Bureau of Customs v.

Sherman
Facts:
 Mark Sensing Philippines (MPSI) caused the importation of 255,870,000 pieces of finished bet
slips and 205,200 rolls of finished thermal papers
 MSPI facilitated the release of the shipment from the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ), where
it was brought, to the PCSO for its lotto operations in Luzon
 MPSI did not pay duties or taxes prompting the Bureau of Customs to file, under it Run After the
Smugglers Program (RATS), a criminal complaint before the DOJ for violation of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines
 State Prosecutor Rohaira Lao-Tamano found probable cause against respondents and accordingly
recommended the filing of an information against them
 Respondents filed a petition for review before the SoJ during the pendency of which the
information was filed before the CTA
 The SoJ then reversed the State Prosecutor’s resolution and accordingly directed the withdrawal of
the Information
 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. They elevated the case by certiorari before the
CA
 In the meantime, Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA, a Motion to Withdraw Information
with Leave of Court to which petitioner filed an Opposition. Respondents, on their part, moved for
the dismissal of the Information
 The CTA granted the withdrawal of, and accordingly dismissed the Information
 Petitioner filed an MR with the CTA. This was “Noted Without Action” by the CTA
o Entry of judgment was already issued; no MR of the Resolution having been filed by State
Prosecutor Lao-Tamano
 Hence the present petition for certiorari

Issue: Whether CTA erred when it noted without action the MR filed by the petitioners—No

Held:
 Prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government whose
principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to
this power is the right to prosecute violators
 All criminal action commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the
direction and control of PUBLIC PROSECUTORS
o In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public service sometimes
require the designation of special prosecutors from different government agencies
TO ASSIST the public prosecutor
o The designation does NOT detract from the public prosecutor having control and
supervision over the case
 In the case at bar…
o The CTA noted without action petitioner’s MR because entry of judgment having been
made, no Motion of Execution was filed by the State Prosecutor
o By merely noting without action petitioner’s MR, the CTA did not gravely abuse its discretion
  A public prosecutor has control and supervision over the cases. The
participation of a private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to that of a
witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case
o Petitioner is not represented by the OSG. The OSG represents the Government
o Overall, petitioner’s MR of the challenged CTA Resolution did not bear imprimatur of the
public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution belongs

Asilo v. People
Facts:
 Private respondent Visitacion’s late mother, Marciana Vda. De Coronado and the Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Lagina enterd into a lease contract, whereby the Municipality allowed the use and
enjoyment of property comprising of a lot and a store located at the corner of Coronado and E.
Fernandez Sts. in favor of respondent’s mother for a period of 20 years, extendible for another 20
years
 The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented
property, which must at least be as high as the store, and in case of modification of the public
market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights
 Visitacion took over the store when her mother died. Visitacion secured the yearly Mayor’s
permits
 A fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection, Engineer
Gosorspe found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong
 This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the Municipality. Nonetheless, the store
of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire
 Visitacion received a letter from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store witihin 5
days from notice. Attached to the letter was a copy of Sangguinang Bayan Resolution no. 156:
o Authorized the Mayor to file an Unlawful Detainer case with damages for the expenses
incurred due to the delay in the completion of the project if the Coronado’s continuously
resists the order
 VIsitaction wrote a reply letter:
o The lease contract was still existing and legally binding
o She was willing to vacate the store as long as the same place and area would be given to
her in the new public market
o In case her proposals are not acceptable, the Mayor should file an unlawful detainer case
against her
 The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor sent a letter to Visitacion ordering her to vacate the portion of the
public market she was occupying within 15 days from her receipt of the letter, else, a court action
will be filed against her
 The Sangguniang Bayan issued Resolution no. 183 authorizing Mayor Comendador to demolish
the store being occupied by Visitacion using legal means
 Asilo, the municipal administrator, sent a letter to Visitacion informing her of the impending
demolition of her store the next day
o Visitacion replied that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court
order and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only
the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her
 The Mayor, relying on the strength of Sangguniang Resolutions nos. 183 and 156 authorized the
demolition of the store with Asilo and Angeles supervising the work
 Engineer Cabrega, a licensed civil engineer, estimated the cost of the demolished property as
amounting to P437,900
 Visitacion, together with her husband Cesar Bombasi (Spouses Bombasi) filed with the RTC a
Civil Case for damages with preliminary injunction against the Municipalitu, the Mayor, Asilo and
Angeles
 Thereafter, Spouses Bombasi filed a criminal complaint, against the Mayor, Asilo and Angeles for
violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. All the accused entered their separate pleas of not guilty
 The SB promulgated a Resolution ordering the consolidation of the Civil Case and the Criminal
Case pending before it, pursuant to Sec. 4 of PD 1606:
o “x x x that where the civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein
has not yet been rendered and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan
or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned”
 During the pendency of the case, Angeles died. Accordingly the counsel of Angeles filed a
motion to drop accused Angeles. The SB issued an order DISMISSING the case against
Angeles
 The death of the Mayor followed. As a result, the counsel of the late Mayor filed a
Manifestation before the SB informing the court of the fact of the Mayor’s death
 The SB rendered a decision finding all the accused GUILTY
 Asilo, through his counsel, filed an MR alleging that there was only an error of judgment when
complied with and implemented the order of his superior, the Mayor
o He alleged that there is no liability when a public officer commits in good faith an error of
judgment
 The SB denied the MR
o Good faith cannot be argued to support his cause in the face of the court’s finding that bad
faith attended the commission of the offense charged
o The invocation of compliance with an order of a superior is of no moment for the “demolition
order cannot be described as having the semblance of legality—it was issued without
authority and therefore the same was patently illegal
 The counsel for the Mayor also filed an MR alleging that the death of the late Mayor had totally
extinguished both his criminal and civil liability
 The SB granted the motion insofar as the extinction of the criminal liability is concerned and
denied the extinction of the civil liability holding that the civil action is an independent civil
action
 Hence the present petition for review on certiorari
o Petitioner Asilo now argues that in order to sustain a conviction under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019,
the public officer must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
negligence
o He contended that he and his co-accused acted in good faith in the demolition of the market
  Petitioner Victoria nor argues that the death of the Mayor prior to the promulgation of the decision
extinguished NOT ONLY the Mayor’s criminal liability but also his civil liability
o She also asserted good faith on the part of the accused public officials when they performed
the demolition

Issue: Whether the civil liability of the Mayor is extinguished after his death before the promulgation of the
judgment of his case—No

Held:
 Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
o (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his social,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
 The Elements:
 That the accused are public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy
 Tat said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of
their official duties or in relation to their public positions
 That they caused undue injury to any party
 OR that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the other party
 Public officers have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence
 The Court SUSTAINED the SB’s finding of criminal and civil liabilities against Asilo and the Mayor
o The first 2 requisites are present at the time of the commission of the complained acts; there
is sufficient amount of evidence to establish that there was an undue injury suffered on the
part of the Spouses Bombasi and that the public officials concerned acted with evident bad
faith when they performed the demolition of the market stall
o The demolition of Spouses Bombasi’s store was carried out without a court order
 The demolition was done in the exercise of official duties which apparently was
attended by bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as there is
nothing in the 2 resolutions which gave the accused the authority to demolish
plaintiff’s store
o The market cannot be considered a nuisance per se because as found out by the Court, the
buildings had not been affected by the fire. The finding was certified to by Supervising Civil
Engineer Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office
o The Sangguniang Resolutions are not enough to justify demolition; the LGC does not
expressly provide for the abatement of nuisance
 The accused officials were still devoid of any power to demolish the store
 The Mayor was only authorized to file an UNLAWFUL DETAINER in case of
resistance to obey the order or to demolish the building using legal means
o The Mayor was placed in estoppel after it granted yearly business permits
 The Court also holds that the SB did not err in holding that the civil liability of the Mayor
survived his death; and that Angeles could have likewise survived had it not been for the
fact that the resolution of the SB that his death extinguished the civil liability
 People v. Bayotas:
o The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon
o The death of the accused PRIOR to the final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed
o The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict
 Law
 Contract
 Quasi contracts
 Delicts
 Quasi delicts
o Where the civil liability survives, an action for recovery therefore may be pursued by
only by way of filing a SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION and subject to SECTON 1, RULE 111
 This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source
of obligation upon which the same is based
 The prescription on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case [for civil liability ex delicto]
 Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there in longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal
 The New Civil Code provisions under the Chapter, Human Relations, were cited by the
prosecution to substantiate its argument that the civil action based therein is an
independent one, thus, will stand despite the death of the accused during the pendency of
the case
 In the case at bar…
o The death of the Mayor during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil
liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed--- the civil liability in this case
is based on another source of obligation
 Art. 31 of the CC states:
 Where the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act
or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings
 Art. 32 states:
 Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly, obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall
be liable to the latter for damages:
 o The right against deprivation of private property without due
process of law
o The Court held that there was a violation of the right to private property of the Spouses
Bombasi
 The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not, as already
shown, justify demolition of the store without court order; even if there is a writ of
execution, there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition
issued by the court before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove
improvements over the contested property
 This special need for a court order even if an ejectment case has
successfully been litigated, underscores the independent basis for civil
liability, in this case, where no case was even filed by the municipality
o NOTE: In this case, the separate civil action precisely based on due process
violations was filed even AHEAD of the criminal case, is complemented by the fact
that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein
petitioner Victoria, who specified in her petition that she has “substituted him as
petitioner in the above captioned case”
 Section 1, Rule 111 is NOT applicable
 The SB was correct when it maintained the separate docketing of the civil
action and criminal cases before it although their CONSOLIDATION WAS
ERRONEOUSLY BASED ON SEC. 2 OF PD 1606 WHICH DEALS WITH CIVIL
LIABILITY EX DELICTO

Ching v. Nicdao
Facts:
 Nicdao was charged with 11 counts of violation of BP 22. The MTC found her guilty of said
offenses. The RTC affirmed
 Nicdao filed an appeal to the CA. the CA reversed the decision of and acquitted the accused
 Ching is now appealing the CIVIL ASPECT of the case to the SC
 Ching’s contentions:
o He argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA, the SC has the
jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability
o He anchors his contention on Rule 111, Sec 1B:
 The criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall
be allowed or recognized
o That based on the mentioned provisions, the criminal action for BP 22 necessarily includes
the corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount of the dishonored check
representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee
 Nicdao’s defense:
o Sec. 2 of Rule 111:
  Except in the cases provided for in Sec. 2 hereof, after the criminal action has been
commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final
judgment in the criminal action
o According to her, the CA’s decision is equivalent to a finding that the facts upon which her
civil liability may arise do not exist
o The instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil liability based on the 11 checks, is thus
allegedly already barred by the final and executor decision acquitting her

Issues:
(1) Whether Ching may appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period—Yes
 Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period.
i. “Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability that
might arise did not exist”
 Petitioner Ching correctly argues that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect
of the case notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA
i. The civil action was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not
reserve his right to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to
the criminal action
ii. If the accused is acquitted on a reasonable doubt, but the court renders judgment on
the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution CANNOT appeal from the
judgment of acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy
iii. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party, or the accused or both may
appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor
(2) Whether Nicdao is civilly liable—No
 General Rule:
i. Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal”
1. Where the acquittal is based on a REASONABLE DOUBT
2. Where the court expressly declares that the liability is NOT CRIMINAL but
only CIVIL IN NATURE
3. Where the civil liability is NOT DERIVED FROM OR BASED ON THE
CRIMINAL ACT OF WHICH THE ACCUSED IS ACQUITTED
 In the case at bar…
i. Respondent Nicdao’s acquittal carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce
her civil liability
ii. There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching
iii. The CA’s acquittal of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt.
Rather, it is based on the finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP
22
1. In particular, the CA found that the P20M check was a stolen check which
was never issued nor delivered by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching
iv. The CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching
1. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she has already fully paid her obligations
 2. The finding relative to the P20M check that it was a stolen check necessarily
absolved respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well—THE
ACQUITTAL CARRIED WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF HER CIVIL
LIABILITY AS WELL

Pimentel v. Pimentel
Facts:
 Maria Christine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC-QC
 Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC of Antipolo City for the pre-trial and trial of
the Civil Case for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Sec. 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity
 Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC-QC on the ground of
the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship
between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil
case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC QC
 The RTC-QC issued an order that the pendency of the case before the RTC-Antipolo is NOT a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it
o Petitioner filed an MR. MR denied
o Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or TRO before the CA
 The CA dismissed the petition.
o The CA ruled in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender
commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not
perform all the act of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance
o However, the issue in the civil action for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations.
o The CA ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be
declared void, it would be IMMATERIAL to the criminal case because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide had
already been committed
 Hence, the petitioner filed a petition for review before the Court

Issue: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrant
the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner—No

Held:
 Section 7, Rule 11:
o Elements of Prejudicial Question—The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed
  The civil action must be instituted BEFORE the filing of the criminal action
 In the case at bar…
o The Information for frustrated parricide was dated August 30, 2004
o The RTC-QC set the criminal case for pre-trial and trial on Feb 14, 2005
o Petitioner was served summons in the civil case on February 7, 2005
o Clearly the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Sec. 7, Rule 111 was not met since
the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action
 The resolution of the civil action is NOT a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action
 There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending,
and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case
 In the case at bar…
o The relationship between petitioner and offender and the victim is a key element in the
crime of parricide which punishes any person “who shall kill his father, mother or child,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse”
o However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the
issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused
 Issue in civil case: whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations.
 Issue in parricide: whether the accused killed the victim
o Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is nullified, petitioner could still
be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he
was still married to respondent

Serag v. CA
Facts:
 May 11, 2001, Atty. Sibya, Jr., a mayoralty candidate in San Joaquin, Iloilo during the 2001
elections, was shot to death in front of his residence. His driver, Norberto Salamat III, was also
wounded
 The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Ililo City filed a criminal complaint for murder
and attempted murder against Lino Napao, then incumbent mayor of San Joaquin and Sebstian
Serag
o Private offended party also filed a criminal complaint against Serag and 14 others
 The Provincial Prosecutor then filed an information for murder and an information for attemted
murder with the use of licensed firearm for both charges against the accused
 The accused-petitioner then filed a petition for review on the Joint Resolution of the Provincial
Prosecutor before the DOJ
 Meanwhile, the trial court found probable cause and issued warrants of arrest directed against the
accused
  Pending the resolution by the SoJ of the said petition for review, the proceedings were suspended.
Subsequently, however, the arraignment of the accused was set on May 21, 2002
o It was thereafter reset to June 6, 2002 which, by agreement of the prosecution and
defense, was “intransferrable” in character
 Before the scheduled arraignment, the SoJ issued a resolution stating that the crime charged be
downgraded to Homicide and Attempted Homicide
o In compliance with the said resolution, the Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave to
File a Second Amended Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the two cases,
and for the court to admit the said second amended informations
o The private offended parties, however, filed an MR before the SoJ assailing the said
resolution
 The RTC order the information to be amended and the arraignment pursued
o The private complainant forthwith assailed the orders of the trial court and the arraignment
of the accused on June 6, 2002 via a petition for certiorari in the CA
 The CA issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the case
 In the meantime, the SoJ issued a Resolution on November 18, 2002, granting the MR of the
private complainant, setting aside the Resolution and ordering to prosecutor the reinstate its
original information
 The petitioners filed an MR of the Resolution of the SoJ but was denied
 They filed a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the resolution, but the CA did not act on
the same as it lacked the necessary requirement of a certification of non-forum shopping

Issue: Whether the prosecutor and the RTC acted with GAD holding the arraignment of the case—Yes

Held:
 The RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate haste when it granted the Provincial Prosecutor’s
motion for the admission of the Second Amended Information for homicide, order the withdrawal of
the criminal case for attempted homicide, and arraigned the accused therein for homicide
 The pendency of an appeal before the DOJ is enough reason for the deferment of any
proceedings in the trial court and petitioner, through the private prosecutors, correctly
moved for the deferment of the admission of the second amended information for homicide
and attempted homicide
o It should be noted that the motion to defer was even with the conformity of the public
prosecutor and the appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to Sec. 16,
Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure to wit:
 Intervention of the offended party in criminal action—where the civil action for
recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the
offense

Okabe v. Gutierrez
Facts:
 Charged for estafa, petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause
and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents appended to the
 Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were respondent Maruyama’s affidavit
complaint for estafa and resolution of the investigating prosecutor
o The respondent’s counter-affidavit and other evidence adduced by the parties were not
attached thereto
 Petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the investigating prosecutor were not
enough on which the trial court could base a finding of probable cause for estafa against her
 The court denied the petitioner’s motion on the following grounds:
o Based on it personal examination and consideration of the Information, the affidavit-
complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor duly
approved by the city prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioner’s arrest
 Since the petitioner’s motion for determination of probable cause was made after the court had
already found probable cause and issued a warrant for the petitioner’s arrest, and after the latter
filed a personal bail bond for her provisional liberty, such motion was a mere surplusage
 In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause, she posits that the respondent judge
acted with GAD amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction

Issue: Whether the RTC judge may rely solely on the investigating prosecutor’s resolution in the
determination of probable cause for the arrest of the accused—No

Held:
 In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused, the
judge should not rely solely on said report
 The judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor, but also the
affidavit/s and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused
and his witnesses, as well as the TSN taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information
o The duty to make such determination is PERSONAL and EXCLUSIVE to the issuing
judge. He cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the investigating
prosecutor that he had conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law
and the Rules of Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the
Information
 The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause FOR THE ARREST
OF THE ACCUSED
o Probable cause—such set of facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or
any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought to be
arrested
o Purpose of the mandate: to insulate from the very start, those falsely charged of
crimes from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial
 Sec. 6 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
o The judge must make a personal determination of the existence or non-existence of
probable cause for the arrest of the accused
  Under Sec. 1 Rule 112, the investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC is tasked to determine whether there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
the respondent therein probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial
o A preliminary investigation is for the purpose of securing the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of a crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial
 If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the information against
respondent, he executed a certification at the bottom of the information that from the
evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense charged has
been committed and the accused is PROBABLY GUILTY thereof
o Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is, BY ITSELF, INEFFECTIVE—IT IS
NOT BINDING ON THE TRIAL COURT. NOR MAY THE RTC RELY ON THE SAID
CERTIFICATION AS BASIS FOR A FINDING OF THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE FOR THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED

Valdez v. People
Facts:
 Petitioner was charged with violation of Sec. 11 par(2) of RA 9165
o It appears in the information that in the Municipality of Aringay, the accused was caught to
have in his possession dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and newspaper
page, weighing more ore less 25 grams
 Petitioner pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 3 witnesses who were the tanods that
arrested petitioner
 Bautista, one of the tanods, was conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway when
they noticed petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus
o The tanods observed that petitioner appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. They thus approached him, but petitioner purportedly attempted to run away
o The tanods chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to the house of
Barangay Captain Mercado where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Merccado to
open his bag
o Petitioner’s bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, 18 pieces of eggplant, and dried
MJ leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was taken to
the police station for further investigation
 The charges were denied by petitioner
o After alighting from the bus, petitioner claimed that he went to the house of a friend to drink
water and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was walking, one of the
tanods, a cousin of his brother’s wife, allegedly approached him and asked where he was
going
o The tanod requested to see the contents of the bag. Petitioner gave his consent. It was at
this point that the other 2 tanods joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag,
petitioner testified that he was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado
o One of the tanods carried the bag until they reached their destination
 o Petitioner maintained that at Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and
Mercado himself
 They took out an item wrapped in newspaper, which are turned out to be MJ leaves
 Petitioner denied ownership; he claimed to have been threatened with imprisonment
if he did not give the drugs to someone from the east in order for them to apprehend
such person
 As petitioner declined, he was brought to the police station and charged with the
instant offense
 He averred that it was one of the tanods who did so at Mercado’s house and it was
only there that they saw the MJ leaves for the first time
 RTC rendered the petitioner guilty. CA affirmed
 Petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of the crime charged had not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt
o The warrantless effected against him by the tanod was unlawfyl and that the warrantless
search of his bad that followed was likewise contrary to law
o He maintains that the MJ leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence
for being the fruit of a poisonous tree

Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was validly made—No

Held:
 Note: petitioner only assails at this stage of the case the validity of his arrest; entering a plea and
participating in the proceedings is deemed a waiver of the right to assail the illegality of the arrest.
HOWEVER, the said waiver does not carry with it the right to assail the inadmissibility of the
evidence obtained
 When petitioner was arrested without a warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto
committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit
 It cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the warrantless search conducted on petitioner was
incidental to a lawful arrest
 Sec. 5, Rule 113:
o Arrest without a warrant; when lawful—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person
 When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
 When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it
 When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another
 In the case at bar…
o None of the circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested
 o By the tanod’s own admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he
alighted from the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense
 The tanod did not have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest
 For the exception in Section 5(a) Rule 113 to operate, 2 elements must be present:
o The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime
o Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
 In the case at bar…
o The petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was
finding his way to his destination
o That he purportedly attempted to run away is IRRELEVANT and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanod with personal knowledge
o Petitioner even testified that he did not run away, but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod
when they arpproached him