No.

17-2074

United States Court of Appeals

For the First Circuit

MOHAN A. HARIHAR
Appellant

v.

THE UNITED STATES

Appellee

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
MOHAN A. HARIHAR

Mohan A. Harihar
Mo.harihar@gmail.com
7124 Avalon Drive
Acton, MA 01720
p. (617) 921.2526

Dated: January 29, 2018

 APPELLANT DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The Appellant, Mohan A. Harihar, who has been wrongfully forced to act as

a pro se litigant throughout this litigation, respectfully makes the following

disclosures:

1. The Appellant’s complaint filed against The United States involves

evidenced civil and criminal misconduct directly related to Appeal No. 17-

1381, HARIHAR v. US BANK et al.1 By Federal Law, the Appellant has

shown that the complaint against the United States was necessarily filed

separately, as evidenced by the record - ONLY after all administrative

remedies had been exhausted.

2. The evidenced misconduct claims of record involve NOT ONLY the

Appellees/ Defendants of both Appeals, but also judicial misconduct

claims against TEN (10) Federal (District and Circuit) Court Judges. These

officers of the Court include (but are not limited to):

a. US District Court Judge Allison Dale Burroughs – stands

accused of judicial misconduct including (but not limited to)

TREASON under ARTICLE III (6 counts, ALL UNOPPOSED)

for ruling WITHOUT JURISDICTION. Following these

evidenced claims, Judge Burroughs RECUSED herself from this

1
HARIHAR v US BANK et al, Lower Court Docket No. 15-cv-11880
1
 litigation - HARIHAR v. THE UNITED STATES, Docket No.

17-cv-11109;

b. US District Court Judge Denise J. Casper - stands accused of

judicial misconduct including (but not limited to) TREASON

under ARTICLE III (1 count, UNOPPOSED) for ruling

WITHOUT JURISDICTION;

c. US Chief Justice Jeffrey R. Howard (First Circuit) - stands

accused of judicial misconduct including (but not limited to)

TREASON under ARTICLE III (1 count, UNOPPOSED) for

ruling WITHOUT JURISDICTION;

d. US Circuit Judge Juan R. Torruella - stands accused of judicial

misconduct including (but not limited to) TREASON under

ARTICLE III (2 counts, UNOPPOSED) for ruling WITHOUT

JURISDICTION;

e. US Circuit Judge William J. Kayatta, Jr. - stands accused of

judicial misconduct including (but not limited to) TREASON

under ARTICLE III (3 counts, UNOPPOSED) for ruling

WITHOUT JURISDICTION;

f. US Circuit Judge David J. Barron - stands accused of judicial

misconduct including (but not limited to) TREASON under

ARTICLE III (2 counts, UNOPPOSED) for ruling WITHOUT

JURISDICTION;
2
 g. US Circuit Judge O. Rogeriee Thompson - stands accused of

judicial misconduct including (but not limited to) TREASON

under ARTICLE III (1 count, UNOPPOSED) for ruling

WITHOUT JURISDICTION;

h. US Chief Judge Joseph N. Laplante (US District Court (NH),

serving as a member of the Judicial Council for the First Circuit,

Judicial Misconduct Complaint No. 90033);

i. US District Court Judge John J. McConnell, Jr. (US District

Court (RI), serving as a member of the Judicial Council for the

First Circuit, Judicial Misconduct Complaint No. 90033);

j. US District Court Judge John David Levy (US District Court

(ME), serving as a member of the Judicial Council for the First

Circuit, Judicial Misconduct Complaint No. 90033).

3. The record also reveals evidenced claims against three (3) additional court

officers AND ALSO against representing counsel for the Appellee, who

collectively stand accused of MISPRISION OF TREASON,

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S. Code § 2382. They include:

a. Circuit Clerk of the Court - Margaret Carter;

b. Circuit Clerk – Robert M. Farrell;

c. Deputy Clerk – Matthew A. Paine;

d. Assistant US Attorney – Dina M. Chaitowitz

3
4. The Appellant necessarily files this Appellate brief by the court ordered

deadline of January 29, 2018, despite the following:

a. The Appellant has provided the First Circuit US Court of Appeals

with a “TEXTBOOK” example(s) warranting assistance with the

appointment of counsel pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §1915. This

refusal to assist the Appellant with the appointment of counsel shows

a failure to uphold Title 28 U.S.C. §1915 and the judicial machinery

of the court. It exemplifies an incremental act made in BAD

FAITH by officers of the Court representing The United States

- ensuring fundamental unfairness that impinges on the Appellant’s

DUE PROCESS rights. Presiding Judges Torruella, Kayatta,

Barron; Judge Thompson, and Chief Justice Howard have ALL

collectively denied to clarify their decisions refusing to assist the

Appellant with the appointment of counsel.

b. These referenced (presiding) Circuit Judges, WHO LACK

JURISDICTION have continued to rule here, recently DENYING

the Appellant’s Motion to Vacate Judgement, pursuant to FED. R.

CIV. P. 60(b)(3), (4) AND (6). This denied motion stands as

UNOPPOSED by Appellee – THE UNITED STATES.

5. Evidenced claims by the Appellant are believed to include (but are not

limited to) matters impacting National Security, and include infractions

to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1832,

4
 and acts of TREASON under ARTICLE III, warranting the intervention

of Congress, the FBI and the Department of Justice, to address associated

criminal (and other) legal components. Evidenced Treason claims of

record have been raised against presiding Judges - Torruella, Kayatta,

Barron for ruling without jurisdiction. The record clearly shows that

with each claim of evidenced Treason, the President has been notified by

the Appellant (as is required by Federal law) via e-mail

communication (www.whitehouse.gov). Proof of delivery and receipt

from the White House is included as attachments with each court

filing. Therefore, a copy of this Appellant Brief will necessarily be

delivered to the President.

6. Historically, aside from the Executive Office of the President (EOP), the

following parties have also been necessarily copied on referenced Court

filings, and will similarly receive a copy of this Appellate Brief2:

a. US Inspector General - Michael Horowitz;

b. US Attorney General - Jeff Sessions;

c. US Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) and other members of

the US Senate;

d. US Congresswoman Niki Tsongas (D-MA) and other members

from the House of Representatives;

2
Referenced parties will receive copies of the Appellant’s Brief via US Mail, E-
mail communication, and/or Social Media.
5
 e. The House Judiciary Committee;

f. The House Oversight Committee;

g. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI);

h. The Public. Therefore, ALL AMERICANS have been made

aware of these evidenced claims.

Parties are additionally informed for documentation purposes, and out of the

Appellant’s continued concerns for personal safety/security.

7. This is a proceeding ancillary to Appeal No. 17-1381 – HARIHAR v. US

BANK et al, Lower Court Docket No. 15-cv-11880, pursuant to FED. R.

APP. P. 26 (a)(1)(B)(viii). The documented judicial misconduct claims

evidenced by BOTH Appeals, and lower court dockets warrant an

expansion of (at minimum) conspiracy claims against The United States.

8. Since filing the Notice of Appeal on October 26, 2017, the identity of the

presiding Circuit judges was UNKNOWN until just a few days ago, by

the order issued on January 23, 2018, collectively DENYING ALL

Appellant motions WITHOUT CAUSE. Reference is again made to the

related Appeal No. 17-1381, HARIHAR v. US BANK et al - Also

Presiding over that Appeal are Circuit Judges - Torruella, Kayatta and

Barron. A review of the record clearly shows that the Appellant has

provided this court with a PLETHORA of evidenced examples

indicating that these Circuit judges have been DISQUALIFIED to rule in

this, OR ANY OTHER related litigation. Their conscious decision to

6
 IGNORE these evidenced claims and continue ruling WITHOUT

JURISDICTION constitutes acts of TREASON under ARTICLE III,

Section 3 – filed as recently as January 25, 2018.3

9. The Appellant firmly believes, based on the evidenced record alone, that

a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism does exist here, making fair

judgment impossible within this First Circuit. It would appear (at least on

its surface), that elements of corruption may exist; and that efforts have

been made thus far – by TEN (10) Federal (District and Circuit) court

judges, to brush aside all motions in order to reach a corrupt and pre-

determined outcome. ANY objective observer would certainly agree, and

giving the Appellant no choice but to proceed as a pro se litigant re-affirms

that argument, and further strengthens existing conspiracy claims in the

related Appeal, HARIHAR v. US BANK et al.

10. The records of both cases will clearly reveal that the Appellant – Mohan

A. Harihar, has IN GOOD FAITH given ALL Appellees/Defendants

multiple opportunities to seek mutual agreement, only to be denied or

ignored. Similarly, ALL referenced (Circuit and District) Court Judges,

3
Incremental Treason claims recently filed against Circuit Judges - Torruella,
Kayatta and Barron on 1/24/18 are referenced in the related Appeal No. 17-1381,
and on 1/25/18 in this Appeal. For Judge Kayatta, the 1/25 filing constitutes a
THIRD (3rd) claim of Treason against him. For Judges Torruella and Barron, it
is a SECOND (2nd) claim of Treason against each.
7
 have been afforded opportunities to take corrective action for erred

judgments, and have consciously refused to do so.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPELLANT DISCLOSURE STATEMENT …………………………………….1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………………….….………….10

BRIEF OF APPELLANT ……………………………………………………...….11

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ……………………………………...……….12

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES …………………………………………………13

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ………………………………………………...…14

STATEMENT OF FACTS …………………………………………………….….15

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ...............................................................................16

STANDARD OF REVIEW .....................................................................................17

ARGUMENT ..........................................................................................................18

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO

VOID ALL RELATED ORDERS FOLLOWING THE
RECUSAL OF JUDGE ALLISON DALE
BURROUGHS……………………….………………………….18

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO

GRANT PERMISSION TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY
(ECF)…………………………………………………………….18

III. THE DISTRICT (AND APPEALS) COURT FAILED TO

EXERCISE JUDICIAL DISCRETION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915
BY REFUSING to ASSIST THE APPELLANT WITH THE
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ………………………………20

8
 IV. THE DISTRICT (AND APPEALS) COURT FAILED TO
ADDRESS JURISDICTION ISSUES CONTINUOUSLY RAISED
BY THE APPELLANT…………………………………………22

V. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE

APPELLANT’S EVIDENCED CLAIMS REGARDING THE
MISAPPROPRIATION OF TRADE SECRETS AND
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, PURSUANT TO 18 U.S. CODE §
1832, AND ITS RESULTING IMPACT TO NATIONAL
SECURITY………………………………………………….….23

VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PREMATURELY DISMISSED MR.

HARIHAR’A COMPLAINT BY FAILING TO ACCEPT HIS
CLAIMS AS FACT, PRIOR TO DISCOVERY ……….…..….24

VII. THE DISTRICT COURT USED DECEPTIVE TACTICS

TO IMPROPERLY DISMISS MR. HARIHAR’S
COMPLAINT…………………………………………….….…25

VIII. THE ISSUED DISMISSAL ORDER CONSTITUTES AN ACT

OF TREASON UNDER ARTICLE III……………………...…26

IX. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT

OF MR. HARIHAR’S CONSPIRACY CLAIMS……….……26
.
X. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT
THAT MR HARIHAR FAILED TO SHOW JUST CAUSE TO
AVOID DISMISSAL………………………………………….27

XI. THE DISTRICT COUT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE

APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE…………………………………27

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................29

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE UNDER FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

9
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Harihar v. US Bank et al
(1st Cir. 2017) ……………………………………………….1, 6,7, 18, 24

Antoine v. Atlas Turner, Inc.,

66F.3d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1995) ……………………………………….….17

United States v. Indoor Cultivation Equip from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply,
55 F.3d 1311, 1317 (7thCir, 1995) ……………………………………….17

Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Caramica Europa II, Inc.,

160 F.3d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1998) …………………………...…………….17
.
Carter v. Fenner,
136 F.3d 1000, 1005(5thCir. 1998) ……………………………………….17

Wilmer v. Board of County Comm‘rs. Of Leavenworth County,

69F.3d 406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995) ………………………………………….17

Indoor Cultivation Equip.,

55 F.3d @ 1317 …………………………………………………..……….17

Export Group v. Reef Indus., Inc.,

54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir, 1995) …………………………………….….17

Page v. Schweiker,
786 F.2d 150, 152 (3rd Cir. 1986) ………………………………………….17

Gordon v. Leeke,
574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978) …………………………………………….22

Levine v. United States,

362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct. 1038 (1960) ……………………………………….27

Offutt v. United States,

348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11,13 (1954) …………………………………….27

Taylor v. O’Grady,
888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) ………………………………….………….27
10
STATUTES:

18 U.S. Code § 2382………………………………………………………….….…3

28 U.S.C. § 1915 ...............................................................................3, 13, 20, 21, 22
28 U.S.C. § 1291…………………………………………………………..……….13
18 U.S. Code § 1832……………………………………………….……….….14, 23
28 U.S.C. §455(a)………………………………………………...……16, 18, 19, 27
28 U.S.C. § 144 ………………………………………………………..….16, 18, 19
28 U.S. Code § 1346………………………………………………………………24
18 USC Chapter 73……………………………………………………..…………24
18 U.S. Code § 4…………………………………………………………….….…24
42 U.S. Code § 1983………………………………………………………………24
18 U.S. Code § 242………………………………………………………..………24
18 U.S. Code § 1964………………………………………………………..……..24
Federal Practice and Procedure §2862 (2d ed. 1995) ……………………………..17

RULES:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (4), and (6) ............................................4, 12, 13, 16, 17, 29
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(1)(B)(viii) ………………………………………….….…….6

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION:

Article III, Section 3……………………….…1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 14, 15, 20, 24, 26, 29

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

The Appellant - Mohan A. Harihar, states that he has UNLAWFULLY been given

NO ALTERNATIVE but to file this brief without the assistance of counsel. The

Court is respectfully called to FIRST recognize: 1.) the UNOPPOSED judicial

misconduct claims evidenced against presiding Circuit Judges - Torruella,

Kayatta and Barron, 2.) Lack of JURISDICTION and 3.) ALL variables

supporting (at minimum) the Motion to Vacate Dismissal with Damages, pursuant

11
to (at minimum) Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), which stands UNOPPOSED by

Appellee – THE UNITED STATES.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Since initially bringing evidenced judicial misconduct claims dating back to

August 2016, the Appellant has raised jurisdiction issues documented in NO

LESS THAN FIFTY (50) SEPARATELY FILED COURT DOCUMENTS

including the Appellant’s Brief.4 NOT EVEN ONCE, has this Federal

Judiciary addressed the Appellant’s issues pertaining to jurisdiction. By

IGNORING EVERY jurisdiction issue raised by the Appellant, Circuit Judges

- Torruella, Kayatta and Barron have been DISQUALIFIED by law to rule in

this, or ANY related litigation. Their insistence to continue ruling without

jurisdiction is IDENTICAL to the circumstances that contributed to the

RECUSAL of District Court Judge Allison Dale Burroughs.5 These judicial

failures also contribute to evidenced arguments supporting: 1.) CONTINUED

PATTERNS OF CORRUPT CONDUCT, 2.) the EGREGIOUS abuse of

judicial authority and 3.) Vacating Dismissal(s) with damages pursuant to

4
Reference is collectively made to filings within: 1.) this Appeal No. 17-2074, 2.)
the lower court Docket No. 15-cv-11109; 3.) the related Appeal No. 17-1381
(Harihar v. US Bank et al); 4.) the lower Court Docket No. 17-cv-11880; 5.) the
Judicial Misconduct complaints filed with Chief Justice Jeffrey R. Howard; and 6.)
the Judicial Misconduct Petitions filed with the First Circuit Executive and the
Judicial Council.
5
Judge Burroughs was initially assigned on 6/16/17 to Docket No. 17-cv-11109,
and RECUSED herself on 6/19/17.
12
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). When asked to clarify their decisions, these referenced

judges have refused to do so. Motions for recusal have been either DENIED or

IGNORED, including the respectful DEMAND for TRANSFER of the Appeal to

another Circuit, and circumstances warranting the intervention of Congress. This

clear and continued failure to uphold the judicial machinery of the Court is

irrefutable, evidenced by record, and certainly impacts jurisdiction here (at

minimum) under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. Whether the District Court erred by failing to VOID ALL RELATED

ORDERS following the RECUSAL of Judge Allison Dale

Burroughs?

2. Whether the District Court erred by refusing to grant the Appellant

permission to file electronically (ECF)?

3. Whether the District (AND Appeals) Court failed to exercise judicial

discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 by REFUSING to assist the

Appellant with the appointment of counsel?

4. Whether the District (AND Appeals) Court failed to address

JURISDICTION ISSUES continuously raised by the Appellant?

5. Whether the District Court failed to address the Appellant’s claims

regarding the Misappropriation of Trade Secrets and Economic

13
 Espionage pursuant to 18 U.S. Code § 1832, and its resulting impact

to National Security?

6. Whether the District Court prematurely dismissed Mr. Harihar’s

complaint by failing to accept his claims as FACT prior to

DISCOVERY?

7. Whether the District Court used DECEPTIVE TACTICS to

improperly dismiss Mr. Harihar’s complaint?

8. Whether the issued dismissal order constitutes an act of Treason under

Article III?

9. Whether the District Court erred in its assessment of Mr. Harihar’s

Conspiracy claims?

10. Whether the District Court erred in its assessment that Mr. Harihar

failed to show just cause to avoid dismissal?

11. Whether the District Court failed to demonstrate the APPEARANCE

OF JUSTICE?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In this separately filed complaint filed against The United States, the

Appellant, Mohan A. Harihar, addresses the District Court’s egregious abuse of

discretion and wrongful dismissal of his complaint seeking: (1) Damages resulting

from his identified illegal foreclosure, including the recovery of his property, (2)
14
Damages resulting from the Misappropriation to his Intellectual Property – also

considered a Trade Secret(s) protected under the Economic Espionage Act, (3)

Professional accountability including (but not limited to) licensure revocation and

disbarment, where applicable, and (4) Criminal accountability with the assistance of

Federal Prosecutors for related criminal offenses, including (but not limited to)

Treason and Fraud.

The Appellant has evidenced that after filing the required SF-95 form with the

appropriate Federal agencies on September 13, 2016, 6 he exhausted ALL

administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint on June 14, 2017.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The FACTS of record which contributed to Judge Burroughs’ RECUSAL are

IDENTICAL to those which ultimately disqualify Judge Casper from issuing any

order associated with Mr. Harihar’s complaint against The United States. These

contributing factors include (but are not limited to): 1.) Failing to VOID orders

impacted by RECUSAL, 2.) Ignoring JURISDICTION issues, 3.) Failing to

exercise judicial discretion by assisting with the Appointment of Counsel, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 4.) Failing to establish a balance of hardships, 5.) Refusing to

6
The SF-95 states: “This Claim has been filed via email communication with: The
Executive Office of the President (EOP), US Inspector General – Michael
Horowitz, Department of Justice (DOJ), Judicial Council of the First Circuit, US
District Court (Boston, MA), US Attorney’s Office (MA), US Senator Elizabeth
Warren (MA), US Senator Ed Markey (MA), and US Congresswoman Niki
Tsongas (MA), and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).”
15
CLARIFY decisions when requested, in separate hearings with the presence of an

independent court reporter, 6.) Refusing to RECUSE under 28 U.S.C. §455(a) and

28 U.S.C. § 144, 7.) Exemplifying judicial fraud upon the court by failing to

uphold Federal law, the Judicial Oath, Judicial Code of Conduct and the judicial

machinery of the court.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Since there are NO filings of record by counsel representing The United States (aside

from the Notice of Appearance), ALL evidenced arguments involving the Appellee

indicate judicial error, warranting (at minimum) VACATING the referenced

Dismissal with damages, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3), (4) AND (6). The

Appellant respectfully references the Motion to Vacate Judgment, filed with THIS

court on 12/23/17. Although the motion stands as UNOPPOSED by The United

States, Circuit Judges - Torruella, Kayatta and Barron denied the motion

WITHOUT CAUSE AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION. 7 Collectively, the

evidenced arguments indicate what MAY be considered the most egregious abuse

of the Federal Judiciary in US History – certainly warranting intervention by

Congress. As an AMERICAN CITIZEN, these judicial abuses are

UNACCEPTABLE.

7
Reference the 1/23/18 order, considered issued without jurisdiction by Circuit
Judges - Torruella, Kayatta and Barron.
16
 STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 60(b)(4) a deferential standard of review is not appropriate because

if the underlying judgment is void, it is a per se abuse of discretion for a district court

to deny movant’s motion to vacate the judgment under Rule 60(b)(4). Antoine v.

Atlas Turner, Inc., 66F.3d 105, 108 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Indoor

Cultivation Equip from High Tech Indoor Garden Supply, 55 F.3d 1311, 1317

(7thCir, 1995)). See also Charles Alan Wright, Arthru R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane,

Federal Practice and Procedure §2862 (2d ed. 1995) (There is no question of

discretion on the part of the court when a motion is under Rule 60(b)(4).

“As many circuits have recognized the absence of discretion under Rule 60(b)(4)

necessitates de novo review.” Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Caramica Europa II, Inc.,

160 F.3d 849, 852 (1st Cir. 1998); Carter v. Fenner, 136 F.3d 1000, 1005(5thCir.

1998); Wilmer v. Board of County Comm‘rs. Of Leavenworth County, 69F.3d

406, 409 (10th Cir. 1995); Indoor Cultivation Equip., 55 F.3d @ 1317; Export

Group v. Reef Indus., Inc., 54 F.3d 1466, 1469 (9th Cir, 1995); Page v.

Schweiker,786 F.2d 150, 152 (3rd Cir. 1986).

Because Judge Casper denied the Plaintiff’s due process of law, she had to disqualify

herself, which she refused to do; she clearly acted ― outside of her legal powers.

17
Carter, 136 F.3d at 1005 (citation omitted); see also Antoine, 66 F.3d at108 (quoting

In re Edwards, 962 F.2d 641, 644 (7thCir. 1992)).

ARGUMENT

I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO VOID ALL

RELATED ORDERS FOLLOWING THE RECUSAL of JUDGE
ALLISON DALE BURROUGHS

On June 19, 2017, three (3) days after being assigned the related case – HARIHAR

v. THE UNITED STATES, Docket no. 17-cv-11109, Judge Allison Dale Burroughs

RECUSED herself, sua sponte, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455(a), AND 28 U.S.C. §

144, for the EXACT reasons that warranted her recusal from Harihar v. US Bank, et

al, Docket No. 15-cv-11880. Judge Burroughs’ recusal from this lower court docket

shows cause to VOID ALL RELATED orders/judgements, which includes the

dismissal, and all other orders associated with this appeal. The Appellant draws

reference to the Motion to Void Orders/Judgments - Document No. 9, filed

7/19/17, the REPLY to Court Order – Document No. 13, filed 9/5/17, and the

REPLY to the Dismissal Order – Document No. 16. The Appellant has made

several attempts to address the impact of recusal during this Appeal process, only to

be ignored by Circuit Judges - Torruella, Kayatta and Barron.

II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO GRANT

PERMISSION TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY (ECF)
The Plaintiff addresses the DENIAL Order – issued on 8/11/17 after nine (9) weeks

and without cause, refusing to allow the Plaintiff to use the Court’s Electronic

18
filing system (ECF). It is unclear exactly how Judge Casper reached her decision

here, in what is ordinarily considered as a procedural formality to ease the filing of

court documents and to provide litigants with immediate notification of any new

developments via email. The Court IS AWARE, that ECF Filing/Notification is

currently granted by both this US District Court, and also the US Court of Appeals,

to the Plaintiff; in the related Docket No. 15-cv-11880, Harihar v. US Bank, et al;

and Appeal No. 17-1381. There has been NO reason or cause to suspend or revoke

this privilege from the Plaintiff/Appellant. Similarly, there was no reason to do so

here.

IF – the motion to file electronically had rightfully (and timely) been granted, an

email would have been received on August 11, 2017, immediately notifying the

Plaintiff. Instead, the order was received by mail on August 18, 2017 – ONE

WEEK LATER, and taking away an entire week for a pro se litigant to respond

by the court-ordered deadline of September 1, 2017. Based on the historical record,

there’s cause to suggest that denying the use of ECF (without cause) is viewed as

an INTENTIONAL, DECEPTIVE ACT to further impact the imbalance of

hardship weighing heavily in favor of the Plaintiff. At minimum, it reveals an

incremental ACT of BAD FAITH by a tenth (10th) officer of the Court, acting on

behalf of The United States. Left uncorrected, it: 1.) Shows an act of prejudice/bias

by Judge Casper, and grounds for RECUSAL pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §455(a) and

28 U.S.C. § 144; 2.) Shows cause to expand upon existing claims of judicial
19
misconduct claims against The United States; 3.) Clearly reinforces the complexity

of issues thus warranting assistance with the appointment of counsel; and 4.) Re-

affirms that the integrity of this US District Court is indeed compromised,

warranting transfer, and the attention of Congress.

III. THE DISTRICT (AND APPEALS) COURT FAILED TO EXERCISE

JUDICIAL DISCRETION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 BY REFUSING to
ASSIST THE APPELLANT WITH THE APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

The Appellant addresses repeated judicial errors made by both the lower court

AND this Appeals Court DENYING WITHOUT CAUSE his requests for

Assistance with the Appointment of Counsel under 28 U.S.C. §1915 and

DESPITE the following:

1. The Appellant has NO LEGAL BACKGROUND and does not have the

financial means to retain counsel. Both of these FACTS have been

recognized by the US District Court and this US Appeals Court.

2. Based on the claims listed in the submitted SF-95 form and the

additional/expanded allegations raised against the United States since, legal

expertise is required (at minimum) in the following areas: a.) Violations to

the Due Process Clause; b.) Color of Law Violations; c.) Civil/Criminal

RICO Violations; d.) Federal Tort Claims; e.) Treason to the Constitution; f.)

Fraud on the Court (Judicial); g.) Judicial Misconduct; h.) Evidenced Acts

made in BAD FAITH; i.) Misprision (of Treason, and of a Felony); j.)
20
 Misappropriation of Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Espionage;

k.) Historical litigation pertaining to the US Foreclosure Crisis; l.) Securities

Fraud - specifically referencing (but not limited to) Residential Mortgage-

Backed Securities (RMBS) associated with the US Foreclosure Crisis; m.)

Real Estate/Foreclosure Law; n.)Litigation involving State and Federal

Government; o.) US District and Appellate Court Litigation; p.) Civil

Conspiracy Claims; and q.) Obstruction of Justice Claims.

3. When THE UNITED STATES is the OPPOSING PARTY (as is the case

here) and when the interests of the indigent litigant, although not involving

his personal liberty, are fundamental and compelling, due process and

fundamental fairness require a presumption in favor of appointed counsel.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit acknowledged

that under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) the district court has broad discretion to

appoint counsel and that the denial of counsel "will not be overturned

unless it would result in fundamental unfairness impinging on due

process rights.” The court said that the district court's decision must "rest

upon the court's careful consideration of all the circumstances of the case,

with particular emphasis upon certain factors that have been recognized as

highly relevant to a request for counsel.”

4. Evidenced Merits of the Appellant’s consistent claims;

5. Position to investigate crucial facts;

21
 6. Whether the search for truth will be better served if both sides are

represented by persons trained in the presentation of evidence and in cross-

examination;

7. Capability of the Appellant to present his case. The court of appeals quoted

Gordon v. Leeke, "If it is apparent to the District Court that a pro se

litigant has a colorable claim but lacks the capacity to present it, the

District Court should appoint counsel to assist him.”;

8. The Court should consider the complexity of the legal issues the claim(s)

raises. When the law is so clearly settled that counsel will serve no purpose,

the court should deny a request for counsel. When, however, the law is not

clear, justice will be better served if both sides are represented by

persons trained in legal analysis.

9. While the Appellant understands that assistance with the appointment of

counsel is rare, it SHOULD be recognized that the Court’s assistance per

Title 28 U.S.C. §1915 is clearly warranted here, in what many would

certainly consider as a TEXTBOOK case example.8

IV. THE DISTRICT (AND APPEALS) COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS

JURISDICTION ISSUES CONTINUOUSLY RAISED BY THE
APPELLANT

8
The Appellant references the Lower Court Document No. 3, filed on 6/14/17
denied by Judge Casper, the recently filed – EMERGENCY MOTION TO
VACATE DISMISSAL W/DAMAGES,8 filed 12/24/17
22
Since initially bringing evidenced judicial misconduct claims dating back to

August 2016, the Appellant has raised jurisdiction issues documented in NO

LESS THAN FIFTY (50) SEPARATELY FILED COURT DOCUMENTS

including the Appellant’s Brief of the related Appeal.9 NOT EVEN ONCE, has

this Federal Judiciary addressed the Appellant’s issues pertaining to

jurisdiction. By IGNORING EVERY jurisdiction issue raised by the Appellant -

Judge Casper AND Circuit Judges - Torruella, Kayatta and Barron are

DISQUALIFIED by law to rule in this, or ANY related litigation. These judicial

failures only add to evidenced arguments supporting CONTINUED PATTERNS

OF CORRUPT CONDUCT and the EGREGIOUS abuse of judicial authority.

This Court is respectfully reminded that ALL evidenced judicial misconduct

claims previously filed by the Appellant against ALL TEN (10) referenced court

officers INCLUDING Judge Casper and Circuit Judges - Torruella, Kayatta

and Barron stand as UNOPPOSED.

V. THE DISTRICT COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE APPELLANT’S

EVIDENCED CLAIMS REGARDING THE MISAPPROPRIATION
OF TRADE SECRETS AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, PURSUANT
TO 18 U.S. CODE § 1832, AND ITS RESULTING IMPACT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY

NOWHERE in the record is there a single reference by Judge Casper to: 1.) the

9Reference is collectively made to filings within: 1.) this Appeal No. 17-1381, 2.)
the lower court Docket No. 15-cv-11880; 3.) the related Appeal No. 17-2074
(Harihar v. The United States); 4.) the lower Court Docket No. 17-cv-11109; 5.)
the Judicial Misconduct complaints filed with Chief Justice Jeffrey R. Howard; and
6.) the Judicial Misconduct Petitions filed with the First Circuit Executive and the
Judicial Council.
23
Appellant’s Intellectual Property/Trade Secret, 2.) Economic Espionage or 3.)

National Security. In the related complaint, Harihar v. US Bank, IDENTICAL

Circumstances contributed to the recusal of Judge Burroughs. A thorough review

of the record in the related complaint clearly articulates the Appellant’s evidenced

claims, and the premature move to dismissal here exemplifies incremental failures

to uphold the judicial machinery of the court.

VI. THE DISTRICT COURT PREMATURELY DISMISSED MR.

HARIHAR’S COMPLAINT BY FAILING TO ACCEPT HIS CLAIMS
AS FACT, PRIOR TO DISCOVERY

The Appellant respectfully reminds this court that the related complaint – Harihar

v. US Bank, contains evidenced arguments supporting the following: 1.) Federal

Tort Claims, pursuant to (at minimum) 28 U.S. Code § 1346; 2.) Judicial Fraud

on the Court; 3.) Failure to acknowledge evidenced acts of Treason to the

Constitution, pursuant to ARTICLE III; 4.) Economic Espionage, and the

Misappropriation of Trade Secrets/Intellectual Property Rights of the Plaintiff; 5.)

Conspiracy Claims; 6.) Obstruction of Justice pursuant to 18 USC Chapter 73;

7.) Violations to Due Process (14th Amendment); 8.) Color of Law Violations

(42 U.S. Code § 1983 and 18 U.S. Code § 242; 9.) Civil/Criminal RICO

Violations (at minimum 18 U.S. Code § 1964); 10.) Misprision (of Treason, and

of a Felony, 18 U.S. Code § 1832 & 4); 11.) Failure to acknowledge evidenced

Securities Fraud; and 12.) Judicial Misconduct and evidenced acts of BAD

FAITH, by officers of the court, acting on behalf of the United States.

CLEARLY, considering the severity and totality of these claims, Judge

24
Casper’s conscious decision to prematurely dismiss the Appellant’s complaint

prior to discovery shows (at least on its surface), that elements of corruption may

exist here; and that an effort is being made – by these officers of the Court, to brush

aside all motions in order to reach a corrupt and predetermined outcome.

VII. THE DISTRICT COURT USED DECEPTIVE TACTICS TO

IMPROPERLY DISMISS MR. HARIHAR’S COMPLAINT

As with the identified deceptive techniques by Judge Burroughs that contributed

to her RECUSAL, a THOROUGH review of the record shows the Appellant

similarly identifies IDENTICAL tactics by Judge Casper and Circuit Judges -

Torruella, Kayatta and Barron. These evidenced techniques include (but are not

limited to): 1.) Failure to consider the possibility of (related) erred judgments; 2.)

Ignoring the Law; 3.) Citing Invalid Law; 4.) Ignoring the Facts; 5.) Ignoring

Issues; 6.) Corruptly calling a complaint "frivolous" and denying motions with no

valid explanation whatsoever; 7.) Block Filing of Motions and Evidence; 8.)

Denying Constitutional Rights; 9.) Automatically Ruling against PRO SE litigants;

10.) Violating the Judicial Oath of Office and the Code of Judicial Conduct; 11.)

Allowing Perjury; 12.) Premature Dismissal PRIOR to DISCOVERY; and 13.)

Denying a Hearing(s) without cause. EACH ONE of these DECEPTIVE

TACTICS detailed within the record constitute obvious errors that warrant

vacating the dismissal with damages.

25
VIII. THE ISSUED DISMISSAL ORDER CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF
TREASON UNDER ARTICLE III

The Appellant draws reference to the lower court docket, Document No. 16 -

REPLY to Court Order, which brought a CLAIM OF TREASON against Judge

Casper for ruling WITHOUT JURISDICTION. Assistant US Attorney – Dina

Michael Chaitowitz and Clerk Margaret Carter both serve as witness to this act

of treason. The record shows that the President has been notified of Treason claims,

as is required by Federal law. It also shows that Circuit Judges - Torruella,

Kayatta and Barron have IGNORED these (and other) evidenced claims of

Treason.

IX. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT OF MR.

HARIHAR’S CONSPIRACY CLAIMS

In the issued order, Judge Casper states: “…the Court rejects the Plaintiff’s

suggestion that an adverse ruling implies participation in a conspiracy…” This

assessment is incorrect. The Court is reminded that the recusal of Judge Burroughs

shows cause for the Appellant to attack all related judgments that SHOULD be

considered VOID. Reference is also drawn to filed judicial misconduct complaints

against TEN (10) Federal Judges for their failure(s) to uphold the judicial

machinery of the Court. What has been evidenced by the historical record(s)

thus far exemplifies what MAY be collectively considered the largest, and

certainly most egregious ABUSE OF AUTHORITY by a Federal Judiciary in

US history. The argument can certainly be made, and should be clear to ANY

objective observer, that there appears to be a set agenda by this Federal

26
Judiciary to ensure that the Appellant – Mohan A. Harihar DOES NOT

receive a FAIR or JUST RESOLUTION in either of his complaints.

X. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS ASSESSMENT THAT MR

HARIHAR FAILED TO SHOW JUST CAUSE TO AVOID DISMISSAL

Based on the evidenced record supporting EACH and EVERY claim brought by

the Appellant, it is unclear exactly HOW Judge Casper could have arrived at such a

conclusion. Furthermore, EVEN IF Judge Casper had jurisdiction to rule further,

her refusal to clarify a single decision shows cause to question her judgment.

XI. THE DISTRICT COUT FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THE

APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE

The Supreme Court has ruled and has reaffirmed the principle that “justice must

satisfy the appearance of justice”, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 80 S.Ct.

1038 (1960), citing Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11,13 (1954).

“Recusal under Section 455 is self -executing; a party need not file affidavits in

support of recusal and the judge is obligated to recuse herself sua sponte under the

stated circumstances. “Taylor v. O’Grady, 888 F.2d 1189 (7th Cir. 1989).

Further, the judge has a legal duty to disqualify himself even if there is no motion

asking for his disqualification. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals further stated

that “We think that this language (455(a)) imposes a duty on the judge to act sua

sponte, even if no motion or affidavit is filed. “Balistrieri, at 1202.

Judges do not have the discretion not to disqualify themselves. By law, they are

bound to follow the law. Should the judge not disqualify himself as required by law,

27
then the judge has given another example of this “appearance of partiality”, which,

possibly, further disqualifies the judge. Should another judge not accept the

disqualification of the judge, then the second judge has evidenced an “appearance

of partiality” and possibly disqualified himself/herself. None of the orders issued by

any judge who has been disqualified by law would appear to be valid. It would

appear that they are void as a matter of law, and are no legal force or effect.

If you are a non-represented litigant, and should the court not follow the law as to

non-represented litigants, then the judge has expressed an “appearance of partiality”

and, under the law it would seem that he/she has disqualified him/herself.

However, since not all judges keep up to date in the law, and since not all judges

follow the law, it is possible that a judge may not know the ruling of the U.S.

Supreme Court and the other courts on this subject. Notice that is states

“disqualification is required” and that a judge “must be disqualified” under certain

circumstances.

The Supreme Court has also held that if a judge wars against the Constitution, or if

he acts without jurisdiction, he has engaged in treason to the Constitution. If a judge

acts after he has been automatically disqualified by law, then he is acting without

jurisdiction, and that suggests that he is then engaging in criminal acts of treason,

and may be engaged in extortion and the interference with interstate commerce.

Courts have repeatedly ruled that judges have no immunity from their criminal acts.

Since both treason and the interference with interstate commerce are criminal acts;

no judge has immunity to engage in such acts.

28
 CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, and as detailed throughout the record(s),

JURISDICTION MUST FIRST be re-established. The Appellant respectfully

makes clear that ANY attempt made by Presiding Judges Torruella, Kayatta,

Barron to continue ruling WITHOUT JURISDICTION will be interpreted as

INCREMENTAL acts of TREASON under Article III. Once jurisdiction has

been re-established, this Court (or a Court with jurisdiction) should OVERTURN

the District Court’s dismissal of Mohan A. Harihar’s complaint, ruling in favor of

the Appellant, pursuant (at minimum) to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. Rule 60(b)(4). The

Court should concur that the referenced actions by officers of the Court were willful

or executed in bad faith or were deliberate and in contumacious disregard of the

court’s authority, and shows intent to ultimately harm – not only the Appellant, but

also The United States. Therefore, the Court should award the Appellant treble

monetary damages, full reimbursement for all related costs and associated legal fees

throughout this litigation, punitive and any other relief the Court deems appropriate.

The Court (or Congress) should also assess appropriate professional penalties

against ALL responsible parties, including (but not limited to) licensure revocation

and disbarment, where applicable. It remains the Appellants full intention to

continue full pursuit of related criminal claims evidenced against ALL parties.

ONCE AGAIN, the Appellant – Mohan A. Harihar respectfully calls for the

assistance of Federal Prosecutors, and if necessary, the assignment of a Special

Prosecutor, in order to move forward with the pursuit of these criminal claims.
29
In closing, the Appellant – Mohan A. Harihar respectfully states that once these

referenced judgements have been appropriately vacated and damages have been

rightfully awarded as stated, the intention remains to align with The United States

for the purpose of implementing the HARIHAR FCS model© nationwide.

Successful implementation will undoubtedly assist in paving the way to historical

economic growth and prosperity for our great Nation. The Appellant is grateful for

the Court’s consideration.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ MOHAN A. HARIHAR

Mohan A. Harihar
Mo.harihar@gmail.com
7124 Avalon Drive
Acton, MA 01720
Dated: January 29, 2018 p. (617) 921.2526

30
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE UNDER FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(7)

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the type-volume limitation of

Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B) because: (1) this brief contains 6070 words excluding

the parts of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. 32(a)(7)(B)(iii); and (2) this brief

complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. 32(a)(5) and the type

style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared

in 14 point proportionally spaced using Times New Roman font.

/s/ MOHAN A. HARIHAR

Mohan A. Harihar
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on January 29, 2018 I electronically filed the foregoing

brief of the Appellant to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit by

using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the following parties or their counsel of

record are registered as ECF filers and that they will be served by the CM/ECF

system:

Dina M. Chaitowitz
Mohan A. Harihar
Appellant
7125 Avalon Drive
Mo.harihar@gmail.com
 No. 17-2074

ADDENDUM
 ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS

18 U.S. Code § 2382…………………..…………………….….…Add. 1

28 U.S.C. § 1915 .............................................................................Add. 2
28 U.S.C. § 1291……………………………………………….… Add. 3
18 U.S. Code § 1832……………………………………….….…. Add. 4
28 U.S.C. §455(a)……………………………………………….... Add. 5
28 U.S.C. § 144 …………………………………………………...Add. 6
28 U.S. Code § 1346………………………………………………Add. 7
18 USC Chapter 73……………………………………………..… Add. 8
18 U.S. Code § 4………………………………………………..… Add. 9
42 U.S. Code § 1983……………………………………………… Add. 10
18 U.S. Code § 242……………………………………………..… Add. 11
18 U.S. Code § 1964………………………………………..…….. Add. 12
Federal Practice and Procedure §2862 (2d ed. 1995) …………….. Add. 13
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3), (4), and (6) ............................................... Add. 14
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(1)(B)(viii) …………………………………. Add. 15
Article III, Section 3…………………………………………….… Add. 16
Addendum 1
18 U.S. Code § 2382 – Misprision of Treason
Whoever, owing allegiance to the United States and having knowledge of the
commission of any treason against them, conceals and does not, as soon as may be,
disclose and make known the same to the President or to some judge of the United
States, or to the governor or to some judge or justice of a particular State, is guilty
of misprision of treason and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than seven years, or both.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 807; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII,
§ 330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

Addendum 2
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(1)
The court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.

Addendum 3
28 U.S.C. § 1291 - Jurisdiction
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin
Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court. The
jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall be
limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and 1295 of this
title.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 929; Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 48, 65 Stat. 726;
Pub. L. 85–508, § 12(e), July 7, 1958, 72 Stat. 348; Pub. L. 97–164, title I, § 124,
Apr. 2, 1982, 96 Stat. 36.)
Addendum 4
18 U.S. Code § 1832 - Theft of trade secrets
(a)Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or
service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the
economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly—
(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or
conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information;
(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs,
downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits,
delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such information;
(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to have
been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization;
(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through (3);
or
(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense
described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more of such persons do
any act to effect the object of the conspiracy,
shall, except as provided in subsection (b), be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b)Any organization that commits any offense described in subsection (a) shall be
fined not more than the greater of $5,000,000 or 3 times the value of the stolen
trade secret to the organization, including expenses for research and design and
other costs of reproducing the trade secret that the organization has thereby
avoided.
(Added Pub. L. 104–294, title I, § 101(a), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3489; amended
Pub. L. 112–236, § 2, Dec. 28, 2012, 126 Stat. 1627; Pub. L. 114–153, § 3(a)(1),
May 11, 2016, 130 Stat. 382.)
Addendum 5
28 U.S.C. §455(a) - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge
Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself
in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Addendum 6
28 U.S.C. § 144 - Bias or prejudice of judge
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal
bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge
shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.
The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or
prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days before the beginning of
the term at which the proceeding is to be heard, or good cause shall be shown for
failure to file it within such time. A party may file only one such affidavit in any
case. It shall be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is
made in good faith.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 898; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 65, 63 Stat. 99.)

Addendum 7
28 U.S. Code § 1346 - United States as defendant
(b)(1)Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts,
together with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone
and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on
and after January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.

Addendum 8
18 USC Chapter 73 – Obstruction of Justice
18 U.S. Code § 1503(a)
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit
juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be
serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate
judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any
such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or
indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been such
juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing magistrate
in his person or property on account of the performance of his official duties, or
corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication,
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede,
the due administration of justice, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). If
the offense under this section occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case,
and the act in violation of this section involves the threat of physical force or
physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment which may be imposed for the
offense shall be the higher of that otherwise provided by law or the maximum term
that could have been imposed for any offense charged in such case.

Addendum 9
18 U.S. Code § 4 - Misprision of felony
Whoever, having knowledge of the actual commission of a felony cognizable by a
court of the United States, conceals and does not as soon as possible make known
the same to some judge or other person in civil or military authority under the
United States, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three
years, or both.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 684; Pub. L. 103–322, title XXXIII,
§ 330016(1)(G), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 2147.)

Addendum 10
42 U.S. Code § 1983 - Civil action for deprivation of rights
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
(R.S. § 1979; Pub. L. 96–170, § 1, Dec. 29, 1979, 93 Stat. 1284; Pub. L. 104–317,
title III, § 309(c), Oct. 19, 1996, 110 Stat. 3853.)

Addendum 11
18 U.S. Code § 242 - Deprivation of rights under color of law
Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom,
willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession,
or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or
protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different
punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by
reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if
bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such
acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon,
explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this
section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated
sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to
kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or
both, or may be sentenced to death.
(June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 696; Pub. L. 90–284, title I, § 103(b), Apr. 11,
1968, 82 Stat. 75; Pub. L. 100–690, title VII, § 7019, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat.
4396; Pub. L. 103–322, title VI, § 60006(b), title XXXII, §§ 320103(b), 320201(b),
title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(H), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1970, 2109, 2113, 2147;
Pub. L. 104–294, title VI, §§ 604(b)(14)(B), 607(a), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3507,
3511.)

Addendum 12
18 U.S. Code § 1964 - Civil remedies
(a)The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to prevent and
restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing appropriate orders,
including, but not limited to: ordering any person to divest himself of any interest,
direct or indirect, in any enterprise; imposing reasonable restrictions on the future
activities or investments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting
any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged
in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce; or ordering
dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, making due provision for the rights
of innocent persons.
(b)The Attorney General may institute proceedings under this section. Pending
final determination thereof, the court may at any time enter such restraining orders
or prohibitions, or take such other actions, including the acceptance of satisfactory
performance bonds, as it shall deem proper.
(c)Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of
the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee, except that no person may rely upon
any conduct that would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities to establish a violation of section 1962. The exception contained in the
preceding sentence does not apply to an action against any person that is criminally
convicted in connection with the fraud, in which case the statute of limitations
shall start to run on the date on which the conviction becomes final.
(d)A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the United States in any
criminal proceeding brought by the United States under this chapter shall estop the
defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any
subsequent civil proceeding brought by the United States.
(Added Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 901(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 943; amended
Pub. L. 98–620, title IV, § 402(24)(A), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3359; Pub. L. 104–
67, title I, § 107, Dec. 22, 1995, 109 Stat. 758.)

Addendum 13
Federal Practice and Procedure §2862 (2d ed. 1995) - Void Judgment
Primary Authority
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60
Forms
West's Federal Forms § § 4951 to 5010
Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes relief from void judgments. Necessarily a motion under
this part of the rule differs markedly from motions under the other clauses of Rule
60(b). There is no question of discretion on the part of the court when a motion is
under Rule 60(b)(4).[FN1] Nor is there any requirement, as there usually is when
default judgments are attacked under Rule 60(b), that the moving party show that
he has a meritorious defense. [FN2] Either a judgment is void or it is valid.
Determining which it is may well present a difficult question, but when that
question is resolved, the court must act accordingly

Addendum 14
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 - Relief from a Judgment or Order
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion
and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.

Addendum 15
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 - Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery
(a) Required Disclosures.
(1) Initial Disclosure.
(B) Proceedings Exempt from Initial Disclosure. The following
proceedings are exempt from initial disclosure:
(viii) a proceeding ancillary to a proceeding in another court;

Addendum 16
Article III, Section 3
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them,
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt
act, or on confession in open court.
The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no
attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the
life of the person attainted.