LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty
SEC. 1 – SYSTEM OF INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
SEC. 3
PIMENTEL, JR. v. COMELEC
FACTS:
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary
and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public
and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among
other personalities, is put in issue.
As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as
follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic
laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories
accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard
the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing
shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive
result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive
screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected
to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. -
Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school's student handbook and with
notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing
(d) Officers and employees of public and private
offices. - Officers and employees of public and private
offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be
subjected to undergo a random drug test as
contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in
the workplace. Any officer or employee found
positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with
administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions
of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office
of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed
or elected both in the national or local government
shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this
Section, those found to be positive for dangerous
drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section
15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug
testing of candidates for public office in connection
with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and
local elections. The pertinent portions of the said
resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165
provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the
national or local government shall undergo a
mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution provides that public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo
mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality
of candidates they are electing and they will be
assured that only those who can serve with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would
be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the
authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA]
9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to
promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following
rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory
drug testing to candidates for public office
SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public
office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004
Synchronized National and Local Elections shall
undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic
laboratories or any drug testing laboratories
monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
SEC. 3. On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug
certificates filed with their respective offices, the
Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists
of candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug
test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period,
the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of
candidates. The first list shall consist of those
candidates who complied with the mandatory drug
test while the second list shall consist of those
candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x
xx
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug
test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected
to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his
office until he has undergone mandatory drug test
and filed with the offices enumerated under Section
2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the
Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May
10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification
for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2)
to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing
Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3,
Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is
a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the
day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age,
able to read and write, a registered voter, and a
resident of the Philippines for not less than two years
immediately preceding the day of the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only
prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for
one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a
member of the Senate. He says that both the
Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among
other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates
for senator must first be certified as drug free. He
adds that there is no provision in the Constitution
authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the
qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v.
Dangerous
 Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner
Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)
from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec.
36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are
constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power
when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
For another, the provisions trench in the equal
protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to
harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional
right against unreasonable searches is also breached
by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v.
Dangerous
 Drugs Board and Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and
taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and
(g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the
right against unreasonable search and seizure, and
the right against self - incrimination, and for being
contrary to the due process and equal protection
guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases
at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners
SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA
assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident
amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights
mentioned in their separate petitions.2
It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be
exercised in connection with a bona fide controversy
which involves the statute sought to be reviewed. 3
But even with the presence of an actual case or
controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial
review unless the constitutional question is brought
before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish
that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.5
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of
procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non -
traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers,
and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance, of overarching significance to society, or
of paramount public interest. 6 There is no doubt that
Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate
for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the
requisite standing since he has substantial interests in
the subject matter of the petition, among other
preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and
Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus
standi owing primarily to the transcendental
importance and the paramount public interest
involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates
for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA
9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these
paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue
delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
 (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of
RA 9165 and
 COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an
additional qualification on candidates for senator. He
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to
meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter
registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency.
Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other
qualification to run for senator and be voted upon
and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress
cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these
qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade,
or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, 7 or
alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no
effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to
the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed.9
Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they
may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as
1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative
power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries
of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments
acting under delegated authority, the powers of each
of the departments x x x are limited and confined
within the four walls of the constitution or the
charter, and each department can only exercise such
powers as are necessarily implied from the given
powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative
authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense
that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of
the power itself and the allowable subjects of
legislation.11 The substantive constitutional
limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights 12 and
other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution prescribing the qualifications of
candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec.
36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions
of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.13
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented
by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively
enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated
in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched,
said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for
senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously
as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition
sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that
"[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its
proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at
the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for
non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.
It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not
expressly state that non - compliance with the drug
test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work
to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument
may be accorded plausibility if the drug test
requirement is optional. But the particular section of
the law, without exception, made drug - testing on
those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that
the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory
command. And since the provision deals with
candidates for public office, it stands to reason that
the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer
to and revolve around the election and the
assumption of public office of the candidates. Any
other construal would reduce the mandatory nature
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without
meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture,
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer
enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover
only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the
candidates running in that electoral event.
Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems
it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules,
on its validity as an implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that
the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is
rooted on its having infringed the constitutional
provision defining the qualification or eligibility
requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as
senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA
9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f)
of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students
and public and private employees, while mandatory,
is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in
the process "the well being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the
policy - declaration portion of the law, can be
achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive
and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and
use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs
and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for
illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are
not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even
be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal
drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54
and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to
Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of
this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her
parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x
for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug
dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall
bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order
that the applicant be examined for drug dependency.
If the examination x x x results in the certification that
the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be
ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and
rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x
x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under
the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug
dependent under the voluntary submission program,
who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be
exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of
this Act subject to the following conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are
most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and
addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems
of the young are more critically impaired by
intoxicants and are more inclined to drug
dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly
low rate.15
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in
this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the
guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure16
under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while
the right to privacy has long come into its own, this
case appears to be the first time that the validity of a
state - decreed search or intrusion through the
medium of mandatory random drug testing among
students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made
the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of
persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random
drug testing among school children, we turn to the
teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton
(Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent
School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al.
v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly
pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving
the constitutionality of governmental search.
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia,
Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their
respective institutions following the discovery of
frequent drug use by school athletes. After
consultation with the parents, they required random
urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James
Acton, a high school student, was denied
participation in the football program after he refused
to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton
forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing
policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of
the US Constitution.
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the
issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following:
(1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students;
(2) school children, while not shedding their
constitutional rights at the school gate, have less
privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights
than non - athletes since the former observe
communal undress before and after sports events; (4)
by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily
subjected themselves to a higher degree of school
supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine
samples does not invade a student's privacy since a
student need not undress for this kind of drug testing;
and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of
the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young.
The US Supreme Court held that the policy
constituted reasonable search under the Fourth20 and
14th Amendments and declared the random drug -
testing policy constitutional.
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a
school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test
for high school students desiring to join extra -
curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the
show choir, marching band, and academic team
declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the
drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes
violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls
argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo
physical examinations and undress before their peers
in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more
privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the
constitutionality of drug testing even among non -
athletes on the basis of the school's custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court
made no distinction between a non - athlete and an
athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act
in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty
of safeguarding the health of the students. And in
holding that the school could implement its random
drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test
was a kind of search in which even a reasonable
parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the
above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are:
(1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult,
and are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools,
acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the
health and well - being of their students and may
adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary
to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right
to impose conditions on applicants for admission that
are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the
Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions
of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of
educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules
and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to
enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable,
and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation
of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the
well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth and
school children who usually end up as victims.
Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug
testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools
is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if
the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government,
are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from
Vernonia, "[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's
schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nation's laws against the
importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to
act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug -
infested school are visited not just upon the users, but
upon the entire student body and faculty.22 Needless
to stress, the random testing scheme provided under
the law argues against the idea that the testing aims
to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level
students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court
notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug
testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search
under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24
Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without
elaboration:
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of
Appeals have made various rulings on the
constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the
school and the workplaces. The US courts have been
consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug
tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy
and right against unreasonable search and seizure.
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. 26
In context, the right to privacy means the right to be
free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person
or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a
way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary
sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general
agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee
against unwarranted search, "translation of the
abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches
and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to
borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28
Authorities are agreed though that the right to
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the
public and defers to the state's exercise of police
power.29
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the
Constitution is couched and as has been held,
"reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of
a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a
search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard
is judged by the balancing of the government -
mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy
interest against the promotion of some compelling
state interest.31 In the criminal context,
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause
to be personally determined by a judge. Given that
the drug - testing policy for employees--and students
for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of
administrative search needing what was referred to
in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary
procedures," the probable - cause standard is not
required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the
review should focus on the reasonableness of the
challenged administrative search in question.
The first factor to consider in the matter of
reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest
upon which the drug testing, which effects a search
within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the
Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or
workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of
the privacy expectation of the employees and the
reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large
extent circumscribed by the company's work policies,
the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered
into by management and the bargaining unit, and the
inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline
and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy
expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon
such privacy has been upheld.
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of
the intrusion authorized by the challenged law.
Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search
or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople
v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search
"narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For
one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules
and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
specifically directed towards preventing a situation
that would unduly embarrass the employees or place
them under a humiliating experience. While every
officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may
be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really
singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to
discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone
when and who is to be tested. And as may be
observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what,
in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that
the employees concerned shall be subjected to
"random drug test as contained in the company's
work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of
reducing the risk in the work place."
For another, the random drug testing shall be
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as
much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity.
As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that
the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e.,
the screening test and the confirmatory test,
doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more
important consideration lies in the fact that the test
shall be conducted by trained professionals in access
- controlled laboratories monitored by the
Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against
results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH
provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
"need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and
the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the
usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality
of the test results."35 Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence
relating to the violation of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the
intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165,
is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly
against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is
relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to
stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect
the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth,
from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The
law intends to achieve this through the medium,
among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing
a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the
need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug
use is substantial enough to override the individual's
privacy interest under the premises. The Court can
consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across
gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it
may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture,
or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market,
would be an investor's dream were it not for the
illegal and immoral components of any of such
activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since
the martial law public execution of a notorious drug
trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back
stance with respect to this modern - day scourge.
Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing
and deterring drug use among employees in private
offices, the threat of detection by random testing
being higher than other modes. The Court holds that
the chosen method is a reasonable and enough
means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the
employees, the compelling state concern likely to be
met by the search, and the well - defined limits set
forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the
conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by
the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers,
all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the
public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more
reason that it should pass the test for civil servants,
who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve
them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38
Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is
objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of
power hardly commends itself for concurrence.
Contrary to its position, the provision in question is
not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options
to schools and employers to determine the manner of
drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools
and officers/employees of public/private offices
should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the
testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as
contained in the student handbook and with notice to
parents. On the part of officers/employees, the
testing shall take into account the company's work
rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be
observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected
to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an
unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against
misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the
test results are established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the
DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH,
Department of the Interior and Local Government,
Department of Education, and Department of Labor
and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR
necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the
participation of schools and offices in the drug testing
scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165.
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and
employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the
drug tests shall be conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a
quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the
face of the increasing complexity of the task of the
government and the increasing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention, resort to delegation of
power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the
power of subordinate legislation, has become
imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of
RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for
mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional
viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when
they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private
and public employees, the constitutional soundness
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug
testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years
and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative
concepts in the mandatory drug testing are
"randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random
or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not
randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.
When persons suspected of committing a crime are
charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will. The persons thus charged, by the
bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing,
if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the
procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a
blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated
objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the
accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
themselves.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the
petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the
petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring
Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but
declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All
concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently
enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA
9165. No costs.
SEC. 5 – COMPOSITION OF THE HOR
TOBIAS, ET AL. v. ABALOS, ET AL.
FACTS:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise
known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be
known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo
Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative
of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which
eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos
signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
RATIFICATION. Pursuant to the Local Government
Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994.
The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they
approved of the conversion of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided
under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was
only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By
virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed
ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending
that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49
thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of
three specific provisions of the Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong
shall have its own legislative district with the first
representative to be elected in the next national
elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder
of the former legislative district of San
Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative
district of San Juan with its first representative to be
elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted
provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the
"one subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI,
Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed
Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city; and (2) the division of the congressional district
of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated
subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A.
No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as
expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since
Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated
in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule
has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve
Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution,
which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in this section.
CONTENTION: Petitioners argue that the division of
San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate
congressional districts under Section 49 of the
assailed law has resulted in an increase in the
composition of the House of Representatives beyond
that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the
Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that
said division was not made pursuant to any census
showing that the subject municipalities have attained
the minimum population requirements. And finally,
petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of
preempting the right of Congress to reapportion
legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
HELD:
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation
of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a
population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the
"one city-one representative" proviso in the
Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3),
Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated
constitutional mandate that the creation of a
separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49
of R.A. No. 7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is
not a subject separate and distinct from the subject
of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into
a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No.
7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates
the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the
creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one
subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus,
in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled
that the constitutional requirement as now expressed
in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical
rather than a technical construction. It should be
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the
title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to that general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject"
rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v.
Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress
to employ in the title of an enactment, language of
such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices
if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators,
the persons interested in the subject of the bill and
the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation" (emphasis
supplied).
SC: Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues
raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no
mention in the assailed law of any census to show
that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained
the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to
justify their separation into two legislative districts,
the same does not suffice to strike down the validity
of R.A. No. 7675.
 The said Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the
establishment of separate legislative districts. At any
rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from
the legislature must contain all relevant data
considered by Congress in the enactment of said
laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the
present limit on the number of representatives as set
forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable
provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than 250 members, "unless otherwise
provided by law." The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of
Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so
mandates through a legislative enactment.
Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and
San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative
districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must
be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675
in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument
borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the
glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot
possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to
itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No.
7675, petitioners present further arguments against
the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan
should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a
change in their legislative district.
 The contention is bereft of merit since the principal
subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion
of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The
matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan
were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
GERRYMANDERING. Similarly, petitioners' additional
argument that the subject law has resulted in
"gerrymandering," which is the practice of creating
legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or
party, is not worthy of credence. As correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted
that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed
law, is the incumbent representative of the former
San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently
won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has
in fact been diminished, which development could
hardly be considered as favorable to him.
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED
MARIANO, JR. v. COMELEC, BINAY
FACTS:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to
be known as the City of Makati."1
G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition
and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay,
Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo Pascual, Teresita
Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante
Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are
residents of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional
sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 on the
following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify
the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution,
in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or
restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local
elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and
Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law (the Charter in violation of the
constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within
three (3) years following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not
expressed in the title of the bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only
450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H.
Osmeña as senator, taxpayer, and concerned citizen.
Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as
unconstitutional on the same grounds as aforestated.
HELD:
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the
land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of
Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city
to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter
referred to as the City, which shall comprise the
present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has
jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River
and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the
Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the
municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the
southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality
of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of
Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to
the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of
existing boundary disputes or cases involving
questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of
Makati and the adjoining local government units.
(Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this
delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a
local government unit should be made by metes and
bounds with technical descriptions.2
RATIONALE OF TERRITORIAL LIMITS. The importance
of drawing with precise strokes the territorial
boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for
they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of
a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits, its acts
are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in
the boundaries of local government units will sow
costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental
powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's
welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local
Government Code in requiring that the land area of a
local government unit must be spelled out in metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot
perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854,
Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of
Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We
note that said delineation did not change even by an
inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a
municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide,
or multiply the established land area of Makati. In
language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated
that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present
territory of the municipality."
HISTORY. The deliberations of Congress will reveal
that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of
the proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the time
of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial
dispute between the municipalities of Makati and
Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.
Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-equal
department of government, legislators felt that the
dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They
did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a
legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
This would have ensued if they defined the land area
of the proposed city by its exact metes and bounds,
with technical descriptions.3 We take judicial notice
of the fact that Congress has also refrained from
using the metes and bounds description of land
areas of other local government units with unsettled
boundary disputes.
SC: We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute
does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty
which will prevent Congress from defining with
reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a
local government unit.
IN THE CASE AT BAR: Congress maintained the
existing boundaries of the proposed City of Makati
but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the
ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering these
peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold
that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We
sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this
regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code, it is beyond cavil that the
requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial
jurisdiction of newly created or converted cities
should be described by meted and bounds, with
technical descriptions" — was made in order to
provide a means by which the area of said cities may
be reasonably ascertained. In other words, the
requirement on metes and bounds was meant
merely as tool in the establishment of local
government units. It is not an end in itself. Ergo, so
long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be
reasonably ascertained, i.e., by referring to common
boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as in
this case, then, it may be concluded that the
legislative intent behind the law has been
sufficiently served.
DETAILED TD NOT NECESSARY. Certainly, Congress
did not intend that laws creating new cities must
contain therein detailed technical descriptions similar
to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners
seem to imply. To require such description in the law
as a condition sine qua non for its validity would be
to defeat the very purpose which the Local
Government Code to seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower local government
units and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to
make local governments more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time
serving as a vital cog in national development. To
invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no
cadastral type of description was used in the law
would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the
Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving
the slave, instead of the other way around. This
could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced
when ascertained, although it may not be consistent
with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not
follow the letter of the statute when to do so would
depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the
general purpose of the act. (Torres v. Limjap, 56 Phil.,
141; Tañada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v.
Hidalgo, 33 SCRA 1105). Legislation is an active
instrument of government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve,
and statutes should be so construed as not to defeat
but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must
indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the
constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The
represent elective officials of the Municipality of
Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of
Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions
until such time that a new election is held and the duly
elected officials shall have already qualified and
assume their offices: Provided, The new city will
acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise
continue exercising their functions and duties and
they shall be automatically absorbed by the city
government of the City of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8,
Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution
which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined
by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives
shall be elected for a term of three years which shall
begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on
the thirtieth day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of
time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected.
CONTENTION: Petitioners stress that under these
provisions, elective local officials, including Members
of the House of Representative, have a term of three
(3) years and are prohibited from serving for more
than three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by
providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854
restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously
served by them. In particular, petitioners point that
section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor,
respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already served
for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that
should Mayor Binay decide to run and eventually win
as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run
for the same position in 1998 and seek another three-
year consecutive term since his previous three-year
consecutive term as municipal mayor would not be
counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section
51 has been conveniently crafted to suit the political
ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
SC: We cannot entertain this challenge to the
constitutionality of section 51. The requirements
before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of
a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be
an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
(3) the constitutional question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.5
Petitioners have far from complied with these
requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that
Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said
elections; and that he would seek re-election for the
same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that
these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except
Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue
in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail
the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. — Upon its conversion
into a highly-urbanized city, Makati shall thereafter
have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall
initially correspond to the two (2) existing districts
created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166
as implemented by the Commission on Elections to
commence at the next national elections to be held
after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays
Magallanes, Dasmariñas and Forbes shall be with the
first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-Viejo
which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis
supplied)
CONTENTION: They contend that the addition of
another legislative district in Makati is
unconstitutional for: (1) reapportionment cannot
made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative
district is not expressed in the title of the bill and (3)
Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands
at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case
of Tobias v. Abalos.8 In said case, we ruled that
reapportionment of legislative districts may be
made through a special law, such as in the charter of
a new city. The Constitution9 clearly provides that
Congress shall be composed of not more than two
hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed
by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership
by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what
was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati's legislative
district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general apportionment law,
with a review of all the legislative districts allotted
to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time. 10 The intolerable situations will
deprive the people of a new city or province a
particle of their sovereignty. 11 Sovereignty cannot
admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It
must be forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI 12 of the Constitution for as of
the latest survey (1990 census), the population of
Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000). 13 Said section provides, inter alia, that a
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of
Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred
fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may
still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides
that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be
entitled to at least one congressional representative.
14
Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention
that the creation of an additional legislative district in
Makati should have been expressly stated in the title
of the bill. In the same case of Tobias v. Abalos, op cit.,
we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal
construction of the "one title-one subject" rule so as
not to impede legislation. To be sure, with
Constitution does not command that the title of a law
should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely
catalogue all its details. Hence, we ruled that "it
should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses
the general subject and all the provisions are germane
to such general subject."
RULING: PETITION DISMISSED
MONTEJO v COMELEC
FACTS:
More than political fortunes are at stake in the case
at bench. Petitioner Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
representing the First District of Leyte, pleads for the
annulment of section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the
COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in
Leyte, on the ground that it violates the principle of
equality of representation. To remedy the alleged
inequity, petitioner seeks to transfer the municipality
of Tolosa from his district to the Second District of the
province. Intervenor Sergio A.F. Apostol, representing
the Second District, vigorously opposed the inclusion
of Tolosa in his district. We gave due course to the
petition considering that, at bottom, it involves the
validity of the unprecedented exercise by the
COMELEC of the legislative power of redistricting and
reapportionment.
The province of Leyte with the cities of Tacloban and
Ormoc is composed of five (5) legislative districts.1
The first district2 covers Tacloban City and the
municipalities of Alangalang, Babatngon, Palo, San
Miguel, Sta. Fe, Tanauan and Tolosa.
The second district3 is composed of the municipalities
of Barugo, Barauen, Capoocan, Carigara, Dagami,
Dulag, Jaro, Julita, La Pat, Mayorga, MacArthur,
Pastrana, Tabontabon, and Tunga.
The third district is composed of the municipalities of
Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Calubian,
Culaba, Kawayan, Leyte, Maripipi, Naval, San Isidro,
Tabango, and Villaba.
The fourth district5 is composed of Ormoc City and the
municipalities of Albuera, Isabel, Kananga, Matagob,
Merida, and Palompon.
The fifth district is composed of the municipalities of
Abuyog, Bate, Baybay, Hilongos, Hindang, Inopacan,
Javier, Mahaplag, and Matalom.
Biliran, located in the third district of Leyte , was made
its sub-province by virtue of Republic Act No. 2141
Section 1 of the law spelled out enacted on April 8,
1959.
Section 1 of the law spelled out the municipalities
comprising the sub-province, viz.: "Almeria, Biliran,
Cabucgayan, Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi and
Naval and all the territories comprised therein."
On January 1, 1992, the Local Government Code took
effect. Pursuant to its Section 462, the sub-province
of Biliran became a regular province. It provides:
Existing sub-provinces are hereby converted into
regular provinces upon approval by a majority of the
votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the sub-
provinces and the original provinces directly affected.
The plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC
simultaneously with the national elections following
the effectivity of this code. The new legislative
districts created as a result of such conversion shall
continue to be represented in Congress by the duly-
elected representatives of the original districts out of
which said new provinces or districts were created
until their own representatives shall have been
elected in the next regular congressional elections
and qualified.
PLEBISCITE. The conversion of Biliran into a regular
province was approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite held on May 11, 1992. As a
consequence of the conversion, eight (8)
municipalities of the Third District composed the new
province of Biliran, i.e., Almeria, Biliran, Cabucgayan,
Caibiran, Culaba, Kawayan, Maripipi, and Naval. A
further consequence was to reduce the Third District
to five (5) municipalities with a total population of
145,067 as per the 1990 census.
To remedy the resulting inequality in the distribution
of inhabitants, voters and municipalities in the
province of Leyte, respondent COMELEC held
consultation meetings with the incumbent
representatives of the province and other interested
parties. On December 29, 1994, it promulgated
Resolution No. 2736 where, among others, it
transferred the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte. The
composition of the First District which includes the
municipality of Tolosa and the composition of the
Fifth District were not disturbed. After the movement
of municipalities, the composition of the five (5)
legislative districts appeared as follows:
First District: Population Registered
 Voters
 (1990)
(1994)
1. Tacloban City, 137,190 81,679
2. Alangalang, 33,375 20,543
3. Babatngon, 17,795 9,929
4. Palo, 38,100 20,816
5. San Miguel, 13,438 8,167
6. Sta. Fe, 12,119 7,497
7. Tanauan and, 38,033 22,357
8. Tolosa; 13,299 7,700
———— ————
TOTAL 303,349 178,688
Second District:
Registered
 Voters
 (1990) (1994)
1. Barugo, 23,817 13,237
2. Barauen, 46,029 23,307
3. Carigara 38,863 22,036
4. Dagami, 25,606 16,519
5. Dulag, 33,020 19,375
6. Jaro, 31,727 17,139
7. Julita, 9,944 6,196
8. La Paz, 14,311 9,003
9. Mayorga, 10,530 5,868
10. Mac Arthur, 13,159 8,628
11. Pastrana, 12,565 7,348
12. Tabontabon, and 7,183 4,419
13. Tunga; 5,413 3,387
———— ————
TOTAL 272,167 156,462
Third District: Population Registered
 Voters
 (1990)
(1994)
1. Calubian, 25,968 16,649
2. Leyte, 32,575 16,415
3. San Isidro, 24,442 14,916
4. Tabango, 29,743 15,48
5. Villaba, 32,339 21,227
6. Capoocan, and 23,687 13,595
7. Palompon; 45,745 27,474
———— ————
TOTAL 214,499 125,763
Fourth District: Population Registered
 Voters
(1990) (1994)
1. Ormoc City, 129,456 75,140
2. Albuera, 32,395 17,493
3. Isabel, 33,389 21,889
4. Kananga, 36,288 19,873
5. Matagob, 15,474 9,407
6. Merida, and 22,345 12,474
———— ————
TOTAL 269,347 155,995
Fifth District: Population Registered
 Voters
 (1990)
(1994)
1. Abuyog, 47,265 28,682
2. Bato, 28,197 116,13
3. Baybay, 82,281 47,923
4. Hilongos, 48,617 26,871
5. Hindang, 16,272 9,659
6. Inopacan, 16,894 10,401
7. Javier, 18,658 11,713
8. Mahaplag, and 22,673 13,616
9. Matalom 28,291 16,247
———— ————
TOTAL 309,148 181,242
Population
ARGUMENT: Petitioner Montejo filed a motion for
reconsideration calling the attention of respondent
COMELEC, among others, to the inequitable
distribution of inhabitants and voters between the
First and Second Districts. He alleged that the First
District has 178,688 registered voters while the
Second District has 156,462 registered voters or a
difference of 22,226 registered voters. To diminish
the difference, he proposed that the municipality of
Tolosa with 7,7000 registered voters be transferred
from the First to the Second District. The motion was
opposed by intervenor, Sergio A.F. Apostol.
Respondent Commission denied the motion ruling
that: (1) its adjustment of municipalities involved the
least disruption of the territorial composition of each
district; and (2) said adjustment complied with the
constitutional requirement that each legislative
district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory.
In this petition, petitioner insists that Section I of
Resolution No. 2736 violates the principle of equality
of representation ordained in the Constitution. Citing
Wesberry v. Sanders,8 he argues that respondent
COMELEC violated "the constitutional precept that as
much as practicable one man's vote in a congressional
election is to be worth as much as another's." The
Solicitor General, in his Comment, concurred with the
views of the petitioner. The intervenor, however,
opposed the petition on two (2) grounds: (1)
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to promulgate
Resolution No. 2736; and (2) assuming it has
jurisdiction, said Resolution is in accord with the
Constitution. Respondent COMELEC filed its own
Comment alleging that it acted within the parameters
of the Constitution.
HELD:
We find section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 void.
While the petition at bench presents a significant
issue, our first inquiry will relate to the constitutional
power of the respondent COMELEC9 to transfer
municipalities from one legislative district to another
legislative district in the province of Leyte. The basic
powers of respondent COMELEC, as enforcer and
administrator of our election laws, are spelled out in
black and white in section 2(c), Article IX of the
Constitution. Rightly, respondent COMELEC does not
invoke this provision but relies on the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution as the source of
its power of redistricting which is traditionally
regarded as part of the power to make laws. The
Ordinance is entitled "Apportioning the Seats of the
House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines to the Different Legislative Districts in
Provinces and Cities and the Metropolitan Manila
Area." Its substantive sections state:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the
House of Representatives of the First Congress of the
Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the
1986 Constitutional Commission and subsequent
elections, and until otherwise provided by law, the
Members thereof shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby
empowered to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment herein made.
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or
any city whose population may hereafter increase to
more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at
least one Member or such number of Members as it
may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. The number of Members apportioned to
the province out of which such new province was
created or where the city, whose population has so
increased, is geographically located shall be
correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on
Elections but such adjustment shall not be made
within one hundred and twenty days before the
election. (Emphasis supplied)
The Ordinance was made necessary because
Proclamation No. 3 10 of President Corazon C. Aquino,
ordaining the Provisional Constitution of the Republic
of the Philippines, abolished the Batasang Pambansa.
11
She then exercised legislative powers under the
Provisional Constitution.12
The Ordinance was the principal handiwork of then
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr., 13 now a
distinguished member of this Court. The records
reveal that the Constitutional Commission had to
resolve several prejudicial issues before authorizing
the first congressional elections under the 1987
Constitution. Among the vital issues were: whether
the members of the House of Representatives would
be elected by district or by province; who shall
undertake the apportionment of the legislative
districts; and, how the apportionment should be
made.14 Commissioner Davide, Jr. offered three (3)
options for the Commission to consider: (1) allow
President Aquino to do the apportionment by law; (2)
empower the COMELEC to make the apportionment;
or (3) let the Commission exercise the power by way
of an Ordinance appended to the Constitution. 15 The
different dimensions of the options were discussed by
Commissioners Davide, Felicitas S. Aquino and Blas F.
Ople. We quote the debates in extenso, viz.:16
MR. PADILLA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. I think I have filed a very simple motion
by way of amendment by substitution and this was, I
believe, a prior or a proposed amendment. Also, the
chairman of the Committee on the Legislative said
that he was proposing a vote first by the Chamber on
the concept of whether the election is by province
and cities on the one hand, or by legislative districts
on the other. So I propose this simple formulation
which reads: "FOR THE FIRST ELECTION UNDER THIS
CONSTITUTION THE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS SHALL BE
APPORTIONED BY THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS."
I hope the chairman will accept the proposed
amendment.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION
MR. DAVIDE. The effect is, more or less, the same
insofar as the apportionment is concerned, but the
Bernas-Sarmiento et al. proposal would also provide
for a mandate for the apportionment later, meaning
after the first election, which will in effect embody
what the Commission had approved, reading as
follows: "Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
So, Mr. Presiding Officer, may I request for a
suspension of the session, so that all the proponents
can work together.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is
suspended.
It was 3:33 p.m.
RESUMPTION OF SESSION
At 3:40 p.m., the session was resumed.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The session is
resumed.
Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. Mr. Presiding Officer, as a compromise,
I wonder if the Commission will allow this. We will just
delete the proposed subparagraph (4) and all the
capitalized words in paragraph (5). So that in
paragraph (5), what would be left would only be the
following: "Within three years following the return of
every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section."
But we shall have an ordinance appended to the new
Constitution indicating specifically the following:
"FOR PURPOSES OF THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE FIRST
CONGRESSIONAL ELECTION IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS
CONSTITUTION PROPOSED BY THE 1986
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION AND SUBSEQUENT
ELECTIONS AND UNTIL OTHERWISE PROVIDED BY
LAW, THE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES SHALL BE ELECTED FROM
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS APPORTIONED AMONG THE
PROVINCES, CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA
AREA AS FOLLOWS."
And what will follow will be the allocation of seats to
Metropolitan Manila Area, to the provinces and to the
cities, without indicating the municipalities
comprising each of the districts. Then, under Section
2, we will mandate the COMELEC to make the actual
apportionment on the basis of the number of seats
provided for and allocated to each province by us.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. I have to object to the provision which
will give mandate to COMELEC to do the
redistricting. Redistricting is vitally linked to the
baneful practices of cutting up areas or spheres of
influence; in other words, gerrymandering. This
Commission, being a nonpartisan, a nonpolitical
deliberative body, is in the best possible situation
under the circumstances to undertake that
responsibility. We are not wanting in expertise and
in time because in the first place, the Committee on
the Legislative has prepared the report on the basis
of the recommendation of the COMELEC.
MR. OPLE. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Ople is recognized.
MR. OPLE. I would like to support the position taken
by Commissioner Aquino in this respect. We know
that the reapportionment of provinces and cities for
the purpose of redistricting is generally inherent in
the constituent power or in the legislative power. And
I would feel very uncertain about delegating this to a
quasi-judicial body even if it is one of the
constitutional offices created under this Constitution.
We have the assurance of Commissioner Davide, as
chairman of the Committee on the Legislative, that
even given the very short time remaining in the life of
this Commission, there is no reason why we cannot
complete the work of reapportionment on the basis
of the COMELEC plan which the committee has
already thoroughly studied and which remains
available to the Constitutional Commission.
So, I support the position taken by Commissioner
Aquino, Mr. Presiding Officer. I think, it is the safest,
the most reasonable, and the most workable
approach that is available to this Commission.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does
Commissioner Davide say:
MR. DAVIDE. The issue now is whether this body will
make the apportionment itself or whether we will
leave it to the COMELEC. So, there arises, therefore, a
prejudicial question for the body to decide. I would
propose that the Commission should now decide
what body should make the apportionment. Should it
be the Commission or should it be the COMELEC? And
the Committee on the Legislative will act accordingly
on the basis of the decision.
MR. BENGZON. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Bengzon is recognized.
MR. BENGZON. Apropos of that, I would like to inform
the body that I believe the Committee on the
Legislative has precisely worked on this matter and
they are ready with a list of apportionment. They
have, in fact, apportioned the whole country into
various districts based on the recommendation of the
COMELEC. So they are ready with the list and if this
body would wish to apportion the whole country by
district itself, then I believe we have the time to do it
because the Committee on the Legislative is ready
with that particular report which need only to be
appended to the Constitution. So if this body is ready
to accept the work of the Committee on the
Legislative we would have no problem. I just would
like to give that information so that the people here
would be guided accordingly when they vote.
MR. RODRIGO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner
Rodrigo is recognized.
MR. RODRIGO. I just would like to ask Commissioner
Davide some questions.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Davide may yield if he so desires.
MR. DAVIDE. Gladly.
MR. RODRIGO. Will this apportionment which we are
considering apply only to the first election after the
enactment of the Constitution?
MR. DAVIDE. On the basis of the Padilla proposal, it
will be for the first election; on the basis of the
Sarmiento proposal, it will only apply to the first
election.
MR. RODRIGO. And after that, Congress will have the
power to reapportion.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
MR. RODRIGO. So, if we attach this to the Constitution
— the reapportionment based on the COMELEC study
and between the approval of the Constitution and the
first election — the COMELEC no longer has the
power to change that even a bit.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) Commissioner
Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. May I address a clarificatory
question to Commissioner Davide?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Gentleman will
please proceed.
MR. REGALADO. On the basis of the Commissioner's
proposed apportionment and considering the fact
that there will be a corresponding reduction to 183
seats, would there be instances representation of
under non-representation?
MR. DAVIDE. None at all, Mr. Presiding Officer. I can
assure the Commission that there will be no case of
inequitable distribution. It will come out to be one for
every 350 to 400,000 inhabitants.
MR. REGALADO. And that would be within the
standard that we refer.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. REGALADO. Thank you.
MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The Floor Leader
is recognized.
MR. RAMA. The parliamentary situation is that there
was a motion by Commissioner Sarmiento to
mandate COMELEC to do the redistricting. This was
also almost the same motion by Commissioner Padilla
and I think we have had some kind of meeting of
minds. On the other hand, there seems to be a
prejudicial question, an amendment to the
amendment as suggested by Commissioner Aquino,
that instead of the COMELEC, it should be this
Commission that shall make the redistricting. So may
I ask Commissioner Aquino, if she insists on that idea,
to please formulate it into a motion so we can vote on
that first as an amendment to the amendment.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).Commissioner
Aquino is recognized.
MS . AQUINO. The motion is for this Commission to
undertake the apportionment of the legislative
districts instead of the proposal that COMELEC be
given the mandate to undertake the responsibility.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. SARMIENTO. May I be clarified, Mr. Presiding
Officer. Is it the motion or the proposed amendment?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). The proposed
amendment.
MR. SARMIENTO. May we move for the approval of
this proposed amendment which we substitute for
paragraphs 4 and 5.
MR. DAVIDE. May I request that it should be treated
merely as a motion to be followed by a deletion of
paragraph 4 because that should not really appear as
a paragraph in Section 5; otherwise, it will appear very
ugly in the Constitution where we mandate a
Commission that will become functus officio to have
the authority. As a matter of fact, we cannot exercise
that authority until after the ratification of the new
Constitution.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What does
Commissioner Sarmiento say?
MR. SARMIENTO. It is accepted, Mr. Presiding Officer.
So, may I move for the approval of this proposed
amendment.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner
Aquino is recognized.
MS. AQUINO. Would that require a two-thirds vote or
a simple plurality to adopt that motion?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). That will require
a two-thirds vote.
MS. AQUINO. Thank you. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I restate the motion, Mr.
Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir) The Gentleman
may proceed.
MR. SARMIENTO. May I move that this Commission
do the reapportionment legislative districts.
MS. AQUINO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). What is the
pleasure of Commissioner Aquino?
MS. AQUINO. May I be clarified again on the motion.
Is Commissioner Sarmiento, therefore, adopting my
motion? Would it not be right for him to move that
the COMELEC be mandated?
MR. SARMIENTO. No, we accepted the amendment.
It is already the Commission that will be mandated.
MS. AQUINO. So, the Gentlemen has accepted the
amendment the amendment.
Thank you.
MR. SARMIENTO. I am voting that this Commission
do the reapportionment.
VOTING
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Let us proceed
to vote.
As many as are in favor, please raise their hand.
(Several Members raised their hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (No
Member raised his hand.)
The results show 30 votes in favor and none against;
the motion is approved.
NOTE: Clearly then, the Constitutional Commission
denied to the COMELEC the major power of
legislative apportionment as it itself exercised the
power. Section 2 of the Ordinance only empowered
the COMELEC "to make minor adjustments of the
reapportionment herein made." The meaning of the
phrase "minor adjustments was again clarified in the
debates of the Commission, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
MR. GUINGONA. This is just clarificatory, Mr.
Presiding Officer. In Section 2, the Commission on
Elections is empowered to make minor adjustments
on the apportionment made here.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. GUINGONA. We have not set any time limit for
this.
MR. DAVIDE. We should not set a time limit unless
during the period of amendments a proposal is made.
The authority conferred would be on minor
corrections or amendments, meaning to say, for
instance, that we may have forgotten an intervening
municipality in the enumeration, which ought to be
included in one district. That we shall consider a
minor amendment.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Romulo). Commissioner
de Castro is recognized.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
I was about to ask the committee the meaning of
minor adjustment. Can it be possible that one
municipality in a district be transferred to another
district and call it a minor adjustment?
MR. DAVIDE. That cannot be done, Mr. Presiding
Officer. Minor, meaning, that there should be no
change in the allocations per district. However, it
may happen that we have forgotten a municipality in
between which is still in the territory of one assigned
district, or there may be an error in the correct name
of a particular municipality because of changes made
by the interim Batasang Pambansa and the Regular
Batasang Pambansa. There were many batas
pambansa enacted by both the interim and the
Regular Batasang Pambansa changing the names of
municipalities.
MR. DE CASTRO. So, the minor adjustment may be
made only if one of the municipalities is not
mentioned in the ordinance appended to, and it will
be up for the COMELEC now to adjust or to put such
municipality to a certain district.
MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer. For instance,
we may not have the data regarding a division of a
municipality by the interim Batasang Pambansa or the
Regular Batasang Pambansa into two municipalities,
meaning, a mother municipality and the new
municipality, but still actually these are within the
geographical district area.
MR. DE CASTRO. So the minor adjustment which the
COMELEC cannot do is that, if, for example, my
municipality is in the First District of Laguna, they
cannot put that in any other district.
MR. DAVIDE. That is not even a minor correction. It is
a substantive one.
MR. DE CASTRO. Thank you.
NOTE: Consistent with the limits of its power to
make minor adjustments, Section 3 of the Ordinance
did not also give the respondent COMELEC any
authority to transfer municipalities from one
legislative district to another district. The power
granted by Section 3 to the respondent COMELEC is
to adjust the number of members (not
municipalities) "apportioned to the province out of
which such new province was created. . . ."
GAD. Prescinding from these premises, we hold that
respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
promulgated section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736
transferring the municipality of Capoocan of the
Second District and the municipality of Palompon of
the Fourth District to the Third District of Leyte.
REMEDY LIES IN THE CONGRESS. It may well be that
the conversion of Biliran from a sub-province to a
regular province brought about an imbalance in the
distribution of voters and inhabitants in the five (5)
legislative districts of the province of Leyte. This
imbalance, depending on its degree, could devalue a
citizen's vote in violation of the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Be that as it may, it is not
proper at this time for petitioner to raise this issue
using the case at bench as his legal vehicle. The issue
involves a problem of reapportionment of legislative
districts and petitioner's remedy lies with Congress. Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the
Section 5(4), Article VI of the Constitution existing first and second legislative districts of the
categorically gives Congress the power to province.
reapportion, thus: "Within three (3) years following Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of
the return of every census, the Congress shall make a Camarines Sur was estimated to have a population of
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the 1,693,821,2 distributed among four (4) legislative
standards provided in this section." In Macias v. districts in this wise:
COMELEC, 18 we ruled that the validity of a legislative District Municipalities/Cities Populatio
apportionment is a justiciable question. But while this 1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
Court can strike down an unconstitutional Ragay Minalabac
reapportionment, it cannot itself make the Lupi Pamplona
reapportionment as petitioner would want us to do Sipocot Pasacao
by directing respondent COMELEC to transfer the Cabusao San Fernando
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the 2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
Second District of the province of Leyte. Milaor Camaligan
Naga Magarao
RULING: IN VIEW WHEREOF, section 1 of Resolution Pili Bombon
No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Ocampo Calabanga
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality 3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District Garchitorena San Jose
of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We Goa Tigaon
also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the Lagonoy Tinamba
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Presentacion Siruma
Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs. 4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
SO ORDERED.
Baao Bula
Balatan Nabua
Bato
AQUINO v. COMELEC
Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716,
the first and second districts of Camarines Sur were
FACTS:
reconfigured in order to create an additional
legislative district for the province. Hence, the first
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
Rules of Court. In this original action, petitioners
combined with the second district municipalities of
Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens,
district. The following table3 illustrates the
seek the nullification as unconstitutional of Republic
reapportionment made by Republic Act No. 9716:
Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Reapportioning the
District Municipalities/Cities
Composition of the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur 1st District Del Gallego
and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Ragay
Such Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently Lupi
pray that the respondent Commission on Elections be Sipocot
restrained from making any issuances and from taking Cabusao
any steps relative to the implementation of Republic 2nd District Libmanan S
Act No. 9716. Minalabac G
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. Pamplona M
4264, and was signed into law by President Gloria Pasacao
Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It took effect 3rd District (formerly 2nd District) Naga C
on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its Pili M
publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of Ocampo B
general circulation.1 In substance, the said law Canaman C
created an additional legislative district for the 4th District (formerly 3rd District) Caramoan S

5th District (formerly 4th District)
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The
factual recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill
that became the law show that, from the filing of
House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the Senate on
a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the
process progressed step by step, marked by public
hearings on the sentiments and position of the local
officials of Camarines Sur on the creation of a new
congressional district, as well as argumentation and
debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the
stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population of
at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for
such new district. 4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who
voted against the approval of the Bill by the Senate.
His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the Mayor of Naga City,
which was a part of the former second district from
which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were
taken for inclusion in the new second district. No
other local executive joined the two; neither did the
representatives of the former third and fourth
districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the
explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic
Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000 minimum
6
population standard. The provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners
Garchitorena San Jose posit that the 250,000 figure
Goa appearing in the above-cited provision is the
Tigaon
Lagonoy minimumTinamba population requirement for the creation of
a legislative
Presentacion Sirumadistrict.7 The petitioners theorize that,
Iriga save in the
Buhicase of a newly created province, each
429,070
Baao legislative
Buladistrict created by Congress must be
Balatan supported Nabuaby a minimum population of at least
8
Bato 250,000 in order to be valid. Under this view, existing
legislative districts may be reapportioned and
severed to form new districts, provided each resulting
district will represent a population of at least 250,000.
On the other hand, if the reapportionment would
result in the creation of a legislative seat representing
a populace of less than 250,000 inhabitants, the
reapportionment must be stricken down as invalid for
non-compliance with the minimum population
requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to
what they claim is the intent of the framers of the
1987 Constitution to adopt a population minimum of
250,000 in the creation of additional legislative seats.9
The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional
Commission fixed the original number of district seats
in the House of Representatives to two hundred
(200), they took into account the projected national
population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the
year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million
people represented by 200 district representatives
translates to roughly 250,000 people for every one (1)
representative.11 Thus, the 250,000 population
requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution is actually based on the population
constant used by the Constitutional Commission in
distributing the initial 200 legislative seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning
legislative districts independently from the creation
of a province, Congress is bound to observe a 250,000
population threshold, in the same manner that the
Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the
newly apportioned first district of Camarines Sur
failed to meet the population requirement for the
creation of the legislative district as explicitly
provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and
(3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended thereto; and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of
proportional representation as provided in Article VI,
Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3) and (4) of the
Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.
(4) Within three years following the return of every
census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standards
provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of
the present petition based on procedural and
substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that
the petitioners are guilty of two (2) fatal technical
defects: first, petitioners committed an error in
choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court; and second, the
petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call
attention to an apparent distinction between cities
and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the
existence of a 250,000 population condition, but
argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no
application with respect to the creation of legislative
districts in provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum
population is only a requirement for the creation of a
legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed
population requirement for the reapportionment of
districts in provinces. Therefore, Republic Act No.
9716, which only creates an additional legislative
district within the province of Camarines Sur, should
be sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment
law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail
themselves of the remedies of Certiorari and
Prohibition, the petitioners have committed a fatal
procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following
reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that
the respondents had acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.1avvphi1
2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be
directed against a tribunal, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or
ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not
acting as a judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were
they engaging in the performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of
another plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Considering that the main
thrust of the instant petition is the declaration of
unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the
same could have been ventilated through a petition
for declaratory relief, over which the Supreme Court
has only appellate, not original jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners
had failed to show that they had sustained, or is in
danger of sustaining any substantial injury as a result
of the implementation of Republic Act No. 9716. The
respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners
lack the required legal standing to question the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural
debates when confronted with issues that, by reason
of constitutional importance, need a direct focus of
the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion,
tempered the application of procedural rules,14 as
well as relaxed the requirement of locus standi
whenever confronted with an important issue of
overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v.
PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned momentary
deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of
courts, and took original cognizance of cases raising
issues of paramount public importance. The Jaworski
case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be
properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition
at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and
moral well being of this nation, specially the youth;
hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-
entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice.
Their strict and rigid application, which would result
in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has
already uniformly ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 18
Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19 Chavez v. Public
Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that
absence of direct injury on the part of the party
seeking judicial review may be excused when the
latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance. In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court
held that in cases of transcendental importance, the
cases must be settled promptly and definitely, and so,
the standing requirements may be relaxed. This
liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent
decision on Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant
petition, the foregoing principles must apply. The
beaten path must be taken. We go directly to the
determination of whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by
Congress carries with it the presumption of
constitutionality.24 Before a law may be declared
unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental
law has been violated or transgressed. When there is
neither a violation of a specific provision of the
Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such
a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to
sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that
fixes a 250,000 minimum population that must
compose a legislative district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the
second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, coupled with what they perceive to be
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt
a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative
district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district
on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about
population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to
separate the phrase "each city with a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
each province" point to no other conclusion than that
the 250,000 minimum population is only required for
a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires
a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for
legislative districts in cities was, in turn, the subject of
interpretation by this Court in Mariano, Jr. v.
COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7854, which was
the law that converted the Municipality of Makati into
a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act
No. 7854 created an additional legislative district for
Makati, which at that time was a lone district. The
petitioners in that case argued that the creation of an
additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution, because the resulting districts
would be supported by a population of less than
250,000, considering that Makati had a total
population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of the law and the
validity of the newly created district, explaining the
operation of the Constitutional phrase "each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,"
to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another
legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the
latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati
stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) shall have at least one representative. Even
granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990
census stood at four hundred fifty thousand
(450,000), its legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population
requirement of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000). In fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides that a city
whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to
at least one congressional representative.28 (Emphasis
supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the
250,000 minimum population requirement for cities
only to its initial legislative district. In other words,
while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
requires a city to have a minimum population of
250,000 to be entitled to a representative, it does not
have to increase its population by another 250,000 to
be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which
involves the creation of an additional district within a
city, should not be applied to additional districts in
provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative district
created within a city is not required to represent a
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid,
neither should such be needed for an additional
district in a province, considering moreover that a
province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact
of its creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to at
least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of the
Local Government Code states:
Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be
created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on
1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely an
alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the
pertinent ideas that ran through the deliberations on
the words and meaning of Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population
requirement of "at least two hundred fifty thousand"
may be gleaned from the records of the
Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the
provisions of Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to
form an ordinance that would be appended to the
final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING THE SEATS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE
DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES AND CITIES AND THE
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such records would
show that the 250,000 population benchmark was
used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of
legislative districts among provinces, cities and
Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the population
figure was used to determine how many districts a
province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have.
Simply discernible too is the fact that, for the purpose,
population had to be the determinant. Even then, the
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was not taken as
an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And,
closer to the point herein at issue, in the
determination of the precise district within the
province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned,
population as a factor was not the sole, though it was
among, several determinants.
From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional
Commission originally divided the entire country into
two hundred (200) districts, which corresponded to
the original number of district representatives. The
200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional
Commission in this manner: first, one (1) seat each
was given to the seventy-three (73) provinces and the
ten (10) cities with a population of at least 250,000;30
second, the remaining seats were then redistributed
among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan
Area "in accordance with the number of their
inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive
ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a
Member and then Chief Justice of the Court,
explained this in his sponsorship remark32 for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the
number of legislative seats which are, in turn,
apportioned among provinces and cities with a
population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan
Area in accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. The population is based on the 1986
projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the
point of reckoning. This projection indicates that our
population is more or less 56 million. Taking into
account the mandate that each city with at least 250,
000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least
one representative, we first allotted one seat for each
of the 73 provinces, and each one for all cities with a
population of at least 250, 000, which are the Cities of
Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu, Iloilo,
Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga.
Thereafter, we then proceed[ed] to increase
whenever appropriate the number of seats for the
provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio. (Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each
province and city. Differentiated from this, the
determination of the districts within the province had
to consider "all protests and complaints formally
received" which, the records show, dealt with
determinants other than population as already
mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the
Constitutional Commission narrates:
INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:
Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including
Puerto Princesa in the northern towns when it was
more affinity with the southern town of Aborlan,
Batarasa, Brooke’s Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos.
He stated that the First District has a greater area than
the Second District. He then queried whether
population was the only factor considered by the
Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the
Committee took into account the standards set in
Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative Department,
namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned
among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio; and 2)
the legislative district must be compact, adjacent and
contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not
met when Puerto Princesa was included with the
northern towns. He then inquired what is the distance
between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa
has a population of 75,480 and based on the
apportionment, its inclusion with the northern towns
would result in a combined population of 265,000 as
against only 186,000 for the south. He added that
Cuyo and Coron are very important towns in the
northern part of Palawan and, in fact, Cuyo was the
capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto
Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more
potential candidates in the north and therefore if
Puerto Princesa City and the towns of Cuyo and Coron
are lumped together, there would be less candidates
in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not
interested in politics. He then suggested that Puerto
Princesa be included in the south or the Second
District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be
considered during the period of amendments. He
requested that the COMELEC staff study said
proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO
On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed
out that it was explained in the interpellations that
District I has a total population of 265,358 including
the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second District
has a total population of 186,733. He proposed,
however, that Puerto Princesa be included in the
Second District in order to satisfy the contiguity
requirement in the Constitution considering that said
City is nearer the southern towns comprising the
Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsod’s query, Mr. Nolledo
explained that with the proposed transfer of Puerto
Princesa City to the Second District, the First District
would only have a total population of 190,000 while
the Second District would have 262,213, and there
would be no substantial changes.
Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledo’s proposal to insert
Puerto Princesa City before the Municipality of
Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members
the same was approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND
DISTRICTING OF PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr.
Davide, there being no objection, the apportionment
and districting for the province of Palawan was
approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000
population figure. It was decided by the importance
of the towns and the city that eventually composed
the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The
Journal further narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that
Mr. Regalado made a reservation with the Committee
for the possible reopening of the approval of Region I
with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the
Committee, Baguio City and Tuba are placed in one
district. He stated that he was toying with the idea
that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio
because it is the summer capital of the Philippines,
Tuba could be divorced from Baguio City so that it
could, by itself, have its own constituency and Tuba
could be transferred to the Second District together
with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that
the population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of
Baguio may be lower during certain times of the year,
but the transient population would increase the
population substantially and, therefore, for purposes
of business and professional transactions, it is beyond
question that population-wise, Baguio would more
than qualify, not to speak of the official business
matters, transactions and offices that are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Lima’s statement
that unless Tuba and Baguio City are united, Tuba will
be isolated from the rest of Benguet as the place can
only be reached by passing through Baguio City. He
stated that the Committee would submit the matter
to the Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on
his amendment, Mr. Regalado stated that the Body
should have a say on the matter and that the
considerations he had given are not on the
demographic aspects but on the fact that Baguio City
is the summer capital, the venue and situs of many
government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection,
the Body approved the reconsideration of the earlier
approval of the apportionment and districting of
Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no
objection, the amendment of Mr. Regalado was put
to a vote. With 14 Members voting in favor and none
against, the amendment was approved by the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of
the amendment, Benguet with Baguio City will have
two seats. The First District shall comprise of the
municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun,
Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay,
La Trinidad, Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second
District shall comprise of Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the
apportionment and districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly
removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of
Cavite was divided into districts based on the
distribution of its three cities, with each district
having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing
area; another a vegetable and fruit area; and the
third, a rice growing area," because such
consideration "fosters common interests in line with
the standard of compactness."36 In the districting of
Maguindanao, among the matters discussed were
"political stability and common interest among the
people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and
disunity" considering the "accepted regional,
political, traditional and sectoral leaders." 37 For
Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities in the
highland should not be grouped with the towns in the
lowland. For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong
proposed that they should "balance the area and
population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer
deliberations on district apportionment, we stated in
Bagabuyo v. COMELEC39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the
population sizes of the districts. The Constitution,
however, does not require mathematical exactitude
or rigid equality as a standard in gauging equality of
representation. x x x. To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and
ease of access by the representative to the
constituents, all that the Constitution requires is that
every legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and adjacent
territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against
the uncompromising stand of petitioner that an
additional provincial legislative district, which does
not have at least a 250,000 population is not allowed
by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear
lesson.
Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a
population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua non
for the formation of an additional legislative district in
a province, whose population growth has increased
beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated
population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─ based on the
formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the
Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning
legislative districts among provinces and cities ─
entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4)
that it was given in the 1986 apportionment.
Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this point.40
In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly
written allows and does not prohibit an additional
district for the Province of Camarines Sur, such as that
provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the
Ordinance on the protests and complaints against
strict conformity with the population standard, and
more importantly based on the final districting in the
Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first
and second legislative districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur that resulted in the creation of a new
legislative district is valid even if the population of the
new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted
upon by the petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on
House Bill No. 4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that
of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality
subject of the discussion from the reconfigured
District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts
resulting from the redistricting of Districts One and
Two.41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others
considered together, with the increased population
of the erstwhile Districts One and Two, point to the
utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave
abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the
invalidation of Republic Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in
the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of
inhabitants in the resulting additional district should
not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not
the only factor but is just one of several other factors
in the composition of the additional district. Such
settlement is in accord with both the text of the
Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so very clearly
given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact
issue presented by this petition.1avvphi1
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New
Legislative District From Such Reapportionment" is a
VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.