Case Name: Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr., v.

Reynalda Pollescas

Doctrine: For tenants failure to pay rental to come within the intend.ent of the law as a ground for
ejectment. it is imperative that the rental must be legal. What the law contemplates iis the deliberate
failure of the tenant to pay the legal rental. not the failure to pay an illegal rental.

Facts: Petitioners Tan were co-owners of a coconut fannland(Land) located at Labo. Ozamis City.
Esteban Pollescas was the original tenant of the said land- Upon Esteban's death. his son Enrique
pollesca's succeeded him and was appointed as tenant by the landowner Enrique Tan-

Respondent herein. Reynalda Pollesca. Esteban's surviving spouse demanded that the Tans recognize
her as Esteban’s successor. The Tans did not accede. Thus. respondent Reynalda Pollesca’s filed with the
DARAB of Ozamis City a complaint for Annulment of Compromise Agreement. Quieting of Tenancy
Relationship and damages.

DARAB-Ozamis declared Reynalda as the lawful tenant of the Land. and apportioned the harvests
between Tan Heirs and Reynalda based on customary sharing which is 2/3 to the landowner. and 1/3 to
the tenant- Tan Heirs demanded Reynalda to pay such amount. but Reynalda ignored it. Tan Heirs filed a
complaint of estafa against Reynalda. The MTC found Reynalda guilty of estafa. and due to her
continued failure to deliver the share of the Tan heirs. the latter filed a complaint for ejectment against
the former.

The petitioner Tan heirs argued that the leasehold agreement is extinguished due to non-payment of
the lease (2/3 of the harvest). The respondent Reyanalda contended that the petitioner’s demand for
payment is excessive- The CA ruled that there is nothing in the law that makes failure to deliver a share
as ground for extinguishment of leasehold agreement.

Issue: Whether the CA is correct in ruling that Reynalda is obliged to pay only 1/4 or 2596 of the normal
harvest and not 213 when the subject land was not yet placed under the leasehold system pursuant to
Sec. 12 of RA. 6657.

Ruling: The law govemning in this case is RA. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1998.
which only expressly repealed Sec. 35 of RA 3844. The harvest in dispute are for the years 1992-1993
after its effectivity- In this case. the Tan Heirs seek Reynalda's ejectment on the ground of non-payment
of lease rental- The Court agrees with the CA that for nonpayment of the lease rental to be valid ground
to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding. the amount of the lease rental must first of all
be lawful- If the amount of the lease rental claimed exceeds the limit allowed by law. non-payment of
lease rental cannot be aground to dispossess the agricultural lessee of the landholding.

Sec. 43 of RA 3844.as amended provides that not more than 25% of the average normal harvest shall
constitute the just and fair rental for leasehold- In this case. the Tan Heirs cannot validly disposses
Reynalda of the landholding for non-payment of rental precisely because the lease rental claimed by the
Tan Heirs is unlawful.
Reynalda and the Tan Heirs failed to agree on a lawful lease rental. Consequently. that means the DAR
must first fix the provisional lease rental payable by Reynalda to the Tan Heirs pursuant to par- 2 of Sec-
34 of RA. 3844- Until DAR has fixed the provisional lease rental. Reynalda cannot be in default in the
payment of the lease rental since such amount is not yet deterrnned. There can be no delay in the
payment of an undetermined lease rental because it is impossible to pay such an undetermined amount.

That Reynalda is not yet in default in the payment of the lease rental is a basic reason why she cannot be
lawfully ejected from the Land for nonpayment of rental- Moreover. there is no ground for
extinguishment of leasehold rental in this case. The case of Gamhitorena v. Panganiban was also
wrongfully cited by Atty. Anonat. counselfor the Tan Heirs.

The Court denied the petition and affirms the assailed decision of the CA It remanded the case to the
DAR for determination of the provisional lease rental-

Hipos Sr vs Bay GR No 174813-15 17 March 2009

Facts: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness
were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before RTC
presided by Judge Bay. Private complainants AAA and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking
Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed
against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of
the cases. Hipos and other filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City
Prosecutor. City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations filed against them. However, 2nd Asst. City
Prosecutor reversed the Resolution holding that there was lack of probable cause. City Prosecutor filed a
Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the motion hence the petition.

Issue: WON the Hon. Supreme Court may compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of
mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the office of the city prosecutor of QC finding no probable
cause against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw information.

Decision: Petition bereft of merit. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal,

corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion
by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to
any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that
of the court.
There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the
reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when
refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.

While a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to
act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In
the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already
acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners
believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the
Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition
for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay.