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NruMrcrvncv Vol. 5. pp.

195 10 206
Pergsmon Press ltd 1980. Printed in Great BnUin
0 lBR0

~O~~ENTA~Y

MIND-BRAIN INTERACTION: MENTALISM, YES;


DUALISM, NO

R. W. SPERRY

California Institute of Technology, Division of Biology, Pasadena, CA 91125, U.S.A.

Abetract-A traditional working hypothesis in neuroscience holds that a complete account of brain
function is possible. in principle, in strictly neurophysiological terms without invoking conscious or
mental agents; the neural correlates of subjective experience are conceived to exert causal influence but
not mental qualities per se. This long established materialist-behaviorist principle has been challenged in
recent years by the introduction of a modified concept of the mind-brain relation in which conscious-
ness is conceived to be emergent and causal. ~choph~~l interaction is explained in terms of the
emergence in nesting brain hierarchies of high order, functionally derived, mental properties that interact
by laws and principles different from, and not reducible to those of neurophysiology. Reciprocal upward
and downward, interlevel determination of the mental and neural action is accounted for on these terms
without violating the principles of scientific explanation and without reducing the qualities of inner
experience to those of physiology. Interaction of mind and brain becomes not only conceivable and
~entific~ly tenable, but more plausible in some respects than were the older parahelist and identity
views of the materialist position.
This revised cpncept of consciousness as causal, with its recognition of mental phenomena as expiana-
tory constructs in science,has brought a marked change during the past decade in the scientific status of
consciousness and of mental and cognitive phenomena generally. Resultant mehtalist trends within
science have been accompanied also by a corollary rise in acceptance of various mentalist-related
concepts and dualist beliefs in the supernatural, the paranormal and in uncmbodied forms of conscious
existena that receiveno logid suppon from the new mind-brain concepts of neuroscience. Reasons are
advanced to show that our latest mind-brain model is fundamen~liy monistic and not only fails to
support dualiim but aerves to further discount fading prospects for finding dualist forms or domains of
conscious experience not embodied in a functidning brain.

THE NEW INTERACTIONXSM locus of consciousness and the support of dualism.. I


have always favored monism, and still do. Sir John
WHEN two eminent authorities of science and philoso- tells me that I am a dualist and I respond, ‘Only if the
phy, of the stature and influence of Sir John Eccles term is redefined to take on a new meaning quite
and Sir I&u1 Popper, join forces to aflirm dualistic dilTerent from what it traditionally has stood for’in
beliefs in the reality of the’supematural and the exist- philosophy.’ Dualism and monism have long repre-
ence of extraphysical, unembodied agents to challenge sented a dichotomy that offers opposing answers to
some of the most fundamental precepts of science, one one of man’s most critical and enduring concerns,
is impelled to take more than passing notice. Regard- namely, Can conscious experience exist apart from
less of one’s personal convictions and reactions, the the brain? Dualism, aflirming the existence of inde-
kind of public message that is conveyed, directly and pendent mental and physical worlds, says ‘yes’ and
indirectly, by their book The Self and Its Brain-An opens the door to a conscious after-life and to many
Argumentjbr Interactionism (Porn & ECCLES,1977) kinds of supernatural, paranormal and other-worldly
along with Eccies’s more recent volume Thp Human beliefs. Monism, on the other hand restricts its
Mystery (ECCLES,1979) and the potential impact of answers to one-world dimensions and says ‘no’ to an
these on the intellectual perspectives of our times independent existence of conscious mind apart from
become a matter of some concern. Such consider- the functioning brain.
ations, and the fact that my own views and writings In recent years there has arisen some real need to
are cited in support of some of the key concepts and change and sharpen ddinitions of certain philosophic
as being in alignment with dualist interactionism, terms to fit our new views in neuroscience. However,
prompt this effort to clarify certain points that other- in the case of monism and dualism, I see no advan-
wise leave erroneous impressions. tage in changing the dassic definitions. We greatly
Before I attempt to focus on specifics, it will help to need terms by which to distinguish the critical dicho-
mention broadly that whereas Sir John Eccles and I tomy regarding the potential separability of brain and
have similar outlooks with many highly congenial conscious experience during life as well as after. Dtut-
persP=tives, aims and values, we do, however, share lism and monism have long served this need in the
certain friendly dilTerences in regard to the nature and past and seem best qualified to continue.
Nb.C 5/2-A 195
196 R. W. SPERR’I

At the same time I am in strong agreement with still complete heresy to those of us in neuroscience
Eccles in rejecting both materialism (or physicalism) and I did not venture to push them at this conference
and reductionism-or at least what these terms pre- beyond mild reference to ‘a view that holds that con-
dominantly stood for prior to the mid-1960s. Since sciousness may have some operational and causal use’.
1965 I have referred to myself as a ‘mentalist’ and To this Eccles responded by asking ‘Why do we have
since the mid-1930s have fhmly renounced reductio- to be conscious at all? We can, in principle, explain all
nism in the philosophic. ‘nothing but’ sense to be our input-output performance in terms of activity of
explained below. However, in the case of the terms neuronal circuits; and. consequently, consciousness
‘mentalism’ and the opposing ‘materialism’, and the seems to be absolutely unnecessary’ (Eccles, 1966, p.
form of dichotomy these two imply, some change and 248). This is, of course. what we had all been taught
sharpening of definitions is now called for by our and believed for decades, not only in science but also
modified mind-brain concepts. On our new terms, (by the great majority) in philosophy. The idea that
which I will outline below, ‘mentalism’ is no longer the objective physical brain process is causally com-
synonymous with ‘dualism’ nor is ‘physicalism’ the plete in itself without reference to conscious or mental
equivalent of lonism’. By our current mind-brain forces represents the central premise of behaviorism
theory, monism has to include subjective mental and of scientific materialism in general and has long
properties as causal realities. This is not the case with served as a prime basis for the renunciation of the
physicalism or materialism which are the understood phenomena of subjective experience as explanatory
antitheses of mentalism, and have traditionally constructs in science. Eccles, however, already at the
excluded mental phenomena as causal.constructs. In time a dualist by faith, training and publication
calling myself a ‘mentalist’, I hold subjective mental (ECCLES,1953);went on to add: ‘I don’t believe this
phenomena to be primary, causally potent realities as story, of course; but at the same time, I do not know
they are experienced subjectively, different from, more the logical answer to it.’ Nevertheless, his considered
than, and not reducible to their physicochemical ele- conviction on the first point was firmly reiterated in a
ments. At the same time, I define this position and the later session, ‘I am prepared to say that as neurophy-
mind-brain theory on which it is based as monistic siologists we simply have no use for consciousness in
and see it as a major deterrent to dualism. In order to our attempts to explain how the nervous system
better explain these distinctions, it will be helpful to works.. .’ (ECCLE.S,1966, p. 250).
start at the beginning and to follow the conceptual I argued the point briefly but was not yet suffi-
developments step-by-step as they occurred. ciently versed in my new-found answer to pursue it
My long-trusted materialist logic was first shaken vigorously at the time. In the ensuing weeks and
in the spring of 1964 in preparing a nontechnical lec- months, however, in pondering the unifying role of
ture on brain evolution in which I was extending the callosal activity, the ideas kept recurring and the
concept of emergent control of higher over lower more I thought about them, the better. they looked. A
forces in nested hierarchies to include the mind-brain trial run the next April to our Caltech Division of
relation. I found myself concluding with the then- Biology convinced me that reductive neuroscience
awkward notion that emergent mental powers must and biology were not exactly ready for this kind of
logically exert downward causal control over electro- thinking. However, I decided to proceed anyway with
physiological events in brain activity. Mental forces a presentation the following month in a humanist lec-
were inferred to be equally or more potent in brain ture at the University of Chicago for the volume, New
dynamics than are the forces operating at the cellular, Views of the Nature ofMan, edited by J. hATi ( 1965).
molecular and atomic levels (SPERRY,1964). Again in For the purpose of this lecture, I worked the new
September of that year, when preparing a paper for mind-brain ideas into a discussion of holist-reduction-
the Vatican Conference on Brain and Consciousness ist issues, emergent downward control. and ‘nothing
organized by John Eccles, it occurred to me that the but’ fallacies in human value systems, in a broad refu-
functionist interpretation of consciousness that I had tation of the then prevalent ’ mechanistic, material-
outlined in the early 1950s (SPERRY,1952), and still istic, behavioristic, fatalistic, reductionistic view of the’
favor, must also logically call for a functional (and nature of mind and psyche’. It was on this occa-
therefore causal) influence of conscious experience in sion that 1 openly changed my alignment from beha-
brain activity. It was obvious that these combined viorist materialism to antimechanistic and nonreduc-
concepts, were they to hold up, would provide a new tive mentalism (-as the term ‘mentalism’ is used in
approach to the old question of how consciousness psychology in contrast to behaviorism; not, of course.
may be of functional use and exert a causal control in the extreme philosophic sense that would deny
role in brain processing. The kind of psychophysical material reality). At the same time, I described this
relation envisaged showed how mind could influence new position as a unifying scheme that ‘would elimin-
matter in the brain, making the interaction of such ate the old dualistic confusions’ in favor of ‘a single
different things as mental states and physical events “this world” measuring stick for evaluating man and
logically understandable at long last on terms that existence’.
were scientifically acceptable. The main thesis of the essay, as in the Poppe-
In the mid-sixties, such interactionist concepts were Eccles book, was psychophysical interaction, its logi-
Mind-brain interaction 197

cal support and its scientific, philosophic and human importance in the present context and will not be
value implications. Essentially, it presented the view pursued here. However, in the case of those differ-
that subjective experience as an operational derivative ences that pertain to the mind-brain problem and to
and emergent property of brain activity plays a prime dualist interactioniim WC deal, as Sir John has very
causal role in the control of brain function. It differed ably emphasized. with more than ordinary professional
from previous emergent theories of consciousness, and academic interpretations. At stake are central
from C. LLOYDMORGAN (1923) onward, in that earlier key concepts that directly involve fundamental con-
emergent views of mind had been conceived in terms victions regarding the nature of man’s inner being,
that wereparallelistic, double aspect, or epiphenomenal, physical reality, the meaning of existence, and related
and had rejected any direct causal influence of mental matters of ultimate concern. Because perspectives in
qualities on neural processing (K~~HLER,1961). The this area profoundly shape human value systems and
thesis was focussed on contradicting the traditional, societal decision-making and hence human destiny,
mechanistic assumption expressed by Eccles that we mutually agree that these issues must take prece-
brain processing can be completely accounted for, in dence over other considerations.
principle, without including conscious phenomena. Looking back today, it Seems clear that I quite
Presented in terms of neuronal circuitry and concepts failed to foresee how the new mind-brain solution
of neuroscience, it seemed to counter and refute, for might be taken to support dualism. Even though dua-
the first time on its own grounds, the classic physica- lism and mentalism had long been associated and
list assumption of a purely physical determinancy of even equated, and some colleagues had forewarned
the CNS. The subjective mental phenomena had to be that I might accordingly be accused of dualism, I
included. Mind-brain interaction was made a scienti- nevertheless supposed the new mentalist-dtialist dis-
fically tenable and even plausible concept without tinctions to have been sufficiently clarified (see
reducing the qualitative richness of mental properties. especially, SPERRY, 19706). Back in the 1960s dualist
The overall aim of the paper, as in ihe Popper-Eccles views were no threat to science and accordingly, it
volume, was to show that this recognition of the pri- seemed much more important in those years to com-
macy of conscious mind as causal would alter pro- bat the more prevalent errors of materialism, mechan-
foundly the value implications of science which were ism, behaviorism and reductionism, than to empha-
being downgraded by the then strongly dominant size the conjoint logic against dualism. Again, the
philosophy of reductive mechanistic materialism. finer points involved here are better and more easily
At the same time, the proposed mind-brain model explained if we continue to follow the chronological
was taken to undermine dualism as well by explaining approach.
conscious experience in terms that would make mind
inextricably inseparable from, and embodied in, the
functioning brain. It provided a rationale for the evo-
GROWING SCIENTIFIC ACCEPTANCE
lution of mind from matter and also the emergence of
mind from matter in brain development. Presented as After waiting more than three years during which
a ‘conceptual skeleton on which to build a body of the feedback was mostly positive, especially from
philosophy’, it was described as a scheme that ‘would humanist groups, I tested the theory more directly in
put mind back into the brti of objective science and the scientific community by presenting it at a neuro-
in a position of top command’. logical meeting (SPERRY, 19704 and then to the
When the reprints arrived, I sent my new mind- National Academy of Sciences (SPERRY,19694 with a
brain ‘answer’ to Eccles who previously had follow-up printed version in the Psychological Review
expressed little, if any, active interest in the holist- (SPERRY, 19696). The result was a wide exposure,
reductionist issues (ECCLES,1966). I was delighted to increased by several reprintings and a critique (Bw-
see by his next IBRO presentation (ECCLES,1968) that DRA, 1970) and reply (SPERRY, 197Ob), within those
he had clearly joined our ranks as an ardent anti- disciplines most knowledgeable and most apt to be
reductionist denouncing ‘the materialistic, mechanis- critical. In these conjectural areas where the concepts
tic, behavioristic, and cybernetic concepts of man . . .’ are still beyond any direct experimental verification,
Reversing his earlier stand on the uselessness of con- the next best test is to put them in the marketplace to
sciousness for a full account of brain function, E&es be churned over by hundreds of minds from all differ-
has since lent his support to the new logic for the ent angles. In this respect the years I%9 to 1971 were
causal intluence of mind over neural activity. On the critical years for this theory. No logical flaw nor
these points I believe we have remained in good gen- prior statement, so far as I know, has yet come to
eral agreement (see ECCLF!S,1973). It is in regard to light.
the nature of the causal influence and to the use of By the early 19709, the -modified concept of cons-
these new mind-brain concepts to support dualism ciousness as having causal eflicacy began to gain sub_
that our critical differences arise. Other differences stantial scientific acceptance particularly in psy-
concerning the relation of consciousness to the right chology in a pervasive resurgence of mentahsm and
hemisphere, to language, to animals, and to self cons- anti-behaviorism that is still gathering momentum
ciousness, though of some concern, are of secondary &WTOR, 1978). Essentially, the new interpretation
198 R. W. SPERRY

brought a logical change in the scientific status of advanced by Eccies (POPPER& ECCLES,1977)one
subjective experience replacing behaviorist principles finds much the same reasoning (see pp. 361-362 and
with a mental&t or cognitivist paradigm. Psycholo- the Summary on p. 373) that I have used to support
gists could now refute the lo@c and principles of my own concept of consciousness (cf. SPERRY,
behaviorism and refer directly to the causal influence 1952-1970a,bf The phraseology and emphasis are
of mental images, ideas, inner feelings, and other sub- somewhat different and some different neural
jective phenomena as explanatory constructs. The examples of the principles are introduced but the
suddenness with which this began to occur was conceptual model for mind-brain interaction that is
almost explosive in the cognitive disciplines (PYL- inferred seems entirely consistent and certainly no dis-
SHYN,1973). The movement has been referred to as tinct alternative is offered.
the ‘cognitive revolution (D~MBEX,1974) and also Eccles emphasizes with italics (p. 362) that ‘A key
variously as the ‘humanist’, ‘consciousness’ or ‘third component of the hypothesis is that unity of con-
revolution (MATSON,1971) and has extended also into scious experience is provided by the mind and not by
philosophy, anthropology (FWMAN, 1979) and the neural machinery’, and this point is again stressed
neuroscience (BUNGE. 1977; JOHN, 1976; MACKAY, in Dialogue VIII, p. 512, and again in his Gifford
1978). Lectures (Eccles, 1979). Here we are in full accord. I
EC&S’s increasingly vigorous campaign for dualist too have made precisely the same point (SPERRY,
interactionism during this same period has followed 1952) stating, ‘In the scheme proposed here, it is con-
on a curve that closely parallels the above. A similar tended that unity in subjective experience does not
curve can be drawn for a rising public belief in psy- derive from any kind of parallel unity in the brain
chic, paranormal and related mentaiist phenomena, processes. Conscious unity is conceived rather as a
along with mysticism. occultism, and other dualist functional or operational derivative’, and There need
beliefs in the su~~atural and in ot~r-worldly forms be little or nothing of a unita~ nature about the
of existence. Some of these have logical support in the physiological processes themselves.’ in his earlier
new mind-brain concepts; others are bolstered only thinking Eccies had given priority to quite a different
spuriously by association. There is good reason to concept, expressed in terms of extraphysical ‘ghostly
think that the gains made by these mentaiist-related influences’ aBecting the course of synaptic events
deJelopments during this period have been substan- (ECCLES, 1953). I have since referred to and consis-
tially aided directly and indirectly, by the appearance tently reiterated the above expiration of mental
in neuroscience of a plausible logical answer by which unity in reference to the role of the cerebral commis-
to counter the basic premises and principles of the sums and to the graininess’ problem (SPERRY,
traditional behaviorist paradigm. Without a convinc- 1%5-1978), emphasizing that the subjective unity
ing alternative to replace the physicalist logic, we does not correlate with the array of excitatory details
would be back today much where we were in the comprising the infrastructure of the brain process but
mid-1960s. i.e. where materialist-~haviorist reason- rather with the holistic ‘mental’ properties.
ing effectively outweighed all the intuitive, natural In a reflective appraisal near the end of their
and omnipresent subjectivist pressures and argu- volume, Eccles (POPPER & Ecctw 1977. p. 552)
ments, and where cognitive psychology remained in observes, ‘As we have developed our hypothesis, we
principle a science of para- and epiphenomena. More have returned to the views of past philosophies that
specifically. the increasing assurance with which the mental phenomena are now ascendant again over
Eccies has been able in recent years openly to pro- the material phenomena.’ Similarly, I too from the
claim dualist arguments not visible in the 1964 confer- start have described?he hy~t~is as one that ‘puts
ence suggests that he has developed in the interim a mind back over matter.. .’ (SF+ERBY, 1965); ‘would re-
new ‘logical answer’ that was not perceived earlier. store mind to its old prestigious position over matter’
(SPERRY,19704. That our key concepts for this and
for mind-brain interaction in general are essentially
WOW MANY NEW MIND-BRAIN SOLUTIONS?
one and the same is further indicated where Eccles
A first question that needs to be considered is (POPPER& Em&s, 1977, p. 373) ends the condensed
whether the set of concepts which Eccles currently summary of his hypothesis with the statement, ‘Sperry
uses to support dualism (Karl Popper’s arguments has made a similar proposal (SPERRY, 1969)’
will be discussed separately) is signiiicantiy dilI&ent and concludes another ‘very brief summary or outline
from that which I proposed as a nondualist, monistic of the theory. ’ (p. 495) with the statement, ‘Thus. in
solution. Have we independently come on two di&r- alyeement with Sperry, it is postulated that the self-
ent answers for mind-bra interaction, or is it a conscious mind exercises a superior inte~retative and
matter of different interpretations of basically the controlling role upon the neural events.’
same solution? So far as I am able to determine, the When we turn to the solution to the mind-brain
underlying concepts bv which psychophysical interac- problem upheld by Sir Karl Popper, we find it is also
tion is inferred by Eccles do not differ in any relevant basically the same, but the. history of its acquisition is
respect from those which I have presented as menta- quite different. Prior to 1965. Popper’s support of
list monism. In searching the arguments and evidence dualism rested mainly on the argument that no causal
Mind-brain interaction 199

physical theory of the descriptive, argumentative func- . , , recall that a molecule in many respects is the master of
tions of language is possible. Products of the mind, its inner atoms and electrons. The latter are hauled and
like myths, abstractions and mathematical formulas for& about in chemical interactions by the overall con-
fi~~tional properties of the whole molecule. At the same
cannot be accounted for by the laws of physiology or
time. if our given molecule is it&f part Of a single-o&d
physics (POPPER, 1%2). During the years in which this
organism such as paramecium, it in turn is obliged, with all
argument was propounded, it failed by itself to have its parts and its partners, lo follow along a trail of events in
much influence in countering physicalist objections time and space determined largely by the extrinsic overall
that products of the mind have neural correlates and dynamics of Purumecium cat&turn. When it comes to
that these products of the mind, Iike other mental brains, remember that the simpler electric, atomic, molecu-
entities, were better interpreted in ~lle~stic terms iar, and cellular forces and laws. though still present and
as being epiphenomena, inner aspects of, or identical operating have been superseded by the configurational
to their neurological correlates. As expressed by forces of higher-level mechanisms. At the top, in the human
OPPENHEIMER & PUTNAM(1958): brain, these include the powers of perception, cognition,
reason, judgment, and the like, the operational, causal
It is not sufficient, for example, simply to advance the effects and forces of which are equally or more potent in
claim that certain phenomena considered to be specifically brain dynamics than are the outclassed inner chemicai
human, such as rhe use of verbal Ianguage in an abstract
forces (Spmav, 1964).
and generalized way, can never be explained on the basis of
neuraphysiotogical theory, or to make the claim that this Note that this statement includes the basic key con-
conceptual capacity distinguishes man in principle and not cepts on which the Popper-Eccles case for mind-
only in degree from nonhuman animals. brain interaction mainly rests, i.e. the downward cau-
In 1%5, Popper proposed a new solution to the sal control influence. of higher emergent (mental) over
mind-brain relation that was exactly what his earlier lower (neural) entities, and the fact that the mental
argnments had been looking for, and which has since and neural events are d&rent kinds of phenomena
become a major theme of hi% philosophy (POPPER, regulated by different kinds of laws and forces.
1978). In a lecture devoted firstly to a discussion of Hence, from very different backgrounds, Popper
physical indeterminism, and in a departure from his and I had arrived by l%S at the same answer to
prior long-time concerns with the logic of knowing, Eccles’s problem. Popper presented his as an answer
POPPER f 1972) added a second theme concerning to ‘a new view of evolution’ and ‘a different view of
some revised perspectives on ~o1ution which he then the world’. I pramted mine as ‘a scientific theory of
extended to include the body-mind problem. He mind’ and ‘a long-sought unifying view of man in
emerged with what seems to be basically the same nature’. We both offered our view as a new solution
view of evolution and the mind-brain relation that I to the mind-body problem. When one considers that
too had proposed a year earli& in my James Arthur this new turn in Popper’s thinking had not appeared
Lecture (SPERRY, 196Qf.In essence, the idea of emerg- in his extensive philosophical publications over the
ing hierarchic controls is applied to the mind-brain previous 40 years, the timing of these convergent de-
relation. This I%5 switch in Popper’s philosophy velopments is remarkable.
from a position in which evolutionary theory was In Popper’s case, his new solution did not become
held to be tautological, explaining almost nothing, to generally available apparently, except by offprint
one in which it expl+ins almost everything was offered request, until the lecture came to be published in 1972
with ‘many apologies’, as a development for-which he among other philosophic essays in the volume O&ec-
was obliged ‘to eat humble pie’. In Iine with the main tiw Knowledge (POPPER, 1972). Even Popper’s own
theme of his lecture, a ‘plastic’ indeterminacy of the thinking seems curiously to have been little influenced
emergent controls was emphasized but the degree of during this interim. His long article ‘On the Theory of
looseness or tightness in the controls is not a critical the Objective Mind’, prepared for the 1972 volume
part of the argument. out of two previous papers from 1968 and 1970, intro-
Because these cunccpts concerning hierarchic or- duces his ‘three world’ terminology. It deals with a
ganization and ‘downward’ control are crucial both to subject that, unlike the 1%5 lecture, almost cries for
the Poppet-Ecclcs volume and to the present paper, I the use and application of the new mind-brain soiu-
restate them with exact quotes: tion and different view of the world, yet this goes
unmentioned. Even in his subsection on the causal
Evolution keeps complicating the universe by adding new relations between the three worlds, he does not refer
phenomena that have new properties and new forces and to his new solution for the control of brain by mind,
that are regulated by pew scientific principles and new
but instead adds a footnote on the word ‘interact’ to
scientific laws-all for future scientists in their respective
explain he is using it ‘in a wide sense so as not to
disciplines to discover and formulate. Note also that the
old simple laws and primeval forces of the hydrogen age exclude psychophysical parallelism’.
never get lost or can&led in the process of compounding
the compounds. They do, however, get superseded, over- DETERMINISM VERSUS INDETERMINISM
whelmed, and outclassed by the higher-level forces as these
successively appear a1 the atomic, the molecular and the Another main theme of Popper’s philosophy, inde-
celhdar and higher levels (SPERRY,1964). tenninism, is applied to the mind-brain relation, In
200 R. W. SPERRY

this we are in fundamental disagreement. I favor phenomena as causal determmants in brain process-
determinism of an emergent, mentalist form that fol- ing are extended and enriched particularly in the
lows directly and logically from my concept of mind upper linguistic and epistemological levels by the
as causal (SPERRY, 1964: 19766). In contrast to Pop insights of Popper. I should also make clear at this
per. I hold that every time the elements of creation, point that in reading Popper’s work for the first time
whether atoms or concepts, are put together in the for this occasion, I was repeatedly impressed with the
same way under the same conditions, that the same great extent, particularly in regard to his general pos-
new properties would emerge and that the emergent itions on epistemology, to which I feel we are in
process is, therefore causal and deterministic. To this strong and warm accord. The present discussion, and
extent and in this sense it may also be said to be, in concern for the impact of dualist ideology, brings a
principle, predictable though generally, with few disproportionate emphasis on our relative differences.
exceptions, it is not so in practice. Rather than view-
ing the mind of man as a ‘first cause’ or ‘prime
IS CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE CAUSAL-OR
mover’ (POPPER,1962; POPPER & ECCLES,1977). I see
ONLY ITS NEURAL CORRELATES?
the brain as a tremendous generator of emergent
novel phenomena that then exert supercedant control This long, chronological approach may help to
over lower-level activities. The higher-level functional clarify the following: The difference between the view
entities of inner experience have their own dynamics of Eccles today and his position in 1964, and similarly
in cerebral activity and, contrary to Popper’s interpre- the sudden rise during this same period in the scien-
tation of my view (POPPER& ECCLES,1977, p. 209), tific acceptance of mental entities as explanatory con-
they also ‘interact causally with one another at their structs, as well as the recent new strength of Popper’s
own level as entities’ (SPERRY, 19696). But the creative dualist arguments, all depend in a very critical way on
process is not indeterminant. The laws of causation the appearance of a logical alternative by which to
are nowhere broken or open (excepting perhaps in refute the traditional behaviorist-materialist para-
quantum-level indeterminacy which is here irrele- digm. The new availability of a logical answer contra-
vant). It is all part of a continuous hierarchic mani- dicting our earlier reasoning that consciousness is
fold, a one-world continuum. acausal and unnecessary for a complete account of
On these terms, human decision-making is not brain function meant that the multiple subjectivist
indeterminant but selfdeterminant. Everyone nor- pressures toward humanism, cognitivism and menta-
mally wants to have control over what he does and to lism were no longer held at bay by behaviorist theory.
determine his own choices in accordance with his own The logical deterrents to dualism also were corre-
wishes. This is exactly the kind of control our mind- spondingly reduced. The one new concept that
brain model provides (SPERRY,1976b; 19776). But this appears to have the logical qualifications and that can
is not freedom from causal determinacy. A person be said to make the interaction of such different
may be relatively free in this view from much that things as physical and mental states now seem plaus-
goes on around him, but he is not free from his own ible, where in 1964 it had seemed inconceivable, is the
inner self. The emphasis here is the diametric converse concept of the mind-brain relation which Popper and
of the behaviorist contention that ‘ideas, motives, and Eccles make the main thesis of their book and on
feelings have no part in determining conduct and which they very largely build their argument for dua-
therefore no part in explaining it’ (BLANSIARD & list interactionism, and it is the concept that I too
SKINNER,1967; SKINNER,1971). Even Skinner, how- have proposed.
ever, seems in recent years to have withdrawn from No other development is visible during this period
his former stance to a point where his present pos- that serves to distinguish between the causal potency
ition (SKINNER,1974) is no longer distinctive. In that of mental experience per se and that of its neural
great complex of external and internal determinants correlates, providing for the former over and above
that control behavior, one can pick out for emphasis the latter, in direct contradiction to behaviorist
either the environmental factors or those of the inner theory. The increasingly frequent references of late to
self. From my standpoint, it is the latter that es- the evolutionary survival value of consciousness as
pecially tend to distinguish man, while the former are evidence of its causal usefulness (GRAY, 1971) was for
more characteristic of animals and increasingly so as many decades effectively rejected on the grounds that
one descends the phylogmetic scale. The self- it is the neural correlates that are causal and have
determinants in man include the stored memories of a survival value, not their conscious qualities. Similarly.
lifetime, value systems, both innate and acquired, plus recent advances in cognitive and humanistic psy-
all the various mental powers of cognition, reasoning, chology now expressed in terms of the causal role of
intuition, etc. mental images and other subjective phenomena, are
In any case, it has become evident that Popper’s equally interpretable, as in the past, on behaviorist
philosophical arguments for mind-brain interaction terms that recognize the causality of the neural corre-
have become greatly strengthened by having the older lates of the subjective phenomena, not the subjective
pre-1964 logic of neuroscience countered on its own qualities themselves. New developments in the mind-
grounds. Conversely, my own concepts of mental brain identity position, the recent ‘consciousness’
Mind-brain interaction 201

movements in clinical and humanistic psychology, that their dualistic extensions and additions are both
and the counterculture developments of the 1960s consistent with, and supported by, the emergent
have all been chronologically and otherwise associ- causal model for mind-brain interaction.
ated, but also similarly fail to furnish any critical Because this model combines features from both of
reasoning that would distinguish betwctn the causal the earlier classical opposing philosophies of monist
efficacy of consciousness and that of its neural corre- materialism on the one hand and dualist mental&m
lates, or to otherwise refute, so far as science is con- on the other, it was presented as a compromise view
cerned, the iong domina’nt materialist-behaviorist (SPERRY,lQ6Q; 19X&; 19764 and could have been
paradigm. The one development that does this and labeled either way at the outset to favor either alter-
presents a logical and plausible alternative, is the native (given certain qualifications and some redefini-
modified concept of mind as a causal, functional tions). It is entirely understandable that Popper and
emergent. Eccles with their prior ~rn~trn~~ to du~ism on
It is the idea, in brief, that conscious phenomena as other grounds should try to make the new com-
emergent functional properties of brain processing promise as consistent as possible with their earlier
exert an active control role as causal detents in thinking. I similarly could have presented it, for
shaping the flow patterns of cerebral excitation. Once example, as ‘enlightened physicalism’, ‘neomateria-
generated from neural events, the higher order mental lism’, ‘emergent& cognitivist or mentalist materia-
patterns and programs have their own subjective qua- lism’, ‘nonreductive materialism’, etc. In what follows
lities and progress, operate and interact by their own I will try to outline briefly the reasons for presenting
causal laws and principles which are different from this interactionist mode1 as neither dualistic nor
and cannot be reduced to those of neurophysiolo~, materialistic. I think it combines features that separ-
as explained further below. Compared to the physio- ately exclude it from both the foregoing and that it is
logical processes, the conscious events are more best recognized as a fundamentally distinct alterna-
molar, being determined by configurational or organi- tive. From here on it may be understood that my
xationaf interrelations in neuronal functions. The comments will be confined strictly to my own version
mental entities transcend the physiological just as the of the model with which I am directly familar. As I
physiological transcends tbe molecular, the molecular, interpret it, this concept of the mind-brain reiation
the atomic and subatomic, etc. The mental forces do not only refutes the doctrines of behaviorism and
not violate, disturb or intervene in neuronal activity materialism, mechanistic determinism and reduction-
but they do supervene. Interaction is mutually reci- ism, as Popper and E&lea correctly it&r, but also
procal between the neural and mental levels in the and with equal force, strongly d&counts dualism. By
nested brain hierarchies. Multilevel and interlevel exptaming &&cious experience in mOrristic terms we
determinism is emphasized in -addition to the one- undermine dualism at its source and point of stron-
level sequential causation more ~a~tion~ly dealt gest support, leaving for dualism only abstract argu-
with. This idea is very different from those of extra- ments like those of Plato and Popper and observa-
physical ghostly intervention at synapses and of inde- tions like those from parapsychology (BEKW, 1962).
t ermmistic influences on which Eccles and Popper
had earlier relied. The question at issue is whether
this form of psychophysical interaction is fundamen- EMERGENT DETERMINISM
tally monistic as I interpret it or whether it is dualistic It will be helpful as we proceed to have in mind
as presented by Popper and E&es. some further concrete examples of the principles of
In following up this question we want to first recog- emergent (holist) control as illustrated at different
nize that Popper and E&es go well beyond the given levels in some simpler and more farnil& physical sys-
formula for mind-brain interaction to promote cor- tems. I have earlier (SPERRY,lQ6Qb) used the example
relative concepts and final overall positions that are of how a wheel rolling downhill carries its atoms and
genuinely dualistic. Eccles‘s description of the cons- mole&es through a course in time and space and to
cious self as having supernatural origins and as some- a fate determined by the overall system properties of
thing that survives death of the brain, and Popper’s the wheel as a whole and regardless of the inclination
concepts of unembodied ‘world 3’ entities existing of the individual atoms and molecules. The atoms and
independently of any material substrate are distinct moiecules are caught up and overpowered by the
examples. Elsewhere in .their writings,’ many implica- higher properties of the whole. One can compare the
tions can be found where they discuss the loose, open rolling wheel to an ongoing brain process or a pro-
and ~~t~in~tic nature of the liaison between gressing train of thought in which the overall proper-
mind and brain that leaves no doubt that they both ties of the brain process, as a coherent organizational
have something genuinely dualistic in mind. ‘The diffi- entity, determine the timing and spacing of the firing
culty is that these dualistic features ‘are indistinguish- patterns within its neuronal infrastructure. The con-
ably mixed in and fused with the given theory for trol works both ways; hence, mind-brain ‘interac-
mind-brain interaction that itself has stood up under tion’. The subsystem components determine colkc-
criticism and is regarded by many of us as being de& tively the properties of the whole at each kvel and
nitcly monistic. Throughout the volume,. it is implied these in turn determine the time/space course and
202 il. W. SPERRY

other relational properties of the components. The 1952) plus also the relating of both these to sensory
organism and its component cells and organs is inputs, to memory, and to emotional values and
another familiar example. The principles are homeostatic needs. The conscious attentional compo-
universal. nent in this central metasystem may be only a small
An example I come back to for classroom illus- surface feature of the whole vast complex of cerebral
tration contrasts the prorating determinants in a intergration. The crucial features of the central self
television receiver with the electronic and other physi- system are presumably innate in each species and
cal interactions involved in its operation. Complete largely preorganized independently of sensory input.
knowledge of the electronic and physical theory that It is import~t to recognize that the term ‘interac-
enables one to fully understand, build and repair the tion’ applies in these examples only in the general
appliance, is no help to explain why Mary struck sense in which it has been used in the history of psy-
John on channel 4, or what caused the building to chology and philosophy to imply a causal influence
collapse on 2, or the laughter on 7. There is no way between mind and brain. I have stressed that the term
that these, or the political message on channel 5, can ‘interaction’ is not to imply that the mental forces
be explained in terms of the laws and concepts of intervene in, or disturb or disrupt the physiology or
electronics. They involve a different order or level of chemistry of the brain, but oniy that they supervene,
interaction. Yet these higher order, supervening, pro- like TV programs over the electronic processes. No
gram variables do control at each instant, and int~ruption or violation of the laws of physiology is
determine the space-time course of the electron flow involved. I infer that Popper and Eccies also use the
patterns to the screen and throughout the set-just as term mostly in the same way and only rarely here and
a train of thought controls the patterns of impulse there in the more specific sense of an actual djsturb-
tiring in the brain. The shift to a new program or to a ante of physiological events, as MACKAY(1978) seems
new channel can be compared to a shift in the brain to have misinterpreted their meaning.
to a new mental set, focus of attention. or to a new
thought sequence (SPERRY,1%5). Popper would pre-
MONISM VERSUS DUALISM
sumably allocate the programs of television to a sen-
arate world (‘worlds“within ‘worlds?). Ahhough the Given our original description of the theory and its
allocation of such human artifacts to a distinct separ- consistent reiteration, along with illustrative examples
ate world proves helpful in some ways and interesting like the foregoing (SPERRY,1964-1972), it is not easy
in its original form as a philosophic conjecture, the to understand how this concept of the mind-brain
current promotion of the separate worlds with a capi- relation co&d be taken as support for dualism.
tal ‘W’ in a true dualistic sense seems fundamentally Firstly, it fails to satisfy the classic philosophic defini-
inaccurate and misleading. tion of dualism as two different forms or states of
The television analogy breaks down if pushed too existence neither of which is reducible to terms of the
far, of course, in that the superimposed programs of other. Our theory describes the mental states as being
television are linearly traceable to the recording stu- built of, composed and constituted of physiological
dio, whereas the brain, by contrast. is largely a self- and physic~hemi~l elements, and thus, in the sense
programming. self-energizing system. It creates its of the definition, reducible to these. It needs to be
own superseding mental programs with its own explained here that much confusion has arisen from
built-in subjective generators calling also on a tife- use of this term ‘reducible’ in two quite different
time of internal memories and an elaborate built-in senses in different contexts. In common usage a build-
system of .value controls (PUGH, 1977) and homeo- ing is said to be reduced to rubble by an earthquake.
static regulators. Also, the programs passing through This is denied, however, in philo~phi~, holist-reduc-
the television monitor lack the internal interaction tionist dispute on the contention that in the reduction
and competition of those of the brain, and also the process, even with careful disassembly, the building as
self-developing originative properties as well as an such has been lost and therefore has not been and
internal selector of the programs to be attended to. cannot be, in principle, reduced to its parts. It is only
The conscious programs of the brain may be pre- in this latter specialized sense, and not in the common
sumed to be created in activity that lies beyond and is sense of the above definition or dictionary usage that
different from that occurring in the genicuiostriate I describe the mental events as not reducible to brain
system. The difference we envisage here is not in re- physiology.
spect to events at the neuronai level but in more sys- The reason that mental or other entities cannot be
temic. organizational, relational. configurational thus reduced to the parts may be understood more
aspects and design features of the cerebral integration. easily if one thinks of a given entity not as a system of
The special central system for consciousness, or the just material components. but as a combined space-
conscious Self, must include a constant registration of time-mass-energy manifold. Think of space being
the changing body schema (so strong it tends to per- bent around and molded by the material parts and
sist after limb amputations) and in reference to which time as similarly defined by events in temporal and
sensory input is consciously perceived, plus a feeling moving systems with the space-time com~nents
for the volitional command of the system (SPERRY. both arranged also in vertical nested hierarchies cor-
Mind-brain interaction 203

responding to and filling in around the material tional attribute of brain activity, conscious experience
elements and de&ted by their relative positions and is inextricably linked to, and inseparabk from, the
timing. The process of reducing an entity to its mater- functioning brain. It is only in the functional relations
ial components, physically or conceptually, inevitably within the matrix of brain processing that the sub
destroys the space-time components at the affected jective qualities appear and have their meaning
level. These last components from the space-time The subjective effects are generated by, and exist
manifold interfusing with, shaped by, and demarcated only by virtue of, brain activity. Even where higher
by the material components, are highly critical in order mental forms are compounded of lower level
determining the causal and other distin~ishing mental entities, as we assume to be the CBSC,the
properties of any system as a whole. The spacing and entire hierarchy is still embodied in, dependent
timing of the parts with reference to one another on, and inseparable from the physiological sub
largely determine the qualities and causal relations of structure.
the whole but the laws for the material components Much the same solution to the mind-brain prob-
fail to include these space-time factors. Attempts to lem has been arrived at recently by MACKAY (1978)
recognixe them in so-called ‘colkctivc’ and ‘coopera- who presents it in the more restricted t~inolo~ of
tive’ effects tend to fall short of an adequate recogni- information theory using for illustration the example
tion of the basic importance of the space-time ele- of goal-directed operations in a computer. The same
ments. This is why quantum mechanics is of little help example was offered by MacRay in 1964 couched in
in explaining physical reality at orders much above ‘dual aspect’ theory when he held the view (most
the quantum level. favored in neuroscience at that time) that the mental
None of this is to reject. the value of reduction as a and the physical are ~rnpl~~~ aspects of one
method in science or as a means to gain understand- and the same process where ‘no physical action waits
ing in general. The properties of any entity are on anything but another physical action’ (MAcKhY
determined largely (but not entirely, and in some 1966, p. 438). In those years, MacKay granted the
cases more than others) by the properties of its parts. physical determinancy for the CNS holding conscious
It obviously helps enormously, as a rule, to know how brain activity to be predictable in principle, in objec-
and of what anything is composed. Further reduction tive terms from a knowledge of the precedent physical
to the composition of the parts of the parts, and so determinants (provided one did not reveal the predic-
on_ becomes increasingly less explanatory of oper- tion of a predicted sequence to a person involved in
ations at the higher, starting level. Though brain the prediction). The emergent nature of the mental
quarks and gluons are not of particular relevance to controls as we now conceive them in a vertical or
behavioral science, one can expect that in many nested hierarchy, and the manner in which they
respects brain physiology in -its upper dimensions supersede, rather than merely parallel as an inner
may become to behavior and cognitive processing aspect, the physiological determinants were missed by
what molecular theory is to chemistry. It is only the MacKay in 1964 but apparently are accepted in his
reductionist reasoning ‘that therefore things can be 1978 version, along with a new recognition of the
reduced to ‘nothing but’ their parts that is rejected causal efficacy of consciousness. These changes now
or that all science can be reduced, in principle, to a bring our respective views into rather close accord
basic unity in one fundamental discipline, or that with respect to those features most directly relevant to
the ‘essence’ of anything is to be sought in its the min~rain problem.
components. Apparently u&quainted with the history of these
Along with the failure to qualify as dualism by defi- conceptual developments and the original concepts
nition, our proposed mind-brain model also is non- from which Popper and Eccks argue, MACKAY (1978)
dualistic in that it makes mind and brain inseparable misinterprets the kind of interactionism they have in
parts of the same continuous hierarchy the great bulk mind and then finds it ‘astonishing’ how dose and
of which, by common agreement, is not dualistic. It natural a fit can otherwise be made between theirs
becomes illogical to make a special exception of the and his own description. Preserving consistency with
principle at the one level of mind and not at those his earlier position, MacKay is inclined to emphasize,
above and below. On the proposed scheme, one can more than I, the extent to which the proposed alter-
proceed continuously in the same universe of dis- native is a physicalist rather than a mentalist view. It
course, following the path of evolution, from sub has to he remembered in this regard that whereas the
atomic elements in the brain up through molecules, programs of the computer or tekvision analogies are
cells and nerve circuits to brain processes with con- conceived in physical terms, those of the brain have
scious properties and on upward through higher always been described as mental with subjective
compounds all within the one ‘this-world’ mode of properties defined as contrast to the physical or
CXiStCfKC. material. In any case, I fully agree with MacKay that
Dualism would seem to be further contradicted in the arguments and evidence advanced in support of
our description of subjective meaning as a functional dualist-interactionism in the Popper-EC& volume
derivative rather than a brain copy or a spatiotem- are very much open to the kind of alternative inter-
poral transform (SPERRY,1952). As an emergent func- pretation that we propose.
204 R. W. SPERRK

MENTALISM VERSUS MATERIALISM these and related materialistic. mechanistic and reduc-
tionist trends.
The explanation of mind in the foregoing terms as Meantime mind-brain identity theory which has
an organizational functional property of brain pro- become the strongest thrust in materialist philosophy
cessing, constituted of neuronal and physicochemical has undergone substantial changes during the last
activity, and embodied in, and inseparable from the decade. In its initial form as a semantic twist to the
active brain has led to an impression in some cases old ‘double aspect’ view that goes back at least to
that this should properly be interpreted as therefore Spinoza, it was described as a ‘dual access’ or ‘double
an essentially materialist view. Some further reasons language’ theory (FEEL, 1967) and was strongly
for defining it instead as mentalist (or cognitivist) can reductivist. In particular, it held that a complete
be outlined as follows: The principal feature of this account of brain processing is possible, in principle, in
model is the new recognition it gives to the primacy neural terms only without resorting to subjective lan-
of subjective mental phenomena in scientific explana- guage or mental terms. Unlike the epiphenomenal
tion and the higher level control role accorded mental view, or the emergent, double aspect or interactionist
or cognitive phenomena as causal determinants, over views, identity theory itself seems to provide no new
and above their neural correlates. It is characterized concrete concepts to the mind-brain problem only
as placing ‘mind back over matter’, and as ‘a scheme different semantic approaches. Our introduction in
that idealizes ideas and ideals over physical and the mid-1960s of the opposing view of consciousness
chemical interactions, nerve impulse traffic, and as a nonreductive emergent with causal potency and
DNA. It is a brain model in which conscious mental downward control has been followed by a spate of
psychic forces are recognized to be the crowning new semantic transformations in identity. thepry in
achievement of some five hundred million years or which a new emphasis is put on the causality of con-
more of evolution’ (SPERRY,1965). As such, it con- sciousness and on emergent concepts under terms
forms to the common textbook and lay definitions of such as organizational, contigurational, holistic, col-
the terms mental and mentalism. The subjective quali- lective, and the like (Groeus, 1973; WILSON, 1976;
ties are recognized to be. real and causal in their own PERRY, 1978; SMART,1978; WARD, 1978). In all cases
right, as subjectively experienced, and to be of very the changes appear to bring these two initially con-
different quality from the neural, molecular and other trasting approaches into closer convergence. The
material components of which they are built. Because argument from identity philosophy today seems
mind and matter, the mental and the physical, have accordingly to he not so much that our emergent
long been de&red as direct contrasts and given mean- determinist view is incorrect, but rather that this is
ing in terms of their opposites, this proposed recogni- what identity theory actually should have been taken
tion of the causal primacy of subjective mental quali- to imply all along. We thus have the curious result
ties would seem to logically exclude materialism. that our latest mind-brain model is today being iden-
In particular, the present position represents a di- tified with materialism on the one side and with
rect refutation of what materialism had long come to dualism on the other.
stand for over many decades in science, philosophy Finally, in defense of the mentalist rather than the
and humanist thinking generally. Materialist beha- materialist designation, I would only add the follow-
viorism asserting the principle that ideas, motives and ing: If there is anything in this world that has been
feelings have no part in determining conduct and commonly defined as a contrast to the material or
therefore no part in explaining it (SKINNEK,1967) had physical, it is the intangibles of conscious experience.
gone, in the extreme, to denying even the existence of The psychological contents of mind from their first
consciousness in any form and, at the least, denied as recognition in language, philosophy and science, have
a founding central premise any causal efficacy of been treated by tradition as opposites of physical and
conscious or mental forces in brain processing. material in the mind-matter dichotomy. Accordingly,
Materialist philosophy and the so-called psychophysi- a position can hardly be called materialist if its very
cal identity theory was being advanced during the essence and reason for being is a new antimaterialist
1960s on the contention that ‘man is nothing but a stress on the existence and functional primacy of men-
material object, having none but physical properties’. tal phenomena and their role as high level causal
And ‘Science can give a complete account of man in determinants in brain function, obeying laws that are
purely physicochemical terms’ (ARMSTRONG,1968). different in kind from those of their constituent
The ‘Unity of Science’ movement, closely aligned with material, neuronal and electrochemical processes. A
identity theory, held that the laws of science can all be mentalist is defined in behavioral science as one who,
reduced eventually, in principle, to the laws of a single in opposition to behaviorist doctrine contends that
basic discipline (CARNAP, 1938; FEIGL, 1953; OPPEN- mental entities and laws are involved in determining
HEIM8~ PUTNAM,1958). Physical science was seeking behavior and are needed to explain it. The concept of
answers to all nature in terms of ‘the four fundamen- consciousness as causal emergent has been presented
tal forces’ with hopes for a further unifying field from the outset as a view that restores to science the
theory to describe the essence of reality. Our view common-sense impression (overruled during the
arose in the mid-1960s in direct opposition to all of behaviorist-materialist era) that we do indeed have
Mind-brain interaction 205

mind and mental faculties over and above, and differ- lated logical concepts and facts they stand for. When
ent from, our brain physiology-just as we have ~ellu- Popper and Eccles, representing modem philosophy
lar properties that are over and above and different and neuroscience, jointly proclaim arguments and
from their molecular constituents. beliefs in dualism, the supernatural and in unem-
The distinction between the mentalist paradigm bodied worlds of existence, the repercussions quickly
and that of materialism or behaviorism, though im- extend beyond professional borders to influence atti-
portant within psychology, is less-critical overall than tudes and faith-belief systems in society at large. The
that between monism and dualism. If common usage result has been a major setback for those of us (for
in the long run should tend to favor the stretching of example, BURHOE, 1975; PUGH, 1977; SPERRY, 1977)
the meaning of materialism and/or physicalism to who see hope for the future and for the very aims and
encompass mental phenomena in the causal, emer- ideals that I think Sir John and Sir Karl strive for, to
gent, embodied non-reductive form we now envisage, lie in replacing old dualist perspectives, values and
there would be no great loss provided there was no beliefs, dualist theologies and related mythological
resultant confusion in regard to the actual conceptual worldview guidelines of the past with a new unifying
changes themselves and their new implications and holistic-monistic interpretation of reality as an ulti-
connotations. Of all the questions one can ask about mate reference frame in the search for criteria of value
conscious experience, there is none for which the and meaning.
answer has more profound and far-ranging implica-
tions than the question of whether or not conscious-
ness is causal. The alternative answers lead to basi- Acknowledgements-This article was prepared initially for
a volume on mind-brain interaction edited by D. L. WIL-
cally different paradigms for science, philosophy and
SON, P. GLOTZBACH and M. RINGLE that was to have
culture in general.
included a response from KARLPOPPERand Jo+t~ ECCLE~
If the concern with terminology begins to seem but later had to be cat&led. Aided by the F. P. Hixon
over done, it should be remembered that labels and Fund of the California Institute of Technology. I thank
their connotations and the right hemisphere impres- JERRELEW, Co~wm TREVARTHEN. EVELYNTEXG and
sions they carry are often more important in human EDWARDREEDfor helpful comments on an earlier draft of
decision-making than are the more precisely formu- the manuscript.

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(Accepred 23 September 1979)

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