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LABOR STANDARS - LABOR LAW REVIEW- TOPIC VII August 5, 2017

Art. 82. Coverage. The provisions of this Title shall apply to employees in all establishments and undertakings
whether for profit or not, but not to government employees, managerial employees, field personnel, members
of the family of the employer who are dependent on him for support, domestic helpers, persons in the personal
service of another, and workers who are paid by results as determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate
regulations.

As used herein, "managerial employees" refer to those whose primary duty consists of the management of the
establishment in which they are employed or of a department or subdivision thereof, and to other officers or
members of the managerial staff.

"Field personnel" shall refer to non-agricultural employees who regularly perform their duties away from the
principal place of business or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot
be determined with reasonable certainty.

ARIEL L. DAVID vs. JOHN G. MACASIO G.R. No. 195466 JULY 2, 2014

For: overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay and payment for service incentive leave.

Facts:

In January 2009, Macasio filed before the LA a complaint against petitioner Ariel L. David, doing business under
the name and style “Yiels Hog Dealer,” for non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay. He
also claimed payment for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. Macasio also claimed payment for
service incentive leave (SIL) David claimed that he started his hog dealer business in 2005 and that he only has
ten employees. The LA concluded that as Macasio was engaged on “pakyaw” or task basis, he is not entitled to
overtime, holiday, SIL and 13th month pay. The NLRC affirmed the LA decision, thus this case reach the CA which
says that Macasio is entitled to his monetary claims following the doctrine laid down in Serrano v. Severino
Santos Transit.The CA explained that as a task basis employee, Macasio is excluded from the coverage of holiday,
SIL and 13th month pay only if he is likewise a “field personnel.”Thus this case reached the SC.

Issue: Whether or not Macasio is entitled of overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay and payment for service
incentive leave.

Ruling: Yes, in so far as the Holiday and SIL pay is concern. To determine whether workers engaged on “pakyaw”
ortask basis” is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or absence) of employer supervision as regards the
worker’s time and performance is the key: if the worker is simply engaged on pakyaw or task basis, then the
general rule is that he is entitled to a holiday pay and SIL pay unless exempted from the exceptions specifically
provided under Article 94 (holiday pay) and Article 95 (SIL pay) of the Labor Code. However, if the worker
engaged on pakyaw or task basis also falls within the meaning of “field personnel” under the law, then he is not
entitled to these monetary benefits. CA that Macasio does not fall under the definition of “field personnel.” The
CA’s finding in this regard is supported by the established facts of this case: first, Macasio regularly performed his
duties at David’s principal place of business; second, his actual hours of work could be determined with
reasonable certainty; and, third, David supervised his time and performance of duties. Since Macasio cannot be
considered a “field personnel,” then he is not exempted from the grant of holiday, SIL pay even as he was
engaged on “pakyaw” or task basis.

However, the governing law on 13th month pay is PD No. 851. As with holiday and SIL pay, 13th month pay
benefits generally cover all employees; an employee must be one of those expressly enumerated to be
exempted. Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 851 enumerates the exemptions from
the coverage of 13th month pay benefits. Under Section 3(e), “employers of those who are paid on task basis,
and those who are paid a fixed amount for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof are exempted. Note that unlike the IRR of the Labor Code on holiday and SIL pay, Section
3(e) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851exempts employees "paid on task basis" without any
reference to "field personnel." This could only mean that insofar as payment of the 13th month pay is
concerned, the law did not intend to qualify the exemption from its coverage with the requirement that the task
worker be a "field personnel" at the same time. Thus Macasio is not entitled to 13th month pay.
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Wherefore, the petition was partially granted the petition insofar as the payment of 13th month pay to
respondent is concerned. But all other aspect of the CA’s decision was affirmed.

SSS VS. UBAÑA GR 200114 AUGUST 24, 2015

FACTS

In her complaint for damages against the Social Security System (SSS), the DBP Service Corporation, and the SSS
Retirees Association, Debbie alleged that in July 1995 she applied for employment with the SSS. Despite
passing all the examinations and submitting the requirements, she was referred to the DBP Service Corporation,
passed the pre-employment examination and was referred to SSS Naga for training and immediate deployment
to SSS Daet. She was made to sign a six-month Service Contract in May, 1996; and when she reported to the
SSS Daet Branch, she was assigned to various sections and divisions as Processor and Data Encoder. Her salary
was only P229.00 daily compared to a regular SSS Processor who receives P846.45 daily. While her service
contract with the DBP Service Corporation was never renewed, she continued to be employed by the SSS; she
was continually assured of being absorbed into the SSS; in fact she was qualified for the position as she passed
the required training. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment of the SSS, she was forced to resign
in August, 2002 as she could not stand anymore the exploitation, the agony of dissatisfactionn, anxiety,
demoralisation, and injustice. The defendants conspired to exploit her and violate civil service rules and
regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human relations, specificlly Articles 19. 20 and 21. She prayed for
actual damages by way of unrealised income, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, averring that the complaint was predicated on
the claims that arose out of employer-employee relations, thus cognizable by the NLRC. At first, the RTC
granted the motion to dismiss, but on motion for reconsideration by Debbie, the RTC reversed itself and denied
the motion to dismiss. It held that a perusal of the complaint filed by Debbie substantially alleges that the case
is for Damages. Having denied the existence of employer-employee relationship between it and Debbie, and
the case is for damages, the regular trial courts, not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.

Equal Pay For Equal Work.DECEMBER 11, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST

The Case:

2In her complaint for damages against the Social Security System (SSS), the DBP Service Corporation, and the SSS
Retirees Association, Debbie alleged that in July 1995 she applied for employment with the SSS. Despite
passing all the examinations and submitting the requirements, she was referred to the DBP Service Corporation,
passed the pre-employment examination and was referred to SSS Naga for training and immediate deployment
to SSS Daet. She was made to sign a six-month Service Contract in May, 1996; and when she reported to the
SSS Daet Branch, she was assigned to various sections and divisions as Processor and Data Encoder. Her salary
was only P229.00 daily compared to a regular SSS Processor who receives P846.45 daily. While her service
contract with the DBP Service Corporation was never renewed, she continued to be employed by the SSS; she
was continually assured of being absorbed into the SSS; in fact she was qualified for the position as she passed
the required training. Because of the oppressive and prejudicial treatment of the SSS, she was forced to resign
in August, 2002 as she could not stand anymore the exploitation, the agony of dissatisfactionn, anxiety,
demoralisation, and injustice. The defendants conspired to exploit her and violate civil service rules and
regulations and Civil Code provisions on Human relations, specificlly Articles 19. 20 and 21. She prayed for
actual damages by way of unrealised income, moral and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, averring that the complaint was predicated on
the claims that arose out of employer-employee relations, thus cognizable by the NLRC. At first, the RTC
granted the motion to dismiss, but on motion for reconsideration by Debbie, the RTC reversed itself and denied
the motion to dismiss. It held that a perusal of the complaint filed by Debbie substantially alleges that the case
is for Damages. Having denied the existence of employer-employee relationship between it and Debbie, and
the case is for damages, the regular trial courts, not the CSC has jurisdiction over the case.
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SSS moved to reconsider, but the RTC denied, hence it filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The appellate
court dismissed the petition, stating:

“It is the character of the principal relief sought that appears essential in this connection. Where such principal
relief is to be granted under labor legislation or a collective bargaining agreement, the case should fall within the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, even though a claim for damages might be asserted as an incident
to such claim.

The pivotal question is whether the Labor Code has any relevance to the principal relief sought in the complaint.
As pointed out earlier, Ubana did not seek refuge from the Labor Code in asking for the award of damages. It was
the transgression of Article[s] 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code that she was insisting in wagering this case. The
primary relief sought herein is for moral and exemplary damages for the abuse of rights. The claims for actual
damages for unrealized income are the natural consequence for abuse of such rights.”

SSS is now before the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Debbie.

RULING:

The Court denies the Petition.

In Home Development Mutual Fund v. Commission on Audit,⁠1 it was held that while they performed the work
of regular government employees, DBP Service Corporation personnel are not government personnel, but
employees of DBP Service Corporation acting as an independent contractor. Applying the foregoing
pronouncement to the present case, it can be said that during respondent’s stint with petitioner, she never
became an SSS employee, as she remained an employee of DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association
– the two being independent contractors with legitimate service contracts with SSS.

Indeed, “[i]n legitimate job contracting, no employer-employee relation exists between the principal and the job
contractor’s employees. The principal is responsible to the job contractor’s employees only for the proper
payment of wages.”⁠2

In her Complaint, respondent acknowledges that she is not petitioner’s employee, but that precisely she was
promised that she would be absorbed into the SSS plantilla after all her years of service with SSS; and that as SSS
Processor, she was paid only P229.00 daily or P5,038.00 monthly, while a regular SSS Processor receives a
monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. In its pleadings, petitioner denied the existence of an
employer-employee relationship between it and respondent; in fact, it insists on the validity of its service
agreements with DBP Service Corporation and SSS Retirees Association – meaning that the latter, and not SSS,
are respondent’s true employers. Since both parties admit that there is no employment relation between them,
then there is no dispute cognizable by the NLRC. Thus, respondent’s case is premised on the claim that in paying
her only P229.00 daily – or P5,038.00 monthly – as against a monthly salary of P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage,
paid to a regular SSS Processor at the time, petitioner exploited her, treated her unfairly, and unjustly enriched
itself at her expense.

For Article 217 of the Labor Code to apply, and in order for the Labor Arbiter to acquire jurisdiction over a
dispute, there must be an employer-employee relation between the parties thereto.
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x x x It is well settled in law and jurisprudence that where no employer-employee relationship exists between the
parties and no issue is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes or
any collective bargaining agreement, it is the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction, x x x The action is within
the realm of civil law hence jurisdiction over the case belongs to the regular courts. While the resolution of the
issue involves the application of labor laws, reference to the labor code was only for the determination of the
solidary liability of the petitioner to the respondent where no employer-employee relation exists. Article 217 of
the Labor Code as amended vests upon the labor arbiters exclusive original jurisdiction only over the following:

Unfair labor practices;

Termination disputes;

If accompanied with a claim for reinstatement, those cases that workers may file involving wages, rates of pay,
hours of work and other terms and conditions of employment;

Claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee relations;

Cases arising from any violation of Article 264 of this Code, including questions involving legality of strikes and
lockouts; and

Except claims for Employees Compensation, Social Security, Medicare and maternity benefits, all other claims,
arising from employer- employee relations, including those of persons in domestic or household service,
involving an amount exceeding five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) regardless of whether accompanied with a claim
for reinstatement.

In all these cases, an employer-employee relationship is an indispensable jurisdictional requisite x x x.⁠3

Since there is no employer-employee relationship between the parties herein, then there is no labor dispute
cognizable by the Labor Arbiters or the NLRC.

There being no employer-employee relation or any other definite or direct contract between respondent and
petitioner, the latter being responsible to the former only for the proper payment of wages, respondent is thus
justified in filing a case against petitioner, based on Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, to recover the proper
salary due her as SSS Processor. At first glance, it is indeed unfair and unjust that as, Processor who has worked
with petitioner for six long years, she was paid only P5,038.00 monthly, or P229.00 daily, while a regular SSS
employee with the same designation and who performs identical functions is paid a monthly salary of
P18,622.00, or P846.45 daily wage. Petitioner may not hide under its service contracts to deprive respondent of
what is justly due her. As a vital government entity charged with ensuring social security, it should lead in setting
the example by treating everyone with justice and fairness. If it cannot guarantee the security of those who work
for it, it is doubtful that it can even discharge its directive to promote the social security of its members in line
with the fundamental mandate to promote social justice and to insure the well-being and economic security of
the Filipino people.

In this jurisdiction, the “long honored legal truism of ‘equal pay for equal work'” has been “impregnably
institutionalized;” “[p]ersons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.”⁠4 “That public policy abhors inequality and
discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The
Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to ‘give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities.’ The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, ‘in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith’.”⁠5

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed July 29, 2011 Decision and January 10, 2012 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 110006 are AFFIRMED. The case is ordered remanded with dispatch to the
Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 39, for continuation of proceedings.

SO ORDERED.
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HOURS OF WORK

Art. 83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall not exceed eight (8) hours a day.

Health personnel in cities and municipalities with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals
and clinics with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office hours for eight (8) hours a
day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for meals, except where the exigencies of the service require that
such personnel work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case, they shall be entitled to an
additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of their regular wage for work on the sixth day. For
purposes of this Article, "health personnel" shall include resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dietitians,
pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians, psychologists, midwives,
attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.

Art. 84. Hours worked. Hours worked shall include (a) all time during which an employee is required to be on
duty or to be at a prescribed workplace; and (b) all time during which an employee is suffered or permitted to
work.

Rest periods of short duration during working hours shall be counted as hours worked.

Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject to such regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of
every employer to give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular meals.

Art. 86. Night shift differential. Every employee shall be paid a night shift differential of not less than ten percent
(10%) of his regular wage for each hour of work performed between ten o’clock in the evening and six o’clock in
the morning.

Art. 87. Overtime work. Work may be performed beyond eight (8) hours a day provided that the employee is
paid for the overtime work, an additional compensation equivalent to his regular wage plus at least twenty-five
percent (25%) thereof. Work performed beyond eight hours on a holiday or rest day shall be paid an additional
compensation equivalent to the rate of the first eight hours on a holiday or rest day plus at least thirty percent
(30%) thereof.

Art. 88. Undertime not offset by overtime. Undertime work on any particular day shall not be offset by overtime
work on any other day. Permission given to the employee to go on leave on some other day of the week shall not
exempt the employer from paying the additional compensation required in this Chapter.

Art. 89. Emergency overtime work. Any employee may be required by the employer to perform overtime work in
any of the following cases:

When the country is at war or when any other national or local emergency has been declared by the National
Assembly or the Chief Executive;

When it is necessary to prevent loss of life or property or in case of imminent danger to public safety due to an
actual or impending emergency in the locality caused by serious accidents, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake,
epidemic, or other disaster or calamity;

When there is urgent work to be performed on machines, installations, or equipment, in order to avoid serious
loss or damage to the employer or some other cause of similar nature;

When the work is necessary to prevent loss or damage to perishable goods; and

Where the completion or continuation of the work started before the eighth hour is necessary to prevent serious
obstruction or prejudice to the business or operations of the employer.
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Any employee required to render overtime work under this Article shall be paid the additional compensation
required in this Chapter.

Art. 90. Computation of additional compensation. For purposes of computing overtime and other additional
remuneration as required by this Chapter, the "regular wage" of an employee shall include the cash wage only,
without deduction on account of facilities provided by the employer.

DEPARMENT ORDER NO. 02 SERIES OF 2004 - Implementation of Compressed Workweek Schemes

PHILIPPINE GRAPHIC ARTS INC VS NLRC G.R. No. 80737 September 29,
1988

FACTS:

petitioner corporation was forced by economic circumstances to require its workers to go on mandatory
vacation leave. The workers were paid while on leave but the pay was charged against their respective earned
leaves. As a result, the private respondents filed complaints for unfair labor practice and discrimination.

Labor Arbiter rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for ULP. Ordering the Philippine Graphic arts, inc to
restore and grant to all its employees the company policy regarding groceries previously enjoyed by them.

The private respondents filed a "partial appeal" with (NLRC) questioning the Labor Arbiter's dismissal of their
complaint for ULP and the resultant forced vacation leaves which were actually without pay.

NLRC affirmed the arbiter's decision with modification ordering the employers to refund the amount
equivalent to the earned leave of the employees.

ISSUE:

whether or not the forced vacation leave without pay is unfair labor practice and if not an unfair labor practice,
whether or not it was tainted with arbitrariness.

RULING:

The Court is convinced from the records now before it, that there was no unfair labor practice. As found by the
NLRC, the private respondents themselves never questioned the existence of an economic crisis but, in fact,
admitted its existence.

There is also no showing that the imposition of forced leave was exercised for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of employees under special laws or under valid agreements.

Petitioner contends that before the implementation of the forced leave a consensus on how to deal with
deteriorating economic conditions was reached between the employer and employees, and such in consonance
with their collective bargaining agreement. Thus the Court finds that the decision to resort to forced leaves was,
under the circumstances, a management prerogative.

Private respondents contend that the petitioners should discuss said management's plan in the grievance
procedure so that the Union members thereof may well be apprised of the reason therefor. The Court however
do not agree.

The statutory law on grievance procedure provides that:

ART. 261. Grievance machinery. Whenever a grievance arises from the interpretation or implementation of a
collective agreement, including disciplinary actions imposed on members of the bargaining unit, the employer
and the bargaining representative shall meet to adjust the grievance. Where the grievance procedure as
provided herein does not apply, grievances shall be subject to negotiation, conciliation or arbitration as provided
elsewhere in this Code.

As the law stands, both employers and bargaining representative of the employees are required to go through
the grievance machinery in case a grievance arises. And though the law does not provide who, as between labor
and capital, should initiate that said grievance be brought first to the, grievance machinery, it is only logical, just
and equitable that whoever is aggrieved should initiate settlement of the grievance through the grievance
machinery. To impose the compulsory procedure on employers alone would be oppressive of capital,
notwithstanding the fact that in most cases the grievance is of the employees
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In the case at bar private respondents instituted a case before the Labor Arbiter for unfair labor practices and
discrimination, prior to any referral to the grievance machinery, which they are equally mandated to go through
and under the circumstances they were better situated to initiate.

The SC ordered the decision of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED

Linton Commercial vs. Hellera et. al [G.R. No. 163147. Oct. 10, 2007]

Facts: Claiming financial losses, Linton implemented a compressed workweek by reducing

from six to three the number of working days with the employees working on a rotation basis.

Issue: Was there an illegal reduction of work hours?

Ruling: In Philippine Graphic Arts, Inc. v. NLRC, the Court upheld for the validity of the
reduction of working hours, taking into consideration the following: the arrangement was
temporary, it was a more humane solution instead of a retrenchment of personnel, there was
notice and consultations with the workers and supervisors, a consensus were reached on how
to deal with deteriorating economic conditions and it was sufficiently proven that the
company was suffering from losses. The Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE released a
bulletin which states that a reduction of the number of regular working days is valid where
the arrangement is resorted to by the employer to prevent serious losses due to causes
beyond his control, such as when there is a substantial slump in the demand for his goods or
services or when there is lack of raw materials. Although the bulletin stands more as a set of
directory guidelines than a binding set of implementing rules, it has one main consideration,
consistent with the ruling in Philippine Graphic Arts Inc., in determining the validity of
reduction of working hours —that the company was suffering from losses. A close
examination of petitioners’ financial reports showed that while Linton suffered from losses
for that year, there remained enough earnings to sufficiently sustain its operations. Financial
losses must be shown before a company can validly opt to reduce the work hours of its
employees. However, to date, no definite guidelines have yet been set to determine whether
the alleged losses are sufficient to justify the reduction of work hours. If the standards set in
determining the justifiability of financial losses in retrenchment (Art 283) or suspension of
work (Art 286) were to be considered, Arco would fail to meet the standards. On the one
hand, Article 286 applies only when there is a bona fide suspension of the employer’s
operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months; but in this
case, Linton continued its business operations during the effectivity of the compressed
workweek, which was more than 6 months. On the other hand, for retrenchment to be
justified, any claim of actual or potential business losses must satisfy the following standards:
(1) the losses incurred are substantial and not de minimis; (2) the losses are actual or
reasonably imminent; (3) retrenchment is reasonably necessary and is likely tobe effective in
preventing expected losses; and (4) the alleged losses, if already incurred, or the expected
imminent losses sought to be forestalled, are proven by sufficient and convincing evidence.
Linton failed to comply with these standards.

Linton Commercial Co., Inc. vs. Hellera, 535 SCRA 434 , October 10, 2007
Labor Law; Reduction of Working Hours; The validity of the reduction of working hours upheld in Philippine
Graphic Arts, Inc. vs. NLRC, 166 SCRA 118 (1988); The Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE released
a bulletin providing for in determining when an employer can validly reduce the regular number of working
days.—In Philippine Graphic Arts, Inc. v. NLRC, 166 SCRA 118 (1988), the Court upheld for the validity of the
reduction of working hours, taking into consideration the following: the arrangement was temporary, it was a
more humane solution instead of a retrenchment of personnel, there was notice and consultations with the
workers and supervisors, a consensus were reached on how to deal with deteriorating economic conditions
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and it was sufficiently proven that the company was suffering from losses. The Bureau of Working Conditions
of the DOLE, moreover, released a bulletin providing for in determining when an employer can validly reduce
the regular number of working days. The said bulletin states that a reduction of the number of regular working
days is valid where the arrangement is resorted to by the employer to prevent serious losses due to causes
beyond his control, such as when there is a substantial slump in the demand for his goods or services or when
there is lack of raw materials.
Same; Same; Permitting reduction of work and pay at the slightest indication of losses would be contrary to
the State’s policy to afford protection to labor and provide full employment.—A close examination of
petitioners’ financial reports for 1997-1998 shows that, while the company suffered a loss of P3,645,422.00 in
1997, it retained a considerable amount of earnings and operating income. Clearly then, while Linton suffered
from losses for that year, there remained enough earnings to sufficiently sustain its operations. In business,
sustained operations in the black is the ideal but being in the red is a cruel reality. However, a year of financial
losses would not warrant the immolation of the welfare of the employees, which in this case was done through
a reduced workweek that resulted in an unsettling diminution of the periodic pay for a protracted period.
Permitting reduction of work and pay at the slightest indication of losses would be contrary to the State’s policy
to afford protection to labor and provide full employment.
Same; Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of
labor.—Management has the prerogative to come up with measures to ensure profitability or loss minimization.
However, such privilege is not absolute. Management prerogative must be exercised in good faith and with
due regard to the rights of labor.

Bisig Manggagawa sa Tryco vs. NLRC [G.R.No. 151309.Oct. 15, 2008]

Facts: Tryco Pharma Corp. is a manufacturer of veterinary medicines. Tryco and BMT (rank-in-file union) signed separate
MOA, providing for a compressed workweek. The MOA was entered into pursuant to DO No. 21, Series of 1990, Guidelines
on the Implementation of Compressed Workweek. As provided in the MOA, 8:00 a.m. to 6:12 p.m., from Monday to Friday,
shall be considered as the regular working hours, and no overtime pay shall be due and payable to the employee for work
rendered during those hours. However, should an employee be permitted or required to work beyond 6:12 p.m., such
employee shall be entitled to overtime pay. Tryco informed the BWC of the DOLE of the implementation of a compressed
workweek in the company. Meantime, Tryco received a Letter from the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of
Agriculture reminding it that its production should be conducted in San Rafael, Bulacan, not in its main office in Caloocan City.
The concerned employees were directed to report at the company’s plant site. BMT opposed the transfer of its members to
San Rafael, Bulacan, contending that it constitutes unfair labor practice. In protest, BMT declared a strike, claiming that the
transfer was inconvenient and amounts to ULP.

Issue:

Is Tryco guilty of unfair labor practice?

Held:

Absent any evidence that the Bureau of Animal Industry conspired with Tryco, the allegation is not only highly irresponsible
but is grossly unfair to the government agency concerned. The transfer of its production activities to San Rafael, Bulacan,
regardless of whether it was made pursuant to the letter of the Bureau of Animal Industry, was within the scope of its
inherent right to control and manage its enterprise effectively. Management’s prerogative of transferring and reassigning
employees from one area of operation to another in order to meet the requirements of the business is, therefore, generally
not constitutive of constructive dismissal. Indisputably, in the instant case, the transfer orders do not entail a demotion in
rank or diminution of salaries, benefits and other privileges of the petitioners. Mere incidental inconvenience is not sufficient
to warrant a claim of constructive dismissal. Personal inconvenience or hardship that will be caused to the employee by
reason of the transfer is not a valid reason to disobey an order of transfer.Moreover, the adoption of a compressed
workweek scheme in the company will help temper any inconvenience that will be caused the petitioners by their transfer to
a farther workplace. The transfer orders do not amount to ULP. Contrary to BMT’s claim, mere transfer of its members will
not paralyze and render the union ineffective. The union was not deprived of the membership of the petitioners whose work
assignments were only transferred to another location. There was no showing or any indication that the transfer orders were
motivated by an intention to interfere with the petitioners’ right to organize. The MOA is enforceable and binding against the
petitioners (esp. waiver of overtime). Where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must
be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. Notably, the MOA complied with the following conditions set by the DOLE,
under D.O. No. 21.

SIME DARBY VS NLRC GR 119205 APRIL 15, 1998

Facts:

Sime Darby is engaged in the manufacture of automotive tires, tubes and other rubber products. Private respondent is an
association of the monthly salaried employees of the Sime Darby factory workers in Marikina. Prior to the controversy, all
employees of Sime Darby worked from 7:45am to 3:45pm with a 30-minute paid "on call" lunch break.

On August 14, 1992, the company issued a memorandum to all factory employees advising all its monthly salaried employees
in Marikina Tire plant except those in the warehouse and Quality Assurance Dept., of a change in work schedules. (M-F,
7:45am-4:45pm and Sat 7:45am-11:45am) with cofee break of 10 minutes between 9:30am-10:30am and 2:30pm-3:30pm
and lunch break between 12nn-1pm(M-F).
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Because of this memorandum, the association filed a complaint in behalf of its members a complaint with labor Arbiter for
unfair labor practice, discrimination and evasion of liability. However, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the elimination of the 30 minute paid lunch break constituted a valid exercise of management prerogative and
that the new work schedule did not have the effect of dimishing the benefits for the work did not exceed 8 hours.

Labor arbiter added that it would be unjust if they continue to be paid during their lunch break even if they are no longer on
call or required to work during the break.

The association appealed to the NLRC but NLRC has affirmed the labor arbiter's decision and dismissed the appeal. However,
in the motion for reconsideration, NLRC having two new commissioners has reversed the earlier decision. Stating that,the
public respondent declared that the new work schedule deprived the employees of the benefits of a time-honored company
practice of providing its employees a 30-minute paid lunch break resulting in an unjust diminution of company privileges
prohibited by Art. 100 of the Labor Code, as amended.

Issue:

Is the act of management in revising the work schedule of its employees and discarding their paid lunch break constitutive of
unfair labor practice?

Ruling:

The Office of the Solicitor General filed in a lieu of comment a manifestation and motion recommending that the petitioner
be granted, alleging that the 14 August 1992 memorandum which contained the new work schedule was not discriminatory
of the union members nor did it constitute unfair labor practice on the part of petitioner.

We agree, hence, we sustain petitioner. The right to fix the work schedules of the employees rests principally on their
employer. In the instant case petitioner, as the employer, cites as reason for the adjustment the efficient conduct of its
business operations and its improved production.

The case before us does not pertain to any controversy involving discrimination of employees but only the issue of whether
the change of work schedule, which management deems necessary to increase production, constitutes unfair labor practice.
As shown by the records, the change effected by management with regard to working time is made to apply to all factory
employees engaged in the same line of work whether or not they are members of private respondent union. Hence, it cannot
be said that the new scheme adopted by management prejudices the right of private respondent to self-organization.

Management is free to regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring,
work assignments, working methods, time, place and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision of workers,
working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay off of workers and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers.
Further, management retains the prerogative, whenever exigencies of the service so require, to change the working hours of
its employees. So long as such prerogative is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest and not
for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this
Court will uphold such exercise.

Petition granted.

ARICA VS NLRC GR 78210 FEBRUARY 28, 1989

FACTS:

Teofilo Arica et al and 561 others sued Standard Fruits Corporation (STANFILCO) Philippines for allegedly not paying the
workers for their assembly time which takes place every work day from 5:30am to 6am. The assembly time consists of the roll
call of the workers; their getting of assignments from the foreman; their filling out of the Laborer’s Daily Accomplishment
Report; their getting of tools and equipments from the stockroom; and their going to the field to work. The workers alleged
that this is necessarily and primarily for STANFILCO’s benefit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the worker’s assembly time should be paid.

HELD:
 10

No. The thirty minute assembly time long practiced and institutionalized by mutual consent of the parties under Article IV,
Section 3, of the Collective Bargaining Agreement cannot be considered as ‘waiting time’ within the purview of Section 5,
Rule I, Book III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code . . .

Furthermore, the thirty (30)-minute assembly is a deeply-rooted, routinary practice of the employees, and the proceedings
attendant thereto are not infected with complexities as to deprive the workers the time to attend to other personal pursuits.
In short, they are not subject to the absolute control of the company during this period, otherwise, their failure to report in
the assembly time would justify the company to impose disciplinary measures.

Pal Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. vs. NLRCAugust 22, 1996 G.R. No. 105963

Facts:

The respondent used to be a security guard under the employ of the petitioner company. He works for 12 hours a day and is
receiving a monthly salary. He was then dismissed by the petitioner company. Because of this, the respondent filed a
complaint with the Labor Arbiter for the payment of his overtime pay. The Labor Arbiter ruled that the respondent is entitled
to an overtime pay. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence, the current petition.

The petitioner contends that the fact that the monthly salary of the petitioner is higher than the minimum wage provided by
law is already compensatory of the excess of 4 hours of work rendered by the said employee. It argues that the salary of the
petitioner already includes the payment for the excess of 4 hours of work rendered by the respondent. It also contends that
since there is a meeting of the minds between the respondent and the petitioner, there is already a perfected contract which
means that the parties are bound by their agreements.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is entitled to an overtime pay.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that the respondent is entitled to an overtime pay. The contention of the petitioner that since the
respondent’s monthly salary is higher than the minimum wage, it is already commensurate of the 4 hours excess of work
rendered by the respondent. The Supreme Court held that the fact that one’s salary is higher than the minimum wage does
not in any way offset the other benefits that are due to the employees, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. To
consider the overtime pay of the respondent included in his monthly salary would be in contravention of the rule against
non-diminution of benefits and a violation of the Labor Code since it prescribes a certain manner on how overtime pay is
included. Moreover, the Supreme Court found that contrary to what the petitioner aver, as shown in the computation of the
petitioner itself, the monthly salary of the respondent is only a basic salary which is exclusive of all the other benefits that the
respondent is to receive.

With regard to the petitioner’s second contention that there is already a perfected contract, hence the terms and conditions
imposed therein binds the parties to the contract, the Supreme Court held that while such contention has the weight and
force of law, it is still subject to certain exception. The general right to contract is subject to a limitation that such terms and
conditions must not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals and good customs. Employment contracts are
imbued with public interest and are therefore subject to the police power of the state. The subject contract in the case at bar
is contrary to labor laws. Therefore, not binding to the parties of the case.

REST DAY/WEEKLY REST PERIODS

Art. 91. Right to weekly rest day.

It shall be the duty of every employer, whether operating for profit or not, to provide each of his employees a rest period of
not less than twenty-four (24) consecutive hours after every six (6) consecutive normal work days.

The employer shall determine and schedule the weekly rest day of his employees subject to collective bargaining agreement
and to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Labor and Employment may provide. However, the employer shall
respect the preference of employees as to their weekly rest day when such preference is based on religious grounds.

Art. 92. When employer may require work on a rest day. The employer may require his employees to work on any day:
 11

In case of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accident, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake, epidemic or other
disaster or calamity to prevent loss of life and property, or imminent danger to public safety;

In cases of urgent work to be performed on the machinery, equipment, or installation, to avoid serious loss which the
employer would otherwise suffer;

In the event of abnormal pressure of work due to special circumstances, where the employer cannot ordinarily be expected
to resort to other measures;

To prevent loss or damage to perishable goods;

Where the nature of the work requires continuous operations and the stoppage of work may result in irreparable injury or
loss to the employer; and

Under other circumstances analogous or similar to the foregoing as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Art. 93. Compensation for rest day, Sunday or holiday work.

Where an employee is made or permitted to work on his scheduled rest day, he shall be paid an additional compensation of
at least thirty percent (30%) of his regular wage. An employee shall be entitled to such additional compensation for work
performed on Sunday only when it is his established rest day.

When the nature of the work of the employee is such that he has no regular workdays and no regular rest days can be
scheduled, he shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of his regular wage for work
performed on Sundays and holidays.

Work performed on any special holiday shall be paid an additional compensation of at least thirty percent (30%) of the
regular wage of the employee. Where such holiday work falls on the employee’s scheduled rest day, he shall be entitled to an
additional compensation of at least fifty per cent (50%) of his regular wage.

Where the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract stipulates the payment of a higher
premium pay than that prescribed under this Article, the employer shall pay such higher rate.

HOLIDAYS, SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVES AND SERVICE CHARGES

Art. 94. Right to holiday pay.

Every worker shall be paid his regular daily wage during regular holidays, except in retail and service establishments regularly
employing less than ten (10) workers;

The employer may require an employee to work on any holiday but such employee shall be paid a compensation equivalent
to twice his regular rate; and

As used in this Article, "holiday" includes: New Year’s Day, Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, the ninth of April, the first of May,
the twelfth of June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the twenty-fifth and thirtieth of December and the day
designated by law for holding a general election.

Art. 95. Right to service incentive leave.

Every employee who has rendered at least one year of service shall be entitled to a yearly service incentive leave of five days
with pay.

This provision shall not apply to those who are already enjoying the benefit herein provided, those enjoying vacation leave
with pay of at least five days and those employed in establishments regularly employing less than ten employees or in
establishments exempted from granting this benefit by the Secretary of Labor and Employment after considering the viability
or financial condition of such establishment.
 12

The grant of benefit in excess of that provided herein shall not be made a subject of arbitration or any court or administrative
action.

Rules on Paternity Leave (RA 8187)

Male employees in the private sector are entitled to a paternity leave under the following conditions:

The new father must be legally married to the mother of the newborn child

He is an employee at the time of birth or miscarriage

He is cohabiting with his wife at the time she gives birth or suffers a miscarriage

He has applied for paternity leave within a reasonable time from the expected date of delivery of his pregnant wife or within
such period as provided by company rules or by collective bargaining agreement

His wife has given birth or suffered a miscarriage

Non conversion to cash: If the employee does not avail of the paternity leave, this benefit is not convertible to cash nor is it
cumulative.

Usage AFTER delivery: While application of paternity leave must be made before the delivery, it can only be used AFTER the
delivery of the child, unless company rules allow prior usage.

Duration of paternity leave: 7 Calendar days with full pay, consisting of basic pay and mandatory allowances.

Limits: This benefit is applicable to the first four (4) deliveries of the spouse of the employee with whom he is cohabiting.

SOLOR PARENTAL LEAVE - RA 8972

Republic Act No. 8972 grants parental leave of seven (7) work days with full pay every year, in addition to leave privileges
under existing laws, to solo parents.

Parental leave for solo parents is granted to any solo parent or individual who is left alone with the responsibility of
parenthood due to:

1. Giving birth as a result of rape or, as used by the law, other crimes against chastity;

2. Death of spouse;

3. Spouse is detained or is serving sentence for a criminal conviction for at least one (1) year;

4. Physical and/or mental incapacity of spouse as certified by a public medical practitioner;

5. Legal separation or de facto separation from spouse for at least one (1) year: Provided that he/she is entrusted with the
custody of the children;

6. Declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage as decreed by a court or by a church: Provided, that he/she is entrusted
with the custody of the children;

7. Abandonment of spouse for at least one (1) year;

8. Unmarried father/mother who has preferred to keep and rear his/her child/children, instead of having others care for
them or give them up to a welfare institution;

9. Any other person who solely provides parental care and support to a child or children: Provided, that he/she is duly
licensed as a foster parent by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) or duly appointed legal guardian
by the court; and

10. Any family member who assumes the responsibility of head of family as a result of the death, abandonment,
disappearance, or prolonged absence of the parents or solo parent: Provided, that such abandonment, disappearance, or
prolonged absence lasts for at least one (1) year.

In order to be entitled to the leave, a solo parent employee should have rendered at least one (1) year of service, whether
continuous or broken. In addition, the employee should notify his or her employer that he or she will avail of the leave within
a reasonable period of time. Finally, the solo parent employee must present to the employer his or her Solo Parent
Identification Card. Such card which may be obtained from the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
located in the city where the employee resides.
 13

In the event that the parental leave is not availed of, it shall not be convertible to cash.

This is how to avail of parental leave for solo parent in the Philippines.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262

AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Sec. 43. Entitled to Leave. – Victims under this Act shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to ten (10) days in
addition to other paid leaves under the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations, extendible when the necessity
arises as specified in the protection order.

Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person under this Sec. shall be penalized in accordance with the provisions
of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who shall prejudice any person for assisting
a co-employee who is a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for discrimination.

Department Order No. 112-11

This special leave privilege is contained in Department Order No. 112-11 which lays down the guidelines for availing the
special leave benefit provided for under Republic Act 9710 (Section 18), known as the Magna Carta of Women (MCW).

Women working in the private sector who are scheduled to undergo surgery for gynecological disorders can now file for
special leave.

Under the Republic Act 9710, otherwise known as “The Magna Carta of Women“, a woman employee shall be
entitled to a special leave benefit of two (2) months with full pay based on her gross monthly compensation
following surgery caused by gynecological disorders. As guidelines for the implementation of special leave
benefits for women in the private sectors, the Department of Labor and Employment issued Department Order
No. 112-11, Series of 2011. For female employees in the government service, you may refer to Civil Service
Commission Guidelines on the Availment of the Special Leave Benefits for Women under RA 9710, CSC
Resolution No. 1000432.
What is special leave benefit for women
Special leave benefits for women refers to a female employee’s leave entitlement of two months with full pay
based on her gross monthly compensation following surgery caused by gynecological disorders.
This benefit is in addition to leave privileges under existing law.
Who are qualified to avail of this benefit; Conditions
All women employees in the private sector, regardless of age and civil status, are entitled to special leave
benefits, provided she has complied with the following conditions:
 She has rendered continuous aggregate employment service of at least 6 months for the last 12 months;
 She has filed an application for special leave;
 She has undergone surgery due to gynecological disorders as certified by competent physician.
Female employees who have taken a leave of absence following surgery for gynecological disorder or or after
15 September 2009 are entitled to avail of the benefit.
What is gynecological disorders
Gynecologial disorders refer to disorders that would require surgical procedures such as dilatation and
curettage and those involving female reproductive organs such as vagina, cervix, uterus, fallopian tubes,
ovaries, breast, adnexa and pelvic floor. Gynecological surgeries shall also include hysterectomy, ovariectomy,
and mastectomy.
How to apply for special leave
The employee shall file her application for leave with her employer within a reasonable period of time from
the expected date of surgery, or within such period as may be provided by company rules and regulations or by
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
When application for special leave is not necessary
Prior application is not necessary in cases requiring emergency surgical procedure. However, the employee
must notify the employer verbally or in writing within reasonable period of time, and after the surgery or
recuperating period, she must immediately file her application using the prescribed form.
When special leave benefits shall be granted
 14

Special leave benefits shall be granted after the employee has undergone surgery. The employer, however, has
the option to pay the employee before or during the surgery.
Benefit
The employee is entitled to full pay for two months based on her gross monthly compensation. Gross monthly
compensation refers to the monthly basic pay plus mandatory allowances.
Benefit is non-convertible to cash
Special leave benefit is non-cumulative and non-convertible to cash unless otherwise provided by a CBA.
WAGES ( ARTICLE 97 TO 127 OF THE LABOR CODE AS AMENDED)

HONDA PHILS., vs.SAMAHAN NG MALAYANG MANGGAGAWA SA HONDA G.R. No. 145561 June 15, 2005

FACTS:

the case stems from the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) forged between petitioner Honda and respondent union
Samahan ng Malayang Manggagawa sa Honda (respondent union) which contained the following provisions:

Section 3. 13th Month Pay

The COMPANY shall maintain the present practice in the implementation [of] the 13th month pay.

Section 6. 14th Month Pay

The COMPANY shall grant a 14th Month Pay, computed on the same basis as computation of 13th Month Pay.

Section 7. The COMPANY agrees to continue the practice of granting, in its discretion, financial assistance to covered
employees in December of each year, of not less than 100% of basic pay.

This CBA is effective until year 2000. In the latter part of 1998, the parties started re-negotiations for the fourth and fifth
years of their CBA. When the talks between the parties bogged down, respondent union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground
of bargaining deadlock. Thereafter, Honda filed a Notice of Lockout. [To cut the story short, Secretary assumed jurisdiction;
second notice of strike; Sec. again assumed jurisdiction]

The management of Honda subsequently issued a memorandum announcing its new computation of the 13th and 14th
month pay to be granted to all its employees whereby the thirty-one (31)-day long strike shall be considered unworked days
for purposes of computing said benefits. As per the company’s new formula, the amount equivalent to 1/12 of the
employees’ basic salary shall be deducted from these bonuses, with a commitment however that in the event that the strike
is declared legal, Honda shall pay the amount deducted.

Respondent union opposed the pro-rated computation of the bonuses in a letter. Honda sought the opinion of the Bureau of
Working Conditions (BWC) on the issue. BWC agreed with the pro-rata payment of the 13th month pay as proposed by
Honda.

The matter was brought before the Grievance Machinery in accordance with the parties’ existing CBA but when the issue
remained unresolved, it was submitted for voluntary arbitration, the latter invalidated Honda’s computation. Motion for
Partial Reconsideration by Honda denied. CA dismissed for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE:

WON the pro-rated computation of the 13th month pay and the other bonuses in question is valid and lawful.

HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

 15

A collective bargaining agreement refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the
employer concerning wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit.8 As in all
contracts, the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient
provided these are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.9 Thus, where the CBA is clear
and unambiguous, it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of
the law.10

In some instances, however, the provisions of a CBA may become contentious, as in this case.

We agree with the findings of the arbitrator that the assailed CBA provisions are far from being unequivocal. A cursory
reading of the provisions will show that they did not state categorically whether the computation of the 13th month pay,
14th month pay and the financial assistance would be based on one full month’s basic salary of the employees, or pro-rated
based on the compensation actually received. The arbitrator thus properly resolved the ambiguity in favor of labor as
mandated by Article 1702 of the Civil Code.11 The Court of Appeals affirmed the arbitrator’s finding and added that the
computation of the 13th month pay should be based on the length of service and not on the actual wage earned by the
worker.

Under the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th month pay issued on November 16, 1987, the salary ceiling
of P1,000.00 under P.D. No. 851 was removed. It further provided that the minimum 13th month pay required by law shall
not be less than one-twelfth (1/12) of the total basic salary earned by an employee within a calendar year. The guidelines
pertinently provides:

The “basic salary” of an employee for the purpose of computing the 13th month pay shall include all remunerations or
earnings paid by his employer for services rendered but does not include allowances and monetary benefits which are not
considered or integrated as part of the regular or basic salary, such as the cash equivalent of unused vacation and sick leave
credits, overtime premium, night differential and holiday pay, and cost-of-living allowances.

For employees receiving regular wage, we have interpreted “basic salary” to mean, not the amount actually received by an
employee, but 1/12 of their standard monthly wage multiplied by their length of service within a given calendar year.

The revised guidelines also provided for a pro-ration of this benefit only in cases of resignation or separation from work. As
the rules state, under these circumstances, an employee is entitled to a pay in proportion to the length of time he worked
during the year, reckoned from the time he started working during the calendar year.

Considering the foregoing, the computation of the 13th month pay should be based on the length of service and not on the
actual wage earned by the worker. In the present case, there being no gap in the service of the workers during the calendar
year in question, the computation of the 13th month pay should not be pro-rated but should be given in full.

The memorandum dated November 22, 1999 which Honda issued shows that it was the first time a pro-rating scheme was to
be implemented in the company. That a full month payment of the 13th month pay is the established practice at Honda is
further bolstered by the affidavits executed by Feliteo Bautista and Edgardo Cruzada. Both attested that when they were
absent from work due to motorcycle accidents, and after they have exhausted all their leave credits and were no longer
receiving their monthly salary from Honda, they still received the full amount of their 13th month, 14th month and financial
assistance pay.

This, we rule likewise constitutes voluntary employer practice which cannot be unilaterally withdrawn by the employer
without violating Art. 100 of the Labor Code.

Petition Denied.

G.R. No. L-62918 August 23, 1989

FILIPINAS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB INC., vs. NLRC PTGWO and LOCAL CHAPTER NO. 424 1989

FACTS:
 16

Pursuant to the decision of the executive labor arbiter resolving a CBA deadlock between petitioner and
its employees union, petitioner Filipinas Golf was ordered to grant a three-stage wage increase to its
employees, as follows:

P2.00, effective February 25,1980 law library

P2.00, effective February 25,1981 law library

Pl.00, eff ective February 25,1982

Petitioner and the employees union were also ordered by the executive labor arbiter to execute a CBA
stipulating such increase. Under the CBA subsequently executed, the increases granted by petitioner shall
be subject to provisions of decrees and/or legislation promulgated/approved during the effectivity of the
CBA.

Meanwhile, on February 20, 1980, Presidential Decree No. 1678 was issued, granting non-agricultural
workers receiving less than Pl,500.00 a month a two-peso (P 2.00) per day increase in living allowance
effective February 21, 1980. A year later, on March 25, 1981, Wage Order No. 1 was promulgated,
granting an additional two-peso (P2.00) per day increase in emergency living allowance to
non-agricultural workers, effective March 22, 1981.

PD 1678 provided that employers who have given increases in wages/allowances of at least P2.00 a day
on or after February 8, 1980 shall be deemed to have complied with the said decree, and that those who
have given less than P2.00 shall pay the difference. Wage Order No. 1 contains a similar provision,
crediting increases granted between 1 January and 22 March 1981.

An order of garnishment was issued against petitioner, which petitioner moved to have reconsidered
since such order of garnishment did not take into account the increases it had given pursuant to PD 1678
and Wage Order No. 1. The Labor Arbiter found no merit in the motion, stating that the increase
prescribed under the CBA should be given in addition to the legislated increases since the increases under
the CBA were granted pursuant to the government’s compulsory arbitration powers, not from a
unilateral act of the employer, and that recent SC decisions had set the rule that benefits under a CBA are
entirely separate and distinct from that which the law grants.

ISSUE:

W/n petitioner must grant separate increases pursuant to PD 1678 and Wage Order No. 1 or must it
simply pay the difference between the increases under the CBA and under the said decrees. (Only the
difference must be paid)

HELD:

The cited provisions of PD 1678 and Wage Order No. 1 upon which the petition is anchored are clear and
unambiguous. In prescribing that increases granted during the periods therein specified, whether
unilaterally or by collective agreement, are creditable to the increases mandated thereby, they create an
equivalence between those legal and contractual obligations to grant increases, rendering both
susceptible of performance by compliance with either, subject only to the condition that where the
increases given under agreement fall short in amount of those fixed by law, the difference must be made
up by the employer.

Further, no distinction is made under those two decrees between unarbitrated agreements and those
brought about through and only after compulsory arbitration. It is axiomatic that no distinctions may be
read into the law which are not provided for therein, or clearly implicit in its terms.

The CBA between petitioner and the union of its employees also further provide that its provisions shall
be subject to decrees and/or legislations promulgated during the CBA’s effectivity. There is nothing
contrary to law, customs, public order or public policy in a stipulation subordinating, as does the
aforesaid provision in the collective bargaining agreement, contractual wage increases to those imposed
or prescribed by law. Filipinas Golf and the respondents were therefore perfectly free to agree thereon,
and having thus agreed, are bound by such stipulation as constituting the law between them.

A survey of relevant decisions of this Court also fails to support the proposition implicit in the Labor
Arbiter's decision that benefits granted by law may be claimed separately from and in addition to those
granted by collective bargaining agreements under any and all circumstances. What seems, on the
 17

contrary, to be the common thrust of applicable rulings is that the intention of the parties whether or not
to equate benefits under a collective bargaining agreement with those granted by law must prevail and
be given effect.

The manifest will and intent of the parties to treat the legislated increases as equivalent pro tanto to
those stipulated in their collective bargaining agreement must be respected and given effect.

Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Co vs NLRC (1997) G.R. 118978

Facts:
Seeking relief through the extraordinary writ of certiorari, petitioner Philippine Telegraph and
Telephone Company (hereafter, PT&T) invokes the alleged concealment of civil status and
defalcation of company funds as grounds to terminate the services of an employee. That employee,
herein private respondent Grace de Guzman, contrarily argues that what really motivated PT&T to
terminate her services was her having contracted marriage during her employment, which is
prohibited by petitioner in its company policies. She thus claims that she was discriminated against
in gross violation of law, such a proscription by an employer being outlawed by Article 136 of the
Labor Code.
Issue: WON the policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker
who contracts marriage is valid?
Held: Petitioner’s policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman
worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination,
afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.
The Constitution, cognizant of the disparity in rights between men and women in almost all phases
of social and political life, provides a gamut of protective provisions. Acknowledged as paramount
in the due process scheme is the constitutional guarantee of protection to labor and security of
tenure. Thus, an employer is required, as a condition sine qua non prior to severance of the
employment ties of an individual under his employ, to convincingly establish, through substantial
evidence, the existence of a valid and just cause in dispensing with the services of such employee,
one’s labor being regarded as constitutionally protected property. The government, to repeat,
abhors any stipulation or policy in the nature of that adopted by petitioner PT&T. The Labor Code
states, in no uncertain terms, as follows:

“ART. 136. Stipulation against marriage. - It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a
condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman shall not get married, or
to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed
resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of marriage.”

In the case at bar, it can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by the
branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, that “you’re fully aware that the company is
not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to you.” Again, in the
termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent was made to
understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment of her
married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company’s policy against
marriage (“and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in
our company.”
Petitioner’s policy is not only in derogation of the provisions of Article 136 of the Labor Code on the right of
a woman to be free from any kind of stipulation against marriage in connection with her employment, but
it likewise assaults good morals and public policy, tending as it does to deprive a woman of the freedom to
choose her status, a privilege that by all accounts inheres in the individual as an intangible and inalienable
right. Hence, while it is true that the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms, and
conditions that they may deem convenient, the same should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy. Carried to its logical consequences, it may even be said that petitioner’s policy
against legitimate marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations and subvert the
sacrament of marriage.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
vs.
NLRC G.R. No. 74965 November 9, 1994

 18

FACTS:

Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued warrants of distraint of personal property and levy of real
property of private respondent Maritime Company of the Philippines for failure to pay its tax liabilities.
However, it appears that four of the barges placed under constructive distraint were levied upon execution
by respondent deputy sheriff of Manila to satisfy a judgment for unpaid wages and other benefits of
employees of respondent Maritime Company of the Philippines.

Petitioner asked the Labor Arbiter to annul the sale but the same was denied. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision
averring that taxes are absolutely preferred claims only with respect to movable or immovable properties
on which they are due and that since the taxes sought to be collected in this case are not due on the barges
in question the government’s claim cannot prevail over the claims of employees of the Maritime Company
of the Philippines which, pursuant to Art. 110 of the Labor Code, “enjoy first preference.”

ISSUE:

WON the claims of the employees are given first preference over the claim for unpaid internal revenue
taxes.

HELD:

No.

Under Articles 2241 No. 1, 2242 No. 1, and 2246-2249 of the Civil Code, this tax claim must be given
preference over any other claim of any other creditor, in respect of any and all properties of the insolvent.

Article 110 of the Labor Code does not purport to create a lien in favor of workers or employees for unpaid
wages either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their employer.

Art. 110 of the Labor Code applies only in case of bankruptcy or judicial liquidation of the employer. This
case does not involve the liquidation of the employer’s business.

DBP VS. NLRC G.R. No. 100264-81; Jan 29, 1993

FACTS:

November 14, 1986, private respondents filed with DOLE- Daet, Camarines Norte, 17 individual complaints
against Republic Hardwood Inc. (RHI) for unpaid wages and separation pay. These complaints were
thereafter endorsed to Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC since the petitioners had already been
terminated from employment.

RHI alleged that it had ceased to operate in 1983 due to the government ban against tree-cutting and that
in May 24, 1981, its sawmill was totally burned resulting in enormous losses and that due to its financial
setbacks, RHI failed to pay its loan with the DBP. RHI contended that since DBP foreclosed its mortgaged
assets on September 24,1985, then any adjudication of monetary claims in favor of its former employees
must be satisfied against DBP. Private respondent impleaded DBP.

Labor Arbiter favored private respondents and held RHI and DBP jointly and severally liable to private
respondents. DBP appealed to the NLRC. NLRC affirmed LA’s judgment. DBP filed M.R. but it was dismissed.
Thus, this petition for certiorari.
 19

ISSUE:

(1) Whether the private respondents are entitled to separation pay.

(2) Whether the private respondents’ separation pay should be preferred than the DBP’s lien over the RHI’s
mortgaged assets.

RULING:

Yes. Despite the enormous losses incurred by RHI due to the fire that gutted the sawmill in 1981 and
despite the logging ban in 1953, the uncontroverted claims for separation pay show that most of the
private respondents still worked up to the end of 1985. RHI would still have continued its business had not
the petitioner foreclosed all of its assets and properties on September 24, 1985. Thus, the closure of RHI’s
business was not primarily brought about by serious business losses. Such closure was a consequence of
DBP’s foreclosure of RHI’s assets. The Supreme Court applied Article 283 which provides:

“. . . in cases of closures or cessation of operations of establishment or undertaking not due to serious

business losses or financial reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to 1 month pay or at least 1/2
month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. . . .”

(2) No. Because of the petitioner’s assertion that LA and NLRC incorrectly applied the provisions of Article
110 of the Labor Code, the Supreme Court was constrained to grant the petition for certiorari.

Article 110 must be read in relation to the Civil Code concerning the classification, concurrence and
preference of credits, which is application in insolvency proceedings where the claims of all creditors,
preferred or non-preferred, may be adjudicated in a binding manner. Before the workers’ preference
provided by Article 110 may be invoked, there must first be a declaration of bankruptcy or a judicial
liquidation of the employer’s business.

NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the LA’s ruling. DBP’s lien on RHI’s mortgaged
assets, being a mortgage credit, is a special preferred credit under Article 2242 of the Civil Code while the
workers’ preference is an ordinary preferred credit under Article 2244.

A distinction should be made between a preference of credit and a lien. A preference applies only to claims
which do not attach to specific properties. A lien creates a charge on a particular property. The right of first
preference as regards unpaid wages recognized by Article 110 does not constitute a lien on the property of
the insolvent debtor in favor of workers. It is but a preference of credit in their favor, a preference in
application. It is a method adopted to determine and specify the order in which credits should be paid in
the final distribution of the proceeds of the insolvent’s assets. It is a right to a first preference in the
discharge of the funds of the judgment debtor.

Article 110 of the Labor Code does not create a lien in favor of workers or employees for unpaid wages
either upon all of the properties or upon any particular property owned by their employer. Claims for
unpaid wages do not therefore fall at all within the category of specially preferred claims established under
Articles 2241 and 2242 of the Civil Code, except to the extent that such claims for unpaid wages are already
covered by Article 2241, (6)- (claims for laborers’ wages, on the goods manufactured or the work done); or
by Article 2242,(3)- (claims of laborers and other workers engaged in the construction, reconstruction or
repair of buildings, canals and other works, upon said buildings, canals and other works.
 20

Since claims for unpaid wages fall outside the scope of Article 2241 (6) and 2242 (3), and not attached to
any specific property, they would come within the category of ordinary preferred credits under Article
2244.

(Note: SC favored DBP kasi yung mortgage nila against RHI was executed prior to the amendment of Article
110. The amendment can’t be given retroactive effect daw. Pero sa present, 1st priority na talaga ang
laborer’s unpaid wages regardless kung may mortgage or wala ang ibang creditors ng employer)

Article 110 of the Labor Code has been amended by R.A. No. 6715 and now reads:

“Article 110. Worker preference in case of bankruptcy. – In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of an
employers business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other
monetary claims, any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding. Such unpaid wages, and monetary
claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid.”

The amendment “expands worker preference to cover not only unpaid wages but also other monetary
claims to which even claims of the Government must be deemed subordinate.” Hence, under the new law,
even mortgage credits are subordinate to workers’ claims.

R.A. No. 6715, however, took effect only on March 21, 1989. The amendment cannot therefore be
retroactively applied to, nor can it affect, the mortgage credit which was secured by the petitioner several
years prior to its effectivity.

Even if Article 110 and its Implementing Rule, as amended, should be interpreted to mean `absolute
preference,’ the same should be given only prospective effect in line with the cardinal rule that laws shall
have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided. To give Article 110 retroactive effect would be
to wipe out the mortgage in DBP’s favor and expose it to a risk which it sought to protect itself against by
requiring a collateral in the form of real property.

The public respondent, therefore, committed grave abuse of discretion when it retroactively applied the
amendment introduced by R.A. No. 6715 to the case at bar.

Petition GRANTED. Decision of NLRC SET ASIDE.

BARAYOGA VS ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST GR 160073 OCTOBER 24, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner Bisudeco-Philsucor Corfarm Workers Union is composed of workers of Bicolandia Sugar

Development Corporation (BISUDECO), a sugar plantation mill located in Camarines Sur. Respondent Asset
Privatization Trust (APT), a public trust was created under Proclamation No. 50, mandated to conserve,
provisionally manage and dispose of non-performing assets of the Philippine government identified for
privatization or disposition. Thus, pursuant to Proclamation No. 50, then President Corazon Aquino issued
Administrative Order No. 14, where the financial claim of the Philippine National Bank against BISUDECO in
the form of a loan secured by a chattel, was transferred to APT as a trustee of the government. Sometime
later, Philippine Sugar Corporation (Philsucor) took over the management of the sugar plantation and
milling operations. Meanwhile, because of BISUDECO’s continued failure of to pay its outstanding loan with
PNB, its mortgaged properties were foreclosed and subsequently sold in a public auction to APT, as the sole
bidder.
 21

The union filed a labor case against BISUDECO-Phisucor for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal when,
the management, conditioned their re-hiring upon their resignation from the union but, nonetheless
employed the services of outsiders under the pakyaw system. Now, the APT's Board of Trustees sold the
plantation to Peñafrancia Sugar Mill (Pensumil). The board, however, passed another resolution authorizing
the payment of separation benefits to BISUDECO's employees in the event of the company's privatization.
Not included in the Resolution, though, were petitioner-union's members who had not been recalled to
work. Thus, petitioners impleaded respondents APT and Pensumil in the labor case, all respondents
interposed the defense of lack of employer-employee relationship.

The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC thereafter, ordered APT to pay herein complainants. It was ruled that while
no employer-employee relationship existed between members of the petitioner union and APT, at the time
of the employees' illegal dismissal, the assets of BISUDECO had been transferred to the national
government through APT. On appeal, the appellate court, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, held that the
APT liable for petitioners' claims for unfair labor practice because the petitioners' claims could not be
enforced against APT as mortgagee of the foreclosed properties of BISUDECO. Hence, under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, petitioner-union's members who were not recalled to work by Philsucor, seek to hold APT
liable for their monetary claims and allegedly illegal dismissal.

ISSUE:

Whether APT is liable for the claims of petitioners against their former employer.

HELD:

NO. Workers' claims for unpaid wages and monetary benefits cannot be paid outside of a bankruptcy or
judicial liquidation proceedings against the employer. It is settled that the application of Article 110 of the
Labor Code[ Article 110. Worker’s preference in case of bankruptcy. – In the event of bankruptcy or
liquidation of the employer’s business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid
wages and other monetary claims shall be paid in full before the claims of the Government and other
creditors may be paid.] is contingent upon the institution of those proceedings, during which all creditors
are convened, their claims ascertained and inventoried, and their preferences determined. Assured thereby
is an orderly determination of the preference given to creditors' claims; and preserved in harmony is the
legal scheme of classification, concurrence and preference of credits in the Civil Code, the Insolvency Law,
and the Labor Code.

Responsibility for the liabilities of a mortgagor towards its employees cannot be transferred via an auction
sale to a purchaser who is also the mortgagee-creditor of the foreclosed assets and chattels. Clearly, the
mortgagee-creditor has no employer-employee relations with the mortgagor’s workers. The mortgage
constitutes a lien on the determinate properties of the employer-debtor, because it is a specially preferred
credit to which the worker’s monetary claims is deemed subordinate.

Article 110. Worker’s preference in case of bankruptcy. – In the event of bankruptcy or liquidation of the employer’s
business, his workers shall enjoy first preference as regards their unpaid wages and other monetary claims shall be paid in
full before the claims of the Government and other creditors may be paid

AMALGAMATED LABORERS ASSOCIATION VS. CIR GR No. L-23467 March 27, 1968

FACTS:

Amalgamated Laborers’ Association won a case of unfair labor practice against Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc.
(Biscom). Upon motion of the complainants, CIR sent the Chief Examiner to go to Biscom and compute the backwages. Total
net backwages amounted to P79,755.22. Appeals were made against this decision. In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez (herein respondent), in the same case, filed a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien” over the amount to be awarded. He
alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the said case since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said
case up to the Supreme Court in Appeal, as chief counsel. He claimed that the labourers have voluntarily agreed to give him
 22

as attorney’s fees on contingent basis 25% of the award. He further averred that this is already a discounted fee out of the plea
of the union’s president to reduce it from 30% for them to also satisfy Atty. Jose Ur Carbonell. Meanwhile, CIR decided the
appeals still in favour of the petitioners and ordered Biscom to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the
cashier of the court to be awarded and granted to Atty. Fernandez. Atty. Carbonell and ALA appealed from the decision
contending that 1) CIR is bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate contractual disputes over attorney’s fees averring that a dispute
arising from contracts for attorney’s fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR’s
authority and to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may validly assume jurisdiction is to
disregard the special and limited nature of said court’s jurisdiction; 2) the award of 25% as attorney’s fees to Atty. Fernandez is
excessive, unfair and illegal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1.Is CIR bereft of jurisdiction over the claim for attorney’s fees?

2.Is 25% of the award a reasonable attorney’s fee?

RULING:

1.No. Court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction. In the absence of such
express grant, and in the absence of prohibitive legislation, it shall also be impliedly granted. In the case at bench, to direct
that the present dispute be lodged in another court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, a situation
abhorred by the rule. Since the court of Industrial Relations obviously had the jurisdiction over the main cases, it likewise had
jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for attorney’s fees made by the members of the
bar who appeared therein.

2.Yes. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of 25% attorney’s fees reasonably
compensates the whole legal services rendered in the case. This must however be shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and
respondent Atty. Fernandez. Afterall, they are the counsel of record of the complainants. Though common effort is presumed,
the rightful shares of both must be ascertained. As such, the case has been remanded to the CIR for the sole determination of
shares.

OTHER IMPORTANT POINTS:

Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns the arrangement wherein union presidents should share in the attorney’s fees. No
division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service and responsibility. The
union president is not the attorney for the labourers. He may seek compensation only as union president.

A contingent fee contract specifying the percentage of recovery an attorney is to receive in a suit should be reasonable under
all circumstances of the case, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR GR 77959 JAN 1989

FACTS:

petitioner, a domestic corporation engaged in the telecommunications business, filed with the National Wages Council an
application for exemption from the coverage of Wage Order No. 1. 2 The application was opposed by respondent
URCPICLA-FUR, a labor organization affiliated with the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR).

National Wages Council disapproving said application and ordering the petitioner to pay its covered employees the mandatory
living allowance of P2.00 daily effective March 22, 1981.

Said letter-decision was affirmed by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 1882 and, subsequently, this Court in its
resolution of July 15, 1985 in G.R. No. 70148 dismissed RCPI's petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Entry of final judgment
was issued by the Court on July 15, 1985.

Furthermore, it is not denied that as early as March 13, 1985, before the aforesaid case was elevated to this Court, respondent
union filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, asserting therein its claim to 15% of the total backpay due to all its
members as "union service fee" for having successfully prosecuted the latter's claim for payment of wages and for
 23

reimbursement of expenses incurred by FUR and prayed for the segregation and remittance of said amount to FUR thru its
National President.

In a subsequent "Motion for Immediate Issuance of Writ of Execution", dated September 9, 1985, respondent union reiterated
its claim for said union service fee but this time in an amount equivalent to 20% of the total backpay due its members, to be
remitted to the institution previously adverted to.6

On September 24, 1985, petitioner filed its opposition to said motion, asserting, among others, that "there is no legal basis for
respondent Union to have the sum equivalent to 20% union service fee deducted from the amount due to every recipient
member".

On October 24, 1985, without the knowledge and consent of respondent union, petitioner entered into a compromise
agreements 9 with BMRCPI-NFL as the new bargaining agent of oppositors RCPI employees.

According to their CBA, par c) Of and from the aforesaid total amount due every employee, 10% thereof
shall be considered as attorney's fee due Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan, the same to be deducted from
the remaining 70% and distributed to Atty. R. Capocyan at the time of the distribution of the
remaining 70%. In this connection, Atty. Rodolfo Capocyan manifest (sic) that he is authorized by
the covered employee (sic) to collect 10% of whatever is/are due them as attorney's fees and
undertakes and binds himself to submit to RCPI the required individual check-off authorization with
respect to the 30%. He and the herein union assume sole responsibility for and shall hold RCPI free
and harmless from any claim, suit or complaint arising from the deduction of this 10% attorney's
fee,'

ISSUE:

whether the public respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding the petitioner
solely liable for "union service fee' to respondent URCPICLA-FUR.

RULING:

NO. While it is true that the original decision of said Council; did not expressly provide for payment of attorney's fees, that
particular aspect or deficiency is deemed to have been supplied, if not modified pro tanto, by the compromise agreement
subsequently executed between the parties. A cursory perusal of said agreement shows an unqualified admission by petitioner
that "from the aforesaid total amount due every employee, 10% thereof shall be considered as attorney's fee, 14 although, as
hereinafter discussed, it sought to withhold it from respondent union. Considering, however, that respondent union was
categorically found by the Labor Secretary to have been responsible for the successful prosecution of the case to its ultimate
conclusion in behalf of its member, employees of herein petitioner, its right to fees for services rendered, or what it termed as
"union service fee," is indubitable.

SC find no cogent reason to disturb the order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment finding petitioner liable for the union
service fee of private respondent.

DEALCO FARMS VS. NLRC G.R. No. 153192 January 30, 2009

FACTS:

 Petitioner is a corporation engaged in the business of importation, production, fattening and

distribution of live cattle for sale to meat dealers, meat traders, meat processors, canned good
manufacturers and other dealers in Mindanao and in Metro Manila. Petitioner imports cattle
by the boatload from Australia into the ports of General Santos City, Subic, Batangas,
or Manila.

 Respondents Albert Caban and Chiquito Bastida were hired by petitioner on June 25, 1993
and October 29, 1994, respectively, as escorts or comboys for the transit of live cattle
 24

from General Santos City to Manila. Respondents work entailed tending to the cattle during
transportation. Upon arrival in Manila, the cattle are turned over to and received by the duly
acknowledged buyers or customers of petitioner, at which point, respondents work ceases.

 Respondents filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for separation pay with full
backwages, salary differentials, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay, damages, and
attorneys fees against petitioner before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

 Petitioner denies the existence of an employer-employee relationship with respondents.

Petitioner posits, among others, that respondents can only be considered as casual
employees performing work not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade
of petitioner, i.e., cattle fattening to market weight and production.

 The Labor Arbiter found that respondents were employees of petitioner.

o All the four elements in the determination of an employer-employee relationship
being present, respondents were, therefore, employees of petitioner.
o Respondents also performed activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the
usual business or trade of petitioner. Transporting the cattle to its main market
in Manila is an essential and component aspect of [petitioners] operation.
o More, it appears that respondents had rendered service for more than one year doing
the same task repeatedly, thus, even assuming they were casual employees they may
be considered regular employees with respect to the activity in which they were
employed and their employment shall continue while such activity exists (last par. of
Art. 280).

 On appeal to the NLRC, the Fifth Division affirmed the Labor Arbiters ruling on the
existence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties .

 Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which denied due
course and dismissed the petition for procedural flaws. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was, likewise, denied by the appellate court.

 Hence, this appeal

ISSUE(S): Whether the employees are casual workers.

HELD: No.

RATIO:

First. Petitioner failed to disprove respondents’ claim that they were hired by petitioner as comboys from 1993 and 1994,
respectively. In fact, petitioner admits that respondents were engaged, at one point, as comboys, on a per trip or per contract
basis. This assertion petitioner failed anew to substantiate. Noteworthy is the fact that respondents’ affidavit merely contain a
statement that the offer of their services as comboys or escorts was not limited to petitioner alone. The affidavits simply aver
that they, including herein respondents, were engaged by Dealco on a per trip basis, which commenced upon embarkation on
a ship for Manila and terminated upon their return to the port of origin. Respondents did not state that their engagement by
petitioner was on a one-time basis. As a result, petitioners claim remains an unsubstantiated and bare-faced allegation.

Second. Even assuming that respondents task is not part of petitioners regular course of business, this does not preclude
their attainment of regular employee status.

Art. 280. Regular and Casual Employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless
of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to
perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at
the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.
 25

An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided, That, any employee
who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular
employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his employment shall continue while such activity exists.

Undoubtedly, respondents were regular employees of petitioner with respect to the escort or comboy activity for which they
had been engaged since 1993 and 1994, respectively, without regard to continuity or brokenness of the service.

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 851 December 16, 1976

REQUIRING ALL EMPLOYERS TO PAY THEIR EMPLOYEES A 13th-MONTH PAY

WHEREAS, it is necessary to further protect the level of real wages from the ravage of worldwide inflation;

WHEREAS, there has been no increase in the legal minimum wage rates since 1970;

WHEREAS, the Christmas season is an opportune time for society to show its concern for the plight of the working masses so
they may properly celebrate Christmas and New Year.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree as
follows:

Section 1. All employers are hereby required to pay all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a
month, regardless of the nature of their employment, a 13th-month pay not later than December 24 of every year.

Section 2. Employers already paying their employees a 13th-month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this Decree.

Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of December 1975.

RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 851

By virtue of the powers vested in me by law, the following rules and regulations implementing Presidential Decree No. 851
are hereby issued for the guidance of all concerned.

Section 1. Payment of 13-month Pay All employers covered by Presidential Decree No. 851, hereinafter referred to as the
"Decree", shall pay to all their employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000 a month a thirteenth-month pay
not later than December 24 of every year.

Section 2. Definition of certain terms As used in this issuance.

(a) "Thirteenth-moth pay" shall mean one twelfth (1/12) of the basic salary of an employee within a calendar year;

(b) "Basic salary" shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but
may not include cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 525 or Letter of Instructions No. 174,
profit-sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the
regular or basic salary of the employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on December 16, 1975.
 26

Section 3. Employers covered The Decree shall apply to all employers except to:

(a) Distressed employers, such as (1) those which are currently incurring substantial losses or (2) in the case of non-profit
institutions and organizations, where their income, whether from donations, contributions, grants and other earnings from
any source, has consistently declined by more than forty (40%) percent of their normal income for the last two (2) years,
subject to the provision of Section 7 of this issuance;

(b) The Government and any of its political subdivisions, including government-owned and controlled corporations, except
those corporations operating essentially as private subsidiaries of the Government;

(c) Employers already paying their employees 13-month pay or more in a calendar year of its equivalent at the time of this
issuance;

(d) Employers of household helpers and persons in the personal service of another in relation to such workers; and

(e) Employers of those who are paid on purely commission, boundary, or task basis, and those who are paid a fixed amount
for performing a specific work, irrespective of the time consumed in the performance thereof, except where the workers are
paid on piece-rate basis in which case the employer shall be covered by this issuance insofar as such workers are concerned.

As used herein, workers paid on piece-rate basis shall refer to those who are paid a standard amount for every piece or unit
of work produced that is more or less regularly replicated, without regard to the time spent in producing the same.

The term "its equivalent" as used in paragraph c) hereof shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing
payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary but shall not include cash and stock
dividends, cost of living allowances and all other allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary
benefits. Where an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employees basic salary, the employer shall pay the difference.

Section 4. Employees covered Except as provided in Section 3 of this issuance, all employees of covered employers shall be
entitled to benefit provided under the Decree who are receiving not more than P1,000 a month, regardless of their position,
designation or employment status, and irrespective of the method by which their wages are paid, provided that they have
worked for at least one month during the calendar year.

Section 5. Option of covered employers A covered employer may pay one-half of the 13th-month pay required by the Decree
before the opening of the regular school year and the other half on or before the 24th day of December of every year.

In any establishment where a union has been recognized or certified as the collective bargaining agent of the employees
therein, the periodicity or frequency of payment of the 13th month pay may be the subject of agreement.

Nothing herein shall prevent employers from giving the benefits provided in the Decree to their employees who are receiving
more than One Thousand (P1,000) Pesos a month or benefits higher than those provided by the Decree.

Section 6. Special feature of benefit The benefits granted under this issuance shall not be credited as part of the regular wage
of the employees for purposes of determining overtime and premium pay, fringe benefits, as well as premium contributions
to the State Insurance Fund, social security, medicare and private welfare and retirement plans.

Section 7. Exemption of Distressed employers Distressed employers shall qualify for exemption from the requirement of the
Decree upon prior authorization by the Secretary of Labor. Petitions for exemptions may be filed within the nearest regional
office having jurisdiction over the employer not later than January 15, 1976. The regional offices shall transmit the petitions
to the Secretary of Labor within 24 hours from receipt thereof.

Section 8. Report of compliance Every covered employer shall make a report of his compliance with the Decree to the nearest
regional labor office not later than January 15 of each year.
 27

The report shall conform substantially with the following form:

REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH PD NO. 851

1. Name of establishment

2. Address

3. Principal product or business

4. Total employment

5. Total number of workers benefited

6. Amount granted per employee

7. Total amount of benefits granted

8. Name, position and tel. no. of person giving information

Section 9. Adjudication of claims Non-payment of the thirteenth-month pay provided by the Decree and these rules shall be
treated as money claims cases and shall be processed in accordance with the Rules Implementing the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the Rules of the National Labor Relations Commission.

Section 10. Prohibition against reduction or elimination of benefits Nothing herein shall be construed to authorize any
employer to eliminate, or diminish in any way, supplements, or other employee benefits or favorable practice being enjoyed
by the employee at the time of promulgation of this issuance.

Section 11. Transitory Provision These rules and regulations shall take effect immediately and for purposes of the 13-month
pay for 1975, the same shall apply only to those who are employees as of December 16, 1975.

Manila, Philippines, 22 December 1975.

SUPPLEMENTARY RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING P.D. NO. 851

To insure uniformity in the interpretation, application and enforcement of the provisions of P.D. No. 851 and its
implementing regulations, the following clarifications are hereby made for the information and guidance of all concerned:

1. Contractors and Subcontractors, including Security and Watchman Agencies, are exempt for the year 1975 subject to the
following conditions:

(a) that the contracts of such enterprises were entered into before December 16, 1975;

(b) that such enterprises have complied with all labor standards laws during the year;
 28

(c) that the contract cannot really accomodate 13-month pay or its equivalent; and

(d) that the contract does not provide for cost escalation clause.

This exemption is without prejudice on the part of the workers to negotiate with their employers or to seek payment thereof
by filing appropriate complaints with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor.

2. Private school teachers, including faculty members of colleges and universities, are entitled to 1/12 of their annual basic
pay regardless of the number of months they teach or are paid within a year.

3. New establishments operating for less than one year are not covered except subsidiaries or branches of foreign and
domestic corporations.

4. Overtime pay, earnings and other remunerations which are not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the
computation of the 13-month pay.

5. In view of the lack of sufficient time for the dissemination of the provisions of P.D. No. 851 and its Rules and the
unavailability of adequate cash flow due to the long holiday season, compliance and reporting of compliance with this Decree
are hereby extended up to March 31, 1976 except in private schools where compliance for 1975 may be made not later than
30 June 1976.

6. Nothing herein shall sanction the withdrawal or diminution of any compensation, benefits or any supplements being
enjoyed by the employees on the effective date of this issuance.

ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR STANDARDS (ARTICLES 128 TO 129, LABOR CODE AS AMENDED)

Chapter VI

ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT

Art. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives, including labor regulation officers, shall have
access to employer’s records and premises at any time of the day or night whenever work is being undertaken therein, and
the right to copy therefrom, to question any employee and investigate any fact, condition or matter which may be necessary
to determine violations or which may aid in the enforcement of this Code and of any labor law, wage order or rules and
regulations issued pursuant thereto.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases where the relationship of
employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives shall have the
power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards provisions of this Code and other labor legislation
based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of
inspection. The Secretary or his duly authorized representatives shall issue writs of execution to the appropriate authority for
the enforcement of their orders, except in cases where the employer contests the findings of the labor employment and
enforcement officer and raises issues supported by documentary proofs which were not considered in the course of
inspection. (As amended by Republic Act No. 7730, June 2, 1994).

An order issued by the duly authorized representative of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under this Article may be
appealed to the latter. In case said order involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon
the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Secretary of Labor and
Employment in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the order appealed from. (As amended by Republic Act No.
7730, June 2, 1994)

The Secretary of Labor and Employment may likewise order stoppage of work or suspension of operations of any unit or
department of an establishment when non-compliance with the law or implementing rules and regulations poses grave and
imminent danger to the health and safety of workers in the workplace. Within twenty-four hours, a hearing shall be
conducted to determine whether an order for the stoppage of work or suspension of operations shall be lifted or not. In case
the violation is attributable to the fault of the employer, he shall pay the employees concerned their salaries or wages during
the period of such stoppage of work or suspension of operation.
 29

It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise render ineffective the orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under
this Article, and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or restraining order or otherwise
assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in accordance with this Article.

Any government employee found guilty of violation of, or abuse of authority, under this Article shall, after appropriate
administrative investigation, be subject to summary dismissal from the service.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by appropriate regulations, require employers to keep and maintain such
employment records as may be necessary in aid of his visitorial and enforcement powers under this Code.

Art. 129. Recovery of wages, simple money claims and other benefits. Upon complaint of any interested party, the Regional
Director of the Department of Labor and Employment or any of the duly authorized hearing officers of the Department is
empowered, through summary proceeding and after due notice, to hear and decide any matter involving the recovery of
wages and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, owing to an employee or person employed in
domestic or household service or househelper under this Code, arising from employer-employee relations: Provided, That
such complaint does not include a claim for reinstatement: Provided further, That the aggregate money claims of each
employee or househelper does not exceed Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). The Regional Director or hearing officer shall
decide or resolve the complaint within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the filing of the same. Any sum thus
recovered on behalf of any employee or househelper pursuant to this Article shall be held in a special deposit account by, and
shall be paid on order of, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or the Regional Director directly to the employee or
househelper concerned. Any such sum not paid to the employee or househelper because he cannot be located after diligent
and reasonable effort to locate him within a period of three (3) years, shall be held as a special fund of the Department of
Labor and Employment to be used exclusively for the amelioration and benefit of workers.

Any decision or resolution of the Regional Director or hearing officer pursuant to this provision may be appealed on the same
grounds provided in Article 223 of this Code, within five (5) calendar days from receipt of a copy of said decision or resolution,
to the National Labor Relations Commission which shall resolve the appeal within ten (10) calendar days from the submission
of the last pleading required or allowed under its rules.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representative may supervise the payment of unpaid wages
and other monetary claims and benefits, including legal interest, found owing to any employee or househelper under this
Code. (As amended by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989)

Title III
WORKING CONDITIONS FOR
SPECIAL GROUPS OF EMPLOYEES
Chapter I
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN
Art. 130. Nightwork prohibition. No woman, regardless of age, shall be employed or permitted or suffered to work,
with or without compensation:

1. In any industrial undertaking or branch thereof between ten o’clock at night and six o’clock in the morning
of the following day; or

2. In any commercial or non-industrial undertaking or branch thereof, other than agricultural, between
midnight and six o’clock in the morning of the following day; or

3. In any agricultural undertaking at nighttime unless she is given a period of rest of not less than nine (9)
consecutive hours.
Art. 131. Exceptions. The prohibitions prescribed by the preceding Article shall not apply in any of the following
cases:

1. In cases of actual or impending emergencies caused by serious accident, fire, flood, typhoon, earthquake,
epidemic or other disasters or calamity, to prevent loss of life or property, or in cases of force majeure or imminent
danger to public safety;

2. In case of urgent work to be performed on machineries, equipment or installation, to avoid serious loss
which the employer would otherwise suffer;

3. Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss of perishable goods;

 30

4. Where the woman employee holds a responsible position of managerial or technical nature, or where the
woman employee has been engaged to provide health and welfare services;

5. Where the nature of the work requires the manual skill and dexterity of women workers and the same
cannot be performed with equal efficiency by male workers;

6. Where the women employees are immediate members of the family operating the establishment or
undertaking; and

7. Under other analogous cases exempted by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in appropriate
regulations.
Art. 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish standards that will ensure the
safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall, by regulations, require any employer to:

1. Provide seats proper for women and permit them to use such seats when they are free from work and
during working hours, provided they can perform their duties in this position without detriment to efficiency;

2. To establish separate toilet rooms and lavatories for men and women and provide at least a dressing room
for women;

3. To establish a nursery in a workplace for the benefit of the women employees therein; and

4. To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special
occupations such as those of flight attendants and the like.
Art. 133. Maternity leave benefits.

1. Every employer shall grant to any pregnant woman employee who has rendered an aggregate service of at
least six (6) months for the last twelve (12) months, maternity leave of at least two (2) weeks prior to the expected
date of delivery and another four (4) weeks after normal delivery or abortion with full pay based on her regular or
average weekly wages. The employer may require from any woman employee applying for maternity leave the
production of a medical certificate stating that delivery will probably take place within two weeks.

2. The maternity leave shall be extended without pay on account of illness medically certified to arise out of
the pregnancy, delivery, abortion or miscarriage, which renders the woman unfit for work, unless she has earned
unused leave credits from which such extended leave may be charged.

3. The maternity leave provided in this Article shall be paid by the employer only for the first four (4)
deliveries by a woman employee after the effectivity of this Code.
Art. 134. Family planning services; incentives for family planning.

1. Establishments which are required by law to maintain a clinic or infirmary shall provide free family planning
services to their employees which shall include, but not be limited to, the application or use of contraceptive pills and
intrauterine devices.

2. In coordination with other agencies of the government engaged in the promotion of family planning, the
Department of Labor and Employment shall develop and prescribe incentive bonus schemes to encourage family
planning among female workers in any establishment or enterprise.
Art. 135. Discrimination prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any employer to discriminate against any woman
employee with respect to terms and conditions of employment solely on account of her sex.
The following are acts of discrimination:
1.Payment of a lesser compensation, including wage, salary or other form of remuneration and fringe benefits, to a
female employees as against a male employee, for work of equal value; and

2. Favoring a male employee over a female employee with respect to promotion, training opportunities, study and
scholarship grants solely on account of their sexes.
Criminal liability for the willful commission of any unlawful act as provided in this Article or any violation of the rules
and regulations issued pursuant to Section 2 hereof shall be penalized as provided in Articles 288 and 289 of this
Code: Provided, That the institution of any criminal action under this provision shall not bar the aggrieved employee
from filing an entirely separate and distinct action for money claims, which may include claims for damages and
other affirmative reliefs. The actions hereby authorized shall proceed independently of each other. (As amended by
Republic Act No. 6725, May 12, 1989)
Art. 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment
or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that
upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.
Art. 137. Prohibited acts.
 It shall be unlawful for any employer:
 31

 To deny any woman employee the benefits provided for in this Chapter or to discharge any woman employed
by him for the purpose of preventing her from enjoying any of the benefits provided under this Code.

 To discharge such woman on account of her pregnancy, or while on leave or in confinement due to her
pregnancy;

 To discharge or refuse the admission of such woman upon returning to her work for fear that she may again be
pregnant.
Art. 138. Classification of certain women workers. Any woman who is permitted or suffered to work, with or
without compensation, in any night club, cocktail lounge, massage clinic, bar or similar establishments under the
effective control or supervision of the employer for a substantial period of time as determined by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment, shall be considered as an employee of such establishment for purposes of labor and social
legislation.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10151

AN ACT ALLOWING THE EMPLOYMENT OF NIGHT WORKERS, THEREBY REPEALING ARTICLES 130 AND 131 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NUMBER FOUR HUNDRED FORTY-TWO, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 130 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed.

SEC. 2. Article 131 of the Labor Code is hereby repealed.

SEC. 3. The subsequent articles in Boot Three, Title III, Chapter I to Chapter IV of Presidential Decree No. 442 are
hereby renumbered accordingly.

SEC. 4. A new chapter is hereby inserted after Book Three, Title III of Presidential Decree No. 442, to read as follows:

“Chapter V

“Employment of Night Workers

“Art. 154. Coverage.— This chapter shall apply to all persons, who shall be employed or permitted or suffered to
work at night, except those employed in agriculture, stock raising, fishing, maritime transport and inland navigation,
during a period of not less than seven (7) consecutive hours, including the interval from midnight to five o’clock in
the morning, to be determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, after consulting the workers’
representatives/labor organizations and employers.

‘”Night worker’ means any employed person whose work requires performance of a substantial number of hours of
night work which exceeds a specified limit. This limit shall be fixed by the Secretary of Labor after consulting the
workers’ representatives/labor organizations and employers.”

“Art. 155. Health Assessment, – At their request, workers shall have the right to undergo a health assessment
without charge and to receive advice on how to reduce or avoid health problems associated with their work:

“(a) Before taking up an assignment as a night worker;

“(b) At regular intervals during such an assignment; and

“(c) If they experience health problems during such an assignment which are not caused by factors other than the
performance of night work.

“With the exception of a finding of unfitness for night work, the findings of such assessments shall not be transmitted
to others without the workers’ consent and shall not be used to their detriment.”

“Art. 156. Mandatory Facilities.— Suitable first-aid facilities shall be made available for workers performing night
work, including arrangements where such workers, where necessary, can be taken immediately to a place for
appropriate treatment. The employers are likewise required to provide safe and healthful working conditions and
adequate or reasonable facilities such as sleeping or resting quarters in the establishment and transportation from
the work premises to the nearest point of their residence subject to exceptions and guidelines to be provided by the
DOLE.”

“Art. 157. Transfer.— Night workers who are certified as unfit for night work, due to health reasons, shall be
transferred, whenever practicable, to a similar job for which they are fit to work.
 32

“If such transfer to a similar job is not practicable, these workers shall be granted the same benefits as other workers
who are unable to work, or to secure employment during such period.

“A night worker certified as temporarily unfit for night work shall be given the same protection against dismissal or
notice of dismissal as other workers who are prevented from working for reasons of health.”

“Art. 158. Women Night Workers.— Measures shall be taken to ensure that an alternative to night work is available
to women workers who would otherwise be called upon to perform such work:

“(a) Before and after childbirth, for a period of at least sixteen (16) weeks, which shall be divided between the time
before and after childbirth;

“(b) For additional periods, in respect of which a medical certificate is produced stating that said additional periods
are necessary for the health of the mother or child:

“(1) During pregnancy;

“(2) During a specified time beyond the period, after childbirth is fixed pursuant to subparagraph (a) above, the
length of which shall be determined by the DOLE after consulting the labor organizations and employers.

“During the periods referred to in this article:

“(i) A woman worker shall not be dismissed or given notice of dismissal, except for just or authorised causes provided
for in this Code that are not connected with pregnancy, childbirth and childcare responsibilities.

“(ii) A woman worker shall not lose the benefits regarding her status, seniority, and access to promotion which may
attach to her regular night work position.

‘Pregnant women and nursing mothers may he allowed to work at night only if a competent physician, other than
the company physician, shall certify their fitness to render night work, and specify, in the ease of pregnant
employees, the period of the pregnancy that they can safely work.

“The measures referred to in this article may include transfer to day work where this is possible, the provision of
social security benefits or an extension of maternity leave.

“The provisions of this article shall not have the effect of reducing the protection and benefits connected with
maternity leave under existing laws.”

“Art. 159. Compensation.— The compensation for night workers in the form of working time, pay or similar benefits
shall recognize the exceptional nature of night work.”

“Art. 160. Social Services.—Appropriate social services shall be provided for night workers and, where necessary, for
workers performing night work.”

“Art. 161. Night Work Schedules.— Before introducing work schedules requiring the services of night workers, the
employer shall consult the workers’ representatives/labor

organizations concerned on the details of such schedules and the forms of organization of night work that are best
adapted to the establishment and its personnel, as well as on the occupational health measures and social services
which are required. In establishments employing night workers, consultation shall take place regularly.”

SEC. 5. The subsequent articles starting from Book Four, Title I, Chapter I of Presidential Decree No. 442 are hereby
renumbered accordingly.

SEC. 6. Application.— The measures referred to in this chapter shall be applied not later than six (G) months from the
effectivity of this Act.

SEC. 7. Guidelines.— The DOLE shah promulgate appropriate regulations in addition to existing ones to ensure
protection, safety and welfare of night workers.

SEC. 8. Penalties.— Any violation of this Act, and the rules and regulations issued pursuant hereof shall be punished
with a fine of not less than Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) nor more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) or
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months, or both, at the discretion of the court. If the offense is committed by a
corporation, trust, firm, partnership or association, or other entity, the penalty shall be imposed upon the guilty
officer or officers of such corporation, trust, firm, partnership or association, or entity.

SEC. 9. Separability Clause.— If any portion of this Act is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect the
validity and effectivity of the other provisions not affected thereby.
 33

SEC. 10. Repealing Clause.— All laws, acts, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or other issuances or
parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Act, are hereby modified and repealed.

SEC. 11 Effectivity Clause.— This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.

STIPULATION AGAINST MARRIAGE - ARTICLE 36, LABOR CODE AS AMENDED

ZIALCITA V. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. (Case No. RO4-3-3398-76; February 20, 1977)

FACTS:

Zialcita is a stewardess of PAL. She was fired from work because she had gotten married. PAL argued and cited its policy that
stewardesses must be single. The policy also states that subsequent marriage of a stewardess shall automatically terminate
employment.

Zialcita anchored on Article 136 of the Labor Code. PAL sought refuge from Article 132.

Article 132 provides, "Article 132. Facilities for women. The Secretary of Labor and Employment shall establish standards that
will ensure the safety and health of women employees. In appropriate cases, he shall, by regulations, require any employer to:
To determine appropriate minimum age and other standards for retirement or termination in special occupations such as
those of flight attendants and the like."

Article 136 provides, "Article 136. Stipulation against marriage. It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition
of employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss,
discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage."

ISSUE:

Was Zialcita's termination proper?

HELD:

The termination was improper. First of all, during the time Zialcita was terminated, no regulation had yet been issued by the
Secretary of Labor to implement Article 132. Second, even assuming that the Secretary of Labor had already issued such a
regulation and to the effect that stewardesses should remain single, such would be in violation of Article 136 of the Labor
Code.

Article 136's protection of women is broader and more powerful than the regulation provided under Article 132.

PT&T Co. v. NLRC, GR No. 118978, May 23, 1997

FACTS:

Grace de Guzman was hired by PT&T as a Supernumerary Project Worker for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until
April 20, 1991 as reliever for C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave. Under the Reliever Agreement signed by Grace, her
employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. From June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991,
and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, PT&T again engaged the services of Grace as reliever for Erlinda F. Dizon who went
on leave during both periods. On September 2, 1991, Grace was asked to join petitioner company as a probationary
employee. In the job application form furnished to Grace, she indicated in the civil status that she was single although she
had in fact contracted marriage on May 26, 1991. This meant she was not single, as she had represented herself, when she
signed the reliever agreements on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. Petitioner dismissed Grace from the company after
learning about Grace’s real civil status and being unconvinced of Grace’s explanation for the discrepancy. Grace immediately
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA), before the
Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City. At the preliminary conference,
Grace volunteered the information that she had failed to remit the amount of P2,380.75 of her collections, and executed a
promissory note for that amount in favor of petitioner. The Labor Arbiter handed down a decision declaring that private
respondent, who had already gained the status of a regular employee, was illegally dismissed by petitioner and ordered her
reinstatement plus payment of the corresponding back wages and COLA. On appeal, the NLRC upheld the Labor Arbiter but
 34

modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision with the qualification that Grace de Guzman deserved to be suspended for three
months due to the dishonest nature of her acts which should not be condoned.

ISSUE:

Can the alleged concealment of civil status be a ground for terminating the services of an employee?

HELD:

No. The Constitution provides a gamut of protective provisions due to the disparity in rights between men and women in
almost all phases of social and political life. Article II Section 14 of the 1987 Constitution states that “The State recognizes the
role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.” Corollary to
this is Article XIII Section 3 which states that “The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all” and Article XIII Section 14
which states that “The State shall protect working women by providing safe and healthful working conditions, taking into
account their maternal functions, and such facilities and opportunities that will enhance their welfare and enable them to
realize their full potential in the service of the nation.” Since the Labor Code was enacted on May 1, 1974, corrective labor
and social laws on gender inequality have emerged with more frequency in the years. Two of these are Republic Act No. 6727
which explicitly prohibits discrimination against women with respect to terms and conditions of employment, promotion, and
training opportunities; and Republic Act No. 7192 or the Women in Development and Nation Building Act which, among
others, affords women equal opportunities with men to act and to enter into contracts. In the Labor Code, Article 136
explicitly prohibits discrimination merely by reason of the marriage of a female employee. The private respondent’s act of
concealing the true nature of her status from PT&T could not be properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was
moved to act the way she did mainly because she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she
was practically forced by that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being
disqualified from work.

STAR PAPER VS SIMBOL G.R. No. 164774, April 12, 2006

FACTS:

Simbol was employed by the company and met a co-employee and they eventually had a relationship and got married. Prior
to the marriage, the manager advise the couple that should they decide to get married, one of them should resign pursuant
to a company policy: 1) new applicant will not be allowed to be hired if he/she has a relative, up to 3rd degree of
consanguinity, already employed by the company. 2) if the two employees got married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated first. Simbol resigned.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of the employer banning spouse from working in the same company, a valid exercise of
management prerogative.

RULING:

No, it is not a valid exercise of management prerogative and violates the rights of employees under the constitution. The case
at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides “it shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married, a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated , or to actually dismiss, discharge ,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage.” The company policy of Star Paper,
to be upheld, must clearly establish the requirement of reasonableness. In the case at bar, there was no reasonable business
necessity. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an
employee of the Repacking Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. The questioned policy may not facially
violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the only
way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect.
Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners.
 35

DUNCAN VS. GLAXO WELCOME GR NO. 162994 SEPTEMBER 17, 2004

FACTS:

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of employment signed by Tecson stipulates,
among others, that he agrees to study and abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with competing drug companies and should
management find that such relationship poses a prossible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code
of Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer the employee to another
department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation for employment outside of the company after 6 months.

Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte area and entered into a
romantic relationship with Betsy, an employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District
Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's
superiors informed him of conflict of intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy
resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao
City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance
Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE:

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any
competitor company is valid

RULING:

On Equal Protection

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing strategies, and other confidential programs
and information from competitors. The prohibition against pesonal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of that nature might
compromise the interests of the company. That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are addressed only to the state or those acting
under color of its authority. Corollarily, it has been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal
protection clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or wrongful.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to comply with the policy. Indeed the
application of the policy was made in an impartial and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

On Constructive Dismissal

Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment becomes
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,
insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None of these conditions are present in the
instant case.
 36

HELD:

The challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at
bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his
relationship with Betsy, but he never availed of any of them.

DISPOSITIVE:

"WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit."

Del Monte Phil vs Lolita Velasco GR. No. 153477March 6, 2007

Facts:

Lolita Velasco, respondent herein was dismissed by the petitioner Del Monte Philippines due to excessive absences without
permission. The respondent alleged that her absences was due to urinary tract infection, pregnancy-borne and that she filed
an application for leave to her supervisor. She also went to see the company doctor for check-up and was advised to rest for
four days.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner as illegally dismissed

Rulings:

Yes. The respondent’s sickness was pregnancy-related and, therefore, the petitioner cannot terminate respondent’s
services because in doing so, petitioner will, in effect, be violating the Labor Code which prohibits an employer to discharge
an employee on account of the latter’s pregnancy.

The undeniable fact is that during her complained absences in 1994, respondent was pregnant and suffered related illnesses.
Again, it must be stressed that respondent’s discharge by reason of absences caused by her pregnancy is covered by the
prohibition under the Labor Code. Since her last string of absences is justifiable and had been subsequently explained, the
petitioner had no legal basis in considering these absences together with her prior infractions as gross and habitual neglect.

Lakpue Drug Inc. vs. Belga G.R. No. 166379 Oct. 20, 2005

Facts:

Ma. Lourdes Belga (Belga), respondent herein, worked at Tropical Biological Philippines, a subsidiary of Lakpue Drug Inc.,
petitioner herein. On March 19, 2001, Belga, brought her daughter to the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) for treatment of
broncho-pneumonia. While at the PGH, Belga who was pregnant experienced labor pains and gave birth on the same day.
Two days after giving birth, Tropical summoned Belga to report for work but the latter replied that she could not comply
because of her situation. Belga was dismissed on the ground of serious misconduct.

Tropical alleged that Belga concealed her pregnancy from the company. She did not apply for leave and her absence
disrupted Tropical’s financial transactions.

Issue:

Whether or not Belga is illegally dismissed.

Rulings:

Yes. The alleged misconduct of Belga barely falls within the situation contemplated by the law. Her absence for 16 days was
justified considering that she had just delivered a child, which can hardly be considered a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty;
 37

much less does it imply wrongful intent on the part of Belga. Tropical harps on the alleged concealment by Belga of her
pregnancy. This argument, however, begs the question as to how one can conceal a full-term pregnancy. We agree with
respondent’s position that it can hardly escape notice how she grows bigger each day. While there may be instances where
the pregnancy may be inconspicuous, it has not been sufficiently proven by Tropical that Belga’s case is such.

Belga’s failure to formally inform Tropical of her pregnancy can not be considered as grave misconduct directly connected to
her work as to constitute just cause for her separation.

ANTI-SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT (RA 7877)

Libres v NLRC G.R. No. 123737. May 28, 1999

Facts:

Petitioner Carlos G. Libres, an electrical engineer, was holding a managerial position with National Steel Corporation (NSC)
as Assistant Manager. He was then asked to comment regarding the charge of sexual harrassment filed against him by the
VP's secretary Capiral. This was included with a waiver of his right tobe heard once he didn't comment.

On 14 August 1993 petitioner submitted his written explanation denying the accusation against him and offering to submit
himself for clarificatory interrogation.

The Management Evaluation Committee said that "touching a female subordinate's hand and shoulder, caressing her nape
and telling other people that Capiral was the one who hugged and kissed or that she responded to the sexual advances are
unauthorized acts that damaged her honor." They suspended Libres for 30 days without pay.

He filed charges against the corporation in the Labor Arbiter, but the latter held that the company acted with due process
and that his punishment was only mild.

Moreover, he assailed the NLRC decision as without basis due to the massaging of her shoulders never “discriminated
against her continued employment,” “impaired her rights and privileges under the Labor Code,” or “created a hostile,
intimidating or offensive environment.”

He claimed that he wasn't guaranteed due process because he wasn't given the right be heard. This was due to his demand
for personal confrontation not being recognized by the MEC.

In the Supreme Court, petitioner assailed the failure of the NLRC to strictly apply RA No. 7877 or the law against sexual
harassment to the instant case. Moreover, petitioner also contends that public respondent’s reliance on Villarama v. NLRC
and Golden Donuts was misplaced. He draws attention to victim Divina Gonzaga’s immediate filing of her letter of
resignation in the Villarama case as opposed to the one year delay of Capiral in filing her complaint against him. He now
surmises that the filing of the case against him was merely an afterthought and not borne out of a valid complaint, hence,
the Villarama case should have no bearing on the instant case.

Issue: Was Libres accorded due process when the MEC denied his request for personal confrontatiom?

Held: Yes Petition denied.

Ratio:

On not strictly applying RA 7877- Republic Act No. 7877 was not yet in effect at the time of the occurrence of the act
complained of. It was still being deliberated upon in Congress when petitioner’s case was decided by the Labor Arbiter. As
a rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect unless otherwise provided, or except in a criminal case when their application will
favor the accused. Hence, the Labor Arbiter have to rely on the MEC report and the common connotation of sexual
harassment as it is generally understood by the public. Faced with the same predicament, the NLRC had to agree with the
Labor Arbiter. In so doing, the NLRC did not commit any abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
 38

On the Villarama afterthought-it was both fitting and appropriate since it singularly addressed the issue of a managerial
employee committing sexual harassment on a subordinate. The disparity in the periods of filing the complaints in the two (2)
cases did not in any way reduce this case into insignificance. On the contrary, it even invited the attention of the Court to
focus on sexual harassment as a just and valid cause for termination. Whereas petitioner Libres was only meted a 30-day
suspension by the NLRC, Villarama, in the other case was penalized with termination. As a managerial employee, petitioner is
bound by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility when he succumbed to his
moral perversity. And when such moral perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable ground
for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence.

“It is the the duty of every employer to protect his employees from oversexed superiors.” Public respondent therefore is
correct in its observation that the Labor Arbiter was in fact lenient in his application of the law and jurisprudence for which
petitioner must be grateful for.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, it could be expected since Libres was Capiral’s immediate superior. Fear of
retaliation and backlash, not to forget the social humiliation and embarrassment that victims of this human frailty usually
suffer, are all realities that Capiral had to contend with. Moreover, the delay did not detract from the truth derived from the
facts. Petitioner Libres never questioned the veracity of Capiral’s allegations. In fact his narration even corroborated the
latter’s assertion in several material points. He only raised issue on the complaint’s protracted filing.

On the question of due process- Requirements were sufficiently complied with. Due process as a constitutional
precept doesnot always and in all situations require a trial type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is
notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The essence of due process is
simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to
seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

It is undeniable that petitioner was given a Notice of Investigation informing him of the charge of sexual harassment as well
as advising him to submit a written explanation regarding the matter; that he submitted his written explanation to his
superior. The VP further allowed him to air his grievance in a private session He was given more than adequate opportunity
to explain his side and air his grievances.

Personal confrontation was not necessary. Homeowners v NLRC- litigants may be heard through pleadings, written
explanations, position papers, memoranda or oral arguments.

Domingo vs. Rayala 546 Scra 90 February 18, 2008

Facts:
Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual
harassment against Rayala, the chairman of NLRC.
She alleged that Rayala called her in his office and touched her shoulder, part of her neck then tickled her
ears. Rayala argued that his acts does not constitute sexual harassment because for it to exist, there must
be a demand, request or requirement of sexual favor.

Issue:
Whether or not Rayala commit sexual harassment.

Rulings:
Yes.

The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related
sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or
training-related sexual harassment is committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the
employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority,
influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work or training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request
or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued
employment of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions,
promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employee’s rights or privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.

even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual
favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
 39

offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her
ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a
promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of
Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Dr. Rico S.Jacutin vs. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002

Facts:

Juliet Q. Yee, then a 22-year old fresh graduate of nursing, averred that on 28 November 1995 her father accompanied her to
the office of petitioner at the City Health Office to seek employment. Juliet’s father and petitioner were childhood friends.
Juliet was informed by the doctor that the City Health Office had just then filled up the vacant positions for nurses but that he
would still see if he might be able to help her.

The following day, 29 November 1995, Juliet and her father returned to the City Health Office, and they were informed by
petitioner that a medical group from Texas, U.S.A., was coming to town in December to look into putting up a clinic in
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro, where she might be considered. On 01 December 1995, around nine o’clock in the morning, she
and her father went back to the office of petitioner. The latter informed her that there was a vacancy in a family planning
project for the city and that, if she were interested, he could interview her for the job. Petitioner then started putting up to
her a number of questions. When asked at one point whether or not she already had a boyfriend, she said “no.” Petitioner
suggested that perhaps if her father were not around, she could afford to be honest in her answers to the doctor. The father,
taking the cue, decided to leave. Petitioner then inquired whether she was still a virgin, explaining to her his theory on the
various aspects of virginity. He “hypothetically” asked whether she would tell her family or friends if a male friend happened
to intimately touch her. Petitioner later offered her the job where she would be the subject of a “research” program. She was
requested to be back after lunch.

Before proceeding to petitioner’s office that afternoon, Juliet dropped by at the nearby church to seek divine guidance as she
felt so “confused.” When she got to the office, petitioner made several telephone calls to some hospitals to inquire whether
there was any available opening for her. Not finding any, petitioner again offered her a job in the family planning research
undertaking. She expressed hesitation if a physical examination would include “hugging” her but petitioner assured her that
he was only kidding about it. Petitioner then invited her to go bowling. Petitioner told her to meet him at Borja Street so that
people would not see them on board the same car together. Soon, at the designated place, a white car driven by petitioner
stopped. She got in. Petitioner held her pulse and told her not to be scared. After dropping by at his house to put on his
bowling attire, petitioner got back to the car.

While driving, petitioner casually asked her if she already took her bath, and she said she was so in a hurry that she did not
find time for it. Petitioner then inquired whether she had varicose veins, and she said “no.” Petitioner told her to raise her
foot and lower her pants so that he might confirm it. She felt assured that it was all part of the research. Petitioner still
pushed her pants down to her knees and held her thigh. He put his hands inside her panty until he reached her pubic hair.
Surprised, she exclaimed “hala ka!” and instinctively pulled her pants up. Petitioner then touched her abdomen with his right
hand saying words of endearment and letting the back of his palm touch her forehead. He told her to raise her shirt to check
whether she had nodes or lumps. She hesitated for a while but, eventually, raised it up to her navel. Petitioner then fondled
her breast. Shocked at what petitioner did, she lowered her shirt and embraced her bag to cover herself, telling him angrily
that she was through with the research. He begged her not to tell anybody about what had just happened. Before she
alighted from the car, petitioner urged her to reconsider her decision to quit. He then handed over to her P300.00 for her
expenses.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of sexual harassment as defined and punished under R.A. 7877.

Held:

The questioned decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 23799, finding Dr. Rico Jacutin y Salcedo GUILTY of the
crime of Sexual Harassment defined and punished under Republic Act No. 7877, particularly Sections 3 and 7 thereof, and
penalizing him with imprisonment of six (6) months and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.

Rationale: Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides:

 40

“SEC. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education or training-related sexual
harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor,
professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work
or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of
whether the demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act.

“(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when:

“(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re-employment or continued employment
of said individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the
refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which in any way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.”

While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that
a recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office could carry good weight.
Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate
Juliet’s employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not
been for his high position in the City Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were bolstered
by the testimony of Vivian Yu, petitioner’s secretary between 1979 to 1994, of Iryn Lago Salcedo, Public Health Nurse II, and
of Farah Dongallo y Alkuino, a city health nurse, all of whom were said to have likewise been victims of perverse behavior by
petitioner.

EMPLOYMENT OF MINORS

Art. 139. Minimum employable age.

No child below fifteen (15) years of age shall be employed, except when he works directly under the sole responsibility of his
parents or guardian, and his employment does not in any way interfere with his schooling.

Any person between fifteen (15) and eighteen (18) years of age may be employed for such number of hours and such periods
of the day as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment in appropriate regulations.

The foregoing provisions shall in no case allow the employment of a person below eighteen (18) years of age in an
undertaking which is hazardous or deleterious in nature as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Art. 140. Prohibition against child discrimination. No employer shall discriminate against any person in respect to terms and
conditions of employment on account of his age.

Chapter IV

EMPLOYMENT OF HOMEWORKERS

Art. 153. Regulation of industrial homeworkers. The employment of industrial homeworkers and field personnel shall be
regulated by the government through the appropriate regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment to
ensure the general welfare and protection of homeworkers and field personnel and the industries employing them.

Art. 154. Regulations of Secretary of Labor. The regulations or orders to be issued pursuant to this Chapter shall be designed
to assure the minimum terms and conditions of employment applicable to the industrial homeworkers or field personnel
involved.

Art. 155. Distribution of homework. For purposes of this Chapter, the "employer" of homeworkers includes any person,
natural or artificial who, for his account or benefit, or on behalf of any person residing outside the country, directly or
indirectly, or through an employee, agent contractor, sub-contractor or any other person:

Delivers, or causes to be delivered, any goods, articles or materials to be processed or fabricated in or about a home and
thereafter to be returned or to be disposed of or distributed in accordance with his directions; or

Sells any goods, articles or materials to be processed or fabricated in or about a home and then rebuys them after such
processing or fabrication, either by himself or through some other person.

APPRENTICES AND LEARNERS

 41

APPRENTICES

Art. 57. Statement of objectives. This Title aims:

To help meet the demand of the economy for trained manpower;

To establish a national apprenticeship program through the participation of employers, workers and government and
non-government agencies; and

To establish apprenticeship standards for the protection of apprentices.

Art. 58. Definition of Terms. As used in this Title:

"Apprenticeship" means practical training on the job supplemented by related theoretical instruction.

An "apprentice" is a worker who is covered by a written apprenticeship agreement with an individual employer or any of the
entities recognized under this Chapter.

An "apprenticeable occupation" means any trade, form of employment or occupation which requires more than three (3)
months of practical training on the job supplemented by related theoretical instruction.

"Apprenticeship agreement" is an employment contract wherein the employer binds himself to train the apprentice and the
apprentice in turn accepts the terms of training.

Art. 59. Qualifications of apprentice. To qualify as an apprentice, a person shall:

Be at least fourteen (14) years of age;

Possess vocational aptitude and capacity for appropriate tests; and

Possess the ability to comprehend and follow oral and written instructions.

Trade and industry associations may recommend to the Secretary of Labor appropriate educational requirements for
different occupations.

Art. 60. Employment of apprentices. Only employers in the highly technical industries may employ apprentices and only in
apprenticeable occupations approved by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. (As amended by Section 1, Executive Order
No. 111, December 24, 1986)

Art. 61. Contents of apprenticeship agreements. Apprenticeship agreements, including the wage rates of apprentices, shall
conform to the rules issued by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The period of apprenticeship shall not exceed six
months. Apprenticeship agreements providing for wage rates below the legal minimum wage, which in no case shall start
below 75 percent of the applicable minimum wage, may be entered into only in accordance with apprenticeship programs
duly approved by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The Department shall develop standard model programs of
apprenticeship. (As amended by Section 1, Executive Order No. 111, December 24, 1986)

Art. 62. Signing of apprenticeship agreement. Every apprenticeship agreement shall be signed by the employer or his agent,
or by an authorized representative of any of the recognized organizations, associations or groups and by the apprentice.

An apprenticeship agreement with a minor shall be signed in his behalf by his parent or guardian, if the latter is not available,
by an authorized representative of the Department of Labor, and the same shall be binding during its lifetime.

Every apprenticeship agreement entered into under this Title shall be ratified by the appropriate apprenticeship committees,
if any, and a copy thereof shall be furnished both the employer and the apprentice.

Art. 63. Venue of apprenticeship programs. Any firm, employer, group or association, industry organization or civic group
wishing to organize an apprenticeship program may choose from any of the following apprenticeship schemes as the training
venue for apprentice:

Apprenticeship conducted entirely by and within the sponsoring firm, establishment or entity;

Apprenticeship entirely within a Department of Labor and Employment training center or other public training institution; or

Initial training in trade fundamentals in a training center or other institution with subsequent actual work participation within
the sponsoring firm or entity during the final stage of training.
 42

Art. 64. Sponsoring of apprenticeship program. Any of the apprenticeship schemes recognized herein may be undertaken or
sponsored by a single employer or firm or by a group or association thereof or by a civic organization. Actual training of
apprentices may be undertaken:

In the premises of the sponsoring employer in the case of individual apprenticeship programs;

In the premises of one or several designated firms in the case of programs sponsored by a group or association of employers
or by a civic organization; or

In a Department of Labor and Employment training center or other public training institution.

Art. 65. Investigation of violation of apprenticeship agreement. Upon complaint of any interested person or upon its own
initiative, the appropriate agency of the Department of Labor and Employment or its authorized representative shall
investigate any violation of an apprenticeship agreement pursuant to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Art. 66. Appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The decision of the authorized agency of the Department of Labor
and Employment may be appealed by any aggrieved person to the Secretary of Labor and Employment within five (5) days
from receipt of the decision. The decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment shall be final and executory.

Art. 67. Exhaustion of administrative remedies. No person shall institute any action for the enforcement of any
apprenticeship agreement or damages for breach of any such agreement, unless he has exhausted all available administrative
remedies.

Art. 68. Aptitude testing of applicants. Consonant with the minimum qualifications of apprentice-applicants required under
this Chapter, employers or entities with duly recognized apprenticeship programs shall have primary responsibility for
providing appropriate aptitude tests in the selection of apprentices. If they do not have adequate facilities for the purpose,
the Department of Labor and Employment shall perform the service free of charge.

Art. 69. Responsibility for theoretical instruction. Supplementary theoretical instruction to apprentices in cases where the
program is undertaken in the plant may be done by the employer. If the latter is not prepared to assume the responsibility,
the same may be delegated to an appropriate government agency.

Art. 70. Voluntary organization of apprenticeship programs; exemptions.

The organization of apprenticeship program shall be primarily a voluntary undertaking by employers;

When national security or particular requirements of economic development so demand, the President of the Philippines
may require compulsory training of apprentices in certain trades, occupations, jobs or employment levels where shortage of
trained manpower is deemed critical as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Appropriate rules in this
connection shall be promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment as the need arises; and

Where services of foreign technicians are utilized by private companies in apprenticeable trades, said companies are required
to set up appropriate apprenticeship programs.

Art. 71. Deductibility of training costs. An additional deduction from taxable income of one-half (1/2) of the value of labor
training expenses incurred for developing the productivity and efficiency of apprentices shall be granted to the person or
enterprise organizing an apprenticeship program: Provided, That such program is duly recognized by the Department of
Labor and Employment: Provided, further, That such deduction shall not exceed ten (10%) percent of direct labor wage: and
Provided, finally, That the person or enterprise who wishes to avail himself or itself of this incentive should pay his
apprentices the minimum wage.

Art. 72. Apprentices without compensation. The Secretary of Labor and Employment may authorize the hiring of apprentices
without compensation whose training on the job is required by the school or training program curriculum or as requisite for
graduation or board examination.

LEARNERS

Art. 73. Learners defined. Learners are persons hired as trainees in semi-skilled and other industrial occupations which are
non-apprenticeable and which may be learned through practical training on the job in a relatively short period of time which
shall not exceed three (3) months.

Art. 74. When learners may be hired. Learners may be employed when no experienced workers are available, the
employment of learners is necessary to prevent curtailment of employment opportunities, and the employment does not
create unfair competition in terms of labor costs or impair or lower working standards.

Art. 75. Learnership agreement. Any employer desiring to employ learners shall enter into a learnership agreement with
them, which agreement shall include:

The names and addresses of the learners;

The duration of the learnership period, which shall not exceed three (3) months;
 43

The wages or salary rates of the learners which shall begin at not less than seventy-five percent (75%) of the applicable
minimum wage; and

A commitment to employ the learners if they so desire, as regular employees upon completion of the learnership. All learners
who have been allowed or suffered to work during the first two (2) months shall be deemed regular employees if training is
terminated by the employer before the end of the stipulated period through no fault of the learners.

The learnership agreement shall be subject to inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representative.

Art. 76. Learners in piecework. Learners employed in piece or incentive-rate jobs during the training period shall be paid in
full for the work done.

Art. 77. Penalty clause. Any violation of this Chapter or its implementing rules and regulations shall be subject to the general
penalty clause provided for in this Code.