JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., MATIAS G.R. No.

188920
V. DEFENSOR, JR., RODOLFO G.
VALENCIA, DANILO E. SUAREZ,
SOLOMON R. CHUNGALAO,
SALVACION ZALDIVAR-PEREZ,
HARLIN CAST-ABAYON, MELVIN G.
MACUSI and ELEAZAR P. QUINTO,
Petitioners, Present:
Puno, C.J.,
Carpio,
Corona,
Carpio Morales,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura,
- versus - Leonardo-De Castro,
Brion,
Peralta,
Bersamin,
Del Castillo,
Abad,
Villarama, Jr.,
Perez, and
Mendoza, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
FRANKLIN M. DRILON and Promulgated:
J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA,
Respondents. February 16, 2010
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This petition is an offshoot of two earlier cases already resolved by the Court involving a leadership dispute within a political party. In this
case, the petitioners question their expulsion from that party and assail the validity of the election of new party leaders conducted by the
respondents.
Statement of the Facts and the Case

For a better understanding of the controversy, a brief recall of the preceding events is in order.

On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys
withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP
Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.

On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and party matters but, when convened,
the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP
president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition[1] with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections. He
claimed that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political
Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution,[2] party officers were elected
to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. The
election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to people power, wherein the LP majority removed respondent Drilon as president
by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments[3] to the original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a
fixed three-year term, had not been properly ratified. Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,[4] partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006
elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the
others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the
amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the
position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.

Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a
resolution,[5] granting respondent Drilons petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the
COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a
consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.

Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out
of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended. Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza
sought to clarify their membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO. Eventually, that meeting installed
respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.

On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez, Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion
Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P. Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory
injunction[6] before the COMELEC against respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general. Atienza, et al.
sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO assembly which elected him was invalidly
convened. They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been based on a list appearing
in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it
showed that the NECO had 103 members.

Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to the NECO meeting and that some
members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of guests during the meeting. Atienzas allies allegedly raised these issues but
respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and railroaded the proceedings. He suspended the meeting and moved it to another
room, where Roxas was elected without notice to Atienzas allies.

On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas election as LP president faithfully complied with the provisions of the
amended LP Constitution. The partys 60thAnniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members because
supervening events changed the bodys number and composition. Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave
after accepting positions in the government. Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections, making them
ineligible to serve as NECO members. LP members who got elected to public office also became part of the NECO. Certain persons of national
stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilons nomination, a privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP
Constitution. In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening circumstances.

Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-Abayon resigned for holding the
illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006. This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently
ratified. Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party membership when they ran
under other political parties during the May 2007 elections. They were dropped from the roster of LP members.

On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.s petition. It noted that the May 2007
elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the amended LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators,
members of the House of Representatives, governors and mayors members of that body. That some lost or won these positions in the May
2007 elections affected the NECO membership. Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not
properly convened.

As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that this was a membership issue that
related to disciplinary action within the political party. The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction
to resolve.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed this petition for certiorari under Rule
65.

The Issues Presented

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; and

2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to question Roxas election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:

3. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership that elected respondent Roxas
as LP president;

4. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the validity of the NECO
meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al. from the party; and

5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.s constitutional right to due process by the latters
expulsion from the party.

The Courts Ruling

One. Respondents Roxas, et al. assert that the Court should dismiss the petition for failure of petitioners Atienza, et al. to implead
the LP as an indispensable party. Roxas, et al. point out that, since the petition seeks the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction against
the NECO, the controversy could not be adjudicated with finality without making the LP a party to the case. [7]

But petitioners Atienza, et al.s causes of action in this case consist in respondents Roxas, et al.s disenfranchisement of Atienza, et al. from the
election of party leaders and in the illegal election of Roxas as party president. Atienza, et al. were supposedly excluded from the elections by
a series of despotic acts of Roxas, et al., who controlled the proceedings. Among these acts are Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party, their
exclusion from the NECO, and respondent Drilons railroading of election proceedings. Atienza, et al. attributed all these illegal and
prejudicial acts to Roxas, et al.

Since no wrong had been imputed to the LP nor had some affirmative relief been sought from it, the LP is not an indispensable
party. Petitioners Atienza, et al.s prayer for the undoing of respondents Roxas, et al.s acts and the reconvening of the NECO are directed
against Roxas, et al.

Two. Respondents Roxas, et al. also claim that petitioners Atienza, et al. have no legal standing to question the election of Roxas as
LP president because they are no longer LP members, having been validly expelled from the party or having joined other political
parties.[8] As non-members, they have no stake in the outcome of the action.

But, as the Court held in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,[9] legal standing in suits is governed by the real parties-in-interest rule under
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This states that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest. And real party-in-interest is one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails
of the suit. In other words, the plaintiffs standing is based on his own right to the relief sought. In raising petitioners Atienza, et al.s lack of
standing as a threshold issue, respondents Roxas, et al. would have the Court hypothetically assume the truth of the allegations in the
petition.

Here, it is precisely petitioners Atienza, et al.s allegations that respondents Roxas, et al. deprived them of their rights as LP
members by summarily excluding them from the LP roster and not allowing them to take part in the election of its officers and that not all
who sat in the NECO were in the correct list of NECO members. If Atienza, et al.s allegations were correct, they would have been irregularly
expelled from the party and the election of officers, void. Further, they would be entitled to recognition as members of good standing and to
the holding of a new election of officers using the correct list of NECO members. To this extent, therefore, Atienza, et al. who want to take
part in another election would stand to be benefited or prejudiced by the Courts decision in this case. Consequently, they have legal standing
to pursue this petition.

Three. In assailing respondent Roxas election as LP president, petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the NECO members allowed to
take part in that election should have been limited to those in the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60 th Anniversary Souvenir
Program. Atienza, et al. allege that respondent Drilon, as holdover LP president, adopted that list in the earlier cases before the COMELEC
and it should thus bind respondents Roxas, et al. The Courts decision in the earlier cases, said Atienza, et al., anointed that list for the next
party election. Thus, Roxas, et al. in effect defied the Courts ruling when they removed Atienza as party chairman and changed the NECOs
composition.[10]

But the list of NECO members appearing in the partys 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program was drawn before the May 2007
elections. After the 2007 elections, changes in the NECO membership had to be redrawn to comply with what the amended LP Constitution
required. Respondent Drilon adopted the souvenir program as common exhibit in the earlier cases only to prove that the NECO, which
supposedly elected Atienza as new LP president on March 2, 2006, had been improperly convened. It cannot be regarded as an immutable
list, given the nature and character of the NECO membership.

Nothing in the Courts resolution in the earlier cases implies that the NECO membership should be pegged to the partys
60th Anniversary Souvenir Program. There would have been no basis for such a position. The amended LP Constitution did not intend the
NECO membership to be permanent. Its Section 27[11] provides that the NECO shall include all incumbent senators, members of the House of
Representatives, governors, and mayors who were LP members in good standing for at least six months. It follows from this that with the
national and local elections taking place in May 2007, the number and composition of the NECO would have to yield to changes brought
about by the elections.

Former NECO members who lost the offices that entitled them to membership had to be dropped. Newly elected ones who gained
the privilege because of their offices had to come in. Furthermore, former NECO members who passed away, resigned from the party, or
went on leave could not be expected to remain part of the NECO that convened and held elections on November 26, 2007. In addition,
Section 27 of the amended LP Constitution expressly authorized the party president to nominate persons of national stature to the
NECO. Thus, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot validly object to the admission of 12 NECO members nominated by respondent Drilon when he
was LP president. Even if this move could be regarded as respondents Roxas, et al.s way of ensuring their election as party officers, there was
certainly nothing irregular about the act under the amended LP Constitution.

The NECO was validly convened in accordance with the amended LP Constitution. Respondents Roxas, et al. explained in details how they
arrived at the NECO composition for the purpose of electing the party leaders. [12] The explanation is logical and consistent with party
rules. Consequently, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld the composition of the NECO that elected Roxas as LP
president.

Petitioner Atienza claims that the Courts resolution in the earlier cases recognized his right as party chairman with a term, like
respondent Drilon, that would last up to November 30, 2007 and that, therefore, his ouster from that position violated the Courts
resolution. But the Courts resolution in the earlier cases did not preclude the party from disciplining Atienza under Sections 29[13] and
46[14] of the amended LP Constitution. The party could very well remove him or any officer for cause as it saw fit.

Four. Petitioners Atienza, et al. lament that the COMELEC selectively exercised its jurisdiction when it ruled on the composition of
the NECO but refused to delve into the legality of their expulsion from the party. The two issues, they said, weigh heavily on the leadership
controversy involved in the case. The previous rulings of the Court, they claim, categorically upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
intra-party leadership disputes.[15]

But, as respondents Roxas, et al. point out, the key issue in this case is not the validity of the expulsion of petitioners Atienza, et al. from the
party, but the legitimacy of the NECO assembly that elected respondent Roxas as LP president. Given the COMELECs finding as upheld by this
Court that the membership of the NECO in question complied with the LP Constitution, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the party
validly expelled petitioners cannot affect the election of officers that the NECO held.

While petitioners Atienza, et al. claim that the majority of LP members belong to their faction, they did not specify who these members were
and how their numbers could possibly affect the composition of the NECO and the outcome of its election of party leaders. Atienza, et al. has
not bothered to assail the individual qualifications of the NECO members who voted for Roxas. Nor did Atienza, et al. present proof that the
NECO had no quorum when it then assembled. In other words, the claims of Atienza, et al. were totally unsupported by evidence.

Consequently, petitioners Atienza, et al. cannot claim that their expulsion from the party impacts on the party leadership issue or
on the election of respondent Roxas as president so that it was indispensable for the COMELEC to adjudicate such claim. Under the
circumstances, the validity or invalidity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion was purely a membership issue that had to be settled within the party. It
is an internal party matter over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

What is more, some of petitioner Atienzas allies raised objections before the NECO assembly regarding the status of members from their
faction. Still, the NECO proceeded with the election, implying that its membership, whose composition has been upheld, voted out those
objections.

The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies
involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC
may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v.
Commission on Elections[16] that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, include the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court also declared in another
case[17] that the COMELECs power to register political parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on its
behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute, in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to
register political parties.

The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP
Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is
also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts.[18] In
simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party.
The law also grants a registered political party certain rights and privileges that will redound to the benefit of its official candidates. It
imposes, too, legal obligations upon registered political parties that have to be carried out through their leaders. The resolution of the
leadership issue is thus particularly significant in ensuring the peaceful and orderly conduct of the elections. [19]

Five. Petitioners Atienza, et al. argue that their expulsion from the party is not a simple issue of party membership or discipline; it
involves a violation of their constitutionally-protected right to due process of law. They claim that the NAPOLCO and the NECO should have
first summoned them to a hearing before summarily expelling them from the party. According to Atienza, et al., proceedings on party
discipline are the equivalent of administrative proceedings[20] and are, therefore, covered by the due process requirements laid down in Ang
Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.[21]

But the requirements of administrative due process do not apply to the internal affairs of political parties. The due process
standards set in Ang Tibay cover only administrative bodies created by the state and through which certain governmental acts or functions
are performed. An administrative agency or instrumentality contemplates an authority to which the state delegates governmental power for
the performance of a state function.[22] The constitutional limitations that generally apply to the exercise of the states powers thus, apply too,
to administrative bodies.

The constitutional limitations on the exercise of the states powers are found in Article III of the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights. The Bill of Rights, which guarantees against the taking of life, property, or liberty without due process under Section 1 is generally a
limitation on the states powers in relation to the rights of its citizens. The right to due process is meant to protect ordinary citizens against
arbitrary government action, but not from acts committed by private individuals or entities. In the latter case, the specific statutes that
provide reliefs from such private acts apply. The right to due process guards against unwarranted encroachment by the state into the
fundamental rights of its citizens and cannot be invoked in private controversies involving private parties.[23]
 Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is
still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or
property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent
his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to
those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party
members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those
rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies.

But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a
political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free
association. In Sinaca v. Mula,[24] the Court said that judicial restraint in internal party matters serves the public interest by allowing the
political processes to operate without undue interference. It is also consistent with the state policy of allowing a free and open party system
to evolve, according to the free choice of the people.[25]

To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on
the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs
performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et
al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot
intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009
in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.

SO ORDERED.
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No. 179271
NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner,

- versus -

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.

ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE

PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.

AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,
and ABONO, QUISUMBING,
Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent.
_______________________

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus,[1] assails the Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07-041
(PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board
of Canvassers (NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot.BANAT filed before the COMELEC En Banc, acting as NBC,
a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.

The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo (AT), and Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).

Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution No. 07-
60[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 07-60 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations and coalitions that obtained at least
two percent of the total votes cast under the Party-List System. The COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the canvass of the party-
list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party, organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC[5] (Veterans).

Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion to intervene in both G.R.
Nos. 179271 and 179295.

The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93
parties under the Party-List System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as
NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently
been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the
Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a
memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen
(13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens Battle Against
Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of
Rural Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:

WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its Sub-Committee for
Party-List, as of 03 July 2007, had officially canvassed, in open and public proceedings, a total of fifteen million two
hundred eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine (15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of
Representation, in connection with the National and Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and Tabulation Groups of the National Board of Canvassers reveals that the
projected/maximum total party-list votes cannot go any higher than sixteen million seven hundred twenty three
thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121) votes given the following statistical data:

Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May 2007 Elections

i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated 15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/ untabulated (i.e.
canvass deferred) 1,337,032
iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100% outcome) from areas
not yet submitted for canvass (Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao
del Norte; and Pagalungan, Maguindanao)
102,430
Maximum Total Party-List Votes 16,723,121

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 (Party-List System Act) provides in part:

The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: provided, that those garnering more than two
percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes: provided, finally, that each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the above projected total of party-list votes, the presumptive two percent
(2%) threshold can be pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC, reiterated its ruling
in Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the additional seats of each party, organization or
coalition receving more than the required two percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be determined only after all
party-list ballots have been completely canvassed;

WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three hundred thirty four
thousand four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:

RANK PARTY/ORGANIZATION/ VOTES

COALITION RECEIVED
1 BUHAY 1,163,218

2 BAYAN MUNA 972,730

3 CIBAC 760,260
4 GABRIELA 610,451
5 APEC 538,971
6 A TEACHER 476,036
7 AKBAYAN 470,872
8 ALAGAD 423,076
9 BUTIL 405,052
10 COOP-NATCO 390,029
11 BATAS 386,361
12 ANAK PAWIS 376,036
13 ARC 338,194
14 ABONO 337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an URGENT
PETITION FOR CANCELLATION/REMOVAL OF REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With
Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07-250, all the
parties, organizations and coalitions included in the aforementioned list are therefore entitled to at least one seat under
the party-list system of representation in the meantime.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order
No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws, the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain conditions set forth below,
the following parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the Party-List System:

1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong BUHAY

2 Bayan Muna BAYAN MUNA
3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption CIBAC
4 Gabriela Womens Party GABRIELA
5 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives APEC
6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action, A TEACHER
 Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms, Inc.
7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party AKBAYAN
8 Alagad ALAGAD
9 Luzon Farmers Party BUTIL
10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party COOP-NATCCO
11 Anak Pawis ANAKPAWIS
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns ARC
13 Abono ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the Party-List System.

The total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results.

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS) is hereby deferred until final
resolution of SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the proceedings therein moot and academic.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-72, which declared the additional
seats allocated to the appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC Resolution
No. 07-72:

WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of Canvassers proclaimed
thirteen (13) qualified parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of
334,462 votes from the projected maximum total number of party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given one (1)
guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group and Supervisory Committee of the National Board of Canvassers, the
projected maximum total party-list votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes actually canvassed, votes canvassed but
not included in Report No. 29, votes received but uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for Pantar, Lanao del Norte,
is 16,261,369; and that the projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and
coalition[s] are as follows:

Party-List Projected total number of votes

1 BUHAY 1,178,747
2 BAYAN MUNA 977,476
3 CIBAC 755,964
4 GABRIELA 621,718
5 APEC 622,489
6 A TEACHER 492,369
7 AKBAYAN 462,674
8 ALAGAD 423,190
9 BUTIL 409,298
10 COOP-NATCO 412,920
11 ANAKPAWIS 370,165
12 ARC 375,846
13 ABONO 340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest number of votes among
the thirteen (13) qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the first party in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and coalitions participating under the party-list system of representation that
have obtained one guaranteed (1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats based on the formula prescribed by
the Supreme Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the first party, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans, is:

Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes of first

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system

wherein the proportion of votes received by the first party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to additional seats:

Proportion of votes received Additional seats

by the first party
Equal to or at least 6% Two (2) additional seats
 Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4% No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369

which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.

WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct
formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows:

Party List Percentage Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA 1.65 1
CIBAC 1.28 1
GABRIELA 1.05 1
APEC 1.05 1
A TEACHER 0.83 0
AKBAYAN 0.78 0
ALAGAD 0.71 0
BUTIL 0.69 0
COOP-NATCO 0.69 0
ANAKPAWIS 0.62 0
ARC 0.63 0
ABONO 0.57 0

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code, Executive Order No.
144, Republic Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following parties, organizations
or coalitions as entitled to additional seats, to wit:

Party List Additional Seats

BUHAY 2
BAYAN MUNA 1
CIBAC 1
GABRIELA 1
APEC 1

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of other parties, organizations or coalitions which may later on be
established to have obtained at least two per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the party-list system to entitle them
to one (1) guaranteed seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to entitle them to one (1) additional seat.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with pending disputes shall
likewise be held in abeyance until final resolution of their respective cases.

Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed
by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).

Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-
list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads:

COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition
to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the
following reliefs, to wit:
 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed.

2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be
harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in
that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of
their initial/first ranking.

3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and

4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the
votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to
the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of
those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule. In fine, the formula/procedure prescribed
in the ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST SEATS, ANNEX A of COMELEC RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June
1996, shall be used for [the] purpose of determining how many seats shall be proclaimed, which party-
list groups are entitled to representative seats and how many of their nominees shall seat [sic].

5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the
procedure in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be
followed.

RECOMMENDATION:

The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic.

The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the
Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating
Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among
others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of
the party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to approve and
adopt the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of BANAT for
being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this resolution.
SO ORDERED.[10]

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for
reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula
as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No.
7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.[11]

Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed three other party-list organizations as
qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines, Inc.
(AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the following party-list organizations have
been proclaimed as of 19 May 2008:

Party-List No. of Seat(s)

1.1 Buhay 3
1.2 Bayan Muna 2
1.3 CIBAC 2
1.4 Gabriela 2
1.5 APEC 2
1.6 A Teacher 1
1.7 Akbayan 1
1.8 Alagad 1
1.9 Butil 1
1.10 Coop-Natco [sic] 1
1.11 Anak Pawis 1
1.12 ARC 1
1.13 Abono 1
1.14 AGAP 1
1.15 AMIN 1

The proclamation of Bagong Alyansang Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS), against which an Urgent Petition for
Cancellation/Removal of Registration and Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for the Issuance of Restraining Order) has
been filed before the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution of SPC No. 07-250.

Issues

BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
 2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?[16]

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand, raised the following issues in their petition:

I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as National Board of Canvassers, committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party
Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations as said rule:

A. Violates the constitutional principle of proportional representation.

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule in allocating additional seats for the First Party violates the principle of
proportional representation under RA 7941.

2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of additional seats, one for the First Party and another for the qualifying
parties, violates Section 11(b) of RA 7941.

3. The proportional relationships under the First Party Rule are different from those required under RA 7941;

C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the Philippine party-list system as provided for under the same case
of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v. COMELEC.

II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it implemented the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to qualified party-list organizations, the
same being merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant Petition is a
justiciable case as the issues involved herein are constitutional in nature, involving the correct interpretation and
implementation of RA 7941, and are of transcendental importance to our nation.[17]

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory
for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008:

1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory
or merely a ceiling?

2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?

3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the
major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?[18]

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly
stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of
the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list;

Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for
the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives;

Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a
maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;

Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in
proportion to their total number of votes.[19]

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is
compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

Number of Party-List Representatives:

The Formula Mandated by the Constitution

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including
those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except
the religious sector.
The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%)
of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list.
xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list
representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of
representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this
point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

Number of seats available to Number of seats available to

legislative districts x .20 = party-list representatives
.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list representatives whenever a legislative
district is created by law. Since the 14thCongress of the Philippines has 220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available to party-list
representatives.

220 x .20 = 55
.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the
manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature.

Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:

The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List System, as well as on the formula
to determine the guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However, there are
numerous interpretations of the provisions of R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System. Veterans produced the First Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer
formula[21] as an alternative.

The Constitution left to Congress the determination of the manner of allocating the seats for party-list representatives. Congress enacted
R.A. No. 7941, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of which provide:

Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x x x

In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote,[22] the following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.

(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes
shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the
parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and
allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. (Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two interpretations through three formulas to allocate party-list representative seats.

The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT described this procedure as follows:

(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the House of
Representatives including those from the party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
Section 11 (1st par.) of RA 7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25 June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be 55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have to be proclaimed.

(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the total party-list votes
they obtained; provided, that no party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats (Section 11, RA 7941).

(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the seats obtained by the party-list groups under the immediately preceding
paragraph and after deducting from their total the votes corresponding to those seats, the remaining seats shall be
allotted proportionately to all the party-list groups which have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under the 2%
threshold rule, in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941.[23]

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs first interpretation.

The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes that the 2% vote requirement is declared unconstitutional, and apportions the
seats for party-list representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:
 (a) shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.[24]

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results: one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes received by each party as
against the total nationwide party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats.[25] Thirty-four (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs second interpretation.

In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6 formula and the Veterans formula for
systematically preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up. They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total number of seats
alloted for the entire Party-List System. Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After
determining the qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by dividing the votes of a qualified partyby the total votes of all qualified
parties only. The number of seats allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying the total party-list seats available with the second
percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation, limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of the number of seats
allocated to the concerned party-list. After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a second round of seat allocation is conducted. The
fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats on the basis of this ranking are
allocated until all the seats are filled up.[26]

We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate seats for party-list representatives.

Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.

Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes garnered during
the elections.[27]

Votes Votes
Rank Party Rank Party
Garnered Garnered
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 48 KALAHI 88,868
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 49 APOI 79,386
3 CIBAC 755,686 50 BP 78,541
4 GABRIELA 621,171 51 AHONBAYAN 78,424
5 APEC 619,657 52 BIGKIS 77,327
6 A TEACHER 490,379 53 PMAP 75,200
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 54 AKAPIN 74,686
8 ALAGAD 423,149 55 PBA 71,544
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 56 GRECON 62,220
10 BUTIL 409,160 57 BTM 60,993
11 BATAS 385,810 58 A SMILE 58,717
12 ARC 374,288 59 NELFFI 57,872
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 60 AKSA 57,012
14 ABONO 339,990 61 BAGO 55,846
15 AMIN 338,185 62 BANDILA 54,751
16 AGAP 328,724 63 AHON 54,522
17 AN WARAY 321,503 64 ASAHAN MO 51,722
18 YACAP 310,889 65 AGBIAG! 50,837
19 FPJPM 300,923 66 SPI 50,478
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 67 BAHANDI 46,612
21 ABS 235,086 68 ADD 45,624
22 KAKUSA 228,999 69 AMANG 43,062
23 KABATAAN 228,637 70 ABAY PARAK 42,282
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 71 BABAE KA 36,512
25 ALIF 217,822 72 SB 34,835
26 SENIOR CITIZENS 213,058 73 ASAP 34,098
27 AT 197,872 74 PEP 33,938
28 VFP 196,266 75 ABA ILONGGO 33,903
29 ANAD 188,521 76 VENDORS 33,691
30 BANAT 177,028 77 ADD-TRIBAL 32,896
31 ANG KASANGGA 170,531 78 ALMANA 32,255
32 BANTAY 169,801 79 AANGAT KA 29,130
PILIPINO
33 ABAKADA 166,747 80 AAPS 26,271
34 1-UTAK 164,980 81 HAPI 25,781
35 TUCP 162,647 82 AAWAS 22,946
36 COCOFED 155,920 83 SM 20,744
 37 AGHAM 146,032 84 AG 16,916
38 ANAK 141,817 85 AGING PINOY 16,729
39 ABANSE! PINAY 130,356 86 APO 16,421
40 PM 119,054 87 BIYAYANG BUKID 16,241
41 AVE 110,769 88 ATS 14,161
42 SUARA 110,732 89 UMDJ 9,445
43 ASSALAM 110,440 90 BUKLOD FILIPINA 8,915
44 DIWA 107,021 91 LYPAD 8,471
45 ANC 99,636 92 AA-KASOSYO 8,406
46 SANLAKAS 97,375 93 KASAPI 6,221
47 ABC 90,058 TOTAL 15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the
total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for illustration purposes.The percentage of votes garnered by each party is arrived at by
dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.

Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their respective percentage of votes garnered over the total votes for the
party-list.[28]

Votes Garnered
Votes Guaranteed
Rank Party over Total Votes for
Garnered Seat
Party-List, in %
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1
6 A TEACHER 490,379 3.07% 1
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1
9 COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1
11 BATAS[29] 385,810 2.42% 1
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1
Total 17
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list candidates received at least 2% from the total number of votes cast for party-list
candidates. The 17 qualified party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or
the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation, we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. This is where petitioners and intervenors problem with the formula
in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause in proportion to their total number of votes to be in proportion to the votes of the first
party. This interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A. No. 7941.

We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of
the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent
threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available
party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the
attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list
elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to
100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.

We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause
of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the
House of Representatives.[30]
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be
observed:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat
each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a
rounding off of fractional seats.

In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each
party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First,
the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the
remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the
parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of
seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Additional (B) plus

Votes Guaranteed Applying
Seats (C), in
Garnered Seat the three
whole
over seat cap
integers
Total Votes
Votes for Party
Rank Party
Garnered List, in %
(Second
(First Round)
Round)
(A) (B) (E)
(C) (D)
1 BUHAY 1,169,234 7.33% 1 2.79 3 N.A.
2 BAYAN MUNA 979,039 6.14% 1 2.33 3 N.A.
3 CIBAC 755,686 4.74% 1 1.80 2 N.A.
4 GABRIELA 621,171 3.89% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
5 APEC 619,657 3.88% 1 1.48 2 N.A.
6 A Teacher 490,379 3.07% 1 1.17 2 N.A.
7 AKBAYAN 466,112 2.92% 1 1.11 2 N.A.
8 ALAGAD 423,149 2.65% 1 1.01 2 N.A.
9[31] COOP-NATCCO 409,883 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
10 BUTIL 409,160 2.57% 1 1 2 N.A.
11 BATAS 385,810 2.42% 1 1 2 N.A.
12 ARC 374,288 2.35% 1 1 2 N.A.
13 ANAKPAWIS 370,261 2.32% 1 1 2 N.A.
14 ABONO 339,990 2.13% 1 1 2 N.A.
15 AMIN 338,185 2.12% 1 1 2 N.A.
16 AGAP 328,724 2.06% 1 1 2 N.A.
17 AN WARAY 321,503 2.02% 1 1 2 N.A.
18 YACAP 310,889 1.95% 0 1 1 N.A.
19 FPJPM 300,923 1.89% 0 1 1 N.A.
20 UNI-MAD 245,382 1.54% 0 1 1 N.A.
21 ABS 235,086 1.47% 0 1 1 N.A.
22 KAKUSA 228,999 1.44% 0 1 1 N.A.
23 KABATAAN 228,637 1.43% 0 1 1 N.A.
24 ABA-AKO 218,818 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
25 ALIF 217,822 1.37% 0 1 1 N.A.
26 SENIOR 213,058 1.34% 0 1 1 N.A.
 CITIZENS
27 AT 197,872 1.24% 0 1 1 N.A.
28 VFP 196,266 1.23% 0 1 1 N.A.
29 ANAD 188,521 1.18% 0 1 1 N.A.
30 BANAT 177,028 1.11% 0 1 1 N.A.
31 ANG 170,531 1.07% 0 1 1 N.A.
KASANGGA
32 BANTAY 169,801 1.06% 0 1 1 N.A.
33 ABAKADA 166,747 1.05% 0 1 1 N.A.
34 1-UTAK 164,980 1.03% 0 1 1 N.A.
35 TUCP 162,647 1.02% 0 1 1 N.A.
36 COCOFED 155,920 0.98% 0 1 1 N.A.
Total 17 55

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-
list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for
one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party, are shown in column (D).

Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we
wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up
the system, and we would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to
put a ceiling on the number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the
party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are
we going to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the
party list concept or must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for
the Senate as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20
percent or 30 percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized
sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would
he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would
pass on whether he is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political
parties, are not prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized
along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the
contention of political parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in
them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list
at mawawalang saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved
din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and
probably also to Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party
list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be
allowed to register for the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

 MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

xxxx

MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also create the stimulus for political parties and mass organizations to seek
common ground. For example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO. I see no reason why they should not be able to
make common goals with mass organizations so that the very leadership of these parties can be transformed through the
participation of mass organizations. And if this is true of the administration parties, this will be true of others like the
Partido ng Bayan which is now being formed. There is no question that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact mass organizations
so that with their participation, the policies of such parties can be radically transformed because this amendment will
create conditions that will challenge both the mass organizations and the political parties to come together. And the party
list system is certainly available, although it is open to all the parties. It is understood that the parties will enter in the roll
of the COMELEC the names of representatives of mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we may, in time, develop
this excellent system that they have in Europe where labor organizations and cooperatives, for example, distribute
themselves either in the Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their very presence
there has a transforming effect upon the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.

It is also a fact well known to all that in the United States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the Democratic Party. But the
businessmen, most of them, always vote with the Republican Party, meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine, reenforce, influence and interact with each other so that the very
objectives that we set in this Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved in a wider, more lasting, and more
institutionalized way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta] amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a
constitutional gift, but at the same time, it challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being elected representatives
later on through a party list system; and even beyond that, to become actual political parties capable of contesting
political power in the wider constitutional arena for major political parties.

x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941 reads:

Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions
thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may
participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It
is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5
hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interests and concerns of their sector,

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical
attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political
and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list elections.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the
framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In
fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation
of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a
sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major
political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No.
7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-
list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to
establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the
Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other
major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can
establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng
Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.

The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:

Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on
the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attainsthe age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk,
or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the
Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of
Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more
than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law
which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a
limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party
from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political parties from the party-list elections joined
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with
this ponencia.

WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent threshold in the distribution
of additional party-list seats. The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List System shall be in accordance with the procedure used in
Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are disallowed from participating in party-list elections. This Decision is immediately
executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013

ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. Nos. 203818-19

AKO BICOL POLITICAL PARTY (AKB), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203922

ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC),represented by its President Congressman Ponciano D.

Payuyo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203936

AKSYON MAGSASAKA-PARTIDO TINIG NG MASA, represented by its President Michael Abas Kida,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203958

KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAKULONG NA WALANG SALA, INC. (KAKUSA), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203960

1st CONSUMERS ALLIANCE FOR RURAL ENERGY, INC. (1-CARE), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203976

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC. (ARARO), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 203981

ASSOCIATION FOR RIGHTEOUSNESS ADVOCACY ON LEADERSHIP (ARAL) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by Ms. Lourdes L.
Agustin, the party’s Secretary General, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204002

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL CONCERNS, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204094

ALLIANCE FOR NATIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY (ANAD), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204100

1-BRO PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., (1BRO-PGBI) formerly PGBI, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204122

1 GUARDIANS NATIONALIST PHILIPPINES, INC., (1GANAP/GUARDIANS), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC composed of SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Chairman, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Commissioner,LUCENITO N. TAGLE, Commissioner,ARMANDO C. VELASCO, Commissioner,ELIAS R. YUSOPH, Commissioner,
andCHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, Commissioner,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204125

AGAPAY NG INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ALLIANCE, INC. (A-IPRA), represented by its Secretary General,Ronald D.
Macaraig, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204126

KAAGAPAY NG NAGKAKAISANG AGILANG PILIPINONG MAGSASAKA (KAP), formerly known as AKO AGILA NG NAGKAKAISANG
MAGSASAKA (AKO AGILA), represented by its Secretary General, Leo R. San Buenaventura, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204139

ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), represented by Atty. Berteni Cataluña Causing, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204141

BANTAY PARTY LIST, represented by Maria Evangelina F. Palparan, President, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204153

PASANG MASDA NATIONWIDE PARTY by its President Roberto "Ka Obet" Martin, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204158

ABROAD PARTY LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, LUCENITO TAGLE, AND ALL OTHER PERSONS
ACTING ON THEIR BEHALF,Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204174

AANGAT TAYO PARTY LIST-PARTY, represented by its President Simeon T. Silva, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204216

COCOFED-PHILIPPINE COCONUT PRODUCERS FEDERATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204220

ABANG LINGKOD PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204236

FIRM 24-K ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204238

ALLIANCE OF BICOLNON PARTY (ABP), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204239

GREEN FORCE FOR THE ENVIRONMENT SONS AND DAUGHTERS OF MOTHER EARTH (GREENFORCE),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204240

AGRI-AGRA NA REPORMA PARA SA MAGSASAKA NG PILIPINAS MOVEMENT (AGRI), represented by its Secretary General, Michael
Ryan A. Enriquez, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204263

A BLESSED PARTY LIST A.K.A. BLESSEDFEDERATION OF FARMERS AND FISHERMEN INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204318

UNITED MOVEMENT AGAINST DRUGS FOUNDATION (UNIMAD) PARTY-LIST, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204321

ANG AGRIKULTURA NATIN ISULONG (AANI), represented by its Secretary General Jose C. Policarpio, Jr.,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204323

BAYANI PARTYLIST as represented byHomer Bueno, Fitrylin Dalhani,Israel de Castro, Dante Navarroand Guiling
Mamondiong, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, CHAIRMAN SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., COMMISSIONERS RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
ARMANDO C. VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MARIA GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204341

ACTION LEAGUE OF INDIGENOUS MASSES(ALIM) PARTY-LIST, represented herein by its President Fatani S. Abdul Malik, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204356

BUTIL FARMERS PARTY, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204358

ALLIANCE OF ADVOCATES IN MININGADVANCEMENT FOR NATIONAL PROGRESS (AAMA), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204359

SOCIAL MOVEMENT FOR ACTIVEREFORM AND TRANSPARENCY (SMART), represented by its Chairman, Carlito B. Cubelo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204364

ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG-TAO, PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY, HANAPBUHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO

BUHAY), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their capacities as Commissioners
thereof, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204367

AKBAY KALUSUGAN INCORPORATION(AKIN), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204370

AKO AN BISAYA (AAB), represented by itsSecretary General, Rodolfo T. Tuazon, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204374

BINHI-PARTIDO NG MGA MAGSASAKA PARA SA MGA MAGSASAKA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204379

ALAGAD NG SINING (ASIN) represented by its President, Faye Maybelle Lorenz, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204394

ASSOCIATION OF GUARD UTILITY HELPER, AIDER, RIDER, DRIVER/DOMESTIC HELPER, JANITOR, AGENT AND NANNY OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (GUARDJAN), Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204402

KALIKASAN PARTY-LIST, represented by its President, Clemente G. Bautista, Jr., and Secretary General, Frances Q.
Quimpo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204408

PILIPINO ASSOCIATION FOR COUNTRY-URBAN POOR YOUTH ADVANCEMENT AND WELFARE (PACYAW),Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204410

1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204421

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC. SENIOR CITIZEN PARTY-LIST, represented herein by
its 1st nominee and Chairman, Francisco G. Datol, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204425

COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ANY OF ITS OFFICERS AND AGENTS, ACTING FOR AND IN ITS BEHALF, INCLUDING THE CHAIR AND
MEMBERSOF THE COMMISSION, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204426

ASSOCIATION OF LOCAL ATHLETICS ENTREPRENEURS AND HOBBYISTS, INC. (ALA-EH), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., RENE V. SARMIENTO, LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO C. VELASCO,
ELIAS R. YUSOPH, CHRISTIAN ROBERT S. LIM, and MA. GRACIA CIELO M. PADACA, in their respective capacities as COMELEC
Chairperson and Commissioners, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204428

ANG GALING PINOY (AG), represented by its Secretary General, Bernardo R. Corella, Jr., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204435

1 ALLIANCE ADVOCATING AUTONOMY PARTY (1AAAP), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204436

ABYAN ILONGGO PARTY (AI), represented byits Party President, Rolex T. Suplico, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204455

MANILA TEACHER SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204484

PARTIDO NG BAYAN ANG BIDA (PBB), represented by its Secretary General, Roger M. Federazo, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204485

ALLIANCE OF ORGANIZATIONS, NETWORKS AND ASSOCIATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (ALONA),Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204486

1st KABALIKAT NG BAYAN GINHAWANG SANGKATAUHAN (1st KABAGIS), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 204490

PILIPINAS PARA SA PINOY (PPP), Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC, Respondent.

PERLAS-BERNABE,*

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Cases

These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition1 filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations
assailing the Resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013
party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.

This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13 November 2012,2 20 November 2012,3 27 November 2012,4 4
December 2012,5 11 December 2012,6 and 19 February 2013.7

The Facts Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately
280 groups and organizations registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

A. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s automatic review of the COMELEC

Division’s resolutions approving registration of groups/organizations

Resolution dated 23 November 20128

1 204379 12-099 Alagad ng - The "artists" sector is not

(PLM) Sining (ASIN) considered marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify under RA 7941 and
Ang Bagong Bayani.

Omnibus Resolution dated 27 November 20129

2 204455 12-041 Manila Teachers - A non-stock savings and
(PLM) Savings and loan association cannot be
Loan considered marginalized and
Association, Inc. underrepresented; and
(Manila - The first and second
Teachers) nominees are not teachers by
profession.

3 204426 12-011 Association of - Failure to show that its

(PLM) Local Athletics members belong to the
Entrepreneurs marginalized; and
and Hobbyists, - Failure of the nominees to
Inc. (ALA-EH) qualify.

Resolution dated 27 November 201210

4 204435 12-057 1 Alliance - Failure of the nominees to

(PLM) Advocating qualify: although registering
Autonomy Party as a regional political party,
(1AAAP) two of the nominees are not
residents of the region; and
four of the five nominees do
not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented.

Resolution dated 27 November 201211

5 204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay - Failure of the group to show

Kalusugan that its nominees belong to
(AKIN), Inc. the urban poor sector.

Resolution dated 29 November 201212

6 204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya - Failure to represent a

(AAB) marginalized sector of
society, despite the formation
of a sectoral wing for the
benefit of farmers of Region
8;
- Constituency has district
representatives;
- Lack of track record in
representing peasants and
farmers; and
- Nominees are neither
farmers nor peasants.

Resolution dated 4 December 201213

7 204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo - Failure to show that the

12-165 Party (AI) party represents a
(PLM) marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
the Province of Iloilo has
district representatives;
- Untruthful statements in the
memorandum; and
- Withdrawal of three of its
five nominees.

Resolution dated 4 December 201214

8 204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of - Failure to establish that the

Organizations, group can represent 14
Networks and Associations of sectors; - The sectors of homeowners’
the Philippines, associations, entrepreneurs
Inc. (ALONA) and cooperatives are not
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

B. Via the COMELEC En Banc’s review on motion for reconsideration

of the COMELEC Division’s resolutions denying registration of groups
and organizations

Resolution dated 7 November 201215

9 204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng - Failure to prove track

Mamamahayag record as an organization;
(ALAM) - Failure to show that the
group actually represents the
marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- Failure to establish that the
group can represent all
sectors it seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201216

10 204402 12-061 (PP) Kalikasan Party-List - The group reflects an

 (KALIKASAN) advocacy for the
environment, and is not
representative of the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- There is no proof that
majority of its members
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented;
- The group represents
sectors with conflicting
interests; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector which the group
claims to represent.

Resolution dated 14 November 201217

11 204394 12-145 (PL) Association of - Failure to prove

Guard, Utility membership base and track
Helper, Aider, record;
Rider, Driver/ - Failure to present activities
Domestic that sufficiently benefited its
Helper, intended constituency; and
Janitor, Agent - The nominees do not belong
and to any of the sectors which
Nanny of the the group seeks to represent.
Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

Resolution dated 5 December 201218

12 204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa - Failure to show that the

(PLM) Pinoy (PPP) group represents a
marginalized and
underrepresented sector, as
Region 12 has district
representatives; and
- Failure to show a track
record of undertaking
programs for the welfare of
the sector the group seeks to
represent.

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012,19 the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second Division’s resolution to grant Partido ng
Bayan ng Bida’s (PBB) registration and accreditation as a political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied
participation in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector; PBB
failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to establish its track record as an organization that seeks to uplift the
lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented."20
These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA, ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were
not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, 21 and excluded the
names of these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 222 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to determine whether
the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually
complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC23 (Ang Bagong Bayani). The
COMELEC disqualified the following groups and organizations from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group Grounds for Denial

Resolution dated 10 October 201224

1 203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Retained registration and

(PLM) Political Party accreditation as a political
12-177 (AKB) party, but denied participation
(PLM) in the May 2013 party-list
elections
- Failure to represent any
marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- The Bicol region already
has representatives in
Congress; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Omnibus Resolution dated 11 October 201225

2 203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Inc. (Atong accreditation
Paglaum) - The nominees do not belong
to the sectors which the party
represents; and
- The party failed to file its
Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the
2010 Elections.

3 203981 12-187 Association for Cancelled registration and

 (PLM) Righteousness accreditation
Advocacy on - Failure to comply, and for
Leadership violation of election laws;
(ARAL) - The nominees do not
represent the sectors which
the party represents; and
- There is doubt that the party
is organized for religious
purposes.

4 204002 12-188 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural Concerns accreditation
(ARC) - Failure of the nominees to
qualify; and
- Failure of the party to prove
that majority of its members
belong to the sectors it seeks
to represent.

5 204318 12-220 United Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Movement accreditation
Against Drugs - The sectors of drug
Foundation counsellors and lecturers,
(UNIMAD) veterans and the youth, are
not marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to establish track
record; and
- Failure of the nominees to
qualify as representatives of
the youth and young urban
professionals.

Omnibus Resolution dated 16 October 201226

6 204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Cancelled registration

(PLM) Guardians - Failure to define the sector
Brotherhood, it seeks to represent; and
Inc. (1BRO-PGBI) - The nominees do not belong
to a marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

7 204122 12-223 1 Guardians Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nationalist - The party is a military
Philippines, Inc. fraternity;
(1GANAP/ - The sector of community
GUARDIANS) volunteer workers is too
broad to allow for meaningful
representation; and
- The nominees do not appear
to belong to the sector of
community volunteer
workers.

8 20426 12-257 Blessed Cancelled registration

(PLM) Federation of - Three of the seven
Farmers and nominees do not belong to
Fishermen the sector of farmers and
International, fishermen, the sector sought
Inc. (A to be represented; and
BLESSED - None of the nominees are
Party-List) registered voters of Region
XI, the region sought to be
represented.

Resolution dated 16 October 201227

9 203960 12-260 1st Cancelled registration

(PLM) Consumers - The sector of rural energy
Alliance for consumers is not
Rural Energy, marginalized and
Inc. (1-CARE) underrepresented;
- The party’s track record is
related to electric
cooperatives and not rural
energy consumers; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector of rural energy
consumers.

Resolution dated 16 October 201228

10 203922 12-201 Association of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Philippine accreditation
Electric - Failure to represent a
Cooperatives marginalized and
(APEC) underrepresented sector; and
- The nominees do not belong
to the sector that the party
claims to represent.
Resolution dated 23 October 201229

11 204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party-List Party accreditation
( AT ) - The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sectors that the party
represents (women, elderly,
youth, urban poor); and
- The nominees do not belong
to the marginalized sectors
that the party seeks to
represent.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201230

12 203976 12-288 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Rural and accreditation
Agrarian - The interests of the peasant
Reconstruction, and urban poor sectors that
Inc. (ARARO) the party represents differ;
- The nominees do not belong
to the sectors that the party
seeks to represent;
- Failure to show that three of
the nominees are bona fide
party members; and
- Lack of a Board resolution
to participate in the party-list
elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 24 October 201231

13 204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Cancelled registration

(PLM) Reporma Para sa - The party ceased to exist for
Magsasaka ng more than a year immediately
Pilipinas after the May 2010 elections;
Movement - The nominees do not belong
(AGRI) to the sector of peasants and
farmers that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only four nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
and
- Failure to show meaningful
activities for its constituency.

14 203936 12-248 Aksyon Cancelled registration

(PLM) Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng - Failure to show that
Masa (AKMA-PTM) majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that four of
its nine nominees actually
belong to the farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that five of
its nine nominees work on
uplifting the lives of the
members of the sector.

15 204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nagkakaisang - The Manifestation of Intent
Agilang and Certificate of Nomination
Pilipinong were not signed by an
Magsasaka appropriate officer of the
(KAP) party;
- Failure to show track record
for the farmers and peasants
sector; and
- Failure to show that
nominees actually belong to
the sector, or that they have
undertaken meaningful
activities for the sector.

16 204364 12-180 Adhikain at Cancelled registration

(PLM) Kilusan ng - Failure to show that
Ordinaryong nominees actually belong to
Tao Para sa the sector, or that they have
Lupa, Pabahay, undertaken meaningful
Hanapbuhay at activities for the sector.
Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

17 204141 12-229 The True Cancelled registration

(PLM) Marcos Loyalist - Failure to show that
(for God, majority of its members are
 Country and marginalized and
People) underrepresented; and
Association of - Failure to prove that two of
the Philippines, its nominees actually belong
Inc. (BANTAY) to the marginalized and
underrepresented.

18 204408 12-217 Pilipino Cancelled registration

(PLM) Association for - Change of sector (from
Country – Urban urban poor youth to urban
Poor Youth poor) necessitates a new
Advancement application;
and Welfare - Failure to show track record
( PA C YAW ) for the marginalized and
underrepresented;
- Failure to prove that
majority of its members and
officers are from the urban
poor sector; and
- The nominees are not
members of the urban poor
sector.

19 204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Cancelled registration

(PLM) Nationwide - The party represents drivers
Party (PASANG and operators, who may have
MASDA) conflicting interests; and
- Nominees are either
operators or former operators.

20 203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng Cancelled registration

(PLM) mga Nakulong - Failure to prove that
na Walang Sala, na Walang Sala,
Inc. (KAKUSA) Inc. (KAKUSA)
majority of its officers and
members belong to the
marginalized and
underrepresented;
- The incumbent
representative in Congress
failed to author or sponsor
bills that are beneficial to the
sector that the party
represents (persons
imprisoned without proof of
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt);
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 30 October 201232

21 204428 12-256 Ang Galing Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Pinoy (AG) accreditation
- Failure to attend the
summary hearing;
- Failure to show track record
for the marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The nominees did not
appear to be marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201233

22 204094 12-185 Alliance for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Nationalism and accreditation
Democracy - Failure to represent an
(ANAD) identifiable marginalized and
underrepresented sector;
- Only three nominees were
submitted to the COMELEC;
- The nominees do not
belong to the marginalized
and underrepresented; and
- Failure to submit its
Statement of Contribution
and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.

Omnibus Resolution dated 7 November 201234

23 204239 12-060 Green Force for Cancelled registration and

(PLM) the Environment accreditation
Sons and - The party is an advocacy
Daughters of group and does not represent
 Mother Earth the marginalized and
(GREENFORCE) underrepresented;
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- The nominees are not
marginalized citizens.

24 204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Association, Inc. accreditation
(FIRM 24-K) - The nominees do not
belong to the sector that the
party seeks to represent
(urban poor and peasants of
the National Capital Region);
- Only two of its nominees
reside in the National Capital
Region; and
- Failure to comply with the
track record requirement.

25 204341 12-269 Action League Cancelled registration and

(PLM) of Indigenous accreditation
Masses (ALIM) - Failure to establish that its
nominees are members of the
indigenous people in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras
sector that the party seeks to
represent;
- Only two of the party’s
nominees reside in the
Mindanao and Cordilleras;
and
- Three of the nominees do
not appear to belong to the
marginalized.

Resolution dated 7 November 201235

26 204358 12-204 Alliance of Cancelled registration

(PLM) Advocates in - The sector it represents is a
Mining specifically defined group
Advancement which may not be allowed
for National registration under the party-list system; and
Progress - Failure to establish that the
(AAMA) nominees actually belong to
the sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201236

27 204359 12-272 Social Cancelled registration

(PLM) Movement for - The nominees are
Active Reform disqualified from
and representing the sectors that
Transparency the party represents;
(SMART) - Failure to comply with the
track record requirement; and
- There is doubt as to whether
majority of its members are
marginalized and
underrepresented.

Resolution dated 7 November 201237

28 204238 12-173 Alliance of Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Bicolnon Party accreditation
(ABP) - Defective registration and
accreditation dating back to
2010;
- Failure to represent any
sector; and
- Failure to establish that the
nominees are employed in the construction industry, the
sector it claims to represent.

Resolution dated 7 November 201238

29 204323 12-210 Bayani Party Cancelled registration and

(PLM) List (BAYANI) accreditation
- Failure to prove a track
record of trying to uplift the
marginalized and
underrepresented sector of
professionals; and
- One nominee was declared
unqualified to represent the
sector of professionals.

Resolution dated 7 November 201239

30 204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Natin Isulong accreditation
 (AANI) - Failure to establish a track
record of enhancing the lives
of the marginalized and
underrepresented farmers
which it claims to represent;
and
- More than a majority of the
party’s nominees do not
belong to the farmers sector.

Resolution dated 7 November 201240

31 204125 12-292 Agapay ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Indigenous accreditation
Peoples Rights - Failure to prove that its five
Alliance, Inc. nominees are members of the
(A-IPRA) indigenous people sector;
- Failure to prove that its five
nominees actively
participated in the
undertakings of the party; and
- Failure to prove that its five nominees are bona fide
members.

Resolution dated 7 November 201241

32 204216 12-202 Philippine Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Coconut accreditation
Producers - The party is affiliated with
Federation, Inc. private and government
(COCOFED) agencies and is not
marginalized;
- The party is assisted by the
government in various
projects; and
- The nominees are not
members of the marginalized
sector of coconut farmers and
producers.

Resolution dated 7 November 201242

33 204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Cancelled registration

(PLM) Party-List - Failure to establish a track
(ABANG record of continuously
LINGKOD) representing the peasant
farmers sector;
- Failure to show that its
members actually belong to
the peasant farmers sector;
and
- Failure to show that its
nominees are marginalized
and underrepresented, have
actively participated in
programs for the
advancement of farmers, and
adhere to its advocacies.

Resolution dated 14 November 201243

34 204158 12-158 Action Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Brotherhood for Active accreditation - Failure to show that the
Dreamers, Inc. party is actually able to
(ABROAD) represent all of the sectors it
claims to represent;
- Failure to show a complete
track record of its activities
since its registration; and
- The nominees are not part
of any of the sectors which
the party seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 28 November 201244

35 204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng Cancelled registration and

(PLM) mga Magsasaka accreditation
Para sa mga - The party receives
Magsasaka assistance from the
(BINHI) government through the
Department of Agriculture;
and
- Failure to prove that the
group is marginalized and
underrepresented.
Resolution dated 28 November 201245

36 204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Party (BUTIL) accreditation
- Failure to establish that the
 agriculture and cooperative
sectors are marginalized and
underrepresented; and
- The party’s nominees
neither appear to belong to
the sectors they seek to
represent, nor to have
actively participated in the
undertakings of the party.

Resolution dated 3 December 201246

37 204486 12-194 1st Cancelled registration and

(PLM) Kabalikat ng accreditation
Bayan - Declaration of untruthful
Ginhawang statements;
Sangkatauhan - Failure to exist for at least
(1st one year; and
KABAGIS) - None of its nominees
belong to the labor,
fisherfolk, and urban poor
indigenous cultural
communities sectors which it
seeks to represent.

Resolution dated 4 December 201247

38 204410 12-198 1-United Cancelled accreditation

(PLM) Transport - The party represents drivers
Koalisyon (1-UTAK) and operators, who may have
conflicting interests; and
- The party’s nominees do not
belong to any marginalized
and underrepresented sector.

Resolution dated 4 December 201248

39 204421, 12-157 Coalition of Cancelled registration

204425 (PLM), Senior Citizens - The party violated election
12-191 in the laws because its nominees
(PLM) Philippines, Inc. had a term-sharing
(SENIOR agreement.
CITIZENS)

These 39 petitioners (AKB, Atong Paglaum, ARAL, ARC, UNIMAD, 1BRO-PGBI, 1GANAP/GUARDIANS, A BLESSED Party-List, 1-CARE, APEC,
AT, ARARO, AGRI, AKMA-PTM, KAP, AKO-BAHAY, BANTAY, PACYAW, PASANG MASDA, KAKUSA, AG, ANAD, GREENFORCE, FIRM 24-K, ALIM,
AAMA, SMART, ABP, BAYANI, AANI, A-IPRA, COCOFED, ABANG LINGKOD, ABROAD, BINHI, BUTIL, 1st KABAGIS, 1-UTAK, SENIOR CITIZENS)
were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the
printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. This Court issued Status Quo
Ante Orders in all petitions. This Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that were granted Status Quo Ante Orders, namely:

G.R. No. SPP No. Group

Resolution dated 13 November 2012

203818-19 12-154 AKO Bicol Political Party (AKB)

(PLM)
12-177
(PLM)

203981 12-187 Association for Righteousness Advocacy on

(PLM) Leadership (ARAL)

204002 12-188 Alliance for Rural Concerns (ARC)

(PLM)

203922 12-201 Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives

(PLM) (APEC)

203960 12-260 1st

(PLM) Consumers Alliance for Rural Energy, Inc.
(1-CARE)

203936 12-248 Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng Masa

(PLM) (AKMA-PTM)

203958 12-015 Kapatiran ng mga Nakulong na Walang Sala,

(PLM) Inc. (KAKUSA)

203976 12-288 Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction,

(PLM) Inc. (ARARO)

Resolution dated 20 November 2012

204094 12-185 Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy

(PLM) (ANAD)

204125 12-292 Agapay ng Indigenous Peoples Rights Alliance,

(PLM) Inc. (A-IPRA)

204100 12-196 1-Bro Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.

 (PLM) (1BRO-PGBI)

Resolution dated 27 November 2012

204141 12-229 The True Marcos Loyalist (for God, Country

(PLM) and People) Association of the Philippines, Inc.
(BANTAY)

204240 12-279 Agri-Agra na Reporma Para sa Magsasaka ng

(PLM) Pilipinas Movement (AGRI)

204216 12-202 Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.

(PLM) (COCOFED)

204158 12-158 Action Brotherhood for Active Dreamer, Inc.

(PLM) (ABROAD)

Resolutions dated 4 December 2012

204122 12-223 1 Guardians Nationalist Philippines, Inc.

(PLM) (1GANAP/GUARDIANS)

203766 12-161 Atong Paglaum, Inc. (Atong Paglaum)

(PLM)

204318 12-220 United Movement Against Drugs Foundation

(PLM) (UNIMAD)

204263 12-257 Blessed Federation of Farmers and Fishermen

(PLM) International, Inc. (A BLESSED Party-List)

204174 12-232 Aangat Tayo Party-List Party (AT)

(PLM)

204126 12-263 Kaagapay ng Nagkakaisang Agilang Pilipinong

(PLM) Magsasaka (KAP)

204364 12-180 Adhikain at Kilusan ng Ordinaryong Tao Para sa

(PLM) Lupa, Pabahay, Hanapbuhay at Kaunlaran
(AKO-BAHAY)

204139 12-127 (PL) Alab ng Mamamahayag (ALAM)

204220 12-238 Abang Lingkod Party-List (ABANG

(PLM) LINGKOD)

204236 12-254 Firm 24-K Association, Inc. (FIRM 24-K)

(PLM)

204238 12-173 Alliance of Bicolnon Party (ABP)

(PLM)

204239 12-060 Green Force for the Environment Sons and

(PLM) Daughters of Mother Earth (GREENFORCE)

204321 12-252 Ang Agrikultura Natin Isulong (AANI)

(PLM)

204323 12-210 Bayani Party List (BAYANI)

(PLM)

204341 12-269 Action League of Indigenous Masses (ALIM)

(PLM)

204358 12-204 Alliance of Advocates in Mining Advancement

(PLM) for National Progress (AAMA)

204359 12-272 Social Movement for Active Reform and

(PLM) Transparency (SMART)

204356 12-136 Butil Farmers Party (BUTIL)

(PLM)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204402 12-061 (PL) Kalikasan Party-List (KALIKASAN)

204394 12-145 (PL) Association of Guard, Utility Helper, Aider,

Rider, Driver/Domestic Helper, Janitor, Agent
and Nanny of the Philippines, Inc.
(GUARDJAN)

204408 12-217 Pilipino Association for Country – Urban Poor

(PLM) Youth Advancement and Welfare (PACYAW)

204428 12-256 Ang Galing Pinoy (AG)

(PLM)

204490 12-073 Pilipinas Para sa Pinoy (PPP)

(PLM)
204379 12-099 Alagad ng Sining (ASIN)
(PLM)

204367 12-104 (PL) Akbay Kalusugan (AKIN)

204426 12-011 Association of Local Athletics Entrepreneurs

 (PLM) and Hobbyists, Inc. (ALA-EH)

204455 12-041 Manila Teachers Savings and Loan Association,

(PLM) Inc. (Manila Teachers)

204374 12-228 Binhi-Partido ng mga Magsasaka Para sa mga

(PLM) Magsasaka (BINHI)

204370 12-011 (PP) Ako An Bisaya (AAB)

204435 12-057 1 Alliance Advocating Autonomy Party

(PLM) (1AAAP)

204486 12-194 1st Kabalikat ng Bayan Ginhawang

(PLM) Sangkatauhan (1st KABAGIS)

204410 12-198 1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK)

(PLM)

204421, 12-157 Coalition of Senior Citizens in the Philippines,

204425 (PLM) Inc. (SENIOR CITIZENS)
12-191
(PLM)

204436 12-009 (PP), Abyan Ilonggo Party (AI)

12-165
(PLM)

204485 12-175 (PL) Alliance of Organizations, Networks and

Associations of the Philippines, Inc. (ALONA)

204484 11-002 Partido ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB)

Resolution dated 11 December 2012

204153 12-277 Pasang Masda Nationwide Party (PASANG

(PLM) MASDA)

The Issues

We rule upon two issues: first, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration
under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; and second, whether
the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement
and Transparency v. Commission on Elections49 (BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.

The Court’s Ruling

We hold that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of this Court in disqualifying
petitioners from participating in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new
parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the
decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to
determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, under
the new parameters prescribed in this Decision.

The Party-List System

The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation. Simply put, the party-list system is intended to
democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of
Representatives.50 The voter elects two representatives in the House of Representatives: one for his or her legislative district, and another
for his or her party-list group or organization of choice. The 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5, Article VI

(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.

(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under
the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

Sections 7 and 8, Article IX-C

Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for those registered under the party-list
system as provided in this Constitution.

Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be represented in the voters’
registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint
poll watchers in accordance with law.

Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system, stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with
that of the sectoral representation."51 The constitutional provisions on the party-list system should be read in light of the following
discussion among its framers:
MR. MONSOD: x x x.

I would like to make a distinction from the beginning that the proposal for the party list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation. Precisely, the party list system seeks to avoid the dilemma of choice of sectors and who constitute the members of the
sectors. In making the proposal on the party list system, we were made aware of the problems precisely cited by Commissioner Bacani of
which sectors will have reserved seats. In effect, a sectoral representation in the Assembly would mean that certain sectors would have
reserved seats; that they will choose among themselves who would sit in those reserved seats. And then, we have the problem of which
sector because as we will notice in Proclamation No. 9, the sectors cited were the farmers, fishermen, workers, students, professionals,
business, military, academic, ethnic and other similar groups. So these are the nine sectors that were identified here as "sectoral
representatives" to be represented in this Commission. The problem we had in trying to approach sectoral representation in the Assembly
was whether to stop at these nine sectors or include other sectors. And we went through the exercise in a caucus of which sector should be
included which went up to 14 sectors. And as we all know, the longer we make our enumeration, the more limiting the law become because
when we make an enumeration we exclude those who are not in the enumeration. Second, we had the problem of who comprise the farmers.
Let us just say the farmers and the laborers. These days, there are many citizens who are called "hyphenated citizens." A doctor may be a
farmer; a lawyer may also be a farmer. And so, it is up to the discretion of the person to say "I am a farmer" so he would be included in that
sector.

The third problem is that when we go into a reserved seat system of sectoral representation in the Assembly, we are, in effect, giving some
people two votes and other people one vote. We sought to avoid these problems by presenting a party list system. Under the party list
system, there are no reserved seats for sectors. Let us say, laborers and farmers can form a sectoral party or a sectoral organization that will
then register and present candidates of their party. How do the mechanics go? Essentially, under the party list system, every voter has two
votes, so there is no discrimination. First, he will vote for the representative of his legislative district. That is one vote. In that same ballot, he
will be asked: What party or organization or coalition do you wish to be represented in the Assembly? And here will be attached a list of the
parties, organizations or coalitions that have been registered with the COMELEC and are entitled to be put in that list. This can be a regional
party, a sectoral party, a national party, UNIDO, Magsasaka or a regional party in Mindanao. One need not be a farmer to say that he wants
the farmers' party to be represented in the Assembly. Any citizen can vote for any party. At the end of the day, the COMELEC will then
tabulate the votes that had been garnered by each party or each organization — one does not have to be a political party and register in
order to participate as a party — and count the votes and from there derive the percentage of the votes that had been cast in favor of a party,
organization or coalition.

When such parties register with the COMELEC, we are assuming that 50 of the 250 seats will be for the party list system. So, we have a limit
of 30 percent of 50. That means that the maximum that any party can get out of these 50 seats is 15. When the parties register they then
submit a list of 15 names. They have to submit these names because these nominees have to meet the minimum qualifications of a Member
of the National Assembly. At the end of the day, when the votes are tabulated, one gets the percentages. Let us say, UNIDO gets 10 percent or
15 percent of the votes; KMU gets 5 percent; a women’s party gets 2 1/2 percent and anybody who has at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote
qualifies and the 50 seats are apportioned among all of these parties who get at least 2 1/2 percent of the vote.

What does that mean? It means that any group or party who has a constituency of, say, 500,000 nationwide gets a seat in the National
Assembly. What is the justification for that? When we allocate legislative districts, we are saying that any district that has 200,000 votes gets
a seat. There is no reason why a group that has a national constituency, even if it is a sectoral or special interest group, should not have a
voice in the National Assembly. It also means that, let us say, there are three or four labor groups, they all register as a party or as a group. If
each of them gets only one percent or five of them get one percent, they are not entitled to any representative. So, they will begin to think
that if they really have a common interest, they should band together, form a coalition and get five percent of the vote and, therefore, have
two seats in the Assembly. Those are the dynamics of a party list system.

We feel that this approach gets around the mechanics of sectoral representation while at the same time making sure that those who really
have a national constituency or sectoral constituency will get a chance to have a seat in the National Assembly. These sectors or these groups
may not have the constituency to win a seat on a legislative district basis. They may not be able to win a seat on a district basis but surely,
they will have votes on a nationwide basis.

The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their
votes nationwide; have about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third place or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even if they would not win
individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and objectives of the party list system.

BISHOP BACANI: Madam President, am I right in interpreting that when we speak now of party list system though we refer to sectors, we
would be referring to sectoral party list rather than sectors and party list?

MR. MONSOD: As a matter of fact, if this body accepts the party list system, we do not even have to mention sectors because the sectors
would be included in the party list system. They can be sectoral parties within the party list system.

xxxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system because we wanted to open up the
political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. x x x We are for opening up the system, and we would like very
much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the number of representatives from
any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list system. x x x.

xxx

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties. My question is this: Are we going
to classify for example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats as political parties? Can they run under the party list concept or
must they be under the district legislation side of it only?

MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can field candidates for the Senate
as well as for the House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30 percent,
whichever is adopted, of the seats that we are allocating under the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian Democrats can field district candidates and can also participate in the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come to the party list system, they will be fielding only sectoral candidates.

MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.

MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Tañada wants to run under BAYAN group and says that he represents the farmers, would he qualify?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Tañada would not qualify.

MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is a farmer. Who would pass on whether he
is a farmer or not?

MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties, particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election if they can prove that they are also organized along sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying is that all political parties can participate because it is precisely the contention of political
parties that they represent the broad base of citizens and that all sectors are represented in them. Would the Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party, it will dominate the party list at mawawalang
saysay din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang bigyan ng diin ang "reserve." Hindi ito
reserve seat sa marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong 198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.

MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi anybody can run there. But my question to Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system, would UNIDO be banned from running under the party list system?

MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may field sectoral candidates. On that condition alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for
the party list system.

MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner Tadeo if he shares that answer?

MR. TADEO. The same.

MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO, pero sa sectoral lines.

MR. MONSOD: Sino po ang magsasabi kung iyong kandidato ng UNIDO ay hindi talagang labor leader or isang laborer? Halimbawa, abogado
ito.

MR. TADEO: Iyong mechanics.

MR. MONSOD: Hindi po mechanics iyon because we are trying to solve an inherent problem of sectoral representation. My question is:
Suppose UNIDO fields a labor leader, would he qualify?

MR. TADEO: The COMELEC may look into the truth of whether or not a political party is really organized along a specific sectoral
line. If such is verified or confirmed, the political party may submit a list of individuals who are actually members of such sectors.
The lists are to be published to give individuals or organizations belonging to such sector the chance to present evidence
contradicting claims of membership in the said sector or to question the claims of the existence of such sectoral organizations or
parties. This proceeding shall be conducted by the COMELEC and shall be summary in character. In other words, COMELEC
decisions on this matter are final and unappealable.52 (Emphasis supplied)

Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral
parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by
Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates
who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution." 53

In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or
alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting
Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani:

The draft provisions on what was to become Article VI, Section 5, subsection (2), of the 1987 Constitution took off from two staunch
positions — the first headed by Commissioner Villacorta, advocating that of the 20 per centum of the total seats in Congress to be allocated
to party-list representatives half were to be reserved to appointees from the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. The proposal was
opposed by some Commissioners. Mr. Monsod expressed the difficulty in delimiting the sectors that needed representation. He was of the
view that reserving seats for the marginalized and underrepresented sectors would stunt their development into full-pledged parties
equipped with electoral machinery potent enough to further the sectoral interests to be represented. The Villacorta group, on the other
hand, was apprehensive that pitting the unorganized and less-moneyed sectoral groups in an electoral contest would be like placing babes in
the lion's den, so to speak, with the bigger and more established political parties ultimately gobbling them up. R.A. 7941 recognized this
concern when it banned the first five major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives from
participating in the party-list system for the first party-list elections held in 1998 (and to be automatically lifted starting with the 2001
elections). The advocates for permanent seats for sectoral representatives made an effort towards a compromise — that the party-list
system be open only to underrepresented and marginalized sectors. This proposal was further whittled down by allocating only half of the
seats under the party-list system to candidates from the sectors which would garner the required number of votes. The majority was
unyielding. Voting 19-22, the proposal for permanent seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral
groups, was voted down. The only concession the Villacorta group was able to muster was an assurance of reserved seats for selected
sectors for three consecutive terms after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, by which time they would be expected to gather and
solidify their electoral base and brace themselves in the multi-party electoral contest with the more veteran political groups.54 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, in the end, the proposal to give permanent reserved seats to certain sectors was outvoted. Instead, the reservation of seats to sectoral
representatives was only allowed for the first three consecutive terms.55 There can be no doubt whatsoever that the framers of the 1987
Constitution expressly rejected the proposal to make the party-list system exclusively for sectoral parties only, and that they clearly
intended the party-list system to include both sectoral and non-sectoral parties.

The common denominator between sectoral and non-sectoral parties is that they cannot expect to win in legislative district elections but
they can garner, in nationwide elections, at least the same number of votes that winning candidates can garner in legislative district
elections. The party-list system will be the entry point to membership in the House of Representatives for both these non-traditional parties
that could not compete in legislative district elections.

The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the party-list system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties
is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law,
shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. (Emphasis
supplied)

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution is crystal-clear that there shall be "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from
sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would
have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list
system exclusively sectoral.

What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of
three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. The text of Section 5(1) leaves no room for any doubt
that national and regional parties are separate from sectoral parties.

Thus, the party-list system is composed of three different groups: (1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or
organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. National and regional parties or organizations are different from sectoral parties or
organizations. National and regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not represent any
particular sector.

Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral
parties for two obvious reasons.

First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives,
clearly negating the idea that the party-list system is exclusively for sectoral parties representing the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the
ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This
means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting
the party-list system.

Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties.

Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution,
provides:

Section 3. Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently provided the
coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system.

(b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties.

(c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for
the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.

It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a
regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces
comprising the region.

(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof
whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector.

(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who share similar physical attributes or
characteristics, employment, interests or concerns.

(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or
election purposes. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." Clearly, a political
party is different from a sectoral party. Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a "political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government." On the other hand,
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors
enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector." R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are separate and distinct from each other.

R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and cause-oriented parties from the party-list system. How will
these ideology-based and cause-oriented parties, who cannot win in legislative district elections, participate in the electoral process if they
are excluded from the party-list system? To exclude them from the party-list system is to prevent them from joining the parliamentary
struggle, leaving as their only option the armed struggle. To exclude them from the party-list system is, apart from being obviously senseless,
patently contrary to the clear intent and express wording of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party
need not be organized as a sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a
national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their
economic status as citizens.

Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals."56The sectors mentioned in Section 5
are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and
underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-
defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of
their respective sectors.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or regional parties, as well
as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the
grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing.

Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested
party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on
any of the following grounds:

(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;

(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.

None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented."

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy.57 Section 2
seeks "to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through the party-list
system," which will enable Filipinos belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who
lack well-defined political constituencies," to become members of the House of Representatives. While the policy declaration in Section 2
of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented."
On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to
absurdities.

How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing
in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter?

The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are, by their nature, economically
"marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party
must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or
must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not
mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More
specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National
Statistical Coordination Board.58

The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be
"marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political
constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" the sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans,
overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and
underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives.

This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those
"marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to
the House of Representatives. This interpretation will also make the party-list system honest and transparent, eliminating the need for
relatively well-off party-list representatives to masquerade as "wallowing in poverty, destitution and infirmity," even as they attend sessions
in Congress riding in SUVs.

The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the
party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the party-list system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political
parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives.

To recall, Ang Bagong Bayani expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that
"while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must
comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling ‘Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be
elected to the House of Representatives.’ "However, the requirement in Ang Bagong Bayani, in its second guideline, that "the political party
xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. This inherent inconsistency in Ang Bagong Bayani has been compounded by the COMELEC’s refusal to register sectoral
wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major
political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings.

Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House
of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections.59 Thus, major political
parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list
elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of
major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in
"well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined
political constituencies" as members of the House of Representatives.

The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 allow major political parties to participate in party-list elections so as to encourage them to work
assiduously in extending their constituencies to the "marginalized and underrepresented" and to those who "lack well-defined political
constituencies." The participation of major political parties in party-list elections must be geared towards the entry, as members of the
House of Representatives, of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving
them a voice in law-making. Thus,to participate in party-list elections, a major political party that fields candidates in the legislative district
elections must organize a sectoral wing, like a labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, professional, women or youth wing, that can register
under the party-list system.

Such sectoral wing of a major political party must have its own constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, officers and
members, a majority of whom must belong to the sector represented. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is
linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component
parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part
does not participate in the party-list system."

Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. This provision prescribes a special qualification only for the
nominee from the youth sector.

Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election.

Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration
of his term.1âwphi1

A party-list nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral
parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy
for such sector.

In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the
guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system:

First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified
in Section 5 of RA 7941. x x x

Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they
must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x
to be elected to the House of Representatives." x x x.

xxxx

Third, x x x the religious sector may not be represented in the party-list system. x x x.

xxxx

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates the grounds for disqualification as
follows:

"(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association, organized for religious purposes;

(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;

(3) It is a foreign party or organization;

(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or
through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan election purposes;

(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
 (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;

(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered."

Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or assisted by, the government. x x x.

xxxx

Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as
follows:

"SEC 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. - No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of
the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days
preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.

In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the
election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the
expiration of his term."

Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its
nominees. x x x.

Eighth, x x x the nominee must likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole. (Emphasis supplied)

In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded
major political parties from participating in party-list elections,60 abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the
1987 Constitution and R.A.No. 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

The minority in BANAT, however, believed that major political parties can participate in the party-list system through their sectoral wings.
The minority expressed that "[e]xcluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of
the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the
exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law."61 The experimentations
in socio-political engineering have only resulted in confusion and absurdity in the party-list system. Such experimentations, in clear
contravention of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, must now come to an end.

We cannot, however, fault the COMELEC for following prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. In following prevailing
jurisprudence, the COMELEC could not have committed grave abuse of discretion. However, for the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections,
we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No.
7941. In BANAT, this Court devised a new formula in the allocation of party-list seats, reversing the COMELEC's allocation which followed
the then prevailing formula in Ang Bagong Bayani. In BANAT, however, the Court did not declare that the COMELEC committed grave abuse
of discretion. Similarly, even as we acknowledge here that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion, we declare that it would
not be in accord with the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 to apply the criteria in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT in determining who are
qualified to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. For this purpose, we suspend our rule62 that a party may appeal to
this Court from decisions or orders of the COMELEC only if the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field
candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political
constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals,
the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must
belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined
political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all
national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all
nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the
COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and
underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they
may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they
do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the
party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such
circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power does not include the power to re-write the Constitution.
Thus, the present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections
under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.

WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED. The 13 petitions, which have been granted Status Quo Ante Orders but without
mandatory injunction to include the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections only for
determination whether petitioners are qualified to register under the party-list system under the parameters prescribed in this Decision but
they shall not participate in the 13 May 2013 part-list elections. The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory injunctions to include
the names of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the Commission on Elections for determination whether petitioners are
qualified to register under the party-list system and to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the parameters prescribed
in this Decision. The Commission on Elections may conduct summary evidentiary hearings for this purpose. This Decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004]

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY
POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.

[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004]

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

[G. R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004]

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS
FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.

DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious
heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,[1]that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those
who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of
citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people are
waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders
for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil
law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of
candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated
his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed SPA No. 04-003
before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in
truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the
allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita Poe y
Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of
birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there
was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives to the effect that no available information could be
found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification
issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information regarding
the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a
certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in
the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy
of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a
certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the
period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed
his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, petitioner
assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or
any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and
Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X. Fornier," and the
other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court
had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner Fornier
invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or
cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64[2] in an action
for certiorari under Rule 65[3] of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of
its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading,
brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution
or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law which power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by,
this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice,
on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be
the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas,[4] as not (being)
justiciable controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines
and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under
the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an election
protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning candidate
from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by
the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President
or Vice-President of the Philippines.

Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not include an
election protest.

Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or
third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition
with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is
generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[5] In such
context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received
either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
 It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not
include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634,
entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen"
to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. [6] Aristotle saw its significance if only to
determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to
achieve a self-sufficient existence.[7] The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like
autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with
concomitant obligations, on the other.[8] In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private
interests to the general interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil
citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. [9] Its
meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of
political power.[10] The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the
citizen to economic well-being and social security.[11] The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.[12]

The Local Setting - from Spanish

Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."[13] In church
records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became
highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these
citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.[14]
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the
law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; [15] however, three royal decrees were
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,[16] the Royal Decree of 23 August
1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,[17] and finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04
July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870.[18]
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,
according to which the provisions of the Ultramaramong which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.[19]
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first categorical
enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy. [20]

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so
cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law dictated that a
change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would
remain virtually intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. [21] Under Article IX of the treaty, the
civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right
to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce, and professions,
being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and
to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the
Congress."[22]

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be "aliens" under
American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United
States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the
Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then
resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as
such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen
hundred and ninety eight."[23]

Under the organic act, a citizen of the Philippines was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day of
April 1899. The term inhabitant was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and
3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.[24]
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no
citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England, governed
those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.[25] More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the
United States, if residing therein."[26]

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word
"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan,
"The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of
the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of
the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such
others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the
foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands
who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States, if residing
therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he
was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other
country.
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship -

Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in
the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that
women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations
that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well as
fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of
the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed,
under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
 Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

The following are citizens of the Philippines:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority;
and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at
least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such
election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."[27]
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis[28] had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus
soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of
Customs[29] (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor[30] (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at
the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was born on 17 May
1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an uncertified copy of a
supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-
five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth
certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie
Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the
marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be
that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public
record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings
before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his
Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to
the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the
death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who
had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

xxxxxxxxx

(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office.

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official
duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as
might have occurred.[31]
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of
Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that
there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show
that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of
residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management
and Archives Office would have had complete records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950
when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was
either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the
putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. [32] Complementary to the
new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if
the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to
acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was
required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition.[33] In Mendoza vs. Mella,[34] the Court ruled -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit
1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been voluntarily
recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there is no showing that
they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it was not
even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is
in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be made, according to the same Article 131.
True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent recognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof of
voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,[35] this Court defined what could constitute such a
document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out in
Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or
compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child had in his
favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of
voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument (one duly
acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

x x x x x x x x x.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,[36] the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this Code, even
if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is
little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his
relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus
[been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of
a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests." [37]

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,[38] the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as
those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between them, the
separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their
property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce
upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is
significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,[39] such as on successional rights and family relations.[40] In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law[41] and not his political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and
property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of
legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly
according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination
survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should
remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity,
although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
Family Code provisions.
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also
facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a
person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
 Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living together with
Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with
law do hereby declare that:

1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando
Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

xxxxxxxxx

7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines
in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived
together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila
in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.

10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.

xxxxxxxxx

18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is
the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas

Declarant

DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted
to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science
Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress."

Petitioners Argument For

Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an
illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at
best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father and an American mother who were
married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner
contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on
the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,[43] citing Chiongbian vs. de Leon[44] and Serra vs. Republic.[45]
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on
the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was
irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not establish doctrine. I therefore
invite the Court to look closely into these cases.
First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was
the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing
about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who
had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No
one was illegitimate here.

Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed to be
naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

Finally, Paa vs. Chan.[46] This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio
Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore
argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact
the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not Filipino, neither was his son
Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's
father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to
fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum
in Morano vs. Vivo.

xxxxxxxxx

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and an
illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the illegitimate
child of a Filipino mother.

The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat. [47] I would grant that the distinction
between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not justify invidious
distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying
an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child
of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish
him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither justice nor rationality in the
distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated.

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views.The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should indeed
fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was
to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would
exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
against him.
The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the
day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the
Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. There utterly is no
cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the disqualification of
respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10 th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ has committed
material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been
directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election contest
under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take
on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of
respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in
1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would
thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first
light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner
has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,[48] must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
 WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing
the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-
appellee.

BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs.
The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues involved in this
case thus:

In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration,
"restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the
Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so."

The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the merits
and the parties submitted their respective evidence.

The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa
to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a
period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted to come into the Philippines on
March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13,
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the
expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962
(Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing
which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung
could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English or
Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not
know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for
injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the
pertinent portions of which read:

First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:

Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and
explicitly expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies
that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites
provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-
11855). However, from the allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a
Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue
of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM,
under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.

it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and
cannot allege that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a
temporary visitor only on March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in
the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).

Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by
virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it
would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of the Philippines."

Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated
extensions thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just
a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for
 convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be
permitted.

Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:

5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of
a deliberate and voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month
and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her representation to stay permanently without first
departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of
Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-
6017, September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court
on the point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 which reads:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain
permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination
by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act
503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).

And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws relating to
immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives
the Commissioner of Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him
(Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not
be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.

It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and
English, she admitted that she cannot write either language.

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the allegation
in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru the testimony of the
plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow
relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held almost ten months after the
alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a child by her husband."

Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF
SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE
QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN
AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.

III

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR
CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF
HER AUTHORIZED STAY.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER
BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO
CITIZEN.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO

PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE
PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON
APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the Solicitor
General to the petition in the court below, viz:

That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go
back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);

That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship.
The alien wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none
of the disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)

It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants'
assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.

The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth assignments of error does
not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has been admitted
into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign
country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of the
Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a
Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were
the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino
husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by
Section 9 (g) of the law.

In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent
admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate
Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a
Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino
citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may
choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this
Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from temporary visitors to
permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned, such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of
Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:

... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that
he will enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him
subsequently to go back on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he
had promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the
guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling
would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so
permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however flimsy such claim should
be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and verifying whether or not every
such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his
stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered. The damages
inherent in such ruling are self-evident.

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the meanwhile
become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo
the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessary concomitant of his
assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the case of the
minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. Could it be the law that
before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine whether or
not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming
unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr.
Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:

... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if
this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such
citizen, and, hence the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613
provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is
given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp.
462-463)

In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically
produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the
Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express
provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus discussed
therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.

II

Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to appellant
Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has
not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess all the
qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, even if she has proven
that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor General implicitly concedes that had it
been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the qualifications required by the law of applicants
for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to
submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.

To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio
Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713,1 for it was only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic, G.R.
NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held
that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance with the procedure
prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other
applicant for naturalization,2 albeit said decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still
pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to
reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all
subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty.3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in the
first Ly Giok Ha case,4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary visitor here whose
authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before
the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband notified the
Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina by reason of said marriage, demanded for
the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so,
on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her
contention that she had no obligation to leave, because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The
Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:

The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least,
excused the aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the
affirmative view, petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been
naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of
Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose
behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his
legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female who marries a male citizen of the Philippines
follows ipso facto his political status.

The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she "herself may
be lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this
limitation of section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:

(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons
who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or
assassination for the success and predominance of their ideas;

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with
the Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions,
and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war, during the period of such
war;

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does not grant
Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the
classes disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines
within the period specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of
proving her alleged change of political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out,
therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.

Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly
felt that there was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression
in our courts, we are of the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an
opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .

As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the following propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino makes her
a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";

2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law
excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in
the decision;

3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by the
Commissioner of Immigration;

4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and

5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need be made as to
qualifications,5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate
superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:

Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States
has been construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case
of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v.
Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op.
No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should
be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of
naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s.
1940)

Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who
married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the
assumption that she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
follows the citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce
Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as
follows:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above provision, means that the woman who
is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the
facts stated in the within papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.

It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be
considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the
citizenship of his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949).
Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec.
15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)

The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May 22, 1957,
in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the following
facts:

Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On December 10,
1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and
because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of
Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus
proceedings. The lower court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other hand, that:

Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the
bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law requires that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself
be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the
woman who married a Filipino is herself not disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.

No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her
marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the
deportation proceedings, where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino
citizenship, as well as the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration
Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .

For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the fact that
they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It
may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien
woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess any of
the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting to any naturalization proceedings
under said law.
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also to be
proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor
proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court,6 so ruled in opinions rendered by
him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held: .

At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute,
such as those relating to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not
necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111,
s. 1953.

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where
the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino
does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this
limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized
as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of
the causes enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine
citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.

xxx xxx xxx

Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but
merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the
petitioner.

We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for naturalization are expressly
enumerated in the law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of
those specified causes may not be invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine
citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice
Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for
the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen
and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s.
19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957),
where the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to
a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized,"
and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)

The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme
Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier
opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s.
1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice
Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)

It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly modified by this Court in
Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:

Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955),
on 26 March 1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration
within 24 hours from receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to
comply with the foregoing order, on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated
(Annex E). Therefore, there was an order issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash
bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail
bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his
inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22
Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the Philippines, no court proceeding is
necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is committed, the Commissioner of
Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the Government. (In the
meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of the Peace
of Las Piñas, Rizal.)

Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok Ha, and
Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:

The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on
the bond. The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the
bond — failure to depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the
Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of
notice — were committed before the marriage. Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not
automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become
 a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.

Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the fact that
the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra. As will be recalled,
on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176,
Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc.,
as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is of the race by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be said that there
was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been in Kua Suy, etc., et
al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who had rendered the
opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no immediate relevancy in the case on hand
then of the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said
matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act,
the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by
itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board
of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567; and there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications
of appellee Kua Suy", without explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice
Makalintal, who wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and
opined that both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the
said first two decisions.

It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San Tuang v.
Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese woman, arrived in the
Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a Filipino on January 7, 1961,
almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested to leave after her authority to stay had expired, she
refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that
she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the
court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo
San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence, moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc.,
provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were
indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification, Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .

It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the
case of Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the
woman "should be a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the
qualifications arising out of her conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for
citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen." (In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the
life of the woman or afterwards, the question of her citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her
citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only prove such marriage, but also that the woman then
possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized under existing laws, the statute will be
practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have existed at the time of the marriage, but
years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")

In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a woman of African descent or
nativity, in order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence,
moral character, etc., she was presumed to be qualified.

Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the
classes of persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus,
the pertinent provisions of that law provided:

Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens — Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives
of the Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular
possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of
the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.

Section 2. Who are disqualified. — The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a)
Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized government; (b) persons defending or teaching the
necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success and predominance
of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war,
during the period of such war.

Section 3. Qualifications. — The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order
to be able to acquire Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of
the hearing of their petition.

The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being not less
than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the
following qualifications:

First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years, except as
provided in the next following section;

Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period
of their residence in the Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted government as well as
with the community in which they are living;
 Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine
currency, or have some known trade or profession; and

Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his
intention of renouncing absolutely and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority,
state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.

Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens
of the Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who
were not citizens thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or (3)
citizens of the United States or foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if
residing therein. With respect to the qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the
same for all intents and purposes.

But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has
since discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its
proponent, the purpose in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization
act which discriminated in favor of the Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by
racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 — 11 ed.]), even as it retained in
Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be
understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so different from that in which it was found by the Court
in Leonard v. Grant.

The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out,
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section
2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.

There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be
understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4
of the Revised Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is
not disqualified is not necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats "qualifications"
and "disqualifications" in separate sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given
to the former law, it was to be understood that the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard
v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order
that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What that case held was that the phrase "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of persons qualified to become citizens
by naturalization — the assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.

We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married
to a citizen of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in
any way disqualified, her marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to
the effect that she is not in any way disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial
court, the same being self-serving.

Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 875, wherein
the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong and her minor son to
await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him nationalization and required her
to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:

In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became
a naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she
herself possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no
allegation, much less showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact
that a decision was favorably made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband)
would become a citizen, as to make a basis for the extension of her temporary stay.

On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same ruling and
citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960 at Taichung, Taiwan
and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6, 1961 did not make her a Filipino
citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year residence in the Philippines required by the
law.

Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination thereof
in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted Philippine citizenship on
January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting
between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her
husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of registration, as well as their child's, for the reason that
they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew
the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not only reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added
further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7

No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily reversed the
decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration, considering that
Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an affidavit that she had none
of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v. Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30,
1965, 14 SCRA 539.

Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King Tee by
illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account the other
affirmative requirements of the law."9
Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien woman who is
widowed during the dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed to take the oath as
Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she possesses all the qualifications and
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the process the decision to such effect discussed
above, 11even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.

Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law.

In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth
Act 473, providing that:

SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized,
shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines
when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless
within one year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American
Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently becomes a Filipino, may
become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law, she must also
possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as recounted above, were
to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is noted that the present case
was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even
before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however, which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court
take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the
Court already when Burca was decided, two members, Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to
them, because (they wanted to leave the point now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and
arguments discussed at length with copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of
the amici curae 13 in the Burca case cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not
only the legal and logical angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the
thousands of alien wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as
such, officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in
charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider the views
of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further reexamine the matter.
After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second (1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not
categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha. Besides, some points brought to
light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later cases can still bear further consideration.

Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the Naturalization
Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a
reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that of March 26,
1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic Laws, the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact, Act No. 2927 was
enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained autonomy on the subjects of
citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it practically impossible for our laws on
said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .

SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection
of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance
with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen
hundred and ninety-eight.

This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine
citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of
other insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would
become citizens of the United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein.

The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .

SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown
of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other
country: Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
 provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine
Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein.

For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the nationality of
an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however, abrogated upon the
change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the husband. Not even Act 2927
contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his alien wife, nor of the marriage of such
alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .

SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a petitioner should die before the final
decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the
case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner.

It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to the
above Section 13:

SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered
Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:

SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the age of
twenty-one years at the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine
Islands, be considered citizens thereof.

SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine
Islands after the naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.

When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its Section 15
which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted practically word for word
in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it could not have been on any other
basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to
Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.

As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who marries a
Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso
facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need be shown. It was only in Lee
Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until 1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala
reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a
Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.

As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United States, our
Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were disqualified," and
inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing who might become citizens,
allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only logical deduction ... is that the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are qualified to
become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized"
must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of
the Revised Naturalization Law." 14

A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be qouted:

The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen
must first prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30,
1964, citing Lo San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784,
December 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the
question anew to the court for a possible reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law
in the United States after which Section 15 of our Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of
February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on
November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on
March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was limited to three classes of
persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular possessions of the
United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may become
citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American
Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in
so far as racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two
countries and hence there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to
the statutory provision concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.

This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law,
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision
found in Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision
— that to be deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one "who might herself be lawfully
naturalized," the reference is no longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become
immaterial, but to the qualifications and disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the
statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman "might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless
surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.

The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national
policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found
 worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the
Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and
traditions.

Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none
of the disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen.

In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:

On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a
continuous period of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p.
13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).

While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate that the present
Naturalization Law requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications
prescribed by section 2 in addition to not being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its
second decision) sustain the view that all that the law demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.

At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not
conclusively settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec.
23, 1959, to the effect that:

The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon
the latter. She must possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.

Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule that the requirement of
section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one
who "might herself be lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section
4 of the Act but also one who possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v.
Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-
21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito
v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife
of a Filipino be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons
in violation of the policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only —

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court would
not be thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of
the requirement of section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes,
in the right to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine
Constitution; yet she would not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government,"
nor affiliated to groups "upholding or teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their
ideas." Et sic de caeteris.

The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications,
without taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok
Ha admittedly does not possess.

As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes
(section 1994) and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court
has rejected the same in Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351,
March 26, 1965.

It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain relevant
considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived thereby not
entirely unassailable.

1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine citizenship, the
purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for naturalization, thereby
opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians only, suffers from lack of exact
accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:

SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. — Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the
Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United
States; (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said
country if residing therein.

and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the persons who were then
eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination of our legislation
during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a territory of the United States by
virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express authority without which it could not
have been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced by the Act of the United States Congress of
March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the pertinent provisions of which have already been footed
earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative
autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to
eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our
Naturalization Law from the impositions of American legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of
the effects rather than the intended purpose of the amendment.

2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to foreigners who may
become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder" fails to consider
the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the grant under it of Philippine
citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the United States and, corollarily,
persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not convey any idea of favoring aliens of any
particular race or color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the disqualifications of foreigners for American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the
naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the following disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:

SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated
with any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who
advocates or teaches the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either
of specific individuals or of officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other organized
government, because of his or their official character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of
the United States.

and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they happened to
be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau of Immigration and
Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States" contained no racial
disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly repealed by this law, hence it is
clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any connotation of racial exclusion necessarily,
even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912 already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that
the rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473
was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the construction adopted in the opinions of the Secretary of
Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the first paragraph of
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, and that the latter is nothing
but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as it stood before its repeal in
1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section 15 had a definite unmistakable
construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to apply the same and which, therefore, must be
considered, as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators enacted said section, they knew of its
unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the American statute, they have in effect incorporated
into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States
and all administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v.
Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32 [1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756
[19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52, 59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536,
59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of Amicus Curiae]).

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is contained in United
States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided November 14, 1922, 26
A. L. R. 1316 as follows:

Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized,
shall be deemed a citizen."

Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap.
71), which in its second section provided "that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws,
married, or who shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen."

And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844,
which provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall
be deemed and taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject."

The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922,
p. 255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman
who marries a citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the United States by
reason of such marriage ..."

Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are repealed."

Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such
sections, ..." meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as
the marriage of the relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached
to 1994 of the Revised Statutes.

In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in the
Act of 1855 as follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application
of the law to free white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required that the person
applying for its benefits should be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy."

This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or race which might be
lawfully naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral
character, or to any of the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.
In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case,"
the statute must be construed as in effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully
naturalized under the existing laws, and who marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not
necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to
entitle her to naturalization.

In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An
alien woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan,
with the concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as
fully as if she had complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There
can be no doubt of this, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19
L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to the class of persons" who might be lawfully naturalized.

In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United States from France and
entered the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of
New York, with the view of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the
disposition of the matter she married a naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit
held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to be discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well
settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife
follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicil became her domicil." .

In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had before it the application of a
husband for his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration
authorities at New York on the ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel on both
sides agreed that the effect of the husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that
contingency District Judge Brown declined to pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best
to wait until it was determined whether the wife's disease was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground
that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At the same time he express his opinion that the
husband's naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who could become lawfully naturalized.
"Her own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining citizenship. If herself
lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided in that
case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something
more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.

In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a
subject of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States,
could not be excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the immigration laws would have
been sufficient ground for her exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on
appeal, and in 1911 was affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married,
they might have been lawfully naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to be
correct that marriage will not make a citizen of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not
affect these relators."

We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of
our law that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now
before the court is that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been made, while in
this the marriage was celebrated after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and
has not the force of a judgment of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances
that existed at the time the order of exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being carried into
effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if an order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the
time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that
the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in
this case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and while she is permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith
marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that she thereby acquired, under
international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an alien. There upon, the
immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to citizens.

In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman
under the following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey.
She was taken into custody by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in October a warrant for her
deportation was issued. Pending hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel.
The ground alleged for her deportation was that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of
her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the United
States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under
such circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view of the facts shown." He held that it was no part of the
intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to authorize the admission into the country of
the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman, who is of a class of persons
excluded by law from admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that section. The court relied
wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.

In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that where, pending
proceedings to deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States,
she thereby became a citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due process of law.
It was his opinion that if, as was contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws and preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent
jurisdiction in an action commenced for the purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A.
666, 219 Fed. 1022.

It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In
1874, Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence
within the United States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an
alien woman a citizen, she having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United
States, she and her husband having continued to reside abroad after the marriage.
 In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney
General Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New
York and went at once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she
was taken before a United States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L.
898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242, 3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had
entered this country for the purpose of prostitution, and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and
practicing the same within three years after landing. It appeared, however, that after she was taken before the United
States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department of Justice, she was lawfully married to a
native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her marriage an intention to abandon her
previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her mode of life had
been, but professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the claim
being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The
Attorney General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words,
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that
compliance with the other conditions of the naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.

Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that Congress, in enacting the
Immigration Act of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually
immoral classes ... shall not invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be
solemnized after her arrest or after the commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this act."

Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:

(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding deportation through the device
of marrying an American citizen.

(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded
classes, either before or after her detention, should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to
enter the country, its intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to women of the
immoral class.

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have found no warrant for the proposition that the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar, even if loose
statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression. The case of Kelley v.
Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:

As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the United States, if
they are of the class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or
"who shall be married," do not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a
state of marriage. They mean that, whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of
marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the
marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship
upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens,
would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was
to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any application for naturalization on her
part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested.

The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the application of the law to free white
women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should
be "a free white person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.

A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is
the one which gives the widest extension to its provisions.

Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application to free
white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the person applying for its
benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply because under the Naturalization Law of
the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been removed by the Act of July 30, 1813,
as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was
mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or no more alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is
demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the previous naturalization law, there was also such
requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian, 165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field,
(in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white
women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning
that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more necessarily,
but on whether or not there were other disqualifications under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her
husband.

4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that because Section 1 of Act
2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section particularly its subdivision (c), being
the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be required is not only that she must not be
disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications enumerated in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good
moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or
ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in
certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927.
Upon further consideration of the proper premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained above of the mentioned provisions has been shown
or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15 is, an exact copy of
Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth Act 473 had already a settled
construction by American courts and administrative authorities.

Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the
construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken, from the Act of
February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good moral character,
adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into account is that of the race
or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra,
discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the American authorities was made thus:

The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed
and taken to be a citizen" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by
ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it
does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent
of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore, whatever an act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any
person or thing, must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or
thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby prescribed.

Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein our legislature has
copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such statute before its being copied
constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in question.
At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate factual premises related
to the real legislative background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.

Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of
Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 is
more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with practically the
same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of
Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the same Act, without regard to the provisions
of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to
the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were embodied
in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that
what should be considered only are the requirements similar to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications
enumerated in Section 4?

Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to convey a
meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448 which contained
said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of September 22, 1922 which did away with the
automatic naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required, instead, that they submit to regular naturalization proceedings,
albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words, when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which,
as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law, the Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a
categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially. Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of
the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow
the new posture of the Americans of requiring judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative
but to conclude that our law still follows the old or previous American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was
approved in 1939, the Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the
old American law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose
to maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had amended their law in order to
provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently, had our
legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had given it a construction which was acquiesced to by
those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of the Americans, but as
things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled construction thereof, and what is more, it
appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under
these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic
and selective orientation and that it should be construed independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of
circumstances here and in the United States. It is always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial
fiat or perspective when the demonstrated legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.

5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so called racial requirements, whether
under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same sense as those enumerated in
Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have always been considered as
disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be lawfully naturalized," just as if they
were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473,
which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is
the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA
(1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with
approval the opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23 Such being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always treated as
disqualifications in the same light as the other disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as
a subtraction from or a lessening of the disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously
considered as irrelevant qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect
that the retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended
by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making the
phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under Section 2 of
Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be naturalized, namely, those
falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e. those belonging to Section 1, could not
have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the disqualifications that used to be before such
elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in
the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out as such in the law distinctly and separately from qualifications
and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence, qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining
"who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our
law on the matter was merely copied verbatim from the American statutes.

6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the United States, there
are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for reconsideration of counsel for
petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:

Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications" —

There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires that
an alien wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2,
before she may be deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and
compliance therewith manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:

1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that
the applicant "must have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years."
If this requirement is applied to an alien wife married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period
of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her husband. If the wife happens to
be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically
loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period of
ten years at least, she would be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence in the
Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her petition for naturalization will be granted, in
which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.

2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he "must own real
estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have
some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation." Considering the constitutional
prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary succession (Art.
XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to
prove that she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The
income requirement has been interpreted to mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to
possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong vs. Republic, L-20605, June
30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or
calling. It is of common knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the
Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the
dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of supporting the former.
(Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a
woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be
remiss in this duty, how can she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for
citizenship?

3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have enrolled his minor children of
school age, in any of the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the Private
Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history, government and civics are taught or prescribed
as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the Philippines required of
him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has
minor children by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor
children had not been enrolled in Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country, she
cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this Court. The reason behind the
requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow
the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88
Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29,
1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26, 1950). Considering that said minor children by her
first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for such requirement as
applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.

4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 "shall be
understood as reduced to five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is
absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be required to reside only for five years in
the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino husband must
reside for ten years.

Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino
citizen to become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the
general purpose of the first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage
to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448
in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien
wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine
legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:

It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the
husband; but the Department of State of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien
wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that our Supreme Court in the leading
case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code being
political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States.
Accordingly, the stated taken by the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that
marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make the former citizens of this counting. (Op.
Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .

To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No.
2927 which provides that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).

If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that
the alien wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become
illusory. It is submitted that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.

A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of
two constructions, one which will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive
the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493, 45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S.
338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85 [1910).
 ... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if
possible, place on the statute a construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with
the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will result in oppression, hardship, or
inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd
consequences.

So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in

legislative intent, as has been determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility,
redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the legislature; and the court should adopt that
construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to have been the
intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute
uncertain and vague is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer
an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326, pp. 623-632).

7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15 with "the national
policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose that in the pursuit of such
policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not practically impossible in some instances, for an alien woman marrying a
Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been demonstrated above? It seems but natural and
logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver
themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse."
Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such
marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be, serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not
farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of
Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it
may be considered that in reality the extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed,
We find the following observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite
persuasive:

We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The avowed policy of "selectives
admission" more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for
naturalization. In such a case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy
to become citizens. There is here a choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy
finds no application in cases where citizenship is conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to
accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the
statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an
individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of his
moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and traditions." A minor child of a
person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise a citizen,
regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien
wife of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not
one of the disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies
the obviously deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to
an alien wife of one of its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the
members of the family. (Nelson v. Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of
Married Women: Historical Background and Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs
E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship
derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the Philippines where tradition and law has placed the
husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the life of the family group. Corollary to this,
our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in whose preservation of State as a
vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our country, there is a
theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home of one
is that of the other. (See De la Viña v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity
of husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of the wife, and
the laws upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1,
130 Fed. 839, held: "The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's
domicile became her domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of husband
and wife are under the regime of conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen
and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be
that the husband's interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the
conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of
the partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused
recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers
from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs.
Republic, supra.)

With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully naturalized," found in the
American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts and administrative authorities.
There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of Philippine circumstances, and with particular
reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the circumstances between the United States, as the so-called
"melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in
the come. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own
concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure, entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and
indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin
and orientation; it is purely American, factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of
statutes of the United States Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that
given the opportunity to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it
patently clear in the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States
without undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as
embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly understood as
conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any naturalization proceeding
and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character, adherence to American ideals and
American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the American Naturalization
Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided
that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.

As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will attempt
to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of
law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more
ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering such undesirable practice and
every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.

III.

The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of judicial
naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case which, as already
noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing discussions would have been
sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications, her marriage to her co-petitioner made
her a Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could sustain, her claim that she is not disqualified
under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a
Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?

Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already stated,
however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for its reconsideration which
vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the reasons expounded earlier in this
opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.

In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply
therefore by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none
of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the
Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and
(3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise — other than the judgment of a
competent court of justice — certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is
hereby declared null and void.

3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it
should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove
afterwards, compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently
considered the petition as one for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."

In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not enough
that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its Section 4. Over
and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from declaration of intention to oathtaking,
before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence to her nationality vis-a-vis that of
her Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance before her marriage, and if she desires to be
of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the
required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish and one of the principle local languages, make her children
study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her
declaration of intention and after one year her application for naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral
character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of
probation, and only then, but not before she takes her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino citizen only by judicial declaration.

Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in
question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly indicated
by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to the wife is intended
by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard look at the ruling, if only to see
whether or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion different from that complained therein.
It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences upon tens of thousands of persons affected by
the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any
adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the national policy it seeks to endorse.

AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and well known for their reputation
for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the quality of the
memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:

The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case -- that an alien woman who marries
a Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through
ordinary naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying
or declaring such woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" — has consequences that reach far beyond the
confines of the present case. Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca.
The newspapers report that as many as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of
the Court. These are women of many and diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian,
Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These members of the community, some of whom have been married to citizens for
two or three decades, have all exercised rights and privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have
acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen husbands, real property, and they will have sold and
transferred such property. Many of these women may be in professions membership in which is limited to citizens. Others
are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in business activities for which a certain
percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now faced with possible
divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith, upon a
reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government
 charged with the administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such
comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and
reexamination.

To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21, 1967, 19 SCRA
401 — when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:

The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases — although referring to situations the
equities of which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar — may have contributed materially to the
irregularities committed therein and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe, although
erroneously, that the procedure followed was valid under the law.

Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only,
to comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of
naturalization have been issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published in the
Official Gazette only once, within the periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was
promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965"
(when the decision in the present case was rendered).

After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the
reply thereto of the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down
in the Ong Son Cui case shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May
29, 1957.

Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective application of its construction
of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In the case at bar, We do
not have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang,
Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the law of the case only for the parties thereto. If there are good
grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify them.

For ready reference, We requote Section 15:

Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens
thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically
become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is
naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the
Philippines when still a minor, in which case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen,
unless within one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the
American Consulate of the country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as a whole,
is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying out such a
procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable persons becoming a
part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an alien undergoing such procedure it
prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all
his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also; (b) all such minor children, if born outside the
Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the
Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall
lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born
outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be "considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing
to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American) Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance;
and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children, falling within the conditions of place
and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat or by force of
the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the language of the provision, is
not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" in
reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by legislative fiat because the antecedent
phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that such status is intended to attach only after
she has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the
ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative naturalization as to the minor children, the same section
deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary judicial naturalization.

Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or vest
citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Tañada & Carreon, Political Law of the
Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27 hence there is no reason it
cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the members of such class or group, like women
who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether or not the legislature hag done so in the
disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one of the most respect authorities on political law in
the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization is often observed by some states with respect to women.
Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who
may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws." (Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is
substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)

More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States statutes from which our law has
been copied, 28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by operation of law.
"In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who marries a citizen of the
United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of her wish in that respect." (USCA 8,
p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct. 106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .

We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an insertion into
Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction among the courts and administrative authorities in that
country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of
law and as a consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could be shown
that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We
already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated
for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the United States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of
the Revised Statutes to be as stated above, and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of September
22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for other
applicants for citizenship, on the other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted
Act 3448 on November 30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its
preference to adopt the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922.

Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United States herself has evidently found it to be
an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic incorporation into the body of
her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to be before 1922, it seems but proper,
without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the
manner in which our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law
along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not
institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be going precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.

There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that under
Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the proceedings do not have
to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the proceedings involving the husband. Section
16 provides: .

SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. — In case a petitioner should die before the final
decision has been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the
case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner.

In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:

Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and
minor children are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that
the qualifications of the original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor children, and (3)
that said Section 16 applies whether the petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment
becomes executory.

There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16 contemplate the fact that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The
decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect
as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue
the proceedings with the deceased as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary
to consider the decision rendered, as far as it affected the widow and the minor children.

xxx xxx xxx

The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated in
the oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the
oath of allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath
of allegiance and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband,
shall have been completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the
benefits of his naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of
the Philippines, by virtue of the legal provision that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of
the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children
of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof."
(Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do
not show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart
from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines. (Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to
be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila, Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The
reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.

Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during
the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should
follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence
that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no reason to
disagree with the following views of counsel: .

It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a
proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which
foreigners may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Tañada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The
Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5],
Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are
naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship
by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the
naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. (See Tañada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152,
 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras, Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3
Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly
manifests an intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised
Statutes, 1994), American courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by
operation of law a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon
the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F. 82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op.
4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28 Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268)
or as it was in the Act of 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a
citizens" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by the
ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper
application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less
a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act
of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered
as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such person or thing, and have force and effect
accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances,
be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being
naturalized directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne,
Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147
[1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).

That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15
reads:

(See supra).

The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become" as used in the above provision, are
undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation
of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who
are already citizens of the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision
concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso
factocitizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of
Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship, necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the
statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such
status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a
citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by them.
Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under the second paragraph
of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes ipso facto a
citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the
time when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the
Philippines. The child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines
and should, therefore, be "considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that
later time. Similarly, an alien woman who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her
marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years after the marriage that her citizenship status became in question), that
she is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine
citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that
she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized."

The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not
have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might
herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself
be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a
state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in
evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine
citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6
DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such power long after her
marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.

(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the
Philippines unless there is proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the
"acquisition" of citizenship by the alien wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is
not a citizen unless and until she proves that she may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law
that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall
be deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform" decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support
its holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has proven her qualifications for citizenship.
What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their qualifications and therefore they
failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the case was remanded to
the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino was
disputed by the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her alleged change of
political status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported,
claimed she was a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not
disqualified under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the
claim of assumption of Philippine citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It
will be observed that in these decisions cited by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be
lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage
to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these wives failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven
fact.

In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be
confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his
 father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status
commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise,
an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a
Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be
lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of
the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of
the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former
becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that
she has established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen
of the Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to
establish her status as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v.
Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905]; Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a representation shown to
have been made is true. (Aetna Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is them for naturalization proceedings to
enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she may not have to be
called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to
Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no
such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's
acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime
the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding"
in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the
effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really
binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant public records
may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera, may
be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for
the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen
and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by
the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration
conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in establishing her
Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the point is
decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby reversed and the
Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and
the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
A.M. No. 533 September 12, 1974

IN RE: FLORENCIO MALLARE, respondent,

RESOLUTION

FERNANDEZ, J.:p

On complaint of then Acting Immigration Commissioner, Martiniano P. Vivo, this Court ordered the investigation of the matter of citizenship
of Florencio Mallare, who was admitted to the Philippine Bar on March 5, 1962, for the purpose of determining whether his name should be
stricken from the roll of persons authorized to practice law in the Philippines.

After an investigation conducted by this Court's Legal Officer Investigator, a decision was rendered by this Court on April 29, 1968, holding
that by preponderance of evidence, it appeared that respondent Mallare's father, Esteban Mallare, was a Chinese up to his death; and his
mother admittedly being a Chinese, respondent is likewise a Chinese national. Consequently respondent Florencio Mallare was declared
excluded from the practice of law; his admission to the bar was revoked, and he was ordered to return to this Court, the lawyer's diploma
previously issued to him.

Respondent moved for reconsideration of the decision, which was denied by the Court in its resolution of January 10, 1969. On February 4,
1969, respondent petitioned the Court for the reopening of the case and for new trial on the ground, inter alia, of newly discovered evidence,
the introduction of which could alter the decision previously promulgated. The evidence proposed to be presented consisted of (1) an entry
in the registry of baptism of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Estaben Mallare
(respondent's father) is the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino; and (2) testimonies of certain persons who had a known Esteban Mallare
and his mother during their lifetime.

By resolution of July 31, 1969, this Court ruled:

Considering that the respondent, as a duly admitted member of the bar, should be given ample opportunity to establish the
true facts about his citizenship and that no effort should be spared to ascertain the truth before strippling him of the privilege
granted to him by this Court since 1962, and denying him the practice of his chosen profession which he has honorably
discharged as far as the records show:

The Court Resolved to set aside the decision of April 29, 1968 and to grant the re-opening and new trial prayed for, which
shall take place before the Court's Investigating Officer on the days specified by him upon notice to respondent Mallare,
the Commissioner of Immigration and the Solicitor General, wherein said parties may adduce all proper additional
evidence that they may desire to present. The proofs taken at the original investigation shall not be retaken, but
considered as part of the evidence in the new trial. Thereafter, the Court Investigator shall submit his report on this
Tribunal. (Emphasis supplied)

Accordingly, the parties submitted their respective additional evidences before the Court's investigator.

Respondent's petition to set aside the decision of this Court of April 29, 1968, as well as the resolution of January 10, 1969, is premised upon
three basic arguments, to wit: (a) Respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, being the natural son of Ana Mallare, a Filipino, was a Filipino
citizen; (b) Esteben Mallare, the son of a Filipino mother, by his own overt acts, had chosen Philippine citizenship; and (c) respondent, a
legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, is a Filipino citizen.

The determinative issue in this controversy, therefore, revolves around the citizenship of respondent's father, Esteban Mallare, for if Esteban
were a Filipino as respondent claims, the latter axiomatically would also be a Filipino and the objection against his inclusion in the Roll of
Attorneys in the Philippines would lose legal basis.

After a painstaking study of the original and additional evidences herein presented, the Court finds sufficient grounds to warrant a definite
setting aside of Our decision of April 29, 1968, and a definitive declaration that respondent Florencio Mallare is a Filipino citizen and
therefore with qualification and right to continue the practice of law in the Philippines.

To support his contention that respondent Florencio Mallare is not a Filipino, the Commissioner of Immigration presented:

Exhibits "A" and "B", Opinions Nos. 90 and 166 of the Secretary of Justice dated March 31, 1955 and July 10, 1959, respectively, to the effect
that respondent and his brothers and sisters had failed to establish their claim to Philippine citizenship;

Exhibit "C", the death certificate of Esteban Mallare dated June 7, 1945, wherein he was reported to be of Chinese nationality;

Exhibits "D", "E", "F" and "G", the birth certificates of respondent, his brothers and sisters, dated October 23, 1929, November 8, 1932,
October 26, 1939, and February 10, 1943, respectively, stating that their father was a Chinese citizen, born in Amoy, China, and wherein
respondent was reported to be a Chinese, born in Macalelon, Quezon;

Exhibits "H" to "M" — the records of Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding No. 3925, both of the Court of First Instance of Quezon; and

Exhibit "N", respondent's alien certificate of registration, dated August 25, 1950.

Upon the other hand, respondent submitted —

Exhibit "1", the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in Civil Case No. 329-G, dated November 18, 1959, upholding the validity of a
contract of sale, the vendees therein (including respondent) being citizens of the Philippines;

Exhibit "2", an order by the Acting Commissioner of Immigration, canceling respondent's alien certificate of registration on the strength of
the court's decision in Civil Case No. 329-G; Exhibit "3", identification certificate No. 11712 issued by the Bureau of Immigration, declaring
respondent "as a citizen of the Philippines by birth being the legitimate son of Esteban Mallare, a Filipino citizen as 'per order of this office
dated 8 June 1960 CEBNO 4223-R'";
Exhibit "4", final order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, dated November 28, 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 3925, ordering the
Municipal Treasurer of Macalelon, Quezon, to correct the entry in the Registry of Birth book of the municipality by changing respondent's
nationality from "Chinese" to "Filipino";

Exhibit "5", respondent's affidavit dated October 7, 1961 showing him to be a registered voter of Macalelon, Quezon;

Exhibit "6", respondent's passport issued on March 5, 1962, showing that he is a citizen of the Philippines;

Exhibit "7", opinion of the Solicitor General, dated July 25, 1962, recognizing respondent Florencio Mallare as a Filipino citizen;

Exhibit "L", landing certificate of Te Na (respondent's mother), dated July 7, 1926, wherein she was certified as "wife of P.I. citizen";

Exhibit "K-9", certification by the municipal treasurer of Macalelon, Quezon that Esteban Mallare was registered in the Registry List of Voters
on April 14, 1928; and

The entry in the baptismal registry of the Immaculate Concepcion Church at Macalelon, Quezon, purporting to show that Esteban Mallare
was the natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina.

Respondent also presented the following residents of Macalelon, Quezon:

(a) Damiana Cabangon, 80 years old who — declared that she was with her mother, the "hilot" who attended to Ana Mallare during her
delivery, when Esteban Mallare was born;1 that she was present when Esteban was baptized;2that Ana Mallare had lived continuously in
Macalelon and was reputed to be unmarried;3 that she had never met (seen) Esteban's father, a certain Mr. Dy. 4

(b) Rafael Catarroja 77 years old and former mayor of Macalelon who declared that he knew Esteban Mallare even as a child; 5 that Esteban
was then living with his mother, Ana Mallare, a Tagala, who was cohabiting with a Chinese;6 that Esteban started voting in 1934, and became
one of his (the witness') campaign leaders when he ran for the mayor ship in 1934.7

(c) Salomon Gimenez, 75 years old and former mayor of Macalelon, who declared having known Esteban Mallare; that in the elections of
l925, when Esteban campaigned for a rival candidate against him, he (the witness) wanted to seek for Esteban's disqualification; that he
sought the counsel of Judge Gaudencio Eleazar (a relative of the witness), who advised him that a disqualification move would not prosper
because Esteban's mother was not married to Esteban's Chinese father; 8 that as of 1940, when witness was municipal mayor, there were
only about 3,000 residents in Macalelon.9

(d) Joaquin Enobal, 69 years old, who declared that he was a classmate and playmate of Esteban Mallare, whose house was only about five
houses away from theirs; 10 that he had not seen the husband of Ana Mallare; 11 that Ana was a Tagalog who had lived in Macalelon. 12

In Our decision of April 29, 1968, respondent's claim that he is a Filipino was denied for lack of evidence proving the Philippine citizenship of
his father, Esteban Mallare. It was ruled that Ana Mallare (Esteban's mother) can not be considered a Filipino, there being no proof that she
was "an inhabitant of the Philippines continuing to reside therein who was a Spanish subject on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
and ninety-nine"; that the landing certificate issued by the Bureau of Immigration which referred to respondent's mother, Te Na, as "wife of
Dy Esteban, P.I. citizen", was based upon an ex parte determination of the evidence presented by therein applicant and consequently carries
little evidentiary weight as to the citizenship of her said husband; and that the affidavit of Esteban Mallare, executed on February 20, 1939,
to the effect that he had chosen to follow the citizenship of his Filipino mother was not only self-serving, but also it can not be considered a
re-affirmation of the alleged election of citizenship since no previous election of such citizenship has been proved to exist.

With the additional evidence submitted by respondent pursuant to the authority granted by this Court, the aforementioned void in the proof
of respondent's citizenship has been duly filled.

The witnesses, all natives of Macalelon, who had personal knowledge of the person, birth and residency of both Ana Mallare and her son
Esteban, were one in their declaration that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog who had continuously resided in the place, and that Esteban, her son,
was reputedly born out of wedlock. Such declarations constitute admissible evidence of the birth and illegitimacy of Esteban Mallare.
Reputation has been held admissible as evidence of age, birth, race, or race-ancestry, and on the question of whether a child was born alive.
Unlike that of matters of pedigree, general reputation of marriage may proceed from persons who are not members of the family — the
reason for the distinction is the public interest that is taken in the question of the existence of marital relations. 13

The principle could not have been more true than in a Philippine rural community where relationships not in conformity with established
contentions become the subject of criticisms and public cynosure. Thus, the public reputation in Macalelon that Esteban was Ana's natural
child, testified to by the witness, would constitute proof of the illegitimacy of the former. Besides, if Estaban were really born out of legal
union, it is highly improbable that he would be keeping the surname "Mallare" after his mother, instead of adopting that of his father. And it
would be straining the imagination to perceive that this situation was purposedly sought by Esteban's parents to suit some ulterior motives.
In 1903, we can not concede that alien inhabitants of his country were that sophisticated or legally-oriented.

The assertion of the witnesses, which have not been controverted, that Ana Mallare is a Tagalog (and, therefore, a Filipino citizen), cannot be
assailed as being mere conclusions devoid of evidentiary value. The declarations were not only based on the reputation in the community
regarding her race or race-ancestry, which is admissible in evidence, but they must have certain factual basis. For it must be realized that in
this Philippine society, every region possesses certain characteristics all its own. Thus, a Tagalog would normally detect if a person hails
from the same region even from the way the latter speaks. Considering that the witnesses testified having known, and lived with, Ana
Mallare in Macalelon, their declaration that she is a Tagalog should receive a high degree of credibility.

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to confer on him
all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine
Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-
5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to
which he is rightfully entitled. 14

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of
April 14, 1928 (Exh. "K-9"), and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections
and campaigning for certain candidate. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship. 15 Indeed, it would be
unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7,
1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1,
subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.

It is true that in the death certificate of Esteban Mallare (Exh. "C"), he was referred to as a Chinese national, and in the birth certificates of
respondent and his brothers and sister (Exhs. "D", "E", "F" and "G"), they were declared to be of Chinese nationality. Respondent likewise
appeared to have applied for alien registration on August 25, 1950 (Exh. "N"). While said documents are public and the entries therein are,
consequently, presumed to be correct, such presumption is merely disputable and will have to yield to more positive evidence establishing
their inaccuracy.

Artemio Mallare, Esteban's eldest son and who supposedly supplied the data appearing in Exhibit "C", denied having any hand in the funeral
arrangements and the preparation of the said death certification of his father. He declared that he was merely 16 years old when his father
met his death in an accident in 1945, and he came to know of it only when he was brought to the funeral parlor on the following day. 16 The
entries in the birth certificates (Exhs. "D", "E", and "G"), on the other hand, appeared to have been prepared upon information given by the
nurse or midwife who attended to respondent's mother during her deliveries and who would have no knowledge of the actual fact of the
place of birth and the citizenship of Esteban, the father; and in the case of respondent Florencio Mallare, the informant was neither his father
or mother; it was Maria Arana a "hilot". In the case of the birth certificate of Esperanza Mallare (Exh. "F"), the informant appeared to be
Esteban Mallare himself. It is noted, however, that no proof has been presented to show that it was Esteban Mallare who personally gave the
information that the child's and parents' nationality is Chinese. And any error on his part can not affect respondent Florencio Mallare. With
respect to the registration of respondent as a citizen of China in 1950 (Exh. "N"), it was explained that this was secured by respondent's
mother, on the belief that upon the death of her husband, Esteban Mallare, she and her children reverted to Chinese citizenship. At any rate,
even assuming that said documents were prepared with actual knowledge and consent by respondent or by his parents, on the erroneous
belief that Esteban was a non-Filipino, such acts would not cause the loss or forfeiture of Philippine citizenship 17 which Esteban acquired
from his Filipino mother.

Complainant places much emphasis on the convicting testimonies of the expert witnesses on the entry in the baptismal registry of the
Immaculate Concepcion church. The discrepancy in the testimonies of said witnesses, however, loses significance in the face of the finding,
based on other evidence that Esteban Mallare is the natural child of Ana Mallare, born to her in 1903 at Macalelon, Quezon.

Upon the foregoing considerations, and on the basis of the original and additional evidence herein adduced the decision of this Court dated
April 29, 1968, is hereby definitely set aside, and the complaint in this case is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 83820 May 25, 1990

JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA, respondents.

Rufino B. Requina for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

Before Us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated June 11, 1988, which
dismissed the petition for the disqualification of private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña as candidate for Provincial Governor of Cebu
Province.

The facts of the case are briefly as follows:

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of
Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.

On January 22, 1988, the Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council (Cebu-PDP Laban, for short), as represented by petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his
capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.

On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the then Immigration and Deportation
Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is an American and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration
(ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively.
(Annex "B-1").

The petitioner also filed a Supplemental Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order to temporarily enjoin the
Cebu Provincial Board of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing the votes cast in favor of private respondent and proclaiming him until the
final resolution of the main petition.

Thus, on January 28, 1988, the COMELEC en banc resolved to order the Board to continue canvassing but to suspend the proclamation.

At the hearing before the COMELEC (First Division), the petitioner presented the following exhibits tending to show that private respondent
is an American citizen: Application for Alien Registration Form No. 1 of the Bureau of Immigration signed by private respondent dated
November 21, 1979 (Exh. "B"); Alien Certificate of Registration No. 015356 in the name of private respondent dated November 21, 1979
(Exh. "C"); Permit to Re-enter the Philippines dated November 21, 1979 (Exh. "D"); Immigration Certificate of Clearance dated January 3,
1980 (Exh. "E"). (pp. 117-118, Rollo)

Private respondent, on the other hand, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D.
Osmeña, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmeña, Sr.; that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No.
0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country
for more than six months; and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965. (pp. 107-108, Rollo)

On March 3, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) directed the Board of Canvassers to proclaim the winning candidates. Having obtained the
highest number of votes, private respondent was proclaimed the Provincial Governor of Cebu.

Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filed and for
lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen.

Hence, the present petition.

The petition is not meritorious.

There are two instances where a petition questioning the qualifications of a registered candidate to run for the office for which his certificate
of candidacy was filed can be raised under the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), to wit:

(1) Before election, pursuant to Section 78 thereof which provides that:

'Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after the notice
and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

and

(2) After election, pursuant to Section 253 thereof, viz:

'Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file
a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November 19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for
disqualification of said private respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond the twenty five-day
period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that said petition was filed out of time.

The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the
same Code as it is unquestionably premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of Cebu only on
March 3, 1988.

However, We deem it is a matter of public interest to ascertain the respondent's citizenship and qualification to hold the public office to
which he has been proclaimed elected. There is enough basis for us to rule directly on the merits of the case, as the COMELEC did below.

Petitioner's contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore, disqualified from running for and being elected to the
office of Provincial Governor of Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.

In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship
by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express
renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the
evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by
any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.

In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the
fact that private respondent was issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter the Philippines by the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being
an American", private respondent "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S. Naturalization Laws." (p. 81,
Rollo)

Philippine courts are only allowed to determine who are Filipino citizens and who are not. Whether or not a person is considered an
American under the laws of the United States does not concern Us here.

By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove that private respondent had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to positively
establish this fact.

The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21, 1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564,
August 1, 1989) are not applicable to the case at bar.

In the Frivaldo case, evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1983 per certification from the United States
District Court, Northern District of California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate General in
San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Frivaldo expressly admitted in his answer that he was naturalized in the United States but claimed that he was forced to embrace American
citizenship to protect himself from the persecution of the Marcos government. The Court, however, found this suggestion of involuntariness
unacceptable, pointing out that there were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo who did not find it
necessary to abandon their status as Filipinos.

Likewise, in the case of Labo, records show that Labo was married to an Australian citizen and that he was naturalized as an Australian
citizen in 1976, per certification from the Australian Government through its Consul in the Philippines. This was later affirmed by the
Department of Foreign Affairs.

The authenticity of the above evidence was not disputed by Labo. In fact, in a number of sworn statements, Labo categorically declared that
he was a citizen of Australia.

In declaring both Frivaldo and Labo not citizens of the Philippines, therefore, disqualified from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon and Mayor of Baguio City, respectively, the Court considered the fact that by their own admissions, they are indubitably aliens, no
longer owing any allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines since they have sworn their total allegiance to a foreign state.

In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p. 81, Rollo). He is a
holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up
to the present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino and the loss of his
Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.

In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as
an American citizen, the first in 1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded as having expressly
renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña
was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino. Thus, by way of analogy, if a person who has two brothers named Jose and Mario states or certifies that he has a brother named
Jose, this does not mean that he does not have a brother named Mario; or if a person is enrolled as student simultaneously in two
universities, namely University X and University Y, presents a Certification that he is a student of University X, this does not necessarily mean
that he is not still a student of University Y. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth
to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either
"'express" or "implied".

Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that "dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt
with by law"(Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country had already
frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso,
the effect of such dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been enacted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]

JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.

[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]

RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The ultimate question posed before this Court in these twin cases is: Who should be declared the rightful governor of Sorsogon

(i) Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes in three successive elections but who was twice declared by
this Court to be disqualified to hold such office due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have re-assumed his lost Philippine
citizenship thru repatriation;

(ii) Raul R. Lee, who was the second placer in the canvass, but who claims that the votes cast in favor of Frivaldo should be considered void;
that the electorate should be deemed to have intentionally thrown away their ballots; and that legally, he secured the most number of valid
votes; or

(iii) The incumbent Vice-Governor, Oscar G. Deri, who obviously was not voted directly to the position of governor, but who according to
prevailing jurisprudence should take over the said post inasmuch as, by the ineligibility of Frivaldo, a "permanent vacancy in the contested
office has occurred"?

In ruling for Frivaldo, the Court lays down new doctrines on repatriation, clarifies/reiterates/amplifies existing jurisprudence on
citizenship and elections, and upholds the superiority of substantial justice over pure legalisms.
G.R. No. 123755.
This is a special civil action under Rules 65 and 58 of the Rules of Court for certiorari and preliminary injunction to review and annul a
Resolution of the respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec), First Division,1 promulgated on December 19,19952 and another
Resolution of the Comelec en bane promulgated February 23, 19963 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in
the May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition 4 with the Comelec docketed as SPA
No. 95-028 praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position by reason of not yet being a citizen of
the Philippines," and that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a
Resolution5 granting the petition with the following disposition:6

"WHEREFORE, this Division resolves to GRANT the petition and declares that respondent is DISQUALIFIED to run for the Office of Governor
of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the Philippines. Accordingly, respondent's certificate of candidacy is cancelled."

The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy
continued and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May 11, 1995, the Comelec en banc7 affirmed the aforementioned
Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the election returns and a Certificate of Votes 8.dated May 27, 1995 was
issued showing the following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor of Sorsogon:

Antonio H. Escudero, Jr. 51,060

Juan G. Frivaldo 73,440

RaulR.Lee 53,304

Isagani P. Ocampo 1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed in said SPA No. 95-028, a (supplemental) petition9 praying for his proclamation as the duly-elected Governor
of Sorsogon.
In an order10 dated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed
"the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
On July 6, 1995, Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition,11 docketed as SPC No. 95-317, praying for the annulment of the June 30,
1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the afternoon, he took his oath of
allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization in September 1994 had been granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the Comelec) x x x was
released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to the proclamation
(of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec,12 the Vice-Governor not Lee
should occupy said position of governor.
 On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution 13 holding that Lee, "not having garnered
the highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the
highest number of votes, and xxx having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 725 xxx (is) qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon"; thus:

"PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Commission (First Division), therefore RESOLVES to GRANT the Petition.

Consistent with the decisions of the Supreme Court, the proclamation of Raul R. Lee as Governor of Sorsogon is hereby ordered annulled,
being contrary to law, he not having garnered the highest number of votes to warrant his proclamation.

Upon the finality of the annulment of the proclamation of Raul R. Lee, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to immediately
reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass, proclaim petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo as the duly elected Governor of Sorsogon having
garnered the highest number of votes, and he having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by repatriation on June 30,1995 under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 725 and, thus, qualified to hold the office of Governor of Sorsogon.

Conformably with Section 260 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), the Clerk of the Commission is directed to notify His Excellency
the President of the Philippines, and the Secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Sorsogon of this resolution
immediately upon the due implementation thereof."

On December 26,1995, Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Comelec en banc in its Resolution14 promulgated
on February 23, 1996. On February 26, 1996, the present petition was filed. Acting on the prayer for a temporary restraining order, this
Court issued on February 27, 1996 a Resolution which inter alia directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing prior to the filing
of this petition."

The Issues in G.R. No. 123755

Petitioner Lee's "position on the matter at hand briefly be capsulized in the following propositions": 15

"First - The initiatory petition below was so far insufficient in form and substance to warrant the exercise by the COMELEC of its jurisdiction
with the result that, in effect, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and deciding said petition;

Second- The judicially declared disqualification of respondent was a continuing condition and rendered him ineligible to run for, to be
elected to and to hold the Office of Governor;

Third - The alleged repatriation of respondent was neither valid nor is the effect thereof retroactive as to cure his ineligibility and qualify him
to hold the Office of Governor; and

Fourth - Correctly read and applied, the Labo Doctrine fully supports the validity of petitioner's proclamation as duly elected Governor of
Sorsogon."

G.R. No. 120295

This is a petition to annul three Resolutions of the respondent Comelec, the first two of which are also at issue in G.R. No. 123755, as
follows:

1. Resolution16 of the Second Division, promulgated on May 1, 1995, disqualifying Frivaldo from running for governor of Sorsogon in the May
8, 1995 elections "on the ground that he is not a citizen of the Philippines";

2. Resolution17 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated on May 11, 1995; and

3. Resolution18 of the Comelec en bane, promulgated also on May 11, 1995 suspending the proclamation of, among others, Frivaldo.

The Facts and the Issue

The facts of this case are essentially the same as those in G.R. No. 123755. However, Frivaldo assails the above-mentioned resolutions
on a different ground: that under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which is reproduced hereinunder:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election." (Italics supplied.)

the Comelec had no jurisdiction to issue said Resolutions because they were not rendered "within the period allowed by law," i.e., "not later
than fifteen days before the election."
Otherwise stated, Frivaldo contends that the failure of the Comelec to act on the petition for disqualification within the period of fifteen
days prior to the election as provided by law is a jurisdictional defect which renders the said Resolutions null and void.
By Resolution on March 12, 1996, the Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 120295 and 123755 since they are intimately related in their factual
environment and are identical in the ultimate question raised, viz., who should occupy the position of governor of the province of Sorsogon.
On March 19, 1995, the Court heard oral argument from the parties and required them thereafter to file simultaneously their
respective memoranda.

The Consolidated Issues

 From the foregoing submissions, the consolidated issues may be restated as follows:

1. Was the repatriation of Frivaldo valid and legal? If so, did it seasonably cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and
to hold the Office of Governor? If not, may it be given retroactive effect? If so, from when?

2. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be elected to
or hold the governorship of Sorsogon?

3. Did the respondent Comelec have jurisdiction over the initiatory petition in SPC No. 95-317 considering that : said petition is not "a pre-
proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case"?

4. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election, valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence?

5. Did the respondent Commission on Elections exceed its jurisdiction in promulgating the assailed Resolutions, all of which prevented
Frivaldo from assuming the governorship of Sorsogon, considering that they were not rendered within ( the period referred to in Section 78
of the Omnibus Election Code, viz., "not later than fifteen days before the elections"?

The First Issue: Frivaldo's Repatriation

The validity and effectivity of Frivaldo's repatriation is the lis mota, the threshold legal issue in this case. All the other matters raised
are secondary to this.
The Local Government Code of 199119 expressly requires Philippine citizenship as a qualification for elective local officials, including
that of provincial governor, thus:

"Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city,
or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

(b) Candidates for the position of governor, vice governor or member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, or mayor, vice mayor or member of
the sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day.

xxx xxx xxx

Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court20 as a non-citizen, it is therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has
reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R. A. 7160).
Under Philippine law,21 citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this
Court in G.R. No. 10465422 and during the oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but that
the bill allowing him to do so "failed to materialize, notwithstanding the endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives"
due, according to him, to the "maneuvers of his political rivals." In the same case, his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court
because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Despite his lack of Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo was overwhelmingly elected governor by the electorate of Sorsogon, with a margin
of 27,000 votes in the 1988 elections, 57,000 in 1992, and 20,000 in 1995 over the same opponent Raul Lee. Twice, he was judicially
declared a non-Filipino and thus twice disqualified from holding and discharging his popular mandate. Now, he comes to us a third time,
with a fresh vote from the people of Sorsogon and a favorable decision from the Commission on Elections to boot. Moreover, he now boasts
of having successfully passed through the third and last mode of reacquiring citizenship: by repatriation under P.D. No. 725, with no less
than the Solicitor General himself, who was the prime opposing counsel in the previous cases he lost, this time, as counsel for co-respondent
Comelec, arguing the validity of his cause (in addition to his able private counsel Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr.). That he took his oath of allegiance
under the provisions of said Decree at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995 is not disputed. Hence, he insists that henot Leeshould have been
proclaimed as the duly-elected governor of Sorsogon when the Provincial Board of Canvassers met at 8:30 p.m. on the said date since, clearly
and unquestionably, he garnered the highest number of votes in the elections and since at that time, he already reacquired his citizenship.
En contrario, Lee argues that Frivaldo's repatriation is tainted ; with serious defects, which we shall now discuss in seriatim.
First, Lee tells us that P.D. No. 725 had "been effectively repealed," asserting that "then President Corazon Aquino exercising legislative
powers under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, forbade the grant of citizenship by Presidential Decree or Executive
Issuances as the same poses a serious and contentious issue of policy which the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound
discretion, should best leave to the judgment of the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution," adding that in her memorandum dated
March 27,1987 to the members of the Special Committee on Naturalization constituted for purposes of Presidential Decree No. 725,
President Aquino directed them "to cease and desist from undertaking any and all proceedings within your functional area of responsibility
as defined under Letter of Instructions (LOI) No. 270 dated April 11, 1975, as amended." 23
This memorandum dated March 27, 198724 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or
authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 25 and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious
that no express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum based on the copy furnished us by Lee did not
categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect. In fact, she did not even
mention it specifically by its number or text. On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed "unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly
repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist."26
The memorandum of then President Aquino cannot even be regarded as a legislative enactment, for not every pronouncement of the
Chief Executive even under the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution can nor should be regarded as an exercise of her law-making
powers. At best, it could be treated as an executive policy addressed to the Special Committee to halt the acceptance and processing of
applications for repatriation pending whatever "judgment the first Congress under the 1987 Constitution" might make. In other words, the
former President did not repeal P.D. 725 but left it to the first Congress once createdto deal with the matter. If she had intended to repeal
such law, she should have unequivocally said so instead of referring the matter to Congress. The fact is she carefully couched her presidential
issuance in terms that clearly indicated the intention of "the present government, in the exercise of prudence and sound discretion" to leave
the matter of repeal to the new Congress. Any other interpretation of the said Presidential Memorandum, such as is now being proffered to
the Court by Lee, would visit unmitigated violence not only upon statutory construction but on common sense as well.
Second. Lee also argues that "serious congenital irregularities flawed the repatriation proceedings," asserting that Frivaldo's
application therefor was "filed on June 29, 1995 x x x (and) was approved in just one day or on June 30, 1995 x x x," which "prevented a
judicious review and evaluation of the merits thereof." Frivaldo counters that he filed his application for repatriation with the Office of the
President in Malacanang Palace on August 17, 1994. This is confirmed by the Solicitor General. However, the Special Committee was
reactivated only on June 8, 1995, when presumably the said Committee started processing his application. On June 29, 1995, he filled up and
re-submitted the FORM that the Committee required. Under these circumstances, it could not be said that there was "indecent haste" in the
processing of his application.
Anent Lee's charge that the "sudden reconstitution of the Special Committee on Naturalization was intended solely for the personal
interest of respondent,"27 the Solicitor General explained during the oral argument on March 19, 1996 that such allegation is simply baseless
as there were many others who applied and were considered for repatriation, a list of whom was submitted by him to this Court, through a
Manifestation28 filed on April 3, 1996.
On the basis of the parties' submissions, we are convinced that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and
the presumption of legality in the repatriation of Frivaldo have not been successfully rebutted by Lee. The mere fact that the proceedings
were speeded up is by itself not a ground to conclude that such proceedings were necessarily tainted. After all, the requirements of
repatriation under P.D. No. 725 are not difficult to comply with, nor are they tedious and cumbersome. In fact, P.D. 725 29 itself requires very
little of an applicant, and even the rules and regulations to implement the said decree were left to the Special Committee to promulgate. This
is not unusual since, unlike in naturalization where an alien covets a first-time entry into Philippine political life, in repatriation the applicant
is a former natural-born Filipino who is merely seeking to reacquire his previous citizenship. In the case of Frivaldo, he was undoubtedly a
natural-born citizen who openly and faithfully served his country and his province prior to his naturalization in the United States a
naturalization he insists was made necessary only to escape the iron clutches of a dictatorship he abhorred and could not in conscience
embrace and who, after the fall of the dictator and the re-establishment of democratic space, wasted no time in returning to his country of
birth to offer once more his talent and services to his people.
So too, the fact that ten other persons, as certified to by the Solicitor General, were granted repatriation argues convincingly and
conclusively against the existence of favoritism vehemently posited by Raul Lee. At any rate, any contest on the legality of Frivaldo's
repatriation should have been pursued before the Committee itself, and, failing there, in the Office of the President, pursuant to the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
Third. Lee further contends that assuming the assailed repatriation to be valid, nevertheless it could only be effective as at 2:00 p.m. of
June 30, 1995 whereas the citizenship qualification prescribed by the Local Government Code "must exist on the date of his election, if not
when the certificate of candidacy is filed," citing our decision in G.R. 104654 30 which held that "both the Local Government Code and the
Constitution require that only Philippine citizens can run and be elected to Public office" Obviously, however, this was a mere obiter as the
only issue in said case was whether Frivaldo's naturalization was valid or not and NOT the effective date thereof. Since the Court held his
naturalization to be invalid, then the issue of when an aspirant for public office should be a citizen was NOT resolved at all by the Court.
Which question we shall now directly rule on.
Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, "(a)n elective local official must be:
* a citizen of the Philippines;
* a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected;
* a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
* able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect."
* In addition, "candidates for the position of governor x x x must be at least twenty-three (23) years of age on election day."
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship,
unlike that for residence (which must consist of at least one year's residency immediately preceding the day of election) and age (at least
twenty three years of age on election day).
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for holding an elective public office, 31 and the purpose of the citizenship
qualification is none other than to ensure that no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another nation, shall govern our people and our
country or a unit of territory thereof. Now, an official begins to govern or to discharge his functions only upon his proclamation and on the
day the law mandates his term of office to begin. Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on June 30, 1995the very day32 the term of office
of governor (and other elective officials) beganhe was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold such office and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date. In short, at that time, he was already qualified to govern his native Sorsogon. This is the
liberal interpretation that should give spirit, life and meaning to our law on qualifications consistent with the purpose for which such law
was enacted. So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that Section 39 of the Local
Government Code speaks of "Qualifications" of "ELECTIVE OFFICIALS," not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at
the time of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications unless otherwise
expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence should thus be possessed when the "elective [or elected] official" begins to govern,
i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term in this case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court's ruling in Vasquez vs.
Giapand Li Seng Giap & Sons,33 if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and country do not end up being
governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by
construing the citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term.
But perhaps the more difficult objection was the one raised during the oral argument 34 to the effect that the citizenship qualification
should be possessed at the time the candidate (or for that matter the elected official) registered as a voter. After all, Section 39, apart from
requiring the official to be a citizen, also specifies as another item of qualification, that he be a "registered voter." And, under the law35 a
"voter" must be a citizen of the Philippines. So therefore, Frivaldo could not have been a voter-much less a validly registered one if he was
not a citizen at the time of such registration.
The answer to this problem again lies in discerning the purpose of the requirement. If the law intended the citizenship qualification to
be possessed prior to election consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification
distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter requirement was
included as another qualification (aside from "citizenship"), not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: "a registered voter in the barangay, municipality,
city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected." It should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official
to be a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registrationnot the actual votingis the core of this "qualification." In
other words, the law's purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the area he seeks
to govern and not anywhere else.
Before this Court, Frivaldo has repeatedly emphasizedand Lee has not disputed that he "was and is a registered voter of Sorsogon, and
his registration as a voter has been sustained as valid by judicial declaration x x x In fact, he cast his vote in his precinct on May 8, 1995."36
So too, during the oral argument, his counsel stead-fastly maintained that "Mr. Frivaldo has always been a registered voter of Sorsogon.
He has voted in 1987,1988,1992, then he voted again in 1995. In fact, his eligibility as a voter was questioned, but the court dismissed (sic)
his eligibility as a voter and he was allowed to vote as in fact, he voted in all the previous elections including on May 8,1995.37
It is thus clear that Frivaldo is a registered voter in the province where he intended to be elected.
 There is yet another reason why the prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not necessarily the
date of election or date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code38 gives any voter, presumably
including the defeated candidate, the opportunity to question the ELIGIBILITY (or the disloyalty) of a candidate. This is the only provision of
the Code that authorizes a remedy on how to contest before the Comelec an incumbent's ineligibility arising from failure to meet the
qualifications enumerated under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code. Such remedy of Quo Warranto can be availed of "within ten days
after proclamation" of the winning candidate. Hence, it is only at such time that the issue of ineligibility may be taken cognizance of by the
Commission. And since, at the very moment of Lee's proclamation (8:30 p.m., June 30, 1995), Juan G. Frivaldo was already and indubitably a
citizen, having taken his oath of allegiance earlier in the afternoon of the same day, then he should have been the candidate proclaimed as he
unquestionably garnered the highest number of votes in the immediately preceding elections and such oath had already cured his previous
"judicially-declared" alienage. Hence, at such time, he was no longer ineligible.
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETRO ACTED to the date of the filing of
his application on August 17,1994.
It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines,39 "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But
there are settled exceptions40 to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW
RIGHTS.
According to Tolentino,41 curative statutes are those which undertake to cure errors and irregularities, thereby validating judicial or
administrative proceedings, acts of public officers, or private deeds and contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended
consequences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. They operate on conditions already
existing, and are necessarily retroactive in operation. Agpalo,42 on the other hand, says that curative statutes are "healing acts x x x curing
defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations x x x (and) are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in existing
laws, and curb certain evils x x x By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive xxx (and) reach back to past events to correct errors
or irregularities and to render valid and effective attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffective for the purpose the parties intended."
On the other hand, remedial or procedural laws, i.e., those statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create
new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of such rights, ordinarily do not come within
the legal meaning of a retrospective law, nor within the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes. 43
A reading of P.D. 725 immediately shows that it creates a new right, and also provides for a new remedy, thereby filling certain voids in
our laws. Thus, in its preamble, P.D. 725 expressly recognizes the plight of "many Filipino women (who) had lost their Philippine citizenship
by marriage to aliens" and who could not, under the existing law (C. A. No. 63, as amended) avail of repatriation until "after the death of their
husbands or the termination of their marital status" and who could neither be benefitted by the 1973 Constitution's new provision allowing
"a Filipino woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine citizenship xxx" because "such provision of the new Constitution does not
apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before said constitution took effect." Thus, P.D. 725 granted a new right to these womenthe
right to re-acquire Filipino citizenship even during their marital coverture, which right did not exist prior to P.D. 725. On the other hand, said
statute also provided a new remedy and a new right in favor of other "natural born Filipinos who (had) lost their Philippine citizenship but
now desire to re-acquire Philippine citizenship," because prior to the promulgation of P.D. 725 such former Filipinos would have had to
undergo the tedious and cumbersome process of naturalization, but with the advent of P.D. 725 they could now re-acquire their Philippine
citizenship under the simplified procedure of repatriation.
The Solicitor General44 argues:

"By their very nature, curative statutes are retroactive, (DBP vs. CA, 96 SCRA 342), since they are intended to supply defects, abridge
superfluities in existing laws (Del Castillo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, 96 Phil. 119) and curb certain evils (Santos vs. Duata, 14
SCRA 1041).

In this case, P.D. No. 725 was enacted to cure the defect in the existing naturalization law, specifically C. A. No. 63 wherein married Filipino
women are allowed to repatriate only upon the death of their husbands, and natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship by
naturalization and other causes faced the difficulty of undergoing the rigid procedures of C.A. 63 for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by
naturalization.

Presidential Decree No. 725 provided a remedy for the aforementioned legal aberrations and thus its provisions are considered essentially
remedial and curative."

In light of the foregoing, and prescinding from the wording of the preamble, it is unarguable that the legislative intent was precisely to
give the statute retroactive operation. "(A) retrospective operation is given to a statute or amendment where the intent that it should so
operate clearly appears from a consideration of the act as a whole, or from the terms thereof." 45It is obvious to the Court that the statute was
meant to "reach back" to those persons, events and transactions not otherwise covered by prevailing law and jurisprudence. And inasmuch
as it has been held that citizenship is a political and civil right equally as important as the freedom of speech, liberty of abode, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures and other guarantees enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore the legislative intent to give
retrospective operation to P.D. 725 must be given the fullest effect possible. "(I)t has been said that a remedial statute must be so construed as
to make it effect the evident purpose for -which it was enacted, so that if the reason of the statute extends to past transactions, as well as to
those in the future, then it will be so applied although the statute does not in terms so direct, unless to do so would impair some vested right
or violate some constitutional guaranty."46 This is all the more true of P.D. 725, which did not specify any restrictions on or delimit or qualify
the right of repatriation granted therein.
At this point, a valid question may be raised: How can the retroactivity of P.D. 725 benefit Frivaldo considering that said law was
enacted on June 5,1975, while Frivaldo lost his Filipino citizenship much later, on January 20, 1983, and applied for repatriation even later,
on August 17, 1994?
While it is true that the law was already in effect at the time that Frivaldo became an American citizen, nevertheless, it is not only the
law itself (P.D. 725) which is tobe given retroactive effect, but even the repatriation granted under said law to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 is to
be deemed to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor, August 17, 1994. The reason for this is simply that if, as in this case, it
was the intent of the legislative authority that the law should apply to past events i.e., situations and transactions existing even before the law
came into being in order to benefit the greatest number of former Filipinos possible thereby enabling them to enjoy and exercise the
constitutionally guaranteed right of citizenship, and such legislative intention is to be given the fullest effect and expression, then there is all
the more reason to have the law apply in a retroactive or retrospective manner to situations, events and transactions subsequent to the passage
of such law. That is, the repatriation granted to Frivaldo on June 30, 1995 can and should be made to take effect as of date of his application.
As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the law that would bar this or would show a contrary intention on the part of the legislative
authority; and there is no showing that damage or prejudice to anyone, or anything unjust or injurious would result from giving retroactivity
to his repatriation. Neither has Lee shown that there will result the impairment of any contractual obligation, disturbance of any vested right
or breach of some constitutional guaranty.
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given
retroactive effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of time,
then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldohaving already renounced his American citizenship was, may be prejudiced for
causes outside their control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is to be presumed that the
law-making body intended right and justice to prevail.47
And as experience will show, the Special Committee was able to process, act upon and grant applications for repatriation within relatively
short spans of time after the same were filed.48The fact that such interregna were relatively insignificant minimizes the likelihood of
prejudice to the government as a result of giving retroactivity to repatriation. Besides, to the mind of the Court, direct prejudice to the
government is possible only where a person's repatriation has the effect of wiping out a liability of his to the government arising in
connection with or as a result of his being an alien, and accruing only during the interregnum between application and approval, a situation
that is not present in the instant case.
And it is but right and just that the mandate of the people, already twice frustrated, should now prevail. Under the circumstances, there
is nothing unjust or iniquitous in treating Frivaldo's repatriation as having become effective as of the date of his application, i.e., on August
17, 1994. This being so, all questions about his possession of the nationality qualification whether at the date of proclamation (June 30,
1995) or the date of election (May 8, 1995) or date of filing his certificate of candidacy (March 20, 1995) would become moot.

Based on the foregoing, any question regarding Frivaldo's status as a registered voter would also be deemed settled. Inasmuch as he is
considered as having been repatriatedi.e., his Filipino citizenship restored as of August 17, 1994, his previous registration as a voter is
likewise deemed validated as of said date.

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him
dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective local
position?"49 We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he
took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he "had long
renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he
abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship."50

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:51

"By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government."

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted
by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.52

The Second Issue: Is Lack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification?

Lee contends that the May 1,1995 Resolution 53 of the Comelec Second Division in SPA No. 95-028 as affirmed in toto by Comelec En
Banc in its Resolution of May 11, 1995 "became final and executory after five (5) days or on May 17,1995, no restraining order having been
issued by this Honorable Court."54 Hence, before Lee "was proclaimed as the elected governor on June 30, 1995, there was already a final and
executory judgment disqualifying" Frivaldo. Lee adds that this Court's two rulings (which Frivaldo now concedes were legally "correct")
declaring Frivaldo an alien have also become final and executory way before the 1995 elections, and these "judicial pronouncements of his
political status as an American citizen absolutely and for all time disqualified (him) from running for, and holding any public office in the
Philippines."
We do not agree.
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections
while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer
be changed. In the words of the respondent Commission (Second Division) in its assailed Resolution: 55

"The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the
purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any 'final judgment' of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate
for the May 8, 1995 elections. What the Commission said in its Order of June 21, 1995 (implemented on June 30, 1995), directing the
proclamation of Raul R. Lee, was that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen 'having been declared by the Supreme Court in its Order dated March
25, 1995, not a citizen of the Philippines.' This declaration of the Supreme Court, however, was in connection with the 1992 elections."

Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality. This is because
a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.
Hence, in Lee vs. Commissioner of Immigration,56 we held:

"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again, as the occasion demands."

The Third Issue: Comelec's Jurisdiction

Over The Petition in SPC No. 95-317
Lee also avers that respondent Comelec had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in SPC No. 95-317 because the only "possible types
of proceedings that may be entertained by the Comelec are a pre-proclamation case, an election protest or a quo warranto case." Again, Lee
reminds us that he was proclaimed on June 30, 1995 but that Frivaldo filed SPC No. 95-317 questioning his (Lee's) proclamation only on July
6, 1995 "beyond the 5-day reglementary period." Hence, according to him, Frivaldo's "recourse was to file either an election protest or a quo
warranto action."
This argument is not meritorious. The Constitution57 has given the Comelec ample power to "exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all elective x x x provincial x x x officials." Instead of dwelling at length
on the various petitions that Comelec, in the exercise of its constitutional prerogatives, may entertain, suffice
it to say that this Court has invariably recognized the Commission's authority to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations of which SPC No. 95-317 obviously is one.58Thus, in Mentang vs. COMELEC,59 we ruled:
"The petitioner argues that after proclamation and assumption of office, a pre-proclamation controversy is no longer viable. Indeed, we are
aware of cases holding that pre-proclamation controversies may no longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidate has
been proclaimed, (citing Gallardo vs. Rimando, 187 SCRA 463; Salvacion vs. COMELEC, 170 SCRA 513; Casimiro vs. COMELEC, 171 SCRA 468.)
This rule, however, is premised on an assumption that the proclamation is no proclamation at all and the proclaimed candidate's assumption
of office cannot deprive the COMELEC of the power to make such declaration of nullity. (citing Aguam vs. COMELEC, 23 SCRA 883;
Agbayani vs. COMELEC, 186 SCRA 484.)"

The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must "be done within ten (10) days following the
proclamation." Inasmuch as Frivaldo's petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee's proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec
correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.

The Fourth Issue: Was Lee's Proclamation Valid

Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him for the following reasons:

First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC,60 "the fact remains that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in Aquino
vs. COMELEC,61 Lee is "a second placer, xxx just that, a second placer."

In spite of this, Lee anchors his claim to the governorship on the pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Labo62 case, as follows:

"The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a candidate's disqualification so as to bring such
awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the electorate
may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes,
in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected."

But such holding is qualified by the next paragraph, thus:

"But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was
notoriously known as an ineligible candidate, much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo was
even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10, 1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its
resolution dated May 9,1992 denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final and subject to the
final outcome of this case."

The last-quoted paragraph in Labo, unfortunately for Lee, is the ruling appropriate in this case because Frivaldo was in 1995 in an
identical situation as Labo was in 1992 when the Comelec's cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was not yet final on election day as
there was in both cases a pending motion for reconsideration, for which reason Comelec issued an (omnibus) resolution declaring that
Frivaldo (like Labo in 1992) and several others can still be voted for in the May 8, 1995 election, as in fact, he was.
Furthermore, there has been no sufficient evidence presented to show that the electorate of Sorsogon was "fully aware in fact and in
law" of Frivaldo's alleged disqualification as to "bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety", in other words, that the voters
intentionally wasted their ballots knowing that, in spite of their voting for him, he was ineligible. If Labo has any relevance at all, it is that the
vice-governor and not Leeshould be proclaimed, since in losing the election, Lee was, to paraphrase Labo again, "obviously not the choice of
the people" of Sorsogon. This is the emphatic teaching of Labo:

"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office."

Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the highest
number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently erroneous and should now
be corrected.

The Fifth Issue: Is Section 78 of the Election Code Mandatory?

In G.R. No. 120295, Frivaldo claims that the assailed Resolution of the Comelec (Second Division) dated May 1, 1995 and the
confirmatory en banc Resolution of May 11, 1995 disqualifying him for want of citizenship should be annulled because they were rendered
beyond the fifteen (15) day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which reads as follows:

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election" (italics supplied.)

This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the
Commission (First Division) on December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc63 on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election. At any rate, it
is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections, thus:

"SEC. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the -winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing
of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." (Italics supplied)

Refutation of Mr. Justice Davide's Dissent

 In his dissenting opinion, the esteemed Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. argues that President Aquino's memorandum dated March 27,
1987 should be viewed as a suspension (not a repeal, as urged by Lee) of P.D. 725. But whether it decrees a suspension or a repeal is a purely
academic distinction because the said issuance is not a statute that can amend or abrogate an existing law. The existence and subsistence of
P.D. 725 were recognized in the first Frivaldo case;64 viz, "(u)nder CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship
maybe reacquired by xxx repatriation" He also contends that by allowing Frivaldo to register and to remain as a registered voter, the Comelec
and in effect this Court abetted a "mockery" of our two previous judgments declaring him a non-citizen. We do not see such abetting or
mockery. The retroactivity of his repatriation, as discussed earlier, legally cured whatever defects there may have been in his registration as
a voter for the purpose of the 1995 elections. Such retroactivity did not change his disqualifications in 1988 and 1992, which were the
subjects of such previous rulings.
Mr. Justice Davide also believes that Quo Warranto is not the sole remedy to question the ineligibility of a candidate, citing the
Comelec's authority under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code allowing the denial of a certificate of candidacy on the ground of a false
material representation therein as required by Section 74. Citing Loong, he then states his disagreement with our holding that Section 78 is
merely directory. We really have no quarrel. Our point is that Frivaldo was in error in his claim in G.R. No. 120295 that the Comelec
Resolutions promulgated on May 1, 1995 and May 11, 1995 were invalid because they were issued "not later than fifteen days before the
election" as prescribed by Section 78. In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of
discretion because "Section 6 of R. A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the elections." In spite of his
disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section 78 "is merely directory," we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide nonetheless votes to
"DISMISS G.R. No. 120295." One other point. Loong, as quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78
must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with the period during which the Comelec
may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that
a decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of
time. There is no inconsistency nor conflict.
Mr. Justice Davide also disagrees with the Court's holding that, given the unique factual circumstances of Frivaldo, repatriation may be
given retroactive effect. He argues that such retroactivity "dilutes" our holding in the first Frivaldo case. But the first (and even the second
Frivaldo) decision did not directly involve repatriation as a mode of acquiring citizenship. If we may repeat, there is no question that
Frivaldo was not a Filipino for purposes of determining his qualifications in the 1988 and 1992 elections. That is settled. But his supervening
repatriation has changed his political status not in 1988 or 1992, but only in the 1995 elections.
Our learned colleague also disputes our holding that Frivaldo was stateless prior to his repatriation, saying that "informal renunciation
or abandonment is not a ground to lose American citizenship." Since our courts are charged only with the duty of the determining who are
Philippine nationals, we cannot rule on the legal question of who are or who are not Americans. It is basic in international law that a State
determines ONLY those who are its own citizens not who are the citizens of other countries. 65 The issue here is: the Comelec made a finding
of fact that Frivaldo was stateless and such finding has not been shown by Lee to be arbitrary or whimsical. Thus, following settled case law,
such finding is binding and final.
The dissenting opinion also submits that Lee who lost by chasmic margins to Frivaldo in all three previous elections, should be
declared winner because "Frivaldo's ineligibility for being an American was publicly known." First, there is absolutely no empirical evidence
for such "public" knowledge. Second, even if there is, such knowledge can be true post facto only of the last two previous elections. Third,
even the Comelec and now this Court were/are still deliberating on his nationality before, during and after the 1995 elections. How then can
there be such "public" knowledge?
Mr. Justice Davide submits that Section 39 of the Local Government Code refers to the qualifications of elective local officials, i.e.,
candidates, and not elected officials, and that the citizenship qualification [under par. (a) of that section] must be possessed by candidates,
not merely at the commencement of the term, but by election day at the latest. We see it differently. Section 39, par. (a) thereof speaks of
"elective local official" while par. (b) to (f) refer to "candidates." If the qualifications under par. (a) were intended to apply to "candidates"
and not elected officials, the legislature would have said so, instead of differentiating par. (a) from the rest of the paragraphs. Secondly, if
Congress had meant that the citizenship qualification should be possessed at election day or prior thereto, it would have specifically stated
such detail, the same way it did in pars. (b) to (f) for other qualifications of candidates for governor, mayor, etc.
Mr. Justice Davide also questions the giving of retroactive effect to Frivaldo's repatriation on the ground, among others, that the law
specifically provides that it is only after taking the oath of allegiance that applicants shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. We do not question what the provision states. We hold however that the provision should be understood thus: that after taking
the oath of allegiance the applicant is deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship, which reacquisition (or repatriation) is deemed for all
purposes and intents to have retroacted to the date of his application therefor.
In any event, our "so too" argument regarding the literal meaning of the word "elective" in reference to Section 39 of the Local
Government Code, as well as regarding Mr. Justice Davide's thesis that the very wordings of P.D. 725 suggest non-retroactivity, were already
taken up rather extensively earlier in this Decision.
Mr. Justice Davide caps his paper with a clarion call: "This Court must be the first to uphold the Rule of Law." We agree we must all
follow the rule of law. But that is NOT the issue here. The issue is how should the law be interpreted and applied in this case so it can be
followed, so it can rule!
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of how to interpret and apply laws relating to
elections: literal or liberal; the letter or the spirit; the naked provision or its ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice; in
isolation or in the context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the voters' obvious choice. In applying election laws, it
would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms. Indeed, to inflict a thrice
rejected candidate upon the electorate of Sorsogon would constitute unmitigated judicial tyranny and an unacceptable assault upon this
Court's conscience.

EPILOGUE

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as
of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold P.D. No. 725 to be in full force
and effect up to the present, not having been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and Frivaldo's repatriation by
virtue thereof to have been properly granted and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or curative nature of the law
granting him a new right to resume his political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique situation of having been
forced to give up his citizenship and political aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his repatriation is to be given
retroactive effect as of the date of his application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he having given ' up his U. S.
nationality. Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee. Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted to August 17, 1994,
his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The foregoing, of course, are precisely
consistent with our holding that lack of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or disqualification to run for and hold
public office. And once again, we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's authority and jurisdiction to hear and
decide petitions for annulment of proclamations.
 This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the manifest
will of our people,66 for in case of doubt, political laws must be
interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise stated, legal niceties and
technicalities cannot stand in the way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:

"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."67

The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection, defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed,
this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy. In
any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a
manner that would give effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those who
are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that
the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic68 to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect
to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to
the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered as a voter before
the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the time of repatriation and thus
hold his consequent dual citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective local position." But the real essence of justice does
not emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic role of law as
a brick in the ultimate development of the social edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy, legalistic, technical and
sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent with Frivaldo's unique
situation approximating venerability in Philippine political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to escape the clutches of
the dictatorship. At this stage, we cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and dedication to this country. At the first
opportunity, he returned to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three
times. He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed naturalization bid.
And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of birth despite several legal
set-backs speak more loudly, in spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his consuming intention and burning desire to re-
embrace his native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years. Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose
cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of ease
and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world. But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving
once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in his
favor. And in the final analysis, over and above Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most certainly deserve to be governed
by a leader of their overwhelming choice.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
(1) The petition in G.R. No. 123755 is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Resolutions of the respondent Commission are AFFIRMED.
(2) The petition in G.R. No. 120295 is also DISMISSED for being moot and academic. In any event, it has no merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001]

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be
a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic
of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth
Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or
the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following circumstances is
present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking
the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided,
finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the
said foreign country, he shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5,
1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. [3] He ran
for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin
of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born
citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly
elected Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and renunciation of
such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private
respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be considered a
natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost his Philippine citizenship
when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of
the Constitution expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
 (3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to
the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications [12] and none of the
disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after
two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies. [14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act.
No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. [16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes to
reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications[17] and none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; [20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at
any other time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last
resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics
in the original.][25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However,
he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the
United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem,
Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born
citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him
to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his citizenship
is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does
not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority,
elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were not Filipinos at
birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of
Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the
enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born
and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process
of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such
persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed
by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in
order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected
as member of the House of Representatives.
 A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the House.[29] The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. [30] In the absence thereof, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of
the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,

vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution
dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.

ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See Article VI, Section
17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity of the
jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral
Commission, supra at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described
as "intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of
power to the legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte
and Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral
Tribunal and it remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission,
(Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987
Constitution. (p. 401)

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete and
excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even affect the same." (pp.
403-404)

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?
In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are beyond judicial
interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination that the Tribunal's
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or paraphrasing Morrero, upon
a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a denial of due process of law, or upon a
demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy
for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond judicial
interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a denial of due
process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent branches of the Government,
It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so grave or glaring that no less than the
Constitution calls for remedial action.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of the other
branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the Constitution. (See Article
VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power; it will not
decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look
into what it thinks is apparent error.

As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of the
government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs — independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The power
granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the legislature. (Angara
v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])

In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive privilege of
the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar, 39 Phil. 886
[1919])

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there is an
unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that makes the
HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive. The degree of judicial
intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this party or that party. The test
remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will necessitate the
exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with his
neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.

The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived the
vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the father of the
private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of
First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and executory and that
Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education in the
province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and practices of the local
populace were concerned.

Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.

Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there is no
showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.

In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar. The
respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved for the
family.

The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.

Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of the
Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was
elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged. Parenthetically, the
Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mother's
citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had
to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on this subject.

The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.

For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there during
those elections.

The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of greater service to
his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for representative in the second
district of Northern Samar.

Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of the two
petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but
also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no ambiguity
in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:

Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?

Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution whether the
election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less
decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding
that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding
Officer?

Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was
designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect.
Now it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 189)

xxx xxx xxx

 Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino
citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of section
4.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was born a
day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol.
1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation.1avvphi1 Between 1935 and 1973 when we were
under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect,
they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a narrow
interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.

It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The spirit and
intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and injustice. (Casela v.
Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])

A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed, hence, it is
the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or
pedantically for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their
essence in their form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother was
automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to elect
Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal
footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two kinds of
citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat equally all
those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and absurd
situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the curative
provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of
whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers
before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary.
The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987 the Constitution would be
amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since
he was nine years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already citizens, we
apply the In Re Mallare rule.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent
has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He
has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has
participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the records to show
that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not
his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any
member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his
acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to
Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other
categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a national of two
countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but it
would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?

The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only nine years of
age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its benefit to him
for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee
by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of
citizenship.

The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just
so we can go after the son.

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a
person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])

To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due
process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To
quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not use beyond
where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case."

The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not the
HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship through
his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not the
respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were Filipinos.
Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in favor of a foreign
nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father which he could possibly have
chosen.

There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue of
natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa convened by
authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a
natural born citizen by both bodies.

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent HRET, such a
difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and whimsical as to amount
to grave abuse of discretion.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then residing
in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.

Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:

ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.

3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.

4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)

The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and will not
be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil. 768 [1949])

As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence was then
issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials of the 1971
Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)

The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is also in
this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.
As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain.

Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China, during one of
his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the Philippines and
pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.

If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain, necessarily, Ong Te
was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed residence in a place; one who has a
domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as
a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.

The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the evidence
rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence, testimonial evidence and
of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was predicated.

On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.

It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary session
of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.

This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies given before
the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44; TSN, February 6, 1989, pp.
28-29)

The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention was
the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)

The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and Atty. Santos.
In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough that it be shown that
after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817 [1918])

Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned documents can
be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.

Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former member of the
1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the private
respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest against the brother
of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding officer of the
plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list of names of delegates
present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have presented any one of the long list of
delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so. Nor did they demur to the contents of the
documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural objections respecting the admissibility of the
evidence presented.

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by explicit
mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at
length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation of all relevant factors
which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as committed with
grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.

ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE

The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous
with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for
Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section
merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the
day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
 Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article
on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p.
110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same
meaning as domicile.

The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan
Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it
continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147
[1966])

The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the petitioners'
imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.

The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in 1961,
another one was constructed.

Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two doors of
which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)

The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident of said
place is misplaced.

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents, necessarily,
the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that these
were still in the names of his parents.

Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61
Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough
that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)

To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. Nowhere is it
required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412
[1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession,
There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province
reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there has
been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives strength to
our country.

Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great Jose
Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President, Corazon Aquino is also
part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private respondent.

Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish.

However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to unreasonably
deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.

Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential patrons,
who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by minor bureaucrats
and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire citizenship. It is time for the
naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an applicant's suitability to be a
Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is essential.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is
AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Gancayco, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I dissent.

These separate petitions for certiorari and mandamus seek to annul the decision* of respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as the tribunal) dated 6 November 1989 which declared private respondent Jose L. Ong, a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, and the resolution of the tribunal dated 22 February 1990 denying petitioners'
motions for reconsideration.

In G.R. Nos. 92191-92, petitioner Co also prays that the Court declare private respondent Ong not qualified to be a Member of the House of
Representatives and to declare him (petitioner Co) who allegedly obtained the highest number of votes among the qualified candidates, the
duly elected representative of the second legislative district of Northern Samar. In G.R. Nos. 92202-03, petitioner Balanquit prays that the
Court declare private respondent Ong and Co (petitioner in G.R. Nos. 92191-92) not qualified for membership in the House of
Representatives and to proclaim him (Balanguit) as the duly elected representative of said district.

Petitioners Antonio Y. Co, Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. and private respondent Jose Ong Chuan, Jr. were among the candidates for the position of
Representative or Congressman for the second district of Northern Samar during the 11 May 1987 congressional elections. Private
respondent was proclaimed duly-elected on 18 May 1987 with a plurality of some sixteen thousand (16,000) votes over petitioner Co who
obtained the next highest number of votes.

Petitioners Co and Balanquit then filed separate election protests against private respondent with the tribunal, docketed as HRET Cases Nos.
13 and 15 respectively. Both protests raised almost the same issues and were thus considered and decided jointly by the tribunal.

The issues raised before the tribunal were the following:

1. Whether or not protestee (meaning, Ong) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof; and

2. Whether or not protestee was a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar, in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the same
Constitution, for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the congressional elections of May 1987.

The respondent tribunal in its decision dated 6 November 1989 held that respondent Jose L. Ong is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines
and was a legal resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for the required period prior to the May 1987 congressional elections. He was, therefore,
declared qualified to continue in office as Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines, representing the second
legislative district of Northern Samar.

The factual antecedents taken from the consolidated proceedings in the tribunal are the following:

1. The Protestee (Ong) was born on June 19, 1948 to the legal spouses Ong Chuan also known as Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E.
Lao. His place of birth is Laoang which is now one of the municipalities comprising the province of Northern Samar (Republic Act
No. 6132 approved on August 24, 1970 and the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution).

2. On the other hand, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China and arrived in Manila on December 16, 1915. (Exhibit zz) Subsequently
thereafter, he took up residence in Laoang, Samar.

3. On February 4, 1932, he married Agrifina E. Lao. Their wedding was celebrated according to the rites and practices of the Roman
Catholic Church in the Municipality of Laoang (Exh. E).

4. At the time of her marriage to Jose Ong Chuan, Agrifina E. Lao was a natural-born Filipino citizen, both her parents at the time of
her birth being Filipino citizens. (Exhibits E & I)

5. On February 15, 1954, Jose Ong Chuan, desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship, filed his petition for naturalization with the
Court of First Instance of Samar, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law.

6. On April 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Samar rendered a decision approving the application of Jose Ong Chuan for
naturalization and declaring said petitioner a Filipino citizen "with all the rights and privileges and duties, liabilities and
obligations inherent to Filipino citizens. (Exh. E)

7. On May 15, 1957, the same Court issued an order:

(1) declaring the decision of this Court of April 28, 1955 final and executory;

(2) directing the clerk of court to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization in favor of the applicant Ong Chuan
who prefers to take his oath and register his name as Jose Ong Chuan. Petitioner may take his oath as Filipino citizen
under Ms new christian name, Jose Ong Chuan. (Exh. F)

8. On the same day, Jose Ong Chuan having taken the corresponding oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines as prescribed by Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, was issued the corresponding Certificate of
Naturalization. (Exh. G)

9. On November 10, 1970, Emil L. Ong, a full-brother of the protestee and a son born on July 25, 1937 at Laoang, Samar to the
spouses Jose Ong Chuan and Agrifina E. Lao, was elected delegate from Northern Samar to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

10. By protestee's own -testimony, it was established that he had attended grade school in Laoang. Thereafter, he went to Manila
where he finished his secondary as well as his college education. While later employed in Manila, protestee however went home to
Laoang whenever he had the opportunity to do so, which invariably would be as frequent as twice to four times a year.
 11. Protestee also showed that being a native and legal resident of Laoang, he registered as a voter therein and correspondingly
voted in said municipality in the 1984 and 1986 elections.

12. Again in December 1986, during the general registration of all voters in the country, Protestee re-registered as a voter in
Precinct No. 4 of Barangay Tumaguinting in Laoang. In his voter's affidavit, Protestee indicated that he is a resident of Laoang since
birth. (Exh. 7)1

Petitioners' motions for reconsideration of the tribunal's decision having been denied, petitioners filed the present petitions.

In their comments, the respondents first raise the issue of the Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the House Electoral Tribunal,
considering the constitutional provision vesting upon said tribunal the power and authority to act as the sole judge of all contests relating to
the qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.2

On the question of this Court's jurisdiction over the present controversy, I believe that, contrary to the respondents' contentions, the Court
has the jurisdiction and competence to review the questioned decision of the tribunal and to decide the present controversy.

Article VIII, Section I of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Constitution, it is true, constitutes the tribunal as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives. But as early as 1938, it was held in Morrero vs. Bocar,3 construing Section 4, Article VI of the 1935
Constitution which provided that ". . . The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly," that:

The judgment rendered by the (electoral) commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial
interference, except, in any event, "upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a
denial of due process of law." (Barry vs. US ex rel. Cunningham, 279 US 597; 73 Law. ed., 867; Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 35
Off. Gaz., 23.)

And then under the afore-quoted provisions of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, this Court is duty-bound to determine
whether or not, in an actual controversy, there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The present controversy, it will be observed, involves more than perceived irregularities in the conduct of a congressional election or a
disputed appreciation of ballots, in which cases, it may be contended with great legal force and persuasion that the decision of the electoral
tribunal should be final and conclusive, for it is, by constitutional directive, made the sole judge of contests relating to such matters. The
present controversy, however, involves no less than a determination of whether the qualifications for membership in the House of
Representatives, as prescribed by the Constitution, have been met. Indeed, this Court would be unforgivably remiss in the performance of its
duties, as mandated by the Constitution, were it to allow a person, not a natural-born Filipino citizen, to continue to sit as a Member of the
House of Representatives, solely because the House Electoral Tribunal has declared him to be so. In such a case, the tribunal would have
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as to require the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
review.

Besides, the citizenship and residence qualifications of private respondent for the office of Member of the House of Representatives, are here
controverted by petitioners who, at the same time, claim that they are entitled to the office illegally held by private respondent. From this
additional direction, where one asserts an earnestly perceived right that in turn is vigorously resisted by another, there is clearly a
justiciable controversy proper for this Court to consider and decide.

Nor can it be said that the Court, in reviewing the decision of the tribunal, asserts supremacy over it in contravention of the time-honored
principle of constitutional separation of powers. The Court in this instance simply performs a function entrusted and assigned to it by the
Constitution of interpreting, in a justiciable controversy, the pertinent provisions of the Constitution with finality.

It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the context
of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost always in situations where some agency of the State has
engaged in action that stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power (the Supreme Court in Modern Role, C.B.
Sevisher, 1958, p. 36).4

Moreover, it is decidedly a matter of great public interest and concern to determine whether or not private respondent is qualified to hold so
important and high a public office which is specifically reserved by the Constitution only to natural-born Filipino citizens.

After a careful consideration of the issues and the evidence, it is my considered opinion that the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its questioned decision and resolution, for reasons to be presently
stated.

The Constitution5 requires that a Member of the House of Representatives must be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day
of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election.

Article IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution defines natural-born (Filipino) citizens as:

Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section I hereof shall
be deemed natural-born citizen,

Article IV, Section 1, paragraph (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:

 xxx xxx xxx

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

The Court in this case is faced with the duty of interpreting the above-quoted constitutional provisions. The first sentence of Section 2 of
Article IV states the basic definition of a natural-born Filipino citizen. Does private respondent fall within said definition?

To the respondent tribunal,

Protestee may even be declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines under the first sentence of Sec. 2 of Article IV of the 1987
Constitution because he did not have "to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." It bears to repeat that on
15 May 1957, while still a minor of 9 years he already became a Filipino citizen by declaration of law. Since his mother was a
natural-born citizen at the time of her marriage, protestee had an inchoate right to Philippine citizenship at the moment of his birth
and, consequently the declaration by virtue of Sec. 15 of CA 473 that he was a Filipino citizen retroacted to the moment of his birth
without his having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such Philippine citizenship.6

I regret that I am neither convinced nor persuaded by such kaleidoscopic ratiocination. The records show that private respondent was born
on 19 June 1948 to the spouses Jose Ong Chuan, a Chinese citizen, and Agrifina E. Lao, a natural-born Filipino citizen, in Laoang, Northern
Samar. In other words, at birth, private respondent was a Chinese citizen (not a natural-born Filipino citizen) because his father was then a
Chinese citizen (not a naturalized Filipino citizen). Under the 1935 Constitution which was enforced at the time of private respondent's birth
on 19 June 1948, only those whose fathers were citizens of the Philippines were considered Filipino citizens. Those whose mothers were
citizens of the Philippines had to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, in order to be considered Filipino citizens.7

Following the basic definition in the 1987 Constitution of a natural-born citizen, in relation to the 1935 Constitution, private respondent is
not a natural-born Filipino citizen, having been born a Chinese citizen by virtue of the Chinese citizenship of his father at the time of his birth,
although from birth, private respondent had the right to elect Philippine citizenship, the citizenship of his mother, but only upon his reaching
the age of majority.

While under Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (C.A. 473) minor children of a naturalized citizen (father), who were born in the
Philippines prior to the naturalization of the parent automatically become Filipino citizens,8 this does not alter the fact that private
respondent was not born to a Filipino father, and the operation of Section 15 of CA 473 did not confer upon him the status of a natural-
born citizen merely because he did not have to perform any act to acquire or perfect his status as a Filipino citizen.

But even assuming arguendo that private respondent could be considered a natural-born citizen by virtue of the operation of CA 473,
petitioners however contend that the naturalization of private respondent's father was invalid and void from the beginning, and, therefore,
private respondent is not even a Filipino citizen.

Respondent tribunal in its questioned decision ruled that only a direct proceeding for nullity of naturalization as a Filipino citizen is
permissible, and, therefore, a collateral attack on Ong Chuan's naturalization is barred in an electoral contest which does not even involve
him (Ong Chuan).

Private respondent, for his part, avers in his Comment that the challenge against Ong Chuan's naturalization must emanate from the
Government and must be made in a proper/appropriate and direct proceeding for de-naturalization directed against the proper party, who
in such case is Ong Chuan, and also during his lifetime.

A judgment in a naturalization proceeding is not, however, afforded the character of impregnability under the principle of res
judicata.9 Section 18 of CA 473 provides that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon motion made in the proper proceeding by
the Solicitor General or his representative, or by the proper provincial fiscal.

In Republic vs. Go Bon Lee,10 this Court held that:

An alien friend is offered under certain conditions the privilege of citizenship. He may accept the offer and become a citizen upon
compliance with the prescribed conditions, but not otherwise. His claim is of favor, not of right. He can only become a citizen upon
and after a strict compliance with the acts of Congress. An applicant for this high privilege is bound, therefore, to conform to the
terms upon which alone the right he seeks can be conferred. It is his province, and he is bound, to see that the jurisdictional facts
upon which the grant is predicated actually exist and if they do not he takes nothing by this paper grant.

xxx xxx xxx

Congress having limited this privilege to a specified class of persons, no other person is entitled to such privilege, nor to a
certificate purporting to grant it, and any such certificate issued to a person not so entitled to receive it must be treated as a mere
nullity, which confers no legal rights as against the government, from which it has been obtained without warrant of law.

"Naturalization is not a right, but a privilege of the most discriminating as well as delicate and exacting nature, affecting public interest of the
highest order, and which may be enjoyed only under the precise conditions prescribed by law therefor." 11

Considering the legal implications of the allegation made by the petitioners that the naturalization of private respondent's father Ong Chuan,
is a nullity, the Court should make a ruling on the validity of said naturalization proceedings. This course of action becomes all the more
inevitable and justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a public office.12

It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the citizenship of private respondent is derived from his father. If his father's Filipino
citizenship is void from the beginning, then there is nothing from which private respondent can derive his own claimed Filipino citizenship.
For a spring cannot rise higher than its source. And to allow private respondent to avail of the privileges of Filipino citizenship by virtue of a
void naturalization of his father, would constitute or at least sanction a continuing offense against the Constitution.

The records show that private respondent's father, Jose Ong Chuan, took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Philippine
Government, as prescribed by Section 12 of CA 473 on the same day (15 May 1957) that the CFI issued its order directing the clerk of court
to issue the corresponding Certificate of Naturalization and for the applicant to take the oath of allegiance.

However, it is settled that an order granting a petition to take the requisite oath of allegiance of one who has previously obtained a decision
favorable to his application for naturalization, is appealable. It is, therefore, improper and illegal to authorize the taking of said oath upon the
issuance of said order and before the expiration of the reglementary period to perfect any appeal from said order. 13
In Cua Sun Ke vs. Republic,14 this Court held that:

Administration of the oath of allegiance on the same day as issuance of order granting citizenship is irregular and makes the
proceedings so taken null and void. (Republic vs. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 [1982]; citing the case of Ong So vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 121 Phil. 1381).

It would appear from the foregoing discussion that the naturalization of Jose Ong Chuan (private respondent's father) was null and void. It
follows that the private respondent did not acquire any legal rights from the void naturalization of his father and thus he cannot himself be
considered a Filipino citizen, more so, a natural-born Filipino citizen.

But assuming that the CFI order of 15 May 1957 directing the clerk of court to issue the certificate of naturalization to Ong Chuan and for the
latter to take the oath of allegiance was final and not appealable, the resulting naturalization of Ong Chuan effected, as previously stated, an
automatic naturalization of private respondent, then a minor, as a Filipino citizen on 15 May 1957, but not his acquisition or perfection of the
status of a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Let us now look into the question of whether or not private respondent acquired the status of a natural-born Filipino citizen by reason of the
undisputed fact that his mother was a natural-born Filipino citizen. This in turn leads us to an examination of the second sentence in Article
IV, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. It expands, in a manner of speaking, in relation to Section 1, paragraph (3) of the same Article IV, the
status of a natural-born Filipino citizen to those who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The right or privilege of
election is available, however, only to those born to Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution, and before the 1973 Constitution took
effect on 17 January 1973.

The petitioners contend that the respondent tribunal acted in excess of its jurisdiction or gravely abused its discretion as to exceed its
jurisdiction in "distorting" the conferment by the 1987 Constitution of the status of "natural-born" Filipino citizen on those who elect
Philippine citizenship — all in its strained effort, according to petitioners, to support private respondent's qualification to be a Member of
the House of Representatives.15

Petitioners argue that the clear, unambiguous wording of section 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution contemplates that only the
legitimate children of Filipino mothers with alien father, born before 17 January 1973 and who would reach the age of majority (and thus
elect Philippine citizenship) after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution are entitled to the status of natural-born Filipino citizen.16

The respondent tribunal in resolving the issue of the constitutional provisions' interpretation, found reason to refer to the interpellations
made during the 1986 Constitutional Commission. It said:

That the benevolent provisions of Sections 2 and 1(3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution was (sic) intended by its (sic) framers to
be endowed, without distinction, to all Filipinos by election pursuant to the 1935 Constitution is more than persuasively
established by the extensive interpellations and debate on the issue as borne by the official records of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission.17

Although I find the distinction as to when election of Philippine citizenship was made irrelevant to the case at bar, since private respondent,
contrary to the conclusion of the respondent tribunal, did not elect Philippine citizenship, as provided by law, I still consider it necessary to
settle the controversy regarding the meaning of the constitutional provisions in question.

I agree with respondent tribunal that the debates, interpellations petitions and opinions expressed in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
may be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning of somewhat elusive and even nebulous constitutional provisions. Thus —

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.18

The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 2, Article IV in relation to Section 1(3) of the same Article,
appear to negate the contention of petitioners that only those born to Filipino mothers before 17 January 1973 and who would elect
Philippine citizenship after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, are to be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.

During the free-wheeling discussions on citizenship, Commissioner Treñas specifically asked Commissioner Bernas regarding the provisions
in question, thus:

MR. TRENAS: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or less
decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born Filipino citizen as provided in Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution, by
adding that persons who have elected Philippine citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be considered natural-born. Am I
right, Mr. Presiding Officer?

FR BERNAS: Yes.

MR. TRENAS: And does the Commissioner think that tills addition to Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution would be contrary to the
spirit of that section?

FR BERNAS: Yes, we are quite aware that it is contrary to the letter really. But whether it is contrary to the spirit is something that
has been debated before and is being debated even now. We will recall that during the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the status
of natural-born citizenship of one of the delegates, Mr. Ang, was challenged precisely because he was a citizen by election. Finally,
the 1971 Constitutional Convention considered him a natural-born citizen, one of the requirements to be a Member of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. The reason behind that decision was that a person under his circumstances already had the inchoate
right to be a citizen by the fact that the mother was a Filipino. And as a matter of fact, the 1971 Constitutional Convention
formalized that recognition by adopting paragraph 2 of Section 1 of the 1971 Constitution. So, the entire purpose of this proviso is
simply to perhaps remedy whatever injustice there may be so that these people born before January 17, 1973 who are not
naturalized and people who are not natural born but who are in the same situation as we are considered natural-born citizens. So,
the intention of the Committee in proposing this is to equalize their status.19

When asked to clarify the provision on natural-born citizens, Commissioner Bernas replied to Commissioner Azcuna thus:
 MR. AZCUNA: With respect to the proviso in Section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1935 Constitution?

FR BERNAS: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution,
whether the election was done before or after 17 January 1973.20

And during the period of amendments. Commissioner Rodrigo explained the purpose of what now appear as Section 2 and Section 1,
paragraph (3) of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, thus:

MR. RODRIGO: The purpose of that proviso is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973, when we were under
the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of Filipino
mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and, if they do elect, they
become Filipino citizens, yet, but not natural-born Filipino citizens.

The 1973 Constitution equalized the status of those born of Filipino mothers and those born of Filipino fathers. So that from January 17,
1973 when the 1973 Constitution took effect, those born of Filipino mothers but of alien fathers are natural-born Filipino citizens. Also,
those who are born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers are natural-born Filipino citizens.

If the 1973 Constitution equalized the status of a child born of a Filipino mother and that born of a Filipino father, why do we not give a
chance to a child born before January 17, 1973, if and when he elects Philippine citizenship, to be in the same status as one born of a Filipino
father — namely, natural-born citizen.

Another thing I stated is equalizing the status of a father and a mother vis-a-vis the child. I would like to state also that we showed equalize
the status of a child born of a Filipino mother the day before January 17, 1973 and a child born also of a Filipino mother on January 17 or 24
hours later. A child born of a Filipino mother but an alien father one day before January 17, 1973 is a Filipino citizen, if he elects Philippine
citizenship, but he is not a natural-born Filipino citizen. However, the other child who luckily was born 24 hours later — maybe because of
parto laborioso — is a natural-born Filipino citizen.21

It would appear then that the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution in defining a natural-born Filipino citizen was to equalize the
position of Filipino fathers and Filipino mothers as to their children becoming natural-born Filipino citizens. In other words, after 17 January
1973, effectivity date of the 1973 Constitution, all those born of Filipino fathers (with alien spouse) or Filipino mothers (with alien spouse)
are natural-born Filipino citizens. But those born to Filipino mothers prior to 17 January 1973 must still elect Philippine citizenship upon
their reaching the age of majority, in order to be deemed natural-born Filipino citizens. The election, which is related to the attainment of the
age of majority, may be made before or after 17 January 1973. This interpretation appears to be in consonance with the fundamental
purpose of the Constitution which is to protect and enhance the people's individual interests, 22 and to foster equality among them.

Since private respondent was born on 19 June 1948 (or before 17 January 1973) to a Filipino mother (with an alien spouse) and should have
elected Philippine citizenship on 19 June 1969 (when he attained the age of majority), or soon thereafter, in order to have the status of a
natural-born Filipino citizen under the 1987 Constitution, the vital question is: did private respondent really elect Philippine citizenship? As
earlier stated, I believe that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship, contrary to the ruling of the respondent tribunal.

The respondent tribunal, on this issue, ruled as follows:

Where a person born to a Filipino mother and an alien father had exercised the right of suffrage when he came of age, the same
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. (Florencio vs. Mallare) [sic] The acts of the petitioner in registering as
a voter, participating in elections and campaigning for certain candidates were held by the Supreme Court as sufficient to show his
preference for Philippine citizenship. Accordingly, even without complying with the formal requisites for election, the petitioner's
Filipino citizenship was judicially upheld.23

I find the above ruling of the respondent tribunal to be patently erroneous and clearly untenable, as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
For it is settled doctrine in this jurisdiction that election of Philippine citizenship must be made in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625.
Sections 1 and 224 of the Act mandate that the option to elect Philippine citizenship must be effected expressly not impliedly.

The respondent tribunal cites In re: Florencio Mallare25 which held that Esteban Mallare's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of
age, constituted a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.

Mallare, cited by respondent tribunal as authority for the doctrine of implied election of Philippine citizenship, is not applicable to the case at
bar. The respondent tribunal failed to consider that Esteban Mallare reached the age of majority in 1924, or seventeen (17) years before CA
625 was approved and, more importantly, eleven (11) years before the 1935 Constitution (which granted the right of election) took effect.

To quote Mr. Justice Fernandez in Mallare:

Indeed, it would be unfair to expect the presentation of a formal deed to that effect considering that prior to the enactment of
Commonwealth Act 625 on June 7, 1941, no particular proceeding was required to exercise the option to elect Philippine
citizenship, granted to the proper party by Section 1, subsection 4, Article IV of the 1935 Philippine Constitution.26

Moreover, Esteban Mallare was held to be a Filipino citizen because he was an illegitimate (natural) child of a Filipino mother and thus
followed her citizenship. I therefore agree with the petitioners' submission that, in citing the Mallare case, the respondent tribunal had
engaged in an obiter dictum.

The respondent tribunal also erred in ruling that by operation of CA 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, providing for private respondent's
acquisition of Filipino citizenship by reason of the naturalization of his father, the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for
him. For, assuming arguendo that the naturalization of private respondent's father was valid, and that there was no further need for private
respondent to elect Philippine citizenship (as he had automatically become a Filipino citizen) yet, this did not mean that the operation of the
Revised Naturalization Law amounted to an election by him of Philippine citizenship as contemplated by the Constitution. Besides, election
of Philippine citizenship derived from one's Filipino mother, is made upon reaching the age of majority, not during one's minority.

There is no doubt in my mind, therefore, that private respondent did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority in
1969 or within a reasonable time thereafter as required by CA 625. Consequently, he cannot be deemed a natural-born Filipino citizen under
Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Based on all the foregoing considerations and premises, I am constrained to state that private respondent is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines in contemplation of Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sections 2 and 1(3), Article IV thereof, and hence
is disqualified or ineligible to be a Member of the House of Representatives.

At this point, I find it no longer necessary to rule on the issue of required residence, inasmuch as the Constitution requires that a Member of
the House of Representatives must be both a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident for at least one (1) year in the district in which he
shall be elected.

The next question that comes up is whether or not either of the petitioners can replace private respondent as the Representative of the
second legislative district of Northern Samar in the House of Representatives.

I agree with respondent tribunal that neither of the petitioners may take the place of private respondent in the House of Representatives
representing the second district of Northern Samar. The ruling of this Court in Ramon L. Labo, Jr. vs. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
EN BANC and Luis L. Lardizabal,27 is controlling. There we held that Luis L. Lardizabal, who filed the quo warranto petition, could not replace
Ramon L. Labo, Jr. as mayor of Baguio City for the simple reason that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election,
he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City for mayor of that City.

A petition alleging that the candidate-elect is not qualified for the office is, in effect, a quo warranto proceeding even if it is labelled an
election protest.28 It is a proceeding to unseat the ineligible person from office but not necessarily to install the protestant in his place. 29

The general rule is that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate in an election does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such a case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the
election is a nullity.30

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure
can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S
243, p. 676).

As early as 1912, this Court has already declared that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the
event that the candidate who won is found ineligible for the office to which he was elected. This was the ruling in Topacio v.
Paredes (23 Phil. 238) —

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in the election
is quite different from that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. . . . If it be found that the
successful candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another
candidate was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking,
a contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible to any other candidate when the sole question
is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast ballots. . . .31

The recognition of Emil L. Ong by the 1971 Constitutional Convention as a natural-born Filipino citizen, in relation to the present case.

Private respondent, as previously stated, is a full brother of Emil L. Ong, both of them having the same father and mother.

Private respondent, relying on a resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention 32 to the effect that Emil L. Ong was a natural-born Filipino
citizen, alleged before the House Electoral Tribunal that, by analogy, he is himself a natural-born Filipino citizen. This submission, while
initially impressive, is, as will now be shown, flawed and not supported by the evidence. Not even the majority decision of the electoral
tribunal adopted the same as the basis of its decision in favor of private respondent. The tribunal, in reference to this submission, said:

Be that as it may and in the light of the Tribunal's disposition of protestee's citizenship based on an entirely different set of
circumstances, apart from the indisputable fact that the matters attempted to be brought in issue in connection therewith are too
far removed in point of time and relevance from the decisive events relied upon by the Tribunal, we view these two issues as being
already inconsequential.33

The electoral tribunal (majority) instead chose to predicate its decision on the alleged citizenship by naturalization of private respondent's
father (Ong Chuan) and on the alleged election of Philippine citizenship by private respondent.

Emil L. Ong, was elected delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. Electoral protests, numbers EP-07 and EP-08, were filed by
Leonardo D. Galing and Gualberto D. Luto against Emil L. Ong, contesting his citizenship qualification. The Committee on Election Protests
Credentials of the 1971 Contitution Convention heard the protests and submitted to the Convention a report dated 4 September 1972, the
dispositive portion of which stated:

It appearing that protestee's grandfather was himself a Filipino citizen under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, thus conferring upon protestee's own father, Ong Chuan, Philippine citizenship at birth, the
conclusion is inescapable that protestee himself is a natural-born citizen, and is therefore qualified to hold the office of delegate to
the Constitutional Convention.34

On 28 November 1972, during a plenary session of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, the election protests filed against Emil L. Ong were
dismissed, following the report of the Committee on Election Protests and Credentials.35

It is evident, up to this point, that the action of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong is, to say the least, inconclusive
to the case at bar, because —

a) the 1971 Constitutional Convention decision in the Emil L. Ong case involved the 1935 Constitution; the present case, on the
other hand involves the 1987 Constitution:

b) the 1935 Constitution contained no specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines; the 1987 Constitution
contains a precise and specific definition of a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines in Sec. 2, Art. IV thereof and private
respondent does not qualify under such definition in the 1987 Constitution;

c) the decision of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong was a decision of a political body, not a court of law.
And, even if we have to take such a decision as a decision of a quasi-judicial body (i.e., a political body exercising quasi-judicial
 functions), said decision in the Emil L. Ong case can not have the category or character of res judicata in the present judicial
controversy, because between the two (2) cases, there is no identity of parties (one involves Emil L. Ong, while the other involves
private respondent) and, more importantly, there is no identity of causes of action because the first involves the 1935 Constitution
while the second involves the 1987 Constitution.

But even laying aside the foregoing reasons based on procedural rules and logic, the evidence submitted before the electoral tribunal and,
therefore, also before this Court, does not support the allegations made by Emil L. Ong before the 1971 Constitutional Convention and
inferentially adopted by private respondent in the present controversy. This leads us to an interesting inquiry and finding.

The 1971 Constitutional Convention in holding that Emil L. Ong was a "natural-born citizen" of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution
laid stress on the "fact" — and this appears crucial and central to its decision — that Emil L. Ong's grandfather, Ong Te became a Filipino
citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and, therefore, his descendants like Emil L. Ong (and therefore, also private respondent) became
natural-born Filipinos. The 1971 Constitutional Convention said:

Ong Te Emil Ong's grandfather, was a Spanish subject residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899 and was therefore one of the
many who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly
declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11,
1899 as well as their children born subsequent thereto, "shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands." (Section
4, Philippine Bill of 1902).36

The "test" then, following the premises of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, is whether or not Ong Te private respondent's and Emil L.
Ong's grandfather was "an inhabitant of the Philippines who continued to reside therein and was a Spanish subject on April 11, 1899." If he
met these requirements of the Philippine Bill of 1902, then, Ong Te was a Filipino citizen; otherwise, he was not a Filipino citizen.

Petitioners (protestants) submitted and offered in evidence before the House Electoral Tribunal exhibits W, X, Y, Z ,AA, BB, CC, DD and EE
which are copies of entries in the "Registro de Chinos" from years 1896 to 1897 which show that Ong Te was not listed as an inhabitant of
Samar where he is claimed to have been a resident. Petitioners (protestants) also submitted and offered in evidence before the House
Electoral Tribunal exhibit V, a certification of the Chief of the Archives Division, Records and Management and Archives Office, stating that
the name of Ong Te does not appear in the "Registro Central de Chinos" for the province of Samar for 1895. These exhibits prove or at least,
as petitioners validly argue, tend to prove that Ong Te was NOT a resident of Samar close to 11 April 1899 and, therefore, could not continue
residing in Samar, Philippines after 11 April 1899, contrary to private respondent's pretense. In the face of these proofs or evidence, private
respondent FAILED TO PRESENT ANY REBUTTAL OR COUNTERVAILING EVIDENCE, except the decision of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention in the case of Emil L. Ong, previously discussed.

It is not surprising then that, as previously noted, the majority decision of the House Electoral Tribunal skirted any reliance on the
alleged ipso facto Filipino citizenship of Ong Te under the Philippine Bill of 1902. It is equally not surprising that Ong Chuan, the son of Ong
Te and father or private respondent, did not even attempt to claim Filipino citizenship by reason of Ong Te's alleged Filipino citizenship
under the Philippine Bill of 1902 but instead applied for Philippine citizenship through naturalization.

Nor can it be contended by the private respondent that the House Electoral Tribunal should no longer have reviewed the factual question or
issue of Ong Te's citizenship in the light of the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention finding him (Ong Te to have become a
Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902. The tribunal had to look into the question because the finding that Ong Te had become a
Filipino citizen under the Philippine Bill of 1902 was the central core of said 1971 resolution but as held in Lee vs. Commissioners of
Immigration:37

. . . Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding Court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res
adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

Which finally brings us to the resolution of this Court in Emil L. Ong vs. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 67201, 8 May 1984.1âwphi1 In connection
with said resolution, it is contended by private respondent that the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention in the Emil L. Ong case
was elevated to this Court on a question involving Emil L. Ong's disqualification to run for membership in the Batasang Pambansa and that,
according to private respondent, this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

To fully appreciate the implications of such contention, it would help to look into the circumstances of the case brought before this Court in
relation to the Court's action or disposition. Emil L. Ong and Edilberto Del Valle were both candidates for the Batasang Pambansa in the 14
May 1984 election. Valle filed a petition for disqualification with the Commission on Election on 29 March 1984 docketed as SPC No. 84-69
contending that Ong is not a natural-born citizen. Ong filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the judgment of the 1971
Constitutional Convention on his status as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines bars the petitioner from raising the Identical issue before
the COMELEC. (G.R. No. 67201, Rollo, p. 94) The motion was denied by the COMELEC, thus, prompting Emil L. Ong to file with this Court a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the COMELEC, docketed as G.R. No. 67201.

In a resolution dated 8 May 1984, this Court resolved to issue a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding
any further hearing on the disqualification case entitled "Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) except to dismiss the same. (G.R.
Nos. 92202-03, Rollo, p. 335)

This Court, in explaining its action, held that:

Acting on the prayer of the petitioner for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and considering that at the hearing this
morning, it was brought out that the 1971 Constitutional Convention, at its session of November 28, 1972, after considering the
Report of its Committee on Election Protests and Credentials, found that the protest questioning the citizenship of the protestee
(the petitioner herein) was groundless and dismissed Election Protests Nos. EP 07 and EP 08 filed against said petitioner (p.
237, Rollo), the authenticity of the Minutes of said session as well as of the said Committee's Report having been duly admitted in
evidence without objection and bears out, for now, without need for a full hearing, that petitioner is a natural-born citizen, the
Court Resolved to ISSUE, effective immediately, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining respondent COMELEC from holding any
further hearing on the disqualification case entitled Edilberto Del Valle vs. Emil Ong (SPC No. 84-69) scheduled at 3:00 o'clock this
afternoon, or any other day, except to dismiss the same. This is without prejudice to any appropriate action that private respondent
may wish to take after the elections. (emphasis supplied)

It is thus clear that the resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 67201 was rendered without the benefit of a hearing on the merits either by the
Court or by the COMELEC and merely on the basis of a Committee's Report to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, and that this Court (and
this is quite significant) did not foreclose any appropriate action that Del Valle (therein petitioner) may wish to take after the elections.
It is thus abundantly clear also that to this Court, the resolution of the 1971 Constitutional Convention recognizing Emil L. Ong as a natural-
born citizen under the 1935 Constitution did not foreclose a future or further proceeding in regard to the same question and that,
consequently, there is no vested right of Emil L. Ong to such recognition. How much more when the Constitution involved is not the 1935
Constitution but the 1987 Constitution whose provisions were never considered in all such proceedings because the 1987 Constitution was
still inexistent.

A final word. It is regrettable that one (as private respondent) who unquestionably obtained the highest number of votes for the elective
position of Representative (Congressman) to the House of Representatives for the second district of Northern Samar, would have had to
cease in office by virtue of this Court's decision, if the full membership of the Court had participated in this case, with the result that the
legislative district would cease to have, in the interim, a representative in the House of Representatives. But the fundamental consideration
in cases of this nature is the Constitution and only the Constitution. It has to be assumed, therefore, that when the electorate in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar cast the majority of their votes for private respondent, they assumed and believed that he was fully
eligible and qualified for the office because he is a natural-born Filipino citizen. That erroneous assumption and belief can not prevail over, but
must yield to the majesty of the Constitution.

This is a sad day for the Constitution. As I see it, the Constitution mandates that members of the House of Representatives should
be "natural-born citizens of the Philippines". The voting majority of the present Court says, "Filipino citizens will do." This is bad enough.
What is worse is, the same voting majority, in effect, says, "even aliens will do as well."

WHEREFORE, my vote is clear: to declare private respondent Jose L. Ong Chua, Jr., as he clearly is, NOT a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and therefore NOT QUALIFIED to be a Member of the House of Representatives, Congress of the Philippines.

Narvasa, J., Paras, J. and Regalado, J., dissenting.

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I concur with the majority.

(1)

I wish to point out first that the question of citizenship is a question of fact, and as a rule, the Supreme Court leaves facts to the tribunal that
determined them. I am quite agreed that the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, as the "sole judge" of all contests relating to
the membership in the House, as follows:

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six
shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.1

is the best judge of facts and this Court can not substitute its judgment because it thinks it knows better.

In the case of Aratuc v. Commission on Elections,2 it was held that this Court can not review the errors of the Commission on Elections (then
the "sole judge" of all election contests) — in the sense of reviewing facts and unearthing mistakes — and that this Court's jurisdiction is to
see simply whether or not it is guilty of a grave abuse of discretion. It is true that the new Constitution has conferred expanded powers on
the Court,3 but as the Charter states, our authority is "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."4 It is not to review facts.

"Grave abuse of discretion" has been defined as whimsical exercise of power amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or otherwise, to denial of
due process of law.5

I find none of that here.

As the majority indicates, Jose Ong's citizenship is a matter of opinion with which men may differ, but certainly, it is quite another thing to
say that the respondent Tribunal has gravely abused its discretion because the majority has begged to differ. It does not form part of the
duty of the Court to remedy all imagined wrongs committed by the Government.

The respondent Tribunal has spoken. According to the Tribunal, Jose Ong is a Filipino citizen and consequently, is possessed of the
qualifications to be a member of the House. As the sole judge, precisely, of this question, the Court can not be more popish than the pope.

(2)

I can not say, in the second place, that the Decision in question stands exactly on indefensible grounds. It is to be noted that Jose Ong had
relied on the Report dated September 4, 1972 of the 1971 Constitutional Convention Committee 6 on Election Protests and Credentials, in
which the Committees upheld the citizenship, and sustained the qualification to sit as Delegate, of Emil Ong, Jose Ong's full blood brother.
According to the Report, Ong Te the Ongs' grandfather, was already a Filipino citizen having complied with the requirements on
Filipinization by existing laws for which his successors need not have elected Filipino citizenship. I quote:

xxx xxx xxx

There is merit in protestee's claim. There can hardly be any doubt that Ong Te protestees's grandfather, was a Spanish subject
residing in the Philippines on April 11, 1899, and was therefore one of the many who became ipso facto citizens of the Philippines
under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. Said law expressly declared that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who
continued to reside therein and who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899, as well as their children born subsequent thereto,
"shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands" (Sec. 4, Philippine Bill of 1902). Excepted from the operation of
this rule were Spanish subjects who shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. But under the Treaty of Paris, only Spanish subjects who were natives of Peninsular Spain
had the privilege of preserving their Spanish nationality.7

xxx xxx xxx

 xxx xxx xxx

As earlier noted, protestee's grandfather established residence in the Philippines in 1895, as shown by the Registro Central de
Chinos. He was also issued a certificate of registration. He established a business here, and later acquired real property. Although he
went back to China for brief visits, he invariably came back. He even brought his eldest son, Ong Chuan, to live in the Philippines
when the latter was only 10 years old. And Ong Chuan was admitted into the country because, as duly noted on his landing
certificate, his father, Ong Te had been duly enrolled under CR 16009-36755 — i.e., as a permanent resident. Indeed, even when
Ong Te went back to China in the 1920's for another visit, he left his son, Ong Chuan, who was then still a minor, in the Philippines
— obviously because he had long considered the Philippines his home. The domicile he established in 1895 is presumed to have
continued up to, and beyond, April 11, 1899, for, as already adverted to, a domicile once acquired is not lost until a new one is
gained. The only conclusion then can thus be drawn is that Ong Te was duly domiciled in the Philippines as of April 11, 1899,
within the meaning of par. 4, Art. 17, of the Civil Code of 1889 — and was, consequently, a Spanish subject, he qualified as a Filipino
citizen under the provisions of Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.8

It is true that Ong Chuan, the Ong brothers' father, subsequently sought naturalization in the belief that he was, all along, a Chinese citizen,
but as the Report held:

Protestants, however, make capital of the fact that both Ong Te and his son, Ong Chuan (protestee's father), appear to have been
registered as Chinese citizens even long after the turn of the century. Worse, Ong Chuan himself believed the was alien, to the
extent of having to seek admission as a Pilipino citizen through naturalization proceedings. The point, to our mind, is neither
crucial nor substantial. Ong's status as a citizen is a matter of law, rather than of personal belief. It is what the law provides, and not
what one thinks his status to be, which determines whether one is a citizen of a particular state or not. Mere mistake or
misapprehension as to one's citizenship, it has been held, is not a sufficient cause or reason for forfeiture of Philippine citizenship;
it does not even constitute estoppel (Palanca vs. Republic, 80 Phil. 578, 584). Too, estoppel applies only to questions of fact and not
of law (Tanada v. Cuenco, L-10520, Feb. 28, 1957).9

It is to be noted that the Report was unanimously approved by the Committee, and on November 28, 1972, approved without any objection
by the Convention in plenary session.10

I am not, of course, to be mistaken as acting as mouthpiece of Emil Ong, but in all candor, I speak from experience, because when the
Convention approved the Report in question, I was one of its vice-presidents and the presiding officer.

It is to be noted finally, that the matter was elevated to this Court (on a question involving Emil Ong's qualification to sit as member of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa)11 in which this Court allowed the use of the Committee Report.

Faced with such positive acts of the Government, I submit that the question of the Ong's citizenship is a settled matter. Let it rest.

It is true that Electoral Protest Nos. EP-07 and EP-08 of the Convention as well as G.R. No. 67201 of this Court, involved Emil Ong and not his
brother; I submit, however, that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

I also submit that the fundamental question is whether or not we will overturn the unanimous ruling of 267 delegates, indeed, also of this
Court.
JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, G.R. No. 125793

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

HON. COURT OF APPEALS, VELASCO, JR., JJ.

BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION

and DEPORTATION and Promulgated:

WILSON SOLUREN,

Respondents. August 29, 2006

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its crowning value when he wrote
that it is mans basic right for it is nothing less than to have rights.[1] When a person loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its
reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable law. Without doubt,
repatriation is not to be granted simply based on the vagaries of the former Filipino citizen.

The Case

The instant petition for review[2] under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the denial by the Court of Appeals
(CA) of the Petition for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation issued by
the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) for his return to theUnited States.

The Facts

The facts as culled by the CA from the records show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines. In 1968,[3] when petitioner was seven years old,[4] his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen[5] of the United
States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship derived from that of another as from a person who holds citizenship by virtue of
naturalization[6]), petitioner also acquired American citizenship.

Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a balikbayan for one year. Thereafter, petitioner was
arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay,
Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila.[7]

Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28,
1996; and on the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge
sheet which alleged:

1. That on 3 August 1995, respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa]) arrived in the Philippines and was
admitted as a balikbayan;

2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General of [the] U.S. Embassy,
informed the Bureau that respondents Passport No. 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A., had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State;
 3. Hence, respondent [petitioner Tabasa] is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be summarily
deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago to effect his deportation (Exhibit 3).[8]

The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as follows:

The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in San
Francisco, California under the name of Joevanie Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21, 1959 in the Philippines.
Mr. Tabasas passport has been revoked because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant of arrest
issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, for violation of Section
1073, Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution, of Title 18 of the United States Code. He is charged with one count of a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one count of sexual
battery, in violation of California Penal Code, Section 243.4 (D).[9]

The BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in the following summary
deportation order:

Records show that on 16 April 1996, Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, filed
a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport the abovenamed [sic] respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the
ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that the respondents
Passport No. 053854189 has been revoked.

By reason thereof, and on the strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72, Intelligence operatives apprehended the
respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.

In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, 81461 should be 86461], 30 May 1989), the
Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport
to him, the alien loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order No. 34
issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the passport of the alien has expired.

It is, thus, apparent that respondent has lost his privilege to remain in the country. [10]

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining
Order[11] on May 29, 1996, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no
warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the
cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-
quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of
1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the
naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.

At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old.[12]

On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the
cause of petitioners detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before
the CA; and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be
considered submitted for decision.[13] Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a
PhP 20,000.00 cash bond.[14]

However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by
repatriation in accordance with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or
detained by the respondent Bureau.[15]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in its August 7, 1996 Decision,[16] denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby
repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative
naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity, as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who
have lost their citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioners parents
to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April 16,
1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. Herbert or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the United States court. The
court a quo noted that after petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, 1996, he successively executed an Affidavit of
Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, 1996more than ten months after
his arrival in the country on August 3, 1995. The appellate court considered petitioners repatriation as a last ditch effort to avoid deportation
and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid
criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.

The Issue

The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. If there is no valid
repatriation, then he can be summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien.

The Courts Ruling

The Court finds no merit in this petition.

RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to
Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos, was enacted on October 23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2) classes of persons, viz:

Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born
Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their minor children, on account of political or
economic necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation in the manner provided in Section
4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That the applicant is not a:

(1) Person opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized government;

(2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or association for
the predominance of their ideas;

(3) Person convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; or

(4) Person suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases.[17] (Emphasis supplied.)

Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by reason of political or economic
necessity under RA 8171?

He does not.

Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171

To reiterate, the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:

a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and

b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
economic necessity.

Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he
lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor.

Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who
lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means
that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA
8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino
subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him
to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood
relationship:[18] the children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does
not have the legal capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On
their own, the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor, his father was
naturalized as an American citizen; and by derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to
believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic
necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his repatriation on June 13, 1996. The privilege under RA 8171
belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition for repatriation.

Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine
citizenship by operation of law and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been motivated by economic
or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization. The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA
8171 is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country due to political
and economic reasons, and extended indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.

In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship
by availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply taking an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant to RA 8171

Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the procedure for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which
was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated August 22, 1996, to wit:

SECTION 1. Composition.The composition of the Special Committee on Naturalization, with the Solicitor
General as Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director-General of the National Intelligence
Coordinating Agency, as members, shall remain as constituted.

SEC. 2. Procedure.Any person desirous of repatriating or reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant to R.A. No.
8171 shall file a petition with the Special Committee on Naturalization which shall process the same. If
their applications are approved[,] they shall take the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon cancel their certificate of registration (emphasis supplied).

SEC. 3. Implementing Rules.The Special Committee is hereby authorized to promulgate rules and regulations
and prescribe the appropriate forms and the required fees for the processing of petitions.

SEC. 4. Effectivity.This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

In the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5, 1999, applicants for repatriation are
required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino
citizenship.[19] These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the
reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship.

What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of
repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said
office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration.[20] At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the
June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos.[21] Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed
pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v.
Republic.[22]Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN.

Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171

Even if petitionernow of legal agecan still apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless failed to prove that his parents
relinquished their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his affidavit of
repatriation did he mention that his parents lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic reasons. It is notable that
under the Amended Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among others,
the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino woman, or whether by political or
economic necessity in case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or
economic necessity should be specified.[23]

Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation must prove that he lost his
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes that the reference to political or economic reasons is
merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country. [24]

Petitioners argument has no leg to stand on.

A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the manifest intent of the legislature to limit the benefit of repatriation only to natural-
born Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D. 725), [25] which was enacted
on June 5, 1975 amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to repatriate but
without the limiting phrase, on account of political or economic necessity in relation to natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to
RA 8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the application of the law only to political or economic migrants, aside from the Filipino
women who lost their citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. Andrea B.
Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the origin of RA 8171, to wit:

Ms. Domingo: x x x
 From my experience as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I observed that
there are only four types of Filipinos who leave the country.

The first is what we call the economic refugees who go abroad to work because there is no work to be
found in the country. Then we have the political refugees who leave the country for fear of their lives because
they are not in consonance with the prevailing policy of government. The third type is those who have committed
crimes and would like to escape from the punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have those Filipinos who feel that
they are not Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship elsewhere.

Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr. Speaker, the first two have to leave the country not of choice, but rather
out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as well as for a safer abode for themselves and their families. It is for these
two types of Filipinos that this measure is being proposed for approval by this body. (Emphasis supplied.)

xxxx

x x x [I]f the body would recall, I mentioned in my short sponsorship speech the four types of Filipinos who
leave their country. And the two typesthe economic and political refugeesare the ones being addressed by this
proposed law, and they are not really Filipino women who lost their citizenship through marriage. We had a lot of
problems with these people who left the country because of political persecution or because of pressing economic
reasons, and after feeling that they should come back to the country and get back their citizenship and participate
as they should in the affairs of the country, they find that it is extremely difficult to get their citizenship back
because they are treated no different from any other class of alien. [26]

From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is incontrovertible that the intent
of our legislators in crafting Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their
country for reasons other than political or economic necessity.

Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing allegiance to ones
native country constitutes a necessary and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance, and his fathers loss of Philippine citizenship
through naturalization cannot therefore be said to be for any reason other than political or economic necessity.[27]

This argument has no merit.

While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to ones native country is necessarily a political act, it does not follow that the act is
inevitably politically or economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish their
Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo illustrates that aside from economic and
political refugees, there are Filipinos who leave the country because they have committed crimes and would like to escape from punishment,
and those who really feel that they are not Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and therefore seek citizenship elsewhere.

Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the satisfaction of the SCN that
the reason for his loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit their Philippine citizenship for political or economic
exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.

Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under
Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to
prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for
repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can
reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in
rejecting the petition for repatriation.

Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to summary deportation

Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation, he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he is not an
undocumented alien subject to deportation.

This theory is incorrect.

As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his case falls within the
coverage of the law.
 Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21, 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation:

2. The Board of Special Inquiry and the Hearing Board IV shall observe summary deportation proceedings in
cases where the charge against the alien is overstaying, or the expiration or cancellation by his government of his
passport. In cases involving overstaying aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall merely require the presentation
of the aliens valid passport and shall decide the case on the basis thereof.

3. If a foreign embassy cancels the passport of the alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien loses
the privilege to remain in the country, under the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 (Schonemann v. Santiago, et
al., G.R. No. 81461 [sic, should be 86461], 30 May 1989). The automatic loss of the privilege obviates deportation
proceedings. In such instance, the Board of Commissioners may issue summary judgment of deportation which
shall be immediately executory.[28]

In addition, in the case of Schonemann v. Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held:

It is elementary that if an alien wants to stay in the Philippines, he must possess the necessary documents. One of
these documents is a valid passport. There are, of course, exceptions where in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogatives the Philippines may grant refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, or otherwise allow him or her
to stay here even if he [the alien] has no valid passport or Philippine visa. Boat people seeking residence
elsewhere are examples. However, the grant of the privilege of staying in the Philippines is discretionary on the
part of the proper authorities. There is no showing of any grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or whimsicality
in the questioned summary judgment. x x x [29]

Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled after his admission into the country, became an undocumented alien who can be
summarily deported. His subsequent repatriation cannot bar such deportation especially considering that he has no legal and valid
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No
costs to the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221697

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 221698-700

MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,

vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application
for an ex parte issuance of temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following:
(1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for having been issued without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a
certain Edgardo Militar (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a
foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the
petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar." 1

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan
Roces) filed a petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their
petition and ordered that petitioner's name be changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the
petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who handled petitioner's adoption failed
to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo.
On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. 4

Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13
December 1986, she received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila.5

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No. F927287 6 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA).
Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos.
L881511 and DD156616.7

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines 8 but she opted to continue
her studies abroad and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts
Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. 9

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at
Sanctuario de San Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew back to
the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11

While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992. 12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie
(Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13

On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December
2001. 15

On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's candidacy for President in the May
2004 elections. It was during this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two daughters
on 8 July 2004. 16

After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating
medical condition. 17 Her father slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to
take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in the settlement of his estate. 18

According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her
grieving mother, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first quarter of
2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to
Philippine schools for the next semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and cars
from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S.23

Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and without delay, secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately followed 25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to complete pending
projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking
slot at One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of Title
covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private schools.

On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.29 She travelled back to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30

In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and abandonment of their address
in the U.S.31 The family home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006,
arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33

In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where they built their family
home34 and to this day, is where the couple and their children have been residing.35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering said property was
issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City on 1June 2006.

On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006.37 As
can be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions and declared that she is deemed to have
reacquired her Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines. 38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3) children. 39

Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new
Philippine Passport bearing the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No.
EC0588861 by the DFA.42

On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
States of America and Renunciation of American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, 44 in satisfaction of the
legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the
BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her American passport.48

On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
Nationality of the United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she stated that
she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American
citizenship.50 In the same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines, from 3
September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to present.51

On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October
2010.52

On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she
answered "6 years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." 53 Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013. 54

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is
a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship"
subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58

Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases against her which were
the subject of these consolidated cases.

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697

A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which
was docketed as SPA No. 15-001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division.59She is convinced that the COMELEC has jurisdiction
over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC
that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to
the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections.61

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she
was a foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225
for she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born Filipino, she is
deemed to have lost that status when she became a naturalized American citizen. 65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be
continuous from birth.66

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC
for Senator wherein she indicated that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections.
Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still
fell short of the ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be counted at the earliest from July 2006,
when she reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost Philippine
Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines.67

Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:

 (1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition for quo warranto which could only
be filed if Grace Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary jurisdiction to revoke
the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;

(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make
false the statement in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that there was a willful or
deliberate intent to misrepresent on her part;

(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her citizenship and residency qualifications for:

a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that foundlings were considered citizens;

b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of the place where they are found;

c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225;

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship prior to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9,
2016 Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not been withdrawn or recanted;

e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess natural-born status;

f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;

g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;

h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and
should give way to evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;

i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino people to decide a purely political
question, that is, should she serve as the country's next leader.68

After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running
for the President of the Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained material representations which
are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is
hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and
Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69

Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23
December 2015 Resolution by denying the same.70

Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700

This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D.
Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First Division.

In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged
that petitioner lacks the requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency.72

Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings,
cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule
of statutory construction that what is not included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly included in the
categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude them. 74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner
to prove that she is a natural-born citizen.75

Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support her claim that foundlings have a
nationality.76 According to Tatad, international conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary in
order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard state practice that
automatically confers natural-born status to foundlings.78

Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225 because it only applies to former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79

Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad
opined that petitioner acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship which was
sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact
that her husband stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82

In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-
born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as
natural-born citizens.84

He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six
(6) years and six (6) months prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have
validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that
petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the
residency issue. He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the ten-year
period of residency required for said candidacy and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident of the
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for computing
petitioner's residency in the Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship was
approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as such, she was governed by the
Philippine immigration laws.88

In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:

First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a
disqualification case as enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the
alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a
candidate to an elective office.90

Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing her ineligibility for the
Presidency.91 A petition for quo warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
COMELEC.92

Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in
her favor that she is a natural-born citizen of this country.

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed to be citizens of the country
where they are found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95

Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her
natural-born status.96 Moreover, the official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of
the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of
adoption of San Juan RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.98

Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as
demonstrated by her children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit in San Juan City and the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99

Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she renounced her American
citizenship as long as the three determinants for a change of domicile are complied with. 100She reasoned out that there was no requirement
that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the acquisition of a new domicile of choice. 101

Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake made in good faith. 102

In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she
failed to complete the ten (10) year residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her COC when she
declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the
elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective position of President of the Republic
of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate
of Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the
COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance
of an ex parte temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its
Resolution of 12 January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.

The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:

1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.

2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.

3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second
Division.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First
Division.

The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. The petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National Elections.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground"
that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC
and restrain it from going into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of
the candidate.

We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:

Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, and recall.

(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction.

Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.

(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the
number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and
credible elections.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other
requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through
violence or unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by any foreign
government shall likewise be refused registration.

Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or
candidates related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional
ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be
prescribed by law.

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters;
investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and
nuisance candidacies.

(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.

(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall.

Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating
that:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine
Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional
representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:

The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.

The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members
of the House of Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for candidates for these positions.

Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En
Banc decision in Fermin v. COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25 § 1, the following:

Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by
the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A, §6
of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases
involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX,
C, §2(3)]

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those
for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate
or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or
during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes
for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No.
473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications
provided in §4.

Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is
in its statement that "the lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his
disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be
voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won,
either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time
to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the
elections of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes
the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be
made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of
candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.106

To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which states that:

Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or
by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.107

was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:

Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found
by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.

A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.

Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final
judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution."

Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not
authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification
must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of
qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.

If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided by law or the
Constitution," neither can the certificate of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or
her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by
which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.

The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this case, alleged false
representations regarding the candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings108 are not
mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral
arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it is certain that
such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a
Filipino parent."

The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.

At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family
Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner
has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission
that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under
Section 4, Rule 128:

Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-
existence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability of
improbability of the fact in issue.

The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of
foreigners born in the Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented
census statistics for Iloilo Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also
presented were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299 Filipino
females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral arguments, that at the time
petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino.112

Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic
Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an
oval face.

There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All
of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province
would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.

To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:

Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn
babies behind. We do not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a Filipino and
a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos?
99.9%.

According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046 children born in the
Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of
non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that the statistical probability that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is 99.93%.

From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the
Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that any child
born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is 99.83%.

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the statistical probability that a
child born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the
likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or
perhaps, shame. We do not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those infants would have better
economic opportunities or believing that this country is a tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt
whether a foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.

To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among
the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and unjust. It
just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a
decision denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court should use an
improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor, constitutional
interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there
is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held
that:

The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional construction
is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation
offered by the framers.115
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers
intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded:

Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a
Filipino mother not recognized by the father.

xxxx

President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of
illegitimate children?

Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown
parents.

Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein
all children of unknown parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of unknown
parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines is
deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...

Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.

Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for amendment.

Sr. Rafols:
The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown parentage."

Sr. Briones:
The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols:
The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child, is not unknown.

President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?

Sr. Rafols:
I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the
child. Their parentage is not unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should
also be considered as Filipinos.

President:
The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones.

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the Legislature?

Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not] refer to them. By
international law the principle that children or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is
not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively.116

Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any objection to the notion that persons of "unknown
parentage" are not citizens but only because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the account, 117 cited by
petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who said:

During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate
children with a foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also foundlings; but this amendment was
defeated primarily because the Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the
Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international
law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed
the nationality of the place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
amendment.

This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:

We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of
foundlings as Filipinos. And so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which
prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos.

Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules
based on assumptions that are imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What matters here is that
Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as
Filipinos because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is
clear: it is to recognize foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried
over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118

The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just and humane society," that "they were reasonable
patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave
implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions "for an express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to
discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the
board marginalization."

We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic
right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the
present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights," Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent
to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers
citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15
of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on
citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction only
if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This
Court said:

In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the
latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not
over the status of the petitioners, who are foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include
foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.

It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino
at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means that the act
must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such
citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.

In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in
her favor.122 The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's
status as a foundling.123

Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into
a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted
as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result
from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the practice
in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal systems
generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation."128 These are
the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Bill of Rights.129

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally accepted principles of
international law and binding on the State.130 Article 15 thereof states:

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following
obligations on our country:

Article 7
1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as
far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents.

2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with their national law and their obligations under the
relevant international instruments in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.

In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the
right of every child "to acquire a nationality:"

Article 24

1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the
right, to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society and the State.

2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.

3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is
stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization
laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The
first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to wit:

Article 14

A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's parentage is established, its
nationality shall be determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.

A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found. (Underlining
supplied)

The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:

Article 2

A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within
the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State.

That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not
mean that their principles are not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1) ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the
1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v.
Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
binding as a "generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the ban as a generally
accepted principle of international law although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force
and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was content with the
practice of international and regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the United States.

Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either
ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters"
when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had
acceded to the Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the
practices of fourteen countries were considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments was widespread
practice.

Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that "generally accepted principles of international law" are based
not only on international custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in
Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international law"
under the incorporation clause.

Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are parties to
the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016
Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.

Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No.
8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among the
Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law,
issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.

Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and
consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
presumption that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at more
than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the
plight of a defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we
are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement
is relevant:

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were drafted because the
world community is concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if this Honorable
Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to
accord them second-class citizenship.138

The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is reacquired is not
"natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."

The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in
particular.

In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, 140 repatriation was explained as follows:

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will
be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where
we described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included is Parreno v. Commission
on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A.
No. 9225), he will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."

The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at
birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to
determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it
had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.

More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the
phrase "from birth" was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a
natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court
pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no
third category for repatriated citizens:

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have
to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in
said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the
necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives. 146

The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule
reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we
decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it "should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines." This Court also
said that "while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected." 148

Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born
to" in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was
a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.

This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between
the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee." 149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner
was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate
"shall not bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers relating to the
adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating
in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were
her birth parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption
records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.

Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted
to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

On Residence

The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material representation when she
stated in her COC that she has before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months.

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since
the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten
(10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in
"10 years 11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned
for good from the U.S.

When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire
a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona
fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.153

Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines
for good. These evidence include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines
every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for
the shipment of their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal
Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting
June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles for condominium and parking slot issued
in February 2006 and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation Army
in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for
change of address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12
July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident since
May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses jointly decided to
relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).

The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad,
Contreras and Valdez cases.

However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments,
COMELEC Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence and animus manendi, but
maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the
basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her
application under R.A. No. 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents
contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or
reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American
(without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be
counted.

But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only
evidence presented was a community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would be running in the
elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. With the Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v. COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that
he only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was found to be an American citizen who had not even
reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on the citizenship issue. On
residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said
that "such fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."

It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold
that residence could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In
contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently
abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the
U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from U.S.
employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on
24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to
the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on
24 May 2005 it was for good.

In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at
R.A. No. 6768 as amended, otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to
treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized
abroad and "comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program "providing the opportunity to avail of the
necessary training to enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the country"164in
line with the government's "reintegration program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.

Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh
conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow
him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while
awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.

No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been
decided by the Court. Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the facts of
residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court
intended to have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue of residence has been decided
particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.

To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence
of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as
"period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine
resident only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC
as false.

As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of
the day she submitted that COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was the period when the U.S.
house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be
counted from 25 May 2005.

Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as
of the time she submitted the COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge
that the first version was vague.

That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible
given the evidence that she had returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the school records of her
children.

It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be
given in evidence against her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to period of
residence made in a COC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as
her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she
was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015
COC both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not
because it was false, but only because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from petitioner's repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here
to stay permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so
in good faith.

For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed
against her with the SET as early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, petitioner's
repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.

Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought
up in the media on 2 June 2015 by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have answered the issue
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep.
Tiangco discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the circumstances that surrounded the statement were
already matters of public record and were not hidden.

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed
on 1 September 2015, admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she
misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record.
Therefore, when petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.

The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the
2015 representation. Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:

Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the
sole ground for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation in
his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to
mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the
electorate as to one's qualifications to run for public office.168

In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced dates all of which can
evince animus manendi to the Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events of coming and
staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for
Senator" which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her residence in the Philippines only
commence sometime in November 2006"; such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the
person that determines residence for purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as President. It
ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts
of residence far less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider as a
primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered by the
SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident
for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had as reference the residency
requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments
before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016
and that the general public was never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was
mentioned in the COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false, and these, to repeat include:

[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and
arrange the sale of their family home.

Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in
2005 and Hanna in Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007, when she was
already old enough to go to school.

In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her
family lived in Unit 7F until the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974
failed to secure from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."

In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the disposal of some of the family's remaining household
belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.

In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment of their address in the US.

The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.

In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for
a Philippine company in July 2006.

In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built their family home.170

In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive ground of false
representation, to consider no other date than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.

All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned
Resolutions of the COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root to fruits.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:

1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:

[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by
respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC)
entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of
Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of President of the Republic of the Philippines
in connection with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the Commission First
Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a
candidate for President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202202 March 19, 2013

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO, Petitioner,

vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND LUCY MARIE TORRES-GOMEZ, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the March 22, 2012 Decision 1 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) which declared the validity of private respondent Lucy Marie
Torres-Gomez’s substitution as the Liberal Party’s replacement candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative
District) in lieu of Richard Gomez.

The Facts

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez (Richard) filed his certificate of candidacy2 (CoC) with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently,
on December 6, 2009, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition,3 alleging that Richard, who
was actually a resident of College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his CoC that he resided in 910
Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI4 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution) and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for
the said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or cancelled.5

On February 17, 2010, the COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution 6 granting Juntilla’s petition without any qualification. The
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVE, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for
Lack of Qualification filed by BUENAVENTURA O. JUNTILLA against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED
as a candidate for the Office of Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En Banc through a Resolution dated May 4,
2010.7 Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with finality "in order to enable his substitute to
facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for substitution."8

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her CoC9 together with a Certificate of Nomination and
Acceptance10 from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same
congressional post. In response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law Department), the COMELEC
En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued Resolution No. 889011 on May 8, 2010, approving, among others, the
recommendation of the said department to allow the substitution of private respondent. The recommendation reads:

STUDY AND OBSERVATION

On the same date, this Department received an Opposition from Mr. Buenaventura O. Juntilla, thru his counsel, opposing the candidacy of Ms.
Lucy Marie Torres Gomez, as a substitute candidate for Mr. Richard I. Gomez.

The crux of the opposition stemmed from the issue that there should be no substitution because there is no candidate to substitute for.

It must be stressed that the resolution of the First Division, this Commission, in SPA No. 09-059 speaks for disqualification of candidate
Richard I. Gomez and not of cancellation of his Certificate of Candidacy:

‘Wherefore, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petition to Disqualify Candidate for
Lack of Qualification filed x x x against RICHARD I. GOMEZ. Accordingly, RICHARD I. GOMEZ is DISQUALIFIED as a candidate for the Office of
Congressman, Fourth District of Leyte, for lack of residency requirement.’

The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.

The disqualification of a candidate does not automatically cancel one’s certificate of candidacy, especially when it is nominated by a political
party. In effect, the political party is still allowed to substitute the candidate whose candidacy was declared disqualified. After all, the right to
substitute is a privilege given to a political party to exercise and not dependent totally to a candidate.

Nonetheless, in case of doubt, the same must always be resolved to the qualification of a candidate to run in the public office.

The substitution complied with the requirements provided under Section 12 in relation to Section 13 of Comelec Resolution No. 8678 dated
October 6, 2009.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department RECOMMENDS the following:

xxxx

2. TO ALLOW CANDIDATE LUCY MARIE TORRES GOMEZ AS A SUBSTITUTE CANDIDATE FOR RICHARD GOMEZ: (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

xxxx
The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for Reconsideration 12 (May 9, 2010 Motion) of the above-
mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During
the elections, Richards, whose name remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino Codilla, Jr. and
herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes, respectively. 13 In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s
votes were credited in favor of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth District
of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9, 2010 Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890. 14 The
said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition15 for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust private respondent from her congressional
seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution
considering that the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan 16 to the Fourth District of Leyte was only applied for on July
23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his CoC was void ab initio; and (3) private respondent’s CoC was void due to her non-
compliance with the prescribed notarial requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof of her identity before the
notarizing officer.17

In her Verified Answer,18 private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations and claimed that she validly substituted her husband in the
electoral process. She also averred that she personally known to the notary public who notarized her CoC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and
thus, she was not required to have presented any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said document. Lastly, she
asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in Metro Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc
City which was the place where she was born and raised.

During the preliminary conference, and as shown in the Preliminary Conference Order dated September 2, 2010, the parties agreed on the
following issues for resolution:

1. Whether or not the instant petition for quo warranto is meritorious;

2. Whether or not the substitution of respondent is valid;
3. Whether or not a petition for quo warranto can be used as a substitute for failure to file the necessary petition for disqualification
with the COMELEC;
4. Whether or not respondent’s COC was duly subscribed; and
5. Whether or not respondent is ineligible for the position of Representative of the Fourth District of Leyte for lack of residency
requirement.19

Ruling of the HRET

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision20 which dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that
private respondent was a qualified candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District). It observed that the
resolution denying Richard’s candidacy i.e., the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution, spoke of disqualification and not of
CoC cancellation. Hence, it held that the substitution of private respondent in lieu of Richard was legal and valid. 21 Also, it upheld the validity
of private respondent’s CoC due to petitioner’s failure to controvert her claim that she was personally known to the notary public who
notarized her CoC.22 Finally, the HRET ruled that while it had been admitted that private respondent resides in Colgate Street, San Juan City
and lived in San Rafael, Bulacan, the fact was she continued to retain her domicile in Ormoc City given that her absence therefrom was only
temporary.

Hence, the instant petition.

Issues Before the Court

The crux of the present controversy is whatever or not the HRET gravely abused its discretion in finding that Richard was validly substituted
by private respondent as candidate for Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the former’s failure to meet the one (1)
year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

It is petitioner’s submission that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the validity of private respondent’s substitution
despite contrary jurisprudence holding that substitution is impermissible where the substituted candidate’s CoC was denied due course to
and/or cancelled, as in the case of Richard. On the other hand, respondents maintain that Richard’s CoC was not denied due course to and/or
cancelled by the COMELEC as he was only "disqualified" and therefore, was properly substituted by private respondent.

Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

A. Distinction between a petition for disqualification and a petition to deny due course to/cancel a certificate of candidacy

The Omnibus Election Code23 (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for public office. Among these which obtain
particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or
cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

Primarily, a disqualification case under Section 68 of the OEC is hinged on either: (a) a candidate’s possession of a permanent resident status
in a foreign country;24 or (b) his or her commission of certain acts of disqualification. Anent the latter, the prohibited acts under Section 68
refer to election offenses under the OEC, and not to violations of other penal laws.25 In particular, these are: (1) giving money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (2) committing acts of
terrorism to enhance one’s candidacy; (3) spending in one’s election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the OEC; (4) soliciting,
receiving or making any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the OEC; and (5) violating Sections
80,26 83,27 85,28 8629 and 261, paragraphs d,30 e,31 k,32 v,33 and cc, sub-paragraph 634 of the OEC. Accordingly, the same provision (Section 68)
states that any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he or she is a party, is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the COMELEC to have committed any of the foregoing acts shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate for public office,
or disallowed from holding the same, if he or she had already been elected. 35
It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to
continue as such only because of supervening infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while
the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age, residency, and citizenship, is not in question,
he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned
election offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under Section 78 of the OEC 36 is premised on a person’s
misrepresentation of any of the material qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the
relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the CoC.37 The nature of a Section 78 petition was
discussed in the case of Fermin v. COMELEC,38 where the Court illumined:

Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding
that the candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is
running for. It is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,
therefore, is to be read in relation to the constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding under
Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a
"Section 78" petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.
(Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance
in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the person’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation,
jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence in the
determination of whether one’s CoC should be deemed cancelled or not.39 What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to
deny due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be granted without any qualification.40

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a candidate for all intents and purposes, on the
other hand, a person whose CoC had been denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a candidate at
all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus, cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to
valid votes.41 In Talaga v. COMELEC42 (Talaga), the Court ruled that:

x x x x While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, a person who certificate is
cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.

The foregoing variance gains utmost importance to the present case considering its implications on candidate substitution.

B. Valid CoC as a condition sine qua non for candidate substitution

Section 77 of the OEC provides that if an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for
any cause, a person belonging to and certified by the same political party may file a CoC to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. It states that:

Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy,
an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to,
and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified.
(Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, Section 77 requires that there be an "official candidate" before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the ground for
substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states that only an official candidate of a
registered or accredited party may be substituted.43

As defined under Section 79(a) of the OEC, the term "candidate" refers to any person aspiring for or seeking an elective public office who has
filed a certificate of candidacy by himself or through an accredited political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the law
requires that one must have validly filed a CoC in order to be considered a candidate. The requirement of having a CoC obtains even greater
importance if one considers its nature. In particular, a CoC formalizes not only a person’s public declaration to run for office but evidences as
well his or her statutory eligibility to be elected for the said post. In Sinaca v. Mula,44 the Court has illumined:

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political
creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and
the be is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all
election purposes being as well stated. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

In this regard, the CoC is the document which formally accords upon a person the status of a candidate. In other words, absent a valid CoC
one is not considered a candidate under legal contemplation. As held in Talaga: 45

x x x a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he
seeks to assume, followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid CoC that render the person making the declaration a
valid or official candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take place, as well as the precept that a person
without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate at all, it necessarily follows that if a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or
cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non
for a disqualified candidate to be validly substituted.46

C. Divergent effects of disqualification and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC cases vis-à-vis candidate substitution

Proceeding, from the foregoing discourse, it is evident that there lies a clear-cut distinction between a disqualification case under Section 68
and denial of due course to and/or cancellation of COC case under Section 78 vis-à-vis their respective effects on candidate substitution
under Section 77.1âwphi1
As explained in the case of Miranda v. Abaya 47 (Miranda), a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly substituted
pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a candidate until disqualified; but a person whose CoC has been denied due course to and/or
cancelled under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not considered a candidate. 48 Stated differently, since there would be no
candidate to speak of under a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC case, then there would be no candidate to be substituted;
the same does not obtain, however, in a disqualification case since there remains to be a candidate to be substituted, although his or her
candidacy is discontinued.

On this note, it is equally revelatory that Section 77 expressly enumerates the instances where substitution is permissible, that is when an
official candidate of a registered or accredited political party "dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause." Noticeably, material
misrepresentation cases are not included in the said section and therefore, cannot be a valid basis to proceed with candidate substitution.

D. Application to the case at bar

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010 elections due to his failure to comply with the one year
residency requirement.49 The confusion, however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the substitution of private respondent, and even
further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not
that his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been validly substitute by private respondent,
thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly decree the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s
substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s "disqualification" is his failure to comply with the
residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation a
CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s
qualifications for elective office such as age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status.51 There is therefore
no legal basis to support a finding of disqualification within the ambit of election laws. Accordingly, given Richard’s non-compliance with the
one year residency requirement, it cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division’s unqualified grant of Juntilla’s "Verified Petition to
Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification"52 – which prayed that the COMELEC declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from
seeking the office of Member of the House of Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE COURSE
and/or CANCELLED"53 – carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC pursuant to Section 78.

Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of CoC and the same is granted by the COMELEC
without any qualification, the cancellation of the candidate’s CoC in in order. This is precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the
Court, in upholding the COMELEC En Banc’s nullification of the substitution in that case, decreed that the COMELEC Division’s unqualified
grant of the petition necessarily included the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the use of
the term "disqualified" in the COMELEC Division’s resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for in the said petition:

The question to settle next is whether or not aside from Joiel "Pempe" Miranda being disqualified by the COMELEC in its May 5, 1998
resolution, his certificate of candidacy had likewise been denied due course and cancelled.

The Court rules that it was.

Private respondent’s petition in SPA No. 98-019 specifically prayed for the following:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that the Certificate of Candidacy filed by respondent for the position of Mayor for the City of Snatiago
be not given due course and/or cancelled.

Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.

In resolving the petition filed by private respondent specifying a very particular relief, the COMELEC ruled favorably in the following
manner:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Commission (FIRST DIVISION) GRANTS the Petition. Respondent JOSE "Pempe" MIRANDA is
hereby DISQUALIFIED from running for the position of mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, in the May 11, 1998 national and local elections.

SO ORDERED.

From a plain reading of the dispositive portion of the COMELEC resolution of May 5, 1998 in SPA No. 98-019, it is sufficiently clear that the
prayer specifically and particularly sought in the petition was GRANTED, there being no qualification on the matter whatsoever. The
disqualification was simply ruled over and above the granting of the specific prayer for denial of due course and cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy.

xxxx

There is no dispute that the complaint or petition filed by private respondent in SPA No. 98-019 is one to deny due course and to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda. There is likewise no question that the said petition was GRANTED without any
qualification whatsoever. It is rather clear, therefore, that whether or not the COMELEC granted any further relief in SPA No. 98-019 by
disqualifying the candidate, the fact remains that the said petition was granted and that the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe" Miranda
was denied due course and cancelled. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same rule was later discussed in the case of Talaga, viz:

3. Granting without any qualification or petition in SPA No. 09-029(DC) manifested COMELEC’s intention to declare Ramon disqualified and
to cancel his CoC

xxxx

In Miranda v. Abaya, the specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the CoC "be not given due course and/or cancelled". The
COMELEC categorically granted "the petition" and then pronounced – in apparent contradiction – that Joel Pempe Miranda was
"disqualified." The Court held that the COMELEC, by granting the petition without any qualification, disqualified Joel Pempe Miranda and at
the same time cancelled Jose Pempe Miranda’s CoC.
 xxxx

The crucial point of Miranda v. Abaya was that the COMELEC actually granted the particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the
CoC prayed for in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In view of the foregoing rulings, the COMELEC En Banc direly misconstrued the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution
when it adopted the Law Department’s finding that Richard was only "disqualified" and that his CoC was not denied due course to and/or
cancelled, paving the way for the approval of private respondent’s substitution. It overlooked the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s
ruling encompassed the cancellation of Richard’s CoC and in consequence, disallowed the substitution of private respondent. It was
therefore grave and serious error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc to have approved private respondent’s substitution.

Consequently, in perpetuating the COMELEC En Banc’s error as above-discussed, the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion,
warranting the grant of the instant petition.

Fundamental is the rule that grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution, the law or
existing jurisprudence.54 While it is well-recognized that the HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House, the Court maintains jurisdiction over it to check
"whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.55 In other
words, when the HRET utterly disregards the law and settled precedents on the matter before it, it commits a grave abuse of discretion.

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the Fourth District of Leyte due to his failure to
comply with the one year residency requirement; (2) Juntilla’s petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC;
and (3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing petition without any qualification. By these undisputed and essential facts alone,
the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC En Banc’s erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010
Resolution "speaks only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of Richard’s CoC"36 and thereby, sanctioned the substitution of private
respondent.

Lest it be misunderstood, the HRET is not bound by previous COMELEC pronouncements relative to the qualifications of the Members of the
House. Being the sole judge57 of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its respective members, the HRET cannot
be tied down by COMELEC resolutions, else its constitutional mandate58 be circumvented and rendered nugatory. Instructive on this point is
the Court’s disquisition in Fernandez v. HRET,59 to wit:

Private respondent concludes from the above that petitioner had no legal basis to claim that the HRET, when reference to the qualification/s
of Members of the House of Representatives is concerned, is "co-equal", to the COMELEC respecting the matter of eligibility and qualification
of a member of the House of Representatives. The truth is the other way around, because the COMELEC is subservient to the HRET when the
dispute or contest at issue refers to the eligibility and/or qualification of a Member of the House of Representatives. A petition for quo
warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET as sole judge, and cannot be considered forum shopping even if another body may
have passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the Member’s qualification while the Member was still a
candidate. There is forum-shopping only where two cases involve the same parties and the same cause of action. The two cases here are
distinct and dissimilar in their nature and character. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Notably, the phrase "election, returns, and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity
of the contestee’s title. More particularly, the term "qualifications" refers to matters that could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding
against the pro-claimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility, or the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy. 60 As used in Section 74
of the OEC, the word "eligible" means having the right to run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities to run for the public office.61 In this relation, private respondent’s own qualification to run for public office – which was
inextricably linked to her husband’s own qualifications due to her substitution – was the proper subject of quo warranto proceedings falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET and independent from any previous proceedings before the COMELEC, lest the jurisdiction
divide between the two be blurred.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that the HRET’s independence is not without limitation. As earlier mentioned, the Court retains
certiorari jurisdiction over the HRET if only to check whether or not it has gravely abused its discretion. In this regard, the Court does not
endeavor to denigrate nor undermine the HRET’s independence; rather, it merely fulfills its duty to ensure that the Constitution and the laws
are upheld through the exercise of its power of judicial review.

In fine, the Court observes that the HRET wantonly disregarded the law by deliberately adopting the COMELEC En Banc’s flawed findings
regarding private respondent’s eligibility to run for public office which essentially stemmed from her substitution. In this light, it cannot be
gainsaid that the HRET gravely abused its discretion.

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a bona fide candidate for the position of
Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this
pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting private respondent’s own qualification to
office.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the March 22, 2012 Decision rendered by the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal in HRET Case No. 10-031 (QW) is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III.The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division
said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-
Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American citizen based on
the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a
Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered
an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual
citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he
eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of
Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained pending even until after the election
held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the
votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion was opposed by private
respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of
the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the
time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel document. His parents
also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however,
did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to
the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of
1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer had U.S.
citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent
Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred three thousand
eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred
ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with
fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular
choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the
cancellation of the respondents certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the
May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim
the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private
respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent
disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City.Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that,
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the elective office of
Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to
bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners
motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that
petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during
the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or proceeding, if he has
legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

....

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of
its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a
defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there
had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner
came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had,
and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v.
COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is
whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a
Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely
to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who
originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner
since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after
private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had
a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646,
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is
disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
 II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160),
which declares as disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated
in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through
40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to
hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. [9] For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to
possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens
of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they
are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state;
but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two
or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest
and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who
explained its necessity as follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee
according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship
which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign
soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all
know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of about 600
chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in
Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast
Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but
who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the concern expressed
by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough
assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of
the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common knowledge in Manila. It can
mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment
and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on
Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: [11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance
under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to the sovereignty
which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is
threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think
some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is
asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when
the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship,
with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee
said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the
security of this country, arising from, let us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but
with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with
mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict
process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their
condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of
the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on
citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is
something completely beyond our control.[12]
 By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between Senators
Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with dual citizenship is disqualified to
run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the
Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born
citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has
to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be
considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the
Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is
the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships,
then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a
citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government
and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied
with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative department of the
Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality
were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but
what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It
would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the
Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at
least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in
Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now
he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and
that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should
have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in
mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States,
whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an
election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under
oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR
PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him
dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective local position? We
answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long
abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine
Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by
Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of capriciousness or
arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondents certificate of
candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be
effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election
of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22,
1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed
to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this
Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth
to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either
express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant
of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt
of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-
Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen,
he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese
national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
NESTOR A. JACOT, G.R. No. 179848
Present:
Petitioner,

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES,

DE CASTRO,* and

BRION,** JJ.

Promulgated:

ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, November 27, 2008

Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution[1] dated 28 September 2007 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in
SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division [2] disqualifying him from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a
personal renouncement of his United States (US) citizenship.

Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. [3]

Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with
the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of Approval[4] of
petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward
C. Yulo. [5] On 27 September 2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No. 06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a
citizen of the Philippines.[6]

Six months after, on 26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-Mayor of
the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. [7]

On 2 May 2007, respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification[8] before the COMELEC Provincial Office
in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the latter failed to renounce his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act
No. 9225, which reads as follows:
 Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.

In his Answer[9] dated 6 May 2007 and Position Paper[10] dated 8 May 2007, petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective
renunciation of his foreign citizenship.

In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position
of Vice Mayor.

On 12 June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution [11] disqualifying the petitioner from running for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second
Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any
person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered
as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v. COMELEC[12] and Mercado
v. Manzano[13] applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his
Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. The COMELEC, thus, decreed in the aforementioned Resolution that:

ACCORDINGLY, NESTOR ARES JACOT is DISQUALIFIED to run for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman, Camiguin for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections. If proclaimed, respondent cannot thus assume
the Office of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification.[14]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 29 June 2007 reiterating his position that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCGand his oath in his Certificate of Candidacy sufficed as an effective renunciation of
his US citizenship. Attached to the said Motion was an Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and
All Foreign Citizenship dated 27 June 2007, wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship.[15] The COMELEC en banc dismissed
petitioners Motion in a Resolution[16] dated 28 September 2007 for lack of merit.

Petitioner sought remedy from this Court via the present Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court, where he presented for the first time an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign
Citizenship[17] dated 7 February 2007. He avers that he executed an act of renunciation of his US citizenship, separate from the Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines he took before the Los Angeles PCG and his filing of his Certificate of Candidacy, thereby
changing his theory of the case during the appeal. He attributes the delay in the presentation of the affidavit to his former counsel,
Atty. Marciano Aparte, who allegedly advised him that said piece of evidence was unnecessary but who, nevertheless, made him execute an
identical document entitled Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship on
27 June 2007 after he had already filed his Certificate of Candidacy.[18]

Petitioner raises the following issues for resolution of this Court:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 9225, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CITIZENSHIP
RETENTION AND RE-ACQUISITION ACT OF 2003, SPECIFICALLY SECTION 5(2) AS TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THOSE
SEEKING ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICE;

II

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT EXERCISED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT HELD THAT
PETITIONER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE AS REGARDS THE
PAYMENT OF THE NECESSARY MOTION FEES; AND
 III

WHETHER OR NOT UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT WOULD RESULT IN THE FRUSTRATION OF
THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE OF CATARMAN, CAMIGUIN.[19]

The Court determines that the only fundamental issue in this case is whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate
in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship.

This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified.

Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los
Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of
foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of
a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine
citizenship:

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance
to the Republic:

I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and
allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion.

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his
renunciation of foreign citizenship.Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship
by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.

The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be
executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath reads:

I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my
own personal knowledge.

Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under
this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:

xxxx
 (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath.

The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer
an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.[20]

Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign
country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic
Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.

Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that
which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear
in the discussion of the Bicameral Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held on
18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and Hon. Representative
Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign
citizenship:

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Okay. So, No. 2. Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. I think its very good, ha? No problem?

REP. JAVIER. I think its already covered by the oath.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Renouncing foreign citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. Ah but he has taken his oath already.

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Nono, renouncing foreign citizenship.

xxxx

CHAIRMAN DRILON. Can I go back to No. 2. Whats your problem, Boy? Those seeking elective office in the Philippines.

REP. JAVIER. They are trying to make him renounce his citizenship thinking that ano

CHAIRMAN DRILON. His American citizenship.

REP. JAVIER. To discourage him from running?

CHAIRMAN DRILON. No.

REP. A.D. DEFENSOR. No. When he runs he will only have one citizenship. When he runs for office, he will have only
one. (Emphasis ours.)
 There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce
their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines.To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos
must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

By the same token, the oath of allegiance contained in the Certificate of Candidacy, which is substantially similar to the one
contained in Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, does not constitute the personal and sworn renunciation sought under Section 5(2) of
Republic Act No. 9225. It bears to emphasize that the said oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as
candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of
having more than one citizenship.

Petitioner erroneously invokes the doctrine in Valles[21] and Mercado,[22] wherein the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a
certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, was already considered a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The ruling of this
Court in Valles and Mercado is not applicable to the present case, which is now specially governed by Republic Act No. 9225, promulgated
on 29 August 2003.

In Mercado, which was cited in Valles, the disqualification of therein private respondent Manzano was sought under another law,
Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, which reads:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxxx

(d) Those with dual citizenship.

The Court in the aforesaid cases sought to define the term dual citizenship vis--vis the concept of dual allegiance. At the time this Court
decided the cases of Valles and Mercadoon 26 May 1999 and 9 August 2000, respectively, the more explicitly worded requirements of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 were not yet enacted by our legislature.[23]

Lopez v. Commission on Elections[24] is the more fitting precedent for this case since they both share the same factual
milieu. In Lopez, therein petitioner Lopez was a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a
naturalized US citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of Republic Act No.9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his candidacy
for a local elective position, but failed to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. This Court unequivocally
declared that despite having garnered the highest number of votes in the election, Lopez is nonetheless disqualified as a candidate for a local
elective position due to his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225.

Petitioner presents before this Court for the first time, in the instant Petition for Certiorari, an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to
the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship,[25] which he supposedly executed on 7 February 2007, even before he filed his
Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. With the said Affidavit, petitioner puts forward in the Petition at bar a new theory of his casethat
he complied with the requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship before filing his Certificate of
Candidacy. This new theory constitutes a radical change from the earlier position he took before the COMELECthat he complied with the
requirement of renunciation by his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and in his
Certificate of Candidacy, and that there was no more need for a separate act of renunciation.

As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories,
issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered
by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late stage.Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule.[26] Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial haphazardly. [27]

Likewise, this Court does not countenance the late submission of evidence.[28] Petitioner should have offered the Affidavit dated 7
February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC.

Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that In the absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules,
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect. Section
34 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for
which the evidence is offered must be specified.
 Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no opportunity to examine and controvert
it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process. [29] Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with
orderly justice.[30]

The Court further notes that petitioner had already presented before the COMELEC an identical document, Oath of Renunciation of
Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship executed on 27 June 2007, subsequent to his filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy on 26 March 2007. Petitioner attached the said Oath of 27 June 2007 to his Motion for Reconsideration with the
COMELEC en banc. The COMELEC en banc eventually refused to reconsider said document for being belatedly executed. What was extremely
perplexing, not to mention suspect, was that petitioner did not submit the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 or mention it at all in the proceedings
before the COMELEC, considering that it could have easily won his case if it was actually executed on and in existence before the filing of his
Certificate of Candidacy, in compliance with law.

The justification offered by petitioner, that his counsel had advised him against presenting this crucial piece of evidence, is lame
and unconvincing. If the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 was in existence all along, petitioners counsel, and even petitioner himself, could have
easily adduced it to be a crucial piece of evidence to prove compliance with the requirements of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. There
was no apparent danger for petitioner to submit as much evidence as possible in support of his case, than the risk of presenting too little for
which he could lose.

And even if it were true, petitioners excuse for the late presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 will not change the
outcome of petitioners case.

It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his counsels conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client
cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. [31] The only exceptions to the
general rule -- that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel -- which this Court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of ones
property through a technicality.[32] These exceptions are not attendant in this case.

The Court cannot sustain petitioners averment that his counsel was grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the
Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon
witnesses and to argue the case -- unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly presenting his case -- do not constitute
gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel. [33]

Also belying petitioners claim that his former counsel was grossly negligent was the fact that petitioner continuously used his
former counsels theory of the case. Even when the COMELEC already rendered an adverse decision, he persistently argues even to this Court
that his oaths of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Los Angeles PCG and in his Certificate of Candidacy amount to the
renunciation of foreign citizenship which the law requires. Having asserted the same defense in the instant Petition, petitioner only
demonstrates his continued reliance on and complete belief in the position taken by his former counsel, despite the formers incongruous
allegations that the latter has been grossly negligent.

Petitioner himself is also guilty of negligence. If indeed he believed that his counsel was inept, petitioner should have promptly
taken action, such as discharging his counsel earlier and/or insisting on the submission of his Affidavit of 7 February 2007 to the COMELEC,
instead of waiting until a decision was rendered disqualifying him and a resolution issued dismissing his motion for reconsideration; and,
thereupon, he could have heaped the blame on his former counsel. Petitioner could not be so easily allowed to escape the consequences of
his former counsels acts, because, otherwise, it would render court proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening at any time by
the mere subterfuge of replacing counsel. [34]

Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,[35] where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence
because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayans denial of his prior leave to do so. The wrongful
insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in
his defense. This was certainly not the case in the Petition at bar.

Herein, petitioner was in no way deprived of due process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the
pleadings, and presenting evidence on petitioners behalf. Moreover, petitioners cause was not defeated by a mere technicality, but because
of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a
deviation from the rule that clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel.[36]

Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the position of Vice-Mayor
of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must comply with the election requirements applicable to dual
citizens and failed to do so, received the highest number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of,
such requirement.[37] The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly
believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to
serve the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other
state.[38] The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of popularity.[39]

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated 28 September 2007 of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 07-361,
affirming the Resolution dated 12 June 2007 of the COMELEC Second Division, is AFFIRMED. Petitioner is DISQUALIFIED to run for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin in the 14 May 2007National and Local Elections, and if proclaimed, cannot assume the Office
of Vice-Mayor of said municipality by virtue of such disqualification. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 176947 February 19, 2009

GAUDENCIO M. CORDORA, Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and GUSTAVO S. TAMBUNTING, Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

In EO Case No. 05-17, Gaudencio M. Cordora (Cordora) accused Gustavo S. Tambunting (Tambunting) of an election offense for violating
Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code. The Commission on Elections’ (COMELEC) En Banc dismissed Cordora’s
complaint in a Resolution1 dated 18 August 2006. The present petition seeks to reverse the 18 August 2006 Resolution as well as the
Resolution2 dated 20 February 2007 of the COMELEC En Banc which denied Cordora’s motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

In his complaint affidavit filed before the COMELEC Law Department, Cordora asserted that Tambunting made false assertions in the
following items:

That Annex A [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the 2001 elections] and Annex B [Tambunting’s Certificate of Candidacy for the
2004 elections] state, among others, as follows, particularly Nos. 6, 9 and 12 thereof:

1. No. 6 – I am a Natural Born/Filipino Citizen

2. No. 9 – No. of years of Residence before May 14, 2001.

36 in the Philippines and 25 in the Constituency where I seek to be elected;

3. No. 12 – I am ELIGIBLE for the office I seek to be elected.3 (Boldface and capitalization in the original)

Cordora stated that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public office because Tambunting lacked the required citizenship and
residency requirements.

To disprove Tambunting’s claim of being a natural-born Filipino citizen, Cordora presented a certification from the Bureau of Immigration
which stated that, in two instances, Tambunting claimed that he is an American: upon arrival in the Philippines on 16 December 2000 and
upon departure from the Philippines on 17 June 2001. According to Cordora, these travel dates confirmed that Tambunting acquired
American citizenship through naturalization in Honolulu, Hawaii on 2 December 2000. Cordora concluded:

That Councilor Gustavo S. Tambunting contrary to the provision of Sec 74 (OEC): [sic] Re: CONTENTS OF CERTIFICATE OF CANDIDACY:
which requires the declarant/affiant to state, among others, under oath, that he is a Filipino (No. 6), No. 9- residence requirement which
he lost when [he was] naturalized as an American Citizen on December 2, 2000 at [sic] Honolulu, Hawaii, knowingly and
willfully affirmed and reiterated that he possesses the above basic requirements under No. 12 – that he is indeed eligible for the office
to which he seeks to be elected, when in truth and in fact, the contrary is indubitably established by his own statements before the
Philippine Bureau of Immigration x x x.4 (Emphases in the original)

Tambunting, on the other hand, maintained that he did not make any misrepresentation in his certificates of candidacy. To refute Cordora’s
claim that Tambunting is not a natural-born Filipino, Tambunting presented a copy of his birth certificate which showed that he was born of
a Filipino mother and an American father. Tambunting further denied that he was naturalized as an American citizen. The certificate of
citizenship conferred by the US government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) merely
confirmed Tambunting’s citizenship which he acquired at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that
Tambunting is not a Filipino citizen. Tambunting also took an oath of allegiance on 18 November 2003 pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225
(R.A. No. 9225), or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003.

Tambunting further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth. Tambunting has imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the
Filipino language, and has been educated in Filipino schools. Tambunting maintained that proof of his loyalty and devotion to the Philippines
was shown by his service as councilor of Parañaque.

To refute Cordora’s claim that the number of years of residency stated in Tambunting’s certificates of candidacy is false because Tambunting
lost his residency because of his naturalization as an American citizen, Tambunting contended that the residency requirement is not the
same as citizenship.

The Ruling of the COMELEC Law Department

The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s complaint against Tambunting because Cordora failed to
substantiate his charges against Tambunting. Cordora’s reliance on the certification of the Bureau of Immigration that Tambunting traveled
on an American passport is not sufficient to prove that Tambunting is an American citizen.

The Ruling of the COMELEC En Banc

The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the COMELEC Law Department. The COMELEC En Banc was convinced
that Cordora failed to support his accusation against Tambunting by sufficient and convincing evidence.

The dispositive portion of the COMELEC En Banc’s Resolution reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.

SO ORDERED.5

Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento (Commissioner Sarmiento) wrote a separate opinion which concurred with the findings of the En
Banc Resolution. Commissioner Sarmiento pointed out that Tambunting could be considered a dual citizen. Moreover, Tambunting
effectively renounced his American citizenship when he filed his certificates of candidacy in 2001 and 2004 and ran for public office.

Cordora filed a motion for reconsideration which raised the same grounds and the same arguments in his complaint. In its Resolution
promulgated on 20 February 2007, the COMELEC En Banc dismissed Cordora’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The Issue

Cordora submits that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
there is no sufficient evidence to support probable cause that may warrant the prosecution of Tambunting for an election offense.

Cordora’s petition is not an action to disqualify Tambunting because of Tambunting’s failure to meet citizenship and residency
requirements. Neither is the present petition an action to declare Tambunting a non-Filipino and a non-resident. The present petition seeks
to prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his certificates of candidacy.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit. We affirm the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc.

Whether there is Probable Cause to Hold Tambunting for Trial for Having Committed an Election Offense

There was no grave abuse of discretion in the COMELEC En Banc’s ruling that there is no sufficient and convincing evidence to support a
finding of probable cause to hold Tambunting for trial for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code.

Probable cause constitutes those facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed. Determining probable cause is an intellectual activity premised on the prior physical presentation or submission of
documentary or testimonial proofs either confirming, negating or qualifying the allegations in the complaint. 6

Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code reads as follows:

Contents of certificate of candidacy. — The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the
office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; x x x the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence;
his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation imposed by his oath is
assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are true to
the best of his knowledge.

xxx

The person filing a certificate of candidacy shall also affix his latest photograph, passport size; a statement in duplicate containing his bio-
data and program of government not exceeding one hundred words, if he so desires.

Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other hand, provides that violation of Section 74, among other sections in the Code, shall
constitute an election offense.

Tambunting’s Dual Citizenship

Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process
involved in INS Form I-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing
citizenships, he is both Filipino and American by birth. Cordora, on the other hand, insists that Tambunting is a naturalized American citizen.

We agree with Commissioner Sarmiento’s observation that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the circumstances of his birth,
it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The process involved in
INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the Bureau of
Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same
certification showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino. Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to
the filing of his certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from
running for public office.7

Requirements for dual citizens from birth who desire to run for public office

We deem it necessary to reiterate our previous ruling in Mercado v. Manzano, wherein we ruled that dual citizenship is not a ground for
disqualification from running for any elective local position.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states.
Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess
dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
 (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are
citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission
they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the
above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or
more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.

xxx

[I]n including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase "dual
citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance." Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject
to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of
the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we
have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered
a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control."

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens
and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on §40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is disqualified to run
for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his
father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural-born citizen, upon reaching the age
of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to
repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen,? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.1avvphi1

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be
considered a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose
mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman’s example, if he does not renounce his other
citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of
Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then
he will probably fall under this disqualification.8 (Emphasis supplied)

We have to consider the present case in consonance with our rulings in Mercado v. Manzano,9 Valles v. COMELEC,10 and AASJS v.
Datumanong.11 Mercado and Valles involve similar operative facts as the present case. Manzano and Valles, like Tambunting, possessed dual
citizenship by the circumstances of their birth. Manzano was born to Filipino parents in the United States which follows the doctrine of jus
soli. Valles was born to an Australian mother and a Filipino father in Australia. Our rulings in Manzano and Valles stated that dual citizenship
is different from dual allegiance both by cause and, for those desiring to run for public office, by effect. Dual citizenship is involuntary and
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said states. Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual citizenship who seeks public office
to file his certificate of candidacy and swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, is brought about
by the individual’s active participation in the naturalization process. AASJS states that, under R.A. No. 9225, a Filipino who becomes a
naturalized citizen of another country is allowed to retain his Filipino citizenship by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines. The act of taking an oath of allegiance is an implicit renunciation of a naturalized citizen’s foreign citizenship.

R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, was enacted years after the promulgation of Manzano and Valles.
The oath found in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 reads as follows:

I __________ , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws
and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.

In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. 12 Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states that
naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run for elective public office in the Philippines shall "meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing the certificate of
candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath" aside from the oath of allegiance prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225. The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance
and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship served as the bases for our recent rulings in Jacot v. Dal and COMELEC,13 Velasco v.
COMELEC,14 and Japzon v. COMELEC,15 all of which involve natural-born Filipinos who later became naturalized citizens of another country
and thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the present case, Tambunting, a natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently
become a naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin requirements in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to him.

Tambunting’s residency

Cordora concluded that Tambunting failed to meet the residency requirement because of Tambunting’s naturalization as an American.
Cordora’s reasoning fails because Tambunting is not a naturalized American. Moreover, residency, for the purpose of election laws, includes
the twin elements of the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, 16 and is not dependent upon
citizenship.

In view of the above, we hold that Cordora failed to establish that Tambunting indeed willfully made false entries in his certificates of
candidacy. On the contrary, Tambunting sufficiently proved his innocence of the charge filed against him. Tambunting is eligible for the office
which he sought to be elected and fulfilled the citizenship and residency requirements prescribed by law.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated 18 August 2006 and 20
February 2007 in EO Case No. 05-17.

SO ORDERED.

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order seeking to set aside the Resolution [1] dated
November 6, 2013 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed in toto the Resolution[2] dated May 3, 2013 of the
COMELEC First Division canceling the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Rogelio Batin Caballero.

Petitioner[3] and private respondent Jonathan Enrique V. Nanud, Jr.[4] were both candidates for the mayoralty position of the Municipality of
Uyugan, Province of Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections. Private respondent filed a Petition[5] to deny due course to or cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy alleging that the latter made a false representation when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to
run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof.

During the December 10, 2012 conference, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was not properly served with a copy of the
petition and the petition was served by registered mail not in his address in Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes. He, however, received a
copy of the petition during the conference. Petitioner did not file an Answer but filed a Memorandum controverting private respondent's
substantial allegations in his petition.

Petitioner argued that prior to the filing of his COC on October 3, 2012, he took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
the Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada on September 13, 2012 and became a dual Filipino and Canadian citizen pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003. Thereafter, he renounced his
Canadian citizenship and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation before a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 to conform with
Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225.[6] He claimed that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a Canadian citizen
as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation
while working in Nigeria, California, and finally in Canada.

On May 3, 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material misrepresentation in his COC when
he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu, Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election. The decretal portion of the
resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES to GRANT the instant Petition. The Certificate of
Candidacy of respondent Caballero is hereby CANCELLED.[7]

The COMELEC First Division did not discuss the procedural deficiency raised by petitioner as he was already given a copy of the petition and
also in consonance with the Commission's constitutional duty of determining the qualifications of petitioner to run for elective office. It
found that while petitioner complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines and
had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those
seeking elective office, i.e., persons who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency requirement
provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner's naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment
of his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to prove that he was
able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for elective office in said locality which he failed to do.

Elections were subsequently held on May 13, 2013 and the election returns showed that petitioner won over private respondent.[8] Private
respondent filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Defer Proclamation.[9]

On May 14, 2013, petitioner was proclaimed Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes.

On May 16, 2013, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc assailing the May 3, 2013 Resolution issued by
the COMELEC's First Division canceling his COC.

On May 17, 2013, private respondent filed a Petition to Annul Proclamation. [10]

On November 6, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner filed with us the instant petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

In the meantime, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution[11] of the May 3, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division as affirmed
by the En Banc and prayed for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, the appropriate correction of the certificate of canvas to reflect that all
votes in favor of petitioner are stray votes, declaration of nullity of petitioner's proclamation and proclamation of private respondent as the
duly-elected Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13, 2013 elections.

On December 12, 2013, COMELEC Chairman Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr. issued a Writ of Execution.[12] Private respondent took his Oath of
Office[13] on December 20, 2013.

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE CLEAR IMPORT OF PROCEDURAL RULES PROVIDED FOR UNDER
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 9523 PROMULGATED ON 25 SEPTEMBER 2012.

THE COMELEC EN BANC GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE WORKED IN
SEVERAL FOREIGN COUNTRIES FOR "GREENER PASTURE."

EVEN ASSUMING THAT PETITIONER HAS ABANDONED HIS PHILIPPINE DOMICILE WHEN HE BECAME A CANADIAN CITIZEN, HIS
REACQUISITION OF HIS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP, TAKING OATH OF ALLEGIANCE TO THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT NINE (9) MONTHS
PRIOR TO HIS ELECTION ON 13 MAY 2013, IS A SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW ON RESIDENCY.[14]

Petitioner contends that when private respondent filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel his COC with the Office of the Municipal
Election Officer of Uyugan, Batanes, a copy thereof was not personally served on him; that private respondent later sent a copy of the
petition to him by registered mail without an attached affidavit stating the reason on why registered mail as a mode of service was resorted
to. Petitioner argues that private respondent violated Section 4, paragraphs (1)[15] and (4),[16] Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as
amended by COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, thus, his petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's certificate of candidacy should have
been denied outright.

We are not convinced.

While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure are subject to liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under
Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.

Sec. 4. Suspension of the Rules. - In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the
Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission.

Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that
do not square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court
is not substantially impaired.[17]

In Hayudini v. COMELEC,[18] we sustained the COMELEC's liberal treatment of respondent's petition to deny due course or cancel petitioner's
COC despite its failure to comply with Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by Resolution No. 9523,
i.e., pertaining to the period to file petition and to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served personally on
petitioner, respectively, and held that:

As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of
public officers may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period,
one whose right to it is uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared, not only for the benefit of the
winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of procedure that protract and delay
the trial of an ordinary action. This principle was reiterated in the cases of Tolentino v. Commission on Elections and De Castro v. Commission
on Elections, where the Court held that "in exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect the integrity of
elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by procedural rules in resolving election disputes."

Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally
interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending
before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives - ensuring the holding of
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and disposition of
every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued with public interest.
It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount need of dispelling the
uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to ascertain, by all means within its
command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.[19]

Here, we find that the issue raised, i.e., whether petitioner had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes at least one (1) year before the elections
held on May 13, 2013 as he represented in his COC, pertains to his qualification and eligibility to run for public office, therefore imbued with
public interest, which justified the COMELEC's suspension of its own rules. We adopt the COMELEC's s ratiocination in accepting the petition,
to wit:

This Commission recognizes the failure of petitioner to comply strictly with the procedure for filing a petition to deny due course to or
cancel certificate of candidacy set forth in Section 4, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure as amended by COMELEC Resolution No.
9523, which requires service of a copy of the petition to respondent prior to its filing. But then, we should also consider the efforts exerted
by petitioner in serving a copy of his petition to respondent after being made aware that such service is necessary. We should also take note
of the impossibility for petitioner to personally serve a copy of the petition to respondent since he was in Canada at the time of its filing as
shown in respondent's travel records.

The very purpose of prior service of the petition to respondent is to afford the latter an opportunity to answer the allegations contained in
the petition even prior to the service of summons by the Commission to him. In this case, respondent was given a copy of the petition during
the conference held on 10 December 2012 and was ultimately accorded the occasion to rebut all the allegations against him. He even filed a
Memorandum containing his defenses to petitioner's allegations. For all intents and purposes, therefore, respondent was never deprived of
due process which is the very essence of this Commission's Rules of Procedure.

Even the Supreme Court acknowledges the need for procedural rules to bow to substantive considerations "through a liberal construction
aimed at promoting their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, x x x

xxxx

When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order, x x x.
Unquestionably, the instant case is impressed with public interest which warrants the relaxation of the application of the [R]ules of
[P]rocedure, consistent with the ruling of the Supreme Court in several cases.[20]

Petitioner next claims that he did not abandon his Philippine domicile. He argues that he was born and baptized in Uyugan, Batanes; studied
and had worked therein for a couple of years, and had paid his community tax certificate; and, that he was a registered voter and had
exercised his right of suffrage and even built his house therein. He also contends that he usually comes back to Uyugan, Batanes during his
vacations from work abroad, thus, his domicile had not been lost. Petitioner avers that the requirement of the law in fixing the residence
qualification of a candidate running for public office is not strictly on the period of residence in the place where he seeks to be elected but on
the acquaintance by the candidate on his constituents' vital needs for their common welfare; and that his nine months of actual stay in
Uyugan, Batanes prior to his election is a substantial compliance with the law. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in canceling his COC.

We are not persuaded.

RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines,
who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can re-acquire or retain his
Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.[21] The law does not provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.[22]

RA No. 9225 treats citizenship independently of residence.[23] This is only logical and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow
for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen. [24] However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual
citizenship seeks for an elective public office, residency in the Philippines becomes material. Section 5(2) of FLA No. 9225 provides:

SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. - Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:

xxxx

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.

Republic Act No. 7160, which is known as the Local Government Code of 1991, provides, among others, for the qualifications of an elective
local official. Section 39 thereof states:

SEC. 39. Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city
or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the district where
he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write
Filipino or any other local language or dialect.

Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year
immediately preceding the election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner's COC on the ground that the latter made
material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceeding
the day of elections.

The term "residence" is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or
legal residence,[25] that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be
found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi)."[26] A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at
birth. It is usually the place where the child's parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
(domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.[27]

Petitioner was a natural born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes. Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC[28] we ruled that naturalization
in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner's case as permanent resident
status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian citizenship.[29] Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the
Philippines and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation from work in Canada
cannot be considered as waiver of such abandonment.

The next question is what is the effect of petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 on his residence or domicile?

In Japzon v. COMELEC,[30] wherein respondent Ty reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 and run for Mayor of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose residency in the said place was put in issue, we had the occasion to state, thus:

[Petitioner's] reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or effect on his
residence/domicile. He could still retain his domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again establish his domicile in the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his residence therein shall be
determined from the time he made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to the time of his birth. [31]

Hence, petitioner's retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan,
Batanes. He must still prove that after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan, Batanes as his
new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as such.

The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan
within a period of one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after reacquiring his Filipino
citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that petitioner can rightfully claim that he re-established his domicile in Uyugan,
Batanes, if such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to reestablish his domicile there. However, the
period from September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.

Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in
the instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations/~ Clearly, where there is no proof of
grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of
COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.[33]

Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately
preceding the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government Code.

Petitioner's argument that his nine (9) months of actual stay in Uyugan, Batanes, prior to the May 13, 2013 local elections is a substantial
compliance with the law, is not persuasive. In Aquino v. Commission on Elections,[34] we held:

x x x A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the
people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly
lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or
plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.[35]

Petitioner had made a material misrepresentation by stating in his COC that he is a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one (1) year
immediately proceeding the day of the election, thus, a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Section 74, in
relation to Section 78, of the OEC governs the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to COCs, to wit:

SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. - The certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for
the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component
cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of
birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.

xxxx

SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.

We have held that in order to justify the cancellation of COC under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein
pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate - the right to run
for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.[36] We concluded that material representation contemplated by Section 78
refers to qualifications for elective office, such as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for
a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code.[37] Furthermore, aside from the requirement of materiality, the
misrepresentation must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.[38] We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in canceling petitioner's COC for material
misrepresentation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution
dated November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990

MATEO CAASI, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990

ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.

Ireneo B. Orlino for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 88831 & 84508.

Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office for private respondent.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code of the private respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, to which he was elected in the
local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of America,
not of Bolinao.

G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13, 1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the
three (3) petitions of Anecito Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C. Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the
disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.

G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the position of municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel on account of his being a green card holder.

In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that
he is a permanent resident of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that he may freely enter the
United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao,
Pangasinan, that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
and the congressional elections on May 18,1987.

After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the
petitions on the ground that:

The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his
residence in the Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card, Respondent has sufficiently indicated his
intention to continuously reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive elections in said municipality. As
the respondent meets the basic requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) as
provided for in Section 42 of the Local Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).

In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:

A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country and respondent having admitted
that he is a green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he
"has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for elected office. This respondent has
not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508.)

In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel, respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the
decision dated June 21, 1989 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon. Artemio R. Corpus, etc.,
respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed
by Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The
Court of Appeals held:

... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of
the Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets the very basic requirements of citizenship and
residence for candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the
petitioner, considering that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under the Election Code are
appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo, G.R. No. 88831.)

These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the United States,
and (2) whether respondent Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A. prior to the local elections
on January 18, 1988.

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his
tenure shall be dealt with by law.

In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
 SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25,
1971, EC).

In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials in the present administration of President Corazon C.
Aquino are holders of green cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office in the Philippines is a
question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.

In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional
Form No. 230, Department of State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy in Manila before his
departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently,
so state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."

On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration
Service to the respondent Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the back of the card, the upper
portion, the following information is printed:

Alien Registration Receipt Card.

Person identified by this card is entitled to reside permanently and work in the United States." (Annex A
pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)

Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the limited
States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa.
Based on that application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there permanently.

Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of immigrating the entering into a country with the
intention of residing in it.

An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the purpose of permanent residence. As shown infra 84,
however, statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term "immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)

As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in
return for the protection given to him during the period of his residence therein.

Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to remain, are in general entitled to the protection of the
laws with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility.

In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are permitted to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the
constitution with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and criminal responsibility. Thus resident
alien friends are entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution that no
state shall deprive "any person" of life liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person the equal
protection of the law, and the protection of this amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the
ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal
constitution that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)

Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or
acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he
acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of Bolinao,
Pangasinan.

The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any
elective office under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'

Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January
18,1988 local elections, waive his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?

To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have
"waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States.
The waiver of his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his candidacy for elective
office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election Code).

Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United
States, but the records of this case are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as municipal
mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.

The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find. Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective
office for at least one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications that a candidate for elective public
office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2, Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a permanent
resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines
in November 1987 and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.

In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus
Election Code has laid down a clear policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens who possess dual
loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental
reservations or purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign country are incapable of such entire
devotion to the interest and welfare of their homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on their
duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve their status as permanent residents thereof.

Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence in the United States, he never really intended to live
there permanently, for all that he wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In other words, he would have
this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States
but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him
to benefit from it, and giving him the best of both worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his possession of a green card attesting to such status are
conclusive proof that he is a permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver of such immigrant
status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988,
our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No.
14531 respectively, are hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby
annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
— reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community." 3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with
the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for
the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner)
disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood"
in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time,
the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of
Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In
said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating
that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to
transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme
Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District.
He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on
such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit
along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1)
finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and
petitioner's compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an
"honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed.
She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of
origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she
always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative
District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She
asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not
Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which
she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy. Her
explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks
clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Thus, the
explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2
SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential
deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily to secure timely
and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a matter of form.
But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation. The
change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a substantial matter
which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation
in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it
was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of
the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her
Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter
to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her registration
in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The
dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her
residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August
1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe
in the respondent's contention that it was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one
year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA
408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but
San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more than
to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of
the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some years after
graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived
and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where
she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the
City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had
not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the
President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her
certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim
that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in
different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days
in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different places.
In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There
must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3) intention to
abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter
there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where
she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence
to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident
was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one
year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa
for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence
in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her residence in
Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the
highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the
time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated
by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.

I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes
of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile
for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of
Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective
position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the
sense that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in
a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is
residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu
vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of
returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile is
residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have
evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the
same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other
than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that
in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence without the
intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the
principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is:
What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of
domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed
section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it
was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by
Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her
residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and
individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or
appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the
First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's
Second Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she
would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same,
claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First
District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate
would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in
the constituency where a candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item
8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the
fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election
of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident
of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute
loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the
time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an
elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions,
stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the
citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose
the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be
the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of every person
to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive
proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the
COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban
City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She
pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she earned her degree in
Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work
with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married
ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When
her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with
him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed
her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up
in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting
well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-
publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they
were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always
knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she
was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could
not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.

First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the
fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established
only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to
the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile"
and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be
inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a
person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.

Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con
justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to
establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family
home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the
same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to
another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the
husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family,
recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake
of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual
help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where
the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile"
and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional
or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous
with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.

xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have
two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the
other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once residence
has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in
some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases
applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of
her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately
from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable
by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal
rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon
v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be
 obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a
decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate
cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to
make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was
ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of
the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21
Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so,
to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property
which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the
wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the
Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix
as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of
the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art.
69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept
of women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing
in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife —
the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil
law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a
new home, not a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new
one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair,
having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely
qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations
where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be
highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting
a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts
established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First
District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April
24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends
that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the
House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely
directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it
would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason
being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within
which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be
thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate
to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of
the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the
Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions
in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an
individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995

AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect
of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give
effect to the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility
ought to be so noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic
institutions.

On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.

(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM VILLAGE, MAKATI.

xxx xxx xxx

(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
______ Years and 10 Months.

xxx xxx xxx

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge. 1

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay
Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino2 on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a
candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year
immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy amending the
certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he
sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days.3

On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the disqualification case.4

On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner testified and presented in evidence, among
others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995,5 lease contract between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994, 6 Affidavit of Leonor
Feliciano dated April 28,19957 and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.8

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution dated May 6, 1995,
the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for
Disqualification against respondent AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative
in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.

SO ORDERED.9

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6, 1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for the congressional seat in the Second
District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who
obtained thirty five thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.10

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.

On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The dispositive portion of the order reads:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the Board of Canvassers of the City of
Makati is hereby directed to complete the canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend
the proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of
Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on
May 7, 1995, shall have been resolved by the Commission.

The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate implementation of this Order. The Clerk of
Court of the Commission is likewise directed to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to
calendar the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning, PICC Press Center,
Pasay City.
 SO ORDERED.11

On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of suspension of proclamation.

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to
Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination
of the qualifications of petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal pursuant to
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal
portion thereof residing:

Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Commission RESOLVED to
proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the
parties to be heard thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied with more
reflection and judiciousness. 12

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995.
The fallo reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the Second Division,
promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED. Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for
lack of the constitutional qualification of residence. Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the
respondent should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now made
permanent.

Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass of election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who
shall be immediately be proclaimed.

SO ORDERED. 13

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari 14 assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995, as well as the resolution dated June 2,
1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the following errors for consideration, to wit:

THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO
AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE
AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER FORUM
WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17, ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED
DECISION (ANNEX "C", PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF JURISDICTION HAS
TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE COMELEC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION
OF THE PROCLAMATION OF THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE THE
MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE
AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.

THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE
PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.

IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF
ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED
POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND
BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.

THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD
OF CANVASSERS TO "DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED CANDIDATES"
AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD
OF THE WELL SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO WAS REPUDIATED BY THE
ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.15

I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction
over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for member of the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the
petition for disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET). Given the yet unresolved
question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the
suspension of his proclamation as the winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.

Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of Representatives and a member of the
same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of their respective Members.

Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and
qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either the Senate or the House of
Representatives. A candidate who has not been proclaimed 16 and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a member of the
House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is
ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus,
petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the winner of the electoral exercise from
the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis,
because even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue to hear and
decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate, who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to continue after the election (and does not
oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the
proceedings against him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong" seems to suggest that
the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of
R.A. 6646 allows the application of the provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of
B.P. 881. Section 7 states:

Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.

II

We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. 17

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident of the district in which he seeks
election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to the elections. 18 Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.

In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives 19 this Court held that the term "residence" has always been understood as
synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held: 20

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a
candidate for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there
was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day
of elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are
concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in the
district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted
from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised
the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual
residence.

Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual
residence rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially considering that the provision in
the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law.
So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical and actual
residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
 The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as
having the same meaning as domicile.

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home," 21 where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for
the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego
vs. Vera at 22 is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of
favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of
residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence
in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative
for this Court to inquire into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year in the
area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he was domiciled in the
same.

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was
a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that
election. 23 At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. 24 His birth certificate places
Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. 25 Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the
COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record
up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of condominium unit in the area. As the
COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:

The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of
buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not
engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms,
it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one
(l) year because he has other "residences" in Manila or Quezon City. 26

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit
in Makati (and the fact, of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence" 27 is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City." 28 The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the
lack of identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease
agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
As the COMELEC en banc emphatically pointed out:

[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence requirement as a qualification for a
candidate of Representative, by establishing a commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement
cannot, by itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better. 29

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts
in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal
or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose.30 These requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed
to continue requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change of domicile from Tarlac to the
Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.

Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency requirement in a newly created political
district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and
existing geographic area, in this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area encompassed by
the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed take advantage of the creation of new political
districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage
of existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running
in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing
wrong with that, but he must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for
the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.

III

The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim
as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of votes. The answer must be in the negative.

To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences.
The result suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases
of Labo vs. Comelec 31 but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they
believed could be validly voted for during the elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would
have been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to second
placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have
received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost
the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates
because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.

In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the other. In the early case of Topacio
v. Paredes. 32 we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified, ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such
candidate believed in good faith that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in favor
of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the next higher number of votes cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to
this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate
to any other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally cast ballots."

Then in Ticson v. Comelec, 33 this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view of his unlawful change of party affiliation
(which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be considered in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category
of invalid and nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the eyes of the law. As a
result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in the disputed position.

In Geronimo v. Ramos 34 we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in an election cannot be proclaimed the
winner in the event the candidate who ran for the portion is ineligible. We held in Geronimo:

[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

However, in Santos v. Comelec 35 we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a
disqualified candidate fall within the category of invalid or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the
eyes of the law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.

In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec 36 Abella v. Comelec; 37 and Benito v. Comelec, 38 this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling
in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to be
declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our
pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:

The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for
the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may be
valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that: 39

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of city mayor, the fact remains that he
was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of
mayor in the belief that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent disqualification does
not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253
[1991]), wherein we held that:

While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the certificate of
candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the
local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona
fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified
candidate for the position of governor.Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. . . What
matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the
highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility, requirements at the time of the
election as provided by law, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same
position cannot assume the vacated position. (Emphasis supplied).

Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella,
petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people
of Baguio City.

Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case with the Comelec (docketed as
SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's (Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio
City from voting for petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted upon, the
resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality (Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).

And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he
obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided
in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his
winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded
as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of
the Court then (Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente,
Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting C.J., Abad Santos and
Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official
leave (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case
of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated
the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court. . . .
 The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed
elected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).

It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes intended for the disqualified
candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void. This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom,
sovereignty resides. At the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo bona
fide without any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that Labo was then qualified to be the
person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned
out to be disqualified and cannot assume the office.

Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed, under no circumstances can a
minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a
larger number than the 27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio City; rollo, p.
109; G.R. No. 105111).

This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the
contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified
candidates because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and English
court decisions. 40 These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and
insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just
one vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice." Moreover, even in instances where
the votes received by the second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and
unpredictable that the result among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an ineligible
candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to
candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have
obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.

In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner ineligible for the elective position of
Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence
in the district mandated by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a republican
government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House
of Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of Makati City would substitute for a
requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming
the candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made
PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.
NORLAINIE MITMUG LIMBONA, G.R. No. 186006

Petitioner,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,*
QUISUMBING, Acting C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,*
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,** and
ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 16, 2009

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MALIK BOBBY T.

ALINGAN,

Respondents.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, in relation to Rule 64, assailing the Resolution [1] dated November 23,
2007 of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) and the Resolution [2] of the Comelec En Banc dated January 14, 2009
in SPA No. 07-621.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

Prior to the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona and her husband, Mohammad Exchan Limbona, each
filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. On April 2, 2007, private respondent Malik Bobby Alingan filed a
disqualification case against Mohammad before the Provincial Election Supervisor of Lanao del Norte. On April 12, 2007, Alingan also filed a
petition for disqualification against petitioner.[3] Both disqualification cases were premised on the ground that petitioner and her husband
lacked the one-year residency requirement and both were not registered voters of Pantar.[4]

On April 17, 2007, petitioner executed an Affidavit of Withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy, [5] which was subsequently
approved by the Comelec.[6] Petitioner also filed a Motion to Dismiss the disqualification case against her for being moot and academic. [7]

On election day, May 14, 2007, the Comelec resolved to postpone the elections in Pantar because there was no final list of voters
yet. A special election was scheduled for July 23, 2007.[8]

On May 24, 2007, the Comelec First Division promulgated a Resolution disqualifying Mohammad as candidate for mayor for failure
to comply with the one-year residency requirement.[9] Petitioner then filed her Certificate of Candidacy as substitute candidate on July 21,
2007. On July 23, 2007, Alingan filed a petition for disqualification against petitioner for, among others, lacking the one-year residency
requirement (SPA No. 07-621).[10]
 In a Resolution in SPA No. 07-621[11] dated November 23, 2007, the Comelec Second Division ruled that petitioner was disqualified
from running for Mayor of Pantar. The Comelec held that petitioner only became a resident of Pantar in November 2006. It explained that
petitioners domicile of origin was Maguing, Lanao del Norte, her birthplace. When she got married, she became a resident
of Barangay Rapasun, Marawi City, where her husband was Barangay Chairman until November 2006. BarangayRapasun, the Comelec said,
was petitioners domicile by operation of law under the Family Code. The Comelec found that the evidence petitioner adduced to prove that
she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City two years prior to the elections consisted mainly of self-serving
affidavits and were not corroborated by independent and competent evidence. The Comelec also took note of its resolution in another case
where it was found that petitioner was not even a registered voter in Pantar. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[12]

The Comelec resolved the motion in an En Banc Resolution dated January 14, 2009,[13] affirming the Second Divisions Resolution
disqualifying petitioner. The Comelec said that the issue of whether petitioner has complied with the one-year residency rule has been
decided by the Supreme Court in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan promulgated on June 25,
2008. The Comelec noted that, in said case, the Supreme Court upheld the Comelec First Divisions Decision in SPA No. 07-611 disqualifying
petitioner from running for mayor of Pantar for failure to comply with the residency requirement.

Petitioner is now before this Court assailing the Comelecs November 23, 2007 and January 14, 2009 Resolutions. She posits that
the Comelec erred in disqualifying her for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement. She alleges that in a disqualification
case against her husband filed by Nasser Macauyag, another mayoralty candidate, the Comelec considered her husband as a resident of
Pantar and qualified to run for any elective office there. Petitioner avers that since her husband was qualified to run in Pantar, she is likewise
qualified to run.[14]

Petitioner also stresses that she was actually residing and was physically present in that municipality for almost two years prior to
the May 2007 elections. During the time she had been residing in Pantar, she associated and mingled with residents there, giving her ample
time to know the needs, difficulties, aspirations, and economic potential of the municipality. This, she said, is proof of her intention to
establish permanent residency there and her intent to abandon her domicile in Marawi City.

She next argues that, even as her husband was Punong Barangay of Rapasun, Marawi City, he never abandoned Pantar as his
hometown and domicile of origin. She avers that the performance of her husbands duty in Rapasun did not prevent the latter from having his
domicile elsewhere. Hence, it was incorrect for the Comelec to have concluded that her husband changed his domicile only on November 11,
2006.[15] At the very least, petitioner says, the Comelecs conflicting resolutions on the issue of her husbands residence should create a doubt
that should be resolved in her and her husbands favor.[16]

She further contends that to disqualify her would disenfranchise the voters of Pantar, the overwhelming majority of whom elected
her as mayor during the July 23, 2007 special elections.[17]

The Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Comment, insisting that the Comelec correctly disqualified petitioner
from running as mayor for lack of the one-year residency requirement.[18] The OSG argues that there is no evidence that petitioner has
abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile in Marawi City.[19]Moreover, the OSG said that this Court has ruled on the issue of
petitioners residency in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan.[20]Lastly, the OSG contends that
the Comelecs ruling in Nasser A. Macauyag v. Mohammad Limbona is not binding on petitioner because she was not a party to the case.[21]

We dismiss the Petition.

The issue of petitioners disqualification for failure to comply with the one-year residency requirement has been resolved by this Court
in Norlainie Mitmug Limbona v. Commission on Elections and Malik Bobby T. Alingan.[22] This case stemmed from the first disqualification case
filed by herein respondent against petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 07-611. Although the petitioner had withdrawn the Certificate of
Candidacy subject of the disqualification case, the Comelec resolved the petition and found that petitioner failed to comply with the one-year
residency requirement, and was, therefore, disqualified from running as mayor of Pantar.

A unanimous Court upheld the findings of the Comelec, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The September 4, 2007 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections in SPA Case No. 07-611 disqualifying petitioner Norlainie Mitmug Limbona from running for office of the Mayor
of Pantar, Lanao del Norte, and the January 9, 2008 Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. In
view of the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor, the proclaimed Vice-Mayor shall SUCCEED as Mayor. The
temporary restraining order issued on January 29, 2008 is ordered LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.[23]

The Court found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. It held:
 The Comelec correctly found that petitioner failed to satisfy the one-year residency requirement. The term
residence as used in the election law is synonymous with domicile, which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. The manifest intent of
the law in fixing a residence qualification is to exclude a stranger or newcomer, unacquainted with the conditions and
needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community.

For purposes of election law, the question of residence is mainly one of intention. There is no hard and fast rule by which
to determine where a person actually resides. Three rules are, however, well established: first, that a man must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is acquired; and third, a
man can have but one domicile at a time.

In order to acquire a domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. A persons domicile once established is
considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established.

To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Petitioners claim that she has been physically present and actually residing in Pantar for almost 20 months prior to the
elections, is self-serving and unsubstantiated. As correctly observed by the Comelec:

In the present case, the evidence adduced by respondent, which consists merely of self-
serving affidavits cannot persuade Us that she has abandoned her domicile of origin or her domicile
in Marawi City. It is alleged that respondent has been staying, sleeping and doing business in her house
for more than 20 months in Lower Kalanganan and yet, there is no independent and competent
evidence that would corroborate such statement.

Further, We find no other act that would indicate respondents intention to stay in Pantar for
an indefinite period of time. The filing of her Certificate of Candidacy in Pantar, standing alone, is not
sufficient to hold that she has chosen Pantar as her new residence. We also take notice of the fact that
in SPA No. 07-611, this Commission has even found that she is not a registered voter in the said
municipality warranting her disqualification as a candidate.

We note the findings of the Comelec that petitioners domicile of origin is Maguing, Lanao del Norte, which is also
her place of birth; and that her domicile by operation of law (by virtue of marriage) is Rapasun, Marawi City. The Comelec
found that Mohammad, petitioners husband, effected the change of his domicile in favor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte only
on November 11, 2006. Since it is presumed that the husband and wife live together in one legal residence, then it follows
that petitioner effected the change of her domicile also on November 11, 2006. Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code
provide:

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the
court shall decide. The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
(Emphasis ours)

Considering that petitioner failed to show that she maintained a separate residence from her husband, and as
there is no evidence to prove otherwise, reliance on these provisions of the Family Code is proper and is in consonance
with human experience.

Thus, for failure to comply with the residency requirement, petitioner is disqualified to run for the office of
mayor of Pantar, Lanao del Norte. x x x.[24]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision was denied with finality on March 3, 2009.[25] Petitioner filed another
Motion for Reconsideration,[26]which the Court treated as a Second Motion for Reconsideration and, consequently, denied in a Resolution
dated June 2, 2009.[27] Of late, petitioner has filed a Manifestation that raises yet again the issues already resolved in the petition and which
the Court has, accordingly, merely noted without action.[28] Thus, our ruling therein has now attained finality.

Consequently, the issue of petitioners compliance with the one-year residency requirement is now settled. We are bound by this
Courts ruling in the earlier Limbona case where the issue was squarely raised and categorically resolved. We cannot now rule anew on the
merits of this case, especially since the present Petition merely restates issues already passed upon by the Comelec and affirmed by this
Court.
 WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is DISMISSED and the Resolution dated November 23, 2007 of the
Second Division of the Commission on Elections and the Resolution of the Commission on Elections En Banc dated January 14, 2009 in SPA
No. 07-621 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 86564 August 1, 1989

RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZABAL, respondents

Estelito P. Mendoza for petitioner.

Rillera and Quintana for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner asks this Court to restrain the Commission on Elections from looking into the question of his citizenship as a qualification for
his office as Mayor of Baguio City. The allegation that he is a foreigner, he says, is not the issue. The issue is whether or not the public
respondent has jurisdiction to conduct any inquiry into this matter, considering that the petition for quo warranto against him was not filed
on time.

It is noteworthy that this argument is based on the alleged tardiness not of the petition itself but of the payment of the filing fee, which the
petitioner contends was an indispensable requirement. The fee is, curiously enough, all of P300.00 only. This brings to mind the popular
verse that for want of a horse the kingdom was lost. Still, if it is shown that the petition was indeed filed beyond the reglementary period,
there is no question that this petition must be granted and the challenge abated.

The petitioner's position is simple. He was proclaimed mayor-elect of Baguio City, on January 20, 1988. The petition for quo warranto was
filed by the private respondent on January 26, 1988, but no filing fee was paid on that date. This fee was finally paid on February 10, 1988, or
twenty-one days after his proclamation. As the petition by itself alone was ineffectual without the filing fee, it should be deemed filed only
when the fee was paid. This was done beyond the reglementary period provided for under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code reading
as follows:

SEC. 253. Petition for quo warranto. — Any voter contesting the election of a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn
petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the result of the election.

The petitioner adds that the payment of the filing fee is required under Rule 36, Section 5, of the Procedural Rules of the COMELEC providing
that —

Sec. 5. No petition for quo warranto shall be given due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of Three
Hundred Pesos (P300.00) and the legal research fee as required by law.

and stresses that there is abundant jurisprudence holding that the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of the filling of the
petition itself. He cites many rulings of the Court to this effect, specifically Manchester v. Court of Appeals. 1

For his part, the private respondent denies that the filing fee was paid out of time. In fact he says, it was flied ahead of time. His point is that
when he filed his "Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Immediate Annulment of Proclamation and Restraining Order or Injunction" on
January 26, 1988, the COMELEC treated it as a pre-proclamation controversy and docketed it as SPC Case No. 88-288. No docket fee was
collected although it was offered. It was only on February 8, 1988, that the COMELEC decided to treat his petition as solely for quo
warranto and re-docketed it as EPC Case No. 88-19, serving him notice on February 10, 1988. He immediately paid the filing fee on that date.

The private respondent argues further that during the period when the COMELEC regarded his petition as a pre-proclamation controversy,
the time for filing an election protest or quo warranto proceeding was deemed suspended under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 2 At any rate, he says, Rule 36, Section 5, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure cited by the petitioner, became effective only on
November 15, 1988, seven days after publication of the said Rules in the Official Gazette pursuant to Section 4, Rule 44 thereof. 3 These rules
could not retroact to January 26,1988, when he filed his petition with the COMELEC.

In his Reply, the petitioner argues that even if the Omnibus Election Code did not require it, the payment of filing fees was still necessary
under Res. No. 1996 and, before that, Res. No. 1450 of the respondent COMELEC, promulgated on January 12, 1988, and February 26, 1980,
respectively. To this, the private respondent counters that the latter resolution was intended for the local elections held on January 30, 1980,
and did not apply to the 1988 local elections, which were supposed to be governed by the first-mentioned resolution. However, Res. No.
1996 took effect only on March 3, 1988, following the lapse of seven days after its publication as required by RA No. 6646, otherwise known
as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which became effective on January 5, 1988. Its Section 30 provides in part:

Sec. 30. Effectivity of Regulations and Orders of the Commission. — The rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission shall take effect on the seventh day after their publication in the Official Gazette or in at least (2) daily
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. We agree with the
respondents that the fee was paid during the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the
assumption that the requirement for the payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. There is no record that Res.
No. 1450 was even published; and as for Res. No. 1996, this took effect only on March 3, 1988, seven days after its publication in the
February 25, 1988 issues of the Manila Chronicle and the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or after the petition was filed.

The petitioner forgets Tañ;ada v. Tuvera 4 when he argues that the resolutions became effective "immediately upon approval" simply
because it was so provided therein. We held in that case that publication was still necessary under the due process clause despite such
effectivity clause.

In any event, what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been is not imputable to the private
respondent's fault or neglect. It is true that in the Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for the
timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion, 5 however this Court, taking into account the special
circumstances of that case, declared:
 This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed
filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of non-
compliance therewith, the case shall be dismissed.

The same idea is expressed in Rule 42, Section 18, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure adopted on June 20, 1988, thus:

Sec. 18. Non-payment of prescribed fees. — If the fees above prescribed are not paid, the Commission may refuse to take
action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court notes that while arguing the technical point that the petition for quo warranto should be dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee
on time, the petitioner would at the same time minimize his alleged lack of citizenship as "a futile technicality," It is regrettable, to say the
least, that the requirement of citizenship as a qualification for public office can be so demeaned. What is worse is that it is regarded as an
even less important consideration than the reglementary period the petitioner insists upon.

This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings
against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more
important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same action.

The Court has similarly acted in a notable number of cases, thus:

From the foregoing brief statement of the nature of the instant case, it would appear that our sole function in this
proceeding should be to resolve the single issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the motion for
new trial of the GSIS in question should indeed be deemed pro forma.But going over the extended pleadings of both
parties, the Court is immediately impressed that substantial justice may not be timely achieved, if we should decide this
case upon such a technical ground alone. We have carefully read all the allegations and arguments of the parties, very ably
and comprehensively expounded by evidently knowledgeable and unusually competent counsel, and we feel we can
better serve the interests of justice by broadening the scope of our inquiry, for as the record before us stands, we see that
there is enough basis for us to end the basic controversy between the parties here and now, dispensing, however, with
procedural steps which would not anyway affect substantially the merits of their respective claims. 6

xxx

While it is the fault of the petitioner for appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse,
the more correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper court which was the Court of
Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length of time that this case has been pending, we apply the
rule in the case of Del Castillo v. Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states:

... it is a cherished rule of procedure for this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a
single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose
will be served if this case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court. (p. 43)

Only recently in the case of Beautifont, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. (G.R. No. 50141, January 29, 1988), we stated
that:

... But all those relevant facts are now before this Court. And those facts dictate the rendition of a verdict in the petitioner's
favor. There is therefore no point in referring the case back to the Court of Appeals. The facts and the legal propositions
involved will not change, nor should the ultimate judgment. Considerable time has already elapsed and, to serve the ends
of justice, it is time that the controversy is finally laid to rest. (See Sotto v. Samson, 5 SCRA 733; Republic v. Paredes, 108
Phil. 57; Lianga Lumber Co. v. Lianga Timber Co., Inc., 76 SCRA 197; Erico v. Heirs of Chigas, 98 SCRA 575; Francisco v.
City of Davao, 12 SCRA 628; Valencia v. Mabilangan, 105 Phil. 162).lâwphî1.ñèt Sound practice seeks to accommodate the
theory which avoids waste of time, effort and expense, both to the parties and the government, not to speak of delay in the
disposal of the case (cf. Fernandez v. Garcia, 92 Phil. 592, 597). A marked characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where
the dictates of justice so demand ... the Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.' (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA
1039, 1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the dictates of justice do demand
that this Court act, and act with finality. 7

xxx

Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to
resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further
proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or when public interest
demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties. 8

This course of action becomes all the more justified in the present case where, to repeat for stress, it is claimed that a foreigner is holding a
public office.

We also note in his Reply, the petitioner says:

In adopting private respondent's comment, respondent COMELEC implicitly adopted as "its own" private respondent's
repeated assertion that petitioner is no longer a Filipino citizen. In so doing, has not respondent COMELEC effectively
disqualified itself, by reason of prejudgment, from resolving the petition for quo warranto filed by private respondent still
pending before it? 9

This is still another reason why the Court has seen fit to rule directly on the merits of this case.

Going over the record, we find that there are two administrative decisions on the question of the petitioner's citizenship. The first was
rendered by the Commission on Elections on May 12, 1982, and found the petitioner to be a citizen of the Philippines. 10 The second was
rendered by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation on September 13, 1988, and held that the petitioner was not a citizen of the
Philippines. 11
The first decision was penned by then COMELEC Chigas, Vicente Santiago, Jr., with Commissioners Pabalate Savellano and Opinion
concurring in full and Commissioner Bacungan concurring in the dismissal of the petition "without prejudice to the issue of the respondent's
citizenship being raised anew in a proper case." Commissioner Sagadraca reserved his vote, while Commissioner Felipe was for deferring
decision until representations shall have been made with the Australian Embassy for official verification of the petitioner's alleged
naturalization as an Australian.

The second decision was unanimously rendered by Chairman Miriam Defensor-Santiago and Commissioners Alano and Geraldez of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation. It is important to observe that in the proceeding before the COMELEC, there was no direct
proof that the herein petitioner had been formally naturalized as a citizen of Australia. This conjecture, which was eventually rejected, was
merely inferred from the fact that he had married an Australian citizen, obtained an Australian passport, and registered as an alien with the
CID upon his return to this country in 1980.

On the other hand, the decision of the CID took into account the official statement of the Australian Government dated August 12, 1984,
through its Consul in the Philippines, that the petitioner was still an Australian citizen as of that date by reason of his naturalization in 1976.
That statement 12 is reproduced in full as follows:

I, GRAHAM COLIN WEST, Consul of Australia in the Philippines, by virtue of a certificate of appointment signed and sealed by the Australian
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs on 19 October 1983, and recognized as such by Letter of Patent signed and sealed by the Philippines
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs on 23 November 1983, do hereby provide the following statement in response to the subpoena
Testificandum dated 9 April 1984 in regard to the Petition for disqualification against RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO (SPC No. 84-73), and do
hereby certify that the statement is true and correct.

STATEMENT

A) RAMON LABO, JR. Y LOZANO, date of birth 23 December 1934, was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen.
As the spouse of an Australian citizen, he was not required to meet normal requirements for the grant of citizenship and
was granted Australian citizenship by Sydney on 28 July 1976.

B) Any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship must take an oath of allegiance or make an
affirmation of allegiance. The wording of the oath of affirmation is: "I ..., renouncing all other allegiance ..." etc. This need
not necessarily have any effect on his former nationality as this would depend on the citizenship laws of his former
country.

C) The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on 27 June 1980 on the ground that the
marriage had been bigamous.

D) According to our records LABO is still an Australian citizen.

E) Should he return to Australia, LABO may face court action in respect of Section 50 of Australian Citizenship Act 1948
which relates to the giving of false or misleading information of a material nature in respect of an application for
Australian citizenship. If such a prosecution was successful, he could be deprived of Australian citizenship under Section
21 of the Act.

F) There are two further ways in which LABO could divest himself of Australian citizenship:

(i) He could make a declaration of Renunciation of Australian citizenship under Section 18 of the Australian Citizenship
Act, or

(ii) If he acquired another nationality, (for example, Filipino) by a formal and voluntary act other than marriage, then he
would automatically lose as Australian citizenship under Section 17 of the Act.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I HAVE HEREUNTO SET MAY HAND AND SEAL OF THE AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY, MANILA, THIS
12th DAY OF APRIL 1984. DONE AT MANILA IN THE PHILIPPINES.

(Signed) GRAHAM C. WEST Consul

This was affirmed later by the letter of February 1, 1988, addressed to the private respondent by the Department of
Foreign Affairs reading as follows: 13

Sir:

With reference to your letter dated 1 February 1988, I wish to inform you that inquiry made with the Australian
Government through the Embassy of the Philippines in Canberra has elicited the following information:

1) That Mr. Ramon L. Labo, Jr. acquired Australian citizenship on 28 July 1976.

2) That prior to 17 July 1986, a candidate for Australian citizenship had to either swear an oath of allegiance or make an
affirmation of allegiance which carries a renunciation of "all other allegiance.

Very truly yours, For the Secretary of Foreign Affairs: (SGD) RODOLFO SEVERINO, JR. Assistant Secretary

The decision also noted the oath of allegiance taken by every naturalized Australian reading as follows:

OATH OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty
Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I will faithfully observe the
laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 14

and the Affirmation of Allegiance, which declares:

 AFFIRMATION OF ALLEGIANCE

I, A.B., renouncing all other allegiance, solemnly and sincerely promise and declare that I will be faithful and bear true
allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second, Queen of Australia, Her heirs and successors according to law, and that I
will faithfully observe the Laws of Australia and fulfill my duties as an Australian citizen. 15

The petitioner does not question the authenticity of the above evidence. Neither does he deny that he obtained Australian Passport No.
754705, which he used in coming back to the Philippines in 1980, when he declared before the immigration authorities that he was an alien
and registered as such under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-323985. 16 He later asked for the change of his status from immigrant to
a returning former Philippine citizen and was granted Immigrant Certificate of Residence No. 223809. 17 He also categorically declared that
he was a citizen of Australia in a number of sworn statements voluntarily made by him and. even sought to avoid the jurisdiction of the
barangay court on the ground that he was a foreigner. 18

The decision of the COMELEC in 1982 quaintly dismisses all these acts as "mistakes" that did not divest the petitioner of his citizenship,
although, as earlier noted, not all the members joined in this finding. We reject this ruling as totally baseless. The petitioner is not an
unlettered person who was not aware of the consequences of his acts, let alone the fact that he was assisted by counsel when he performed
these acts.

The private respondent questions the motives of the COMELEC at that time and stresses Labo's political affiliation with the party in power
then, but we need not go into that now.

There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed.
This doctrine does not apply to questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. 19 Moreover, it does not appear that it was
properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply 20 to
the private respondent's comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of parties, is not present in this case.

The petitioner's contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is
irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of
Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an
Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance,
both quoted above. Renouncing all other allegiance, he swore "to be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Elizabeth the Second,
Queen of Australia ..." and to fulfill his duties "as an Australian citizen."

The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual national and did not divest him of his Philippine
citizenship. Such a specious argument cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3)
subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are applicable to the petitioner. It is
also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."

Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was annulled after it was found that his marriage to the
Australian citizen was bigamous, that circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture of
Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his adopted country. What we must consider is the fact
that he voluntarily and freely rejected Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign country. The
possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated
as a citizen of the Philippines.

Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by
repatriation. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him.
Neither has he shown that he has complied with PD No. 725, providing that:

... (2) natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through
repatriation by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if
their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, after which they
shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. (Emphasis supplied.)

That is why the Commission on Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.

The petitioner is not now, nor was he on the day of the local elections on January 18, 1988, a citizen of the Philippines. In fact, he was not
even a qualified voter under the Constitution itself because of his alienage. 21 He was therefore ineligible as a candidate for mayor of Baguio
City, under Section 42 of the Local Government Code providing in material part as follows:

Sec. 42. Qualifications. — An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-three years of age on
election day, a qualified voter registered as such in the barangay, municipality, city or province where he proposes to be
elected, a resident therein for at least one year at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy, and able to read and
write English, Filipino, or any other local language or dialect.

The petitioner argues that his alleged lack of citizenship is a "futile technicality" that should not frustrate the will of the electorate of Baguio
City, who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority." To be accurate, it was not as loud as all that, for his lead over the second-
placer was only about 2,100 votes. In any event, the people of that locality could not have, even unanimously, changed the requirements of
the Local Government Code and the Constitution. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the Queen
of Australia, or at least a stateless individual owing no allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, to preside over them as mayor of their
city. Only citizens of the Philippines have that privilege over their countrymen.

The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the
conclusion that the results of the election cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are continuing
requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and
voting requirements were not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the election. The petitioner was
disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as
mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio city.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections 22 decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed
second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court
then 23 with three dissenting 24 and another two reserving their vote. 25 One was on official leave. 26

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v.
Ramos, 27 Which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912
in Topacio vs. Paredes 28 was supported by ten members of the Court 29 without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, 30 another took
no part 31 and two others were on leave. 32 There the Court held:

... it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate
who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in
the election for that office, and it is a fundamental Idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared
elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for
the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of
votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which clearly
asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

It remains to stress that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more
than a hundred other nationalities, God has seen fit to grant him. Having been so endowed, he must not lightly yield this precious advantage,
rejecting it for another land that may offer him material and other attractions that he may not find in his own country. To be sure, he has the
right to renounce the Philippines if he sees fit and transfer his allegiance to a state with more allurements for him. 33 But having done so, he
cannot expect to be welcomed back with open arms once his taste for his adopted country turns sour or he is himself disowned by it as an
undesirable alien.

Philippine citizenship is not a cheap commodity that can be easily recovered after its renunciation. It may be restored only after the
returning renegade makes a formal act of re-dedication to the country he has abjured and he solemnly affirms once again his total and
exclusive loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. This may not be accomplished by election to public office.

WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing
to serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
G.R. No. 150605 December 10, 2002

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. JOSE DE VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities as Speaker
and Secretary-General of the House of Representatives, respectively,
and MA. VICTORIA L. LOCSIN, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by the people cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin lost to petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people
of Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not subject to the discretion of any official of the land.

This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P.
Nazareno of the House of Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on Elections en banc by (a)
administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the
name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping,
intruding into, and unlawfully holding and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.

The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for the position of Representative of the 4th legislative
district of Leyte during the May 14, 2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent Locsin was the
sitting Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8, 2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte,
filed directly with the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification 1 against the petitioner for indirectly soliciting votes from the
registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the
petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the
residents of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him. Attached to the
petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates,2 Danilo D. Maglasang,3 Cesar A. Laurente;4 (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio
T. Salvera;5 (c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police Superintendent Elson G. Pecho;6 and (d) Photographs showing
government dump trucks, haulers and surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the intercession of the
respondent.7 The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and assigned to the COMELEC's Second Division.

On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification
case to the Office of the Regional Director of Region VIII.8 On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division sent a telegram informing the
petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for
investigation.9

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director had yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently,
petitioner was included in the list of candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results showed that petitioner was
the winning candidate.

On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined as intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a "Most Urgent
Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner]" with the COMELEC Second Division.10 Respondent Locsin alleged
that "the evidence on record against respondent is very strong and unless rebutted remains." She urged the Commission to set the hearing of
the disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the respondent "so as not to render the present
disqualification case moot and academic." A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by registered mail but no registry
receipt was attached thereto.11

On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a "Second Most Urgent Motion to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent" stating "there is clear
and convincing evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him and this remains unrebutted by the
respondent." A copy of the Motion was sent to the petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading. 12 The
records, however, do not show the date the petitioner received the motion.

On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Ex-Parte Order13 directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Leyte to suspend the proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of "the seriousness of the
allegations in the petition for disqualification."14 It also directed the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to
forward immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the Clerk of the Commission. 15 As a result,
petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent
Locsin's 53,447 votes.16

At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to
answer the petition for disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24, 2001 that petitioner was able
to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the
summons together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue of the telegram sent by the COMELEC
Second Division informing him that a petition was filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed to investigate and
receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own
instance.17 Petitioner further alleged that the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of Matag-ob and
Kananga were undertaken without his authority, participation or directive as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following:
(a) Affidavit of Alex B. Borinaga;18 (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of Barangay Monterico;19 (c) Affidavit of
Wilfredo A. Fiel;20 (d) Supplemental Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel;21 and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.22

On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension,23 alleging that (a) he did not receive a copy of the Motion to
Suspend his Proclamation and hence, was denied the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not receive a copy
of the summons on the petition for disqualification and after personally obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on
May 24, 2001; and (c) that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his proclamation only on May 22,
2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested the setting of a
hearing on his Motion.24

On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioner's Motion and the parties were ordered to submit their respective
memoranda.25 On June 4, 2001, petitioner submitted his Memorandum26 in support of his Motion assailing the suspension of his
proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his
guilt is patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his proclamation as winning congressional
candidate be expediently made, even while the disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the
following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by PNP Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre; 27 (b)
Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles, City Budget Officer;28 (c) Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer of Ormoc;29 (d)
Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito Restituto; 30and (e) Affidavits of Demetrio Brion,31 Igmedio Rita32 and Gerardo
Monteza.33 Respondent Locsin's memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.34

Petitioner's Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second
Division promulgated its Resolution35 in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect solicitation of votes and ordered
his disqualification. It directed the "immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx." A copy
of said Resolution was sent by fax to the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the afternoon of the following day.36

By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350, were declared stray even before said Resolution could
gain finality. On June 15, 2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for
Member of the House of Representatives stating that "MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the legislative district for said
office."37 Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.

On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a Motion for Reconsideration 38from the June 14, 2001
Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the Motion for
Reconsideration.39 Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying
petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the
witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein
the immediate proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.' Respondent Locsin and her co-petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint
Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration.40

On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation,41 docketed as SPC No.
01-324, assailing the validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second highest number of votes.
Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the
proclamation of Locsin and that any question on the "election, returns, and qualification" of Locsin can only be taken cognizance of by the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the
Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of Locsin was valid because she received the highest
number of valid votes cast, the votes of Codilla being stray.

On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation42 stating that he was deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case
because while the documentary evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting of the suspension
of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that
a full-dress hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of additional witnesses 43 which he claims would refute
and substantially belie the allegations of petitioner's/intervenor's witnesses. A Reply,44 Rejoinder45 and Sur-Rejoinder46were respectively
filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No. 01-
324 were submitted for resolution.

From the records, it appears that initially, a "Resolution" penned by Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to
the Office of the Chairman, dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla.47 Commissioners Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective
dissenting opinions48 to the Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr. was the ponente of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division which ordered the disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional evidence presented by the
latter, he concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioner's favor. Equally worth mentioning is the fact that Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, who was the Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented and voted to grant Codilla's motion for
reconsideration on the ground that "[T]he people of Leyte have spoken and I respect the electorate's will. x x x." 49

On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a "Vote and Opinion and Summary of Votes" reversing the
resolution of the Second Division and declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. The dispositive portion
reads:

"JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to REVERSE the resolution
of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1, 2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the
petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin.

Accordingly:

1. On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against Codilla, promulgated by the Commission (Second
Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No. 01-208), I vote:

(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for insufficiency of evidence;

(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission (Second Division) on
May 18, 2001, having been issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla
is strong and, thus, null and void;

(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001,
for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of
respondent" and the concurrent order for "the Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the
same being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;
 (d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated o June 14, 2001,
that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an
inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;

(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim
petitioner Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte to comply with its
ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for that position;
and

(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of Representative of the
House of Representatives representing the Fourth legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of
Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and

2. On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:

(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the
proclamation being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission on Elections;

(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18,
2001, in SPA No. 01-208, having been issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla
is strong and, thus, null and void;

(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No.
01-208, for "(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of
respondent" and the concurrent order for "the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene and
thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent" the same
being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the Commission;

(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No.
01-208, that the votes of respondent Codilla are "considered stray and invalid" said ruling being issued on the basis of an
inapplicable decision, and contrary to established jurisprudence;

(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner
Codilla as the winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth legislative district of Leyte he (sic) having garnered the highest
number of votes in the elections for the position; and

(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate the office of Representative of the House of
Representatives representing the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the House of Representatives
through the Honorable Speaker of this resolution for its attention and guidance.

Summary of Votes

Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion,
to grant the Motion for Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) in SPA
No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of the
proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners taken
together now stands, as it is, the MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases; and the "Resolution" submitted by three (3)
Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier, Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is
considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases.

The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who joined the majority. The Chairman and the three (3)
Commissioners comprising the majority decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead, each one will write his
own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion
wrote an explanation on his vote."50

The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a "Vote of Adoption" signed by Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.51

Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her proclamation. Instead, she filed a "Comment and
Manifestation"52 with the COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which the decision was issued. In addition,
respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo
B. Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath
and assumed office since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House.53Relying on
this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to the House during its regular session on September 4, 2001, where
she declared that she will not only disregard but will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en banc resolution ordering her to vacate her
position.54

On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order55 constituting the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
implement the aforesaid decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and "proclaim the candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes in the district, as the duly-elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x x x, based on the city/municipal certificates
of canvass submitted beforehand to the previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte x x x."

On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest number of votes cast in the
district.56 On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of
Ormoc City.57

On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the
August 29, 2001 COMELEC en banc resolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and proclaiming him as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.58 Petitioner also served notice that "I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as
Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my
constituents, I therefore expect that all rights and privileges intended for the position of Representative of the fourth legislative district of
Leyte be accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff support." On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum59 dated October 8,
2001 was issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for Speaker De Venecia, stating that "there is no legal
obstacle to complying with the duly promulgated – and now final and executory – COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x x x."

These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20,
2001,60 no action was taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the assistance of his party, LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter61 addressed to respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party President
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the
House of Representatives to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner "can avail of whatever remedy is available should their
action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive."

In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter62 dated October 30, 2001, stating that:

"We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE
in her privilege speech, inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall 'openly defy and disobey' the COMELEC
ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same
congressional seat, a legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the HOUSE's liberty to take action.

In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC decision is a matter that can be best, and with
finality, adjudicated by the Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously." (emphases supplied)

Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.

Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which has become final and executory for failure of respondent
Locsin to appeal therefrom, it has become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as its Administrative Head
and Presiding Officer, to implement the said resolution of the COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of the records of the House, to formally register his
name in the Roll of Members of the House and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends that respondent
Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that
her premature proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges that the action or inaction of public
respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

In his Comment,63 public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus will not lie to compel the implementation of the COMELEC
decision which is not merely a ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the House considering
that: (1) it affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty
on the House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House member.

In his Comment,64 public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in reading the name of respondent Locsin during the roll call,
and in allowing her to take her oath before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during the Joint Session of Congress, he was
merely performing official acts in compliance with the opinions65 rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive
Director Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and
void since it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He also contends that the
determination of who will sit as Member of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by
mandamus.

Respondent Locsin, in her Comment,66 alleged that the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving
a member of the House of Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET which is the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court
cannot issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly violating the principle of separation of powers.
She contends that the act of recognizing who should be seated as a bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a ministerial
function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of
mandamus cannot be directed against the Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the authority to enforce and implement
the resolution of the COMELEC.

Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should
have dismissed the case pending before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of office. Jurisdiction then was vested in
the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the House of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a pre-
proclamation controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must
first be heard by a COMELEC Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a "hodge-podge" decision because of the peculiar manner in
which the COMELEC disposed of the case.

Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility has been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it
dismissed the quo warranto case filed against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled "Paciano Travero vs. Ma. Victoria Locsin,"
on the ground that "the allegations stated therein are not proper grounds for a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late."67

In his Reply,68 petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the COMELEC decision was to file a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court, not to seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of Representatives; that the HRET has no jurisdiction
over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate
proclaimed as winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of proclamation is a pre-proclamation
controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881 69 and section 3, Article
IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to
refer the matter to the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final decision of the COMELEC
involves a ministerial act and does not encroach on the legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as
Member of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the sovereign will of the electorate.

The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin by the COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether
said proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of said proclamation,
whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.

I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.

After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of respondent Locsin is null and void for the following
reasons:

First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.

COMELEC Resolution Nos. 340270 sets the procedure for disqualification cases pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:

"C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY
FOR LACK OF QUALIFICATIONS OR POSSESSING SAME GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION

(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and the verified petition to
disqualify a candidate for lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may be filed any day after the last
day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.

(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies
by any citizen of voting age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties against any candidate
who in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of:

2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions;

2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;

2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Omnibus Election Code;

2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus
Election Code;

2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus
Election Code, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office.

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(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of P20.00, the offices concerned shall docket the petition and
assign to it a docket number which must be consecutive, according to the order of receipt and must bear the year and prefixed as
SPA with the corresponding initial of the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01-001;

(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall issue summons to the respondent candidate
together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any;

(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to
dismiss) to the petition in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be
raised as an affirmative defense;

(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-
affidavits and other documentary evidences including their position paper;

(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the filing of the answer. The hearing officer concerned
shall submit to the Clerk of the Commission through the fastest means of communication, his findings, reports and
recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete
records of the case;

(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk
of the Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar the same for raffle to a division;

(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the same to a member who shall pen the decision,
within five (5) days from the date of consultation."

Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate
together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for disqualification.
Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure
compliance with this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the summons together with the proof of service
to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC when service has been completed, viz:

"Rule 14. Summons

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Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the
protestant or his counsel and shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it, accompanied with the proof of service.

Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines."

Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, must be conducted. The hearing officer is required
to submit to the Clerk of the Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the hearing
and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend
his proclamation.

The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly
served on the petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent never rebutted petitioner's repeated
assertion that he was not properly notified of the petition for his disqualification because he never received summons. 71 Petitioner claims
that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May 22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers
to suspend his proclamation, he was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He was able to obtain a
copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23,
2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24, 2001.

More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

"Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by
reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which
the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall
not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office." (emphases supplied)

In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional
Election Director has yet to conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was voted in office by a
wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's
proclamation. The Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the petitioner through registered mail.
The records reveal that no registry receipt was attached to prove such service. 72 This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring notice
and service of the motion to all parties, viz:

"Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing
thereof, together with a copy of the motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice, especially on matters which
the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own motion.

The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place of the hearing of the motion.

Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission without proof of service of notice thereof, except when the
Commission or a Division is satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected."

Respondent's Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and service of motions. First, the suspension of proclamation
of a winning candidate is not a matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of R.A. No.
664673 requires that the suspension must be "upon motion by the complainant or any intervenor", viz:

"Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall
continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong." (emphases supplied)

Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly affected. Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to the
petitioner, said Motion is a mere scrap of paper.74 It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second Division.

On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m.,75 respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioner's
proclamation. Petitioner was served a copy of the Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt 76 was attached evidencing
service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same
day, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the petitioner was not given any
opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second
Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as
he was served a copy thereof by registered mail.

Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only when evidence of the winning candidate's guilt is strong. In
the case at bar, the COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong. Its only
basis in suspending the proclamation of the petitioner is the "seriousness of the allegations" in the petition for disqualification. Pertinent
portion of the Order reads:

"Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2nd Division), pursuant to Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in
relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 xxx and considering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of respondent, if winning, until further orders."77 (emphases supplied)

We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its
power when it suspended his proclamation.

(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in
the petition for his disqualification.

All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646
which specifically enjoins the COMELEC to "continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest." This is also in violation
of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within ten
(10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and recommendations within the five (5) days from completion
of the hearing and the reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on May 25, 2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion
was held, and the parties were allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the COMELEC Second
Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the
affidavits attached to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the respective memoranda of the
parties.

On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the
disqualification case. Although intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main disqualification case
are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to
present only on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence which are unavailable during the hearing for the
Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension but which may be available during the hearing for the disqualification case.

In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to support his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was
not intended to answer and refute the disqualification case against him. This submission was sustained by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the
members of the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the
evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of the challenged Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division held:

"Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC (Second Division) concerns only the incident relating to the
Motion to Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the parties' respective memoranda
was in lieu of the parties' oral argument on the motion. This would explain the fact that Codilla's Memorandum refers mainly to the validity
of the issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of any hearing on the urgent motion for the
suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of the
Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en banc had the opportunity to consider Codilla's affidavits.
This time, Codilla was able to present his side, thus, completing the presentation of evidentiary documents from both
sides."78 (emphases supplied)

Indeed, careful reading of the petitioner's Memorandum shows that he confined his arguments in support of his Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. In said Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of procedural due process, and
consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is null and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and
factual basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of directing the suspension of his proclamation.79 He
urged the COMELEC Second Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main disqualification case should the suspension be lifted.80

(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on substantial evidence.

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of
witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without
hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the COMELEC en banc correctly observed:

"Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the
supporting affidavits. With this lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second Division) had no choice.
Codilla was disqualified."81

Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the evidence coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen
of the offense for which he was charged.82

Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which reads:

"Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent
court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the
voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall be disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding office"

To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his
instructions, must have given money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material consideration must
be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters or public officials performing electoral functions.

In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered the extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and
sand, and (b) his purpose was to induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him. Pertinent portion of the
petition reads:

"[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his current elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City
by illegally and unlawfully using during the prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned by the City
Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel and sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of
Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte, well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were executed without
period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly corrupting various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4th
legislative district of Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to
cast their votes for said respondent."83

The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these allegations. For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated
that he saw three (3) ten-wheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings "Ormoc City Government" extracting and hauling
sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the property owned by the Codilla family.84

Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that they saw white trucks owned by the City Government of
Ormoc dumping gravel and sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered the sand and gravel
unloaded by the white trucks.85

On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City Government of Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery
of sand and gravel for the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:

"3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay,
Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but Engr. Padayao said that it's
not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were
to deliver sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla."86

Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the petitioner. He alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white
truck with the marking "City Government of Ormoc" came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded mixed sand and that the
driver of the truck told him to "vote for Codilla as a (sic) congressman during election." 87 His statement is hearsay. He has no personal
knowledge of the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The
same could be said about the affidavits of Randy T. Merin,88 Alfredo C. De la Peña,89 Miguel P. Pandac,90 Paquito Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez ,
Glicerio Rios,91 Romulo Alkuino, Sr.,92 Abner Casas,93 Rita Trangia,94 and Judith Erispe95 attached to respondent Locsin's Memorandum on
the Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.

Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses96 of respondent Locsin, all similarly worded, which alleged that the petitioner ordered the
repair of the road in Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where the cockfights were to be held.
These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a
ground to disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses against the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the
Omnibus Election Code, viz:

"Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money or anything of value, gives or promises any
office or employment, franchise or grant, public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or
cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity or community in order to induce anyone or the
public in general, to vote for or against any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any aspirant for
the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar selection process of a political party.

xxxxxxxxx

(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or controlled by the government for an election
campaign.- Any person who uses under any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility,
apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or
controlled corporations, or by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan political activity x
x x."

However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code. All other election offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. 97 They are criminal and not administrative
in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of
preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged offenders before the regular
courts of justice, viz:

"Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail
of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to
act on any complaint within four months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with
the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.

xxxxxxxxx

Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or
proceeding for violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the
jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."

The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on
section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.

(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was done with undue haste.

The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent
Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of
Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent
Locsin received the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.

Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile
message in the afternoon of June 15, 200198 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the
issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in
prejudice of his rights is void.

Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that
basis.

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two dispositions: (1) it ruled that the petitioner was disqualified
as a candidate for the position of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate proclamation of the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].

As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial
factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to
order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the
next highest number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray."

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a
disqualified candidate to be considered "stray." Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during the election
day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in
whom sovereignty resides.99 For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the
people voted for him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was then
qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of government. 100

This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified not only before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner did
not attain finality, and hence, could not be executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule 18 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions reads:

"Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a
decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its promulgation.

(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission en banc shall become final and executory after five (5)
days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other proceedings, following their promulgation.

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or resolution of a Division shall become final and executory
after the lapse of five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other actions or proceedings,
following its promulgation." (emphasis supplied)

In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116,101 issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:

"This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on Special Actions
(Disqualification Cases).

Special Action cases refer to the following:

(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;

(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;

(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and

(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special action cases
(disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five
(5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days
unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed;

(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence, citizenship, violation of election laws and other
analogous cases and on the day of the election the resolution has not become final and executory the BEI shall tally and count the
votes for such disqualified candidate;

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the same
name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;

(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate has the same name
as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for the bona fide
candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed."

Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
immediate disqualification of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule 19 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:

Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be
filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or implementation of
the decision, resolution, order or ruling." (emphases supplied)

(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.

More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest
number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. 102 In every election, the people's choice is the
paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a
candidate by giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be declared elected in his
place.103 In Domino v. COMELEC,104 this Court ruled, viz:

"It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of which have
positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received
that (sic) other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be considered the first among the
qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.

xxxxxxxxx

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot
be transferred from the disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to
take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to
undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice."105

Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on personal circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship
and disqualification based on election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later disqualified based on election offenses like
those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as
such, the votes cast in his favor should not be considered.106

This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC,107 this Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a
candidate, after winning the election, based on personal circumstances or section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is the same: the second
placer could not take the place of the disqualified winner.

II

Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.

Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul her proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en
banc was been divested of jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

We find no merit in these contentions.

First. The validity of the respondent's proclamation was a core issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the
petitioner.

In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner argued that the COMELEC Second Division erred thus:

"(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin;

(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and

(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing therein the immediate
proclamation of the second highest 'vote getter.'" (emphases supplied)

In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that "the Second Division's directive for the immediate proclamation of the
second highest vote-getter is premature considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and executory." 108 Clearly, the validity of
respondent Locsin's proclamation was made a central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner. Without
doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.

The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said
Petition, the COMELEC en banc could still rule on the nullity of respondent's proclamation because it was properly raised in the Motion for
Reconsideration.

Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or
resolutions decided by a division, viz:

"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be decided by the Commission en banc."

Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides:

"Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.-

Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may be filed on the grounds that the evidence is
insufficient to justify the decision, order or ruling, or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.

Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division
shall be filed within five (5) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling."

Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be verified and shall point out specifically the
findings or conclusions of the decision, resolution, order or ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary
to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to
such findings or resolutions.

Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling
when not pro forma, suspends the running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
 Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or
ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding
Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the Commission en banc.

Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.- The Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the
motion for reconsideration for the resolution of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification thereof."
(emphases supplied)

Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division suspending his proclamation and
disqualifying him, the COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said Order of the Second Division.
The said Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.

Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which has no jurisdiction in the instant case.

Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any
question relative to her election and eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.109

We reject respondent's contention.

(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was
seasonably challenged by the petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

In Puzon vs. Cua,110 even the HRET ruled that the "doctrinal ruling that once a proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has
assumed office, it is this Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of Representatives, could
not have been immediately applicable due to the issue regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves."
This is because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.

(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent Locsin.

Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a petition for quo warranto with the HRET.

A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.111 In the case at
bar, neither the eligibility of the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in question. There is no issue that she
was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume office.

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest
number of votes but whose eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent Locsin cannot be the
subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent
nullity. Her premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte was void from the beginning. It is the
height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser, to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.

III

Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to

recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative

of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.

Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file a verified petition for mandamus "when any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting
from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." 112 For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must
be shown that the subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.113

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives
representing the 4th legislative district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents. The facts are settled
and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001
elections. The COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on Motion for Reconsideration the
COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the COMELEC en
banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin and said Decision has become final and executory.

In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc,
the constitutional body with jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by all officials of the land.
There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign of chaos and confusion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the House of Representatives shall administer the oath of
petitioner EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. Public respondent
Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has
taken his oath of office. This decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.
CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III, G.R. No. 189034
Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND Promulgated:
BENHUR L. SALIMBANGON,
Respondents. January 12, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks to nullify the Decision[1] dated May 28, 2009 of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07-035 dismissing the election protest and declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the
Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution[2] dated July 30, 2009 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Facts

In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative
in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-
Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.

On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. [3] However, the Commission on Elections
Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after
the elections.

On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the
basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who
garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.

Martinez filed an Election Protest Ad Cautelam on July 18, 2007 and on July 26, 2007, the HRET granted his motion to convert the same
into a Regular Protest of all one thousand one hundred twenty-nine (1,129) precincts of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu.

The election protest is based on three hundred (300) ballots more or less with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line
for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another
congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. Martinez further alleged that he lost several thousand votes as a
result of incorrect appreciation of ballots not counted in his favor while clearly marked ballots, groups of ballots which appeared to have
been prepared by one (1) person, individual ballots which appeared to have been prepared by two (2) or more persons, and fake and
unofficial ballots were read and counted in favor of Salimbangon. He also claimed that the votes reflected in the election returns were
unlawfully increased in favor of Salimbangon while votes in his favor were unlawfully decreased. [4]

Salimbangon filed his Answer with Counter-Protest stating that the Minutes of Voting (MOV) inside the ballot boxes in all the protested
precincts contain no recorded objections regarding straying of votes claimed by Martinez, and that it was very seldom, if at all, that there
were ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative. He counter-protested 954 precincts on
grounds of coercion/intimidation and duress; massive vote-buying; "lansadera"; misreading/miscounting/misappreciation of votes; and
other electoral anomalies and irregularities.

During the revision, ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative were not counted and
temporarily classified as stray. These comprise majority of the 9,831 stray ballots claimed by Martinez. [5]

HRET Ruling

In its Decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET resolved each of the claims and objections respectively raised by protestant and protestee
applying the rules for appreciation of ballots. The Tribunal recognized as most crucial the issue of whether or not ballots with only
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative should be counted in favor of Martinez. Thus, the election protest "will
rise or fall on how the Tribunal [appreciates said] ballots."[6]

Ruling on the issue, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus
Election Code which provides:

"Where only the first name of a candidate or only his surname is written, the vote for such candidate is valid, if
there is no other candidate with the same first name or surname for the same office."[7] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held
that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were
properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. These ballots were included in the
7,544 ballots denied as votes for Martinez in 961 precincts.[8]

Commiserating with Martinez on the delayed resolution of SPA Case No. 07-133 (PES), the HRET stated:

"We sympathize to (sic) the protestant that he is the victim of the inaction of the Comelec in failing to decide the
petition to disqualify Edilito C. Martinez as nuisance candidate on or before the May 14, 2007 elections. After all, it
 appears that the latter did not even lift a finger to oppose the petition for his declaration as nuisance candidate and that
per its decision rendered only twenty-nine (29) days after the May 14, 2007 elections, Edilito C. Martinez was indeed a
nuisance candidate.

"As it is, the delay committed by the Comelec in deciding the petition to disqualify Edilito C. Martinez as nuisance
candidate on or before May 14, 2007 election did not only cause injustice to herein protestant but worst, had resulted
to (sic) the disenfranchisement of five thousand four hundred one (5,401) electorates whose votes could have changed
the number of votes garnered by the parties herein if not changed altogether the outcome of the election itself." [9]

The final overall results of recount and appreciation of ballots, election documents and other evidence in the entire 1,129 precincts as
determined by the HRET are as follows :[10]

Overall Fourth District of Cebu Votes

PROTESTANT PROTESTEE
1] Votes per physical count* in 961 precincts
where there was ballot appreciation
57,758 57,132
2] Votes in 12 precincts** without ballots found
during revision (based on election returns)
998 660
3] Votes per election returns in 156 precincts in
which several spurious ballots were placed after
elections, counting and/or canvassing of votes
9,937 7,815
68,693 65,607

Less: Objected ballots rejected*** 4,333 860

Add: Claimed ballots admitted*** 2,287 2,348
Unclaimed ballots admitted*** 8 11
Restored Ballots 2
Total Votes in the Contested Precincts After
Appreciation of Evidence
66,655 67,108
PLURALITY OF PROTESTEE'S VOTES
453

* Taken from Revision Reports

** Namely Precinct Nos. 51A, Daan-Bantayan, 40A, 56A, 79A, all of Bantayan,
15C, 19D, 66B/67A, 88A, 105A, all of Bogo, 40A/41A, 70A/71A, all of
Medellin, 30A, Sta. Fe.
*** During appreciation of ballots in 961 precincts.

On the basis of the foregoing, the HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to
be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes.

Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009. [11]

The Petition

Petitioner alleges that the HRET gravely abused its discretion when it failed to credit the "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" votes in his
favor despite the finality of the COMELEC resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. Petitioner argues that the Decision
disenfranchised 5,401 voters when it ruled that said votes cannot be counted as votes for him since "there is no way of determining the real
intention of the voter", in utter disregard of the mandate of Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of the Constitution. He maintains that there is no clear and good
reason to justify the rejection of those 5,401 ballots, and points out that at the time private respondent was proclaimed by the Board of
Canvassers, only 104 votes separated private respondent from him (private respondent was credited with 67,277 votes as against 67,173
votes of petitioner, while nuisance candidate Edilito C. Martinez got a measly 363 votes.)[12]

Petitioner further alleges that the HRET invalidated ballots for him without stating the legal and factual bases therefor, and on grounds
other than the objections raised by private respondent. He contends that the HRET erred in concluding that the ruling in Bautista v.
Commission on Elections[13] cannot be applied in view of circumstances which supposedly distinguish the present case from Bautista. Finally,
petitioner cites the dissenting opinion of the Honorable Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura who disagreed with the majority
ruling and posited that the final declaration by COMELEC that Edilito C. Martinez was a nuisance candidate and the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy should be deemed effective as of the day of the election. [14]

In his Comment, private respondent assails the apparent desire of petitioner for this Court to review the physical appreciation of ballots
conducted by the HRET when he assigned as issues the alleged erroneous invalidation by the HRET of petitioner's ballots which were ruled
as written by two (2) persons, and when he even appreciated ballots that were declared by the HRET as marked ballots. Private respondent
details the mostly post-election anomalies and irregularities, particularly in Bogo City, perpetrated by the petitioner as found by the HRET
such as tampering of election returns and statement of votes and vote padding/tampering.

As to the "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" ballots, private respondent asserts that the HRET correctly refused to credit petitioner with
these votes, stressing that there were admittedly three (3) candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of
Cebu as of May 14, 2007. Not a single voter in the district knew of any nuisance congressional candidate on election day. Private respondent
argues that it would be illogical and most unfair to count the said ballots in favor of petitioner as it is erroneous to base the voter's intent on
the supervening circumstance which was inexistent on the date the ballot was accomplished and cast. The HRET likewise did not err in
holding that the Bautista ruling is inapplicable, there being no announced declaration yet of one (1) of the candidates as nuisance candidate
when the voters cast their ballots on election day.
The Issues

What then is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections? Should ballots containing
only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
 Our Ruling

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

"Section 69. Nuisance candidates. -- The Commission may motu proprio or upon a verified petition of an
interested party, refuse to give due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy if it is shown that said certificate has
been filed to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of
the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrate that the candidate
has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a
faithful determination of the true will of the electorate."

Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987" provides in Section 5 thereof:

"SEC. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. --

(a) A verified petition to declare a duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized representative with the Commission by any
registered candidate for the same office within five (5) days from the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy.
Filing by mail shall not be allowed.

"(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue summons to the respondent
candidate together with a copy of the petition and its enclosures, if any.

"(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within which to file his verified
answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to
dismiss may be raised as affirmative defenses.

"(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case and receive evidence. The
proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers
together with affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing officer shall immediately
submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of such
submission of evidence. The Commission shall render its decision within five (5) days from receipt thereof.

"(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme Court.

"(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means, disseminate its decision
or the decision of the Supreme Court to the city or municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors and the
general public in the political subdivision concerned." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

By their very nature, proceedings in cases of nuisance candidates require prompt disposition. The declaration of a duly registered
candidate as nuisance candidate results in the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The law mandates the Commission and the courts
to give priority to cases of disqualification to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in
which the disqualification is sought.[15] In many instances, however, proceedings against nuisance candidates remained pending and
undecided until election day and even after canvassing of votes had been completed.

Here, petitioner sought to declare Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate immediately after the latter filed his certificate of
candidacy as an independent candidate and long before the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner averred that Edilito C. Martinez who was a
driver of a motorcycle for hire, locally known as "habal-habal", did not own any real property in his municipality, had not filed his income
tax return for the past years, and being an independent candidate did not have any political machinery to propel his candidacy nor did he
have political supporters to help him in his campaign. Petitioner claimed that Edilito C. Martinez after the filing of his certificate of
candidacy, was never heard of again and neither did he start an electoral campaign. Given such lack of bona fide intention of Edilito C.
Martinez to run for the office for which he filed a certificate of candidacy, petitioner contended that his candidacy would just cause
confusion among the voters by the similarity of their surnames, considering that petitioner was undeniably the frontrunner in the
congressional district in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu as his mother, Rep. Clavel A. Martinez, was the incumbent Representative of
the district.[16]

The COMELEC's Second Division granted the petition and declared Edilito C. Martinez as a nuisance candidate. It noted that the failure
of said candidate to answer and deny the accusations against him clearly disclosed the fact that he had no bona fide intention to run for
public office. Thus, it concluded that his only purpose for filing his certificate of candidacy was to put the election process into mockery and
cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of his surname with that of petitioner. [17]

No motion for reconsideration was filed by Edilito C. Martinez and neither did he appeal before this Court the resolution declaring him
a nuisance candidate. Said decision had thus become final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation in accordance with
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.[18] But having come too late, the decision was an empty victory for petitioner who lost to private
respondent by a slim margin of 104 votes. In his election protest, petitioner sought to have ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
written on the line for Representative counted in his favor. The HRET, however, considered such ballots numbering 5,401 as stray and
rejected petitioner's argument that the ruling in Bautista v. Comelec (supra) is applicable in this case.

Bautista involves a mayoralty candidate (Cipriano "Efren" Bautista) during the May 11, 1998 elections who filed a petition to declare as
nuisance candidate Edwin "Efren" Bautista, who filed a certificate of candidacy for the same position at the last minute. The COMELEC
granted the petition, declared Edwin Bautista a nuisance candidate and ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy.
Consequently, Edwin Bautista's name was not included in the official list of candidates for the position of mayor of Navotas City and copies
of the list were distributed to the boards of election inspectors (BEI). On May 8, 1998, Edwin filed a motion for reconsideration and as a
result, the Election Officer of Navotas issued a directive to the BEI to include the name of Edwin Bautista in the certified list of candidates,
only to recall said order in the afternoon. In view of the conflicting directives, counsel for petitioner requested the COMELEC that
instructions be given to the BEI to tally separately the votes for "EFREN BAUTISTA", "EFREN", "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA."

On May 13, 1998, the COMELEC denied Edwin Bautista's motion for reconsideration. When the canvass of the election returns was
commenced, the Municipal Board of Canvassers refused to canvass as part of the valid votes of petitioner the separate tallies of ballots on
which were written "EFREN BAUTISTA," "EFREN," "E. BAUTISTA" and "BAUTISTA." Petitioner then filed with the COMELEC a petition to
declare illegal the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Meanwhile Edwin Bautista filed a petition for certiorari with this Court
assailing the actions of COMELEC declaring him a nuisance candidate and ordering the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The Court
dismissed said petition finding no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC and subsequently also denied with finality the
motion for reconsideration filed by Edwin Bautista.

As to the petition to declare as illegal the proceedings of the Municipal Board of Canvassers for its refusal to include the stray votes in
the separate tally sheet, the COMELEC dismissed the same, citing Sec. 211 (4) [19] of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner Bautista elevated
the case to the Supreme Court which ruled in his favor, thus:

"At the outset and initially setting aside all the ramifications of the substantive issue of the instant petition, the
primordial concern of the Court is to verify whether or not on the day of the election, there was only one 'Efren Bautista' as a
validly registered candidate as far as the electorate was concerned.

"x x x

"Edwin Bautista moved for reconsideration on May 8, 1998. Unfortunately, said motion was not resolved as of
election day. Technically, the April 30, 1998 decision was not yet final as of May 11, 1998, and this technicality created
serious problems on election day.

xxx

"An analysis of the foregoing incidents shows that the separate tallies were made to remedy any prejudice that
may be caused by the inclusion of a potential nuisance candidate in the Navotas mayoralty race. Such inclusion was
brought about by technicality, specifically Edwin Bautista's filing of a motion for reconsideration, which prevented the
April 30, 1998 resolution disqualifying him from becoming final at that time.

"Ideally, the matter should have been finally resolved prior to election day. Its pendency on election day
exposed petitioner to the evils brought about by the inclusion of a then potential, later shown in reality to be
nuisance candidate. We have ruled that a nuisance candidate is one whose certificate of candidacy is presented and filed
to cause confusion among the electorate by the similarity of the names of the registered candidate or by other names
which demonstrate that the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy
has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate (Fernandez vs. Fernandez, 36
SCRA 1 [1970]).

"It must be emphasized that the instant case involves a ground for disqualification which clearly affects the voters'
will and causes confusion that frustrates the same. This is precisely what election laws are trying to protect. They give
effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter. Thus, extreme caution should be observed before any ballot is
invalidated. Further, in the appreciation of ballots, doubts are resolved in favor of their validity. (Silverio vs. Castro, 19
SCRA 521 [1967]).

xxxx

"As discussed in the COMELEC's April 30, 1998 decision, in accordance with Section 69, Edwin Bautista was found
to be a nuisance candidate. First and foremost, he was running under the name of Edwin 'Efren' Bautista, when it had
been established that he was really known as 'Boboy' or 'Boboy Tarugo.' Second, the following circumstances saliently
demonstrate that he had no bona fide intention of running for the office for which he filed his certificate of candidacy: He
is said to be engaged in a 'buy and sell' business, but he has no license therefor. He declared that he had a monthly income
of P10,000.00 but with expenses totalling P9,000.00. He does not own any real property. He did not file his income tax
return for the years 1995 and 1996 and when asked why, he said he did not have any net income and that he was only
earning enough to defray household expenses. He even violated COMELEC rules since he failed to submit the names of
individuals who paid for his campaign materials as well as the printing press he dealt with. He did not have a political
line-up and had no funds to support his campaign expenses. He merely depended on friends whose names he did not
submit to the COMELEC. And as straightforwardly found by the COMELEC, he 'has not demonstrated any
accomplishment/achievement in his twenty-six (26) years of existence as a person that would surely attract the
electorate to choose him as their representative in government.'

"In contrast, it was shown that petitioner had previously held under his name Cipriano and appellation, 'Efren'
Bautista, various elective positions, namely: Barangay Captain of Navotas in 1962, Municipal Councilor of Navotas in
1970, and Vice-Mayor of Navotas in 1980. He is a duly registered Naval Architect and Marine Engineer, and a member of
various civic organizations such as the Rotary Club of Navotas and the Philippine Jaycees.
"It seems obvious to us that the votes separately tallied are not really stray votes. Then COMELEC Chairman
Bernardo P. Pardo himself, now a respected member of the Court, in his May 14, 1998 Memorandum, allowed the
segregation of the votes for "Bautista," "Efren," and "Efren Bautista," and "E. Bautista" into a separate improvised tally, for
the purpose of later counting the votes. In fine, the COMELEC itself validated the separate tallies since they were
meant to be used in the canvassing later on to the actual number of votes cast. These separate tallies actually made
the will of the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a potential nuisance candidate.
What remained unsaid by the COMELEC Chairman was the fact that as early as May 13, 1998, the COMELEC had already
spoken and stated its final position on the issue of whether or not Edwin Bautista is a nuisance candidate. It had already
denied Edwin's motion for reconsideration in its May 13, 1998 Order x x x
"x x x x
"This important detail only shows that as of May 14, 1998, when Chairman Pardo issued the aforestated
Memorandum, Edwin Bautista had already been finally declared as a nuisance candidate by the COMELEC. And
when Edwin Bautista elevated the matter to this Court, we upheld such declaration. How then can we consider valid the
votes for Edwin Bautista whom we finally ruled as disqualified from the 1998 Navotas mayoralty race? That is like
saying one thing and doing another. These are two incompatible acts the contrariety and inconsistency of which are all
too obvious."[20] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Petitioner now invokes this Court's pronouncement in Bautista to the effect that votes indicating only the surname of two (2)
candidates should not be considered as stray but counted in favor of the bona fide candidate after the other candidate with a similar
surname was declared a nuisance candidate. In refusing to apply the ruling in Bautista, the HRET said that the factual circumstances in said
case are different, thus:
"Protestant strongly asserts that the 'MARTINEZ' or 'C. MARTINEZ' only votes be counted in his favor invoking the
ruling in the case of Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998 (298 SCRA 480) where the Supreme Court
held that the final and conclusive ruling on the declaration of a nuisance candidate retroacts on the day of the election.
"We disagree.
 "While the Bautista vs. Comelec case also involves a candidate declared as nuisance by the Comelec, the case
herein is not on all fours with it. x x x
"x x x
"It is clear from the foregoing facts of the Bautista case that the nuisance candidate, Edwin Bautista, was declared
as such on April 30, 1998, eleven (11) days before the May 11, 1998 elections. Although the decision was not yet final on
Election Day because of a Motion for Reconsideration that Edwin Bautista had filed on May 8, 1998, nevertheless, his
name was not included in the list of candidates for the position of Mayor for Navotas. This is not the situation in the
present case for Edilito C. Martinez was not yet declared disqualified during the May 14, 2007 elections. There were,
therefore, two (2) congressional candidates on the day of the election with "MARTINEZ" as surname, Celestino A.
Martinez and Edilito C. Martinez.
"More importantly, in the Bautista case, while the Comelec's decision declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate had not yet attained finality on election day, May 11, 1998, the voters of Navotas were informed of such
disqualification by virtue of newspaper releases and other forms of notification. The voters in said case had
constructive as well as actual knowledge of the action of the Comelec delisting Edwin Bautista as a candidate for
mayor. This is not so in the present case for Edilito C. Martinez was not yet disqualified as nuisance candidate
during the May 14, 2007 elections. There were no newspaper releases and other forms of notification to the voters
of the Fourth District of Cebu on or before May 14, 2007 elections that Edilito C. Martinez was disqualified as a
nuisance candidate."[21] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

It is clear that Bautista is anchored on the factual determination that the COMELEC resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was already final since his motion for reconsideration was already denied by the Commission when canvassing of the votes
started. Hence, the segregated and separately tallied votes containing only the similar first names/nicknames and surnames of the two (2)
candidates were considered as not really stray votes. We held that the separate tallies validated by the COMELEC actually made the will of
the electorate determinable despite the apparent confusion caused by a nuisance candidate.

In the case at bar, there was no segregation or separate tally of votes for petitioner. Unlike in Bautista, there was simply no opportunity
for petitioner to request the segregation and separate tally of expected ballots containing only the surname "MARTINEZ" as the resolution
granting his petition was promulgated only a month later. The HRET, while not closing its eyes to the prejudice caused to petitioner by
COMELEC's inaction and delay, as well as the disenfranchisement of the 5,401 voters, refused to credit him with those votes on the ground
that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter.

We disagree.

The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of
the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. Election
contests, therefore, involve the adjudication not only of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also of paramount public
interest considering the need to dispel uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. [22]

In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the
similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant
circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the
reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered
stray and not counted for either of them.

In elections for national positions such as President, Vice-President and Senator, the sheer logistical challenge posed by nuisance
candidates gives compelling reason for the Commission to exercise its authority to eliminate nuisance candidates who obviously have no
financial capacity or serious intention to mount a nationwide campaign. Thus we explained in Pamatong v. Commission on Elections[23]:

"The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have
not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical
considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for
logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These
practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the
same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper.
Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our
democratic institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a

significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on
the ballot -- the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of the
democratic [process].

"x x x x

"There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for national
positions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage a
national campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of
Candidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to the
government. x x x

"The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to run in
the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every
polling place, watchers in the board of canvassers, or even the receipt of electoral contributions. Moreover, there are
election rules and regulations the formulations of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.

"Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. The
organization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with no
serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral process. x x x

"x x x" [24] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED]

Given the realities of elections in our country and particularly contests involving local positions, what emerges as the paramount
concern in barring nuisance candidates from participating in the electoral exercise is the avoidance of confusion and frustration of the
democratic process by preventing a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate, more than the practical considerations
mentioned in Pamatong. A report published by the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism in connection with the May 11, 1998
elections indicated that the tactic of fielding nuisance candidates with the same surnames as leading contenders had become one (1) "dirty
trick" practiced in at least 18 parts of the country. The success of this clever scheme by political rivals or operators has been attributed to the
last-minute disqualification of nuisance candidates by the Commission, notably its "slow-moving" decision-making.[25]

As illustrated in Bautista, the pendency of proceedings against a nuisance candidate on election day inevitably exposes the bona
fide candidate to the confusion over the similarity of names that affects the voter's will and frustrates the same. It may be that the factual
scenario in Bautista is not exactly the same as in this case, mainly because the Comelec resolution declaring Edwin Bautista a nuisance
candidate was issued before and not after the elections, with the electorate having been informed thereof through newspaper releases and
other forms of notification on the day of election. Undeniably, however, the adverse effect on the voter's will was similarly present in this
case, if not worse, considering the substantial number of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" written on the line for
Representative - over five thousand - which have been declared as stray votes, the invalidated ballots being more than sufficient to overcome
private respondent's lead of only 453 votes after the recount.

Bautista upheld the basic rule that the primordial objective of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voter.
The inclusion of nuisance candidates turns the electoral exercise into an uneven playing field where the bona fide candidate is faced with the
prospect of having a significant number of votes cast for him invalidated as stray votes by the mere presence of another candidate with a
similar surname. Any delay on the part of the COMELEC increases the probability of votes lost in this manner. While political campaigners
try to minimize stray votes by advising the electorate to write the full name of their candidate on the ballot, still, election woes brought by
nuisance candidates persist.

The Court will not speculate on whether the new automated voting system to be implemented in the May 2010 elections will lessen the
possibility of confusion over the names of candidates. What needs to be stressed at this point is the apparent failure of the HRET to give
weight to relevant circumstances that make the will of the electorate determinable, following the precedent in Bautista. These can be gleaned
from the findings of the Commission on the personal circumstances of Edilito C. Martinez clearly indicating lack of serious intent to run for
the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy, foremost of which is his sudden absence after such filing. In contrast to petitioner
who is a well-known politician, a former municipal mayor for three (3) terms and a strong contender for the position of Representative of
the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu (then occupied by his mother), it seems too obvious that Edilito C. Martinez was far from the voters'
consciousness as he did not even campaign nor formally launch his candidacy. The HRET likewise failed to mention the total number of votes
actually cast for Edilito C. Martinez, which can support petitioner's contention that the "MARTINEZ" and "C. MARTINEZ" votes could not
have been intended as votes for Edilito C. Martinez.

Petitioner should not be prejudiced by COMELEC's inefficiency and lethargy. Nor should the absence of objection over straying of votes
during the actual counting bar petitioner from raising the issue in his election protest. The evidence clearly shows that Edilito C. Martinez,
who did not even bother to file an answer and simply disappeared after filing his certificate of candidacy, was an unknown in politics within
the district, a "habal-habal" driver who had neither the financial resources nor political support to sustain his candidacy. The similarity of his
surname with that of petitioner was meant to cause confusion among the voters and spoil petitioner's chances of winning the congressional
race for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu. As it turned out, there were thousands of ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ"
written on the line for Representative, votes considered stray by the BEI and not counted in favor of petitioner, and which the HRET affirmed
to be invalid votes. Had the Commission timely resolved the petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate, all such ballots with
"MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" would have been counted in favor of petitioner and not considered stray, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution
No. 4116,[26] issued in relation to the finality of resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, which provides:

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or division, particularly on
Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).

Special Action cases refer to the following:

(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.

Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions or resolutions on special
action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission, RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:

(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on disqualification cases shall become final and
executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;

xxx

(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates, particularly whether the nuisance candidate
has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory;

(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly where the nuisance candidate
has the same name as the bona fide candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a
motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be
counted and tallied for the bona fide candidate.

All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed. [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

We held in several cases that the judgments of the Electoral Tribunals are beyond judicial interference, unless rendered without or in
excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[27] The power of judicial review may be invoked in exceptional cases upon a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a clear denial of due process of law, or upon
a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of direction that there has to be a remedy for
such abuse.[28] Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.[29] Respondent HRET gravely abused its discretion in affirming the
proclamation of respondent Salimbangon as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu despite the final
outcome of revision showing 5,401 ballots with only "MARTINEZ" or "C. "MARTINEZ" written on the line for Representative, votes which
should have been properly counted in favor of petitioner and not nullified as stray votes, after considering all relevant circumstances clearly
establishing that such votes could not have been intended for "Edilito C. Martinez" who was declared a nuisance candidate in a final
judgment.
Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of
ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical
infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice
of the people is imperative. [30] The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in
ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate
should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will
continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition
to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.

We therefore hold that ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate
cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate
by final judgment after the elections. Accordingly, the 5,401 votes for "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" should be credited to petitioner giving
him a total of 72,056 votes as against 67,108 total votes of private respondent. Petitioner thus garnered more votes than private
respondent with a winning margin of 4,948 votes.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 28, 2009 and Resolution dated July 30, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal in HRET Case No. 07-035 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Celestino A. Martinez III is hereby
declared the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu in the May 14, 2007 elections. This decision is
immediately executory.

Let a copy of the decision be served personally upon the parties and their counsels.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 154512. November 12, 2002]

VICTORINO DENNIS M. SOCRATES, Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE
PREPARATORY RECALL ASSEMBLY (PRA) of Puerto Princesa City, PRA Interim Chairman Punong Bgy. MARK DAVID
HAGEDORN, PRA Interim Secretary Punong Bgy. BENJAMIN JARILLA, PRA Chairman and Presiding Officer Punong Bgy.
EARL S. BUENVIAJE and PRA Secretary Punong Bgy. CARLOS ABALLA, JR. respondents.

[G.R. No. 154683. November 12, 2002]

VICENTE S. SANDOVAL, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

[G.R. Nos. 155083-84. November 12, 2002]

MA. FLORES P. ADOVO, MERCY E. GILO and BIENVENIDO OLLAVE, SR., petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and
EDWARD S. HAGEDORN, respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before us are consolidated petitions for certiorari[1] seeking the reversal of the resolutions issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC for brevity) in relation to the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan.

The Antecedents

On July 2, 2002, 312 out of 528 members of the then incumbent barangay officials of the Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a
Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA for brevity) at the Gymnasium of Barangay San Jose from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. The PRA was convened
to initiate the recall[2] of Victorino Dennis M. Socrates (Socrates for brevity) who assumed office as Puerto Princesas mayor on June 30,
2001. The members of the PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn, president of the Association of Barangay Captains, as interim chair of
the PRA.
On the same date, the PRA passed Resolution No. 01-02 (Recall Resolution for brevity) which declared its loss of confidence in Socrates
and called for his recall. The PRA requested the COMELEC to schedule the recall election for mayor within 30 days from receipt of the Recall
Resolution.
On July 16, 2002, Socrates filed with the COMELEC a petition, docketed as E.M. No. 02-010 (RC), to nullify and deny due course to the
Recall Resolution.
On August 14, 2002, the COMELEC en banc[3] promulgated a resolution dismissing for lack of merit Socrates petition. The COMELEC
gave due course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
On August 21, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated Resolution No. 5673 prescribing the calendar of activities and periods of
certain prohibited acts in connection with the recall election. The COMELEC fixed the campaign period from August 27, 2002 to September 5,
2002 or a period of 10 days.
On August 23, 2002, Edward M. Hagedorn (Hagedorn for brevity) filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election.
On August 17, 2002, Ma. Flores F. Adovo (Adovo for brevity) and Merly E. Gilo (Gilo for brevity) filed a petition before the COMELEC,
docketed as SPA No. 02-492, to disqualify Hagedorn from running in the recall election and to cancel his certificate of candidacy. On August
30, 2002, a certain Bienvenido Ollave, Sr. (Ollave for brevity) filed a petition-in-intervention in SPA No. 02-492 also seeking to disqualify
Hagedorn. On the same date, a certain Genaro V. Manaay filed another petition, docketed as SPA No. 02-539, against Hagedorn alleging
substantially the same facts and involving the same issues. The petitions were all anchored on the ground that Hagedorn is disqualified from
running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three (3) consecutive full terms
immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same post. Subsequently, SPA Nos. 02-492 and 02-539 were consolidated.
In a resolution promulgated on September 20, 2002, the COMELECs First Division [4] dismissed for lack of merit SPA Nos. 02-492 and
02-539. The COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election. The COMELEC also reset the recall election from September
7, 2002 to September 24, 2002.
On September 23, 2002, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a resolution denying the motion for reconsideration of Adovo and
Gilo. The COMELEC affirmed the resolution declaring Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions.
G.R. No. 154512
Petitioner Socrates seeks to nullify the COMELEC en banc resolution dated August 14, 2002 in E.M. No. 02-010 (RC) which gave due
course to the Recall Resolution and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.
Socrates alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution. Socrates cites the following
circumstances as legal infirmities attending the convening of the PRA and its issuance of the Recall Resolution: (1) not all members of the
PRA were notified of the meeting to adopt the resolution; (2) the proof of service of notice was palpably and legally deficient; (3) the
members of the PRA were themselves seeking a new electoral mandate from their respective constituents; (4) the adoption of the resolution
was exercised with grave abuse of authority; and (5) the PRA proceedings were conducted in a manner that violated his and the publics
constitutional right to information.
G.R. No. 154683
Petitioner Vicente S. Sandoval, Jr. seeks to annul COMELEC Resolution No. 5673 dated August 21, 2002 insofar as it fixed the recall
election on September 7, 2002, giving the candidates only a ten-day campaign period. He prayed that the COMELEC be enjoined from holding
the recall election on September 7, 2002 and that a new date be fixed giving the candidates at least an additional 15 days to campaign.
In a resolution dated September 3, 2002, the Court en banc enjoined the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 5673 insofar as
it fixed the date of the recall election on September 7, 2002. The Court directed the COMELEC to give the candidates an additional fifteen 15
days from September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.
Accordingly, on September 9, 2002, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 5708 giving the candidates an additional 15 days from
September 7, 2002 within which to campaign.Thus, the COMELEC reset the recall election to September 24, 2002.
G.R. Nos. 155083-84
Petitioners Adovo, Gilo and Ollave assail the COMELECs resolutions dated September 20, 2002 and September 23, 2002 in SPA Nos. 02-
492 and 02-539 declaring Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in the recall election. They likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order to enjoin the proclamation of the winning candidate in the recall election.
Petitioners argue that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in upholding Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor in the recall
election despite the constitutional and statutory prohibitions against a fourth consecutive term for elective local officials.
In a resolution dated September 24, 2002, the Court ordered the COMELEC to desist from proclaiming any winning candidate in the
recall election until further orders from the Court.Petitioners were required to post a P20,000 bond.
On September 27, 2002, Socrates filed a motion for leave to file an attached petition for intervention seeking the same reliefs as those
sought by Adovo, Gilo and Ollave.
In the meantime, Hagedorn garnered the highest number of votes in the recall election with 20,238 votes. Rival candidates Socrates
and Sandoval obtained 17,220 votes and 13,241 votes, respectively.
Hagedorn filed motions to lift the order restraining the COMELEC from proclaiming the winning candidate and to allow him to assume
office to give effect to the will of the electorate.
On October 1, 2002, the Court granted Socrates motion for leave to file a petition for intervention.

The Issues

The issues for resolution of the Court are:

1. In G.R. No. 154512, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course to the Recall Resolution
and scheduling the recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa.
2. In G.R. Nos.155083-84, whether Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall election of Puerto Princesa on September
24, 2002.
In G.R. No. 154683, the issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in fixing a campaign period of only 10 days
has become moot. Our Resolution of September 3, 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 5708 granted an additional 15 days for the campaign
period as prayed for by petitioner.

First Issue: Validity of the Recall Resolution.

Petitioner Socrates argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in upholding the Recall Resolution despite the
absence of notice to 130 PRA members and the defective service of notice to other PRA members. The COMELEC, however, found that

On various dates, in the month of June 2002, the proponents for the Recall of incumbent City Mayor Victorino Dennis M. Socrates sent
notices of the convening of the PRA to the members thereof pursuant to Section 70 of the Local Government Code. Copies of the said
notice are in Volumes I and II entitled Notices to PRA. Likewise, Proof of Service for each of the said notices were attached to the
Petition and marked as Annex G of Volumes II and III of the Petition.

Notices were likewise posted in conspicuous places particularly at the Barangay Hall. Photos establishing the same were attached to
the Petition and marked as Annex H. The proponents likewise utilized the broadcast mass media in the dissemination of the
convening of the PRA.

Notices of the convening of the Puerto Princesa PRA were also sent to the following: [a list of 25 names of provincial elective officials,
print and broadcast media practitioners, PNP officials, COMELEC city, regional and national officials, and DILG officials].

xxx

The City Election Officer of Puerto Princesa City in her Certification dated 10 July 2002 certified that upon a thorough and careful
verification of the signatures appearing in PRA Resolution 01-02, x x x the majority of all members of the PRA concerned approved
said resolution. She likewise certified that not a single member/signatory of the PRA complained or objected as to the veracity and
authenticity of their signatures.

The Provincial Election Supervisor of Palawan, Atty. Urbano Arlando, in his Indorsement dated 10 July 2002, stated, upon proper
review, all documents submitted are found in order.

The Acting Director IV, Region IV, in his study dated 30 July 2002 submitted the following recommendations:
This Office, after evaluating the documents filed, finds the instant Petition sufficient in form and substance. That the PRA was validly
constituted and that the majority of all members thereof approved Resolution No. 01-02 calling for the recall of Mayor Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates.

xxx.

This Court is bound by the findings of fact of the COMELEC on matters within the competence and expertise of the COMELEC, unless
the findings are patently erroneous. In Malonzo v. COMELEC,[5] which also dealt with alleged defective service of notice to PRA members, we
ruled that

Needless to state, the issue of propriety of the notices sent to the PRA members is factual in nature, and the determination of the same
is therefore a function of the COMELEC. In the absence of patent error, or serious inconsistencies in the findings, the Court should not
disturb the same. The factual findings of the COMELEC, based on its own assessments and duly supported by gathered evidence, are
conclusive upon the court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.

In the instant case, we do not find any valid reason to hold that the COMELECs findings of fact are patently erroneous.
Socrates also claims that the PRA members had no authority to adopt the Recall Resolution on July 2, 2002 because a majority of PRA
members were seeking a new electoral mandate in the barangay elections scheduled on July 15, 2002. This argument deserves scant
consideration considering that when the PRA members adopted the Recall Resolution their terms of office had not yet expired. They were
all de jure sangguniang barangay members with no legal disqualification to participate in the recall assembly under Section 70 of the Local
Government Code.
Socrates bewails that the manner private respondents conducted the PRA proceedings violated his constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern. Socrates, however, admits receiving notice of the PRA meeting and of even sending his representative and
counsel who were present during the entire PRA proceedings. Proponents of the recall election submitted to the COMELEC the Recall
Resolution, minutes of the PRA proceedings, the journal of the PRA assembly, attendance sheets, notices sent to PRA members, and
authenticated master list of barangay officials in Puerto Princesa. Socrates had the right to examine and copy all these public records in the
official custody of the COMELEC. Socrates, however, does not claim that the COMELEC denied him this right. There is no legal basis in
Socrates claim that respondents violated his constitutional right to information on matters of public concern.
Thus, we rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the Recall Resolution and in
scheduling the recall election on September 24, 2002.

Second Issue: Hagedorns qualification to run for mayor

in the recall election of September 24, 2002.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which states:

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years
and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which
provides:
Section 43. Term of Office. (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official was elected.

These constitutional and statutory provisions have two parts. The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for
more than three consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The
second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is
that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service before and after the
interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive terms.
After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate
reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was whether there would
be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after three terms. This is clear from the
following deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:

THE PRESIDENT: The Acting Floor Leader is recognized.

MR. ROMULO:[6] We are now ready to discuss the two issues, as indicated on the blackboard, and these are Alternative No. I where
there is no further election after a total of three terms and Alternative No. 2 where there is no immediate reelection after three
successive terms.[7]

The Journal of the Constitutional Commission reports the following manifestation on the term of elective local officials:

MANIFESTATION OF MR. ROMULO

Upon resumption of session, Mr. Romulo manifested that the Body would proceed to the consideration of two issues on the term of
Representatives and local officials, namely: 1) Alternative No. 1 (no further reelection after a total of three terms), and 2) Alternative
No. 2 (no immediate reelection after three successive terms).[8]

The framers of the Constitution used the same no immediate reelection question in voting for the term limits of Senators [9] and
Representatives of the House.[10]
 Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The
Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the reelection is not immediately after the end
of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an
immediate reelection after the third term.
Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other subsequent election involving
the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. The debates in the Constitutional Commission
evidently show that the prohibited election referred to by the framers of the Constitution is the immediate reelection after the third term,
not any other subsequent election.
If the prohibition on elective local officials is applied to any election within the three-year full term following the three-term limit, then
Senators should also be prohibited from running in any election within the six-year full term following their two-term limit. The
constitutional provision on the term limit of Senators is worded exactly like the term limit of elective local officials, thus:

No Senator shall serve for more than two consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. [11]

In the debates on the term limit of Senators, the following exchange in the Constitutional Convention is instructive:

GASCON:[12] I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period
of time before he can run again?

DAVIDE:[13] That is correct.

GASCON: And the question that we left behind before - if the Gentleman will remember - was: How long will that period of rest
be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?

DAVIDE: If the Gentleman will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the expiration
of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular member of the Senate
can run. So, it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committees stand.

GASCON: So, effectively, the period of rest would be three years at the least.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

The framers of the Constitution thus clarified that a Senator can run after only three years[15] following his completion of two terms. The
framers expressly acknowledged that the prohibited election refers only to the immediate reelection, and not to any subsequent election,
during the six-year period following the two term limit. The framers of the Constitution did not intend the period of rest of an elective official
who has reached his term limit to be the full extent of the succeeding term.
In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate reelection after his third
consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate reelection that the Constitution barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to
the regular elections in 2001. Hagedorn did not seek reelection in the 2001 elections.
Hagedorn was elected for three consecutive terms in the 1992, 1995 and 1998 elections and served in full his three consecutive terms
as mayor of Puerto Princesa. Under the Constitution and the Local Government Code, Hagedorn could no longer run for mayor in the 2001
elections. The Constitution and the Local Government Code disqualified Hagedorn, who had reached the maximum three-term limit, from
running for a fourth consecutive term as mayor. Thus, Hagedorn did not run for mayor in the 2001 elections.[16] Socrates ran and won as
mayor of Puerto Princesa in the 2001 elections. After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same
period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not
because of his voluntary renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. Hagedorns three consecutive terms ended on June 30,
2001. Hagedorns new recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 is not a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive
terms as mayor.One cannot stitch together Hagedorns previous three-terms with his new recall term to make the recall term a fourth
consecutive term because factually it is not. An involuntary interruption occurred from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 which broke
the continuity or consecutive character of Hagedorns service as mayor.
In Lonzanida v. Comelec,[17] the Court had occasion to explain interruption of continuity of service in this manner:

x x x The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent
of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at
the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

In Hagedorns case, the nearly 15-month period he was out of office, although short of a full term of three years, constituted an interruption
in the continuity of his service as mayor. The Constitution does not require the interruption or hiatus to be a full term of three years. The
clear intent is that interruption for any length of time, as long as the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break an elective local officials
continuity of service.
In the recent case of Adormeo v. Comelec and Talaga,[18] a unanimous Court reiterated the rule that an interruption consisting of a
portion of a term of office breaks the continuity of service of an elective local official. In Adormeo, Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. had served two
consecutive full terms as mayor of Lucena City. In his third bid for election as mayor in 1998, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, in
the recall election of May 12, 2000, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao from May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001. When Talaga
ran again for mayor in the 2001 elections, Raymundo Adormeo, the other candidate for mayor, petitioned for Talagas disqualification on the
ground that Talaga had already served three consecutive terms as mayor.
Thus, the issue in Adormeo was whether Talagas recall term was a continuation of his previous two terms so that he was deemed to
have already served three consecutive terms as mayor. The Court ruled that Talaga was qualified to run in the 2001 elections, stating that
the period from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 when Talaga was out of office interrupted the continuity of his service as mayor. Talagas
recall term as mayor was not consecutive to his previous two terms because of this interruption, there having been a break of almost two
years during which time Tagarao was the mayor.
We held in Adormeo that the period an elective local official is out of office interrupts the continuity of his service and prevents his
recall term from being stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous two consecutive terms. In the instant case, we likewise
hold that the nearly 15 months Hagedorn was out of office interrupted his continuity of service and prevents his recall term from being
stitched together as a seamless continuation of his previous three consecutive terms. The only difference between Adormeo and the instant
case is the time of the interruption. In Adormeo, the interruption occurred after the first two consecutive terms. In the instant case, the
interruption happened after the first three consecutive terms.In both cases, the respondents were seeking election for a fourth term.
In Adormeo, the recall term of Talaga began only from the date he assumed office after winning the recall election. Talagas recall term
did not retroact to include the tenure in office of his predecessor. If Talagas recall term was made to so retroact, then he would have been
disqualified to run in the 2001 elections because he would already have served three consecutive terms prior to the 2001 elections. One who
wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term. The period of time prior to the
recall term, when another elective official holds office, constitutes an interruption in continuity of service. Clearly, Adormeo established the
rule that the winner in the recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of three years for purposes of counting the
consecutiveness of an elective officials terms in office.
In the same manner, Hagedorns recall term does not retroact to include the tenure in office of Socrates. Hagedorn can only be
disqualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election if the recall term is made to retroact to June 30, 2001, for only then can the
recall term constitute a fourth consecutive term. But to consider Hagedorns recall term as a full term of three years, retroacting to June 30,
2001, despite the fact that he won his recall term only last September 24, 2002, is to ignore reality. This Court cannot declare as consecutive
or successive terms of office which historically and factually are not.
Worse, to make Hagedorns recall term retroact to June 30, 2001 creates a legal fiction that unduly curtails the freedom of the people to
choose their leaders through popular elections.The concept of term limits is in derogation of the sovereign will of the people to elect the
leaders of their own choosing. Term limits must be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the sovereign will of the people. As
this Court aptly stated in Borja, Jr. v. Comelec:

Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving
three consecutive terms or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted
the alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same
position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term. Monsod warned against prescreening
candidates [from] whom the people will choose as a result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft
constitution contained provisions recognizing people's power.[19] (Emphasis supplied)

A necessary consequence of the interruption of continuity of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official
elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting
the three-term limit. This is clear from the following discussion in the Constitutional Commission:

SUAREZ:[20] For example, a special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired
portion of the term. Would that mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term,
which is actually the correct statement, plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of
this provision on disqualification, Madam President?

DAVIDE: Yes, because we speak of term, and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired portion of that
particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House. [21]

Although the discussion referred to special elections for Senators and Representatives of the House, the same principle applies to a
recall election of local officials. Otherwise, an elective local official who serves a recall term can serve for more than nine consecutive years
comprising of the recall term plus the regular three full terms. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in
itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election.
In summary, we hold that Hagedorn is qualified to run in the September 24, 2002 recall election for mayor of Puerto Princesa because:
1. Hagedorn is not running for immediate reelection following his three consecutive terms as mayor which ended on June 30,
2001;
2. Hagedorns continuity of service as mayor was involuntarily interrupted from June 30, 2001 to September 24, 2002 during
which time he was a private citizen;
3. Hagedorns recall term from September 24, 2002 to June 30, 2004 cannot be made to retroact to June 30, 2001 to make a fourth
consecutive term because factually the recall term is not a fourth consecutive term; and
4. Term limits should be construed strictly to give the fullest possible effect to the right of the electorate to choose their leaders.
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 154512, 154683 and 155083-84 are DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on September 24, 2002 enjoining the proclamation of the winning candidate for mayor of Puerto Princesa in the recall election of
September 24, 2002 is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SIMON B. ALDOVINO, JR., DANILO B. FALLER AND G.R. No. 184836
FERDINAND N. TALABONG,
Petitioners, PUNO, C J.,
CARPIO,

CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND WILFREDO F. ASILO, VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Respondents.
Promulgated:

December 23, 2009

x ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Is the preventive suspension of an elected public official an interruption of his term of office for purposes of the three-term limit
rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (RA 7160, or the Local Government Code)?

The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it
renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the
purpose of the three-term limit rule.

The present petition[1] seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

THE ANTECEDENTS

The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-
2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively
suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans
suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term.

In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B.
Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground
that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favour in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It
reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the
suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

The COMELEC en banc refused to reconsider the Second Divisions ruling in its October 7, 2008 Resolution; hence, the PRESENT
PETITION raising the following ISSUES:

1. Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and

2. Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160

Thus presented, the case raises the direct issue of whether Asilos preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run
for a 4th term.
THE COURTS RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

General Considerations

The present case is not the first before this Court on the three-term limit provision of the Constitution, but is the first on the effect
of preventive suspension on the continuity of an elective officials term. To be sure, preventive suspension, as an interruption in the term of
an elective public official, has been mentioned as an example in Borja v. Commission on Elections.[2] Doctrinally, however, Borja is not a
controlling ruling; it did not deal with preventive suspension, but with the application of the three-term rule on the term that an elective official
acquired by succession.

a. The Three-term Limit Rule:

The Constitutional Provision Analyzed

Section 8, Article X of the Constitution states:

 Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of RA 7160 practically repeats the constitutional provision, and any difference in wording does not assume any
significance in this case.

As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more
than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.

Significantly, this provision refers to a term as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can
serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,[3] a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term connotes, as follows:

The word term in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer
may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon
expiration of the officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public
officer must ipso factocease. In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a public officer
ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. [Emphasis supplied].

A later case, Gaminde v. Commission on Audit,[4] reiterated that [T]he term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as
of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another.

The limitation under this first branch of the provision is expressed in the negative no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. This formulation no more than three consecutive terms is a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible
rule. While it gives no exact indication of what to serve. . . three consecutive terms exactly connotes, the meaning is clear reference is to the
term, not to the service that a public official may render. In other words, the limitation refers to the term.

The second branch relates to the provisions express initiative to prevent any circumvention of the limitation through voluntary
severance of ties with the public office; it expressly states that voluntary renunciation of office shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. This declaration complements the term limitation mandated by the
first branch.

A notable feature of the second branch is that it does not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption
of service that does not affect continuity of service for a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule. It is a pure declaratory statement
of what does not serve as an interruption of service for a full term, but the phrase voluntary renunciation, by itself, is not without
significance in determining constitutional intent.

The word renunciation carries the dictionary meaning of abandonment. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline, or resign.[5] It is
an act that emanates from its author, as contrasted to an act that operates from the outside. Read with the definition of a term in mind,
renunciation, as mentioned under the second branch of the constitutional provision, cannot but mean an act that results in cutting short the
term, i.e., the loss of title to office. The descriptive word voluntary linked together with renunciation signifies an act of surrender based on the
surenderees own freely exercised will; in other words, a loss of title to office by conscious choice. In the context of the three-term limit rule,
such loss of title is not considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid the application of the term
limitation.

The following exchanges in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission on the term voluntary renunciation shed further
light on the extent of the term voluntary renunciation:

MR. MAAMBONG. Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? This term voluntary renunciation
does not appear in Section 3 [of Article VI]; it also appears in Section 6 [of Article VI].

MR DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. MAAMBONG. It is also a recurring phrase all over the Constitution. Could the Committee please enlighten us exactly
what voluntary renunciation mean? Is this akin to abandonment?

MR. DAVIDE. Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by merely resigning at any
given time on the second term.

MR. MAAMBONG. Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than abandonment and
resignation?

MR. DAVIDE. It is more general, more embracing.[6]

From this exchange and Commissioner Davides expansive interpretation of the term voluntary renunciation, the framers intent apparently
was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to defeat the three-term limit rule, in the way that voluntary renunciation has been
rendered unavailable as a mode of defeating the three-term limit rule. Harking back to the text of the constitutional provision, we note
further that Commissioner Davides view is consistent with the negative formulation of the first branch of the provision and the inflexible
interpretation that it suggests.

This examination of the wording of the constitutional provision and of the circumstances surrounding its formulation impresses upon us the
clear intent to make term limitation a high priority constitutional objective whose terms must be strictly construed and which cannot be
defeated by, nor sacrificed for, values of less than equal constitutional worth.We view preventive suspension vis--vis term limitation with this
firm mindset.

b. Relevant Jurisprudence on the

Three-term Limit Rule

Other than the above-cited materials, jurisprudence best gives us a lead into the concepts within the provisions contemplation,
particularly on the interruption in the continuity of service for the full term that it speaks of.

Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections[7] presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit
applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third
term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification
(viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully
served three consecutive terms) were not present. In so ruling, we said:
 The clear intent of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a
voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full service
of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full
term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before
the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued
by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. [Emphasis supplied]

Our intended meaning under this ruling is clear: it is severance from office, or to be exact, loss of title, that renders the three-term limit rule
inapplicable.

Ong v. Alegre[8] and Rivera v. COMELEC,[9] like Lonzanida, also involved the issue of whether there had been a completed term for
purposes of the three-term limit disqualification. These cases, however, presented an interesting twist, as their final judgments in the
electoral contest came after the term of the contested office had expired so that the elective officials in these cases were never effectively
unseated.

Despite the ruling that Ong was never entitled to the office (and thus was never validly elected), the Court concluded that there was
nevertheless an election and service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule based on the following premises: (1) the final
decision that the third-termer lost the election was without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the
contested office had expired; and (2) the official assumed and continuously exercised the functions of the office from the start to the end of
the term. The Court noted in Ong the absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view that the official (referring to the winner in the
election protest) would, under the three-term rule, be considered to have served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest
ruling, when another actually served the term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. This factual variation led the
Court to rule differently from Lonzanida.

In the same vein, the Court in Rivera rejected the theory that the official who finally lost the election contest was merely a caretaker
of the office or a mere de facto officer.The Court obeserved that Section 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its purpose defeated
when an official fully served in the same position for three consecutive terms. Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercised the
powers and enjoyed the perquisites of the office that enabled him to stay on indefinitely.

Ong and Rivera are important rulings for purposes of the three-term limitation because of what they directly imply. Although the
election requisite was not actually present, the Court still gave full effect to the three-term limitation because of the constitutional intent to
strictly limit elective officials to service for three terms. By so ruling, the Court signalled how zealously it guards the three-term limit
rule. Effectively, these cases teach us to strictly interpret the term limitation rule in favor of limitation rather than its exception.

Adormeo v. Commission on Elections[10] dealt with the effect of recall on the three-term limit disqualification. The case presented the
question of whether the disqualification applies if the official lost in the regular election for the supposed third term, but was elected in a
recall election covering that term. The Court upheld the COMELECs ruling that the official was not elected for three (3) consecutive
terms. The Court reasoned out that for nearly two years, the official was a private citizen; hence, the continuity of his mayorship was disrupted
by his defeat in the election for the third term.

Socrates v. Commission on Elections[11] also tackled recall vis--vis the three-term limit disqualification. Edward Hagedorn served
three full terms as mayor. As he was disqualified to run for a fourth term, he did not participate in the election that immediately followed his
third term. In this election, the petitioner Victorino Dennis M. Socrates was elected mayor. Less than 1 years after Mayor Socrates assumed
the functions of the office, recall proceedings were initiated against him, leading to the call for a recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate
of candidacy for mayor in the recall election, but Socrates sought his disqualification on the ground that he (Hagedorn) had fully served three
terms prior to the recall election and was therefore disqualified to run because of the three-term limit rule. We decided in Hagedorns favor,
ruling that:

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive
term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a
subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive
terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.

When the framers of the Constitution debated on the term limit of elective local officials, the question asked was
whether there would be no further election after three terms, or whether there would be no immediate reelection after
three terms.
xxxx

Clearly, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate reelection for a fourth term following three
consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a subsequent reelection for a fourth term as long as the
reelection is not immediately after the end of the third consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following
the third consecutive term is a subsequent election but not an immediate reelection after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate reelection to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.[12]

Latasa v. Commission on Elections[13] presented the novel question of whether a municipal mayor who had fully served for three
consecutive terms could run as city mayor in light of the intervening conversion of the municipality into a city. During the third term, the
municipality was converted into a city; the cityhood charter provided that the elective officials of the municipality shall, in a holdover
capacity, continue to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials. The Court ruled that the
conversion of the municipality into a city did not convert the office of the municipal mayor into a local government post different from the
office of the city mayor the territorial jurisdiction of the city was the same as that of the municipality; the inhabitants were the same group of
voters who elected the municipal mayor for 3 consecutive terms; and they were the same inhabitants over whom the municipal mayor held
power and authority as their chief executive for nine years. The Court said:

This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the
peoples freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating
excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To
allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal
mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed
another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very
scenario sought to be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.[14]
 Latasa instructively highlights, after a review of Lonzanida, Adormeo and Socrates, that no three-term limit violation results if a rest
period or break in the service between terms or tenure in a given elective post intervened. In Lonzanida, the petitioner was a private citizen
with no title to any elective office for a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private
respondents lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months, respectively. Thus, these cases establish that the law contemplates a
complete break from office during which the local elective official steps down and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.

Seemingly differing from these results is the case of Montebon v. Commission on Elections,[15] where the highest-ranking municipal
councilor succeeded to the position of vice-mayor by operation of law. The question posed when he subsequently ran for councilor was
whether his assumption as vice-mayor was an interruption of his term as councilor that would place him outside the operation of the three-
term limit rule. We ruled that an interruption had intervened so that he could again run as councilor. This result seemingly deviates from the
results in the cases heretofore discussed since the elective official continued to hold public office and did not become a private citizen during
the interim. The common thread that identifies Montebon with the rest, however, is that the elective official vacated the office of councilor
and assumed the higher post of vice-mayor by operation of law. Thus, for a time he ceased to be councilor an interruption that effectively
placed him outside the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

c. Conclusion Based on Law

and Jurisprudence

From all the above, we conclude that the interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one
that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time,
however short, for an effective interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be
faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using voluntary
renunciation as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption.

Thus, based on this standard, loss of office by operation of law, being involuntary, is an effective interruption of service within a
term, as we held in Montebon. On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post, even if
involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an
effective break from holding office; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a
reason provided by law.

An interruption occurs when the term is broken because the office holder lost the right to hold on to his office, and cannot be
equated with the failure to render service. The latter occurs during an office holders term when he retains title to the office but cannot
exercise his functions for reasons established by law. Of course, the term failure to serve cannot be used once the right to office is lost;
without the right to hold office or to serve, then no service can be rendered so that none is really lost.

To put it differently although at the risk of repetition, Section 8, Article X both by structure and substance fixes an elective officials term of
office and limits his stay in office to three consecutive terms as an inflexible rule that is stressed, no less, by citing voluntary renunciation as
an example of a circumvention. The provision should be read in the context of interruption of term, not in the context of interrupting the full
continuity of the exercise of the powers of the elective position. The voluntary renunciation it speaks of refers only to the elective officials
voluntary relinquishment of office and loss of title to this office. It does not speak of the temporary cessation of the exercise of power or
authority that may occur for various reasons, with preventive suspension being only one of them. To quote Latasa v. Comelec:[16]
Indeed, [T]he law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to
exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
[Emphasis supplied].

Preventive Suspension and

the Three-Term Limit Rule

a. Nature of Preventive Suspension

Preventive suspension whether under the Local Government Code,[17] the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[18] or the Ombudsman
Act[19] is an interim remedial measure to address the situation of an official who have been charged administratively or criminally, where the
evidence preliminarily indicates the likelihood of or potential for eventual guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is imposed under the Local Government Code when the evidence of guilt is strong and given the gravity of
the offense, there is a possibility that the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety
and integrity of the records and other evidence. Under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is imposed after a valid information (that
requires a finding of probable cause) has been filed in court, while under the Ombudsman Act, it is imposed when, in the judgment of the
Ombudsman, the evidence of guilt is strong; and (a) the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; or (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may
prejudice the case filed against him.

Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office and does
not receive salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only results upon an
eventual finding of guilt or liability.

Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a premium to the protection of the
service rather than to the interests of the individual office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary
prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the officials office; the official is reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the
preventive suspension is lifted. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public
official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly happened to Asilo.

That the imposition of preventive suspension can be abused is a reality that is true in the exercise of all powers and prerogative
under the Constitution and the laws. The imposition of preventive suspension, however, is not an unlimited power; there are limitations
built into the laws[20] themselves that the courts can enforce when these limitations are transgressed, particularly when grave abuse of
discretion is present. In light of this well-defined parameters in the imposition of preventive suspension, we should not view preventive
suspension from the extreme situation that it can totally deprive an elective office holder of the prerogative to serve and is thus an effective
interruption of an election officials term.

Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an elective officials service in office and they do not
overlap. As already mentioned above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people being served, and prevents
the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official
has served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title
to office. If preventive suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this common point may be with respect
to the discontinuity of service that may occur in both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never
intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term
limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term.

b. Preventive Suspension and

the Intent of the Three-Term
Limit Rule

Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption
because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office
within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and
the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.

To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to
allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the
interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates. To be sure, many reasons exist, voluntary or involuntary some of them
personal and some of them by operation of law that may temporarily prevent an elective office holder from exercising the functions of his
office in the way that preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through force majeure, or the enforcement of a
suspension as a penalty, to cite some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising the functions of his office for a time
without forfeiting title to office. Preventive suspension is no different because it disrupts actual delivery of service for a time within a
term. Adopting such interruption of actual service as the standard to determine effective interruption of term under the three-term rule
raises at least the possibility of confusion in implementing this rule, given the many modes and occasions when actual service may be
interrupted in the course of serving a term of office. The standard may reduce the enforcement of the three-term limit rule to a case-to-case
and possibly see-sawing determination of what an effective interruption is.

c. Preventive Suspension and

Voluntary Renunciation

Preventive suspension, because it is imposed by operation of law, does not involve a voluntary act on the part of the suspended
official, except in the indirect sense that he may have voluntarily committed the act that became the basis of the charge against him. From
this perspective, preventive suspension does not have the element of voluntariness that voluntary renunciation embodies. Neither does it
contain the element of renunciation or loss of title to office as it merely involves the temporary incapacity to perform the service that an
elective office demands. Thus viewed, preventive suspension is by its very nature the exact opposite of voluntary renunciation; it is
involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery of service, not the title to the office. The easy conclusion therefore is that
they are, by nature, different and non-comparable.

But beyond the obvious comparison of their respective natures is the more important consideration of how they affect the three-
term limit rule.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as
an effective interruption of a term. It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.

Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation. It can pose as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective interruption of a
term. Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment
or loss of office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a
preventive suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as
a circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.

Conclusion

To recapitulate, Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension in 2005, as
preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials term. Thus, the COMELEC refused to apply the legal command of Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution when it granted due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy for a prohibited fourth term. By so refusing, the
COMELEC effectively committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; its action was a refusal to perform a
positive duty required by no less than the Constitution and was one undertaken outside the contemplation of law.[21]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private
respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth
term. Costs against private respondent Asilo.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002]

RAYMUNDO M. ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to nullify
and set aside the resolution dated May 9, 2001 of public respondent Commission on Elections in Comelec SPA No. 01-055, which granted the
motion for reconsideration and declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., qualified to run for Mayor in Lucena City for the May 14,
2001 election. Petitioner prays that votes cast in private respondents favor should not be counted; and should it happen that private
respondent had been already proclaimed the winner, his proclamation should be declared null and void.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in
the May 14, 2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor.
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the
election of 1998, he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again won and served the unexpired term of
Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the ground that the latter was elected and had served as
city mayor for three (3) consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he served the full term; (2) in the election of
May 1995, where he again served the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served only the unexpired term of
Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998 election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a violation of
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two
(2) consecutive terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as
mayor was interrupted, and thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each. Respondent added that his service
from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for 13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of the law and the
Constitution. He cites Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), as authority to the effect that to apply
disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, two (2) conditions must concur, to wit: (a) that the official concerned has been
elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that he has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position
of city mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn
and/or cancelled.
On April 27, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating that three (3) consecutive terms means continuous
service for nine (9) years and that the two (2) years service from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao who defeated him in the election of 1998
prevented him from having three consecutive years of service. He added that Tagaraos tenure from 1998 to 2000 could not be considered as
a continuation of his mayorship. He further alleged that the recall election was not a regular election, but a separate special election
specifically to remove incompetent local officials.
On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed his Opposition to private respondents Motion for Reconsideration stating therein that serving the
unexpired term of office is considered as one (1) term.[1] Petitioner further contended that Article 8 of the Constitution speaks of term and
does not mention tenure. The fact that private respondent was not elected in the May 1998 election to start a term that began on June 30,
1998 was of no moment, according to petitioner, and what matters is that respondent was elected to an unexpired term in the recall election
which should be considered one full term from June 30, 1998 to June 30, 2001.
On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.. It reversed the First Divisions ruling
and held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he
was installed only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory in the recall elections was not considered a
term of office and is not included in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three (3) consecutive terms, and
his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena City.
On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.
Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9, 2001, DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR.,
QUALIFIED TO RUN FOR MAYOR IN LUCENA CITY FOR THE MAY 14, 2001 ELECTIONS.[2]

Stated differently, was private respondent disqualified to run for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections?[3] This issue
hinges on whether, as provided by the Constitution, he had already served three consecutive terms in that office.
Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the
unexpired portion of the term of office he served after winning a recall election, covering the period May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is
considered a full term. He posits that to interpret otherwise, private respondent would be serving four (4) consecutive terms of 10 years, in
violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987 Constitution[4] and Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the Local Government Code.

Section 43. Term of Office.

xxx

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
 Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-
election in 1998 and between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during Tagaraos incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been
mayor for 3 consecutive terms.
In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms having lost
his third bid in the May 11, 1998 elections, said defeat is an interruption in the continuity of service as city mayor of Lucena.
The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held,

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the
same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must
also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made
clearer by considering the following case or situation:

xxx

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice
reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

xxx

To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the people
should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is
not unduly curtailed.

Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), we said,

This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly
two years he was a private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
Patently untenable is petitioners contention that COMELEC in allowing respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates
Article X, Section 8 of 1987 Constitution.[5] To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional
Commission member, stating that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another,
that unexpired, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms allowed. [6]
As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas comment is pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike
local government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of Congress. [7]
Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary
renunciation for clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:

The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of the
constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the
peoples choice and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not
cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months
before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the
COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.[8]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9,
2001, in Comelec SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 133495. September 3, 1998]

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR., petitioner vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR., respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This case presents for determination the scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials, with the exception of barangay
officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms. In particular, the question is whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of
mayor by operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the
three-term limit.
Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On
September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was
elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 30, 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three
years ending June 30, 1998.[1]
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998
elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the theory that the latter
would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another
term after that.
On April 30, 1998, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent
Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros.[2]However, on motion of private respondent, the COMELEC en banc,
voting 5-2, reversed the decision and declared Capco eligible to run for mayor in the May 11, 1998 elections. [3] The majority stated in its
decision:
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term
limitation refers to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It
made no reference to succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the
case before the Commission, respondent Capco was not elected to the position of
mayor in the January 18, 1988 local elections. He succeeded to such office by
operation of law and served for the unexpired term of his
predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not counted as one (1)
term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code.
Accordingly, private respondent was voted for in the elections. He received 16,558 votes against petitioners 7,773 votes and was
proclaimed elected by the Municipal Board of Canvassers.
This is a petition for certiorari brought to set aside the resolution, dated May 7, 1998, of he COMELEC and to seed a declaration that
private respondent is disqualified to serve another term as Mayor of Pateros, Metro Manila.
Petitioner contends that private respondent Capcos service as mayor from September 2, 1989 to June 30, 992 should be considered as
service for full one term, and since he thereafter served from 1992 to 1998 two more terms as mayor, he should be considered to have
served three consecutive terms within the contemplation of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution and 43(b) of the Local Government Code. Petitioner
stresses the fact that, upon the death of Mayor Cesar Borja on September 2, 1989, private respondent became the mayor and thereafter
served the remainder of the term. Petitioner argues that it is irrelevant that private respondent became mayor by succession because the
purpose of the constitutional provision in limiting the number of terms elective local officials may serve is to prevent a monopolization of
political power.
This contention will not bear analysis. Article X, 8 of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

This provision is restated in 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160):

Sec. 43. Term of Office - . . .

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.

First, to prevent the establishment of political dynasties is not the only policy embodied in the constitutional provision in question. The
other policy is that of enhancing the freedom of choice of the people. To consider, therefore, only stay in office regardless of how the official
concerned came to that office whether by election or by succession by operation of law would be to disregard one of the purposes of the
constitutional provision in question.
Thus, a consideration of the historical background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization
of political power. Indeed, they rejected a proposal put forth by Commissioner Edmundo F. Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms
or nine years there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. Instead, they adopted the alternative proposal of
Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election following
the expiration of the third consecutive term.[4] Monsod warned against prescreening candidates [from] whom the people will choose asa
result of the proposed absolute disqualification, considering that the draft constitution provision recognizing peoples power.[5]
Commissioner Blas F. Ople, who supported the Monsod proposal, said:

The principle involved is really whether this Commission shall impose a temporary or a perpetual disqualification on those who have served
their terms in accordance with the limits on consecutive service as decided by the Constitutional Commission. I would be very wary about
this Commission exercising a sort of omnipotent power in order to disqualify those who will already have served their terms from
perpetuating themselves in office. I think the Commission achieves its purpose in establishing safeguards against the excessive accumulation
of power as a result of consecutive terms. We do put a cap on consecutive service in the case of the President, six years; in the case of the
Vice-President, unlimited; and in the case of the Senators, one reelection. In the case of the Members of Congress, both from the legislative
districts and from the party list and sectoral representation, this is now under discussion and later on the policy concerning local officials
will be taken up by the Committee on Local Governments.The principle remains the same. I think we want to prevent future situations
where, as a result of continuous service and frequent reelections, officials from the President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a
proprietary interest in their position and to accumulate those powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer
these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. I think that is taken care of because we put a gap on the continuity or the
unbroken service of all of these officials. But where we now decide to put these prospective servants of the people or politicians, if we want
to use the coarser term, under a perpetual disqualification, I have a feeling that we are taking away too much from the people, whereas we
should be giving as much to the people as we can in terms of their own freedom of choice.[6]

Other commissioners went on record against perpetually disqualifying elective officials who have served a certain number of terms as
this would deny the right of the people to choose. As Commissioner Yusup R. Abubakar asked, why should we arrogate unto ourselves the
right to decide what the people want?[7]
Commisioner Felicitas S. Aquino spoke in the same vein when she called on her colleagues to "allow the people to exercise their own
sense of proportion and [rely] on their own strength to curtail power when it overreaches itself.[8]
Commissioner Teodoro C. Bacani stressed: Why should we not leave [perpetual disqualification after serving a number of terms] to the
premise accepted by practically everybody here that our people are politically mature? Should we use this assumption only when it is
convenient for us, and not when it may also lead to a freedom of choice for the people and for politicians who may aspire to serve them
longer?[9]
Two ideas thus emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. The first is the notion of service of
term, derived from the concern about the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the idea of election,
derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials
concerned were serving by reason of reelection. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional Commission concerning term
limits, now embodied in Art. VI 4 and 7 of the Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will allow the Senator to rest for a period
of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before if the Gentlemen will remember- was: How long will that period of rest be? Will
it be one election which is three years or one term which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that during the election following the
expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, this particular
member of the Senate can run. So it is not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committees stand.[10]
Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people should be allowed to choose whom they please to govern
them.[11] To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by
operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.
Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, 8 contemplates
service by local officials for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the term of office of elective local
officials and bars such official[s] from serving for more than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective
local official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. The term served must
therefore be one for which [the official concerned] was elected. The purpose of this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation
on the number of terms an elective official may serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply
continuing the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term now withstanding his
voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.
Reference is made to Commissioner Bernas comment on Art. VI, 7, which similarly bars members of the House of Representatives from
serving for more than three terms. Commissioner Bernas states that if one is elected Representative to serve the unexpired term of another,
that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms
allowed.[12]
This is actually based on the opinion expressed by Commissioner Davide in answer to a query of Commissioner Suarez: For example, a
special election is called for a Senator, and the Senator newly elected would have to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Would that
mean that serving the unexpired portion of the term is already considered one term? So, half a term, which is actually the correct statement,
plus one term would disqualify the Senator concerned from running? Is that the meaning of this provision on disqualification, Madam
President? Commissioner Davide said: Yes, because we speak of term and if there is a special election, he will serve only for the unexpired
portion of that particular term plus one more term for the Senator and two more terms for the Members of the Lower House.[13]
There is a difference, however, between the case of a vice-mayor and that of a member of the House of Representatives who succeeds
another who dies, resigns, becomes incapacitated, or is removed from office. The vice-mayor succeeds to the mayorship by operation of
law.[14] On the other hand, the Representative is elected to fill the vacancy.[15] In a real sense, therefore, such Representative serves a term for
which he was elected. As the purpose of the constitutional provision is to limit the right ot be elected and to serve in Congress, his service of
the unexpired term is rightly counted as his first term.Rather than refute what we believe to be the intendment of Art. X, 8 with regard to
elective local officials, the case of a Representative who succeeds another confirms the theory.
Petitioner also cites Art. VII, 4 of the Constitution which provides for succession of the Vice-President to the Presidency in case of
vacancy in that office. After stating that The President shall not be eligible for any reelection, this provision says that No person who has
succeeded as President and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified for election to the same office at any
time.Petitioner contends that, by analogy, the vice-mayor should likewise be considered to have served a full term as mayor if he succeeds to
the latters office and serves for the remainder of the term.
The framers of the Constitution included such a provision because, without it, the Vice-President, who simply steps into the Presidency
by succession would be qualified to run for President even if he has occupied that office for more than four years. The absence of a similar
provision in Art. X, 8 on elective local officials throws in bold relief the difference between the two cases. It underscores the constitutional
intent to cover only the terms of office to which one may have been elected for purpose of the three-term limit on local elective officials,
disregarding for this purpose service by automatic succession.
There is another reason why the Vice-President who succeeds to the Presidency and serves in that office for more than four years is
ineligible for election as President. The Vice-President is elected primarily to succeed the President in the event of the latters death,
permanent disability, removal or resignation. While he may be appointed to the cabinet, his becoming so is entirely dependent on the good
graces of the President. In running for Vice-President, he may thus be said to also seek the Presidency. For their part, the electors likewise
choose as Vice-President the candidate who they think can fill the Presidency in the event it becomes vacant. Hence, service in the
presidency for more than four years may rightly be considered as service for a full term.
 This is not so in the case of the vice-mayor. Under the local Government Code, he is the presiding officer of the sanggunian and he
appoints all officials and employees of such local assembly. He has distinct powers and functions, succession to mayorship in the event of
vacancy therein being only one of them.[16] It cannot be said of him, as much as of the Vice-President in the event of a vacancy in the
Presidency, that in running for vice-mayor, he also seeks the mayorship. His assumption of the mayorship in the event of vacancy is more a
matter of chance than of design. Hence, his service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in
the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he
must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This point can be made
clearer by considering the following cases or situations:

Case No. 1. Suppose A is a vice-mayor who becomes mayor by reason of the death of the incumbent. Six months before the next election, he
resigns and is twice elected thereafter. Can he run again for mayor in the next election.

Yes, because although he has already first served as mayor by succession and subsequently resigned from office before the full term expired,
he has not actually served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the term limit. Under Art. X, 8, voluntary renunciation of the
office is not considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term only if the term is one for which he was
elected. Since A is only completing the service of the term for which the deceased and not he was elected. A cannot be considered to have
completed one term. His resignation constitutes an interruption of the full term.

Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected Mayor and, during his first term, he is twice suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice
reelected after that, can he run for one more term in the next election?

Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.

In both cases, the mayor is entitled to run for reelection because the two conditions for the application of the disqualification
provisions have not concurred, namely, that the local official concerned has been elected three consecutive times and that he has fully served
three consecutive terms. In the first case, even if the local official is considered to have served three full terms notwithstanding his
resignation before the end of the first term, the fact remains that he has not been elected three times. In the second case, the local official has
been elected three consecutive times, but he has not fully served three consecutive terms.

Case No. 3. The case of vice-mayor C who becomes mayor by succession involves a total failure of the two conditions to concur for the
purpose of applying Art. X 8. Suppose he is twice elected after that term, is he qualified to run again in the next election?

Yes, because he was not elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither
had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death , of the deceased mayor.

To consider C in the third case to have served the first term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would be
not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the people to choose whom they wish to govern them. If the vice-mayor turns
out to be a bad mayor, the people can remedy the situation by simply not reelecting him for another term. But if, on the other hand, he
proves to be a good mayor, there will be no way the people can return him to office (even if it is just the third time he is standing for
reelection) if his service of the first term is counted as one of the purpose of applying the term limit.
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of the Constitutional Commission that while the
people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of
choice is not unduly curtailed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003]

ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROMEO SUNGA, respondents.

DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which seeks to challenge the resolution issued by the First Division
of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27, 2001 in SPA Case No. 01-059 entitled, Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus Arsenio
A. Latasa, respondent, and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed
Resolution denied due course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring him disqualified to run for mayor of
Digos City, Davao del Sur Province in the May 14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted, and if he has
been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation null and void.
The facts are fairly simple.
Petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality of Digos was declared a component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite
conducted on September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province
into a Component City to be known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event also marked the end of petitioners tenure
as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter, petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over
capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that
he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos
and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC
a Petition to Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For Disqualification[1] against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga
alleged therein that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since
petitioner had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer,[2] arguing that he did not make any false representation in his certificate of
candidacy since he fully disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms. Moreover, he
argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001elections since this will be the first time that
he will be running for the post of city mayor.
Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19, 2001.[3]
On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First Division issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the respondents certificate of candidacy should be cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.[4]

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001,[5] which remained unacted upon until the day of the elections, May
14, 2001. On May 16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the
City Board of Canvassers From Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as the Duly Elected Mayor if He
Wins the Elections.[6] Despite this, however, petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having garnered the most
number of votes. Consequently, private respondent Sunga filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion[7] which essentially sought the
annulment of petitioners proclamation and the suspension of its effects.
On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the newly elected mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27,
2002 that the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC[8] that after an elective official has been proclaimed
as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications. An opposing partys remedies after proclamation
would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation.
On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact that its very heart is something which this Court considers of
paramount interest. This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was already entertaining some doubt as to whether or
not he is indeed eligible to run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In his certificate of candidacy, after the phrase I am eligible,
petitioner inserted a footnote and indicated:

*Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first time as city mayor. [9]

Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that
when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their
operation. We will not hesitate to set aside technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.[10]
The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated by a rigid application of procedural rules.
The present case raises a novel issue with respect to an explicit Constitutional mandate: whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to
run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as
mayor of the Municipality of Digos.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8
of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and
no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

An examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional
Commission were as much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the monopolization
of political power. In fact, they rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after serving three consecutive terms or
nine years, there should be no further re-election for local and legislative officials.[11] The members, instead, adopted the alternative
proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding
election following the expiration of the third consecutive term:

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked to speak because in this draft Constitution, we are
recognizing peoples power. We have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of Filipino. And yet at the same
time, we are prescreening candidates among whom they will choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has
decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running for the same position.

The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are very skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of
a national stature to be Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent and with integrity. They get voted into office at the age
of 25, which is the age we provide for Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them into pasture.

Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here only of congressional or senatorial seats. We want to
broaden the peoples choice but we are making prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of people. We are, in effect, putting
an additional qualification for office that the officials must have not have served a total of more than a number of years in their lifetime.

Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of statesmen, but the future participation of these statesmen
is limited. Their skills may be only in some areas, but we are saying that they are going to be barred from running for the same position.

Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the day-to-day honing of his skills and competence, in
intellectual combat, in concern and contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is going to be barred from the same kind of public
service.

I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous decision with respect to many of our countrymen in the
future who may have a lot more years ahead of them in the service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will perpetuate them, then let us give them this rest period
of three years or whatever it is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their fathers or mothers or relatives of the second degree
should not run. But let us not bar them for life after serving the public for number of years. [12]

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of
power as a result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the deliberations:

x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous service and frequent re-elections, officials from the
President down to the municipal mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate these powers and
perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. x x x [13]

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two conditions concur:
1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local government post, and 2.) that he has fully
served three consecutive terms.[14]
In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated
as a single entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not
deny the fact that he has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.However, he asserts that when Digos was converted
from a municipality to a city, it attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor,
he cannot be construed as vying for the same local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code provides:

SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive
years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:

(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,

(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics
Office.

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.

(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land are shall
not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more island. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands.

(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income.[15]

Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is a material change in the political and economic
rights of the local government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as
well.[16] It is precisely for this reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to help
assure its economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based on verified indicators:

Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another
shall be based on verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:

(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government facilities and services and special
functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;

(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit
concerned; and

(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a local government unit independent
of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and
facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and
the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).[17]

On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:

Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a component city to be known as the City of Digos,
hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province. The
territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x

Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:

Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers
and functions until such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already qualified and assumed their
offices. x x x.

As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not
change even by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This Court also notes that the elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until elections were held for the new city officials.
 True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean,
however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as
a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the
same as that of the municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the
same group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are also the same
inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.
This Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled upon this Court involving the same Constitutional provision.
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC,[18] the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor who became the mayor by operation of law and who served the
remainder of the mayors term should be considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit under the
Constitution. Private respondent in that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death of the incumbent mayor, he occupied the
latters post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for two more terms. This Court therein held that when private respondent
occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having
served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional provision. The term served must be one for which [the official
concerned] was elected.
It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before he assumed the position of mayor, first served as the vice-
mayor of his local government unit. The nature of the responsibilities and duties of the vice-mayor is wholly different from that of the
mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold office as chief executive over his local government unit. In the present case, petitioner, upon
ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial
jurisdiction. There were changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as local government unit, but no substantial change occurred
as to petitioners authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC,[19] petitioner was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again
for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation
and filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position of
mayor vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate the post. During the May 1998 elections,
petitioner therein again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the ground that he had already
served three consecutive terms. This Court ruled, however, that petitioner therein cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the
post in the May 1995 elections, and that said petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.
In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected as mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed
as having involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion of Digos from municipality to city? This Court believes that he did
involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the
very instant he vacated his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for
even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local
government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC,[20] this Court was confronted with the issue of whether or not an assumption to office through a recall election
should be considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. Private respondent, in that case, was elected and served for two
consecutive terms as mayor. He then ran for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his opponent
faced recall proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, private respondent won and served for the unexpired term. For the May
2001 elections, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was questioned on the ground that he had
already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.This Court held therein that private respondent cannot be construed as having been
elected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the May 1998 elections was considered by this Court as an interruption in the
continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, private respondent therein lived as a private citizen. The same, however, cannot be
said of petitioner Latasa in the present case.
Finally, in Socrates v. COMELEC,[21] the principal issue was whether or not private respondent Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run
during the recall elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001
and did not run in the immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened
themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor, Victorino Dennis M. Socrates. On August 23,
2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed on
the ground that he cannot run for the said post during the recall elections for he was disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term. This Court, however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent
consecutiveness of the service of terms, and that there was in his case a break in such consecutiveness after the end of his third term and
before the recall election.
It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or a break in the service of the local elective
official. In Lonzanida, petitioner therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral elections. Similarly,
in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively. Indeed, the
law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over
the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those
who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor after having served for three
consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be
allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive
over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided
by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v. COMELEC,[22] he should be deemed the mayoralty candidate with
the highest number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held in Labo that the disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily
entitle the candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of the elections. As an obiter, the Court merely
mentioned that the rule would have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a candidates disqualification so as to
bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away
their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however,
cannot be said of the present case.
This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular
election, or that a candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the candidate who garnered the second highest
number of votes to be declared elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidates election a nullity.[23] In the present case,
moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa. [24] The second placer is
obviously not the choice of the people in that particular election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby created
which should be filled by succession.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCIS G. ONG, G.R. No. 163295 Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.

JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and Promulgated:

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. January 23, 2006
x---------------------x

ROMMEL G. ONG,
Petitioner,

- versus - G.R. No. 163354

JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------x
DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc.

The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition for certiorari with petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the COMELEC en
banc resolution[1] dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No. 04-048, granting private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's motion for
reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31, 2004[2] of the COMELECs First Division.

The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with application for injunctive relief, filed by petitioner Rommel
Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other things, to stop the COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its aforesaid May 7, 2004 en
banc resolution in SPA Case No. 04-048 pending the outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295.

Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of these petitions.

The recourse stemmed from the following essential and undisputed factual backdrop:

Private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre (Alegre) and petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed certificates of
candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the incumbent mayor.

On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy[3] of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No. 04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule,
Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as mayor
and discharged the duties thereof for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections.

To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre subsequently filed an election
protest, docketed as Election Case No. 6850before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as
the duly elected mayor in that 1998 mayoralty contest,[4]albeit the decision came out only on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the
1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First Division of the
COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution[5] dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as follows:

We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those obtaining in the sample situations addressed by
the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein, one of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is not present.
Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The
mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC]
of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Stanley
Alegre was the legally elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte. This
disposition had become final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the case having become moot and
academic.

xxx xxx xxx

On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida case and applicable in the case at bench, Ong
could not be considered as having served as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to the post; he
merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later overturned when [the RTC] decided with
finality that [he] lost in the May 1998 elections. (Words in bracket and emphasis in the original).

Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration, contending, in the main, that there was a misapplication of the three-term rule,
as applied in the cited cases of Borja vs. Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra.
On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-048, a resolution[6] reversing the March 31, 2004 resolution of the COMELECs
First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis as disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004; (b)
ordering the deletion of Francis name from the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned board of election inspectors not to
count the votes cast in his favor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine copy of the aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him posthaste to
seek the assistance of his political party, the Nationalist Peoples Coalition, which immediately nominated his older brother, Rommel
Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate. At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the deadline for filing a certificate of
candidacy, Rommel filed his own certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute candidate for his brother Francis.

The following undisputed events then transpired:

1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Rommel
Ong.

2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a letter[7] to Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Camarines
Norte Liza Z. Cario and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which he appealed that, owing to the COMELECs inaction on Alegre's
petition to cancel Rommels certificate of candidacy, the name Rommel Ong be included in the official certified list of candidates for mayor of
San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The desired listing was granted by the PES Carino.

3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote[8] to then COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV
and V, seeking clarification on the legality of the action thus taken by the PES Cario. Responding, Commissioner Garcillano issued a
Memorandum under date May 10, 2004[9] addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cario, ordering her to implement the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004.[10] Said Memorandum partly stated:

The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department], which
he quote your stand, "that substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied due course. In the
Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of candidacy of Francis Ong was denied due course," and elaborated
further that:

"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to include the name of a substitute
candidate in the certified list of candidates unless the substitution is approved by the Commission.

In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute certificate of candidacy of Rommel

Ong Gan Ong, should be denied due course; and 2) the election officer be directed to delete his name
from the list of candidates."

The above position of the Commission was in line with the pronouncement of Supreme Court in Miranda vs.
Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which states:

"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification
but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."

In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said Resolution of the Commission En Banc
in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May 7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added].

4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would seem that the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of
San Vicente issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the votes cast for Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that
Board.[11]

5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed Alegre as the winning candidate for the mayoralty post in San
Vicente, Camarines Norte.[12]

On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition for certiorari, presently docketed as G.R. No. 163295. His brother
Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a week after.

In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No. 163295 and G.R. No. 163354 were consolidated.[13]

Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order dismissing private respondent Alegres Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for being moot and academic.[14]

The issues for resolution of the Court are:

In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its en
banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring petitioner Francis as disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May
10, 2004 elections and consequently ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of candidates so that any vote cast in his favor
shall be considered stray.

In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommels certificate of
candidacy in the same mayoralty election as substitute for his brother Francis.

A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question of whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit
rule.

Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He argues that,
while he indeed assumed office and discharged the duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his proclamation as mayor-
elect in the May 1998 election was contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4,
2001. Pressing the point, petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida vs. Comelec[15], that a proclamation subsequently declared void is no
proclamation at all and one assuming office on the strength of a protested proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the
final outcome of the election protest.

The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
 Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.

Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same rule as follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

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(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the
full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three (3)
consecutive terms.[16]

With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from running for
mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis Ong having been duly
elected mayor of that municipality in the May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the
July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004 terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 1998-2001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no
quibbling that Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998 elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by
virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be addressed,
therefore, is whether or not Franciss assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001, may be considered as one full term service in the context of the consecutive three-term limit rule.

We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for Francis, service for the full term, and should be counted as a full term served in
contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local elective officials from
being elected and serving for more than three consecutive term for the same position.
It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election Protest Case No. 6850, [17] that it was Francis opponent (Alegre) who won in
the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it must be stressed, was
without practical and legal use and value, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Petitioner Francis
contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less
than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term,
should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.

The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would under
the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another
actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.

Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from the Courts ruling in, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,[18] citing Borja vs.
Comelec[19]. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior
to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as Mayor.
However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of Zambales, which, in a decision dated
January 9, 1997, ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and
petitioner Lonzanida acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only.
Now, during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule,
was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in
the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary relinquishment of office. As
the Court pointedly observed, Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate
[and in fact vacated] his post before the expiration of the term.

The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty
election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of failure of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as
mayor-elect was nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective
interruption of the continuity of service.

On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there was actually
no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis was never unseated
during the term in question; he never ceased discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the
entire period covering the 1998-2001 term.

The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from
running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of San Vicente and denying due course to his certificate of candidacy by force of
the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official cannot be sustained. What the
COMELEC en banc said in its May 7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence:

As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the ruling in the Borja and Lonzanida cases
in the instant petition will be erroneous because the factual milieu in those cases is different from the one obtaining here.
Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an
interruption in the continuity of service of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served
continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full term from 1998 to 2001 could not be simply
discounted on the basis that he was not duly elected thereto on account of void proclamation because it would have
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally disqualified and repudiated loser with
a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added; emphasis in the original)

Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his discretion when he
issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004 COMELEC en banc resolution even before its
finality[20] is now of little moment and need not detain us any longer.
Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R. No. 163295 is Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel) challenges the
COMELEC's act of not including his name as a substitute candidate in the official list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. As it were,
existing COMELEC policy[21] provides for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the certified list of candidates pending
approval of the substitution.

Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding in Miranda vs. Abaya,[22] that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled or not
given due course cannot be substituted by another belonging to the same political party as that of the former, thus:

While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may
substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases
where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section
78 of the Code.

Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly
substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial
and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter
case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or
cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and
conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under
the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

xxx xxx xxx

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

xxx xxx xxx

After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in
Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is
no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and
unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably
cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.

In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections were already pass, Rommel Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354 is already
moot and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC, in SPA No. 04-
048 AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.