G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970 Perfecto Cruz, et al.

Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in
accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere
RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO
strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs.
AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners,
vs. Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor
HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, of the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its
PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The
CRUZ and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA respondents. Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the above-named oppositors
[Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted."
Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners.
In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity
Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners.
or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the
De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these
Cruz. documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness
Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents. of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the
results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary
questioned-document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity
CASTRO, J.: of the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved
the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary
On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First
for further study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the
Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante
court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and
mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the
obtained written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of
present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro
the pertinent adoption proceedings.
Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and
nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to
probate of the will allowed after due hearing. intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to
set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the
The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will
respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set
to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani
by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-
Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been
Meñez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother
assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children.
Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court,
On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should
probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent.
executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions
On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion.
of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the
Both sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and
petitioner Ruben Austria.
finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the
Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not
proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance disposed of in the will.
that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents
The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews
eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest
1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The
petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been
A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of
disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take
memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964.
place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance.
Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of
The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the
June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting
entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic
petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the
nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have
decedent's testamentary dispositions.
thus raised squarely the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs
The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of
over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the the same heirs by the decedent is false.
petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria
The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code
Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the
which reads:
nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are
the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez, The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be
Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator
will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such
decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is cause.
Basilia's last will — immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the
Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called
imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings.
the attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent
The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of portions of the will of the deceased which recite:
the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters
III
claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed,
by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang
material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na
the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong
al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary Cruz.
heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in
article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads: xxx xxx xxx

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking
any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod:

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he A.—Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong
of said heirs. Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en
partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati
(½) ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking
yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's
640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such
parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati (½) ng mga lagay na lupa at institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork
palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking or uncertain implications.
yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati (½) ng ilang lagay na
And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent
lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong
instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she
kapatid na si Fausto Austria.
believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption
The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must
inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was stand.
legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents
Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to
Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend
ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for
that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not
the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is
have instituted the respondents at all — the basis of the institution being
satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would
solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the
not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false.
falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and
Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution
the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse
of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as
its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the
her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them
petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to
nonetheless?
properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will?
The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on
Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil
this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang
Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the
tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language
institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be
of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the
shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that
class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They
the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the
offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate
falsity of the cause.
other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by
The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of
tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that her estate (libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent
the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of the respondent
the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the
were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to
did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the
to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners
wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner
compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al.
legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and
statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy — a result
highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.
Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by
these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to
receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect,
rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and
of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent
intestacy." 1
Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where
the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of
practically his whole estate,2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes
of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of
the will for the purpose of giving it effect.3 A probate court has found, by
final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed
of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification,
fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to
give full expression to her will.4
At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix
can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and
cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.5
To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its
order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the
records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the
first — an act which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent
power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them
conformable to law and justices.6 That the court a quo has limited the
extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated
by the Rules of Court.7
ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987 the testament. On the disposition of the testator's property, the will
provided:
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs. THIRD: All my shares that I may receive from our properties. house, lands
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases and money which I earned jointly with my wife Rosa Diongson shall all be
Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, given by me to my brother SEGUNDO ACAIN Filipino, widower, of legal
respondents. age and presently residing at 357-C Sanciangko Street, Cebu City. In case
my brother Segundo Acain pre-deceased me, all the money properties,
lands, houses there in Bantayan and here in Cebu City which constitute
PARAS, J.: my share shall be given to me to his children, namely: Anita, Constantino,
Concepcion, Quirina, laura, Flores, Antonio and Jose, all surnamed Acain.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of respondent.
Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP No. 05744 promulgated on August 30, Obviously, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. Thus it is the children of
1985 (Rollo, p. 108) ordering the dismissal of the petition in Special Segundo who are claiming to be heirs, with Constantino as the petitioner
Proceedings No, 591 ACEB and its Resolution issued on October 23, in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
1985 (Rollo, p. 72) denying respondents' (petitioners herein) motion for
After the petition was set for hearing in the lower court on June 25, 1984
reconsideration.
the oppositors (respondents herein Virginia A. Fernandez, a legally
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision reads as follows: adopted daughter of tile deceased and the latter's widow Rosa Diongson
Vda. de Acain filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds for the
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and respondent Regional petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; (2) he is
Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region, Branch XIII (Cebu City), is merely a universal heir and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have
hereby ordered to dismiss the petition in Special Proceedings No. 591 been pretirited. (Rollo, p. 158). Said motion was denied by the trial judge.
ACEB No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
After the denial of their subsequent motion for reconsideration in the lower
The antecedents of the case, based on the summary of the Intermediate court, respondents filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
Appellate Court, now Court of Appeals, (Rollo, pp. 108-109) are as follows: and prohibition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently
On May 29, 1984 petitioner Constantino Acain filed on the Regional Trial referred to the Intermediate Appellate Court by Resolution of the Court
Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, a petition for the probate of the will of the dated March 11, 1985 (Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 3; Rollo, p. 159).
late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to the same petitioner of letters Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court granted private respondents'
testamentary, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB (Rollo, p. petition and ordered the trial court to dismiss the petition for the probate
29), on the premise that Nemesio Acain died leaving a will in which of the will of Nemesio Acain in Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB
petitioner and his brothers Antonio, Flores and Jose and his sisters Anita,
Concepcion, Quirina and Laura were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed this
executed by Nemesio Acain on February 17, 1960 was written in Bisaya present petition for the review of respondent Court's decision on
(Rollo, p. 27) with a translation in English (Rollo, p. 31) submi'tted by December 18, 1985 (Rollo, p. 6). Respondents' Comment was filed on
petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. The will June 6, 1986 (Rollo, p. 146).
contained provisions on burial rites, payment of debts, and the
On August 11, 1986 the Court resolved to give due course to the petition
appointment of a certain Atty. Ignacio G. Villagonzalo as the executor of
(Rollo, p. 153). Respondents' Memorandum was filed on September 22,
1986 (Rollo, p. 157); the Memorandum for petitioner was filed on If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the
September 29, 1986 (Rollo, p. 177). institution shall he effectual, without prejudice to the right of
representation.
Petitioner raises the following issues (Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4):
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs
(A) The petition filed in AC-G.R. No. 05744 for certiorari and prohibition
or anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or,
with preliminary injunction is not the proper remedy under the premises;
though mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly
(B) The authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the disinherited (Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 450 [1966]; Maninang v. Court
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]). Insofar as the widow is concerned,
the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate; Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as she does not ascend or
descend from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated
(C) The will of Nemesio Acain is valid and must therefore, be admitted to otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir, there is no
probate. The preterition mentioned in Article 854 of the New Civil Code preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is not in
refers to preterition of "compulsory heirs in the direct line," and does not the direct line. (Art. 854, Civil code) however, the same thing cannot be
apply to private respondents who are not compulsory heirs in the direct said of the other respondent Virginia A. Fernandez, whose legal adoption
line; their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs; by the testator has not been questioned by petitioner (.Memorandum for
(D) DICAT TESTATOR ET MERIT LEX. What the testator says will be the the Petitioner, pp. 8-9). Under Article 39 of P.D. No. 603, known as the
law; Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to the adopted person the
same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
(E) There may be nothing in Article 854 of the New Civil Code, that makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied
suggests that mere institution of a universal heir in the will would give the that she has totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator and
heir so instituted a share in the inheritance but there is a definite distinct that both adopted child and the widow were deprived of at least their
intention of the testator in the case at bar, explicitly expressed in his will. legitime. Neither can it be denied that they were not expressly disinherited.
This is what matters and should be in violable. Hence, this is a clear case of preterition of the legally adopted child.
(F) As an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and annulment throws open to
file the petition in Sp. Proc. No. 591 ACEB for probate of the will of intestate succession the entire inheritance including "la porcion libre (que)
Nemesio Acain and no hubiese dispuesto en virtual de legado mejora o donacion" Maniesa as
cited in Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra; Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114
(G) Article 854 of the New Civil Code is a bill of attainder. It is therefore
SCRA [1982]). The only provisions which do not result in intestacy are the
unconstitutional and ineffectual.
legacies and devises made in the will for they should stand valid and
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not private respondents have respected, except insofar as the legitimes are concerned.
been pretirited.
The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters
Article 854 of the Civil Code provides: to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will
because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs-without any
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory other testamentary disposition in the will-amounts to a declaration that
heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will nothing at all was written. Carefully worded and in clear terms, Article 854
or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but of the Civil Code offers no leeway for inferential interpretation (Nuguid v.
the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not; inofficious. Nuguid), supra. No legacies nor devises having been provided in the will
the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites
petitioner and his brothers and sisters. The effect of annulling the or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally
"Institution of heirs will be, necessarily, the opening of a total intestacy comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly
(Neri v. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185 [1943]) except that proper legacies and authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
devises must, as already stated above, be respected. upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will
(Nuguid v. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449 [1966]; Sumilang v. Ramagosa, supra;
We now deal with another matter. In order that a person may be allowed
Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 478 [1982]; Cayetano v.
to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest iii the estate,
Leonides, 129 SCRA 522 [1984]; and Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals,
or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as
139 SCRA 206 [1985]).
a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional
the estate like a creditor (Sumilang v. Ramagosa, 21 SCRA 1369/1967). circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation
Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will
there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an (Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals, supra). In Nuguid v. Nuguid the
individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive oppositors to the probate moved to dismiss on the ground of absolute
(Article 782, Civil Code). At the outset, he appears to have an interest in preteriton The probate court acting on the motion held that the will in
the will as an heir, defined under Article 782 of the Civil Code as a person question was a complete nullity and dismissed the petition without costs.
called to the succession either by the provision of a will or by operation of On appeal the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the probate court,
law. However, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of respondent induced by practical considerations. The Court said:
adopted child and the universal institution of heirs, petitioner is in effect
We pause to reflect. If the case were to be remanded for probate of the
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the
will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation will be
probate of the will left by the deceased and Special Proceedings No. 591
protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of
A-CEB must be dismissed.
probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that the case will
As a general rule certiorari cannot be a substitute for appeal, except when come up once again before us on the same issue of the intrinsic validity
the questioned order is an oppressive exercise of j judicial authority or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
(People v. Villanueva, 110 SCRA 465 [1981]; Vda. de Caldito v. Segundo, anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief
117 SCRA 573 [1982]; Co Chuan Seng v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA that we might as well meet head-on the issue of the validity of the
308 [1984]; and Bautista v. Sarmiento, 138 SCRA 587 [1985]). It is provisions of the will in question. After all there exists a justiciable
axiomatic that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are not available controversy crying for solution.
where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or some other plain, speedy
In Saguimsim v. Lindayag (6 SCRA 874 [1962]) the motion to dismiss the
and adequate remedy in the course of law (DD Comendador Construction
petition by the surviving spouse was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal
Corporation v. Sayo (118 SCRA 590 [1982]). They are, however, proper
capacity to institute the proceedings which was fully substantiated by the
remedies to correct a grave abuse of discretion of the trial court in not
evidence during the hearing held in connection with said motion. The
dismissing a case where the dismissal is founded on valid grounds (Vda.
Court upheld the probate court's order of dismissal.
de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 137 [1983]).
In Cayetano v. Leonides, supra one of the issues raised in the motion to
Special Proceedings No. 591 ACEB is for the probate of a will. As stated
dismiss the petition deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority
Respondent Judge allowed the probate of the will. The Court held that as
is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof,
on its face the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner the
respondent judge should have denied its probate outright. Where promulgated on August 30, 1985 and its Resolution dated October 23,
circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be 1985 are hereby AFFIRMED.
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the
SO ORDERED.
probate court should meet the issue. (Nepomuceno v. Court of
Appeals, supra; Nuguid v. Nuguid, supra).
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the
petition in Sp. Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu on the following grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute the proceedings; (2) he is merely a universal heir; and (3) the
widow and the adopted daughter have been preterited (Rollo, p. 158). It
was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for the
reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to
be resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the
merits of the case (Rollo, p. 32). A subsequent motion for reconsideration
was denied by the trial court on February 15, 1985 (Rollo, p. 109).
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and
allowed the case to progress when on its face the will appears to be
intrinsically void as petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted
as universal heirs coupled with the obvious fact that one of the private
respondents had been preterited would have been an exercise in futility.
It would have meant a waste of time, effort, expense, plus added futility.
The trial court could have denied its probate outright or could have passed
upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions before the
extrinsic validity of the will was resolved (Cayetano v. Leonides, supra;
Nuquid v. Nuguid, supra. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were
properly availed of by private respondents.
Thus, this Court ruled that where the grounds for dismissal are indubitable,
the defendants had the right to resort to the more speedy, and adequate
remedies of certiorari and prohibition to correct a grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, committed by the trial court in
not dismissing the case, (Vda. de Bacang v. Court of Appeals, supra) and
even assuming the existence of the remedy of appeal, the Court harkens
to the rule that in the broader interests of justice, a petition for certiorari
may be entertained, particularly where appeal would not afford speedy
and adequate relief. (Maninang Court of Appeals, supra).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit and the questioned decision of respondent Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-17818 January 25, 1967 partition, which was signed by her in her own behalf and as guardian of
the minor Milagros Barretto. Said project of partition was approved by the
TIRSO T. REYES, as guardian of the minors Azucena Flordelis and
Court of First Instance of Manila on November 22, 1939. The distribution
Tirso, Jr., all surnamed Reyes y Barretto,plaintiffs-appellants,
of the estate and the delivery of the shares of the heirs followed forthwith.
vs.
As a consequence, Salud Barretto took immediate possession of her
LUCIA MILAGROS BARRETTO-DATU, defendant-appellee.
share and secured the cancellation of the original certificates of title and
Recto Law Office for plaintiff-appealant. the issuance of new titles in her own name.
Deogracias T. Reyes and Associates for defendant-appellee.
Everything went well since then. Nobody was heard to complain of any
REYES, J.B.L., J.: irregularity in the distribution of the said estate until the widow, Maria
Gerardo died on March 5, 1948. Upon her death, it was discovered that
Direct appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in she had executed two wills, in the first of which, she instituted Salud and
its Civil Case No. 1084, dismissing the complaint of appellant Tirso T. Milagros, both surnamed Barretto, as her heirs; and, in the second, she
Reyes and ordering the same to deliver to the defendant-appellee, Lucia revoked the same and left all her properties in favor of Milagros Barretto
Milagros Barretto-Datu, the properties receivea by his deceasea wife alone. Thus, the later will was allowed and the first rejected. In rejecting
under the terms of the will of the late Bibiano Barretto, consisting of lots in the first will presented by Tirso Reyes, as guardian of the children of Salud
Manila, Rizal, Pampanga and Bulacan, valued at more than P200,000. Barretto, the lower court held that Salud was not the daughter of the
The decision appealed from sets the antecedents of the case to be as decedent Maria Gerardo by her husband Bibiano Barretto. 1This ruling was
follows: appealed to the Supreme Court, which affirmed the same.

"This is an action to recover one-half share in the fishpond, located in the
barrio of San Roque, Hagonoy, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-13734 of the Land Records of this Province, being the share
of plaintiff's wards as minor heirs of the deceased Salud Barretto, widow
of plaintiff Tirso Reyes, guardian of said minors."
Having thus lost this fight for a share in the estate of Maria Gerardo, as a
legitimate heir of Maria Gerardo, plaintiff now falls back upon the remnant
of the estate of the deceased Bibiano Barretto, which was given in usufruct
to his widow Maria Gerardo. Hence, this action for the recovery of one-
half portion, thereof.

It appears that Bibiano Barretto was married to Maria Gerardo. During
their lifetime they acquired a vast estate, consisting of real properties in
Manila, Pampanga, and Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 41423, 22443, 8858, 32989, 31046, 27285, 6277, 6500, 2057, 6501,
2991, 57403 and 12507/T-337.
When Bibiano Barretto died on February 18, 1936, in the City of Manila,
he left his share of these properties in a will Salud Barretto, mother of
plaintiff's wards, and Lucia Milagros Barretto and a small portion as
legacies to his two sisters Rosa Barretto and Felisa Barretto and his
nephew anä nieces® The usufruct oæ the fishponä situateä iî barrio Saî
Roque¬ Hagonoy, Bulacan, above-mentioned, however, was reserved for
his widow, Maria Gerardo® Iî the meantime¬ Maria Gerardo was
appointeä administratrix. By virtue thereof, she prepared a project of
This action afforded the defendant an opportunity to set up her right of
ownership, not only of the fishpond under litigation, but of all the other
properties willed and delivered to Salud Barretto, for being a spurious heir,
and not entitled to any share in the estate of Bibiano Barretto, thereby
directly attacking the validity, not only of the project of partition, but of the
decision of the court based thereon as well.
The defendant contends that the Project of Partition from which Salud
acquired the fishpond in question is void ab initio and Salud Barretto did
not acquire any valid title thereto, and that the court did not acquire any
jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, who was then a minor.'
Finding for the defendant (now appellee), Milagros Barretto, the lower
court declared the project of partition submitted in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of Bibiano Barretto (Civil Case No. 49629 of the
Court of First Instance of Manila) to be null and void ab initio (not merely on the legitime of Milagros, Salud did not for that reason cease to be a
voidable) because the distributee, Salud Barretto, predecessor of plaintiffs testamentary heir of Bibiano Barretto.
(now appellants), was not a daughter of the spouses Bibiano Barretto and
Nor does the fact that Milagros was allotted in her father's will a share
Maria Gerardo. The nullity of the project of partition was decreed on the
smaller than her legitime invalidate the institution of Salud as heir, since
basis of Article 1081 of the Civil Code of 1889 (then in force) providing as
there was here no preterition, or total ommission of a forced heir. For this
follows: .
reason, Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 322, invoked by appellee, is not at all
A partition in which a person was believed to be an heir, without being so, applicable, that case involving an instance of preterition or omission of
has been included, shall be null and void. children of the testator's former marriage.
The court a quo further rejected the contention advanced by plaintiffs that Appellee contends that the partition in question was void as a compromise
since Bibiano Barretto was free to dispose of one-third (1/3) of his estate on the civil status of Salud in violation of Article 1814 of the old Civil Code.
under the old Civil Code, his will was valid in favor of Salud Barretto (nee This view is erroneous, since a compromise presupposes the settlement
Lim Boco) to the extent, at least, of such free part. And it concluded that, of a controversy through mutual concessions of the parties (Civil Code of
as defendant Milagros was the only true heir of Bibiano Barretto, she was 1889, Article 1809; Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 2028); and the
entitled to recover from Salud, and from the latter's children and condition of Salud as daughter of the testator Bibiano Barretto, while
successors, all the Properties received by her from Bibiano's estate, in untrue, was at no time disputed during the settlement of the estate of the
view of the provisions of Article 1456 of the new Civil Code of the testator. There can be no compromise over issues not in dispute. And
Philippines establishing that property acquired by fraud or mistake is held while a compromise over civil status is prohibited, the law nowhere forbids
by its acquirer in implied trust for the real owner. Hence, as stated at the a settlement by the parties over the share that should correspond to a
beginning of this opinion, the Court a quo not only dismissed the plaintiffs' claimant to the estate.
complaint but ordered them to return the properties received under the
At any rate, independently of a project of partition which, as its own name
project of partition previously mentioned as prayed for in defendant
implies, is merely a proposal for distribution of the estate, that the court
Milagros Barretto's counterclaim. However, it denied defendant's prayer
may accept or reject, it is the court alone that makes the distribution of the
for damages. Hence, this appeal interposed by both plaintiffs and
estate and determines the persons entitled thereto and the parts to which
defendant.
each is entitled (Camia vs. Reyes, 63 Phil. 629, 643; Act 190, Section 750;
Plaintiffs-appellants correctly point out that Article 1081 of the old Civil Rule 90, Rules of 1940; Rule 91, Revised Rules of Court), and it is that
Code has been misapplied to the present case by the court below. The judicial decree of distribution, once final, that vests title in the distributees.
reason is obvious: Salud Barretto admittedly had been instituted heir in If the decree was erroneous or not in conformity with law or the testament,
the late Bibiano Barretto's last will and testament together with defendant the same should have been corrected by opportune appeal; but once it
Milagros; hence, the partition had between them could not be one such had become final, its binding effect is like that of any other judgment in
had with a party who was believed to be an heir without really being one, rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
and was not null and void under said article. The legal precept (Article
It is thus apparent that where a court has validly issued a decree of
1081) does not speak of children, or descendants, but of heirs(without
distribution of the estate, and the same has become final, the validity or
distinction between forced, voluntary or intestate ones), and the fact that
invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant.
Salud happened not to be a daughter of the testator does not preclude her
being one of the heirs expressly named in his testament; for Bibiano It is, however, argued for the appellee that since the court's distribution of
Barretto was at liberty to assign the free portion of his estate to the estate of the late Bibiano Barretto was predicated on the project of
whomsoever he chose. While the share (½) assigned to Salud impinged partition executed by Salud Barretto and the widow, Maria Gerardo (who
signed for herself and as guardian of the minor Milagros Barretto), and
since no evidence was taken of the filiation of the heirs, nor were any
findings of fact or law made, the decree of distribution can have no greater
validity than that of the basic partition, and must stand or fall with it, being
in the nature of a judgment by consent, based on a
compromise. Saminiada vs. Mata, 92 Phil. 426, is invoked in support of
the proposition. That case is authority for the proposition that a judgment
by compromise may be set aside on the ground of mistake or fraud, upon
petition filed in due time, where petition for "relief was filed before the
compromise agreement a proceeding, was consummated" (cas. cit. at p.
436). In the case before us, however, the agreement of partition was not
only ratified by the court's decree of distribution, but actually
consummated, so much so that the titles in the name of the deceased
were cancelled, and new certificates issued in favor of the heirs, long
before the decree was attacked. Hence, Saminiada vs. Mata does not
apply.
Moreover, the defendant-appellee's argument would be plausible if it were
shown that the sole basis for the decree of distribution was the project of
partition. But, in fact, even without it, the distribution could stand, since it
was in conformity with the probated will of Bibiano Barretto, against the
provisions whereof no objection had been made. In fact it was the court's
duty to do so. Act 190, section 640, in force in 1939, provided: .
SEC. 640. Estate, How Administered. — When a will is thus allowed, the
court shall grant letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the
will annexed, and such letters testamentary or of administration, shall
extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippine Islands. Such
estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of
administration, shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such
will may operate upon it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in these Islands belonging to persons
who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)
That defendant Milagros Barretto was a minor at the time the probate court
distributed the estate of her father in 1939 does not imply that the said
court was without jurisdiction to enter the decree of distribution. Passing
upon a like issue, this Court ruled in Ramos vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. Reports,
pp. 741 and 742:
If we are to assume that Richard Hill and Marvin Hill did not formally
intervene, still they would be concluded by the result of the proceedings,
not only as to their civil status but as the distribution of the estate as well.
As this Court has held in Manolo vs. Paredes, 47 Phil. 938, "The
proceeding for probate is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265) and the court
acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of
the notice prescribed by section 630 C.P.C.; and any order that any be
entered therein is binding against all of them." (See also in re Estate of
Johnson, 39 Phil. 156.) "A final order of distribution of the estate of a
deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees". (Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45
Phil. 895.) There is no reason why, by analogy, these salutary doctrines
should not apply to intestate proceedings.
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is
left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake
or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion
within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect
of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court
or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and
reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
It is well to observe, at this juncture, as this Court expressly declared
in Reyes vs. Barretto Datu, 94 Phil. 446 (Am'd Rec. Appeal, pp. 156, 157),
that:
... It is argued that Lucia Milagros Barretto was a minor when she signed
the partition, and that Maria Gerardo was not her judicially appointed
guardian. The claim is not true. Maria Gerardo signed as guardian of the
minor. (Secs. 3 and 5, Rule 97, Rules of Court.) The mere statement in
the project of partion that the guardianship proceedings of the minor Lucia
Milagros Barretto are pending in the court, does not mean that the
guardian had not yet been appointed; it meant that the guardianship
proceedings had not yet been terminated, and as a guardianship
proceedings begin with the appointment of a guardian, Maria Gerardo
must have been already appointed when she signed the project of
partition. There is, therefore, no irregularity or defect or error in the project
of partition, apparent on the record of the testate proceedings, which
shows that Maria Gerardo had no power or authority to sign the project of counsel. In fact, the trial court made no mention of such promise in the
partition as guardian of the minor Lucia Milagros Barretto, and, decision under appeal. Even more: granting arguendo that the promise
consequently, no ground for the contention that the order approving the was made, the same can not bind the wards, the minor children of Salud,
project of partition is absolutely null and void and may be attacked who are the real parties in interest. An abdicative waiver of rights by a
collaterally in these proceedings. guardian, being an act of disposition, and not of administration, can not
bind his wards, being null and void as to them unless duly authorized by
So that it is now incontestable that appellee Milagros Barretto was not only
the proper court (Ledesma Hermanos vs. Castro, 55 Phil. 136, 142).
made a party by publication but actually appeared and participated in the
proceedings through her guardian: she, therefore, can not escape the In resume, we hold (1) that the partition had between Salud and Milagros
jurisdiction of the Manila Court of First Instance which settled her father's Barretto in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Bibiano
estate. Barretto duly approved by the Court of First Instance of Manila in 1939, in
its Civil Case No. 49629, is not void for being contrary to either Article
Defendant-appellee further pleads that as her mother and guardian (Maria
1081 or 1814 of the, Civil Code of 1889; (2) that Milagros Barretto's action
Gerardo) could not have ignored that the distributee Salud was not her
to contest said partition and decree of distribution is barred by the statute
child, the act of said widow in agreeing to the oft-cited partition and
of limitations; and (3) that her claim that plaintiff-appellant guardian is a
distribution was a fraud on appellees rights and entitles her to relief. In the
possessor in bad faith and should account for the fruits received from the
first place, there is no evidence that when the estate of Bibiano Barretto
properties inherited by Salud Barretto (nee Lim Boco) is legally untenable.
was judicially settled and distributed appellants' predecessor, Salud Lim
It follows that the plaintiffs' action for partition of the fishpond described in
Boco Barretto to, knew that she was not Bibiano's child: so that if fraud
the complaint should have been given due course.
was committed, it was the widow, Maria Gerardo, who was solely
responsible, and neither Salud nor her minor children, appellants herein, Wherefore, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan now
can be held liable therefor. In the second placegranting that there was under appeal is reversed and set aside in so far as it orders plaintiff-
such fraud, relief therefrom can only be obtained within 4 years from its appellant to reconvey to appellee Milagros Barretto Datu the properties
discovery, and the record shows that this period had elapsed long ago. enumeracted in said decision, and the same is affirmed in so far as it
denies any right of said appellee to accounting. Let the records be
Because at the time of the distribution Milagros Barretto was only 16 years
returned to the court of origin, with instructions to proceed with the action
old (Exhibit 24), she became of age five years later, in 1944. On that year,
for partition of the fishpond (Lot No. 4, Plan Psu-4709), covered by TCT
her cause of action accrued to contest on the ground of fraud the court
No. T-13734 of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan, and for the
decree distributing her father's estate and the four-year period of limitation
accounting of the fruits thereof, as prayed for in the complaint No costs.
started to run, to expire in 1948 (Section 43, Act. 190). In fact, conceding
that Milagros only became aware of the true facts in 1946 (Appellee's
Brief, p. 27), her action still became extinct in 1950. Clearly, therefore, the
action was already barred when in August 31, 1956 she filed her
counterclaim in this case contesting the decree of distribution of Bibiano
Barretto's estate.
In order to evade the statute of limitations, Milagros Barretto introduced
evidence that appellant Tirso Reyes had induced her to delay filing action
by verbally promising to reconvey the properties received by his deceased
wife, Salud. There is no reliable evidence of the alleged promise, which
rests exclusively on the oral assertions of Milagros herself and her