CASE NO.

10
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-32684 September 20, 1988

RAMON TUMBAGAHAN petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, TEODULO C. TANDAYAG, TIMOTEA LASMARIAS, JOSE F. DEL ROSARIO, and THE
IISMI SUPERVISORS HOUSING ASSOCIATION, INC., through TIBURCIO ESPENIDO respondents.

Demetrio P. Sira, Sr. for petitioner.

Francisco Ma. Garcia for respondent Timotea Lasmarias.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

In this present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner assails the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of his
petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to give due course to his appeal. The appellate court dismissed his
appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period to appeal.

The issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner validly terminated the services of his counsels of record-Attys.
Melvyn Salise and Jose Amarga — such that service on them of processes and notices would no longer bind him.
The resolution of this issue will also resolve the question raised in the petition whether the receipt by Atty. Amarga of
the trial court's order of dismissal would start the running of the period within which the petitioner should file his
appeal.

The records show that the petitioner filed two cases with the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, Branch II,
namely: (1) Civil Case No. 1257, for declaration of ownership and reconveyance of Lot Nos. 3050 and 3051 of the
Iligan Cadastre; and (2) Cadastral Case No. IL-N-4, for the review of the decree of registration issued by the Land
Registration Commission in favor of Timotea Lasmarias and cancellation of her titles to the same lots. When the
cases were called for joint trial on April 10, 1968, the petitioner relieved Atty. Salise as his counsel. Atty. Salise filed
his withdrawal of appearance which was approved by the court. On April 15, 1968, the cases were again called for
trial. This time, the petitioner personally appeared and filed a written motion for postponement on the ground that he
still had no counsel and was not ready for trial. Upon motion of the other party, the motion for postponement was
denied and the court issued an order dismissing the two cases.

A copy of the order was sent to Atty. Amarga which he received on April 26, 1968. The petitioner received his copy
of the order on May 17, 1968. Thereafter, he filed his motion for reconsideration. After the motion was denied, he
filed a notice of appeal and record on appeal which the Court dismissed for being filed out of time, counting the
period to appeal from the day Atty. Amarga received a copy of the order of dismissal.

The petitioner alleges that he had neither engaged the services of Atty. Amarga nor authorized the latter to
represent him in his two cases. From an examination of the records, however, this Court finds that these allegations
are without merit.

The pleadings filed with the trial court bear the names of Atty. Salise and Atty. Amarga as counsels for the
petitioner. Copies of some of the pleadings of the opposing party were furnished to Atty. Amarga who received the
same and signed for Atty. Salise. Such being the case, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in
agreeing with the trial court in its rejection of the claim that the petitioner had not even authorized the said counsel to
represent him and to take part in the conduct of the case.

As stated by the Court of Appeals:

The only issue raised in petitioner's petition for mandamus is whether or not petitioner's appeal from
the order dismissing his complaint in Civil Case No. 1257 was perfected on time.

The resolution of the issue depends upon a determination of the date when services of notice of the
order of April 15,1968, was legally effected upon petitioner. Was service made on April 26, 1968,
when Atty. Jose Amarga actually received a copy of the order of April 15, 1968, as held by the
respondent court and maintained by private respondent Lasmarias? Or on May 17,1968, when
petitioner actually received a copy of said order, as contended by petitioner? Or on the date
Benjamin Sta. Maria received the other copy of said order?
 At the outset we can eliminate for consideration the date Mr. Sta. Maria received a copy of said
order of dismissal for there is nothing in the record to show that Mr. Sta. Maria was authorized by
petitioner to receive the latter's mail.

Petitioner alleges that Atty. Jose Amarga is not his counsel, and that he has never engaged the
services of said lawyer and has not authorized said lawyer to represent him in Civil Case No. 1257

or Cadastral Case No. II-N-4, and that his counsel in said cases was Atty. Melvyn Salise only.

The record, however, negates, petitioner's allegations. Petitionees answer to the counterclaim of
private respondents del Rosario and the IISMI Supervisors Housing Association, Inc. was filed by
Attys. M. Salise and J. Amarga and signed by Atty. Jose B. Amarga (p. 14, record on appeal). This
fact sufficiently shows that Atty. Jose B. Amarga was one of the counsel for petitioner in said cases.

When Atty. Melvyn T. Salise filed his motion to withdraw as counsel for petitioner, he stated that
petitioner has terminated his legal services and that he was withdrawing as such counsel. There was
no indication in said motion that petitioner had likewise discharged Atty. Amarga as his counsel for
petitioner. Therefore, Atty. Amarga continued to be the counsel for petitioner.

There is another clear indication to show that petitioner had the assistance and services of legal
counsel even after Atty. Salise had withdrawn as his counsel. When the cases were called for
hearing on April 15, 1968, petitioner personally filed a motion captioned "Motion For Longer Time To
Prepare For Trial." This motion is quite long and raises legal points which only a lawyer can be
conversant with. We quote with approval respondent court's observation on this point.:

On the other hand, the court is of the observation and belief that the motion under
consideration could not have been prepared by Ramon Tumbagahan himself, who is
not a lawyer but prepared by lawyer who is afraid to show his face before the court
by not signing the motion himself, as counsel for Ramon Tumbagahan, and
apparently to deceive the court to believe the allegation of Ramon Tumbagahan that
he has not until the present, retained the services of counsel in order to secure the
postponement of the trial of the above cases to the prejudice of the oppositors and
defendants.' (Record on Appeal, p. 65).

Petitioner having been represented by counsel, service of a copy of the order of April 15, 1968, was
legally effected upon him on the date Atty. Amarga, his remaining counsel of record, actually
received said copy, i.e., on April 26, 1968. The Supreme Court and this Court have invariably
adhered to the rule that, where a party is represented by counsel, service of notices must be made
upon counsel and not upon the party personally. Service upon counsel is sufficient and binding upon
the party (Perez v. Ysip 81 Phil. 218; Hernandez v. Clapis 87 Phil. 437; Tanpinco vs. Lozada, L-
17335, January 31, 1962; Valdez vs. Valdez, CA-G.R. No. 28393, May 24, 1962). This rule is
mandatory and service of notice upon the party personally is not only superfluous but also legally
ineffective; notice given to a party personally is not notice in law (Chaivani vs. Tancinco, 90 Phil.
862; Perez vs. Araneta, L-11788, May 16, 1958; Cabili v. Badelles, L-17786, September 29, 1962;
Capicon v. Abbas, CA-G.R. No. 16870-R, 52 O.G. 6960; Aseniero vs. Fernandez, CA-G.R. No.
23527-B, May 22, 1962. (Rollo, pp. 14-18)

This Court, therefore, affirms the appellate court's findings that Atty. Amarga was one of the counsels for petitioner
and that he remained as the petitioner's counsel after Atty. Salise withdrew from the case and was discharge by the
court.

There is a need to observe the legal formalities before a counsel of record may be considered relieved of his
responsibility as such counsel (Cubar vs. Mendoza, 120 SCRA 768). The withdrawal as counsel of a client, or the
dismissal by the client of his counsel, must be made in a formal petition filed in the case Baquiran vs. Court of
Appeals, 2 SCRA 873, 878). In this case, the termination of the attorney-client relationship between the petitioner
and Atty. Salise does not automatically severe the same relations between the petitioner and Atty. Amarga. Only
Atty. Salise's dismissal was made of record. None was made with regard to the other counsel.

The attorney-client relation does not terminate formally until there is a withdrawal made of record; at least so far as
the opposite party is concerned, the relation otherwise continues until the end of the litigation (Visitacion vs. Manit
27 SCRA 523). Unless properly relieved, the counsel is responsible for the conduct of the case (Cortez vs. Court of
Appeals, 83 SCRA 31).

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The questioned decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

 CASE NO. 11

GR NO. L-145, September 07, 1946

77 Phil. 366

GR NO. L-145, September 07, 1946

TERESA FANLO DE FEYER ET AL., PLAINTIFFS & APPELLEES,

~vs~
R. C. PEYER, DEFENDANT & APPELLANT.

DECISION
PERFECTO, J.:
On May 10, 1945, plaintiff and her three daugthers filed a complaint for alimony aginst her husband,
praying for P500 monthly allowance from February, 1945, for counsel’s fees, for confirmation of her
custody of the children, for the delivery of a Buick automobile and reasonable rental for the use of said
car, and for damages in the sum of P10,000, plus costs.
On September 28, 1945, the lower court rendered judgment the dispositive part of which reads as
follows:
“In view of all the foregoiong, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
“On the first cause of action, the defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs as monthly
support, and until further orders from this court, the sum of three hundred fifty pesos (P350)
commencing from March 1, 1945, the same to be payable within the first five days of each and every
month. Whatever amounts have been paid by the defendant to the plaintiffs heretofore as support
pendente lite pursuant to their agreement of June 22, 1945, attached to the record shall be deducted
accordingly.
“The defendant is further sentenced to pay plaintiffs’ counsel, as professional fees due for their services
in connection with this case, the sum of P1,500.
“The custody given to Mrs. Peyer to her co-plaintiffs is hereby confirmed.
“0n the third cause of action, the defendant is hereby ordered to return to his wife, the plaintiff Teresa
Fanlo de Peyer, the Buick Sedan mentioned heretofore, in good and undamaged condition, otherwise to
pay for the cost of whatever repair may be required to put it in running condition.
“The cross-claims of the defendant are hereby dismissed.
“No special pronouncement as to costs.”

Defendant appealed from said judgment assigning in his brief eight errors alleged to have been
committed by the lower court.
Defendant admits his obligation to support his daughters, plaintiffs Elizabeth and Ruth, but disclaims
any obligation to support his wife and his eldest daughter, Alice Peyer. In this appeal, we need not
decide the question concerning the support of Alice, the parties having agreed that the case be
dismissed with respect to her, as she married in March, 1946. As a consequence, appellant’s second
asignment of error need not be considered.
The main question in this case is whether, upon the evidence, plaintiff Teresa Fanlo had attempted
against her husband’s life on June 19, 1942, and lastly on June 1, 1945.
Appellant alleges that, for said attempts, he is relieved from the obligation to support his wife under
paragraph 4 of article 152 and paragraph 4 of article, 855 of the Civil Code, which read as follows:
“ART. 152. The obligation to give support shall cease:

* * * * * * *
“4. When the recipient, whether a forced heir or not, commits any of the offenses which constitutes
sufficient grounds for disinhertance.
 “ART. 855. In addition to those mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3, and 6 of article 756, the following shall
also be sufficient causes for disinheriting a spouse:
* * * * * * *
“4. An attempt against the life of the spouse making the will, should there not have been a
reconciliation.”

Regarding the alleged attempt on June 19, 1942, defendant testified that “at that time she had a knife
in her hand while we were having a quarrel and I had to run around the table to avoid serious
consequence and the others intervened taking the knife away from her.” Plaintiff pursued me “but she
could not catch me; she followed me around the table with the knife * * * but what she did was that
she hit the knife on the table, the knife cut the table.” After the attempt, no reconciliation took place
between wife and husband.
Concerning, the same incident, plaintiff testified: “I remember I was also sick at that time and I
overheard his conversation with someone, and I went out and told him, ‘If you do not stop insulting
me or my family, I shall hit you with this.’ The only thing I did was to hit the table with the knife. I did
not strike him.” Asked whether she pursued him around the table, she answered: “I do not remember,
may be I did, may be I did not, but I did not hit him; it was such along time already.”
Regarding: the alleged attempt on June 1, 1945, Jesus Santiago, Jesus P. Sans, and Zoilo Tasio
testified.
Jesus Santiago testified that “Mrs. Peyer went away and when she came back I saw her making a
movement to stab Mr. Peyer on the back with a knife. I then parried the stab and got hold of her
hand.”
Jesus P. Sans testified that “I saw Jesus Santiago trying to disarm Mrs, Peyer who was holding a knife
in her hand. Then I held her at the back and said: ‘for God’s sake, leave that knife,’ and I tried to
disarm her and I was wounded in the chin; I was able to get the knife from her hand.”
Zoilo Tasio testified that “I saw her (Mrs. Peyer) raise her hand, but the timekeeper who was between
her and Mr. Peyer, held the hand of Mrs. Peyer who was holding the knife. The timekeeper is the same
Jesus Santiago. If Mrs. Peyer had not been held by our foreman, she could have stabbed Mr. Peyer.
Mr. Peyer was stooping and were it not for the intervention of our foremen Mrs. Peyer could have
stabbed Mr. Peyer on the back.”
Exhibit 1 was identified as the knife which Sans took from Mrs. Peyer.
Plaintiff Teresa Fanlo, after relating the struggle she had with defendant, testified: “The only answer I
received was with closed fist, he gave me a big blow on my right breast, so strong that my ribs started
to ache, and I almost fainted. When I saw I was defenseless and very weak, I ran upstairs to the
kitchen and took a kitchen knife. It was really not a kitchen knife because our kitchen knife was taken
by his men when Mr. Peyer left the house to work for the company in April. So when I came down, I
was met by Jesus Santiago, who caught my hand and tried to snatch the knife away from me. When I
saw that the blade was hurting my right hand, I let it go.” When Jesus Santiago succeeded in taking
the knife from her hand, she was about three meters from Mr. Payer. Plaintiff denies having actually
stabbed Mr. Peyer. “The only thing I did when I took the knife was to try, in case Mr. Peyer would hit
me again, to repel him.”
Concerning the incident which occurred on June 19, 1942, plaintiff and defendant gave contradicting
testimonies. Under the circumstances, the court is not in a position to give credence to either of the
spouses, and is more inclined to believe that in said incident plaintiff had not in fact attempted against
defendant’s life. At any rate, the court is of opinion that after said incident a sort of reconciliation,
which defendant denies, took place between the spouses, they having continued to live under the same
roof, and defendant having continued giving support to plaintiff, although there were frequent
disagreements on this regard.
Concerning the second incident, the writer of this decision is of opinion that the preponderance of
evidence militates in favor of defendant, but the majority, constituting all the other members of the
division, agree with the lower court’s pronouncement to the effect that the evidence adduced by the
defendant does not establish the fa
ct that his wife intended to kill him, but only armed herself with the knife to prevent defendant and his
laborers from taking away the foodstuff and goods stored in the basement of the conjugal house, and
that plaintiff acted, in a sort of self-protection, by trying to secure the retention of said foodstuff and
other goods to satisfy her and her daughters’ necessities, an understandable attitude, considering the
differences between them regarding plaintiffs’ support, differences which more than three weeks before
had culminated in the filing of the complaint in this case.
Appellant complains because the lower court confirmed the custody that plaintiff Teresa Fanlo had of
her daughters Elizabeth and Ruth, defendant’s ground being that his wife is not a fit person to have
said custody in view of her two alleged attempts against his life, and that Elizabeth has not attended
any school since December, 1941, and practically every night she stays up as late as 1 o’clock in the
morning and Ruth is not taken to bed until 10 or 11 o’clock at night.
It is not necessary to repeat what we have said relative to the alleged attempts against defendant’s
life. As regards the other grounds, we believe them not enough to make the mother unfit to have the
custody of the two minors. Elizabeth’s not going to school may be explained by the difficulties obtaining
during enemy occupation, when plaintiffs, according to their complaint, were not sufficiently provided
for by defendant for their support. Besides, if defendant had serious doubts as to his wife’s fitness to
have the custody of their daughters, no explanation has been given by defendant of his inaction to
deprive his wife of said custody before he was sued in this case.
The sum of P1,500 awarded by the lower court for attorney’s fees of plaintiffs is impugned by defendsnt
because (a) the complaint was filed by Atty. Vicente J. Francisco, who withdrew from the case, and
there is a total lack of evidence that Teresa Fanlo entered into an agreement with her attorneys
regarding their fees; (b) plaintiff Teresa Fanlo’s testimony to the effect that she agreed with Mr.
Gonzales, who prepared the complaint in attorney Francisco’s’ office, to pay the sum of P2,000 as
attorney’s fees, and that Mr. Francisco fixed everything with Judge Camus of the firm, is not admissible
in evidence under paragraph 6 of article 1280 of the Civil Code; and (c) the amount is exorbitant.
Appellant’s liability to pay attorney’s fees is not based on any contractual relation. It is part of his legal
obligation to support his wife and children. It is an incidental expense, similar to judicial costs, in the
enforcement of the legal righht of the wife and children to be supported. (Mercado vs. Ostrand, and
Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179; Arroyo vs. Vasquez, and Arroyo, 42 Phil. 54.) And even if it were considered
contractual, it is still obligatory no matter what the form of its execution may be, according to article
1278 of the Civil Code.
No written agreement is necessary to prove plaintiffs’ obligation to pay their attorney’s fees, even if
the amount involved be higher than three hundred pesos. Said article 1280 is not applicable, because
it refers to cases wherein the existence of a contract is in issue, and being of procedural nature must
be considered superseded by the present rules on evidence. Plaintiffs do not need to prove the
existence of any contract on attorney’s fees. It is enough that the legal services, as well as their nature,
extent, and such other facts and circumtances be shown so as to enable the court to determine the
reasonable amount that must be awarded. The lower court which conducted the trial of this case was
in a good position to appraise the reasonable attorney’s fees that must be awarded, and there is no
showing that the amount awarded should be disturbed.
With respect to the Buick automobile, appellant maintains that the lower court erred in not holding that
he is the owner thereof,
Plaintiff Teresa Fanlo testified that the car was given to her as a Christmas present in 1930 and, as she
was denied the use of the car by all kinds of excuses, a stipulation regarding it was included in the
agreement of April 27, 1944. Defendant points out that he acquired, the car only in 1934, as shown by
the certificate of registration (Exhibit 2).
Upon the evidence, we are convinced that, because defendant had two automobiles, one a De Sotto
and the other the Buick in question, defendant in fact bought the Buick for the use of his family and
the De Sotto for his business, and it is only reasonable that the possession of the Buick car be given to
plaintiffs. We do not believe it reasonable for defendant to acquire two automobiles for his sole personal
use to the exclusion of his wife and children. The lower court’s pronouncement that plaintiff Teresa
Fanlo is entitled to the ownership of the Buick car is, therefore, not correct, because the car belongs
to the conjugal partnership and consequently to both spouses. There must be distinction between
ownership and use and possession.
Defendant’s claim in the amount of P2,830 for the use of sundry goods and merchandise belonging to
the Philippine Manufacturing Company, taken by plaintiff Teresa Faqnlo from the basement of the
conjugal house and for which defendant was responsible, is groundless. Neither the quantity of goods
taken nor their value was proved. The goods were purchased by defendant himself, which might make
them as part of the conjugal assets. Plaintiffs were dependent upon those goods for their subsistence.
Defendant is not certain how much the Philippine Manufacturing Company would claim for said goods,
and the company has not as yet attempted to collect their value. At any rate, if the Philippine
Manufacturing Company is entitled to claim the amount in question, it is the company, not the
defendant, which has the personality to sue for the amount.
Modified with the exclusion of plaintiff Alice Peyer, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed, with
costs against appellant.
Paras, Pablo, Hilado, and Padilla, JJ., concur

CASE NO. 12
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against
his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by
men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues,
who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he
ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client
"in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court,"
and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He
ends his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time
in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title
to assume the practice of the noblest profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or
appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned
to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our
Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
 without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living,
the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought
to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and
obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic]
justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the
Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion.
Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of
service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of
his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc.
vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying
that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant;
the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason
that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on
appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore,
a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co.,
G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to
appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support
of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417,
decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:

Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement
thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the
resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that
of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636,
June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further
states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided
 by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is
contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the
appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26,
1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila
Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case
was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza
the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the
Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as
his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until
he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why
no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November
17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court
has no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed
to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you
judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be
measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and
yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy
brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a
 beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own
eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's
eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them:
for this is the Law and the Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition.
On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath
that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously
DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are
insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members
of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute;
and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been
asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with
the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our client, the members have
shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will bear us on this
matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity,
fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, —
what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and
insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and prayers, in simple
word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.

xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in
the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your
respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY,
GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial
with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent is given the opportunity
to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the
way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: — "the story is
current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have
told me frankly and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the
Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack
the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled
by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We
waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never interfered nor obstruct in the
performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has placed
finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your
duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise
to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

 The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we
sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in
thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would
correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion
must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and
government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb.
Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that
inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal
has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or
ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and
nothing more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court
and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY.
Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended
as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to when we must end our
self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the
Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial.
We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-
impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous
in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to
decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance
beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition
different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
 Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for
denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court
indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court
may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress has placed the control
of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same
three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons,
however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently
move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular
time makes review undesirable.

Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this
Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII
of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before;
and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional
requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in
view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have
all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion;
and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating
its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein
petitions for review are often merely ordered "dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but
of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important
reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's
discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore
determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with
law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call
for the exercise of the power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of
his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court
in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought
to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
 The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15,
Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time,
and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three
days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same Rule no motion shall be acted
upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case
the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco,
I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117).
The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court
would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion,
and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any
period within which he may file his reply or opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally,
is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for
a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, 4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see
fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery
of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the
administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a
fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary,
has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief
Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication
of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar.
They have the best opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are
in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on
this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his profession and
livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose,
is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant
with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the
privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation of an able and
upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those
in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under
such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to
his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration
take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to
the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice
and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of
courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley,
v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the
judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as
incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of
justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of the judge must be
obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times
be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
 We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his
privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his
misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a
belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-
honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of
the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to
bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond
bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth
or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as
such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of justice the direct
product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial
error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the
control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND,
but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate
to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and
besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension
of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election
to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement
that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the
courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney capable of
correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and integrity of the
highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann
Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an

attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a
nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than
those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires
of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance
at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of
the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice be
upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac.
220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman
who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He
wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the
judge and others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected

from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to
resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for
serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the administration of the
law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the people. Unjust
criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by
attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The
letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the
discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the
write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into
disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear
that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged
with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court
against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its
influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration
of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary
proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a
citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final
determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when
an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for
an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well
as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723.
725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of
criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and
thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial
action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well
as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities
in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial
officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is
false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such
charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided
 against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or
the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in
the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not against the officers
whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made
by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of
justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary
observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were
foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor
against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo,
upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper
conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court and who is under
oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an
article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court
of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The
Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the
public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of
the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime
importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would
concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as well as to public
officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be served by denying
this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary
that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client
and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever
properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly
asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion
is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water
supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through
its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the affairs of the private
individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to maintain the
judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar
to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a
fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of
assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and
faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee chosen from its rank,
or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its hundreds of
bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate
a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before
it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the
state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in
sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have
found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this court; and the
insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts done by him and
his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never
subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an
angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever
enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise
by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial
officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or
indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any action
triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person
defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.)
p. 1017. In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice
was wholly different from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said,
wholly different principles are applicable thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised
the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations
of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the
penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount
to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which
the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain
the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of
court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for
their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears
to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault
by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like
cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at his home
or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial
acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and
well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court
in that case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of
the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his rulings in a
cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting or
assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion
until the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect
to the regard of the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own
 person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No
high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes

professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been
directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter
to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice,
is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App.
Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re
Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated,
in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have
been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt
under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which
has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are
permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them with ignorance, with
unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be long
before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the
administration of justice will fall into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the
same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to
the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his home, while not
holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause
wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney
was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge]
as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the
same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the
following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3
Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.

Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to
make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable
warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of
a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the
official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred
for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over
a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts
involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was
ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements
is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting
on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client,
should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never
will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is
that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in
utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences,
or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching
to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the
source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and
his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this
Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press,
the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case,
which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel
Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation
of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the
members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement,
are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case
by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose
of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of
justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately
so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que
 party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the
one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and
believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into
their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of
the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the
oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without
such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his
conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from
the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of
one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the tendency of this Court
to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without
as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so
patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed
error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this
Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on
the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract
much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability
of the members — and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second
paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule
against splitting of jurisdiction."
18
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to
his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted
to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing
an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after
the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually,
this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect
that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in

administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which
is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and
to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to bring them in any way into
disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by courts.
What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of
newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice
is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into
disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where
there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced
by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts
would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November
17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise
of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the
legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of
the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of
no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession,
by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative
is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved
themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and
incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of
judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of
attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint. Such a view is without
support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the
inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy
of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the
trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the
duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of
ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held
that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is
admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right,
 but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound
judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment
of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the
object of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move
as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with
vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members
as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks
for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite
of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and
its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of
the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of
our disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government
entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the
Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And
more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires
detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain
them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by
perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or
a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended
to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view
of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
 29
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof.
But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in
one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of
law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded
as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact
that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension
shall last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he
is once again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court
of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor JJ., concur.

Footnotes
IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2/18/70) - Lawyers' Duty
FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in
protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court”. He
indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore
without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.” His client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one
of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”
He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s
forum,” so that “ people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that:
“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the
practice of the noblest profession.”
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was
counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen
receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of
the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the
judgment. For lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the
adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion
for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of
Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for
reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.
As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his
duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is
suspended from the practice of law until further orders.

In Re: Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

19JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to the Supreme Court as a sign
of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled by people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He
also expressed strong words as against the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” . The
petition rooted from the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal was
dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, it was again
dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments, he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this
petition to surrender his title is only in trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in
the justice system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.

HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.

RATIO:
It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen himself because of his
negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in speaking of the truth and alleged injustices,so as not
to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this
particular case is sui generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited as
benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed. Indefinite suspension may
only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of
law.
 CASE NO. 19
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.M. No. 1608 August 14, 1981

MAGDALENA T. ARCIGA complainant,

vs.
SEGUNDINO D. MANIWANG respondent.

AQUINO, J.:

Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the disbarment of lawyer Segundino D.
Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975 ) on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his promise of marriage to her.
Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.

Magdalena and Segundino got acquainted sometime in October, 1970 at Cebu City. Magdalena was then a medical
technology student in the Cebu Institute of Medicine while Segundino was a law student in the San Jose Recoletos
College. They became sweethearts but when Magdalena refused to have a tryst with Segundino in a motel in
January, 1971, Segundino stopped visiting her.

Their paths crossed again during a Valentine's Day party in the following month. They renewed their relationship.
After they had dinner one night in March, 1971 and finding themselves alone (like Adam and Eve) in her boarding
house since the other boarders had gone on vacation, they had sexual congress. When Segundino asked
Magdalena why she had refused his earlier proposal to have sexual intercourse with him, she jokingly said that she
was in love with another man and that she had a child with still another man. Segundino remarked that even if that
be the case, he did not mind because he loved her very much.

Thereafter, they had repeated acts of cohabitation. Segundino started telling his acquaintances that he and
Magdalena were secretly married.

In 1972 Segundino transferred his residence to Padada, Davao del Sur. He continued his law studies in Davao City.
.Magdalena remained in Cebu. He sent to her letters and telegrams professing his love for her (Exh. K to Z).

When Magdalena discovered in January, 1973 that she was pregnant, she and Segundino went to her hometown,
Ivisan, Capiz, to apprise Magdalena's parents that they were married although they were not really so. Segundino
convinced Magdalena's father to have the church wedding deferred until after he had passed the bar examinations.
He secured his birth certificate preparatory to applying for a marriage license.

Segundino continued sending letters to Magdalena wherein he expressed his love and concern for the baby in
Magdalena's womb. He reassured her time and again that he would marry her once he passed the bar
examinations. He was not present when Magdalena gave birth to their child on September 4, 1973 in the Cebu
Community Hospital. He went to Cebu in December, 1973 for the baptism of his child.

Segundino passed the bar examinations. The results were released on April 25, 1975. Several days after his oath-
taking, which Magdalena also attended, he stopped corresponding with Magdalena. Fearing that there was
something amiss, Magdalena went to Davao in July, 1975 to contact her lover. Segundino told her that they could
not get married for lack of money. She went back to Ivisan.

In December, 1975 she made another trip to Davao but failed to see Segundino who was then in Malaybalay,
Bukidnon. She followed him there only to be told that their marriage could not take place because he had married
Erlinda Ang on November 25, 1975. She was broken-hearted when she returned to Davao.

Segundino followed her there and inflicted physical injuries upon her because she had a confrontation with his wife,
Erlinda Ang. She reported the assault to the commander of the Padada police station and secured medical
treatment in a hospital (Exh. I and J).

Segundino admits in his answer that he and Magdalena were lovers and that he is the father of the child Michael.
He also admits that he repeatedly promised to marry Magdalena and that he breached that promise because of
Magdalena's shady past. She had allegedly been accused in court of oral defamation and had already an
illegitimate child before Michael was born.

The Solicitor General recommends the dismissal of the case. In his opinion, respondent's cohabitation with the
complainant and his reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.

An applicant for admission to the bar should have good moral character. He is required to produce before this Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court.

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good moral
character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar may be
terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil. 865).

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or to
specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar.
The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the immoral
conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community" (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a
married lawyer who was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the ground of immoral conduct was
justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd 896).

There is an area where a lawyer's conduct may not be inconsonance with the canons of the moral code but he is not
subject to disciplinary action because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not glaringly
scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer's behavior to the opposite sex where the question of immorality usually
arises. Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as "grossly immoral conduct," will depend on the surrounding circumstances.

This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still prevailed, observed that "the legislator
well knows the frailty of the flesh and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality is not
well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An
occasion is so inducive to sin or crime that the saying "A fair booty makes many a thief" or "An open door may tempt
a saint" has become general." (People vs. De la Cruz, 48 Phil. 533, 535).

Disbarment of a lawyer for grossly immoral conduct is illustrated i

CASE NO. 20

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s during
their schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their
families and respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio
City.[1] For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed
that respondent would keep the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back.
Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then
issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973,
respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On
March 9, 1976, respondents law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the
settlement of Joses estate. Complainant was appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears that
respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On February 13, 1978,
respondent transferred his title to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent and
his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that
a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to
disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which
belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he
prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan
secured to purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate,
all for the purpose of transferring the title to the said property to his family
corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him
as its counsel and auditor.[2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as lawyer
and auditor to settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a petition for settlement of
the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not include the Moran property in the estates inventory.
Instead, respondent transferred the property to his corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was
issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in trust
knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly acknowledged that
the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences [3] with the Baguio City Treasurer
and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and Co.,
CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet included in the
claims against the estate the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented
as her husbands loans applied probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio
City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while respondents
auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors.
She claimed that respondent represented conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the
list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husbands estate which was
represented by respondents law firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction between
respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms
which are housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER, [4] respondent initially
asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the result of the
pending action in the CFI for reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran
property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case that
he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent
explained that the Nakpils never bought back the Moran property from him, hence, the property
remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpils estate.
 As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which
included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran
property. In charging his loans against the estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting
firm merely stated that the loans in respondents name were applied probably for the purchase of the
house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City. Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that
the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably for the purchase did not imply a consummated
transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H) of his
accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran property on
behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the Moran
property for: (1) complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include the
said property, and; (2) complainant, as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where
the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms in the
settlement of her husbands estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his law and
accounting firms as early as 1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos
Valdes & Associates) who filed the inestate proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm
represented the estate in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
served as accountant of the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants were
closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which
the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon the
latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients of his law
and accounting firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of
conflicting interests was with the knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there
was no conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi,
i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full payment of the principal bank creditors.
Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc.
Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the
banks claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the
work of Carlos J. Valdes and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm
prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and
accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.[6] He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He
submitted as proof the SECs certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of
Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm Carlos J. Valdes and
Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were
represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote
possibility that he committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such misconduct not as a
lawyer but as an accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he
should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. [7] She maintained that the pendency
of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint against
respondent for the issue in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and
morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets &
Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did not
claim ownership of the Moran property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the
estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for
the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned the Moran property
but were part of respondents scheme to remove the property from the estate and transfer it to his family
corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because of the professional counsel
of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent
with greed for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself
prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims
against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran property) which
were prepared by his law and accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the same
firms which are favorable to him. She averred that respondent must accept responsibility not just for
some, but for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 to
several years later. She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to his
resignation from his law firm. The documents merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting
firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for representing
the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate.
He urged that it is not per se anomalous for respondents accounting firm to act as accountant for the
estate and its creditors. He reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted
not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel Nakpil
and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique
Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because
they were prepared by his accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims
were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondents law firm to object to these claims
damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case until after
resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of ownership by the
then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership
pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e.,
the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and referred the
administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that
respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived her right
over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that respondent
was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the OSG
submitted its Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of the
Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on
notice of complainants claim over the property. It opined that there was no trust agreement created
over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondents
right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the claimants were
related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the disbarment of
a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with the
property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The measure of good faith which an attorney is
required to exercise in his dealings with his client is a much higher standard than is required in business
dealings where the parties trade at arms length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his
client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts carefully watch these
transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client. This rule is founded on
public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the
credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing
is considered in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These findings
were based mainly on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was
reversed by this Court in 1993.[15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the aforementioned
reconveyance case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the complainant the services of
his law and accounting firms by reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the 50s. She
reposed her complete trust in respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of
her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the Moran
property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement, respondent claimed
absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death of
Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent
later transferred it to his corporation.
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust
nature of the Moran property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his family
corporation is well discussed in this Courts Decision,[17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime
of the late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e
repudiated the trust when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties
of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can
be bolstered by Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings
of the late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos
J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a
list of the application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31
December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains the two (2) loans
contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was
already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been
included in the list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement
outlined in Exh. J was that respondent Valdes would x x x take over the total
loan of P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the notes while the
heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed property
for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular maintenance
expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year
period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x
Valdes could already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap.
Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty
Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil
and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence (Exhibits
H, J and L), which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop respondent from claiming
that he bought the Moran property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil. [18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which his law
firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed
that the said property belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his adverse
claim. If they could not agree on its ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in
the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and concealing it
from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings. Respondents misuse of his legal expertise
to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent
for the purchase and renovation of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to
exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of
the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error or
oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two loans should be
treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the
supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondents loans against the estate could not have
been committed without respondents participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too
and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause
and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.
 As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse
interests. It is highly improper to represent both sides of an issue. [19] The proscription against
representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect
to the same general matter[20] and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It applies
although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith. [21] However,
representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation,
after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed
consent to such representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of conflict
and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his clients. [22]
In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors are
adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the
estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a
conflict between the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants
who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondents law firm questioned the claims of
creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate
proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes &
Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the
case and appear in court is beside the point. As established in the records of this case and in the
reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant of complainant after the death of
Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974
(or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of
resignation from his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof. The documents on
record [24] only show respondents resignation from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these
documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been terminated. It does not escape
us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the
intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent
could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the
legal counsel of the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both
the estate and the two claimants against it. [26] The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix,
did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in the records to show that
respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to complainant. Thus, her
silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence based on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of
interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. As
correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a claim against her husbands estate, her claim is still
adverse and must be filed in the intestate proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where
his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm
was to contest the claims of these two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondents
accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still
undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is
probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be
charged before this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is
the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant
is not charging respondent with breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and
the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate
and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings where these
claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it placed
respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondents
misconduct refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as
a member of the Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good moral character is not only a
prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of
a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to
always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good
faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to observe candor,
fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct.
He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this
Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., no part. Previous associate with respondent.

CASE NO.21
MUNOZ VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. L-33672 September 28, 1973

VICENTE MUÑOZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE

COURT OF APPEALS, respondents, DELIA T. SUTTON, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

We have before us a task far from pleasant. Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a

member of the Philippine Bar, connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoñez,
Yap, Parlade, and Associates, must be held accountable for failure to live up to
that exacting standard expected of counsel, more specifically with reference to
a duty owing this Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty
required of pleaders when, in a petition for certiorari prepared by her to review
a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of facts in reckless
disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired.
When given an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her appearance
before us and thereafter in her memorandum, there was lacking any showing of
regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable. Such an attitude of
intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear. Only her relative
inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than
severe censure. So we rule.

The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July
12, 1971. It reads as follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G.R. No. L-
33672, Vicente Muñoz v. People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals, and
considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñoz is guilty of
homicide through reckless negligence, as charged in the information; that - in
the language of the decision of the Court of Appeals - "the prosecution and the
defense offered two conflicting versions of the incident that gave rise to the
case"; that, upon examination of the evidence, the Court of Appeals found, as
did the trial court, that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that
of the defense is unbelievable; that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne
out by substantial evidence, whereas the version of the defense is inconsistent
with some established facts, for: (a) petitioner's theory, to the effect that his
boat had been rammed by that of the complainant, is refuted by the fact that
after hitting the left frontal outrigger of the latter's boat, the prow and front
outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left front portion of complainant's
boat - where the complainant was seated, thereby hitting him on the back and
inflicting the injury that cause his death - so that, immediately after the collision
- part of petitioner's boat was on top of that of the complainant; (b) these
circumstances, likewise, indicate the considerable speed at which petitioner's
motorboat was cruising, (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very little
damage, which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the
offended party's boat, the latter being bigger than, as well as provided with an
engine twice as powerful as, that of the petitioner; and (d) although appellant's
boat carried several passengers, including children, and was, in fact,
overloaded, appellant acted as pilot and, at the same time, as its machinist,
thereby rendering it difficult for him to manuever it properly; the Court resolved
to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is mainly factual and for lack of
merit. Considering further, that the petition quotes, on page 5 thereof a portion
of the decision appealed from, summing up evidence for the defense, and makes
reference thereto "findings" of the Court of Appeals, which is not true; that, on
page 6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a portion of the same
quotation, that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized
by the Court of Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue; that, on page 8 of the
petition, it is averred - "It being conceded that the two versions recounted above
are by themselves credible, although they are conflicting the same cannot be
binding on, and is therefore, reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court.
Where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same
[are not binding] on the Supreme Court. (Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. L-9590, April
30, 1957)" although, in fact, no conflicting findings of fact are made in the
decision appealed from; and that, on page 9 of the petition, it is alleged that the
Court of Appeals had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1)
day imposed by the lower court," although, in fact, minimum penalty imposed
by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor"; the Court resolved to
require counsel for the petitioner to show cause, within ten (10) days from
notice, why they should not be dealt with for contempt of court [or] otherwise
subjected to disciplinary action for making aforementioned misrepresentations."
"1chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary

A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was
filed on August 14, 1971. There was no attempt at justification, because in law
there is none, but it did offer what was hoped to be a satisfactory explanation.
If so, such optimism was misplaced. It betrayed on its face more than just a
hint of lack of candor, of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the
attribution to the Court of Appeals certain alleged facts not so considered as
such. It was then to say that the least a far from meticulous appraisal of the
matter in issue. Much of what was therein contained did not ring true.
Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the
same year, requiring all lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. At such a
hearing, respondent Delia T. Sutton appeared. While her demeanor was
respectful, it was obvious that she was far from contrite. On the contrary, the
impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her was hardly
deserving of any reproach. Even when subjected to intensive questioning by
several members of the Court, she was not to be budged from such an untenable
position. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable
reaction to, which her evasive answers gave rise. There certainly was lack of
awareness of the serious character of her misdeed. The act of unruffled
assurance under the circumstances was hard to understand. Perhaps realizing
that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo,
Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what
appeared in its petition for certiorari prepared by respondent Delia T. Sutton
insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of Appeals decision
sought to be reviewed was reprehensible, and did make with the proper spirit
of humility the necessary expression of regret. chanroblesvi rtual awlib raryc han robles v irt ual law l ibra ry

What is more, the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme
Court" filed on December 1, 1971, signed jointly by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and
Delia Sutton, did seek to make amends thus: "1. That undersigned attorney,
Delia T. Sutton, together with Messrs. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Pedro L. Yap and
Custodio O. Parlade, partners in the firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade &
Associates, appeared before this Honorable Court on November 22, 1971,
pursuant to an order dated October 18, 1971; 2. That with all the sincerity and
candor at the command of undersigned attorney, the circumstances surrounding
her preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show
cause why she should not be punished for contempt of court were explained by
her, with the assistance of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez; 3. That the undersigned
Delia T. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this
Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit, and that it was her lack of
adequate extensive experience in preparing petitions for certiorari which may
have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition which were
enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court; 4. That undersigned Delia T.
Sutton contritely realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of
the said petition for certiorari and that the same will not recur in the future as
she will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the Canons of
Professional Ethics, which reads: "22. [Candor and Fairness]. - The conduct of
the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by
candor and fairness. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote
the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or a textbook or;
with knowledge of its invalidity, to cite as authority a decision that has been
overruled, or a statute that has been repealed; or in argument to assert as fact
that which has not been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the
opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or
withholding positions in his opening argument upon which his side then intends
to rely. ..." 5. That undersigned Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez joins Atty. Delia T.
Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not having
thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. Delia T. Sutton of a type of
pleading with which she was not thoroughly familiar." 2 chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of
respondent Sutton. Some members of the Court feel, however, that it does not
go far enough. While expressing regret and offering apology, there was lacking
that free admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely
as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If there were a
greater sincerity on her part, the offense should have been acknowledged as
the submission of deliberate misstatements. There ought to be, for the apology
to gain significance, no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the
misdeed. It is then as if there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand
originally taken. The mood, even at this stage, seems to be that she could
brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were offered. This
Court does not view matters thus. To purge herself of the contempt, she ought
to have displayed the proper spirit of contrition and humility. The burden cast
on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is
asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due
recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense
of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of deviation from the truth.
As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more
certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and
to deprive the profession of that full measure of public esteem and confidence
which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than does the false claim,
often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that
it is the duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning
his client's cause." 3 What is more, the obligation to the bench, especially to this
Court, for candor and honesty takes precedence. It is by virtue of such
considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to
respondent Delia T. Sutton. chanroblesv irt ualawli bra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners, Attorney
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, both in the appearances before the Court and in the
pleadings submitted, must be commended. He has made manifest that his
awareness of the role properly incumbent on counsel, especially in his
relationship to this Court, is deep-seated. It must be stated, however, that in
the future he, as well as the other senior partners, should exercise greater care
in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm, perhaps
inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory
tenets of ethical conduct. chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law l ibra ry

WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured. Let a copy of

this resolution be spread on her record.

Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary chan roble s virtual law lib rary

Barredo, J., took no part. chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra rychan rob les vi rtual law lib rary

Makasiar, J., is on leave.