CHAPTER 1

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

(Police Power)

1. YNOT VS IAC, 148 SCRA 659

FACTS:
There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from inter provinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984,
Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in
violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to
be heard or his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court
ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.
HELD:
The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos from one
area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue. Ynot
should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.

2. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL VS. MAYOR OF MANILA, July 31, 1967;

Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of
the due process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or
oppressive but also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right
to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed
form in the lobby in open view;
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old;

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3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax
issue also);
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD:
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in
this case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the
presumption stays. As in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail
over the presumption. Further, the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no
question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only
discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also increases the revenue
of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well.

The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise definition
of due process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the
standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to
free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of
reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the ordinance’s nullity for an
alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It
was not violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is
'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and
for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in
question

3. WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION VS. CITY OF MANILA, January

FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo Lim signed an ordinance prohibiting short
time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses, and similar establishments in
the City of Manila. On December 21, 1992, petitioners (White Light Corporation, Titanium
Corporation, and Sta. Mesa Tourist Development Corporation) filed a motion to intervene
because the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in hotels
and motels in the city. The RTC granted the motion and they noted that the Ordinance “strikes at
the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution”.
Meanwhile, the City maintains that the Ordinance is valid because it is a valid exercise of police
power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) Local Government Code, where they are impowered to

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regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including
tourist guides and transports. They also contended that it is a valid exercise of police power
under the Revised Manila Charter, where the can enact ordinances that it may deem necessary
and proper for sanitation and safety. The CA ruled in favor of the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Ordinance is valid

HELD: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon
individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for
protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights.
Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene
purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the
infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited
group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.

4. CITY OF MANILA VS. JUDGE LAGUI0, 455 SCRA 308

FACTS: On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE
PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING
CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE
ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels
and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light
district harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the
ordinance is invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use
women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only
regulate motels but cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a
valid exercise of Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized
that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.

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The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.

5. JMM Promotions vs CA, 260 SCRA 319

FACTS:
In January 27, 1995 the FEDERATION OF ENTERTAINMENT TALENT MANAGERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES assailed the validity of Department order no 3 issued by the Entertainment
Industry Advisory Council (EIAC):
1. Department Order No. 3-A, providing for additional guidelines on the training, testing,
certification and deployment of performing artists.
2. Department Order No. 3-B, pertaining to the Artist Record Book (ARB) requirement, which
could be processed only after the artist could show proof of academic and skills training and has
passed the required tests.
3. Department Order No. 3-E, providing the minimum salary a performing artist ought to receive
(not less than US$600.00 for those bound for Japan) and the authorized deductions therefrom.
4. Department Order No. 3-F, providing for the guidelines on the issuance and use of the ARB
by returning performing artists who, unlike new artists, shall only undergo a Special Orientation
Program (shorter than the basic program) although they must pass the academic test.
The FETMOP argued that it violated the constitutional right to travel; that it abridged existing
contracts for employment; and deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of
law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was
discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and
property."
Issue:
Whether department order no 3 is constitutional
whether there was a valid exercise of police power

Held:
1. Yes. The department order no 3 was simply created as an attempt to minimize the
subjectivity of the process by defining the minimum skills required from entertainers and
performing artists. As the Solicitor General observed, this should be easily met by experienced
artists possessing merely basic skills. The tests are aimed at segregating real artists or
performers from those passing themselves off as such, eager to accept any available job and
therefore exposing themselves to possible exploitation.
2. Yes. Police power is defined as a public necessity and upon the right of the state and of the
public to self-protection, the issuance of department order no 3 is simply a regulatory standards
for professionals, and to prevent artists from being exploited and abused in their field of work.

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 6. ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil. 1155 (Read also the case of
Rep. Gerardo Espina vs. Exec. Secretary Zamora, September 21,
2010 in relation to the Retail Trade Nationalization Law)

Facts: Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress
enacted Act No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of
the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among
others, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and (2) Prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or
branches of retail business. Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien
residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to
obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all
other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its
provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
● It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty
and property without due process of law.
● The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
● The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s: Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted
principles.

Ruling/s: Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the
Supreme Court saw no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA
1180. The equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection
clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist
for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

7. US VS. TORIBIO 15 Phil. 85

FACTS:
Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating
that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD:

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The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it “is not a taking of the property for public
use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the power of
the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under
the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the community.”

8. VELASCO vs. VILLEGAS, February 13, 1983

Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of barbershops in the City of
Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila,
which prohibited the business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it amounts
to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law.
Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an improper exercise of police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the brief of respondents-
appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to
impose payment of the license fee for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No.
3659 as amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the
business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the
construction of separate rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the general welfare clause. As far
back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision, this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the
significance and scope of such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a
municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by municipal authorities and
has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case been liberally construed by the courts.
Such, it is well to really is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”

9. AGUSTIN VS. EDU, 88 SCRA 195

Agustin is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car. He is assailing the validity of Letter of
Instruction No 229 which requires all motor vehicles to have early warning devices particularly to
equip them with a pair of “reflectorized triangular early warning devices”. Agustin is arguing that
this order is unconstitutional, harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public. Cars are
already equipped with blinking lights which is already enough to provide warning to other
motorists. And that the mandate to compel motorists to buy a set of reflectorized early warning
devices is redundant and would only make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said is EO is valid.
HELD: Such early warning device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive,
for car owners whose cars are already equipped with 1) ‘blinking-lights in the fore and aft of said
motor vehicles,’ 2) ‘battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles,’ 3) ‘built-in reflectorized
tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles,’ or 4) ‘well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps
(the Kinke) . . . because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters,

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any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized rectangular
early warning device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will conclude, without
thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway, or expressway, there
is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which obstructs or endangers passing
traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the aforementioned other built-in warning
devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately get adequate advance warning because he
will still think what that blinking light is all about. Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law
enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist
will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger of collision.

On Police Power
The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision,
as “nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every sovereignty” was
stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Ericta thus: “Justice Laurel, in the first leading
decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, identified police power with
state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus ‘be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state.
Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as ‘the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people.’ The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as ‘that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society.’ In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted
by this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, ‘the
most essential, insistent, and at least illimitable powers,’ extending as Justice Holmes aptly
pointed out ‘to all the great public needs.’ Its scope, ever expanding to meet the exigencies of
the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an
efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits. In the language of Justice Cardozo: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past
may be interwoven in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent
changes with the time.’ The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from
precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon
its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an
individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary
measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.”
It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by Agustin, compounded by the fact that the
particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public safety. It

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would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or executive act of
that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its being non-existent. The
latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the Reflector Law, an enactment
conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found nothing objectionable in a
statute, the purpose of which was: “To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstruction on
roads and streets designated as national roads . . .” As a matter of fact, the first law sought to be
nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National Defense Act, with petitioner
failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative demands of public safety.
Full Case: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1979/feb1979/gr_l_49112_1979.html

10.TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT, 119 SCRA 597

FACTS:
Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 providing for the phasing out
and replacement of old and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years old. Pursuant to OT circular,
respondent Director of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular
formulating a schedule of phase-out of vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as
public conveyances. The Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., Felicisimo Cabigao and Ace
Transportation filed a petition for "Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order", to declare the nullity of Memorandum Circular of
the BOT and Memorandum Circular of the BLT. Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the
circulars on the ground that fixing the ceiling at 6 years is arbitrarily and oppressive because the
road worthiness of taxicabs depends upon their kind of maintenance and the use to which they
are subjected and therefore their actual physical condition should be taken into consideration at
the time of the registration.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the implementation and enforcement of the assailed memorandum circulars
violate the petitioners' constitutional rights to (1) Equal protection of the law; (2) Substantive due
process; and (3) Protection against arbitrary and unreasonable classification and standard.

HELD:
On Procedural and Substantive Due Process: Petitioners cannot justifiably claim that they were
deprived of procedural due process. Neither can they state with certainty that public
respondents had not availed of other sources of inquiry prior to issuing the challenged Circulars
for the Board gave a wide range of choice in gathering necessary information or data in the
formulation of any policy, plan or program. It is not mandatory that it should first call a
conference or require the submission of position papers or other documents from operators or
persons who may be affected, this being only one of the options open to the Board, which is
given wide discretionary authority. Furthermore, as public contend it is impractical to subject
every taxicab to constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the
door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to an vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and
justly. The span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience
shows that by that time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on
investment obtained. They are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and

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comfortable service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift.
With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due
process has been met.

On Equal Protection of the Law: The law being enforced in Metro Manila only and was directed
solely towards the taxi industry does not violate their right to equal protection of the law for the
traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exists so that
infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed. The State, in the
exercise, of its police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society. It may also regulate property rights. In the language of Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the exercise
of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that
their interests are disregarded". In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other
transportation services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause
does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject of the
law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make for real
differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is required under
the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under
identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
Evident then is the conclusion that the questioned Circulars do not suffer from any constitutional
infirmity. To declare a law unconstitutional, the infringement of constitutional right must be clear,
categorical and undeniable. Hence, the Writs prayed for are denied and was dismissed.

11.BAUTISTA VS. JUINIO, 127 SCRA 329

FACTS: Petitioners Mary Concepcion Bautista and Enrique D. Bautista who are "the registered
owners of an eight cylinder 1969 Buick, and the vendees of a six cylinder Willy's kaiser jeep,
which are both classified as heavy or H" are assailing the constitutionality of Letter of
Instruction 869 issued in 1979 which classified vehicles into Heavy and Extra Heavy. The LOI
further banned these vehicles during weekends and holidays that is from 5am Saturday until 5am
Monday. This was in pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 39, issued on June 11, 1979 by
respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, then Minister of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications and respondent Romeo P. Edu, then Commissioner of Land Transportation
Commission, which imposed "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of
registration on owners of the certain vehicles" found violating such Letter of Instruction. As
provided, “For violation of any provisions of this Act or regulations promulgated pursuant
hereto, not hereinbefore specifically punished, a fine of not less than ten nor more than fifty
pesos shall be imposed”.
Purpose of this law is to curb down petroleum consumption as bigger cars consume more
oil. Bautista claimed the LOI to be discriminatory as it made an assumption that H and EH cars

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are heavy on petroleum consumption when in fact there are smaller cars which are also big on oil
consumption. Further, the law restricts their freedom to enjoy their car while others who have
smaller cars may enjoy theirs. Bautista avers that there is no rational justification for the ban
being imposed on vehicles classified as heavy (H) and extra-heavy (EH), for precisely those
owned by them fall within such category.
Petitioners also contends that Memorandum Circular No. 39 issued by herein respondents
imposing penalties of fine, confiscation of the vehicle and cancellation of license of owners of
the above specified vehicles found violating such LOI, is likewise unconstitutional, for being
violative of the doctrine of “undue delegation of legislative power.”

ISSUE: Whether or not Letter of Instruction 869 as implemented by Memorandum Circular No.
39 is violative of certain constitutional rights.

HELD: No, the disputed regulatory measure is an appropriate response to a problem that presses
urgently for solution, wherein its reasonableness is immediately apparent. Thus due process is
not ignored, much less infringed. The exercise of police power may cut into the rights to liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. Those adversely affected may invoke the
equal protection clause only if they can show a factual foundation for its invalidity.

Moreover, since LOI No. 869 and MC No. 39 were adopted pursuant to the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code which contains a specific provision as to penalties, the
imposition of a fine or the suspension of registration under the conditions therein set forth is
valid with the exception of the impounding of a vehicle.

12.Gancayco vs. City Govt. of Quezon City and MMDA, GR No.

177933, October 11, 2011
FACTS:

The consolidated petitions of Retired Justice Emilio Gancayco, City Government of Quezon City and
the Metro Manila Development Authority stemmed from a local ordinance pertaining to Construction
of Arcades, and the clearing of Public Obstructions. Gaycanco owns a property, of which he was
able to obtain a building permit for a two-storey commercial building, which was situated along
EDSA, in an area which was designated as part of a Business/Commercial Zone by the Quezon City
Council. The Quezon City Council also issued Ordinance No. 2904, which orders the construction of
Arcades for Commercial Buildings. The ordinance was amended to not require the properties
located at the Quezon City - San Juan boundary, and commercial buildings from Balete - Seattle
Street to construct the arcades, moreover, Gancayco had been successful in his petition to have his
property, already covered by the amended ordinance, exempted from the ordinance. MMDA on April
28, 2003, sent a notice to Gancayco, under Ordinance no. 2904, part of his property had to be
demolished, if he did not clear that part within 15 days, which Gancayco did not comply with, and so
the MMDA had to demolish the party wall, or “wing walls.” Gancayco then filed a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Quezon City, seeking to

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prohibit the demolition of his property, without due process and just compensation, claiming that
Ordinance no. 2904 was discriminatory and selective. He sought the declaration of nullity of the
ordinance and payment for damages. MMDA contended that Gancayco cannot seek nullification of
an ordinance that he already violated, and that the ordinance had the presumption of
constitutionality, and it was approved by the Quezon City Council, taking to note that the Mayor
signed the ordinance. The RTC, however, declared that the Ordinance was unconstitutional, invalid
and void ab initio. MMDA appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the CA partly granted the appeal,
with the contention that the ordinance was to be modified; it was constitutional because the intention
of the ordinance was to uplift the standard of living, and business in the commercial area, as well as
to protect the welfare of the general public passing by the area, however the injunction against the
enforcement and implementation of the ordinance is lifted. With that decision, the MMDA and
Gancayco filed Motions for Reconsideration, which the CA denied, as both parties have no new
issues raised. Therefore they petitioned to the Court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not MMDA was in their authority to demolish Gancayco’s property as an act of police
power.

HELD:

The MMDA was only to enforce Authoritative power on development of Metro Manila, and was not
supposed to act with Police Power as they were not given the authority to do such by the
constitution, nor was it expressed by the DPWH when the ordinance was enacted. Therefore, MMDA
acted on its own when it illegally demolished Gancayco’s property, and was solely liable for the
damage.

13.ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN

REFORM, 175 SCRA 343
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for
the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian
reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own
directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum
retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full
land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of R.A. No.
6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.

11
FACTS:

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the
grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional
limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the
President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of
the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended
that the taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is not
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President
and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be
taken without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No. 78742, (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary), the Association of Small Landowners
in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The
Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7
hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to
distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till
their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to
belong to a different class.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent
Domain.

RULING:
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that
logically preclude the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. Property
condemned under the police power is noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on
the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the public safety, or obscene materials, which
should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of such property is not
compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.

The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is
concerned. To the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for
landowners, there is an exercise of the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is definitely a

12
taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is imperative. The
taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of
the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner
in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain

14.DECS (Department of Education, Culture and Sports ) VS. SAN

DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533

FACTS: A graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in
Zoology took the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) three times and in those three times
had failed successively and was no longer allowed to take it for the fourth time. However, the
graduate insisted that he can on constitutional grounds. Thus he filed a case in the Regional
Trial Court presided over by Judge Teresita Capulong who granted the petition and was allowed
to take the NMAT again on the ground that he was being deprived of his right to pursue medical
education through an arbitrary exercise of police power. ISSUE: Whether the State had
exercised its Police Power correctly. HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court and cited Tablarin v. Gutierrez which stated that the NMAT is a measure
intended to limit the admission to medical schools only to those who have initially proved their
competence and preparation for medical education. The Supreme Court added that the
government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means of achieving its
stated objective of upgrading the selection of applicants into medical schools and of improving
the quality of medical education in the country. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the
State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients
may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The petition is GRANTED and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court is REVERSED. Police power is validly exercised if a.) Interests of public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class require interference of the State and
b.) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.

15.VILLANUEVA VS. CASTANEDA, September 21, 1987

Facts:
There is in the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street,
a strip of land on which stands a conglomeration of vendors stalls together forming what is
commonly known as a talipapa. Felicidad Villanueva claim that they have a right to remain in
and conduct business in this area by virtue of a previous authorization granted to them by the
municipal government. The respondents deny this and justify the demolition of their stalls as
illegal constructions on public property. At the petitioners' behest, the court has issued a
temporary restraining order to preserve the status quo between the parties pending decision.
This dispute goes back to November 7, 1961, when the municipal council of San Fernando
adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants
and Traders Association to construct permanent stags and sell in the above-mentioned place.

13
The action was protested, where the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Branch 2, issued a
writ of preliminary injunction that prevented the defendants from constructing the said stalls until
final resolution of the controversy. While this case was pending, the municipal council adopted
Resolution G.R. No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the parking place and as the public
plaza of the municipality, thereby impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. Four
years later, Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided the aforesaid case and held that the land occupied
by the petitioners, being public in nature, was beyond the commerce of man and therefore could
not be the subject of private occupancy.
Issue:
Whether the vendors had the right to occupy and make use of the property?
Held:
No. A public plaza is beyond the commerce of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any
other contractual undertaking. The town plaza cannot be used for the construction of market
stalls, especially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance subject to
abatement according to law. Town plazas are properties of public dominion, to be devoted to
public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the common of
man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police
power as delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This authorizes the
municipal council "to enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law,
as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it
by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety,
promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein." This
authority was validly exercised in this case through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of
1964, by the municipal council of San Fernando.

Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively
terminated the agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or
bargained away through the medium of a contract. In fact, every contract affecting the public
interest suffers a congenital infirmity in that it contains an implied reservation of the police power
as a postulate of the existing legal order. This power can be activated at any time to change the
provisions of the contract, or even abrogate it entirely, for the promotion or protection of the
general welfare. Such an act will not militate against the impairment clause, which is subject to
and limited by the paramount police power.

16.PRC vs. De Guzman, et al., June 21, 2004;

FACTS:
After the Professional Regulations Commission (PRC) released the names of successful
examinees in the Medical Licensure Examination, the Board of Medicines observed that the
grades of the 79 Fatima College of Medicine successful examinees were unusually and
exceptionally high in the two most difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., Biochemistry and
Obstetrics and Gynecology.
The Board then issued Resolution No. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all
the examinees from Fatima College of Medicine. The results of those from Fatima were not only

14
incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other compared to other schools. The NBI
Investigation found that the “Fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.”
On July 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the RTC of
Manila to compel the PRC to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on July
21, 1993, the Board of Medicine issued Resolution No. 21 charging the respondents of
immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud, and deceit and recommended that the test results of the
Fatima Examinees be nullified.
On December 19, 1994, the RTC of Manila promulgated its decision ordering the PRC to
allow the respondents to take the physician’s oath and to register them as physicians. The same
was appealed by the PRC to the Court of Appeals which sustained the RTC decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review shall be granted and the decision of the CA be
nullified?

RULING:
“WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, (1) the assailed decision
dated May 16, 2000, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37283, which affirmed the
judgment dated December 19, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, in Civil
Case No. 93-66530, ordering petitioners to administer the physicians oath to herein
respondents as well as the resolution dated August 25, 2000, of the appellate court, denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) the writ of
mandamus, issued in Civil Case No. 93-66530, and affirmed by the appellate court in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37283 is NULLIFIED AND SET ASIDE.”

HELD:
It must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of
an occupation cannot be exercised by the State in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner.
However, the regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with
certain conditions.
But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, their exercise may be
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace,
education, order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to
compel the Board of Medicine to issue licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.
RA 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine,
the qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the
examinations, the grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physician’s license, or revoking a
license that has been issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully
complied with all the conditions and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to
be granted the privilege to practice medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications. The petition is therefore granted.

17.DIDIPIO VS. GOZUN, 485 SCRA 586 (Distinctions between police power
and power of eminent domain and taxation)

15
In 1987, Cory rolled out EO 279 w/c empowered DENR to stipulate with foreign companies when it
comes to either technical or financial large scale exploration or mining. In 1995, Ramos signed into law
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act. In 1994, Ramos already signed an FTAA with Arimco Mining Co, an
Australian company. The FTAA authorized AMC (later CAMC) to explore 37,000 ha of land in Quirino and
N. Vizcaya including Brgy Didipio. After the passage of the law, DENR rolled out its implementing RRs.
Didipio petitioned to have the law and the RR to be annulled as it is unconstitutional and it constitutes
unlawful taking of property. In seeking to nullify Rep. Act No. 7942 and its implementing rules DAO 96-40
as unconstitutional, petitioners set their sight on Section 76 of Rep. Act No. 7942 and Section 107 of DAO
96-40 which they claim allow the unlawful and unjust “taking” of private property for private purpose in
contradiction with Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandating that private property shall
not be taken except for public use and the corresponding payment of just compensation. They assert
that public respondent DENR, through the Mining Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations,
cannot, on its own, permit entry into a private property and allow taking of land without payment of just
compensation.

Traversing petitioners’ assertion, public respondents argue that Section 76 is not a taking provision but a
valid exercise of the police power and by virtue of which, the state may prescribe regulations to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. This
government regulation involves the adjustment of rights for the public good and that this adjustment
curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. Public respondents
concluded that “to require compensation in all such circumstances would compel the government to
regulate by purchase.”

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7942 and the DENR RRs are valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Didipio. The SC noted the requisites of eminent domain. They are;

(1) the expropriator must enter a private property;

(2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period.

(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority;

(4) the property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected;

(5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

In the case at bar, Didipio failed to show that the law is invalid. Indeed there is taking involved but it is
not w/o just compensation. Sec 76 of RA 7942 provides for just compensation as well as section 107 of
the DENR RR. To wit,

Section 76. xxx Provided, that any damage to the property of the surface owner, occupant, or
concessionaire as a consequence of such operations shall be properly compensated as may be provided
for in the implementing rules and regulations.

Section 107. Compensation of the Surface Owner and Occupant- Any damage done to the property of
the surface owners, occupant, or concessionaire thereof as a consequence of the mining operations or

16
as a result of the construction or installation of the infrastructure mentioned in 104 above shall be
properly and justly compensated.

Further, mining is a public policy and the government can invoke eminent domain to exercise entry,
acquisition and use of private lands.

5-a. Not a valid exercise of police power

18.CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759

Facts:
After the seven years of enactment and non-enforcement of Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64,
entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE
MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND
PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides:
Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall
immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of
approval of the application.
The quezon city council passed a resolution which reads: “RESOLVED by the council of Quezon
assembled, to request, as it does hereby request the City Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further
selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City where the owners thereof have failed to
donate the required 6% space intended for paupers burial”.
The city engineer notified the Himalayang Pilipino, Inc. of its enforcement. The Himalayang Pilipino filed
a petition prohibition and madamus with preliminary injuction, declaratory relief, for it is contrary to the
Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code,
which was granted by the Court of First Instance. The city government filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied.
Hence the petition, the petitioner argues that it is a valid and reasonable exercise of police power. On
the other hand, Himalayang Pilipino argues that the taking or confiscation of property is obvious because
the questioned ordinance permanently restricts the use of the property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. Himalayang Pilipino
also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the taking of the
property in this case because it refers to "the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property." The respondent points out that if an owner is deprived of his
property outright under the State's police power, the property is generally not taken for public use but is
urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare. The respondent cites the
case of a nuisance per se or the destruction of a house to prevent the spread of a conflagration.
Issue: whether section 9, ordinance 6118, s-64, is a valid exercise of police power?
Ruling:
No, We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the
bill of rights is the provision which states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).

17
On the other hand, there are three inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with
the property rights, namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation. These are said to exist
independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty.
Police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and
regulating the use of liberty and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and
enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it is not taken for public
use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
The police power being the most active power of the government and the due process clause being the
broadest station on governmental power, the conflict between this power of government and the due
process clause of the Constitution is oftentimes inevitable.
It will be seen from the foregoing authorities that police power is usually exercised in the form of mere
regulation or restriction in the use of liberty or property for the promotion of the general welfare. It does
not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a
necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and
order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms.
It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of an
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city
passes the burden to private cemeteries.

19.DELA CRUZ VS. PARRS, 123 SCRA 569

FACTS: Vicente De La Cruz et al were club & cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz contended that the said Ordinance violates
their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to go
out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against
Ordinance 84 after due hearing declaring that Ordinance No. 84 is constitutional for it is
pursuant to RA 938 which reads “AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS
AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE ESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN
THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTIONS”. Paras ruled that the prohibition
is a valid exercise of police power to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed
citing that they were deprived of due process.

18
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ordinance No. 84 which is
further in pursuant to RA 938.

HELD: The SC ruled against Paras. If night clubs were merely then regulated and not
prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had
stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
municipal corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It
cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could
qualify under the term reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy
and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a
field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by over breadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than
by an absolute prohibition. Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and
can only regulate not prohibit the business of cabarets.
The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15,
1976 reversed, set aside, and nulled. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of the
Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional. The temporary restraining
order issued by the Court is made permanent.

CHAPTER II
DUE PROCESS

● Requisites of "judicial due process"

20.BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA 37 Phil 921

Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his
debt. His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe.
Due to the failure of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to
mortgage Engracio’s property. Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died.
Since Engracio is a non resident El Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by
means of publication using a newspaper. The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to
furnish Engracio a copy and that it’d be sent to Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El
Banco petition to execute Engracio’s property. 7 years thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of
Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the ruling. Vicente averred that
there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process
had been met. The requisites are;

19
 ● There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
decide the matter before it.
● Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property subject of the proceedings.
● The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
● Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

21.SENATOR JINGGOY ESTRADA VS. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, January 21, 2015

Facts:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2)
criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co- respondents
in the two complaints filed their counter-a davits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-A
davits of the Other Respondents, A davit of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”).
Sen. Estrada’s request was made pursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the
evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b],
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c],
Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).” The Ombudsman denied
Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.

Issue:
What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

Held:
First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his
Request. Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is
only for the determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of
guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of
the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such
as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the
rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural
law. Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules. Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary
investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark
doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is
greater than the evidence needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or
to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case.
Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs
“only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.”

20
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause
in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where
rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which
cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as
substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence.

22.Jessica Lucila Reyes vs. Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, March 5, 2016

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the
anomalous Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) scam, involving, as
reported15 by whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula (Sula), and Merlina Suñas
(Suñas), the illegal utilization and pillaging of public funds sourced from the PDAF of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) for the years 2004 to 2010, in the total
amount of P172,834,500.00.

(a) Reyes, as Chief of Staff of Senator Enrile during the times material to this case, for
fraudulently processing the release of Senator Enrile's illegal PDAF disbursements
(b) Janet Napoles, as the alleged mastermind of the entire PDAF scam, for facilitating
the illegal utilization, diversion, and disbursement of Senator Enrile's PDAF
(c) the Napoles siblings,as high ranking officers of the JLN Corporation,for continuously
diverting the sums sourced from Senator Enrile's PDAF to Janet Napoles's control
(d) De Asis, as Janet Napoles's driver, body guard, or messenger,for assisting in the
fraudulent releases of the PDAF funds to the JLN-controlled NGOs and eventually
remitting the funds to Janet Napoles's control

All petitioners denied their alleged part in the PDAF scam. While preliminary
investigation proceedings were ongoing before the Ombudsman, Tuason, who was
likewise charged under OMB-C-C-13-0318 and OMB-C-C-13-0396, surfaced as an
additional witness and offered her affidavit implicating Reyes in the PDAF scam. This
prompted Reyes to file before the Ombudsman an Omnibus Motion, requesting that: (a)
she be furnished copies of: (1) Tuason's affidavit, which supposedly contained vital
information that was described by Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima as
"slam dunk evidence"; (2) the transcript of the alleged 12-hour clarificatory hearing on
February 11, 2014 where Tuason was said to have substantiated the allegations in her
affidavit; and (3) the additional documents the latter submitted thereat; and (b) she be
given a period of time to comment on Tuason's affidavit or to file a supplemental
counter-affidavit, if deemed necessary. On even date, the Ombudsman denied Reyes's
Omnibus Motion on the ground that "there is no provision under [the said office's Rules

21
of Procedure] which entitles [Reyes] to be furnished filings by the other parties,
including the other respondents.

The following day, the Ombudsman issued the assailed 144-page Joint Resolution82 dated March 28,
2014 finding probable cause against, inter alia, Reyes, Janet Napoles, and De Asis of one (1) count
of Plunder, and against Reyes, Janet Napoles, De Asis, and the Napoles siblings for fifteen (15)
counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Accordingly, separate motions for reconsideration
were timely filed by Reyes,83 Janet Napoles,84 the Napoles siblings,85 and De Asis.86

Due to reports that Tuason was officially declared a state witness and granted immunity from criminal
prosecution for the PDAF scam-related cases, Reyes wrote a letter dated May 7, 2014 to the
Ombudsman, requesting a copy of the immunity agreement that it entered into with Tuason. Again,
the Ombudsman denied Reyes's request for the reason that the immunity agreement is a "privileged
communication which is considered confidential under Section 3, Rule IV of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing [RA] 6713," otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees."102

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue in this case is whether or not the Ombudsman and/or the Sandiganbayan committed
any grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions ultimately finding probable cause
against petitioners for the charges against them.

HELD:
The petitions are bereft of merit.
[This Court's consistent policy has been to maintain non-interference in the determination of the
Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of
such discretion. This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and
prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality
as well. Otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with

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regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
flscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.
In assessing if the Ombudsman had committed grave abuse of discretion, attention must be drawn to
the context of its ruling - that, is: preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of
discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and
that the person charged should be held responsible for it.148 Being merely based on opinion and
belief, "a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient
evidence to secure a conviction.[p]robable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has
been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean 'actual or positive
cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief.
Probable cause does riot require an inquiry x x x whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged.

Finally, no grave abuse of discretion may be imputed on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying
Reyes's motion to suspend proceedings against her in view of her filing of a petition for certiorari
questioning the Ombudsman's issuances before the Court, i.e., G.R. Nos. 212593-94. Under Section
7, Rule 65262 of the Rules of Court, a mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari in relation
to a case pending before the court a quo does not ipso facto stay the proceedings therein, unless the
higher court issues a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the
conduct of such proceedings. Otherwise stated, a petition for certiorari does not divest the lower
courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. Unlike an appeal, a petition
for certiorari is an original action; it is not a continuation of the proceedings in the lower court. It is
designed to correct only errors of jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. Thus, under Section 7 of Rule 65, the higher court should issue against the
public respondent a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in order to interrupt
the course of the principal case. The petitioner in a Rule 65 petition has the burden of proof to show
that there is a meritorious ground for the issuance of an injunctive writ or order to suspend the

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proceedings before the public respondent. She should show the existence of an, urgent necessity for
the writ or order, so that serious damage may be prevented.263 In this case, since the Court did not
issue any temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction in G.R. Nos. 212593-94,
then the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted for continuing with the proceedings before it.

Hence, overall, the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion in judicially determining the
existence of probable cause against Reyes and the Napoles siblings; and in denying Reyes's Urgent
Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Perforce, the dismissal of G.R. Nos. 213163-78 and G.R. Nos.
215880-94 is in order

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Resolutions
and Orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan are hereby AFFIRMED.

23.UYBOCO VS PEOPLE. G.R. No. 211703, December 10, 2014

Petitioner asserts that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the existence of a conspiracy and in
convicting him in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt of such conspiracy. More importantly,
petitioner finds fault in the Sandiganbayan's denial of his Motion to Reconsider the Decision of this
Honorable Court (Promulgated on January 9, 2014) with a Plea to Re-Open the Proceedings dated
January 22, 2014. In his motion, petitioner prayed for the reopening of the proceedings on the ground
that his constitutional rights to due process and to competent counsel were violated when his former
counsel, due to blatant error, abuse of discretion, and gross incompetence, did not present any evidence
in his defense, causing serious prejudice to him.
According to petitioner, he was "accorded grossly insufficient legal assistance by his former lawyer" who
informed him that "there was no necessity for a preliminary investigation and to present any evidence."
His former counsel also "failed to cross examine the main prosecution witness because said counsel was
inexplicably absent on the trial date" and even "failed to prepare and file a memorandum" and "merely
relied on the defense presented by the lawyers of co-accused Valencia and Maramot by adopting the
defenses of the other accused and all their pleadings and manifestations, even when these were clearly
not applicable to petitioner’s defense." Thus, petitioner avers that his constitutional rights to procedural
and substantive due process and of law and to competent counsel were violated.

Issue: Whether or not there is an absence of due process?

Ruling:
No. In the present case, the Sandiganbayancorrectly denied petitioner’s motion to re-open the
proceedings on the ground of violation of his due process, to wit:

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In the same vein, accused-movant Uyboco’s clear admission that "he had been given the opportunity to
present his evidence" and despite said opportunity, he and his counsel decided/opted not to present any
evidence for his defense, as shown by their written Manifestatio ndated November 20, 2012, that "after
earnest assessment and evaluation, the accused EDELBERT C. UYBOCO has deemed it unnecessary to
present further evidence in his defense, thus he is waiving his right to present further testimonial and
documentary evidence," militates against his claim of miscarriage of justice, and hence, his motion to
reopen proceedings must likewise fail. Accused-movant Uyboco cannot attribute any serious
misjudgment or fault or gross incompetence on his counsel aloneas the decision not to present further
evidence in his defense bears his conformity as shown by his signature in the said manifestation.18
The Office of the Special Prosecutor correctly pointed out that petitioner was given an opportunity tobe
heard during trial.1âwphi1 This opportunity to be heard is the essence of due process. While petitioner
claims that he was incorrectly advised by his former counsel that the presentation of evidence is no
longer necessary, this unfortunate mistake cannot qualify as gross negligence or incompetence that
would necessitate a reopening of the proceedings. In fact, not once did petitioner refute, or at the very
least, address the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he had expressly consented to the waiver of the
presentation of evidence by affixing his signature as conformity to the manifestation submitted by his
former counsel.
Petitioner also erroneously claims that his former counsel "failed to prepare and file a memorandum for
him" since the records show that petitioner’s former counsel had belatedly filed a memorandum on his
behalf, which the Sandiganbayan had admitted in the interest of justice

24.ALEJANDRO ALMENDRAS VS. ALEXIS ALMENDRAS, G.R. No 179491,

January 14, 2015

FACTS:
Alejandro C. Almendras sent letters to house speaker Jose De Venecia Jr. and Dr. Nemesio Prudente ,
President of Oil Carriers, Inc. These letters were allegedly printed , distributed, circulated and published
by Alejandro Almendras Jr. in Davao Del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and manifest malice
to destroy Alexis Almendras’ good name. Hence, the latter filed and action for damages arising from
libel and defamation against petitioner in RTC, Digos City.
RTC granted the complaint, awarding Alexis P5 m as noral damages P100T as exemplary damages, P10T
for litigation expenses and attorney’s fees in the amount of 25% of whatever amounts actually received
by plaintiff for judgment. After the denial of Motion for Reconsideration and/ or new trial, the case was
elevated to CA. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is deprived of due process
HELD:
Petitioner was give several opportunities to present his evidence or to clarify his medical constraints in
court, but he did not do so, despite knowing fully well that he had pending case in court. In keeping the
normal course of events, he should have taken the initiative “of making proper inquiries from his counsel
and the trial court as to the status of his case”. For his failure to do so, he has only himself to blame. The
court cannot allow petitioner the exception to the general rule just because his counsel admitted having
no knowledge of his medical condition. To do so will sit a dangerous precedent of never ending suits, so

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long as lawyers could allege their own fault or negligence to support the client’s case and obtain
remedies and reliefs already lost by the operation of law.

25.MALIKSI VS. COMELEC, March 12, 2013 and

During the 2010 Elections, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Saquilayan the winner
for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate who garnered the second
highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus,
Cavite alleging that there were irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts.
Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the results of the revision,
declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist
from performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the
meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi’s motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was
then installed as Mayor.

In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties,
decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of the ballot images from the CF
cards. Thus, it issued an order dated March 28, 2012 requiring Saquilayan to deposit the
amount necessary to defray the expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images.
Later, it issued another order dated April 17, 2012 for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

On August 15, 2012, the First Division issued a resolution nullifying the RTC’s decision and
declaring Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.

Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due
process because he had not been notified of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the
resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had been
unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been
preserved.

On September 14, 2012, the COMELEC En Banc resolved to deny Maliksi’s motion for
reconsideration.

Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the
decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images without prior notice to him, and to
the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by the First
Division.

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 In the decision promulgated on March 12, 2013, the Court, by a vote of 8-7, dismissed Maliksi’s
petition for certiorari. The Court concluded that Maliksi had not been denied due process
because: (a) he had received notices of the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot
images by the First Division — referring to the orders of the First Division directing Saquilayan to
post and augment the cash deposits for the decryption and printing of the ballot images; and
(b) he had been able to raise his objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration.
The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its discretion in deciding to use
the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images
were not secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value
as the official ballots under the Rule on Electronic Evidence; and that the First Division’s finding
that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully established by the large
number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.

Hence, Maliksi filed the petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: W/O Maliksi was deprived of due process when the COMELEC First Division ordered on
appeal the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images in the CF cards.

HELD: The petition was dismissed. Maliksi alleged that he was denied due process when the
COMELEC First Division directed the decryption, printing, and examination of the ballot images
in the CF cards for the first time on appeal without notice to him, thus depriving him of his right
to be present and observe the decryption proceedings.

The records also showed that Maliksi was aware of the decryption, printing, and examination of
the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. The COMELEC First Division issued an Order
dated 28 March 2012 directing Saquilayan to deposit the required amount for expenses for the
supplies, honoraria, and fee for the decryption of the CF cards, and a copy of the Order was
personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. Maliksi’s counsel was likewise given a copy of
Saquilayan’s Manifestation of Compliance with the 28 March 2012 Order. In an Order dated 17
April 2012, the COMELEC First Division directed Saquilayan to deposit an additional amount for
expenses for the printing of additional ballot images from four clustered precincts, and a copy of
the Order was again personally delivered to Maliksi’s counsel. The decryption took weeks to
finish.

Clearly, Maliksi was not denied due process. He received notices of the decryption, printing, and
examination of the ballot images by the COMELEC First Division. In addition, Maliksi raised his
objections to the decryption in his motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.
The Court has ruled:

x x x. The essence of due process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain one’s

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side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal
or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the
controversy at hand. x x x.

There is no denial of due process where there is opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings. It is settled that “opportunity to be heard” does not only mean oral
arguments in court but also written arguments through pleadings. Thus, the fact that a party
was heard on his motion for reconsideration negates any violation of the right to due process.
The Court has ruled that denial of due process cannot be invoked where a party was given the
chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.

MALIKSI VS. COMELEC

April 11, 2013

In Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration he argued that the Supreme Court en
banc gravely erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation of petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and examination
of the digital images of the ballots, which is the basis for the assailed 14 September 2012
resolution of the public respondent, which in turn affirmed the 15 August 2012 resolution of the
COMELEC First Division, were done inconspicuously upon a motu proprio directive of the
COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner, and for the first time on appeal.

HELD: The Court grants Maliksi’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, and reverses the
decision promulgated on March 12, 2013 on the ground that the First Division of the COMELEC
denied to him the right to due process by failing to give due notice on the decryption and
printing of the ballot images. Consequently, the Court annuls the recount proceedings
conducted by the First Division with the use of the printouts of the ballot images.

It bears stressing at the outset that the First Division should not have conducted the assailed
recount proceedings because it was then exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing
rule of procedure allowed it to conduct a recount in the first instance. The recount proceedings
authorized under Section 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804, as amended, are to be
conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction
over all election protests involving elective regional (the autonomous regions), provincial and
city officials.

As we see it, the First Division arbitrarily arrogated unto itself the conduct of the recount
proceedings, contrary to the regular procedure of remanding the protest to the RTC and
directing the reconstitution of the Revision Committee for the decryption and printing of the
picture images and the revision of the ballots on the basis thereof. Quite unexpectedly, the

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 COMELEC En Banc upheld the First Division’s unwarranted deviation from the standard
procedures by invoking the COMELEC’s power to “take such measures as [the Presiding
Commissioner] may deem proper,” and even citing the Court’s minute resolution in Alliance of
Barangay Concerns (ABC) Party-List v. Commission on Elections5 to the effect that the
“COMELEC has the power to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its
cases. The Court will not interfere with its exercise of this prerogative so long as the parties are
amply heard on their opposing claims.”

Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on

Elections, the power of the COMELEC to adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy
resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the opportunity
to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties’ right to be heard upon adversarial issues and
matters is never to be waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility
of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the parties, or to any of them. Thus, the
COMELEC En Banc should not
have upheld the First Division’s deviation from the regular procedure in the guise of speedily
resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.

26.MALIKSI VS. COMELEC, April 13, 2013

During the 2010 elections, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed Homer T. Saquilayan
as the winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Emmanuel L. Maliksi, the candidate who
garnered the second highest number of votes, filed an electoral protest citing that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. The RTC held a revision of the
ballots, and granted Maliksi's motion for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then
installed as Mayor.

In resolving the appeal, the COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties,
decided to recount the ballots through the use of the print outs of the ballot images from the CF
card. It issued an order requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the
expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. It issued another order for
Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

On August 15, 2012, the COMELEC First Division issued a resolution nullifying the decision
of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor. Maliksi filed a motion for
reconsideration assailing that he was denied due process when the First Division did not notify
him of the decryption procedure which was later on denied by the COMELEC En Banc. He
came to Court and filed a petition for certiorari which was resolved by the Court on March 12,
2013, denying his petition by a vote of 8-7. He now files this urgent motion for reconsideration
on the grounds that his right to due process was violated.

ISSUE : Whether or not there is a violation of due process in the conduct of the recount.

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HELD : Yes. The First Division of COMELEC erroneously conducted the recount as it was
exercising appellate jurisdiction as to which no existing rule of procedure allowed it to conduct it
in the first place. The recount proceedings authorized under Sec. 6, Rule 15 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8804 (as amended), are to be conducted by the COMELEC Divisions only in the
exercise of their exclusive original jurisdiction over all election protests involving elective
regional, provincial, and city officials.

Further, Section 6, Rule 10 of the 2010 Rules of Procedure for Municipal Election
Contests provides that the Revision/Recount Committee has to determine the integrity of the
ballots and finds it not preserved before it can order its decryption. It is further supplemented by
a rule where the recount proceedings should be done in the presence of the parties involved
and to be represented. The reason for this is that the recount proceeding is the only time where
the parties are allowed to be represented and allows them to timely raise their objections..
Moreover, whenever the Recount Committee finds a tampering or the ballots are made
unreliable, the parties are afforded to be informed immediately.

Maliksi's right to be informed of the decision cannot be shrugged by asserting the fact that he
was allowed to file a motion for consideration. In the first place, the motion was only directed
against the entirety of the First Division. The claim of due process was directed on the recount
procedures made by the First Division that resulted in the prejudicial result against him. Further,
the First Division did not give Maliksi any written notice which deprived him of any chance to
seek reconsideration on their procedure or even to assail the irregularity of it.

The order of the First Division requiring Saquilayan to post and augment cash deposits
cannot be construed as sufficient notice to Maliksi. It did not meet the requirements of due
process because it did not specifically inform Maliksi that the ballots were found to be tampered.
Nor did it offer factual bases in finding of tampering. To leave Maliksi to surmise on the factual
bases for finding the need to print the picture images still violated the principle of fair play,
because such responsibility is firmly rested upon the shoulders of the First Division. It is proper
to say that “the end does not justifies

● Read also:
27. IMELDA MARCOS VS SANDIGANBAYAN October 6, 1998

FACTS:
Imelda was charged together with Jose Dans for Graft & Corruption for a dubious transaction
done in 1984 while they were officers transacting business with the Light Railway Transit. The
case was raffled to the 1st Division of the Sandiganbayan. The division was headed by Justice
Garchitorena with Justice Balajadia and Justice Atienza as associate justices. No decision was
reached by the division by reason of Atienza’s dissent in favor of Imelda’s innocence.
Garchitorena then summoned a special division of the Sandiganbayan to include Justices
Amores and Cipriano as additional members. Amores then asked Garchitorena to be given 15

30
days to send in his manifestation. On the date of Amores’ request, Garchitorena received
manifestation from J. Balajadia stating that he agrees with J. Rosario who further agrees with J.
Atienza. Garchitorena then issued a special order to immediately dissolve the special division
and have the issue be raised to the Sandiganbayan en banc for it would already be pointless to
wait for Amores’ manifestation granted that a majority has already decided on Imelda’s favor.
The Sandiganbayan en banc ruled against Imelda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not due process has been observed.

HELD:
The SC ruled that the ruling of the Sandiganbayan is bereft of merit as there was no strong
showing of Imelda’s guilt. The SC further emphasized that Imelda was deprived of due process
by reason of Garchitorena not waiting for Amores’ manifestation. Such procedural flaws
committed by respondent Sandiganbayan are fatal to the validity of its ”decision” convicting
petitioner. Garchitorena had already created the Special Division of five (5) justices in view of
the lack of unanimity of the three (3) justices in the First Division. At that stage, petitioner had a
vested right to be heard by the five (5) justices, especially the new justices in the persons of
Justices Amores and del Rosario who may have a different view of the cases against her. At
that point, Presiding Justice Garchitorena and Justice Balajadia may change their mind and
agree with the original opinion of Justice Atienza but the turnaround cannot deprive petitioner of
her vested right to the opinion of Justices Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice
del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal, unscheduled meeting in the
unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law. But
what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given,
Presiding Justice Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

28. DELGADO VS. CA, November 10, 1986

Emma R. Delgado, herein petitioner, together with Gloria C. Tortona, Celia Capistrano and
Catalino Bautista was charged with estafa thru falsification of public and/or official documents
resulting in deceiving one Erlinda Rueda, a Medical Technologist, in arranging her travel to the
United States.
Emma R. Delgado was assisted and represented by her counsel de parte, Atty. Lamberto G.
Yco. the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence, Atty. Yco failed to appear
despite proper and previous notice. Instead, he sent a telegram requesting for postponement on
the ground that he was sick. However, no medical certificate was however submitted. The court
was not impressed with such actuation and had considered the same as Delgado’s waiver of
her right to trial. The lower court convicted her and the others. She appealed before the CA and
the CA sustained the lower court’s rule.
On May 27, 1977, petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration of the Order denying her
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Judgments, etc., invoking as one of the grounds therein, the newly
discovered fact that petitioner came to know for the first time only on May 19, 1977 that Atty.

31
Lamberto G. Yco is not a member of the Philippine Bar. Petitioner prayed that she be granted a
new trial on the ground that she was deprived of her right to be defended by competent counsel.

Issue: Whether or not due process was observed.

Resolution:
The main thrust of petitioner's arguments is that she is entitled to a new trial and therefore, all
the assailed orders of respondent courts should be vacated and set aside, because her
"lawyer," Atty. Lamberto G. Yco, is not a lawyer.
We find the petition impressed with merit
This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a member of the bar in a
criminal case filed against her before the Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a
lawyer, there is great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court proceedings. This would
certainly be a denial of due process.

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