Garcia vs Mata

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975

Facts:

The donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that
the law was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing
power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to
Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Issue:

Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held:

The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item.
RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of
calling to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the constitutional prohibition
against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When an act
contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void,
inoperative and without effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

DEMETRIA VS ALBA
148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then
Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree
of 1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1, Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the
Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred
are actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose
of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set
in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond
the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to another in the GAA may be
allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.

ARAULLO VS AQUINO III

Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers – Fund Realignment – Constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program
Power of the Purse – Executive Impoundment

W hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the economy.

The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio “Butch” Abad then
came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign
funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next year’s appropriation. So what happens
under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the
funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by
the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate
the economy as economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted
by the Supreme Court).
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and other Senators,
received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request
of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign funds within the Executive.
It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
People’s Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province,
P50-P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned
citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions
was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions
thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order
292 (power of the President to suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a program by the Executive
and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not
violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were
withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were
already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the President’s power to refuse
to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, there’s no impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the heads of
the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”. Thus, no cross-border
transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the
GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing project in the
GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as
the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may
be legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such,
transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under the definition of
“savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in the funding of a certain
project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under
the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year.
But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being
declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under the law, such
funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections
have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it being declared as
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more
harm than good. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact
may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate
tribunals (civil, criminal, or administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

Philippine Constitution Association vs Salvador Enriquez

235 SCRA 506 – Political Law – Veto Power – Part of the Legislative Process
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel “Countrywide Development Fund”
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto authority of the president involving the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994 as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Constitution Association
(PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds
but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be applied for since that is already the function of
the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress
took steps to override the veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Tañada and Alberto Romulo sought the issuance of the
writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Tañada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions imposed by
the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, the DPWH, and the National Housing
Authority (NHA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the President’s veto is valid.
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted within its power and that the CDF is constitutional.
In the Tañada petitions the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others.
Veto on special provisions
The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the ruling in Gonzales vs Macaraig. The president
particularly vetoed the debt reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is already taken cared
of by other legislation and may be more properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete
the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Tañada et al averred that the president cannot validly veto that
provision w/o vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the vetoed
provision is considered “inappropriate”; in fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal
the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC’s), the President vetoed special provisions which authorize
the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was likewise vetoed. The reason
for the veto is that there were already funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Tañada et al
claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is in compliant to the “One Fund Policy” – it
avoided double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a breach of contractual obligations. The funds if
allotted may result to abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special Provision in question is
not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended – 70% by administrative and
30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in
an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they are
“appropriate” in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate
of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, “shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP
Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP”. The SC affirmed the
veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of
executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being “inappropriate” provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by direct appropriations
specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution. Moreover, he stated
that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU’s
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU’s including the payment of separation benefits. The President
declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on the CAFGU’s shall be
subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per
reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the it would only lead to the repeal of said
existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: “The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8,
Article IX-B of the Constitutional which states that ‘no elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive
additional, double, or indirect compensation unless specifically authorized by law.’ I am, therefore, confident that the
heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established principle on
compensation standardization. Tañada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the
independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained
the veto: In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself, not by
the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the
disbursements of appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as
superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being representatives of their local districts know more
about the problems in their constituents areas than the national government or the president for that matter. Hence,
with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.

Neptali Gonzales vs Macaraig

Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec
16 FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited
to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89)
and Section 16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she
cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided
for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that
power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put,
has the President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as “item,”
which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules
that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and
Section 16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that
should be treated as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.

Greco Belgica vs Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa

710 SCRA 1 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Local Government – Invalid Delegation
Legislative Department – Invalid Delegation of Legislative Power
This case is consolidated with G.R. No. 208493 and G.R. No. 209251.
The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about 1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known
as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from
“Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork
barrel is integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to – P40 million for “hard projects” (infrastructure
projects like roads, buildings, schools, etc.), and P30 million for “soft projects” (scholarship grants, medical assistance,
livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to – P100 million for hard projects, P100 million for soft projects.
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members may request for
the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for realignment is approved or concurred
by the legislator concerned.
Presidential Pork Barrel
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel
comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project – this has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR – this has been around since
about 1983.
Pork Barrel Scam Controversy
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers,
headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated
by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus
NGO’s (non-government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit
existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit
and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the Supreme Court
questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because it violates the following
principles:
a. Separation of Powers
As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive,
on the other hand, implements the laws – this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may
implement the law but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was
enacted, the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to – a clear act
of implementing the law they enacted – a violation of the principle of separation of powers. (Note in the older case
of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund,
was constitutional insofar as the legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go).
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still have to get the concurrence of
the legislator concerned.
b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power
As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in Congress alone. (The Constitution does grant the people legislative
power but only insofar as the processes of referendum and initiative are concerned). That being, legislative power
cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.
Exceptions to the rule are:
(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely local matters;
(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy
in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as Congress may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.
In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the projects to which his PDAF money
should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further,
nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
c. Principle of Checks and Balances
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he
may deem to be inappropriate. But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is
approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how
can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the approval of the
GAA – again, “Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power
of the President useless.”
d. Local Autonomy
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local affairs. Through their Local Development
Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF,
particularly on the part of the members of the house of representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman can
either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is an instance where the national
government (note, a congressman is a national officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government – and this is
contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good if that’s all that is happening
under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.
The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides:
No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not
from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as
amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter, provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain energy-related ventures shall
form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development
and for other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings shall be allocated to a General
Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the Constitution. The appropriation
contemplated therein does not have to be a particular appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case
of PD 910 and PD 1869.

Guingona v Carague Digest

Facts:
Petitioner senators question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget which
was authorized by PD 81. Petitioners seek that (1) PD 81, PD 1177 (Sec 31), and PD 1967 be declared unconstitutional, and
(2) restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees. While respondents contend
that the petition involves a political question (repeal/amendment of said laws)

Issue: Whether or not subject laws has been impliedly repealed by the 1987 Constitution

NO.
(1). Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental is the principle
that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly
stated.

(2) The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient
standards are indicated therein.

The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount
needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal, interest,
taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall
become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of
these laws is to enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the
credit standing of the country.
CASE DIGEST: Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and P155.3
Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while
the appropriations for the DECS amount to P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177,
entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,” and by
PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.”

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher
than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to
“assign the highest budgetary priority to education.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for
education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the highest
budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it
the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country.
More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for
debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional

Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works and Communications

110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed
the validity of the law. He claimed that the appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals
sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta
who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta
misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched
at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works
and Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the
property to the government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law
was passed when the said property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that
the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public
purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads
were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and,
hence, was null and void.
Garcia v. Comelec [Sept. 30, 1994]

24 SEP

GARCIA V. COMELEC
Sept. 30, 1994

FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10,
Serye 1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No.
7227.

The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of
initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said
resolution.

However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter
dated June 11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.

On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative because its subject is “merely a resolution and not an
ordinance.”

ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper subject of an initiative?
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set aside?

HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled and set aside.

RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation because of the event in February 1986. The
new Constitution became “less trusting of public officials.”

Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides
“amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least
12% of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at least 3% of the
registered voter therein.”

The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and
referendum.

On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor.”

YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides “ the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions
therefrom, whereby the people can directly propose
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress or local legislative body.

Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution – petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes – petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation – petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or
ordinance
 Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is “the power of local initiative shall not be exercised
more than once a year.”

Romulo Macalintal vs Commission on Elections

Political Law – Election Laws – Absentee Voters Act – Proclamation of Winners in a National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
(R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the following grounds, among others:

1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be allowed to participate in absentee
voting provided he executes an affidavit stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
intends to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which is empowered to do so.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintal’s arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically reside in the Philippines within the
period required for non-absentee voters. Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as election laws is concerned). The domicile is
the place where one has the intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating his intent to
return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee
voter to be exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified as an absentee voter.
2. The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to allow COMELEC to include the
proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that
Congress allowed COMELEC to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice
presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.

CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS. DESIERTO

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G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo

G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto

March 2, 2001

FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his
Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given
Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singson’s allegation also caused controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint.
The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as
presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.
The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from
private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and other bar associations joined in the thousands of protesters.

On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada
and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not
resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently with
congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned
his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming
the 14th president of the Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and
his family later left Malacañang Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for prohibition with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in
cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful
and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring
respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not petitioner Estrada was a president-
on-leave or did he truly resign.

2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity from suits.

HELD:

The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court said that while the Aquino
government was a government spawned by the direct demand of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing
the old government entirely, the Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution,
wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, it The question of whether the previous president (president
Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the issue is legal and not political.

For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore,
the quoted statements extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the press
release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning of its legality
and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by
the use of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.

As to the issue of the peitioner’s contention that he is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner is no longer entitled to
absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a
public office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal acts
committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president
from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time
during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another).

ESTRADA VS DESIERTO; ARROYO

Posted by kaye lee on 2:48 AM

Estrada vs Desierto G.R. No. 146710-15; Estrada vs Arroyo G.R. No. 146738, March 2 2001

[Immunity from Suit; Resignation of the President; Justiciable controversy]

FACTS:

It began in October 2000 when allegations of wrong doings involving bribe-taking, illegal gambling, and other forms of corruption
were made against Estrada before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. On November 13, 2000, Estrada was impeached by the Hor
and, on December 7, impeachment proceedings were begun in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and
corruption against Estrada were made and were only stopped on January 16, 2001 when 11 senators, sympathetic to the President,
succeeded in suppressing damaging evidence against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the
entire prosecution panel walked out and Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote against Estrada.

On January 19, PNP and the AFP also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. Estrada called for a
snap presidential election to be held concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not
run in this election. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his
post”. At noon, Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and his family later
left Malacañang Palace. Erap, after his fall, filed petition for prohibition with prayer for WPI. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until his term as president ends. He also prayed
for judgment “confirming Estrada to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to
discharge the duties of his office.

ISSUE(S):
1. WoN the petition presents a justiciable controversy.

2. WoN Estrada resigned as President.

3. WoN Arroyo is only an acting President.

4. WoN the President enjoys immunity from suit.

5. WoN the prosecution of Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity.

RULING:

1. Political questions- "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity,
or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure."

Legal distinction between EDSA People Power I EDSA People Power II:
 EDSA I EDSA II

exercise of people power of freedom of

speech and freedom of assemblyto petition
exercise of the people power of the government for redress of grievances
revolution which overthrew the whole which only affected the office of the
government. President.

extra constitutional and the legitimacy of

intra constitutional and the resignation of
the new government that resulted from it
the sitting President that it caused and the
cannot be the subject of judicial review
succession of the Vice President as
President are subject to judicial review.

presented a political question; involves legal questions.

The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain
provisions in the 1987 Constitution: Sec 1 of Art II, and Sec 8 of Art VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under Sec 11 of Art
VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the
right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity.

2. Elements of valid resignation: (a)an intent to resign and (b) acts of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left
the Palace.

Totality of prior contemporaneous posterior facts and circumstantial evidence— bearing material relevant issues—President Estrada
is deemed to have resigned— constructive resignation.

SC declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving Malacañan Palace. In the press
release containing his final statement:

1. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;

2. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process (he did not say that he was
leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);

3. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt referring to the past
opportunity);

4. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the country;

5. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

Intent to resign—must be accompanied by act of relinquishment—act or omission before, during and after January 20, 2001.

3. The Congress passed House Resolution No. 176 expressly stating its support to Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and subsequently passed H.R. 178 confirms the nomination of Teofisto T. Guingona Jr. As Vice President.
Senate passed HR No. 83 declaring the Impeachment Courts as Functius Officio and has been terminated. It is clear is that both
houses of Congress recognized Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of Estrada is
no longer temporary as the Congress has clearly rejected his claim of inability.

The Court therefore cannot exercise its judicial power for this is political in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional
fiat. In fine, even if Estrada can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the
ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that Arroyo is the
de jure, president made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
4. The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the
imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with
post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any trespasser.

5. No. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Also, since our justice system does not use the
jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court
also said that Estrada did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to
render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against Estrada were still undergoing preliminary
investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more
concerned with justice and less with prosecution.

G. R. No. 85468, September 07, 1989

DOROMA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor

FACTS:

 Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government

(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with
his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading
Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (or DECS) and the National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
 An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a
preliminary investigation was conducted.
 The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the
“Tanodbayan” to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman.
 The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987
Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly
without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by
the “Tanodbayan”.
 A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the
Doromal, a public officer, being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the Doromal
International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and which company
participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the
constitution.
 The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had
been no preliminary investigation for the new information that was filed against him.
 The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary
because both old and new informations involve the same subject matter.

ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations involve the same subject
matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.

HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.

RATIO:

 (1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to
bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family
corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
 Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or
indirectly... participate in any business.
 (2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his
opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.
 Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also
be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
 (3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do
they impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no
preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the
court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately
remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall
hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.

Civil Liberties Union vs Executive Secretary

194 SCRA 317 – Political Law – Ex Officio Officials – Members of the Cabinet – Singularity of Office – EO 284
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries to hold other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions subject to limitations set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this EO averring
that such law is unconstitutional. The constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU on the principal
submission that it adds exceptions to Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions against
holding any other office or employment in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The
Vice-President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary
of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice-
President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices
or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as above clarified
with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
examples during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials should be
considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s
understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,
EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members,
undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more than 2
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple offices
or employment in direct contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
Antonio Carpio vs The Executive Secretary
206 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Control Power – Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A
REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” was passed.
Antonio Carpio, as a member of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said
law as he averred that it only interferes with the control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its power “to
administrative control” over the PNP thus, “control” remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the
NPC and the PNP were placed; that the system of letting local executives choose local police heads also undermine
the power of the president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential power of
control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the
lowliest clerk. Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the “Doctrine of
Qualified Political Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time
and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants
and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
law to act in person on the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts
of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective jurisdictions in the
executive department.”
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies created under the assailed Act,
the funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by the national government.

Marcos VS. Manglapus- G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines
to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time
when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:

1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders

2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is
to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of

1. accumulated foreign debt

2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies

Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim
of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:

1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus
and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined
& exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare &
advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore
Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra
at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman, American President) and that the
president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of
the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions,
or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the
part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It
is proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her
decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country &
protection of the people. She has to uphold the Constitution.

Fernan, Concurring

1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on
abstract theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be
answerable by the President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s
responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish
to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.

Cruz, Dissenting

1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right
guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national security.
Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting

1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the
Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10
days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in
police power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such
be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative &
military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.

Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting

1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be agreed upon
by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.

G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989

Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return
of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the
death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and
society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:

1. Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth
and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily.
3. There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.

Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Ratio:

1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.

2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have
not been shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is
Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are
merely for specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general
grant that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive
unlike Congress can exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by
constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly
granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply
w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily

Government of the Philippine Islands vs Milton Springer

50 Phil 259 – Law on Public Officers – Power to Appoint is Essentially Executive
Sometime in the 1900s, the National Coal Company (NCC) was created by the Philippine Congress. The law created it
(Act No. 2822) provides that: “The voting power … shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.”
In November 1926, the Governor-General (Leonard Wood) issued E.O. No. 37 which divested the voting rights of the
Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in
the Governor-General who is the head of the government (President at that time was considered the head of state
but does not manage government affairs). A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate President and the House
Speaker.
However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker,
notwithstanding EO No. 37 and the objection of the Governor-General, still elected Milton Springer and four others
as Board of Directors of NCC. Thereafter, a quo warranto proceeding in behalf of the government was filed against
Springer et al questioning the validity of their election into the Board of NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly elect the Board Members of NCC.
HELD: No. E.O. No 37 is valid. It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill
the office. Appointing persons to a public office is essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled
corporation. It was created by Congress. To extend the power of Congress into allowing it, through the Senate
President and the House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is already an invasion of executive powers. The
Supreme Court however notes that indeed there are exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons
to fill public office. Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to fill offices within
the legislative branch – this exception is allowable because it does not weaken the executive branch.
Bermudez vs. Torres G.R. No. 131429, August 4, 1999
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-in-Charge of the
Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice Guingona for the position of Provincial
Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second
District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office.
Bermudez refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the duties and
functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the appointment of Quiaoit primarily
on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all
provincial and city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of the
Secretary.”

Issue: Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can be held
fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit

Held: An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one having the
authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The
appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing authority has been complied with and
its acceptance thereafter by the appointee in order to render it effective.

The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of choice which he may
exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have the
necessary qualifications and eligibilities.

When the Constitution or the law clothes the Pres. with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such conferment
must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. The Pres. is the head of
government whose authority includes the power of control over all “executive departments, bureaus and offices.”
Control means the authority of an empowered officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as
and when the former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions of an
executive department, bureau and office. It can therefore be inferred that the Pres. can interfere in the exercise of
discretion of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised
Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially
persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here
nothing really more than advisory in nature. The Pres., being the head of the Executive Department, could very well
disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary
authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
MA. J. ANGELINA G. MATIBAG, petitioner,
vs.
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, RESURRECCION Z. BORRA, FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., VELMA J. CINCO, and GIDEON C.
DE GUZMAN in his capacity as Officer-In-Charge, Finance Services Department of the Commission on
Elections,respondents.
G.R. No. 149036
April 2, 2002
EN BANC

FACTS:
On February 2, 1999, the COMELEC en banc appointed petitioner as "Acting Director IV" of the EID. On February 15, 2000, then
Chairperson Harriet O. Demetriou renewed the appointment of petitioner as Director IV of EID in a "Temporary" capacity. On March 22,
2001, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo as COMELEC Chairman together with other commisioners in
an ad interim appointment.
In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a Memorandum dated April 11, 2001 addressed to petitioner as Director
IV of the EID and to Cinco as Director III also of the EID, designating Cinco Officer-in-Charge of the EID and reassigning petitioner to the
Law Department. COMELEC EID Commissioner-in-Charge Mehol K. Sadain objected to petitioner’s reassignment in a Memorandum
dated April 14, 2001 addressed to the COMELEC en banc. Specifically, Commissioner Sadain questioned Benipayo’s failure to consult
the Commissioner-in-Charge of the EID in the reassignment of petitioner.
Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department.
Petitioner cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government
offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period beginning January 2 until June 13, 2001."
Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000,
Exempting the Comelec from the coverage of the said memo circular.
Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc in a Memorandum dated April 23,
2001. Petitioner also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her
reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.
During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC,
respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on
the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by
the President amounts to a temporary appointmentprohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

RULING:

We find petitioner’s argument without merit.

An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn
by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in
character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress.

DE CASTRO V. JBC, G.R. No. 191342 April 2, 2010 (CASE DIGEST)

FACTS:

This is a consolidated case which assails the constitutionality of the action of former President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo by appointing a Chief Justice 7 days after the Presidential election in 2010.

After the compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the position of Chief Justice was left
vacant. Section 4 (1), in relation to Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution states that, "vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from occurrence thereof," from a, "List of nominees prepared by the Judicial Bar Council for
every vacancy" furthermore, Section 15, Article VII was also taken into consideration which prohibits the
President or the Acting President from making appointments within two (2) months immediately before the next
Presidential elections and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC agreed that the vacant position must be filled and there were five (5) candidates for the position from
the most senior of the Associates of the court and one of them is Associate Justice Reynato C. Corona who was
chosen by the President and was appointed for the position of Chief Justice.

Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief Justice
since the Constitution do not apply to the Supreme Court. If the framers of the Constitution intended the
prohibition to apply in the Supreme Court then it should have expressly stated it in the Constitution.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the President can appoint the successor of the Chief Justice..

RULING:

Yes, the President can appoint the successor of Chief Justice as the prohibitions in the Constitution.

If the framers of the Constitution intends that the prohibition shall apply to the appointment of Chief Justice,
then they should have expressly stated it in the Constitution under Section 15 (THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT),
Article VII and Section 4 (1), Article VIII (JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT).

Section 14, Section 15 and Section 16 refers only to the appointments made in the Executive Department.
Funa vs Executive Secretary with Notes
G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Office of the President, SEC.
LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, USEC. MARIA ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as Undersecretary of the
Department of Transportation and Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the Maritime Industry Authority
(MARINA), Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation
of respondent Undersecretary Maria Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Maritime Industry
Authority (MARINA).
On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
(Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary.
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s appointment/designation, which is proscribed by
the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and assistants
to hold any other office or employment.
On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the MARINA
and she assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on February 2, 2009.
Petitioner argues that Bautista’s concurrent positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution .
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the requisites of a judicial inquiry are not present in this case. In
fact, there no longer exists an actual controversy that needs to be resolved in view of the appointment of
respondent Bautista as MARINA Administrator effective February 2, 2009 and the relinquishment of her post as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, which rendered the present petition moot and academic.
Petitioner’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is likewise moot and
academic since, with this supervening event, there is nothing left to enjoin.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position
of DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed, violated the constitutional
proscription against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
Held:
The petition is meritorious.
Petitioner having alleged a grave violation of the constitutional prohibition against Members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants holding two (2) or more positions in government, the fact that he filed this suit as
a concerned citizen sufficiently confers him with standing to sue for redress of such illegal act by public officials.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening
events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. But even in cases where supervening events had made the
cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and public. In the present case, the mootness of the petition does
not bar its resolution.
Resolution of the present controversy hinges on the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They
shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not,
during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B reads:
Sec. 7. x x x
Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
Noting that the prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing, the disqualification
was held to be absolute, as the holding of "any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in the Government"
unlike in Section 13, Article VI prohibiting Senators and Members of the House of Representatives from holding
"any other office or employment in the Government"; and when compared with other officials and employees
such as members of the armed forces and civil service employees, we concluded thus:
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his official family, which prohibitions
are not similarly imposed on other public officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of
the civil service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the 1987 Constitution to
treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in
the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions,
members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all
elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
multiple offices or employment in the government during their tenure, the exception to this prohibition must
be read with equal severity. On its face, the language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that it must be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to
be understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in
this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the
Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par.
(2), Article VII; or acting as President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII; and,
the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided in Section
7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or the primary functions of the
position. Neither was she designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception recognized
in Civil Liberties Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
Note:
Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results
in security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his
office. Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an
incumbent official, as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the
Board of Directors of the Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the
Supreme Court are designated by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. It is said that appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.
Designation may also be loosely defined as an appointment because it likewise involves the naming of a particular
person to a specified public office. That is the common understanding of the term. However, where the person
is merely designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, the designation is considered only
an acting or temporary appointment, which does not confer security of tenure on the person named.