Severino M. Manotok IV, Froilan M. Manotoc, Fernando M. Manotok, et. Al.

, represented by their Attorney-in-

fact, Rosa R. Manotok vs. Heirs of Homer L. Barque, represented by Teresita Barque Hernandez

[G.R. Nos. 162335 & 162605. December 12, 2005.]

Facts:

Respondent’s as the surviving heirs of the late Homer Barque, filed a petition with the LRA for
administrative reconstitution of the original copy of TCT No. 210177 issued in the name of Homer Barque which
was destroyed in a fire. In support of the petition, petitioners submitted the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No.
210177, tax receipts, and tax declarations and the Plan covering the property. Upon being notified of the
petition,petitioners filed their opposition claiming that the lot under the title of Barque forms part of their land
and that the TCT in the name of Barque was spurious. Atty. Benjamin Bustos, as reconstituting officer, denied the
petition on the grounds that:

a. The lots covered by TCT No. 210177 appear to duplicate the Lot of Piedad Estate covered by TCT No.
372302 registered under the name of Severino Manotok
b. The submitted plan is a spurious document

Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied hence they appealed to the LRA. The LRA ruled that
Atty. Bustos should not have required the submission of other documents other than the owner’s duplicate copy
as bass in denying the petition and that based on the documents presented, petitioners established that their TCT
was, at the time of the destruction, was valid, genuine, authentic, and effective. It is also noteworthy that the
technical description covered by TCT No. 210177 conforms to the description of the lot covered by TCT No.
372302. It therefore becomes evident that the existence of TCT No. 210177 was established irrefutably by the
petitioners and that the recounstruction must be given due course. The LRA ruled that the reconstitution of TCT
No. 210177 be given due course upon the cancellation of the TCT of Manotok upon order of the RTC.

Petitioner’s filed a motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the respondents. Bother their
motions were denied. Respondents filed a petition for review with the CA praying that the LRA be directed
immediately to reconstitute their TCT. Petitioners also filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA dismissed the
petition of respondents. Respondents moved for reconsideration which was reconsidered by the CA.

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. In so ruling, the Third Division of the
Court of Appeals declared that the LRA correctly deferred in giving due course to the petition for
reconstitution since there is yet no final judgment upholding or annulling respondents' title. From the
foregoing decisions of the Court of Appeals, petitioners filed separate petitions for review before this
Court docketed as G.R. No. 162605 and G.R. No. 162335, respectively. Both petitions were consolidated.

Issue:

a. WON the LRA has no authority to annul their title

b. WON the reconstituition of Respondent’s Title would be a collateral attack on petitioner’s existing
title
c. WON they were not given the opportunity to be heard, specifically the chance to defend the
validity of their Torrens title
d. the Court of Appeals, in resolving the appeal from the LRA, has no jurisdiction to order the
cancellation of petitioners' title
Ruling:

The petitions must be denied.

The LRA properly ruled that the reconstituting officer should have confined himself to the owner's
duplicate certificate of title prior to the reconstitution. When respondents filed the petition for
reconstitution, they submitted in support thereof the owner's duplicate certificate of title, real estate tax
receipts and tax declaration. Plainly, the same should have more than sufficed as sources for the
reconstitution. Since respondents' source of reconstitution is the owner's duplicate certificate of title,
there is no need for the reconstituting officer to require the submission of the plan, much less deny the
petition on the ground that the submitted plan appears to be spurious.

The factual finding of the LRA that respondents' title is authentic, genuine, valid, and existing,
while petitioners' title is sham and spurious, as affirmed by the two divisions of the Court of Appeals, is
conclusive before this Court. It should remain undisturbed since only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

There is no basis in the allegation that petitioners were deprived of "their property" without due
process of law when the Court of Appeals ordered the cancellation of their Torrens title, even without a
direct proceeding in the RTC. As already discussed, there is no need to remand the case to the RTC for a
re-determination on the validity of the titles of respondents and petitioners as the same has been
squarely passed upon by the LRA and affirmed by the appellate court. By opposing the petition for
reconstitution and submitting their administratively reconstituted title, petitioners acquiesced to the
authority and jurisdiction of the reconstituting officer, the LRA and the Court of Appeals, and recognized
their authority to pass judgment on their title. All the evidence presented was duly considered by these
tribunals. There is thus no basis to petitioners' claim that they were deprived of their right to be heard
and present evidence, which is the essence of due process.

The reconstitution would not constitute a collateral attack on petitioners' title which was
irregularly and illegally issued in the first place. In this case, petitioner anchors her arguments on the
premise that her title to the subject property is indefeasible because of the presumption that her
certificate of title is authentic. However, this presumption is overcome by the evidence presented,
consisting of the LRA report . . . that TCT No. T-320601 was issued without legal basis

Thus, petitioner cannot invoke the indefeasibility of her certificate of title. It bears emphasis that
the Torrens system does not create or vest title but only confirms and records one already existing and
vested. Thus, while it may be true, as petitioner argues, that a land registration court has no jurisdiction
over parcels of land already covered by a certificate of title, it is equally true that this rule applies only
where there exists no serious controversy as to the authenticity of the certificate.