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Jump to: navigation, search Not to be confused with fishing, pish, or Phish.
An example of a phishing e-mail, disguised as an official e-mail from a (fictional) bank. The sender is attempting to trick the recipient into revealing confidential information by "confirming" it at the phisher's website. Note the misspelling of the words received and discrepancy. Such mistakes are common in most phishing emails. Also note that although the URL of the bank's webpage appears to be legitimate, it actually links to the phisher's webpage. In the field of computer security, phishing is the criminally fraudulent process of attempting to acquire sensitive information such as usernames, passwords and credit card details by masquerading as a trustworthy entity in an electronic communication. Communications purporting to be from popular social web sites, auction sites, online payment processors or IT administrators are commonly used to lure the unsuspecting public. Phishing is typically carried out by e-mail or instant messaging, and it often directs users to enter details at a fake website whose look and feel are almost identical to the legitimate one. Even when using server authentication, it may require tremendous skill to detect that the website is fake. Phishing is an example of social engineering techniques used to fool users, and exploits the poor usability of current web security technologies. Attempts to deal with the growing number of reported phishing incidents include legislation, user training, public awareness, and technical security measures. A phishing technique was described in detail in 1987, and the first recorded use of the term "phishing" was made in 1996. The term is a variant of fishing, probably influenced by phreaking, and alludes to baits used to "catch" financial information and passwords.
2.2 Technical responses 4. Interex. in a paper and presentation delivered to the International HP Users Group.1 Recent phishing attempts o 2. although the term may have appeared earlier in the print edition of the hacker magazine 2600. After AOL brought in measures in late 1995 to prevent using fake.2 Link manipulation o 2. .1.2.[hide] • • • • • • • 1 History and current status of phishing o 1.1 Fundamental flaws in the security model of secure browsing 4.1 Social responses o 4.3 Legal responses 5 See also 6 References 7 External links  History and current status of phishing A phishing technique was described in detail in 1922.214.171.124 Other techniques 3 Damage caused by phishing 4 Anti-phishing o 4.2.online-service.2 Browsers alerting users to fraudulent websites 4.2.1 Early phishing on AOL o 1.4 Eliminating phishing mail 4. The first recorded mention of the term "phishing" is on the alt. 1996.3 Augmenting password logins 4.1 Helping to identify legitimate websites 4.  Early phishing on AOL Phishing on AOL was closely associated with the warez community that exchanged pirated software and the hacking scene that perpetrated credit card fraud and other online crimes.3 Filter evasion o 2.5 Phone phishing o 2.4 Website forgery o 2.2 Transition from AOL to financial institutions 2 Phishing techniques o 2.5 Monitoring and takedown o 4.America-online Usenet newsgroup on January 2.
though even this didn't prevent some people from giving away their passwords and personal information if they read and believed the IM first. which was followed up by a "post-9/11 id check" shortly after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center. the attacker could access and use the victim's account for fraudulent purposes or spamming. Once the victim had revealed the password. Both were viewed at the time as failures. which were assembled into finished attacks.  Transition from AOL to financial institutions The capture of AOL account information may have led phishers to misuse credit card information. A phisher might pose as an AOL staff member and send an instant message to a potential victim.) After 1997.  Phishing techniques  Recent phishing attempts .reported to AOL TOS department for disciplinary action. AOL crackers resorted to phishing for legitimate accounts and exploiting AOL. phishing was recognized as a fully industrialized part of the economy of crime: specializations emerged on a global scale that provided components for cash. often before the victims could respond. AOL simultaneously developed a system to promptly deactivate accounts involved in phishing. A user using both an AIM account and an AOL account from an ISP simultaneously could phish AOL members with relative impunity as internet AIM accounts could be used by non-AOL internet members and could not be actioned (ie. asking him to reveal his password. By 2004. The first known direct attempt against a payment system affected E-gold in June 2001. and to the realization that attacks against online payment systems were feasible. such as AOHell. Both phishing and warezing on AOL generally required custom-written programs.algorithmically generated credit card numbers to open accounts. but can now be seen as early experiments towards more fruitful attacks against mainstream banks. AOL's policy enforcement with respect to phishing and warez became stricter and forced pirated software off AOL servers. In order to lure the victim into giving up sensitive information the message might include imperatives like "verify your account" or "confirm billing information". Phishing became so prevalent on AOL that they added a line on all instant messages stating: "no one working at AOL will ask for your password or billing information". The shutting down of the warez scene on AOL caused most phishers to leave the service. and many phishers—often young teens—grew out of the habit.
 Some people are being victim to a Facebook Scam. supposedly from the Internal Revenue Service. Petersburg. account numbers and email addresses as well as their names. have been used to glean sensitive data from U.A chart showing the increase in phishing reports from October 2004 to June 2005 Phishers are targeting the customers of banks and online payment services. and the term whaling has been coined for these kinds of attacks. so they launched a follow-up spear phishing attack. and target bogus e-mails accordingly. Such sites often provide specific details about the particular messages.  Link manipulation .  Experiments show a success rate of over 70% for phishing attacks on social networks. auto-removal of uploads. since the personal details in such sites can be used in identity theft. Almost half of phishing thefts in 2006 were committed by groups operating through the Russian Business Network based in St. dates of birth. Several recent phishing attacks have been directed specifically at senior executives and other high profile targets within businesses. taxpayers. and cooldown times between downloads.S. addresses. phone numbers and trading activity) also wanted the account usernames and passwords. such as FraudWatch International and Millersmiles. E-mails. which removes speed caps on downloads. waits on downloads. Targeted versions of phishing have been termed spear phishing.  There are anti-phishing websites which publish exact messages that have been recently circulating the internet.3 million customers' social security numbers. in late 2006 a computer worm took over pages on MySpace and altered links to direct surfers to websites designed to steal login details. the link being hosted by T35 Web Hosting and people are losing their accounts. Attackers who broke into TD Ameritrade's database (containing all 6. Social networking sites are now a prime target of phishing. While the first such examples were sent indiscriminately in the expectation that some would be received by customers of a given bank or service.  The RapidShare file sharing site has been targeted by phishing to obtain a premium account. recent research has shown that phishers may in principle be able to determine which banks potential victims use.
These look much like the real website.2 million computer users in the United States suffered losses caused by phishing. Once the phone number (owned by the phisher. the Bank of Ireland initially refused to cover losses suffered by its customers (and it still insists that its policy is not to do so). In reality. To avoid anti-phishing techniques that scan websites for phishing-related text. approximately 1. Microsoft claims these estimates are grossly exaggerated and puts the annual phishing loss in the US at $60 million. totaling approximately US$929 million.2m in 2005.  Phone phishing Not all phishing attacks require a fake website.everything from the web address to the security certificates appears correct. United States businesses lose an estimated US$2 billion per year as their clients become victims.2m in 2004. 3. Messages that claimed to be from a bank told users to dial a phone number regarding problems with their bank accounts. making it very difficult to spot without specialist knowledge. The stance adopted by the UK banking body APACS is that "customers must also take sensible precautions ." Similarly. provides a simple-to-use interface that allows a phisher to convincingly reproduce websites and capture log-in details entered at the fake site. from £12.300 were made good. so that they are not vulnerable to the criminal.. then to place a popup window requesting credentials on top of the website in a way that it appears the bank is requesting this sensitive information. the link to the website is crafted to carry out the attack. A Universal Man-in-the-middle Phishing Kit. although losses to the tune of €11.2 billion in the 12 months ending in August 2007.  Other techniques Another attack used successfully is to forward the client to a bank's legitimate website. In 2007 phishing attacks escalated. discovered by RSA Security. In the United Kingdom losses from web banking fraud—mostly from phishing —almost doubled to £23. phishers have begun to use Flash-based websites. Just such a flaw was used in 2006 against PayPal.6 million adults lost US $ 3. while 1 in 20 computer users claimed to have lost out to phishing in 2005.  Damage caused by phishing The damage caused by phishing ranges from denial of access to e-mail to substantial financial loss. but hide the text in a multimedia object. when the first spate of phishing attacks hit the Irish Republic's banking sector in September 2006. . Vishing (voice phishing) sometimes uses fake caller-ID data to give the appearance that calls come from a trusted organization. prompts told users to enter their account numbers and PIN. It is estimated that between May 2004 and May 2005. and provided by a Voice over IP service) was dialed..
so if an e-mail addresses the recipient in a generic fashion ("Dear PayPal customer") it is likely to be an attempt at phishing. which suggests that most people do not pay attention to such details. One newer phishing tactic. recent research has shown that the public do not typically distinguish between the first few digits and the last few digits of an account number—a significant problem since the first few digits are often the same for all clients of a financial institution. People can take steps to avoid phishing attempts by slightly modifying their browsing habits. Phishing attempts in early 2006. When contacted about an account needing to be "verified" (or any other topic used by phishers). it is a sensible precaution to contact the company from which the e-mail apparently originates to check that the e-mail is legitimate. which uses phishing e-mails targeted at a specific company. Furthermore. used personalized information. another recent study concluded in part that the presence of personal information does not significantly affect the success rate of phishing attacks. Education can be effective. has suggested that conventional phishing techniques could become obsolete in the future as people are increasingly aware of the social engineering techniques used by phishers. Alternatively. Nearly all legitimate e-mail messages from companies to their customers contain an item of information that is not readily available to phishers. which makes it unsafe to assume that the presence of personal information alone guarantees that a message is legitimate. rather than trusting any hyperlinks in the suspected phishing message. NY. People can be trained to have their suspicion aroused if the message does not contain any specific personal information. In a June 2004 experiment with spear phishing. including United States Military Academy at West Point. especially where training provides direct feedback. an industry and law enforcement association. They predict that pharming and other uses of malware will become more common tools for stealing information. 80% of 500 West Point cadets who were sent a fake e-mail were tricked into revealing personal information. known as spear phishing. always address their customers by their username in e-mails. E-mails from banks and credit card companies often include partial account numbers. and to deal with them. including legislation and technology created specifically to protect against phishing. Unfortunately. Some companies. even well-known players are known to incite users to . the address that the individual knows is the company's genuine website can be typed into the address bar of the browser. for example PayPal. Everyone can help educate the public by encouraging safe practices. and by avoiding dangerous ones. however. However. Anti-phishing There are several different techniques to combat phishing.  Social responses One strategy for combating phishing is to train people to recognize phishing attempts. The Anti-Phishing Working Group. has been harnessed to train individuals at various locations.
The superficial flaw is that the browser's security user interface (UI) is insufficient to deal with today's strong threats. and indicating which authority says it is this site. Users often do not know or recognise the URL of the legitimate sites they intend to connect to. and as part of website login procedures.  Helping to identify legitimate websites This section may contain previously unpublished synthesis of published material that conveys ideas not attributable to the original sources. Please do not remove this message until the dispute is resolved. A condition for meaningful server authentication is to have a server identifier that is meaningful to the user. such as email. URLs can be too complex to be easily parsed. many ecommerce sites will change the domain names within their overall set of websites. Secure Connection. which is easily missed by the user. as extensions or toolbars for browsers. Simply displaying the domain name for the visited website as some anti-phishing toolbars do is not sufficient. this is easy to trick. . Please see the discussion on the talk page. meaning that SSL with strong cryptography is used for server authentication.g. (December 2008) Most websites targeted for phishing are secure websites. The user is expected to confirm that the domain name in the browser's URL bar was in fact where they intended to go. indicating which site the user is connected to. Mozilla fielded a yellow URL bar in 2005 as a better indication of the secure connection.  Technical responses Anti-phishing measures have been implemented as features embedded in browsers. where the website's URL is used as identifier. by requesting their users to reveal their passwords for third party services. The following are some of the main approaches to the problem. (December 2008) The neutrality of this section is disputed. Which Site. See the talk page for details. In theory it should be possible for the SSL authentication to be used to confirm the site to the user. All three are necessary for authentication. But in practice. The standard display for secure browsing from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s was the padlock. which replaced certain high-value certificates with a green display.hazardous behaviour. e. so that the authentication becomes meaningless. Unfortunately. and this was SSL v2's design requirement and the meta of secure browsing. this innovation was then reversed due to the EV certificates. and other certificates with a white display. There are three parts to secure authentication using TLS and certificates: indicating that the connection is in authenticated mode. adding to the opportunity for confusion. and need to be confirmed by/to the user.
There is resistance to CAs being branded on the chrome. and not the customers of other CAs. as far as the user is concerned. Who is the Authority. when displaying EV certificates.An alternate approach is the petname extension for Firefox which lets users type in their own labels for websites. Hence. Certificate Manufacturing is the name given to low-value certificates that are delivered on a credit card and an email confirmation. and is unfamiliar with high-value ecommerce sites. This was an isolated case. The use of brand is also critical to providing the CA with an incentive to improve their checking. This represents user-centric identity management of server identities. With the advent of EV certificates. The solution to this is that the browser should show. resulting in a fallback to the simplest level above: the browser is the user's authority. This could be because the CA is in another part of the world. regardless of attempts by browser vendors to control the quality. no authority is stated. Unfortunately. which is much more visible and is hopefully more consistent with the user's expectations. At the simplest level. As the CA is only charged with protecting its own customers. This solution was first put into practice in early IE7 versions.  Fundamental flaws in the security model of secure browsing . The problem with this is that not all certification authorities (CAs) employ equally good nor applicable checking.  Nor do all CAs subscribe to the same model and concept that certificates are only about authenticating ecommerce organisations. Some suggest that a graphical image selected by the user is better than a petname. and the user should be familiar with. or it could be that no care is taken at all. so they can later recognize when they have returned to the site. browsers now typically display the organisation's name in green. a highvalue site may be easily spoofed by a valid certificate provided by another CA. In that display. both of these are easily perverted by fraudsters. the name of the authority. browser vendors have chosen to limit this prominent display only to EV certificates. and allows the user to learn the handful of CAs that she is likely to come into contact within her country and her sector. the issuing CA is displayed. however. The browser vendors take on this responsibility by controlling a root list of acceptable CAs. This is the current standard practice. then the software may either warn the user or block the site outright. The browser needs to state who the authority is that makes the claim of who the user is connected to. and therefore the browser is the authority. If the site is not recognised. this flaw is inherent in the model. leaving the user to fend for himself with all other certificates. as the user will learn the brand and demand good checking for high-value sites. This presents the CA as a brand.
Lack of interest. regulators (e. but have also exposed fundamental flaws in the security model. webserver vendor.. it is hard to see how click-thru syndrome will ever be avoided. the users learned to bypass the warnings. If a certificate had an error in it (mismatched domain name.. The result is that the use of authentication is too rare to be anything but a special case.Experiments to improve the security UI have resulted in benefits. E. As the reason was generally misconfiguration. hence the local fixes are not prioritised. the security display lost out in the "real estate wars" of the early browsers. warnings to poorly configured sites continued. Lateral communications. The underlying causes for the failure of the SSL authentication to be employed properly in secure browsing are many and intertwined. etc. auditors and CAs. this message does not reach the UI groups. which in turn has meant that the attempts by browser vendors to upgrade their security UIs have been slow and lacklustre. as the vast majority of warnings will be for misconfigurations not real MITMs. In practice. resulting in Clickthru syndrome. Another underlying factor is the lack of support for virtual hosting. as that group includes browser vendors. and security standards committees. Matters improved slightly with the CAB Forum. ecommerce site. Users are now highly experienced in not checking security information at all. and now. and were not down-graded. then the browser would commonly launch a popup to warn the user. auditor. Click-thru syndrome.g. The specific causes are a lack of support for Server Name Indication in TLS webservers. users are accustomed to treat all warnings with the same disdain. but it has been shown to be ignored by an experienced user in a real case of MITM. Because secure browsing was put into place before any threat was evident.g. developers. expiry). CA. and does not include representation from small CAs. . and the result suffered from commercial interests of the first players. Firefox 3 has a 4-click process for adding an exception. but these were dropped in the first release. not seeing it as a security fix but instead a new feature. For example. Even today. This has caused a general lack of knowledge and resources in authentication within TLS. all participants look to the others as the source of the failures leading to phishing. end-users. ecommerce owners. However. The security model for secure browser includes many participants: user. as well as a lack of parity between the participants. although the understanding of authentication is strong at the protocol level of the IETF committees. Security before threat. FDIC). But the group did not start out in an open fashion. Webserver vendors do not prioritise the Server Name Indication (TLS/SNI) fix. The original design of Netscape's browser included a prominent display of the name of the site and the CA's name. browser vendor. and the expense and inconvenience of acquiring certificates. There is a lack of communication between different groups that are committed to the security model. Even today. CAB forum is not open.
and display this user-selected image with any forms that request a password. the threat model has. or a server can detect that the image was not requested as part of normal browsing. and is similar in principle to using a hosts file to block web adverts. According to a report by Mozilla in late 2006. several site owners have altered the images to send a message to the visitor that a site may be fraudulent. However. and established a good benchmark. Audit processes are in great need of updating. and instead send a warning image.0. Venerable CA model. The image may be moved to a new filename and the original permanently replaced. Some implementations of this approach send the visited URLs to a central service to be checked. Firefox 2 was found to be more effective than Internet Explorer 7 at detecting fraudulent sites in a study by an independent software testing company. In addition. Control mechanisms employed by the browser vendors over the CAs have not been substantially updated.2. these have not been adopted because they are not standard. Threat models can re-invent themselves in around a month. To mitigate the problem of phishing sites impersonating a victim site by embedding its images (such as logos). Vendors commit to standards. as well as live whitelists from GeoTrust. Although there have been many and good experiments in improving the security UI. Security standards take around 10 years to adjust. An approach introduced in mid-2006 involves switching to a special DNS service that filters out known phishing domains: this will work with any browser. Safari 3. or clash with the standards. but did not push for any substantial changes to be made. and Opera all contain this type of anti-phishing measure.Standards gridlock. Users of the bank's online services are instructed to enter a password only when they see the image they selected.  Augmenting password logins The Bank of America's website is one of several that ask users to select a personal image. a recent study suggests few users refrain from entering their password when images are absent. Opera 9.[citation needed Browsers alerting users to fraudulent websites Another popular approach to fighting phishing is to maintain a list of known phishing sites and to check websites against the list. this feature (like other forms of .1 uses live blacklists from PhishTank and GeoTrust. Microsoft's IE7 browser. which results in an outsourcing effect when it comes to security. Firefox 2 used Google anti-phishing software. which has raised concerns about privacy. The control and quality process over CAs is insufficiently tuned to the protection of users and the addressing of actual and current threats. Mozilla Firefox 2. The recent EV Guidelines documented the current model in greater detail.
analyze and assist in shutting down phishing websites. was arrested in Brazil for leading one of the largest phishing crime rings.  Monitoring and takedown Several companies offer banks and other organizations likely to suffer from phishing scams round-the-clock services to monitor.S. which in two years stole between US$18 million and US$37 million. allegedly created a webpage designed to look like the America Online website. would have subjected criminals who created fake web sites and sent bogus e-mails in order to defraud . In 2006 eight people were arrested by Japanese police on suspicion of phishing fraud by creating bogus Yahoo Japan Web sites. Security skins are a related technique that involves overlaying a user-selected image onto the login form as a visual cue that the form is legitimate. which makes it less vulnerable to attacks that affect user-only authentication schemes. Federal Trade Commission.  Eliminating phishing mail Specialized spam filters can reduce the number of phishing e-mails that reach their addressees' inboxes.S. netting themselves 100 million yen ($870. which targeted notorious "carder" websites. is in use at other financial institutions. Unlike the website-based image schemes. The defendant. Individuals can also contribute by reporting phone phishing attempts to Phone Phishing. and not between the user and the website. Federal Trade Commission filed the first lawsuit against a suspected phisher. such as PhishTank. Secret Service Operation Firewall. in a case connected to the U. Individuals can contribute by reporting phishing to both volunteer and industry groups. This bill. A similar system. UK authorities jailed two men in June 2005 for their role in a phishing scam.S. 2004. and Europe. Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Anti-Phishing Act of 2005 in Congress on March 1.000 USD). and used it to steal credit card information. In the United States.  Legal responses On January 26. such as those suffered by Scandinavian bank Nordea in late 2005. a Californian teenager. 2005. Other countries have followed this lead by tracing and arresting phishers. and Citibank in 2006. These approaches rely on machine learning and natural language processing approaches to classify phishing e-mails. The scheme also relies on a mutual authentication protocol. however. the U. in which an automatically-generated “Identity Cue” consisting of a colored word within a colored box is displayed to each website user.two-factor authentication) is susceptible to other attacks. Valdir Paulo de Almeida. the image itself is shared only between the user and the browser. if it had been enacted into law. A phishing kingpin. The arrests continued in 2006 with the FBI Operation Cardkeeper detaining a gang of sixteen in the U.
including phishing. and prohibits the development or possession of phishing kits with intent to commit fraud. He was found guilty of sending thousands of e-mails to America Online users. of 129 lawsuits mixing criminal and civil actions.S. AOL reinforced its efforts against phishing in early 2006 with three lawsuits seeking a total of $18 million USD under the 2005 amendments to the Virginia Computer Crimes Act. Microsoft filed 117 federal lawsuits in the U. which prompted customers to submit personal and credit card information. The lawsuits accuse "John Doe" defendants of obtaining passwords and confidential information. he was sentenced to serve 70 months.  See also • • • • • • • • • • • • • • Advanced Persistent Threat Anti-phishing software Computer hacking Confidence trick E-mail spoofing FBI Internet fraud Pharming SMiShing Social engineering Spy-phishing Vishing In-session phishing White collar crime . while posing as AOL's billing department. Microsoft announced a planned further 100 lawsuits outside the U. Goodin had been in custody since failing to appear for an earlier court hearing and began serving his prison term immediately. Jeffrey Brett Goodin of California became the first defendant convicted by a jury under the provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. On March 31. in March 2006. followed by the commencement. which introduces a general offence of fraud that can carry up to a ten year prison sentence. District Court for the Western District of Washington. and the misuse of AOL's trademark. Facing a possible 101 years in prison for the CAN-SPAM violation and ten other counts including wire fraud. and Earthlink has joined in by helping to identify six men subsequently charged with phishing fraud in Connecticut.S. 2005. as of November 2006. In January 2007.consumers to fines of up to $250. Companies have also joined the effort to crack down on phishing. The UK strengthened its legal arsenal against phishing with the Fraud Act 2006. the unauthorized use of credit cards.000 and prison terms of up to five years. March 2005 also saw a partnership between Microsoft and the Australian government teaching law enforcement officials how to combat various cyber crimes.
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