G.R. No.
L-48006 July 8, 1942 § defense: liability of Barredo is governed by the
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
FACTS:
§ May 3, 1936 1:30 am: road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on
collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven
by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro
Dimapalis
§ The carretela was overturned and its
passenger Faustino Garcia (16 years old boy) suffered
injuries from which he died two days later
§ Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap
§ he was driving on the wrong side of the road and at
high speed
§ criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the CFI
§ CA affirmed CFI: he was convicted and sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of 1 year and 1 day to 2
years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal
case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved.
§ March 7, 1939: parents Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario brought an action in the CFI of Manila against
Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of Fontanilla
§ Barredo was careless in employing Fontanilla who had
been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding violation which
appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works
available to be public and to himself
§ Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code
RPC>liability is only subsidiary (no civil action against
the driver Fontanilla Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case)
§ CFI awarded damages for P2,000 plus legal interest
§ CA: reduced the damages to P1,000 w/ legal interest
§ Applied Article 1903: applicable only to those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
or commission not punishable by law
§ by reason of his negligence in the selection or
supervision of his servant or employee
ISSUE: W/N the parents may bring separate civil action
against Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly,
responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer
HELD: YES. CA Affirmed.
§ quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all
its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from delict or crime
§ Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the
petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death
of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla,
a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road
between Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a
head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by
Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old
boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two
days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day
to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action
be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the
lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto
Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First
Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for
P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This
decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action
was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was
the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of
the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the
Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer.
There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22,
appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in
employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times
for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit
A) — violation which appeared in the records of the
Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to
himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto
Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his
liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action
against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo
cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief
states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being
sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the
respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists
on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title
16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article
to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar
simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV of the
Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil
Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations)
arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The
liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not
a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor
(the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed
in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his
negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or
employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may
bring this separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus
making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903
of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The
defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being
punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has
not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut
through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and
jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the
Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost
in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly
envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the
luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists
and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in
previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the
consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa
aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with
a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart
and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on
the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal
Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and
quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which are
unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence
intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by
law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of
Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be
liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding
article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another
is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or
incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living
with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are
equally liable for any damages caused by their employees
while engaged in the branch of the service in which
employed, or on occasion of the performance of their
duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts
through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have
been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved
the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for
any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the
persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by
his employees may recover from the latter what he may
have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. —
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain
cases. — The exemption from criminal liability established
in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include
exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to
the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the
civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by
one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control,
unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on
their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile
or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or
control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane,
imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property,
excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11,
the person for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit
which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the
proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined,
even approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the
Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and,
in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the
consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be
made in the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the
persons using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable
and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the
act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their
property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern
keepers and proprietors of establishment. — In default of
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and
any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some
general or special police regulation shall have been
committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of
goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the
value thereof, provided that such guests shall have
notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the
inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions
which such innkeeper or his representative may have
given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over
such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery
with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation
of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The
subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person
who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony,
shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it
would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall
be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence,
shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in
its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the
Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the driver's
negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093
limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law."
But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes
not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has
apparently been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the
"confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows
that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does
not destroy the distinction between the civil liability arising from a
crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may
produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa
extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms
clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage,
one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman
Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is
often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed
to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil
Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es
de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a
sabiendas en daño al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code.
According to article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is
this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los
actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o
negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of
obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is
exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code
and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are
only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the
criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification,
merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the
former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering
them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any
king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be
noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil
responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances,
violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when
nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de
Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate
existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary and direct
liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the
"Enciclopedia Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca
diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas.
Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha,
que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad
criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable
de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various
aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a
civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case
carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another
which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as
a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following
case: There had been a collision between two trains belonging
respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del
Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a
criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as
subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been
acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril
del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was
whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action
for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion
was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6,
pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y
neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que
exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de
indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el
choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion
para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse
con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito,
siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa
rodeada de notas agravatorias que motivan sanciones
penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere
restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual
la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo
vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y
claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos
y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya
conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual coincidencia
de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las
acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de
culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que
tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de
daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia.
Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante
los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la
Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los
articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos
al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del
regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina
aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos
del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de
indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es
necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal
paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de
distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre
los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito
o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los
establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los
delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun
el texto literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables
criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo
anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones
propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se
debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las
cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio,
sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y
se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas,
despues de intervenir en las causas criminales con el
caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon
del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los
tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y
formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen
judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de
lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de
fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de
proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir
al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico,
que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable
que la de indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le
irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del
Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta,
al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el
veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente
reservada para despues del proceso; pero al declararse
que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de
delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion
aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la
obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la
accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume,
extraña a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of
the facts, it seems less tenable that there should be res
judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on
account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains.
The title upon which the action for reparation is based
cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a
crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each
nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects
which give rise to penal measures that are more or less
severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor
upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or
indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public
order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the
office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by
this means the losses and damages are repaired, the
injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but
this coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar
nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to
contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to
another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of
the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses
and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It
is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before
the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering
therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and
political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the
matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law,
of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be
unwarranted to make a detailed comparison between the
former provisions and that regarding the obligation to
indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and
necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in
their own way the civil responsibilities among those who,
for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor,
make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises
and establishments for which the guilty parties render
service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say,
according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of
those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the
Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says:
"The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions,
but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or
enterprises, either for acts during their service or on the
occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it
happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that
the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and
sentenced directly and separately with regard to
the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the
separation between punitive justice and the civil courts
being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they
have different fundamental norms in different codes, as
well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as
the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained
from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the
right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the
action for indemnification for the losses and damages
caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before
the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a
sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of
March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been
that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such
action had been legitimately reserved till after the criminal
prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-
existence of the felony and the non-existence of the
responsibility arising from the crime, which was
the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del
Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil
obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action
for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the
French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely
based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says,
referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which
corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person
responsible (for another), without including the author of
the act. The action against the principal is accessory in
the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the
sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment
against the author of the act or at least, that it is
subsidiary to the principal action; the action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal
action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish
translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4,
pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is
principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo
1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas
por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es
principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario
saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal.
Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una
falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante
afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima
universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada
uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La
responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion
de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por
causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la
negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del
establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de
las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de
edad, incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan
un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro,
etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir
o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No
hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en la
apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un
hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea
subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article
1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who
one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to
answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first
place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that
there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It
seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be
contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all
faults are personal, and that everyone is liable for those
faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in
question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault,
but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-
delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the
establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of
the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors,
incapacitated persons, employees, apprentices) causes
any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian,
teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not
preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is
condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that
there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the
responsibility exacted is for one's own act. The idea that
such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely
inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia,
Referentes al Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
 Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se
responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo
1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena
respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun
nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el
orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre
menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa
la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos
20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo
que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los
actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba
responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of
others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this
being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one
is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a
bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the
penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors
and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other
persons on the other, declaring that the responsibility for
the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the
civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility
should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of
that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the
acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain,
that court has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-
delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal
institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from
criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the
Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent
acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of
October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the
result of having been run over by a street car owned by the
"compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was
prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon,
the widow filed a civil action against the street car company,
paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower
court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the
Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of
the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of
fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of
Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda
en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al
condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del
daño causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente
Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la
sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que
se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de
este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes
as pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los
limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata
no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado
descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo
este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso
de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de
obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y
que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los
Directores de establecimientos o empresas por los daños
causados por sus dependientes en determinadas
condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del
mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la
compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño
causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los
 mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la
Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido
estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones ajenas a su
jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo
recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on
the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing
the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage
caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo,
disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence
of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on
account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two
jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared
within the limits of its authority that the act in question did
not constitute a felony because there was no grave
carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis
of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil
obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code,
affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises
by reason of the damages caused by employees under
certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in
taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and
in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an
indemnity for the damage caused by one of its
employees, far from violating said legal provisions, in
relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading
attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and
without in any way contradicting the decision in that
cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either
separately or with the street car company. This is precisely what
happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been
sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal
negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did
not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not
qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of
criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil
responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been
held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly
suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own
presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under
article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising
from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's
primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs
were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred the
second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It
might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more
expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla
was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he
was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing
any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21,
1910, the employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the
acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal
case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the
case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against
him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of
negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less
than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was
acquitted in the previous criminal case while the latter was found
guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the
one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February
14, 1919, an action was brought against a railroad company for
damages because the station agent, employed by the company,
had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles
consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that
this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the
court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en
virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las
pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas
por la compañia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de
las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian
como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con
vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su destino tales
mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario
por el jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con
intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega de estas
expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le
originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de
vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener
al verse privado de servir los pedidos que se le habian
hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de
estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso,
porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no
contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del
contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el
retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes,
careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del
Codigo de Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el
fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de
los daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del
actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a
la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas,
segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad
esta claramente sancionada en el articulo 1902 del
Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia
demandada como ligada con el causante de aquellos por
relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia
administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in
virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the
evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the
railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that
the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should
be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2)
that when the said merchandise reached their destination,
their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station
agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and
(3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they
were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and
damages of considerable importance, as he was a
wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders
sent to him by the consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of
upholding the four assignments of error, as the original
complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from
non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the
action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on
any contractual relation between the parties litigant and,
therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which
the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but
it limits to asking for reparation for losses and damages
 produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of
the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to
deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by
the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid
down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in
virtue of the next article, the defendant company, because
the latter is connected with the person who caused the
damage by relations of economic character and by
administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act
may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that
case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And
yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7
Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages
to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had
negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which
the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the
plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the
action that the necessary conclusion from these collated
laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his
employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this
theory the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the
representative of the company accountable for not
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine
should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and
secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish
codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code
makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not
punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter
II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes
damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage
so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the
preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of
the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the
mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or
enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter may be employed or
in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular
action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our
general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to
provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His
obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and
falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the
answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant,
under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the
defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect,
would shut out litigants against their will from the civil
courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent
upon the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal
offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the
strict rules of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if
these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is
thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of
Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento
Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these
Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory
effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of
action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was pending the
civil was suspended. According to article 112, the penal
action once started, the civil remedy should be sought
therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured
or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings
for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted,
arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on
private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be
extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those
of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same
subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much
further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show
that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the
criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as
expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is
civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not
required that the injured party should seek out a third
person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a
condition precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an
employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they are
in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises,
and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement
in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the
election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the
accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code can
not affect this action. This construction renders it
unnecessary to finally determine here whether this
subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the
laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the
American civil and criminal procedure now in force in the
Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above
cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to
have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article
1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as
applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been
shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his
relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be
regarded as derived from negligence punished by the law,
within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than
this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of
acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which
are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are
understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations
 already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from
contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties
are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same
code. A typical application of this distinction may be found
in the consequences of a railway accident due to
defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability
to his employee would arise out of the contract of
employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
passage, while that to the injured bystander would
originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother
of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action
against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of
the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and
managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment
requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as
indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the
southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before
crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which
were going along the latter street or were coming from the
opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed
that, when he again started to run his auto across said
Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street
northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto
which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real
Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana
Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto
precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident
could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a
slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the
moment of crossing Real Street and entering Solana
Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child
in the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on
the right to that on the left, and if the accident had
occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run
over the body of the child, and the child's body had
already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile
still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this
circumstance shows the fact that the automobile entered
Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without
the defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions
had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident
which caused the death of the child would not have
occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have
been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence
causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code.
Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence
being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the
same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban
Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-
year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to
recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused
by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of
April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban,
Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal
had come from another municipality to attend the same. After the
procession the mother and the daughter with two others were
passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the
Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V.
House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so
frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but
unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water from
the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from
the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the
contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on
appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed
the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time
of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the
electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact
hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order
the dismissal of the action because of the contributory
negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a
majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to
be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the
evening when the religious procession was held. There
was nothing abnormal in allowing the child to run along a
few paces in advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and
of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled
with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much
debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co.
([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil
Code must again be enforced. The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not
operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense
could only result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that
although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also
made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the
action was for damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter
alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in
driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of
the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant
Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage
of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the
fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to
pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court
reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had
shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family,
thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article
1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage
and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The
workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage,
were duly licensed by the Government in their particular
calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The
machine had been used but a few hours when the
accident occurred and it is clear from the evidence that
the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive,
of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability
in cases of negligence, but also provides when the liability
shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease
when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to avoid the damage."
 From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when
an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that
there was negligence on the part of the matter or
employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection,
or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It
follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve
from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master
ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court
in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the
complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently
driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a
public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the
plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and
following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p.
41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant
where he is the owner or director of a business or
enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the
servant is engaged in his master's employment as such
owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua
and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18
(year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought
by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The
little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some
large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy
underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya
and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee
of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of
homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent
superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory
bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his servant.
(Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55
Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages
for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the
steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p.
526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the
plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain,
authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage,
and that the appellee contracted his services because of
his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been
overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a
good father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in
accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in
the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore
absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his
secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set forth.
He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article
1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the
defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co.,
52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City
of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on
June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of
P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for
the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through
reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a
fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for P1,788.27, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect
the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action
against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming
that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was
that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part, that this
case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no
escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal
Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable
language authorizes the determination of subsidiary
liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a
misdemeanor falling under article 604 of the Penal Code.
The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent
act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the
civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not
with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the
Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code
negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case
of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the
Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed
out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the
master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving
that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection
and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That
would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or
predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By
way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the
statements here made are offered to meet the argument
advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article
0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's
proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in
the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under
article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability
arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the
case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated
on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of
an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas
the foundation of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903
of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and
independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case
invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the employ of the
Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then
brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as
employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to
show that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
 In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion
and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability
established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who
have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family,
is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in
article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant
in the instant case, because the action there had for its purpose
the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the
Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action
is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision
illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility
under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from
his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the
defendant has failed to recognize the distinction between civil
liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal
Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the
importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46
Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that
the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime.
Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between
civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the
Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same
negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still
more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable
to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-
petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of
the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should
ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as
we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in
the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only
reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold that
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual
life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence — even the slightest — would have to
be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed
to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life.
We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which
is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant
pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal
negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such
cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a
civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's
liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his
(the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the
plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining
relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is
also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and
direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy
for civil wrongs, because the procedure indicated by the
defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar
public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with
which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and
probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have
endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and
justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct
responsibility of employers and their presumed negligence are
principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees
should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury
to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap
the profits resulting from the services of these servants and
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's
careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others.
As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach themselves, at
least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and
all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much
more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon
the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and
prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not
exercise such selection and who used such employee because of
his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd
Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the
agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p.
747) that before third persons the employer and employee
"vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la
del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as
one personality by the merging of the person of the employee in
that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations
acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor
accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the
responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has
given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a
common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another
remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and
to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence
under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters
may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of
private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a
criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged
or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious
redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals
should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
defendant-petitioner.
Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-
appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
§ Reginald Hill, a minor, married but living with his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill with whom he was living and
getting subsistence killed Agapito Elcano
§ CFI Civil Case: dismissed on the ground that he
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake
§ Spouses Elcano appealed
ISSUES:
1. W/N the civil action should be barred by the
acquittal of criminal action - NO
2. W/N the Civil Code can be applied to
Atty. Marvin Hill even though Reginald is already
married -YES
HELD: order appealed from is reversed
1. NO.
§ separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully and
clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent
act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
§ If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not
punished by law, accordingly to the literal import of
article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life
§ to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a
civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to
make the defendant pay in damages. . Otherwise.
there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified remedium."
§ ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
§ in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes
voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law
§ It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill
in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to
the instant action against him.
2. YES
§ While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor
(child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.
Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable
the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but
he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue
and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or
guardian."
§ Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one
is responsible
§ the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the
parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while
still a minor, does not give answerable for the
borrowings of money and alienation or encumbering
of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent
§ Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to
that of his son.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro
Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of
damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the
time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill,
with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of
which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a
violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule
III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which
is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against
defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for
reconsideration of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the
above grounds that the following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by
the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein
contained, the Court finds the same to be
meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p.
40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses
Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the following
assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -
I because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the basis
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY
AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW RULE 111, OF
THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT
SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF
COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR
JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-
ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS,
ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE,
ARE INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE;
and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE
OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN
HILL BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS
GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT
THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE.
(page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-
appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted
criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance
of Quezon City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill,
coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably
stated in the court's decision. And so, when appellants filed their
complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two
decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal
of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil
liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code
he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact
that at the time of the occurrence complained of. Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistenee from his
father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character, criminal
and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which
was firmly established in this jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73
Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a
scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or
fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court of
Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence
of our own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not
only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus,
the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows
that the same act machinist. come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the
action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to
be also a proper subject of a civil action under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted
that it was the employer and not the employee
who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above
case could have been prosecuted in a criminal
case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here
is therefore a clear instance of the same act of
negligence being a proper subject matter either of
a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with
regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this
Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple
negligence and not only punished but also made
civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an
independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already
invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose
of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood, in the
past, it might not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365
punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
very little scope and application in actual life.
Death or injury to persons and damage to
property- through any degree of negligence - even
the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from a
crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere
would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana?
We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal
case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of
evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay
in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which can not be shown
beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in
a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus
Idemnified remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice
to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that
there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this
habitual method is allowed by, our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective
remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-
contractual. In the present case, we are asked to
help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe
it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by
such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict
or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural
channel, so that its waters may no longer be
diverted into that of a crime under the Penal
Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding or private rights because it realtor,
an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of
a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621,
73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a
reading of the foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that
the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein
referred to contemplate only acts of negligence and not
intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the
thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in
fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the
reference made therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud
or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil
Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia, provided
textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or
omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline
qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice Bocobo
emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation
of the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth
lift- hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of
the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such
ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring
in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so,
because Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia
doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not punishable by law,"
thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in
violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code,
which is Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived
from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter
2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws."
More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code
provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision
(Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is not so novel or
extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while
the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been
sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by Maura, an
outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence,
whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal
negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report
of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to
only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo
about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather
than that which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker
should be observed in applying the same. And considering that
the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability
in a civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to
32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111, contemplate also the
same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic.
Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia covers not
only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed,
if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred
to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal
case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that
acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's
emancipation by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill,
his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot
be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under
Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the
minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article
399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as
though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate
or encumber real property without the consent of his father or
mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with
the assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176
is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who
live in their company." In the instant case, it is not controverted
that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in
question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to
and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason
behind the joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the
parent to supervise their minor children in order to prevent them
from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the
clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated
by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry
with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give
rise to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.)
And surely, killing someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise
stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation or
encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty.
Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald.
However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age,
as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial
court is ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing
opinion. Costs against appellees.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA,
EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON VIRATA, ARACELY
VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA
VIRATA, and EVANGELINA VIRATA, petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT OF
FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE, respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First
Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-134 granting the
motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there is another action pending between the same parties for
the same cause. 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata
died as a result of having been bumped while walking along Taft
Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo
Borilla and registered in the name Of Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla
is the employer of Ochoa; that for the death of Arsenio Virata, a
action for homicide through reckless imprudence was instituted
on September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as C Case No.
3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal case
on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private
prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate civil action for
damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that on
February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said c
case to withdraw the reservation to file a separate civil action; that
thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in the trial
and presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976
the heirs of Arsenio Virata again reserved their right to institute a
separate civil action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio
Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the
Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for
damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla
and the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on
August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action,
Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties for
the same cause; that on September 8, 1976 the Court of First
Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a decision in Criminal Case No.
3612-P acquitting the accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that
he caused an injury by name accident; and that on January 31,
1977, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the
motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2
The principal issue is weather or not the of the Arsenio Virata,
can prosecute an action for the damages based on quasi-delict
against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa, driver and owner,
respectively on the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio
Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may
choose between an action under the Revised Penal Code or of
quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines is to recover twice for the same negligent act.
The Supreme Court has held that:
According to the Code Commission: 'The
foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first
sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary
when we consider the exact nature of criminal and
civil negligence. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa aquiliana'
or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate
from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and 'culpa extra-
contractual' or quasi-delito has been sustained by
decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable
by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist.
Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177,
acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not
for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa
aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery. (Report of the Code Commission, p.
162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to
literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bocobo about construction
that upholds 'the spirit that given life' rather than
that which is literal that killeth the intent of the
lawmaker should be observed in applying the
same. And considering that the preliminary
chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code
definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from
the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by
Article 100 of the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the
Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is
'more congruent' with the spirit of law, equity and
justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress', to borrow the felicitous language in
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to
359, to hod as We do hold, that Article 2176,
where it refers to 'fault covers not only acts 'not
punishable by law' but also criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or consequently,
a separate civil action lies against the in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty and acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually
charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the, two
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.
In other words the extinction of civil liability
refereed to in Par. (c) of Section 13, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of
Garcia, that culpa aquilina includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same
negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was decided,
they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a
separate civil action for damages against the owner and driver of
the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. The acquittal of the
driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No.
3162-P is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for
damages based on quasi-delict The source of the obligation
sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not
an act or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or omission
punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages,
Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to establish their cause of
action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby
set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is reinstated and remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987
CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-
Quezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario Claudia respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders
of the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City
dated (1) 8 January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty.
Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-40909 to Q-40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the
accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31
March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for
mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as
private prosecutor in the aforestated criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against
respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City and originally assigned to Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when
respondent Claudio, through counsel, filed a petition for recuse
dated May 19,1986.
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June
25, 1986 to Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge
Johnico G. Serquina
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally
arraigned on November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to
the charges. Pre-trial was then set on January 8, 1987.
In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge
Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order
rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private
prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil
liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property
but public order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration
of the order dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for
reconsideration on March 25, 1987.
In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent
Court.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court
acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction
in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.
The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as
an offense against public order. As such, it is argued that it is the
State and the public that are the principal complainants and,
therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that
"Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that
indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of
whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to
the issue in the case at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the
fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable
is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code).
Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a
person commits a crime he offends two entities namely ( 1) the
society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State
whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that
society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable
act or omission. However, this rather broad and general provision
is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal
procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially
where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one
instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a
separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the
criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many
legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally
accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the
crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or
omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise
to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but because it
caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can
readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the
same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will
give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission
results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and
proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently
the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal
actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or
omission complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or
not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco,
Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp.
246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall
indemnify the latter for the same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so
provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on
account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a
consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which
a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of the penalty
imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court
of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84
Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for
the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the
restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification
for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar
who suffered the offenses committed against her. Not only the
State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the
public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the
checks were good when she parted with money, property or
services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18,
1986) and the cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The
effects of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests
of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the wrong
done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that
"The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the
holder, but also an injury to the public."
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied,
The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of
money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been
caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of
Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party
defrauded and empty- handed by excluding the civil liability of the
offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results
in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a separate civil suit. To do so,
may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face
value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant
drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law
seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases
40909 to 40913 is justified not only for the protection of her
interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive
administration of justice mandated by the Constitution (Section
16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A separate civil
action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further
delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits
must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy
adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court, resort t o a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent
court is ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor
in behalf of petitioner Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of
the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913. The
temporary restraining order issued by this court a quo for further
proceedings. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990
EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the
Regional Trial Court Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose,
Antique; THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of Antique; and CRISTINA
VEGAFRIA, respondents.
Comelec Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
Comelec Legal Assistance Officer for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted
before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San
Remigio — Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal Case No.
1717, a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly openly,
publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and
statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor,
malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a
foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and
other words and statements of similar import which caused great
and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not
guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without
reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages
actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of
Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty
Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to
petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that "the facts and
circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not
warrant the awarding of moral damages." 1
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court,
which in a decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's
appeal as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of
the lower court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this
appeal, for lack of merit, is hereby DENIED.
After the decision shall have become final, remand the
records of this case to the court of origin, Second
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio-
Belison, Antique, for the execution of its decision on the
criminal aspect.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review
on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC decision for being contrary
to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code providing that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article
2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral damages may be
recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He
submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases
of Roa vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum
Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said
cases from the case at bar by saying that in the case of Roa, the
decision of the trial court had become final before Maria C. Roa
instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instant case,
the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason
of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for
damages has been instituted by petitioner against private
respondent for the same cause. Tan, on the other hand,
contemplates of two actions, one criminal and one civil, and the
prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal of
the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect
was impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance
with Section 1, Rule 111, of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial
court carries with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since
petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action without
reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he
assumed the risk that in the event he failed to recover damages
he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.
We find merit in the petition.
The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not
the decision of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-
Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique constitutes the final
adjudication on the merits of private respondent's civil liability;
and whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award of damages
arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found
by the trial court to be defamatory.
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by
the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be
considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private
respondent simply because said decision has not yet become
final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with respect to the
civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the
unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we
categorically stated that from a judgment convicting the accused,
two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may
seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal
actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to
the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to
award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to
him. The right of either to appeal or not to appeal in the event of
conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Thus,
private respondent's theory that in actively intervening in the
criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the
decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and
inaccurate. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on
the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action
and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil
liability from attaining finality.
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil
liability arising from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal
offenses are governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that "(E)very person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on
quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the
Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating
damages, also found in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable
is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its
effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the
state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an
offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it
involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and
others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there
is no private person injured by the crime. 3
In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really
the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight
oral defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising
from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is
erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to be
criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in
which he lives and the individual member of the society or private
person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or
omission. The offense of which private respondent was found
guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results
because either there is no offended party or no damage was
caused to a private person. There is here an offended party,
whose main contention precisely is that he suffered damages in
view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private
respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000) as exemplary damages.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of
moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation This provision of law establishes the right of an
offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the
guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The
offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or
exemplary damages.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be
inferred from the style and tone of publication 5 subject to certain
exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus,
traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in
petitioner's character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and
social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and
anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of. 6 It
is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of
evidence and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the
case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of
moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial
court's findings with respect thereto is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his
feelings and reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is
entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further
sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private
respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00
as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010
ALFREDO P. PACIS and CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, Petitioners,
vs.
JEROME JOVANNE MORALES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 11 May 2005 Decision2 and
the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60669.
The Facts
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra
D. Pacis (petitioners) filed with the trial court a civil case for
damages against respondent Jerome Jovanne Morales
(respondent). Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis,
Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident
inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store)
in Baguio City. Respondent is the owner of the gun store.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and
a first year student at the Baguio Colleges Foundation taking up
BS Computer Science, died due to a gunshot wound in the head
which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and
Ammunition[s] Store located at Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City.
The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome
Jovanne Morales.
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes
Matibag and Jason Herbolario. They were sales agents of the
defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers of the gun
store.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun
brought in by a customer of the gun store for repair.
The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with Serial
No. SN-H34194 (Exhibit "Q"), was left by defendant Morales in a
drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee
Armando Jarnague, who was the regular caretaker of the gun
store was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales
agents Matibag and Herbolario to look after the gun store while
he and defendant Morales were away. Jarnague entrusted to
Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store
which included the key to the drawer where the fatal gun was
kept.
It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun
from the drawer and placed it on top of the table. Attracted by the
sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the
same. Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The
latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the
bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before
branch VII of this Court. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the
charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
"accident" under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal
case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted
by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.3
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of
petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [Spouses Alfredo P. Pacis and
Cleopatra D. Pacis] and against the defendant [Jerome Jovanne
Morales] ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs —
(1) ₱30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Alfred Pacis;
(2) ₱29,437.65 as actual damages for the hospitalization
and burial expenses incurred by the plaintiffs;
(3) ₱100,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(4) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages;
(5) ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its
Decision5 dated 11 May 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court’s Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.6
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 19 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of Alfred
under Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.7 The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred
which caused his death was partly due to the negligence of
respondent’s employee Aristedes Matibag (Matibag). Matibag
and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were employees of respondent
even if they were only paid on a commission basis. Under the
Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages caused by
Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his duties, unless
respondent proved that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. The trial court held that
respondent failed to observe the required diligence when he left
the key to the drawer containing the loaded defective gun without
instructing his employees to be careful in handling the loaded
gun.
The Court of Appeals’ Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly
liable since there was no employer-employee relationship
between respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found
that Matibag was not under the control of respondent with respect
to the means and methods in the performance of his work. There
can be no employer-employee relationship where the element of
control is absent. Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not
apply in this case and respondent cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if respondent is
considered an employer of Matibag, still respondent cannot be
held liable since no negligence can be attributed to him. As
explained by the Court of Appeals:
Granting arguendo that an employer-employee relationship
existed between Aristedes Matibag and the defendant-appellant,
we find that no negligence can be attributed to him.
Negligence is best exemplified in the case of Picart vs. Smith (37
Phil. 809). The test of negligence is this:
"x x x. Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured
as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued?
If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that
course or take precaution against its mischievous results, and the
failure to do so constitutes negligence. x x x."
Defendant-appellant maintains that he is not guilty of negligence
and lack of due care as he did not fail to observe the diligence of
a good father of a family. He submits that he kept the firearm in
one of his table drawers, which he locked and such is already an
indication that he took the necessary diligence and care that the
said gun would not be accessible to anyone. He puts [sic] that his
store is engaged in selling firearms and ammunitions. Such items
which are per se dangerous are kept in a place which is properly
secured in order that the persons coming into the gun store would
not be able to take hold of it unless it is done intentionally, such
as when a customer is interested to purchase any of the firearms,
ammunitions and other related items, in which case, he may be
allowed to handle the same.
We agree. Much as We sympathize with the family of the
deceased, defendant-appellant is not to be blamed. He exercised
due diligence in keeping his loaded gun while he was on a
business trip in Manila. He placed it inside the drawer and locked
it. It was taken away without his knowledge and authority.
Whatever happened to the deceased was purely accidental.8
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN
RENDERING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN
QUESTION IN DISREGARD OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE
BY REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY NOTWITHSTANDING
CLEAR, AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND TESTIMONIES
PRESENTED DURING THE TRIAL WHICH NEGATE AND
CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.
II. THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE,
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION BY DEPARTING FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS THEREBY IGNORING THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 59)
OF BAGUIO CITY SHOWING PETITIONER’S CLEAR RIGHTS
TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.9
The Ruling of the Court
We find the petition meritorious.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of
petitioners’ son. Under Article 116110 of the Civil Code, petitioners
may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability
arising from the crime under Article 10011 of the Revised Penal
Code or they may opt to file an independent civil action for
damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing
their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against
Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for
damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag’s
employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article
10312 of the Revised Penal Code,13 the liability of the employer, or
any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is
primary and direct, based on a person’s own negligence. Article
2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a
gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the "Policy on
1avvphi1
Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair," a person who is in
the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements
of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will
be suspended or canceled.14
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has
in his possession or under his control an instrumentality
extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons
or substances. Such person in possession or control of
dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional
precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby.15 Unlike the
ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a
business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise
of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be
knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known
never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid
unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the
duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded.
Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from
ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access
defensive use.16 With more reason, guns accepted by the store
for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are
defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what
happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when
he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer
without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the
defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before
accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent should have
made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward
accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from
another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has
personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.17 For
failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself
was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case
whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes
him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition
or enhance or upgrade firearms.18
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and
diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the
degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous
weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 11
May 2005 Decision and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE the
trial court’s Decision dated 8 April 1998.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-
C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya
("Laroya" for brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto
Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a
result, two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal
case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On
the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against
Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil
case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case.
The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999
and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted
that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion
for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and
Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas
RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a
final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper
remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC further
held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the
premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such
error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but
the Capas RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24,
2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each
one of them may think and believe that the accident was
caused by the fault of the other. x x x [T]he first party,
believing himself to be the aggrieved party, opted to file a
criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second
party. On the other hand, the second party, together with
his operator, believing themselves to be the real
aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for
quasi-delict against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case."4
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending
criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.
The Court’s Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which
the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping,
constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and
Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a
counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action
resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused
in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising
from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and
2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently
of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was
not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on
quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle,
who was not a party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective
as it does not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges
that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy
of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be
resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition
for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition
raises the legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since
they filed only one action - the independent civil action for quasi-
delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the
ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of
dismissal5 that the dismissal was with prejudice. Under the
Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice
to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly
states it is with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal
is with prejudice, the same is deemed without prejudice. Thus,
the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a
dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action
without prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved
party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of
Rule 41 expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is
not appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTC’s
order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more
cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and
reliefs sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant
case because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the
criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code while
Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based
on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions
arose from the same act or omission, they have different causes
of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable
under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the
Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he
proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered
damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the
private complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action
under these articles. There is nothing in the law or rules that state
only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these
articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires
the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a)
x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may
be filed by the accused in the criminal case, but any
cause of action which could have been the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action
to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no
forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil
("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action present its evidence and under circumstances affording
provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action before reservation.
the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil
actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed In no case may the offended party recover damages twice
"impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions for the same act or omission of the accused.
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages for x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on
December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-
delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a)
the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action
civil action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal
for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
action shall be made before the prosecution starts
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
presenting its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity make such reservation.
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
xxx
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
(b) x x x
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the
others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial
file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others. thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court
trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2
 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed
instituted" with the criminal action is only the action to recover civil
liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil
actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are
no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal
action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code.
The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these
articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of
the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles
of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the
civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action.10
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the
option to file a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the
prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is
deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil
action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover
civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet
commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the
criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply
to separate civil actions arising from the same act or omission
filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a
separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action, could not
be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. If the separate civil action was filed before the
commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until
final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule
applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-
delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based
on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could
proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal
action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
continues this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After
the criminal action has been commenced, the separate
civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action
has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before
judgment on the merits. The suspension shall last
until final judgment is rendered in the criminal
action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of
the offended party, be consolidated with the criminal
action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of
consolidation, the evidence already adduced in the civil
action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by
the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties
to present additional evidence. The consolidated criminal
and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of
the period of prescription of the civil action which cannot
be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been
suspended shall be tolled.
 x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change
the rule that the separate civil action, filed to recover
damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal
action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing,
after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate civil
action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo,
who are not the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a
separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal
case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. -
In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case,
however, may the offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the
amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to
bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule
111, this civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action
can file an independent civil action for quasi-delict against the
accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that
the "offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same act or
omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule
111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the
accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero
vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused therein could
validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused
in the criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for
malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence
of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted
civil actions and the necessary consequences and
implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court
should confine itself to the criminal aspect of the case and
disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further
ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the
offended party "after the criminal case is terminated and/or in
accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The
Court explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party
complaint on the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate
the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated
in the 2000 Rules precisely to address the lacunamentioned
in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from
filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the
criminal case. However, the same provision states that "any
cause of action which could have been the subject (of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be
litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111
mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
actiosn which shall proceed independently of the criminal action,
even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the
criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil
action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not
deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed
separately by the offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the
prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of
the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule
111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such
civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same
act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other
a civil case for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed simultaneously and
independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution
of the criminal action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-
delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In
most cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a
second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the
accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the
same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This
is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule
111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be
litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the
criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the
accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the
prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run
until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to
invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the
offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by
Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the
MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of
the trial court in the criminal case may vary with the decision of
the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has
always been recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in
1950 the concept of an independent civil action under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the
Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action "may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena vs.
Potenciano,13the Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion
than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated
in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
— whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil action
and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action 'may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.’"
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code G.R. No. L-34666 October 30, 1981
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and independent
from the criminal action although arising from the same act or THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
omission. The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of appellee, MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA, petitioner,
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts, one hearing vs.
the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. ITONG AMISTAD respondent.
The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies
under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took

effect on December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of
dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the
rules. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent."14
DE CASTRO, J.:
The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether
from a decision of acquittal, the complainant in a criminal action
for estafa, may appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, under an information which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is INFORMATION

hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28, 1999
and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99)
are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal
accuses ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of Estafa
penalized under Article 316 Paragraph 2, of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That on or about January 30,

1965, October 11, 1965, and
December 23, 1965, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the
Republic of the Philippines jurisdiction of this Honorable
SUPREME COURT Court, the abovenamed accused,
Manila did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously —
FIRST DIVISION
(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and
deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Ben
Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42,326
square meters of that parcel of land described in
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 0-105
A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-
203086-Amd., Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, L.R.C. Civil
Reservation Record No. 211),
situated in the Res. Sec. "J", City
of Baguio. Bounded on the NE., by
property of Honor Kingdoms; on
the SW., by Lot 2; on the W and
NW., by Public land. ... containing
an area of EIGHTY FOUR
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND
FIFTY THREE (84,653) Square
meters, more or less, ... in the
names of spouses I tong Amistad
and Luisa Tengdan.
(2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and
deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of
Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square
meters of the above-described parcel of land; and
(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental
deed of sale over the entire area covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in favor of
vendees Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an which
effected the issuance of two separate titles in
favor of said vendees —
knowing fully well and purposely withholding the
information that on or about February 10, 1962,
he had previously entered into an agreement with
one MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey to her
an area of 10,000 square meters from the above-
described parcel of land for the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and had
already received from her the sum of FIVE
THOUSAND ( P5,000.00) PESOS, thereby
causing damage and prejudice to said Mercedes
L. Javellana in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
All contrary to law.
After trial, decision was rendered dated February 8, 1971, and
promulgated on March 18, 1971 acquitting the accused,
respondent herein, the Court holding that "the case of the
prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the guilt of the accused
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt."
From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner
herein, appealed to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned. Without awaiting the
completion of the transcript of the stenographic notes in the case,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal merely on the legal
proposition that an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of
acquittal should be disallowed.
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971,
is set forth in full as follows:
This refers to an appeal against the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in Criminal
Case No. 4205, wherein the accused Itong
Amistad who was prosecuted for the crime of
estafa paragraph 2, Article 316 R.P.C.), was
acquitted. The decision was promulgated on
March 18, 1971 and on that same day, the
complainant, through counsel, filed a Notice of
Appeal from said judgment, "insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned." Apparently
the appeal was approved by the trial court, the
records of the case were elevated to this Court,
and this Court required the completion of the
same.
Now, while the right of the offended party to
intervene in the criminal action (Section 15, Rule
110, Rules) as well as to appeal from a final
judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is
recognized, the offended party however, cannot
appeal if the accused is acquitted as matters are
(People vs. Herrera 74 Phil. 21). indeed, the trial
court in acquitting the herein defendant stated:
In the mind of the court, the case
of the prosecution is civil in nature.
In fact, the supervening acts of the
parties after the execution of
Exhibit A until the execution of
Exhibit D are clear and
unequivocal which ineluctably lead
this court to believe that the guilt of
the accused has not been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance would perforce require a new
determination of defendant's criminal liability. This
cannot be done. Besides, the offended party has
the remedy of bringing a civil action independently
of the criminal action.
Indeed, this question is not new. It has already
been so ruled by the Supreme Court in several
cases (People vs. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523,
December 18, 1957, citing People vs. Velez, 77
Phil. 1026; People vs. Benjamin Liggayu et al.,
No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People vs. Joaquin
Lipana 72 Phil. 166; People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil.
679 [decided under the new Rules of Court];
Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575, 572).
Considering that the complainant is appealing
from a judgment acquitting the accused in a
criminal case, her appeal should be disallowed.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered
dismissed. The stenographers who were required
to submit their respective transcripts of
stenographic notes in this case are hereby
excused therefrom. (pp. 6-7, Brief for the
Respondent, p. 78, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of
Appeals was filed but was denied on January 4, 1972. From both
aforesaid Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the order
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner came to
this Court on a petition for certiorari with prayer that the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and that
judgment be rendered in favor of petitioner and against
respondent insofar as the latter's hability is concerned —
(a) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such
sum as this Court shall adjudge to rightfully
represent the value of the one hectare portion of
the land involved agreed to be conveyed to
petitioner by respondent in accordance with the
Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit "A");
 (b) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the
expenses of litigation actually incurred by the
latter; and
(c) Ordering respondent to pay the costs of suit.
(p.28, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset,
is whether an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be
allowed from a decision acquitting the accused of the crime
charged, only insofar as the latter's civil liability is concerned.
In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated,
petitioner cites Section 2, Rules 122 of the Rules of Court which
provides:
SEC. 2. Who may appeal.—The People of the
Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would
be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all other
cases either party may appeal from a final
judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
appellant. (p. 12, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60,
Rollo).
Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she
quotes the following:
SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from
offenses.—In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did
not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the
civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in
the manner provided by law against the person
who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
(Rule 111, Rules of Court in the Philippines.) (pp.
13-14, Id)
Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which reads:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act
or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in
case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground. (p. 14, id).
From the aforequoted provisions, petitioners contend that the
remedy of appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch as the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, Criminal Case No. 4205 of the Court of
First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, there having been no
reservation to file a separate civil action or a waiver of the right to
file one. She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle,
primarily the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution of the crime
remaining under the direction and control of the prosecuting
Fiscal. The private prosecutor presented evidence bearing on the
civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum he filed, he also
discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite
which, the trial court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the
complainant.
It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that con
constitutes the thrust of her first assignment of error, the only one
We feel called upon to rule on, among her three assigned errors,
the other two having relation to how the trial court evaluated the
evidence, and the extent of damages petitioner alleges to be
entitled to under such evidence, which evidently may not be
passed upon in the instant proceedings, the evidence presented
during the trial not having been elevated to this Court, nor even to
the Court of Appeals, at least not fully or completely.
Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We find
no ground to reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals on
the purely legal question of whether the petitioner, as complainant
in Criminal Case No. 4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio
and Benguet, for estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting
the accused, because the trial court failed to declare the latter's
civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the
evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the
petitioner clearly requires the institution of a separate action by
the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused
as the defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive
pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a
criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of
civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or
waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is
the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The
obvious reason is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal
action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said
liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is
never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof,
except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil
liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously
with the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or waived, as
so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court and as held in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission
of the offense, such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its
enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as
expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be
disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant.
Then, all the defenses available, such as prescription, lack of
jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion to dismiss
may be availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the case, complete with pre-trial after issues
have been joined. Upon these considerations, it becomes clear
that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against
multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put
forth.
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have
been cited which held that an appeal from the dismissal of the
criminal case on motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the
offended party (People vs. Lipana 72 Phil. 168; People vs.
Florendo, 73 Phil. 679). In the case of People vs. Herrera, et al.,
74 Phil. 21, the accused was acquitted without the court making
any pronouncement as to his civil liability, in exactly the same
manner that the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in
Criminal Case No. 4025, was charged with a similar omission in
the case at bar. The Supreme Court did not permit an appeal by
the offended party, the Court saying:
The decision of the justice of the peace court
which acquitted the defendant of the charge and
did not make any pronouncement holding the
defendant civilly liable put an end to the case, not
 only by freeing the defendant from criminal
responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for
damages arising from the alleged crime of
malicious mischief. The offended parties not
having reserved their right to bring a separate civil
action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered
both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case
under Rule 107, section l (a) of the new Rules of
Court. An appeal from that decision to the Court of
First Instance, as intended by the offended
parties, would reopen the question of defendant's
civil liability arising from the alleged crime. And
considering that such civil liability must be based
on the criminal responsibility of the defendant (art.
100, Revised Penal Code), any review or re-
examination of the question of civil liability would
perforce require a new determination of
defendant's criminal liability. But another trial upon
defendant's criminal responsibility cannot be held,
in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of
the peace court. So the appeal from the decision
of the justice of the peace court is not authorized
by law.
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is
impliedly brought simultaneously with the criminal action is the
civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence,
the two actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil
action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable
doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may
be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent
of, and not based on, the commission of an offense. Only
preponderance of evidence would then be required.
The futility of petitioner's instant recourse becomes all too evident
upon consideration of the principles enunciated, particularly in the
Herrera case, since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal
action is one arising from the crime charged, no longer may the
respondent be found criminally liable upon a review of the
evidence, after the verdict of acquittal has been handed down by
the trial court. Again, petitioner tries to show that the cases cited
by the Court of Appeals are not in point. But she has not cited
one single case faintly supporting her position as she has tried to
maintain in the instant case.
Nevertheless, petitioner may not complaint, as she does of being
denied due process for disallowing her appeal. She can institute a
separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the
category of quasi-delict or one arising from law, contract or any
other known source of civil liability, but certainly not anymore from
the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted. It is
but fair to require petitioner to take this course of action, not only
because she would have to pay for the lawful expenses for
instituting the action to obtain the relief she seeks from
respondent, from which she is spared in the prosecution of a
criminal case, but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of
all defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil
action not otherwise available in a criminal action that carries with
it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to
recover civil liability arising from the crime charged.
For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed,
and the instant petition is, accordingly, dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EDGAR JARANTILLA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
JOSE KUAN SING, Respondents.
Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for Petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for Private Respondent.
 3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COURT OBLIGATED IN CASE OF
ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED ON REASONABLE DOUBT TO
SYLLABUS MAKE PRONOUNCEMENT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
ACCUSED. — Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where
the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; "LAW OF THE CASE" ; CONCEPT. —" ‘Law could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of
of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a the accused and the complainant could file a petition for
former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil
once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of liability in the judgment of acquittal.
decision between the same parties in the same case continues
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general 4. ID.; ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED ION REASONABLE DOUBT;
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR THE SAME ACT
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the OR OMISSION PROPER. — We have ruled in the relatively
court (21 C.J.S. 330)." (Emphasis supplied). "It need not be recent case of Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., Et. Al. "In
stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was
the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before acquitted on the ground that ‘his guilt was not proven beyond
it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-appellant has the right to
that particular case. . ." (Emphasis supplied). institute a separate civil action to recover damages from the
defendants-appellants (See Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113).
2. TORTS AND DAMAGES; CREATION OF DUAL LIABILITY FROM The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally
THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION OF THE OFFENDER. — The liable may still be civilly liable.’The judgment of acquittal
settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability might arise did not exist’. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the 129 SCRA 558 cited in People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et Al.,
same negligence can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano v.
quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,
may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat 1988).
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages under both types of liability. 5. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE COURT TO MAKE ANY
PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED;
RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO INSTITUTE SEPARATE CIVIL
ACTION ACCORDED COMPLAINANT. — Another consideration
in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was
of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or "sideswiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in Iznart
unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to Street, Iloilo City." 1 The respondent Court of Appeals
a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and concurred in the findings of the court a quo that the said
determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle
that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along
no longer enforceable. said street toward the direction of the provincial capitol, and
that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a
6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINT TO RESERVE HIS RIGHT consequence. 2
TO FILE SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION, NOT A FORECLOSURE OF
RIGHT TO FILE SEPARATE ACTION FOR DAMAGES. — Since this Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court
action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as
intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing the complaining witness therein, did not reserve his right to
such separate civil action for damages. The Court has also institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the
heretofore ruled in Elcano v. Hill that the extinction of civil prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor.
liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the doubt." 5
Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint
extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that against the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976,
committed by the accused. . . ." and which civil action involved the same subject matter and
act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer
filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative
D E C I S I O N defenses that the private respondent had no cause of action
and, additionally, that the latter’s cause of action, if any, is
barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207
REGALADO, J.: inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil
liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff
failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is
the criminal case. 8 whether the private respondent, who was the complainant in
the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof
defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of without reserving the civil action arising from the act or
denial, with the suggestion that" (t)o enrich our jurisprudence, omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil
it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the liability arising from the same act or omission where the
Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on
review the ruling of the court." 9 reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or
awarded in the judgment of acquittal.
On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by
as G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the faulting the respondent court for refusing to resolve an
trial court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent
Court’s resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for court holding that the main issue had been passed upon by
reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is
resolution of October 28, 1975. 11 petitioner’s position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the
Court in said case, the first dismissing the petition and the
After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, second denying the motion for reconsideration, do not
1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering constitute the "law of the cases which would control the
herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P6,920.00 for subsequent proceedings in this controversy.chanrobles virtual
hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other lawlibrary
actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for
attorney’s fees, and costs. 12 1. We incline favorably to petitioner’s submission on this
score.
On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed
the decision of the lower court except as to the award for The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the
moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to aforesaid posture of the proceedings when the two
P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied by resolutions were handed down. While it may be true that G.R.
respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14 No. L-40992 may have involved some of the issues which were
thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two constitutes the law of that particular case. . ." (Emphasis
lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one supplied). 17
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing an
interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its order "It is a rule of general application that the decision of an
denying therein defendant’s motion to dismiss. This Court, appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the points
without rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the
legal and factual bases on which its two resolutions were case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no
predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action on that question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will
incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same
resolution was premised on the fact that the Court, at that case, provided the facts and issues are substantially the same
stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did not as those on which the first question rested and, according to
consider that the denial order of the court a quo was tainted some authorities, provided the decision is on the merits.’ . . ."
with grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for 18
such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that
action, no law of the case may be said to have been laid down 2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now
in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent court’s refusal to consider the principal plaint of petitioner.
consider petitioner’s claim that his former acquittal barred the
separate action. Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same
act or omission (in this case, the negligent sideswiping of
"‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the
on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil
is once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give
decision between the same parties in the same case continues rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort,
to be the law of the case, whether correct on general either of these two types of civil liability may be enforced
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
court (21 C.J.S. 330)." (Emphasis supplied). 16 damages under both types of liability." 19

"It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa v. De la
of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly Cruz, Et Al., 20 it was held that where the offended party
brought before it and that its decision in any given case elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in
the criminal case through her intervention as a private milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on
prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement
bar to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. on the civil liability of the accused 23 and the complainant
It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the fact that the could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to
criminal action involved therein was for serious oral include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24
defamation which, while within the contemplation of an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil
constitutes only a penal offense and cannot otherwise be action after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of
considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., Et. Al. 25
attention to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
the later case of Azucena v. Potenciano, Et Al., 21 this time
involving damage to property through negligence as to make "In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was
out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the acquitted on the ground that ‘his guilt was not proven beyond
Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the reasonable doubt’ the plaintiff-appellant has the right to
therein plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal institute a separate civil action to recover damages from the
action against defendant Potenciano. The citation of Roa in defendants-appellants (See Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113).
the later case of Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally
affords no comfort to petitioner. liable may still be civilly liable.’The judgment of acquittal
extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it
These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
and even statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions liability might arise did not exist’. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals,
arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will 129 SCRA 558 cited in People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et Al.,
reserve our discussion on the statutory aspects for another G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano v.
case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7,
doctrinal developments on this issue.chanrobles virtual 1988). The ruling is based on Article 29 of the Civil Code which
lawlibrary provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In the case under consideration, private respondent ‘When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on
participated and intervened in the prosecution of the criminal the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
suit against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act
or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a delict committed by the petitioner, thus:chanrobles law library
preponderance of evidence.’ . . ." 26 : red

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the "3. That in the evening of July 7, 1971 at about 7:00 o’clock,
doctrine that the failure of the court to make any the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his restaurant situated
pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil at 220 Iznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a
liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to meeting of the Cantonese Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City
have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate and while he was standing on the middle of the street as there
action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to were vehicles coming from the Provincial Building towards
determine the civil liability it becomes no longer enforceable. Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was bumped and sideswiped by
27 Volkswagen car with plate No. B-2508 W which was on its way
from Plazoleta Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City,
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be which car was being driven by the defendant in a reckless and
recovered through the application of Article 29 is no longer negligent manner, at an excessive rate of speed and in
that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is violation of the provisions of the Revised Motor Vehicle (sic)
persuasive logic in the view that, under such circumstances, as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation and Traffic
the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based Code as well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and failure to act
the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of with due negligence and by failing to take into consideration
the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such (sic) his degree of intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of
acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in effect a the place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other
quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be conditions of Iznart Street;" 29
instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be
proved by mere preponderance of evidence. 28 Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the
Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and
the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing
not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the such separate civil action for damages. 30 The Court has also
same criminal act or omission. heretofore ruled in Elcano v. Hill 31 that —

The allegations of the complaint filed by the private ". . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi- criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is respondent court aside, We hold that on the issues decisive of
not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a
damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such quo.cralawnad
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED,
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 without costs.
of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime SO ORDERED.
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not
been committed by the accused. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007
The aforecited case of Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., Et.
HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,
Al. involved virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in
vs.
arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his
right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his DECISION
intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a
separate civil action for damages, especially considering that CARPIO MORALES, J.:
the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA)
proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were
Resolutions dated May 20, 20041 and September 28, 20042 in CA
anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying
being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code reconsideration thereof, respectively.
while the subsequent complaint for damages was based on a
quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won
aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Choi, was charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on
Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by June 28, 1999 Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133
Article 29 of the Civil Code. postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of ₱1,875,000 which
was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. Following the pre-trial
conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion
for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he
attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to
prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the
presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds
did not arise.4
By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and
dismissed the case. The prosecution’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.6
7
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the
criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held
that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove
respondent’s criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his
civil liability. It accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and
ordered respondent to pay him the amount of ₱1,875,000 with
legal interest.8
Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC
set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the
MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-
respondent herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of
the case."9 Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the remand
of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA
which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition for the
following reasons:
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping
attached to the petition does not fully comply with Section
4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997
Rules of Court, because it does not give the assurance
that the allegations of the petition are true and correct
based on authentic records.
2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain
pleadings and other material portions of the record, (i.e.,
motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to
evidence and the opposition thereto, and the Municipal
[sic] Trial Court’s Order dismissing Criminal Case No.
294690) as would support the allegations of the petition
(Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court attached to the petition is an
uncertified and illegible mere machine copy of the original
(Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the
Philippines as party-respondent in the petition.10
In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons
of the appellate court in dismissing his petition.
The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be
verified, such as a petition for review before the CA of an
appellate judgment of the RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of
Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required
by law or rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or
accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the
pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of
his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification
based on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge,
information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading.12(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence, hence, he chose to affirm in
his petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are
"true and correct of my own personal knowledge,"13 and not on
the basis of authentic documents.
On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may
be interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed to mean as
"and," or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that
a pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or
under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be
affirmed based on either one’s own personal knowledge or on
authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the
preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a
sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the
concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient.14 Bearing
both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal
signification avoids a construction that will exclude the
combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of
the alternatives standing alone.15
Contrary to petitioner’s position, the range of permutation is not
left to the pleader’s liking, but is dependent on the surrounding
nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be
based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on
authentic records, or on both sources.
As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for
verification bear significance in petitions wherein the greater
portions of the allegations are based on the records of the
proceedings in the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not
solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To illustrate,
petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal
knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his
petition16 before the CA that at the pre-trial conference
respondent admitted having received the letter of demand,
because he (petitioner) was not present during the
conference.17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to
confirm its veracity.
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its
import must never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience
or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity
attested by the sanctity of an oath18 to secure an assurance that
the allegations in the pleading have been made in good faith, or
are true and correct and not merely speculative.19
This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of
verification and certification and enunciating that obedience to the
requirements of procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be
expected therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot just be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.20 While the requirement is not jurisdictional in
nature, it does not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the
rule can only be justified by the attending circumstances of the
case.21
To sustain petitioner’s explanation that the basis of verification is
a matter of simple preference would trivialize the rationale and
diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection
and pay no heed in providing enough assurance of the
correctness of the allegations.
On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition – that
the petition was not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings
and other material portions of the record as would support the
allegations of the petition (i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer
to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the Opposition thereto,
and the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case) –
petitioner contends that these documents are immaterial to his
appeal.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however, the materiality of
those documents is very apparent since the civil aspect of the
case, from which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the
trial court on account of the same Demurrer.
Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to
the CA copies of the enumerated documents, save for
the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as attachments to his Motion
for Reconsideration.
The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be
accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of
the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct
by the clerk of court."22
A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only
duplicate original or certified true copies attached as annexes
thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order granting
respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004
RTC Order denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The
copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner
prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not
even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending
to his Motion for Reconsideration a duplicate original copy.
While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for
Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was
already attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a
replicate copy of a different order, however. It was to this Court
that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the
said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondent’s
Comment.
This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC
Order, that dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached to his
petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.
Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with
respect to the civil aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to
submit them in the required form.23
In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of
Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of which is discernible thereunder
and is well settled.24 He has not, however, advanced any strong
compelling reasons to warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence,
his petition before the CA was correctly dismissed.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication
of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this we stress,
was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate
the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and
application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under
justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation
is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case
must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure
to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.25 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the third reason for the appellate court’s dismissal of his
petition – failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a
party in the petition – indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is
of no moment, he having appealed only the civil aspect of the
case. Passing on the dual purpose of a criminal action, this Court
ruled:
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the
right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal
case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the
offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the
plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private
complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal
aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from
the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused
is the defendant. There is a merger of the trial of the two cases to
avoid multiplicity of suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)
It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent.27 As a rule,
a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the
prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal
the civil aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the
accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in
appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated as far as he
is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of
a decision are the offended party and the accused.28
Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the
whole case is submitted for judgment on the basis of the
evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have
waived the right to present evidence.29 At that juncture, the court
is called upon to decide the case including its civil aspect, unless
the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has
been waived or reserved.30
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or
priorly instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived,
the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability
or damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is
any.31
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly
liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil;
and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is
not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.32
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed
extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.33
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the
accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies
the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two
aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary
value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the
case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the
criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the
civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient
to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same
evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by
mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient
as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the
same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of
evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the
civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The only recognized
instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the
dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act
or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case
must perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v.
People,35 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court,
the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect
of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.36
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and
dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby
recognized that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely
borrowed ₱1,500,000 with the remainder representing the
interest, and that he already made a partial payment of
₱1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however, that the payments
made by respondent pertained to other transactions.37 Given
these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case
would afford the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and
for the trial court to resolve the same.
Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present
evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the
demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule
33,38 and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the
civil aspect of the case continue.
Petitioner’s position is tenuous.
Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a
1awphi1.net
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person
of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all
issues that the law requires it to resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the
accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which
pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that
gives rise to the suit.39
As for petitioner’s attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be
determined with certainty from the records the nature of the
alleged oral objections of respondent to petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any
waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively
demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is
frowned upon,40 hence, courts must indulge every reasonable
presumption against it.41
This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to present
evidence as reserved by his filing of leave of court to file the
demurrer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, DENIED.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith
set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the
purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165496 June 29, 2007
HUN HYUNG PARK, petitioner,
vs.
EUNG WON CHOI, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
This resolves petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration dated March
21, 2007.
For the first time, petitioner raises the matter of inadvertence with
respect to the improper verification of his petition. This Court
notes that petitioner has softened his previously adamant
stance1 as he now claims to have simply overlooked the failure to
include the words "or based on authentic records" in verifying the
petition.
This Court takes cognizance of petitioner’s humble submission
and finds his invocation of honest mistake to be well-taken in
explaining the lapse in the verification.
The relaxation of the rule on verification notwithstanding,
petitioner’s motion must nonetheless fail.
In asserting that he was not required to attach the MeTC Orders,
petitioner tries to impress upon this Court that he was not
questioning the Orders of the MeTC. Such attempt does not
persuade.
Rule 42 explicitly mandates that a clearly legible duplicate original
or certified true copy of both lower courts’ judgments or final
orders must be attached to the petition, except where, as in the
case of Ramos v. Court of Appeals,2 the MeTC Order was
rendered in favor of the petitioner in which case only a true or
plain copy thereof is required to be attached.
In this case, the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was not
submitted to the appellate court when, in fact, such Order
dismissing the entire case was undoubtedly adverse to petitioner.
If petitioner deemed the MeTC Order favorable as he now claims,
he should not have appealed to the RTC in the first place.
Clearly, petitioner’s failure to attach the MeTC Order runs counter
to the rules.
In insisting on the application of Rule 33 to buttress his claim that
respondent waived his right to present evidence, petitioner
underscores the silence of Section 23 of Rule 119 in cases where
the demurrer to evidence
was granted by the MeTC but reversed on appeal by the RTC.
Suffice it to state that the granting of a demurrer in criminal cases
is tantamount to an acquittal and may not be reversed on appeal
without violating the proscription against double jeopardy.
Succinctly stated, there is no waiver to speak of in such case
since an accused’s acquittal on demurrer may not be reversed on
appeal.
It must be noted that the RTC decided the appeal only insofar as
the MeTC dismissed sub silentio the civil aspectof the
case without finding that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist. Since the parties do not even
dispute the existence of the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise, there was absolutely no reason for the
dismissal of the civil aspect of the case.
A finding of sufficiency of evidence as to the civil aspect, where a
demurrer to evidence is filed with leave of court, does not
authorize the trial court to terminate the proceedings and
immediately render a decision. As this Court ruled, if the evidence
so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt,
it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to
establish a preponderance of evidence.
It was thus incorrect for the MeTC to dismiss the civil aspect of
the case without any basis. And it was thus premature for the
RTC, in its initial decision, to adjudicate the merits of the civil
aspect of the case.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
ANAMER SALAZAR, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Criminal Procedure of the Order 1 of the Regional Trial Court,
5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5, 2 dated November 19,
2001, and its Order 3 dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect
thereof and to allow her to present evidence thereon.
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein
petitioner Anamer D. Salazar and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario
with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 7474 which reads as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above named-accused, conspiring and confederating with each other,
with intent to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, on the part of accused
NENA JAUCIAN TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL BANK,
LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996,
in the amount of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, represented by its Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO,
and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated said check
as payment of 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS
MARKETING CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said
check was issued and endorsed, Nena Jaucian Timario did not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount
called for therein and without informing the payee of such
circumstance; that when said check was presented to the drawee bank
for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused
payment for the reason of "ACCOUNT CLOSED" ; that despite
demands, Accused failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay
and/or make arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the
damage and prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea
of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300
cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation, through Mr.
Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner gave
the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the
Prudential Bank, Legazpi City Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one
Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted
the check upon the petitioner’s assurance that it was a good check.
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The cavans of rice were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon
presentment, the check was dishonored because it was drawn under a
closed account ("Account Closed"). The petitioner was informed of
such dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No.
365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which,
however, was returned with the word "DAUD" (Drawn Against
Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to
Evidence with Leave of Court 5 alleging that she could not be guilty of
the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she was merely an
indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) on estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and
not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient evidence to prove
that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian
Timario, in order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first
check was dishonored, the petitioner replaced it with a second one.
The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the
issuance of the second check. Unfortunately, her personal check was
dishonored not for insufficiency of funds, but for "DAUD," which in
banking parlance means "drawn against uncollected deposit."
According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient
funds but was still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had
not yet been cleared.
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioner’s
demurrer to evidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting
the petitioner of the crime charged but ordering her to remit to the
private complainant the amount of the check as payment for her
purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution
did not establish the existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt
between the petitioner and the issuer of the check, her co-accused
Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the private
complainant. In fact, the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted
that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who remained at large.
As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioner’s breach of the
warranty that the check was a good one is not synonymous with the
fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess credit under Article
315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial court’s judgment reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged but is hereby held liable for
the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D. Salazar is
therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum
of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused. 6
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration on the civil aspect of the decision with a plea that
he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of the Rules of
Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the
motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court
claiming that after her demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial
court, she was denied due process as she was not given the
opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable
to the private Respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of
Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this case, contending that
before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should
have been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.
The Petition Is Meritorious
According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure —
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the
accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages
without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or information,
the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the
complaint or information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by
the offended party upon the filing thereof in court. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be
required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by
the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could
have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended
party shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check
involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages claimed.
Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated,
moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party
shall pay additional filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If
the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the
amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has
not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist. 7
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the
offender and indemnity to the offended party. The dominant and
primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of the
offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the
conviction of the accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions
are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage against the sovereignty
of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication
of the disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the
other hand, the action between the private complainant and the
accused is intended solely to indemnify the former. 8
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right
to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The
first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The
parties are the People of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the
accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second
is the civil action arising from the delict. The private complainant is the
plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger of the
trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof
beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the action, the
quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. 9 Under Section 3,
Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall
govern the procedure to be observed in action, civil or criminal.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of
the accused to the offended party. After the prosecution has rested its
case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal
but also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial,
the court should render judgment not only on the criminal aspect of
the case but also on the civil aspect thereof: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. — If the judgment is of conviction,
it shall state (1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by the
acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of
the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or
accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon the accused;
and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if
there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence
of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either
case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist. 10
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him
on the civil aspect of the case where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b)
where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil;
(c) where the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted. Moreover,
the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding
in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders
judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution
cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place the
accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the
offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment
on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option
either to (a) file a demurrer to evidence with or without leave of court
under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The
aforecited rule reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. — After the prosecution rests its case,
the court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with or without leave of court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court,
the accused may adduce evidence in his defense. When the demurrer
to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused waives his right
to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of
the evidence for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall
specifically state its grounds and shall be filed within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The
prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of
five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to
evidence within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice.
The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a similar
period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to
evidence or the demurrer itself shall not be reviewable by appeal or,
by certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a
motion to dismiss the case for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused files a
demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his
right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the
basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the
accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the
right to adduce evidence not only on the criminal aspect but also on
the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the court. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case , unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues
an order or renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to
evidence of the accused and acquitting him but also on the civil liability
of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil
aspect of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the
constitutional right of the accused to due process is thereby violated.
As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.: 11
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution
provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law.
"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been
duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."
cralaw virtua1aw library
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings,
in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is
properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person
of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be
heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now
elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice system,
are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which
hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial." 12
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the
accused has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil
aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for
the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or
partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused; and set the case for continuation of trial for the petitioner to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the
parties may adduce their sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in
Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Sec. 11. Order of trial. — The trial shall proceed in the following
order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in
evidence. The court issued an order granting the demurrer on its
finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only civil.
However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case
and ordered the petitioner to pay for her purchases from the private
complainant even before the petitioner could adduce evidence thereon.
Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Orders dated November 19, 2001 and January 14, 2002 are SET
ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the
continuation of trial for the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the
petitioner on the civil aspect of the case and for the rebuttal evidence
of the private complainant and the sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties
if they opt to adduce any. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

the proper case, the civil liability.

SO ORDERED.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and
damages, if any, arising from the issuance of a provisional remedy in
the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006
rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence unless the court, in furtherance of
justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the
main issue. SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER
PAJARILLO, petitioners,
(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be vs.
deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs them to argue LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO,
orally or to submit written memoranda.
VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
complaint or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of
trial may be modified.

Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the
case on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
DECISION
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) off the Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising
from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was no waiver by
the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the
civil action. Neither did he file a civil action before the institution of the
criminal action.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo)
assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the
Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco
(Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon
City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as
she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed
firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same
outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who
was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from
her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo
shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor
children (respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to
Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate
civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated
January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was
affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated
July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC,
Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages against
Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against
Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard.
Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the
complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's
negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set
up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's
fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered
its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND
FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as
moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as
attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected
Pajarillo's claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no
credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen
roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since
Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the
police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on
duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised
proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline for
him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that
Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal
Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof
negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be
jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may
be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the
selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no
sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its
employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not
the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision
includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions
designed for the protection of persons and property, for the
guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to
see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully
complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16,
2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case
is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. No pronouncement as to costs.9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held
that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions
on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal
Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a
final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence
in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the
provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent
upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense
charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with
a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might
proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising
from quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a
family in the employment and supervision of employees is
inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-
delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees
is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA
denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the
following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding
petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment
of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it
applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding
petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner
Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money
claims.
 The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to
find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees, hence, should be excused from any
liability.10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of
negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be
held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is
based on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in
which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo.
However, since it has established that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be
exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that
respondents, in filing a separate civil action against petitioners
are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime
or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer
under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code12 is
subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only
subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to
wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. -
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising
from the same act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and
in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case
must be the crime of homicide, for which he had already been
found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be
governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to
two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil
liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;
and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising
from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law
under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles
32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an
action independent and distinct from the criminal action under
Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission or under both
causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of
action. The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts
alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.14 The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be
determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in
his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard
assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank – Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under
employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence
there is employer-employee relationship between co-
defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing
Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her
bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care,
and in idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired
and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her
instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee
are jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline
M. Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter
are invoking their right to recover damages against Safeguard for
their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act
of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code
which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also
acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as
the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]),
this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by
law" but also acts criminal in character, whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a
separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration
of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law."
(Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the
criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based
on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from crime.18 The source of the
obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-
delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was
whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on
crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based
on a crime in view of the reservation made by the
offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No.
92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate
civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the
assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the
accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The
Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In
Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While that case was
pending, the offended parties reserved the right to
institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the
right to file a separate civil action for damages is
reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not
on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-
18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the
trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has
the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-
2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he
may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent
act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an
action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to
file an independent civil action did not preclude them
from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-
delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty
of Homicide is already final and executory, such judgment has no
relevance or importance to this case.21 It would have been entirely
different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising
from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard
to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents'
cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in
the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision
over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is
incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent
in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is
negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we
cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our
jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.23 Generally,
factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established
exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of
discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of
the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7)
when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the
evidence on record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any
cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial
court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of
negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in
going to the bank was to renew her time deposit.25On the other
hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag
and aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her
in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a
distance of about one meter or one arm's length26he stepped
backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is
however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make
such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him.
Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the
trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting
Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage
a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own
testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw
Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10
meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man
thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the
street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare
testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed
Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and
acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is
no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or
the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns or that he
reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just
about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the
bank, she could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who
was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that
there were two guards inside the bank30manning the entrance
door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a
companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10
meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself
without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying
the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure
entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance
door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself — such as
the common experience and observation of mankind can approve
as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the
truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these
belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering
the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her
bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support
from the contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review
where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank,
she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner
Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act
as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure
instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act,
regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used
against petitioner Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the
mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing
a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former
merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is
absent, Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be accepted
specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence other than his testimony which was even
doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him
to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear
that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of
Pajarillo's imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful
aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory
negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had
no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people
would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had
Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before
drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by
roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have
held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the
act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim
that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank
and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident.
Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in
shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the
bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it
had adequately shown that it had exercised the diligence required
in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it
had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to
submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the
RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously
found that it did not exercise the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it
conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein
supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the
security guards which include among others, whether or not they
are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as
regular evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact
that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating
procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed
its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say that
Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and
policies were not properly implemented by reason of one
unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but
also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
 Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily
liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is
presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his
employee by operation of law. This presumption may be
overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer
exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,
and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the
supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable
rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the
public and persons with whom the employer has relations through
his or its employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary
measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the
business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that
actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance
with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer,
acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly
report on their supervisory functions.36 To establish these factors
in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised
the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows
that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where
no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on
the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as
police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the
diligence required in the supervision of its employee, particularly
Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James
Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance
of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of
Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,37 Weapons
Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training
Lesson Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also
been established during Camero's cross-examination that
Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and
regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-
direct examination that these company rules and regulations are
lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during
classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of
the same,42 the records do not show that Pajarillo had attended
such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training
and continuous evaluation of the security guard's performance.
Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1,
1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as
security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with
Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training
was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and
protection of the life of the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota,
Safeguard had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when
he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different
nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified
that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a
factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just
depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately
shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given
on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were
inspectors who go around the bank two times a day to see the
daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there
was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if
there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act
of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of
actual damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the
expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of
Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code
provides that the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate
descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand
moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve
to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason
of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo
ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no
relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering
caused by Evangeline's death was so sudden causing
respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who
were all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee,
Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the
heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we likewise
awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral damages to
the parents of a third year high school student and who was also
their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the
girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the
respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos
as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and
minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her
untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code,
exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.49 It is awarded as a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with
gross negligence.50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be
recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are
awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the
amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision
dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of
petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
is SOLIDARYand PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
SO ORDERED.