal Case No. 119830) were vexatious, capricious
and oppressive, resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial. The RTC ordered 194[13] the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises duly considered and finding the motion to dismiss to be
meritorious, the Court hereby orders Criminal Case No. 119830 DISMISSED.

On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate trials
of the BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No.
119832 ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC denied the
Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.

The RTC’s order of dismissal was elevated to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari, with
the People contending that:

RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT THE PEOPLE
VIOLATED DANTE TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL, ALBEIT, THE LATTER AND
RESPONDENT JUDGE HIMSELF HAVE CONFORMED TO THE DEFERMENT OF CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 119830 PENDING HEARING OF THE TWO OTHER RELATED CASES.

Setting aside the trial court’s order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for
certiorari in its Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving the petition, the appellate court reinstated
Criminal Case No. 119830 in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed Orders dated December 22, 2003 and
January 20, 2004 are set aside. Criminal Case No. 119830 is reinstated and the trial court is ordered to
conduct further proceedings in said case immediately.195[14]

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the Decision and filed a motion for inhibition of the
Justices who decided the case.

On 17 July 2006, the Court of Appeals denied both motions.

Petitioner Dante Tan, henceforth, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, raising the
following issues:

190 [9]
Section 36. Directors, officers and principal stockholders.—
(a) Every person who is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten per centum of any class of any equity security which is
registered pursuant to this Act, or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of such security, shall file, at the time of the registration of such
security on a securities exchange or by the effective date of a registration statement or within ten days after he becomes such a beneficial owner,
director, or officer, a statement with the Commission and, if such security is registered on a securities exchange, also with the exchange, of the
amount of all equity securities of such issuer of which he is the beneficial owner, and within ten days after the close of each calendar month
thereafter, if there has been a change in such ownership during such month, shall file with the Commission, and if such security is registered on a
securities exchange, shall also file with the exchange, a statement indicating his ownership at the close of the calendar month and such changes
in his ownership as have occurred during such calendar month.
191 [10]
Section 32. Reports. – (a) (1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity security of a
class which is registered pursuant to this Act, is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than ten (10%) per centum of such class shall,
within ten days after such acquisition or such reasonable time as fixed by the Commission, submit to the issuer of the security, to the stock
exchanges where the security is traded, and to the Commission a sworn statement x x x.
192 [11]
Penalties. Any person who violates any of the provisions of this Act, or the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission
under authority thereof, or any person who, in a registration statement filed under this Act, makes any untrue statement of a material fact of omits
to state any material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not misleading, shall, upon conviction, suffer a
fine of not less than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos nor more than five hundred thousand (P500,000.00) pesos or imprisonment of not less than
seven (7) years nor more than twenty one (21) years, or both in the discretion of the court. If the offender is a corporation, partnership or
association or other juridical entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the officer or officers of the corporation, partnership, association or entity
responsible for the violation, and if such officer is an alien, he shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed, be deported without further
proceedings after service of sentence.
193 [12]
Section 27. Manipulative and deceptive devices. It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any facility of
any exchange –
xxxx
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.
194 [13]
Rollo, pp. 835-855.
195[14]
Id. at 99-100.
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I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE THE
CERTIFICATE OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL
ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE AUTHORIZED OFFICERS
OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TAN’S RIGHT AGAINST
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL
COURT ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TAN’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

We first resolve the preliminary issues.

In an attempt at having the instant petition dismissed, petitioner contends that the certificate of non-
forum shopping attached to the People’s appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been signed by the
Chairman of the SEC as complainant in the cases instead of Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N.
Gutierrez.

Petitioner’s argument is futile. The Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the authority of
Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas Gutierrez to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping of the petition for
certiorari before said court. It must be stressed that the certification against forum shopping is required to
be executed by the plaintiff. 196[15] Although the complaint-affidavit was signed by the Prosecution and
Enforcement Department of the SEC, the petition before the Court of Appeals originated from Criminal
Case No. 119830, where the plaintiff or the party instituting the case was the People of the Philippines.
Section 2, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court leaves no room for doubt and establishes that criminal cases are
prosecuted in the name of the People of the Philippines, the offended party in criminal cases. Moreover,
pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (2) of the Revised Administrative Code, the DOJ is the executive arm of
the government mandated to investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the
probation and correction system. It is the DOJ, through its prosecutors, which is authorized to prosecute
criminal cases on behalf of the People of the Philippines. 197[16] Prosecutors control and direct the
prosecution of criminal offenses, including the conduct of preliminary investigation, subject to review by
the Secretary of Justice. Since it is the DOJ which is the government agency tasked to prosecute criminal
cases before the trial court, the DOJ is best suited to attest whether a similar or related case has been filed
or is pending in another court of tribunal. Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the head
of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping for Criminal Case
No. 119830, which was filed on behalf of the People of the Philippines.

The preliminary issues having been resolved, the Court shall proceed to discuss the main issues.

At the crux of the controversy is the issue of whether there was a violation of petitioner Dante Tan’s
right to speedy trial.

Petitioner Dante Tan assails the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 83068. The appellate court determined that he “impliedly agreed” that Case No. 119830 would not be
tried until after termination of Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832, which finding was grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises and conjectures.

196[15]
Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW, p. 729.
197[16]
Revised Administrative Code, Section 3(2).
 38
Both parties concede that this issue is factual. It is a basic rule that factual issues are beyond the
province of this Court in a petition for review, for it is not our function to review evidence all over again. 198
[17]
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of law may be raised in this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari.199[18] The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts. 200[19] However, the
rule is subject to several exceptions.201[20] Under these exceptions, the Court may delve into and resolve
factual issues, such as in cases where the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are absurd,
contrary to the evidence on record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a misappreciation of
facts.

In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the Court of Appeals on the substantial
matters at hand, while conflicting with those of the RTC, are adequately supported by the evidence on
record. We, therefore, find no reason to deviate from the jurisprudential holdings and treat the instant case
differently.

An accused’s right to “have a speedy, impartial, and public trial” is guaranteed in criminal cases by
Section 14(2) of Article III of the Constitution. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from
vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its “salutary objective” being to assure that an innocent person
may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt
determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of
whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose . Intimating historical perspective on the evolution of the
right to speedy trial, we reiterate the old legal maxim, “justice delayed is justice denied.” This oft-repeated
adage requires the expeditious resolution of disputes, much more so in criminal cases where an accused is
constitutionally guaranteed the right to a speedy trial .

Following the policies incorporated under the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise
known as “The Speedy Trial Act of 1998,” was enacted, with Section 6 of said act limiting the trial period
to 180 days from the first day of trial . Aware of problems resulting in the clogging of court dockets, the
Court implemented the law by issuing Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, which has been incorporated in
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, Section 2 of Rule 119 .

In Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan the Court had occasion to state –

The right of the accused to a speedy trial and to a speedy disposition of the case against him was
designed to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over him for
an indefinite time, and to prevent delays in the administration of justice by mandating the courts to proceed
with reasonable dispatch in the trial of criminal cases. Such right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of a case is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The inquiry as to whether or not an accused has been denied such right is not
susceptible by precise qualification. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.

While justice is administered with dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be
swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights
given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are
to give meaning to that intent.

The Court emphasized in the same case that:

A balancing test of applying societal interests and the rights of the accused necessarily compels the
court to approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc basis.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay;
(c) the defendant’s assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

198 [17]
Centeno v. Viray, 440 Phil. 881, 887 (2002).
199 [18]
Busmente, Jr. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 73647, 8 April 1991, 195 SCRA 710, 713.
200 [19]
Tad-y v. People, G.R. No. 148862, 11 August 2005, 466 SCRA 474, 492; Romago Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 388 Phil. 964,
975 (2000).
201 [20]
Palon v. Nino, 405 Phil. 670, 681 (2001).
 39
Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of the State for such delay.
Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or justifications invoked by the State. x x x.202[26]

Exhaustively explained in Corpuz v. Sandiganbayan, an accused’s right to speedy trial is deemed

violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. In
determining whether petitioner was deprived of this right, the factors to consider and balance are the
following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and
(d) prejudice caused by such delay.203[27]

From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of
evidence for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense
admit that no evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two
years and eight months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830.

The question we have to answer now is whether there was vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay. To this, we apply the four-factor test previously mentioned.

We emphasize that in determining the right of an accused to speedy trial, courts are required to do
more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the
case. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is clearly insufficient, 204[28] and particular regard
must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.205[29]

In Alvizo v. Sandiganbayan,206[30] the Court ruled that there was no violation of the right to speedy
trial and speedy disposition. The Court took into account the reasons for the delay, i.e., the frequent
amendments of procedural laws by presidential decrees, the structural reorganizations in existing
prosecutorial agencies and the creation of new ones by executive fiat, resulting in changes of personnel,
preliminary jurisdiction, and the functions and powers of prosecuting agencies. The Court also considered
the failure of the accused to assert such right, and the lack of prejudice caused by the delay to the accused.

In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan,207[31] the complexity of the issues and the failure of the
accused to invoke her right to speedy disposition at the appropriate time spelled defeat for her claim to the
constitutional guarantee.

In Cadalin v. Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s Administrator,208[32] the Court,

considering also the complexity of the cases and the conduct of the parties’ lawyers, held that the right to
speedy disposition was not violated therein.

Petitioner’s objection to the prosecution’s stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial
of Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his
defense counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing. 209[33] Petitioner’s conformity
thereto can be deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested
that the evidence to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to
object to the prosecution’s manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts,
mistakes and negligence of counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious
injustice.210[34] In fact, petitioner’s acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during
the initial presentation of the People’s evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February 2001, herein quoted
below:

COURT: Atty. Sandejas, call your witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS [SEC Prosecuting Lawyer]: May we make some manifestation first, your Honor, before
we continue presenting our witness. First of all, this witness will only be testifying as to two (2) of the
charges: non-disclosure of beneficial ownership of Dante Tan x x x.

xxxx
202[26]
Id. at 313-314.
203 [27]
Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 985, 999-1000 (2001); Dela Pena v. Sandiganbayan, 412 Phil. 921, 929 (2001).
204 [28]
Socrates v. Sandiganbayan, 324 Phil. 151, 170 (1996); Tai Lim v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 971, 977 (1999).
205 [29]
Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, 2 December 1993, 228 SCRA 214, 221.
206 [30]
G.R. No. 101689, 17 March 1993, 220 SCRA 55.
207 [31]
408 Phil. 767 (2001).
208 [32]
G.R. No. 104776, 5 December 1994, 238 SCRA 721.
209 [33]
TSN, 27 February 2001.
210 [34]
Producers Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 430 Phil. 812, 823 (2002); People v. Hernandez, 328 Phil. 1123, 1143 (1996).
 40

COURT: (to Atty. Sandejas) Call your witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Our witness is Mr. Wilfredo Baltazar of the Securities and Exchange Commission, your
Honor. We are presenting this witness for the purpose of non-disclosure of beneficial ownership case…

COURT: I would advise the counsel from the SEC to make it very clear your purpose in presenting your first
witness.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Yes, your Honor. Can I borrow the file?

COURT: Show it to counsel.

ATTY. SANDEJAS: Crim. Case Nos. 119831 and 119832, for Violation of RA Rule 36(a)1, in relation to Sec. 32
(a)-1 of the Revised Securities Act when he failed to disclose his beneficial ownership amounting to more
than 10% which requires disclosure of such fact.211[35]

During the same hearing, the People manifested in open court that the parties had agreed to the
separate trials of the BW Cases:

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

May we be allowed to speak, your Honor?

Your Honor please, as we x x x understand, this is not a joint trial but a separate trial x x x so as manifested
by the SEC lawyer, the witness is being presented insofar as 119831 and 119832 as against Dante Tan only
x x x.212[36]

The transcript of stenographic notes taken from the 3 April 2001 hearing further clarifies that only
the two cases against Dante Tan were being prosecuted:

ATTY. DE LA CRUZ [new counsel for accused Eduardo Lim, Jr.]:

Your Honor, please, may I request clarification from the prosecutors regarding the purpose of the testimony
of the witness in the stand. While the Private Prosecutor stated the purpose of the testimony of the
witness. .

PROSECUTOR LAZARO:

I was present during the last hearing. I was then going over the transcript of this case, well, I
believe the testimony x x x mainly [is] on accused Dante Tan, your Honor. As a matter of fact, there was a
clarification made by the parties and counsels after the witness had testified that the hearing in these cases
is not a joint trial because it involves separate charges, involving different documents, your Honor. That is
why the witness already testified only concerning Dante Tan. Per the query made by Atty. Fortun, because
at that time, Atty. Fortun was still representing Mr. Lim, I believe, your Honor, then I understand that the
testimony of this witness cannot just be adopted insofar as the other accused, your Honor.

ATTY. MARANAN:

We confirm that, your Honor, since x x x particularly since this is already cross, it is clear that the
direct examination dealt exclusively with Mr. Dante Tan.

PROS. LAZARO:

Mr. Dante Tan, involving the 2 (two) cases.213[37]

211[35]
TSN, 27 February 2001, pp. 3-7; CA rollo, pp. 87-91.
212[36]
Id. at 71-74; id. at 155-156.

213 [37]
TSN, 3 April 2001, pp. 5-10; id. at 225-230.
 41
Moreover, although periods for trial have been stipulated, these periods are not absolute. Where
periods have been set, certain exclusions are allowed by law.214[38] After all, this Court and the law
recognize that it is but a fact that judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and must contend with the
realities of everyday life. In spite of the prescribed time limits, jurisprudence continues to adopt the view
that the fundamentally recognized principle is that the concept of speedy trial is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.215[39]

As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830 has
prejudiced petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time, suffice
it to say that the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution. 216[40] Should the prosecution fail for
any reason to present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner will be
acquitted. It is safely entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to
prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his
behalf.217[41]

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to
invoke said right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the
constitutional guarantee.218[42] More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the
prosecution’s manifestation during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the
other, petitioner was deemed to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.

For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is
guilty of violating petitioner’s right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but
generally refers to “capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.”
Any capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. This is true in the instant case.

There is also no merit to petitioner’s claim that a reversal of the RTC’s Order dismissing Criminal
Case No. 119830 is a violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy which dismissal was
founded on an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial.

The constitutional protection against double jeopardy shields one from a second or later prosecution
for the same offense. Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution declares that no person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, providing further that if an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act.

Following the above constitutional provision, Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court
found it apt to stipulate:

SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused has been convicted or
acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court
of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be
present:

(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;

(b) The court had jurisdiction;

214 [38]
Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge How, 393 Phil. 172, 184 (2000).
215 [39]
Id.
216 [40]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan and Marcos, 461 Phil. 598, 615 (2003).
217 [41]
People v. Ganguso, G.R. No 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275; People v. Abellanosa, 332 Phil. 760, 788 (1996),
citing People v. Baclayon, G.R. No. 110837, 29 March 1994, 231 SCRA 578, 584, citing People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992,
215 SCRA 349, 358-359.
218 [42]
Santiago v. Garchitorena, supra note 29.
 42
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and

(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.219[43]

Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or acquittal,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. This
element is crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with
the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double
jeopardy.220[44] This rule, however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial
of the right to speedy trial. 221[45] While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to
Dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830, the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to
speedy trial, which would otherwise put him in double jeopardy should the same charges be revived.
Petitioner’s situation is different. Double jeopardy has not attached, considering that the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial was without basis and
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the right of the
accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.

Following this Court’s ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals,222[46] as petitioner’s right to speedy
trial was not transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy – that the defendant was
acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused – was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from
such order of dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness
but the validity of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction,
which prevents double jeopardy from attaching.223[47]

As this Court ruled in People v. Tampal,224[48] reiterated in People v. Leviste,225[49] where we

overturned an order of dismissal by the trial court predicated on the right to speedy trial –

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that dismissal of cases on the ground of
failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the
same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals were predicated on the clear right of the
accused to speedy trial. These cases are not applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of
the private respondents to speedy trial has not been violated by the State. x x x.

From the foregoing, it follows that petitioner cannot claim that double jeopardy attached when said
RTC order was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering
that there is no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial.

The old adage that justice delayed is justice denied has never been more valid than in our
jurisdiction, where it is not a rarity for a case to drag in our courts for years and years and even decades. It
was this difficulty that inspired the constitutional requirement that the rules of court to be promulgated by
the Supreme Court shall provide for a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy trial and
disposition of cases.226[50] Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance, for justice is not to be
dispensed for the accused alone.227[51]

Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society
under the rule of law, ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are
afforded a fair opportunity to present their side. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Criminal
Case No. 119830 is just one of the many controversial cases involving the BW shares scam where public
interest is undoubtedly at stake. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a

219[43]
Condrada v. People, 446 Phil. 635, 641 (2003).
220[44]
Id.
221 [45]
Id.; Philippine Savings Bank v. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, 26 September 2005, 471 SCRA 94, 106, citing People v. Bans, G.R. No.
104147, 8 December 1994, 239 SCRA 48, 55.
222[46]
407 Phil. 279 (2002).
223[47]
Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM (Vol. II, 2001), p. 503.
224[48]
314 Phil. 35, 45 (1995).
225[49]
325 Phil. 525, 537 (1996).
226 [50]
Justice Isagani Cruz, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW, p. 292.
227 [51]
Dimatulac v. Villon, 358 Phil. 328, 366 (1998); People v. Subida, G.R. No. 145945, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 125, 137.
 43
reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually
increased the workload of the justice system and unwittingly prolonged the litigation.228[52]

Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court
are shields, not weapons. Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. There being no capricious,
vexatious, oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur in
the conclusions reached by the Court of Appeals.

Speedy disposition of cases before administrative bodies; effect of undue

delay

CAPT. WILFREDO ROQUERO VS. THE CHANCELLOR OF UP-MANILA, ET

AL., G.R. No. 181851, March 9, 2010

PEREZ, J.:

Petitioner Wildredo G. Roquero is an employee of UP-Manila assigned at the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH) Security Division as Special Police Captain. Private respondent Imelda O. Abutal is a Lady Guard of Ex-
Bataan Security Agency who was applying for a position in the security force assigned at UP-PGH.

The instant controversy arose from a complaint by private respondent Abutal with then Chancellor of UP-
Manila Perla D. Santos-Ocampo for Grave Misconduct against petitioner Capt. Roquero. The formal charge filed
on 1 October 1998 and docketed as ADM Case No. UPM-AC 97-007 reads as follows:

After preliminary investigation duly conducted in accordance with the Rules and
Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and Employees, a prima facie case has
been found to exist against you for GRAVE MISCONDUCT punishable under the
University Rules and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty and Employees in
relation to the Civil Service Law, committed as follows:

That you, Capt. Wilfredo Roquero of the UP Manila Police Force,

sometime in April 1996, while conducting an interview on MS. IMELDA
ABUTAL who was then applying for the position of Lady Guard of Ex-
Bataan Security Agency to be assigned at UP-PGH, proposed to her that if
she agreed to be your mistress, you would facilitate her application and give
her a permanent position; that despite the fact the MS. ABUTAL rejected
your proposal, you still insisted on demanding said sexual favor from her;
that you, therefore, are liable for GRAVE MISCONDUCT under Section 22,
paragraph (c) of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of
E.O. 292 on Civil Rules.

On 1 October 1998, the petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days by
Chancellor Santos-Ocampo, the material portion of said Order reads:

Considering the gravity of the offense charged and pursuant to Section 19 of Rules
and Regulations on the Discipline of UP Faculty Members and Employees and
Section 26 and 27 Rule XIV of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Omnibus
Rules, you are hereby preventively suspended for ninety (90) days effective upon
receipt hereof.

While on preventive suspension, you are hereby required to appear before the
Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) whenever your presence is necessary.

Thereafter, the Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) composed of Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden
Perdido and Isabella Lara, was organized to hear the instant case. Atty. Paul A. Flor, as University Prosecutor,
represented the prosecution. He was later on replaced by Atty. Asteria Felicen. Petitioner was represented by Atty.
Leo G. Lee of the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) who was then replaced by Public Attorney Philger Inovejas.

228 [52]
People v. Leviste, supra note 49.
 44
The Prosecution presented its only witness, private respondent Abutal. After the completion of the cross-
examination on the prosecution’s only witness, the prosecution agreed to submit its Formal Offer of Evidence on
or before 16 July 1999.

The prosecution, however, failed to submit its formal offer of evidence within the period agreed upon.

Thereafter, on 10 August 1999, when the case was called, only petitioner and his counsel appeared. Atty.
Flor merely called by telephone and requested Atty. Docena to reset the case to another date. Atty. Docena then
ordered the resetting of the hearing on the following dates: 11 August and 21 August 1999. On 11 August 1999,
only petitioner and his counsel came. No representative from the prosecution appeared before the ADT. Atty. Flor
again called and asked for the postponement of the hearing. By reason thereof, Atty. Docena issued an Order,
which reads as follows:

The continuation of the hearing of this case is hereby set to September 29, 1999 at
2:00 p.m., with the understanding that if and when the parties fail to appear at said
hearing date, this case shall be deemed submitted for resolution based on the
evidences already obtaining in the record of the case.

SO ORDERED.

11 August 1999.

On said date, the representative from the prosecution again failed to appear.

On 22 October 1999, petitioner filed a Motion through counsel praying that complainant (private
respondent herein) be declared to have waived her rights to formally offer her exhibits since complainant
was not able to file her Formal Offer within the given period of fifteen (15) days from 1 July 1999 or up to
16 July 1999.

The ADT was not able to act on the said Motion for almost five (5) years. Due to the unreasonable delay,
petitioner, on 19 May 2004 filed another Motion asking for the dismissal of the administrative case against him.
The Motion to Dismiss was anchored on the following reasons: that the prosecution had not formally offered its
evidence; that the ADT had failed to act on the motion filed on 22 October 1999; that the unfounded charges in the
administrative complaint were filed just to harass him; and that he is entitled to a just and speedy disposition of the
case.

On 26 May 2004, the prosecution, represented by Atty. Felicen in view of the resignation of Atty. Flor in
August 1999, filed its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. The prosecution alleged that a Formal
Offer of Documentary Exhibits had been filed on 24 January 2004, of which a copy thereof was received by
Atty. Lee, petitioner’s counsel, on 30 January 2004, per registry return receipt. However, petitioner has not filed
his comment to the said Formal Offer.

Furthermore, the prosecution explained in its Comment/Opposition that in view of the resignation of Atty.
Flor in August 1999 but who had been on leave by mid-July 1999, the Formal Offer could not be prepared by
another counsel until all the transcript of stenographic notes have been furnished to the counsel that replaced Atty.
Flor. Meanwhile, the stenographer, Jamie Limbaga, had been in and out of the hospital due to a serious illness,
thus the delay in the filing of the prosecutor’s Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits.

On 8 June 2004, Atty. Docena issued the assailed Order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss, to wit:

Acting on respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, as well as the University

Prosecutor’s Comment and/or Opposition to said Motion, and finding that said
Motion to Dismiss to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby DENIED.

In view of the failure of the respondent to file his comment on the

Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence, the Exhibit’s (“A” to “G-1”) of the
Prosecution are hereby ADMITTED for the purpose for which the same have been
offered.

The respondent is hereby directed to present his evidence on June 22, 2004 at
10:30 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.
 45

A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was denied in an Order dated 9
November 2004.

Petitioner Captain Wilfredo Roquero then filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 87776, alleging therein that the ADT committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied the motion to dismiss the administrative case filed against him.

In a Decision dated 22 March 2007, the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the petition with prayer for TRO
of Roquero reasoning that the ADT did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed orders.

Hence, this Petition.

The core issue of this case is whether the failure of the ADT to resolve Roquero’s Motion (to declare
complainant Imelda Abutal to have waived her right to submit her Formal Offer of Exhibit) which he seasonably
filed on 22 October 1999 and the assailed Order of the ADT dated 8 June 2004 admitting the Formal Offer of
Exhibit of complainant Imelda Abutal despite having filed after almost five years violated the constitutional right
of Roquero to a speedy disposition of cases.

HELD:

Indeed, while Section 27 of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service states that the
failure to submit the formal offer of evidence within the given period shall be considered as waiver thereof,
the ADT in fact allowed the prosecution to present its formal offer almost five (5) years later or on 24 January
2004. Starting on that date, petitioner was presented with the choice to either present his evidence or to, as he did,
file a motion to dismiss owing to the extraordinary length of time that ADT failed to rule on his motion.

We cannot accept the finding of the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the ADT because “a formal offer of evidence was filed by the prosecution, a copy of which was received by
petitioners’ counsel.” The admission by ADT on 8 June 2004 of the formal offer of exhibits belatedly filed did
not cure the 5-year delay in the resolution of petitioner’s 1999 motion to deem as waived such formal offer of
evidence. Indeed, the delay of almost five (5) years cannot be justified.

The ADT admitted this explanation of the prosecutor hook, line and sinker without asking why it took him
almost five (5) years to make that explanation. If the excuses were true, the prosecution could have easily
manifested with the ADT of its predicament right after Roquero filed his motion to declare the waiver of the
formal offer. It is evident too that the prosecution failed to explain why it took them so long a time to find a
replacement for the original prosecutor. And, the stenographer who had been in and out of the hospital due to
serious illness should have been replaced sooner.

While it is true that administrative investigations should not be bound by strict adherence to the technical
rules of procedure and evidence applicable to judicial proceedings, the same however should not violate the
constitutional right of respondents to a speedy disposition of cases.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 16. All person shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.

The constitutional right to a “speedy disposition of cases” is not limited to the accused in criminal
proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings,
including judicial and quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action by all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.

The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of
the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in
which the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is weighed, and such factors as the length of the
delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice
 46
caused by the delay. The concept of a speedy disposition is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept.

Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the
assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

Applying the doctrinal ruling vis-a-vis the factual milieu of this case, the violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of the case against petitioner is clear for the following reasons: (1) the delay of almost five (5) years on
the part of ADT in resolving the motion of petitioner, which resolution petitioner reasonably found necessary
before he could present his defense; (2) the unreasonableness of the delay; and (3) the timely assertions by
petitioner of the right to an early disposition which he did through a motion to dismiss. Over and above this, the
delay was prejudicial to petitioner’s cause as he was under preventive suspension for ninety (90) days, and during
the interregnum of almost five years, the trial of the accusation against him remained stagnant at the prosecution
stage.

The Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem
the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial
tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the
established rules of procedure but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive
delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various
legislations inutile.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Administrative Disciplinary Tribunal (ADT) of
the University of the Philippines-Manila, Atty. Zaldy B. Docena, Eden Perdido and Isabella Lara, in their
capacities as Chairman and Members of the ADT respectively, are hereby ORDERED to DISMISS the
administrative case against Capt. Wilfredo G. Roquero for violation of his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of cases.

JAIME BERNAT VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, May 20, 2004

Right to speedy disposition of case.

Facts:

1. On August 14, 1991, the petitioner and several others were charged of violation of Section 3 [e] of RA
3019, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
2. On August 23, 1994 after the presentation of the parties’ evidence, the case was deemed submitted for
decision before the 2nd Division;
3. Thereafter, the case was unloaded to the newly created 5th Division, particularly to Justice Godofredo
Legaspi and later re-assigned to Justice Ma. Cristina Cortez-Estrada upon her assumption of office on
November 3, 1998.
4. In the early part of 2002 while Justice Estrada was writing the decision of the case, she found out that the
November 26, 1993 transcript of stenographic notes, which was the cross-examination of the petitioner,
was missing so she called the parties for a conference on April 19, 2002 to discuss the matter.
5. Instead of attending the conference, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the alleged
violation of his right to speedy trial. The Court denied the same as well as the subsequent Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.

Issue:

Was there violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy disposition of his case when the same was
not decided for almost 8 years from the time it was “deemed submitted for decision?”

Held:

No. The right is violated only if the proceedings were attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be
based on mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.
As held in the case of DE LA PENA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, certain factors shall be considered and
balanced to determine if there is delay, as follows:

3. Length of the delay;

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4. Reasons for the delay;
5. Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
6. Prejudiced caused by the delay.

There is no violation of the right to speedy disposition of his case because petitioner failed to assert his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year period prior to April 19, 2002,
petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case.

a. Read Admin. Circular No. 4 of the Supreme Court dated September 22, 1988
b. Department of Justice Circular No. 27, dated September 16, 1988

c. When shall this right starts

Read:

1. P vs. Orsal, 113 SCRA 226

d. To what proceedings is this right available

Read:

1. Caballero vs. Alfonso, 153 SCRA 153

e. In general

Read:

1. The right to speedy trial, 28 SCRA 601

2. Conde vs. Rivera, 59 Phil. 650
3. Ventura vs. People, Nov. 6,1976
4. Martin vs. Ver, July 25, 1983
5. Bermisa vs. CA, 92 SCRa
6. Luneta vs. Mil. Com., 102 SCRA 56
7. P vs. Baladjay, 113 SCRA 284
8. P vs. Araula, 111 SCRA 598
9. Regaspi vs. Castillo, 69 SCRA 160
10. Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247
11. Nepumuceno vs. Secretary,108 SCRA 658
12. Tatad vs. SB, 159 SCRA 70
13. P vs. CFI of Rizal, 161 SCRA 249
14. P vs. Laya, 161 SCRA 327
15. Salcedovs. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811
16. DUTERTE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 289 SCRA 721
18. ANGCHANGCO VS. OMBUDSMAN, 269 SCRA 301

SUMBANG VS. GEN. COURT MARTIAL, G.R. NO. 140188, 337 SCRA 227, AUG. 3, 2000;
BLANCO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 136757 – 58, 346 SCRA 108, NOV. 27, 2000; SOLAR
TEAM ENTERTAINMENT, INC. HON. HOW, G.R. NO. 140863, 338 SCRA 51, AUG. 22, 2000.

Speedy Disposition of Cases.

(i) The determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial depends on the
surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it took about 8 years before the trial of this case was
resumed, such delay did not amount to violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial considering that such
delay was not by attributable to the prosecution.

Factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated:

1. length of delay,
2. reasons for such delay, and
3. assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused and the prejudice
caused by the delay.
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(ii) Speedy Trial Act of 1998. The authority of the Secretary of Justice to review resolutions of his
subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not present an irreconcilable
conflict with the 30-day period prescribed in Sec. 7 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.

8. The right to an impartial trial

Read:

1. P vs. Opida, June 13,1986

1-a. P vs. Tuazon, 159 SCRA 317
2. Olaguer vs. Chief of Staff, May 22, 1987
3. Mateo, Jr. vs. Villaluz,90 SCRA 16
4. P vs. Sendaydiego, 81 SCRA 120
5. Dimacuha vs. Concepcion, 117 SCRA 630

9. Right to a public trial

Read:

1. Garcia vs. Domingo, July 25,1973

2. P vs. Tampus, March 28,1980

10. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation. When the same is considered
waived.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JERRY NAZARENO, G.R. No. 167756, April 8, 2008

THE FACTS:

On March 17, 1999, appellant Jerry Nazareno was indicted for violation of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code in Criminal Case No. 2638 for the alleged rape of BBB, his daughter. The information
reads:

That sometime and between January 1992 up to December 06, 1998, in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force, violence and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and repeatedly made sexual intercourse with his daughter BBB at
the age of 7 through 14 years old against her will.

The Information is worded thus:

That from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon, municipality of
San Andres, Catanduanes, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused, being the
father of the complainant, did then and there willfully, feloniously and criminally repeatedly had sexual
intercourse with her daughter AAA, then five years old up to the time when she was 15-years-old against
her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.229[18]

After trial , the accused was found guilty of qualified rape in both cases. He appealed his conviction
to the Court of Appeals in accordance with the People vs. Mateo Doctrine but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC Decision. Hence, this Petition before the Supreme Court.

I S S U E:

Is the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him violated since the information failed to specify with certainty the approximate date of the
commission of the offenses for rape which is a fatal defect.

H E L D:

229[18]
Records, Vol. II, p. 18.
 49
The argument is specious. An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations
against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. Verily, an accused cannot be convicted
of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Thus, to ensure that the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him is
not violated, the information should state the name of the accused; the designation given to the offense by
the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense; the name of
the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense has been committed. 230[27] Further, it must embody the essential elements of the crime charged
by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and liability of the
accused, so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense.231[28]

However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of
the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense. 232[29] In People v.
Bugayong,233[30] the Court held that when the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense,
the time need not be proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the
offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the
commencement of the action.

In People v. Gianan,234[31] the Court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element
of the said crime as it is defined in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is
the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In accordance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed “at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed,” an information is sufficient.

The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in People v. Salalima235[32] and in People v.
Lizada.236[33]

In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB
transpired “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes.” In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information
averred that “from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of
San Andres, Province of Catanduanes,” AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals
in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

In People v. Garcia,237[34] the Court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape based on an
Information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rapes “from November 1990 up to July 21,
1994.” In People v. Espejon,238[35] the Court found the appellant liable for rape under an information
charging that he perpetrated the offense “sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto” and
“sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto.”

In the case under review, the information in Criminal Case No. 2638 alleged that the rape of BBB
transpired “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998 in Barangay Codon,
Municipality of San Andres, Province of Catanduanes.” In Criminal Case No. 2650, the information
averred that “from sometime in January 1990 up to December 1998 in Barangay Codon, Municipality of
San Andres, Province of Catanduanes,” AAA was raped by appellant. To the mind of the Court, the recitals
in the informations sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

230[27]
People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372, 388 (1998), citing Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Secs. 6 and 8.
231[28]
Id.
232[29]
People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161 (2000); Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11 reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense was committed except
when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its
commission.
233[30]
G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998, 299 SCRA 528.
234[31]
G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 477.
235[32]
G.R. Nos. 137969-71, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 192.
236[33]
G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62.
237[34]
G.R. No. 120093, November 6, 1997, 281 SCRA 463.
238[35]
G.R. No. 134767, February 20, 2002, 377 SCRA 412.
 50
Indeed, this Court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed “before and until October
15, 1994,”239[36] “sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter,” 240[37] and “on or about and sometime
in the year 1988”241[38] constitute sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

More than that, the Court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates in the information is
being raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as
to matter of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 242[39]
Appellant failed to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. He could have moved to
quash the informations or at least for a bill of particulars. He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights
and awakened too late.

Too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the People contending that the
offenses were committed “sometime and between January 1992 up to December 6, 1998” for Criminal
Case No. 2632 and “sometime in January 1990, up to December 1998” in Criminal Case No. 2650. On the
contrary, appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial and alibi as his defenses. Simply put,
he cannot now be heard to complain that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the
recitals in the informations.

REASONS FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO

BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION

DE LA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , G.R. No. 175929, December 16, 2008

It is true that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.243[88] The Constitution uses the word “shall,” hence, the same is mandatory. A
violation of this right prevents the conviction of the accused with the crime charged in the Information.

The constitutional guaranty has a three-fold purpose: First. To furnish the accused with such a
description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; and second, to avail himself
of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and third, to
inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction.244[89]

Read:

1. Sales vs. CA, 164 SCRA 717

1-a. P vs. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653
1-b. P vs. Corral, 157 SCRA 678
1-c. P vs. Resavaga, 159 SCRA 426
1-d. Formilleza vs. SB, 159 SCRA
2. P vs. Labado, 98 SCRA 730
3. Ko Bu Lin vs. CA, 118 SCRA 573
4. P. vs. Cabale, 185 SCRA 140
5. People vs. Regala, April 27, 1982

11. The right to meet witnesses face to face or the right of confrontation

Read:

1. P. vs. Talingdan, Nov. 9, 1990

1-a. P vs. Villaluz, October 20, 1983
2. P vs. Valero, 112 SCRA 661
3. P vs. Bundalian, 117 SCRA 718
4. Talino vs. Sandiganbayan, March 16,1987

239[36]
People v. Bugayong, supra note 30.
240[37]
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999, 319 SCRA 719.
241[38]
People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103 & 143472, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 655.
242[39]
People v. Razonable, 386 Phil. 771, 780 (2000).
243
244
 51
5. P vs. Seneris, 99 SCRA 92
6. Ortigas, JR. vs. Lufthansa, 64 SCRA 610
7. Toledo vs. People, 20 SCRA 54
8. P vs. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388
9. P vs. Santos, 139 SCRA 383
10. Soliman vs. Sandiganbayan, 145 SCRA 640
11. P vs. Lacuna, 87 SCRA 364
12. P vs. Clores, 100 SCRA 227
13. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273
14. Fulgado vs. CA, 182 SCRA 81

12. Trial in absentia

Read:

1. Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 420

2. Nolasco vs. Enrile, 139 SCRA 502
3. P vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163; Note the purpose
of this provision)
4. P vs. Judge Prieto, July 21,1978
5. Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1
6. Carredo vs. People, 183 SCRA 273

13. Right to secure witnesses and production of evidence.

Read:

1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 SCRA 610

2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 SCRA 514