Cases Assignment in Civil Procedure

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 150274 August 4, 2006
IN THE MATTER TO DECLARE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT HON. SIMEON A. DATUMANONG in the latter’s capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways. JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, Petitioner,
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen, District Engineer of Mountain Province, DPWH Cordillera Administrative Region, filed this
present petition to cite the former Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) in contempt of court for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5, 2001 dismissing him from the service.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The Ombudsman Task Force on Public Works and Highways filed with the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative
complaint for dishonesty, falsification of official documents, grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, violation of office
rules and regulations, and conduct prejudicial to the service against petitioner Tel-Equen and several others, relative to
the anomalous payment of P553,900.00 of the bailey bridge components owned by the government. The case was
docketed as OMB-ADM-0-91-0430. 1
On March 28, 1994, the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman found respondents guilty of
dishonesty, falsification of public documents, misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
ordered their dismissal from the service with accessory penalties pursuant to Section 23 of Rule XIV, Book V of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. 2
After the denial of the motions for reconsideration, three petitions were filed before this Court which were consolidated
and referred to the Court of Appeals in light of the ruling in Fabian v. Desierto 3 where appeals from decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be referred to the appellate court under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. 4
On March 2, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner and two co-accused guilty as charged and dismissed them from the
service while the other two respondents were exonerated from administrative liability for lack of evidence. 5
Petitioner, together with his two co-accused, appealed from the decision of the Court of Appeals which was docketed as
G.R. No. 144694. 6 Meanwhile, while appeal was still pending, Secretary Datumanong issued the assailed Memorandum
Order, 7 which reads:
October 5, 2001
MEMORANDUM TO:
Messrs:
JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN
District Engineer
RUDY P. ANTONIO
Chief, Construction Section
All of Mountain Province Engineering District
This Department
Civil Procedure Reading Assignment #1 | 1

This is with reference to the Order of the Ombudsman dated December 11, 1995 in OMB ADM. 0-91-0430 entitled "OMB
TASK FORCE ON DPWH versus JIMMIE F. TEL-EQUEN, ET AL." (Annex "A"), affirming the March 28, 1994 Resolution
(Annex "B") in the same case finding you guilty of having committed acts of dishonesty, falsification of public documents,
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and recommending that you be DISMISSED from
the service together with its accessory penalties pursuant to Sec. 23, Rule XIV, Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
The Order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (Eight Division) in its Decision (Annex "C") promulgated on March 02,
2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50324 entitled "ROMULO H. MABUNGA, ET AL. versus THE OMBUDSMAND, ET AL."
Inasmuch as the Order dismissing you from the service is not a subject of any injunction or restraining order from the
Supreme Court, the same is immediately executory. Wherefore, you are hereby ordered DROPPED/DISMISSED from the
service effective upon receipt hereof.
(Sgd.) SIMEON A. DATUMANONG
Secretary
Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court.
Petitioner contends that in issuing the Memorandum Order despite knowledge of the pendency of G.R. No. 144694,
Secretary Datumanong committed a contumacious act, a gross and blatant display of abuse of discretion and an unlawful
interference with the proceedings before the Court, thereby directly or indirectly impeding, obstructing and degrading the
administration of justice, and pre-empting the Court’s sole right to make a decision in accord with the evidence and law. 8
Petition lacks merit.
The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in dealing with him accordingly is an inherent power lodged in
courts of justice, to be used as a means to protect and preserve the dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings
therein, and the administration of justice from callous misbehavior, offensive personalities, and contumacious refusal to
comply with court orders. 9 This contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be exercised judiciously and
sparingly with utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity
of the court, not for retaliation or vindication. 10 It should not be availed of unless necessary in the interest of justice. 11
After careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the issuance of the Memorandum
Order by Secretary Datumanong was not a contumacious conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice. A conduct, to be contumacious, implies willfulness, bad faith or with deliberate intent
to cause injustice, which is not so in the case at bar. If it were otherwise, petitioner should have been dismissed
immediately after the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman rendered its decision on March
28, 1994. It was only after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision on March 2, 2000 affirming the dismissal that
Secretary Datumanong issued the memorandum and after ascertaining that no injunction or restraining order was issued
by the Court.
At most, it may be considered only an error of judgment or a result of confusion considering the different rules regarding
execution of decisions pending appeal.
Decisions of the Civil Service Commission under the Administrative Code of 1987 12 are immediately executory even
pending appeal because the pertinent laws 13 under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be so. 14 Thus,
"where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is immediately final and
executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides." 15 Otherwise, execution of decisions takes place only when
they become final and executory, like decisions rendered by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Thus, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 16 the Court held:
Petitioner was administratively charged for misconduct under the provisions of R.A. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Section 27 of the said Act provides as follows:
"Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. – All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five
(5) days after receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on the following grounds:
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Findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order,
directive or decision imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary
shall be final and unappealable.
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to
the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court."
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman likewise contain a similar provision. Section 7, Rule III of the said
Rules provides as follows:
"Sec. 7. Finality of Decision – where the respondent is absolved of the charge and in case of conviction where the penalty
imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month
salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision shall become final after the expiration
of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall
have been filed by him as prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."
It is clear from the above provisions that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one
year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. Section 27 states that all
provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive
or decision of the said Office imposing the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month’s
salary is final and unappealable. As such the legal maxim "inclusio[n] unius est exclusio alterius" finds application. The
express mention of the things included excludes those that are not included. The clear import of these statements
taken together is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not
enumerated in the said Section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed,
such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. This finds support
in the Rules of Procedure issued by the Ombudsman itself which states that "(I)n all other cases, the decision shall
become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the respondent, unless a motion for
reconsideration or petition for certiorari (should now be petition for review under Rule 43) shall have been filed by him as
prescribed in Section 27 of R.A. 6770."
xxxx
A judgment becomes "final and executory" by operation of law. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any
order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or
suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the respondent
therein has the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision. In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of
the reglementary period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in
the appellate tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly categorized as a "final and executory
judgment" in respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman
Act gives parties the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions
pending appeal. Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered
nugatory. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner was charged administratively before the Office of the Ombudsman. Accordingly, the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act and its Rules of Procedure should apply in his case. It is a principle in statutory construction that where
there are two statutes that apply to a particular case, that which was specially designed for the said case must prevail
over the other. 17
In fine, Secretary Datumanong cannot be held in contempt of court for issuing the Memorandum Order in the absence of
malice or wrongful conduct in issuing it. The remedy of the petitioner is not to file a petition to cite him in contempt of court
but to elevate the error to the higher court for review and correction.

However, two events supervened since the filing of this petition that would support its dismissal. First, on March 28, 2005,
the Court in G.R. No. 144694 affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the
Office of the Ombudsman ordering petitioner dismissed from the service for dishonesty, falsification of public documents,
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Second, Section 7, Rule III of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was amended by Administrative Order No. 17 18 wherein the pertinent
provision on the execution of decisions pending appeal is now essentially similar to Section 47 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service and other related laws, thus:
Rule III
PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month,
or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory and unappealable. In all other
cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review under the
requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
written Notice of the Decision or Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or removal and the
respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be
paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.
A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter of course. The
Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforced and properly implemented. The
refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Office of the Ombudsman to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer.
Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that sense and to that extent. As a general rule, the retroactive
application of procedural laws cannot be considered violative of any personal rights because no vested right may attach to
nor arise therefrom. 19
In the case at bar, the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman are clearly procedural and no vested right of
the petitioner is violated as he is considered preventively suspended while his case is on appeal. Moreover, in the event
he wins on appeal, he shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal. Besides, there is no such thing as a vested interest in an office, or even an absolute right
to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure,
no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. 20
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition to cite former Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong of the
Department of Public Works and Highways in contempt of court for issuing Memorandum Order dated October 5,
2001 dismissing petitioner Jimmie F. Tel-Equen from the service is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 Antonio v. Villa, G.R. No. 144694, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 84, 91.
2 Id. at 95.
3 356 Phil. 787, 808 (1998).
4 Antonio v. Villa, supra at 96.
5 Id. at 96-97.
6 Id. at 97.
7 Rollo, p. 12.
8 Id. at 6.
9 Office of the Court Administrator v. Paderanga, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1660, August 25, 2005, 468 SCRA 21,
34.
10 Rodriguez v. Bonifacio, 398 Phil. 441, 468 (2000).
11 Quinio v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 852, 861 (2000).
12 Section 47(4), Chapter 6, Title I of Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (1987), reads:
Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. –

xxxx
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or
removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
13 Section 37(d) of Article IX of P.D. No. 807 (1975), otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines, reads:
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. –
xxxx
(d) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or
removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under the preventive suspension during the
pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.
And, Section 47 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, otherwise known as the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (1999), reads:
Section 47. Effect of Filing. - An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the
penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension during the pendency of the appeal, in the event he wins an appeal.
14 Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236, 251 (2000).
15 Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., 416 Phil. 580, 592 (2001).
16 Supra at 246-247, 249.
17 Id. at 251.
18 Signed by Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo on September 15, 2003.
19 Calacala v. Republic, G.R. No. 154415, July 28, 2005, 464 SCRA 438, 446.
20 Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 303, 321 (1998).

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 168240 February 9, 2011
AURORA B. GO, Petitioner,

vs.
ELMER SUNBANUN,* GEORGIE S. TAN, DORIS SUNBANUN and RICHARD SUNBANUN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
When a procedural rule is amended for the benefit of litigants for the furtherance of the administration of
justice, it shall be retroactively applied to likewise favor actions then pending, as equity delights in equality.
For non-compliance with the formal requirements of a petition, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the
certiorari petition filed by herein petitioner Aurora Go (Aurora), prompting her to file before us this petition for
review on certiorari. Aurora now calls for liberality in the application of the procedural rules in the hope that she
would eventually be given a chance to be heard by the CA after the trial court denied her prayer for an
extension of time to file a notice of appeal.
Factual Antecedents
In November 2000, respondents filed a suit for damages against Aurora, her husband Yiu Wai Sang (Sang),
and Yiu-Go Employment Agency (hereinafter collectively referred to as defendants), docketed as Civil Case
No. CEB-25778, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 58. 1 The respondents claimed that the
spouses occupied the ground floor portion of their house in 68-F General Junquera Street, Cebu City under a
one-year lease contract and had used the premises as the business office of Yiu-Go Employment Agency.
This allegedly increased the risk of loss by fire, and thus a breach of warranty in the fire insurance policies that
the respondents made which described the property as residential type. 2
Only Aurora filed her Answer with Affirmative Defenses and Counter-Claim.3 In her answer, Aurora averred
that they already left the premises sometime in 2001and that during the entirety of their stay, they used the
leased floor as a private residence and as a lodging house. She denied that their employment agency held
office there. She also pointed out that the lease contract was terminated when the one-year term expired in
July 1996, and that she was not privy to the contracts of insurance since she was not informed of the
contracts’ existence. To her, whether the house was used as a business office or as a lodging house was
immaterial as there was no increased risk of fire either way. Aurora demanded actual damages as she claimed
that she works in Hong Kong on a no-work-no-pay basis and the suit would result in spending airfare and lost
earnings.
After the respondents concluded their presentation of evidence, Aurora moved on October 28, 2002 that her
testimony be taken by deposition upon written interrogatories, as she was unsure as to when she could come
home to the Philippines considering that her work schedule as a court interpreter in Hong Kong is erratic. She
averred that arrangements have already been made with the Philippine consulate in Hong Kong to take her
deposition.4 Over the objection of the respondents, the RTC granted Aurora’s motion on November 21, 2002.5
However, Aurora’s deposition was taken only on January 28, 2004 6 after her follow-up letter dated November
7, 2003 to the Philippine consulate.7
Before this deposition was taken, the RTC in its December 1, 2003 Order8 already deemed the defendants to
have waived their right to present their evidence and considered the case submitted for resolution since more
than a year had elapsed from the date the RTC granted Aurora’s motion to have her testimony be taken by
deposition. Again, only Aurora moved for reconsideration9 and prayed that the December 1, 2003 Order be
recalled and instead admit the deposition. She attributed the delay of her deposition-taking to the consulate’s
fault, as she was passed from one officer to another or no officer was available.

On January 26, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment10 finding only Aurora liable and ordering her to pay moral
damages, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses and costs. 11 The trial court disregarded her two-page transcript
of deposition when it received the same on March 5, 2004.12
Aurora’s former counsel of record, Atty. Jude Henritz R. Ycong (Atty. Ycong), belatedly discovered about this
adverse judgment when he received from respondents’ counsel a Motion to Direct Issuance of Entry of
Judgment and Writ of Execution13 on March 16, 2004. It turned out that although he had already previously
informed the court of his new office address, the court mistakenly sent the January 26, 2004 Decision to his
former office address.14 He raised this in his opposition to the motion filed by the respondents.15 Finding this
point meritorious, the court denied respondents’ motion, ruling that the judgment against Aurora has not yet
attained finality as the 15-day period to appeal, counted from March 16, 2004, has not yet lapsed. 16
Aurora filed her Motion for Reconsideration17 on March 31, 2004, the last day to file her appeal. The court in its
April 27, 2004 Order18 denied said motion.
Atty. Ycong received the notice of denial on May 6, 2004, thus giving his client a day left to file her appeal.
Explaining that Aurora has been busy campaigning for the local elections as she was running for the position
of town mayor in Calubian, Leyte19 and that he and his client have yet to discuss the pros and cons of
appealing the case, Atty. Ycong sought for the relaxation of the procedural rules by filing an extension of 15
days to file Aurora’s notice of appeal.20
Atty. Ycong thereafter filed the Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2004.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its May 12, 2004 Order, the RTC denied the notice of appeal, viz:
While there are rulings of the Supreme Court declaring that the period to appeal is not extendible, there are
also instances when it allowed appeals to be perfected despite their filing out of time. x x x
In the instant case, the delay is due to defendant-Go’s running for an elective post. Such is no excuse.
In other words, contrary to the belief of this court that Aurora Go had been and is out of the country, she in fact
is in the Philippines. Consequently, she could have the time to confer with her counsels in order to prepare for
her appeal.
Accordingly, the Motion for Extension of Time to File Notice of Appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the
Notice of Appeal is hereby declared filed out of time.
SO ORDERED.21
Aurora sought for reconsideration but it was denied by the RTC on June 10, 2004. 22
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Filing her petition for certiorari with the CA by way of registered mail on August 13, 2004, 23 Aurora claimed that
the RTC gravely abused its discretion in refusing to relax the period for filing the notice of appeal. She
contended that her situation is enough reason to grant her prayer. She averred that she could not just leave
the campaign trail just to discuss matters with her lawyer about her case as she was busy in Leyte at the
homestretch of the campaign period.
However, the CA on December 8, 2004, dismissed the petition (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 85897) for being
procedurally flawed, viz:
1) The Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping is signed by only one petitioner without a Special
Power of Attorney/Secretary’s Certificate authorizing her to represent the two (2) other petitioners;

2) The Affidavit of Service shows that respondents were personally served copies of the petition but lacks
explanation why service of the petition with this Court was not done personally (Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Revised Rules of Court);
3) Counsel for petitioners failed to indicate his PTR and IBP numbers;
4) Certified true [sic] copies of the assailed decision dated January 26, 2004 attached to the petition is a mere
photocopy of a certified true copy;
5) The following copies of pleadings and other relevant documents referred to in the petition which would
support the allegations therein are not attached:
a) Complaint; and,
b) Answer.24
Invoking the liberal construction of procedural rules, petitioner Aurora asked for reconsideration25 with the
following justifications:
1) A certification/verification of one of a number of principal parties is sufficient compliance. Although her

certiorari petition named her, her spouse, and Yiu-Go Employment Agency, as ‘petitioners,’ her co-defendants
were not held liable in the lower court. It is only she who is interested in filing the certiorari petition for her to be
able to appeal, hence her lone signature.
2) Anent the lack of explanation of why personal service to the CA was not resorted to, Aurora averred that it
was redundant to explain why registered mail was used considering the distance between Cebu, where she is
based, and the CA in Manila.
3) The professional tax receipt (PTR) and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt numbers were
inadvertently overlooked. However, the defect was cured when Atty. Ycong included the numbers when he
subsequently filed on October 14, 2004 his Notice of Change of Address 26 with the CA.
4) Questioned in the certiorari are the May 12 and June 10, 2004 Orders that denied Aurora’s prayer for an
extension of time to file her notice of appeal. Requiring her to additionally append to the CA petition the
certified true copies of the January 26, 2004 RTC Decision (i.e., the decision on the merits of the case), the
complaint, and the answer was not necessary as these documents are not relevant and material to the issue
to be resolved.
Finding Aurora’s reasoning unacceptable, the CA insisted on a strict observance of the rules in its April 8,
2005 Resolution:
As to the first ground, petitioners merely disagree with the deficiency which occasioned the outright dismissal
of their petition without even curing the said defect. Suffice it to say here that the petition itself contains more
than one petitioner. No less than the Supreme Court pronounced in Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman that
where there are two or more plaintiffs or petitioners, a complaint or petition signed by only [sic] of the parties is
defective unless he/she is authorized by his co-parties. x x x
xxxx
The reason why petitioners’ petition was dismissed based on the second defect was because the said petition
lacks explanation why service of the petition with this Court was not done personally, not much for having filed
the same by registered mail. In other words, the dismissal was not due to the fact that the petition was filed by
registered mail, but because of the failure to explain why the personal service was not resorted to. Then again,
petitioners did not even bother to cure such defect.
Anent the third ground, counsel for petitioners posits that his failure to indicate in the petition for certiorari his
PTR and IBP numbers was cured by his succeeding Notice of Change Address filed with this Court. However,
a closer of [sic] examination of the same reveals that the same was only filed on October 14, 2004 or some

two (2) months after the petition for certiorari was filed on August 13, 2004. If it was really the intention of
counsel for petitioners to cure such defect, he could have done it immediately after filing the petition. Had it not
been due to the filing of the notice of change of address, We doubt if petitioners would have cured such
defect.
Considering the foregoing, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other grounds raised by petitioners.
x x x x27
The Parties’ Respective Arguments
Believing that her case should not have been dismissed for procedural
defects, Aurora assails the December 8, 2004 and April 8, 2005 Resolutions of the CA, reiterating to this Court
that she deserves to be accorded the chance to prove to the CA that the RTC had unfairly denied her motion
for extension of time to file her notice of appeal.
On the other hand, respondents defend the stance of the CA, insisting that perfection of an appeal is
jurisdictional and mandatory; and that the circumstances do not justify granting Aurora leniency in the
application of the procedural rules. Moreover, ever since she filed her motion for reconsideration on the RTC’s
January 26, 2004 Decision, she had in the interim sufficient time to think about the next legal action to take
before the trial court issued its order of denial on April 27, 2004.
Issue
The sole question to resolve is whether the formal deficiencies in the petition before the CA may be relaxed in
the interest of justice.
Our Ruling
The signatures/authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency in the verification and certification on
non-forum shopping are not necessary.
In filing a certiorari petition, one aggrieved by a court’s judgment, order or resolution must verify his/her
petition and must also attach a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.28 In dismissing Aurora’s petition, the
CA cited as one of its grounds the lack of signatures or authorizations of Sang and Yiu-Go Employment
Agency in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. Such signatures, however, may be
dispensed with as these parties are not involved in the petition. Although the caption in Aurora’s petition before
the CA erroneously included Sang and Yiu-Go Employment Agency as petitioners, its contents reveal that it is
solely Aurora who is the ‘person aggrieved,’ as she is the one who assailed before the CA the RTC’s Order
that denied her notice of appeal and, hence, she should be the one who should sign the petition. Notably,
Aurora is the only one held liable by the trial court for damages and thus is the one interested in filing an
appeal and in elevating the case to the CA. Moreover, only Aurora filed her answer before the RTC while Sang
and Yiu-Go Employment Agency did not file any.
Non-submission of certified true copy of the January 26, 2004 Decision and copies of the Complaint and
Answer not fatal.
Another ground cited by the CA was the non-submission of the certified true copy of the January 26, 2004
Decision as well as the failure to attach copies of the complaint and answer in Aurora’s petition.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 65 requires the submission of a certified true copy of the judgment,
order or resolution subject of the petition as well as the submission of copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant to the petition. "The initial determination of what pleadings, documents or order are relevant and
pertinent to the petition rests on the petitioner. [Should the CA opine that additional documents must be
submitted together with the petition, it may] (a) dismiss the petition under the last paragraph of [Section 3,]
Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; (b) order the petitioner to submit the required additional pleadings, documents,
or order within a specific period of time; or (c) order the petitioner to file an amended petition appending
thereto the required pleadings, documents or order within a fixed period." 29 We emphasize that not all
pleadings and parts of case records are required to be attached, but only those which are material and
pertinent that they may provide the basis for a determination of a prima facie case for abuse of discretion. 30
Thus, we agree with the petitioner that the CA required pleadings
immaterial to the issue presented before it. The questioned subject of certiorari does not touch upon the
substantive merits of the suit for damages against Aurora but actually involves the refusal of the trial court to
entertain her notice of appeal due to late filing. The complaint and answer are not indispensable at all in the
resolution of this issue, the contents of which are already summarized in the January 26, 2004 Decision
attached to the petition. Furthermore, since Aurora’s petition assails the May 12 and June 10, 2004 Orders of
the RTC, it is the certified true copies of these orders that are required to be attached to the petition. On the
other hand, photocopy of the January 26, 2004 Decision will suffice, as this document is material and pertinent
to the petition.
Failure to indicate PTR and IBP Official Receipt Numbers not fatal.
The failure of petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Ycong, to indicate in the petition before the CA his PTR and
IBP numbers for the year 2004 was obviously an oversight. A perusal of the records of the case would show
that counsel had duly paid the required dues for that year and that his PTR and IBP receipt numbers are
indicated in the pleadings he had filed with the RTC.31 Although he omitted to indicate the numbers on
Aurora’s CA petition, the same numbers were nevertheless stated on his Notice of Change of Address, around
two months before the appellate court issued the questioned December 8, 2004 Resolution.
Rules on perfecting appeals must be strictly complied with; liberal application available only under exceptional
circumstances.
Whenever practicable, personal service and personal filing of pleadings are always the preferred modes of
service. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, should one deviate from the general rule, it is
mandatory for him/her to submit a written explanation why the pleading was not personally filed/served.
Otherwise, the court has the discretion to consider the paper as not filed. Petitioner should be aware that a
court, in reasonably exercising discretionary power to dismiss a petition that violated the rule on written
explanation for resorting to modes other than personal service, also has to take into account another factor,
i.e., the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. 32 For this reason,
we do not find any grave abuse on the part of the CA in exercising its discretion to dismiss Aurora’s petition.
Indeed, judicial notice may be taken that personal service is impracticable considering the distance between
Cebu and Manila, and that Musa v. Amor33 supports Aurora’s argument that a written explanation why service
was not done personally might have been superfluous considering the evident distance between the appellate
court and the place where the petition was posted. It must be emphasized, however, that provisions with
respect to the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed
in very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations. 34 In the case at bar, the reason behind the
filing of an extension of time to file her notice of appeal was not per se, a compelling and a highly exceptional
one. Just as it is the lawyer’s duty to safeguard her client’s interest, it is the responsibility of the client to make
herself available to her counsel and open the lines of communication, even during the busy election period, for
their discussions of legal options. She is obliged to be vigilant in fighting for her cause and in protecting her
rights. It is Aurora's duty, "as a client, to be in touch with [her] counsel so as to be constantly posted about the
case. [She] is mandated to inquire from [her] counsel about the status and progress of the case from time to
time and cannot expect that all [she] has to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of the case." 35
Additionally, "motions for extension are not granted as a matter of right but in the sound discretion of the court,
and lawyers should never presume that their motions for extension or postponement will be granted or that
they will be granted the length of time they pray for."36
In spite of petitioner’s error, the ‘fresh period rule’ amendment as held in Neypes v. Court of Appeals will be
applied to her benefit
Aurora had almost lost her statutory privilege to appeal, but in view of our ruling on Neypes v. Court of
Appeals,37 we shall grant Aurora’s petition.1avvphi1

In Neypes we held that a litigant is given another fresh period of 15 days to perfect an appeal after receipt of
the order of denial of his/her motion for reconsideration/new trial before the RTC. We said:
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their
cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in
the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court
of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform,
to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether
full or partial) or any final order or resolution. 38 (Emphasis supplied.)
"[P]rocedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure."39 Neypes, which we rendered in September
2005, has been applied retroactively to a number of cases 40 wherein the original period to appeal had already
lapsed subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Aurora’s situation is no exception, and thus
she is entitled to benefit from the amendment of the procedural rules.
The denial of Aurora’s Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s January 26, 2004 decision was received
by her former counsel on May 6, 2004. Sans her motion for extension to file a notice of appeal, with the fresh
period rule under Neypes, she still has until May 21, 2004 to file her notice of appeal and thus, had timely filed
her notice of appeal on May 11, 2004.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 85897 dated December 8, 2004 and April 8, 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 58, dated May 12 and June 10, 2004 that denied Aurora Go’s notice of
appeal are likewise REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 58 is hereby
DIRECTED to give due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal dated May 11, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Also spelled as Sunbanon in some parts of the record.
1 Rollo, pp. 77-79.
2 Id. at 57-76.
3 Id. at 80-84.
4 Id. at 157-160.
5 Id. at 163.
6 Id. at 165-225.
7 CA rollo, p. 18.
8 Rollo, p. 85.
9 Id. at 86-89.
10 Id. at 92-96; penned by Judge Gabrile T. Ingles.
11 In said Decision, the RTC ordered Aurora Go to pay the following:
1. ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;

2. ₱30,000.00 plus P2,000.00 per appearance as attorney’s fees.
3. ₱10,000.00 as litigation expense; and
4. cost of suit. (Id. at 96.)
12 Id. at 110.
13
Id. at 90-91.
14 Id. at 97.
15 Id. at 100-101.
16 Id. at 103.
17 Id. at 104-109.
18 Id. at 111.
19 Id. at 114.
20 Id. at 112-113.
21 Id. at 116.
22 Id. at 121.
23 CA rollo, p. 3.
24 Rollo, pp. 130-131; penned by Associate Justice Vicente L. Yap and concurred in by Associate Justices Mercedes
Gozo-Dadole and Pampio A. Abarintos.

25 Id. at 132-140.
26 CA rollo, pp. 39-40.
27 Rollo, pp. 142-143. Citations omitted. Underscoring in the original.
28
Rules of Court, Rule 65, Sec. 1.
29 Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 498 Phil. 809, 820 (2005).
30 Air Philippines Corporation v. Zamora, G.R. No.148247, August 7, 2006, 498 SCRA 59, 62.
31
CA rollo, pp. 19-24, 27-28, 30-33.
32 Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Judge Ricafort, 355 Phil. 404, 414 (1998).
33 430 Phil 128 (2002).
34 Heirs of Gaudiano v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 174247, February 21, 2007, 516 SCRA 416, 420-421 citing Sps. Buenaflor v.
Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 395, 402-403 (2000).

35 GCP-Manny Transport Services, Inc. v. Judge Principe, 511 Phil. 176, 186 (2005), citing Philhouse Development Corp.
v. Consolidated Orix Leasing & Finance Corp., 408 Phil. 392, 398 (2001) and Balgami v. Court of Appeals, 487 Phil. 102,
114-115 (2004).
36 Ramos v. Atty. Dajayog, Jr., 428 Phil. 267, 278 (2002).
37 506 Phil. 613 (2005).
38 Id. at 626-627.
39 Pfizer, Inc. v. Galan, 410 Phil. 483, 491 (2001).
40 Sumiran v. Damaso, G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009, 596 SCRA 450; Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia,
G.R. No. 173942, June 25, 2008, 555 SCRA 345; First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R.
No. 154034, February 5, 2007, 514 SCRA 223; Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc., G.R. No. 142534, June 27, 2006, 493
SCRA 99; Elbiña v. Ceniza, G.R. No. 154019, August 10, 2006, 498 SCRA 439.

EN BANC
G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO
CABACUNGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, namely: FE, CORAZON, JOSEFA, SALVADOR
and CARMEN, all surnamed DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES,
Presiding Judge, Branch 43, Regional Trial Court, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan
filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau
of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo, namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and
Carmen.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and respondents) filed various motions with the trial court.
Among these were: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau
of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the
Philippines, respectively.
In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the
foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners’ motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest
Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del
Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Bank’s motion to dismiss for lack
of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after
trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because
there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. 1
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss on the ground that the
trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting
for the trial proper.
In an order2 dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint on the ground that the action had
already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration3 which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal4 and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. 5 This was received
by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated
September 3, 1998.6
Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the
dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals.
In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the final order of
the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five
days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal. 7
On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should
have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It held further:
Perforce the petitioners’ tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the (P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal requirement is fatal and
effectively renders the judgment final and executory.8
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision. This was denied by the Court of Appeals on
January 6, 2000.
In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by
the appellate court:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH
DISMISSED THE PETITIONERS’ APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 43,
ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER
OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M. ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS’ APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY 22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE
OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE WORDS "FINAL ORDER" IN
SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF
RESPONDENT JUDGE HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE LAST AND
FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON
JULY 22, 1998.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF
DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS RENDERED PRIOR
TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.9
The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of
appeal.
First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege
and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the
right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to
appeal.10 The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129, 11 as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all
these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision
appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from
the notice of judgment appealed from. x x x
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. ― The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from the notice of the judgment
or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record
on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time
to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from.
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It
is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action. 12
As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration should be
construed as the "final order," not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their
copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had
not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.
What therefore should be deemed as the "final order," receipt of which triggers the start of the 15-day reglementary period
to appeal ¾ the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?
In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,13 the trial court declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and
accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When
the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another
order, this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for
having been filed out of time.
The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his complaint since this was
the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it was the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the
issues raised there.
This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman et al.14 where we again considered the
order denying petitioner Apuyan’s motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed of the issues involved
in the case.
Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners’ view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners
in fact file their notice of appeal on time?
Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or final order to appeal the decision of the trial
court. On the 15th day of the original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal but instead
opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day
appeal period.15 It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal,
had only one (1) day left to file the notice of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners, however,
argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of 15 days from receipt of the "final order" or the order
dismissing their motion for reconsideration.
In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the trial court. We ruled there
that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We consistently applied this
rule in similar cases,16 premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.17 The rule is also founded on deep-seated
considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by law.18
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. — Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse party and filing with the trial court
within thirty (30) days from notice of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on appeal.
The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for new trial has been pending shall be deducted,
unless such motion fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the period herein provided, the appeal must be
perfected within the day following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion. 19 (emphasis
supplied)
According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this
appeal period to 15 days. In the deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization 20 that drafted BP 129, the raison
d’ etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of appeal21 and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice.
We have since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal. Seldom have we condoned late filing of
notices of appeal,22 and only in very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.
In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan,23 however, we declared that
appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This Court has on
occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party
litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint
of technicalities.
In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,24 we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be
followed unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness
and justice.
In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or
unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities
were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we
hasten to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a clear
need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a
healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full
opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.25
The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. 26 It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even
establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules
governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 27 4328 and 45,29 the Court allows extensions of
time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days
or more.
To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the
Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. 30
Henceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the
Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies31 to the Court of Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme
Court.32 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying
the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July
22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent with
Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from
another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. 33 Hence, the use of "or" in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial
or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal period from 30 days
to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the
requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file
a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is
given another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While we

aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire
to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted –
from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s
decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision
becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already
discussed.34
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines), Inc. v. IAC35 since the Court of Appeals never
even referred to it in its assailed decision.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WECONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice Acting Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
"Exh. B," Records, p. 37.
2
"Exh. E," Records, p. 47.
3
"Exh. G," Records, pp. 56-57.
4
"Exh. H," Records, p. 58.
5
"Exh. I," Records, pp. 61-62. The trial court received the notice of appeal dated July 27, 1998 on July 31, 1998. According to the court, it was
eight days late, counted from July 23, 1998, which was the last day to file the notice since petitioners had one (1) day left to file it.
6
"Exh. K," Records, pp. 67-69.
7
Rollo, p. 41.
8
Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios and concurred in by Justices Godardo O. Jacinto and Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the 16th Division.
9
Rollo, p. 12.
10
M.A. Santander Construction, Inc. v. Zenaida Villanueva, G.R. No. 136477, November 10, 2004.
11
The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
12
Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. (ITC) et al. v. Philippine Tourism Authority, et al., G.R. No. 135630, 26 September 2000, 341 SCRA 90.
13
G.R. No. 145911, July 7, 2004.
14
G.R. No. 129980, September 20, 2004.
15
Supra.

16
Bank of America v. Gerochi, G.R. No. 73210, 10 February 1994, 230 SCRA 9; Dayrit v. Philippine Bank of Communications, 435 Phil. 120
(2002); Gallego v. Spouses Galang, G.R. No. 130228, July 27, 2004.
17
BPI Data Systems Corp. v. Hon. Court of Appeals and Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 324 Phil. 267 (1996).
18
Borre v. Court of Appeals, No. L-57204, 14 March 1988, 158 SCRA 561.
19
Appeals from the Court of First Instance (now RTC) and the Social Security Commission to the Court of Appeals.
20
Created by virtue of Executive Order No. 611.
21
MR. MILLORA: Mr. Speaker, although I am a Member of the committee I have been granted permission to ask questions about some
unresolved matters and I would like to begin with the period of appeal.
Under Section 39, Mr. Speaker, the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or decisions of any court in all cases
shall be fifteen days. This is very good because it will shorten the period to appeal. Under our rules today, the period to appeal is 30 days. x x
x
(February 2, 1981, Record of the Batasan, Volume IV, p. 2004.)
22
Ramos v. Bagasao, No. L-51552, 28 February 1980, 96 SCRA 395; Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31303-04, 31 May 1978, 83 SCRA
453; Olacao v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 81390, 29 August 1989, 177 SCRA 38.
23
No. L-27197, 28 April 1980, 97 SCRA 138.
24
345 Phil. 678 (1997).
25
Allied Banking Corp. and Pacita Uy v. Spouses Eserjose, G.R. No 161776, October 22, 2004.
26
Article VIII, Section 5 (5), 1987 Constitution.
27
Petition for Review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals.
28
Appeals from (the Court of Tax Appeals and) Quasi-Judicial Agencies to the Court of Appeals. RA 9282 elevated the Court of Tax Appeals
to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction.
29
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
30
Rule 22, Section 1. How to compute time ― In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these Rules, or by order of the court,
or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date
of performance included x x x. (1997 Rules of Civil Procedure)
31
Before the effectivity of RA 9282 (AN ACT EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS [CTA], ELEVATING ITS
RANK TO THE LEVEL OF A COLLEGIATE COURT WITH SPECIAL JURISDICTION AND ENLARGING ITS MEMBERSHIP) on March 30,
2004, decisions or rulings of the CTA were appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. With the
passage of the new law, Section 19 thereof provides that a party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Court of Tax Appeals en
banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure.
32
As far as Rule 65 (Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition) is concerned, Section 3 thereof, as amended by SC Adm. Memo. No.
00-2-03, states that no extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding 15 days.
33
Katindig v. People, 74 Phil. 45 (1942) as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 3rd Edition (1995).
34
Rules of procedure may be applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. (Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, 416 Phil. 289 [2001] as cited in Agpalo, Statutory Construction, 1995 Edition, p. 294)
35
No. L-75000, 27 February 1987,148 SCRA 280.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 136368 January 16, 2002
JAIME TAN, JR., as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Jaime C. Tan, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Ninth Special Div.) and JOSE A. MAGDANGAL and ESTRELLA
MAGDANGAL, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 19981 and its Resolution dated
November 9, 19982 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP-41738.
The facts are as stated in the impugned Decision, viz:
"Involved in this case is a parcel of land, designated as Lot No. 645-C, with an area of 34,829 square meters,
more or less, situated in Bunawan, Davao City. The lot was once covered by TCT No. T-72067 of the Registry
of Deeds of Davao City in the name of the late Jaime C. Tan (Tan, for short) married to Praxedes V. Tan.
From the petition, the motion to dismiss petition, their respective annexes and other pleadings, we gather the
following factual antecedents:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200.00, executed a deed of absolute sale over the
property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal. Simultaneous with the
execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into another agreement whereunder Tan given
one (1) year within which to redeem or repurchase the property.
Albeit given several opportunities and/or extensions to exercise the option, Tan failed to redeem the property
until his death on January 4, 1988.
On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the Regional Trial Court at Davao City a suit against the Magdangals
for reformation of instrument. Docketed as CIVIL CASE NO. 19049-88, the complaint alleged that, while Tan
and the Magdangals denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude
an equitable mortgage.
Barely hours after the complaint was stamped 'received,' the Magdangals were able to have Tan's title over the
lot in question canceled and to secure in their names TCT No. T-134470. This development prompted the heirs
of Tan, who were to be later substituted by Jaime V. Tan, Jr. (Tan, Jr.) as plaintiff, to file a supplemental
complaint.
The intervening legal tussles are not essential to this narration. What is material is that on June 4, 1991, Branch
11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City rendered judgment finding for Tan, Jr., as plaintiff therein. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:.
'WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibits B, B-1) is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby
declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;
2. The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200
plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid;
3. In order to avoid multiplicity of suits and to fully give effect to the true intention of the parties, upon the
payment of the aforesaid amount, TCT No. T-134470 in the name of defendants Jose Magdangal and Estrella
Magdangal (Exh. 13) and shall be deemed canceled and null and void and TCT No. T-72067 in the name of
Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Valles Tan (Exh. A) be reinstated).

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. (Annex 'B', Petition; Emphasis added).'
From the above, the Magdangals appealed to this Court in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657.
In a decision promulgated on September 28, 1995, this Court, thru its then Special Third Division, affirmed in
toto the appealed decision of the lower court. Copy of this affirmatory judgment was each received by the
Magdangals and Tan, Jr. on October 5, 1995.
On March 13, 1996, the Clerk of this Court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment the Decision in CA-G.R.
CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said Decision
'has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory' (Annex 'L', Petition; Emphasis added).
On March 21, 1996, the Magdangals filed in the lower court a MOTION FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT
OF POSSESSION, therein alleging that they did not appeal from the aforesaid decision of this Court, adding
'[T]hat the appealed judgment of the Court of Appeals has become final and executory 15 days from October
5, 1995 or up to October 20, 1995, which the 120 days redemption period commences. And noting that the
redemption period has expired without Tan, Jr. exercising his option, the Magdangals thus prayed that the title
'in the name of Jaime C. Tan and Praxedes Tan be consolidated and confirmed in the name of the (Magdangals)
x x x and pending such issuance, a writ of possession be ordered issued (Annex "C", Petition).1âwphi1.nêt
In opposition to this motion (Annex 'F', Petition), Tan, Jr. alleged, among other things, that until an entry of
judgment has been issued by the Court of Appeals and copy thereof furnished the parties, the appealed decision
of the court a quo in this case cannot be considered final and executory. Pressing the point, Tan, Jr., citing
Cueto vs. Collantes, infra., would then assert that the period of redemption on his part commenced to run from
receipt of entry of judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657.
Meanwhile, Tan, Jr. via a motion for execution dated March 27, 1996, which he filed directly with this court,
prayed this court to direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 19049-
88. In a related move, Tan, Jr. filed on April 16, 1996, a MANIFESTATION AND MOTION therein advising the
court a quo of his intention to redeem the property in question and of the fact that, on such date, he has
deposited with its clerk of court the repurchase price, plus interest, as required by its original decision. By way
of relief, Tan, Jr. prayed that the Magdangals be ordered to claim the amount thus deposited and the Register
of Deeds of Davao City, to reinstate the title of Jaime Tan and Praxedes Tan.
Jointly acting on the aforementioned MOTON FOR CONSOLIDATION AND WRIT OF POSSESION of the
Magdangals (Annex 'C', Petition), MANIFESTATION AND MOTION of Tan, Jr. (Annex 'I', Petition), the court a
quo presided by the respondent judge, came out with the first challenged order of June 10, 1996 (Annex 'N',
Petition) dispositively reading, as follows:
'WHEREFORE, x x x the Motion for Consolidation and a Writ of Possession is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The deposit of the amount of P116,032.00 made by plaintiff with the Office of Court x x x on April 17, 1996 is
hereby considered full payment of the redemption price and the Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to deliver said
amount to herein defendants.
The Register of Deeds of Davao City x x x is hereby directed to cancel TCT No. T-134470 in the name of Jose
Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal and, thereafter, to reinstate TCT No. 72067 in the name of Jaime C. Tan
and Praxedes Valles Tan and to submit her compliance thereto within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.'
Explaining her action, the respondent judge wrote in the same order:
'Following the ruling of the Supreme Court in Cueto vs. Collantes, et al., 97 Phil. 325, the 120 days period for
plaintiff to pay the amount of P59,200.00 plus interest x x x should be reckoned from the date of Entry of

Judgment x x x which was March 13, 1996. The plaintiff made a deposit on April 17, 1996 well within the 120-
day period mandated by the decision of this Court.'
In due time, the Magdangals moved for a reconsideration. However, in her next assailed order of July 24, 1996
(Annex 'R', Petition), the respondent judge denied the motion for being proforma and fatally defective." 3
Petitioner assails the aforequoted Decision as follows:
"I. Petitioner's right to due process was violated when the Court of Appeals rendered a judgment on the merits
of private respondents' petition without granting to petitioner the opportunity to controvert the same.
II. Appeal not certiorari was the appropriate remedy of private respondents as there was no grave abuse of
discretion as to amount to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the trial judge. Neither is delay in
resolving the main case a ground for giving due course to the petition.
III. Cueto vs. Collantes, 97 Phil. 325, was disregarded by the Court of Appeals in resolving the petition of private
respondents. It is still good case law and was in effect made a part of section 2 of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure on Foreclosure of Mortgage.
IV. The St. Dominic vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 138 SCRA 242 case is not applicable to the case at bar;
on the other hand the ruling in Gutierrez Hermanos vs. de La Riva, 46 Phil. 827, applies.
V. Equity considerations justify giving due course to this petition." 4 (emphasis ours)
We will immediately resolve the key issue of what rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained
in the trial court by the petitioner.
The operative facts show that in its Decision of June 4, 1991, the trial court held that: (1) the contract between
the parties is not an absolute sale but an equitable mortgage; and (2) petitioner Tan should pay to the
respondents Magdangal "within 120 days after the finality of this decision P59,200.00 plus interest at the rate
of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the complaint was filed, until paid."5
On September 28, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657, the Special Third Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court in toto. Both parties received the decision of the appellate court on October 5,
1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement
the decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 33657 and issued the corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face,
stated that the said decision "has on October 21, 1995 become final and executory." 6
The respondents Magdangal filed in the trial court a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession.7 They
alleged that the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired. They reckoned that the said period
began 15 days after October 5, 1995, the date when the finality of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by
the appellate court commenced to run.
On the other hand, petitioner filed on March 27, 1996 a motion for execution in the appellate court praying that
it "direct the court a quo to issue the corresponding writ of execution in Civil Case No. 19049-88."8 On April 17,
1996, petitioner deposited with the clerk of court the repurchase price of the lot plus interest as ordered by the
decision.
On June 10, 1996, the trial court allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that the 120-day
redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the appellate court or from March
13, 1996.9 The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996. As aforestated, the Court of Appeals set
aside the ruling of the trial court.
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of judgment is Rule 51 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:
"SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. - If no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is
filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final resolution shall forthwith be entered by the

clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The date when the judgment or final resolution becomes executory
shall be deemed as the date of its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final
resolution and shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has become
final and executory. (2a, R36)
SEC. 11. Execution of judgment. - Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a portion thereof,
is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may only be filed in the proper court after
its entry.
In original actions in the Court of Appeals, its writ of execution shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of
the entry of judgment or final resolution and addressed to any appropriate officer for its enforcement.
In appealed cases, where the motion for execution pending appeal is filed in the Court of Appeals at a time that
it is in possession of the original record or the record on appeal, the resolution granting such motion shall be
transmitted to the lower court from which the case originated, together with a certified true copy of the judgment
or final order to be executed, with a directive for such court of origin to issue the proper writ for its enforcement."
This rule has been interpreted by this Court in Cueto vs. Collantes as follows:10
"The only error assigned by appellants refer to the finding of the lower court that plaintiff can still exercise his
right of redemption notwithstanding the expiration of the 90-day period fixed in the original decision and,
therefore, defendants should execute the deed of reconveyance required in said decision. Appellants contend
that, the final judgment of the Court of Appeals having been entered on July 8, 1953, the 90-day period for the
exercise of the right of redemption has long expired, it appearing that plaintiff deposited the redemption money
with the clerk of court only on October 17, 1953, or, after the expiration of 101 days. Appellee brands this
computation as erroneous, or one not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the rules of court.
Appellee's contention should be sustained. The original decision provides that appellee may exercise his right
of redemption within the period of 90 days from the date the judgment has become final. It should be noted that
appellee had appealed from this decision. This decision was affirmed by the court of appeals and final judgment
was entered on July 8, 1953. Does this mean that the judgment became final on that date?
Let us make a little digression for purposes of clarification. Once a decision is rendered by the Court of Appeals
a party may appeal therefrom by certiorari by filing with the Supreme Court a petition within 10 days from the
date of entry of such decision (Section 1, Rule 46). The entry of judgment is made after it has become final, i.e.,
upon the expiration of 15 days after notice thereof to the parties (Section 8, Rule 53, as modified by a resolution
of the Supreme Court dated October 1, 1945). But, as Chief Justice Moran has said, 'such finality *** is subject
to the aggrieved party's right of filing a petition for certiorari under this section,' which means that 'the Court of
Appeals shall remand the case to the lower court for the execution of its judgment, only after the expiration of
ten (10) days from the date of such judgment, if no petition for certiorari is filed within that period.' (1 Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed., p. 950) It would therefore appear that the date of entry of judgment
of the Court of Appeals is suspended when a petition for review is filed to await the final entry of the resolution
or decision of the Supreme Court.
Since in the present case appellee has filed a petition for review within the reglementary period, which was
dismissed by resolution of July 6, 1953, and for lack of a motion for reconsideration the entry of final judgment
was made on August 7, 1953, it follows that the 90-day period within which appellee may exercise his right of
redemption should be counted from said date, August 7, 1953. And appellee having exercised such right on
October 17, 1953 by depositing the redemption money with the clerk of court, it is likewise clear that the motion
be filed for the exercise of such right is well taken and is within the purview of the decision of the lower court."11
On April 18, 1994, this Court issued Circular No. 24-94, viz:
"TO: COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS,
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS,
AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

SUBJECT: RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC APPROVING AND PROMULGATING THE REVISED
PROVISION ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS. SPECIFICALLY IN APPEALED CASES, AND AMENDING
SECTION 1, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT
It appears that in a number of instances, the execution of judgments in appealed cases cannot be promptly
enforced because of undue administrative delay in the remand of the records to the court of origin, aggravated
at times by misplacement or misdelivery of said records. The Supreme Court Committee on the Revision of the
Rules of Court has drafted proposals including a provision which can remedy the procedural impasse created
by said contingencies.
Accordingly, pending approval by the Court of the revised rules on Civil Procedure, and to provide a solution to
the aforestated problems, the Court Resolved to approve and promulgate the following section thereof on
execution of judgments, amending Section 1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court:
Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, such execution may forthwith be applied for in the
lower court from which the action originated, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified
true copies of the judgment or judgments or the final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry
thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court
of origin to issue the writ of execution.
This resolution shall be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on June 1,
1994.
April 18, 1994.
"(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice"
The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.
The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of judgment by providing in
section 1, Rule 39 as follows:
"Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion,
upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected. (1a)
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the
court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse
party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the court
of origin to issue the writ of execution."
The rationale of the new rule is explained by retired Justice F.D. Regalado as follows: 12
"1. The term 'final order' is used in two senses depending on whether it is used on the issue of appealability or
on the issue of binding effect. For purposes of appeal, an order is "final" if it disposes of the action, as
distinguished from an interlocutory order which leaves something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case (De la Cruz, et al. vs. Paras, et al., L-41053, Feb. 27, 1976). For purposes of binding

effect or whether it can be subject of execution, an order is 'final' or executory after the lapse of the reglementary
period to appeal and no appeal has been perfected (see Perez, et al. vs. Zulueta, L-10374, Sept. 30, 1959; cf.
Denso [Phil.], Inc. vs. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75000, Feb. 27, 1987; Montilla vs. CA, et al., L-47968, May 9, 1988).
2. On the aspect of appealability, these revised Rules use the adjective 'final' with respect to orders and
resolutions, since to terminate a case the trial courts issue orders while the appellate courts and most of the
quasi-judicial agencies issue resolutions. Judgment are not so qualified since the use of the so-called
interlocutory judgments is not favored in this jurisdiction, while the categorization of an order or a resolution for
purposes of denoting that it is appealable is to distinguish them from interlocutory orders or resolutions.
However, by force of extended usage the phrase 'final and executory judgment' is sometimes used and
tolerated, although the use of 'executory' alone would suffice. These observations also apply to the several and
separate judgments contemplated in Rule 36, or partial judgments which totally dispose of a particular claim or
severable part of the case, subject to the power of the court to suspend or defer action on an appeal from or
further proceedings in such special judgment, or as provided by Rule 35 on the matter of partial summary
judgments which are not considered as appealable (see Sec. 4, Rule 35 and the explanation therein).
The second paragraph of this section is an innovation in response to complaints over the delay caused by the
former procedure in obtaining a writ of execution of a judgment, which has already been affirmed on appeal,
with notice to the parties. As things then stood, after the entry of judgment in the appellate court, the prevailing
party had to wait for the records of the case to be remanded to the court of origin when and where he could
then move for the issuance of a writ of execution. The intervening time could sometimes be substantial,
especially if the court a quo is in a remote province, and could also be availed of by the losing party to delay or
thwart actual execution.
On these considerations, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 24-94, dated April 18, 1994, approving and
promulgating in advance this amended Section 1 of Rule 39 and declaring the same effective as of June 1,
1994.
Under the present procedure, the prevailing party can secure certified true copies of the judgment or final order
of the appellate court and the entry thereof, and submit the same to the court of origin with and to justify his
motion for a writ of execution, without waiting for its receipt of the records from the appellate court. That motion
must be with notice to the adverse party, with a hearing when the circumstances so require, to enable him to
file any objection thereto or bring to the attention of said court matters which may have transpired during the
pendency of the appeal and which may have a bearing on the execution sought to enforce the judgment.
The third paragraph of this section, likewise a new provision, is due to the experience of the appellate courts
wherein the trial court, for reasons of its own or other unjustifiable circumstances, unduly delays or unreasonably
refuses to act on the motion for execution or issue the writ therefor. On motion in the same case while the
records are still with the appellate court, or even after the same have been remanded to the lower court, the
appellate court can direct the issuance of the writ of execution since such act is merely in the enforcement of
its judgment and which it has the power to require."
It is evident that if we apply the old rule on finality of judgment, petitioner redeemed the subject property within
the 120-day period of redemption reckoned from the appellate court's entry of judgment. The appellate court,
however, did not apply the old rule but the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. In fine, it applied the new
rule retroactively and we hold that given the facts of the case at bar this is an error.
There is no dispute that rules of procedure can be given retroactive effect. This general rule, however, has well-
delineated exceptions. We quote author Agpalo:13
"9.17. Procedural laws.
Procedural laws are adjective laws which prescribe rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
redress for their invasion; they refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly
administer justice. They include rules of pleadings, practice and evidence. As applied to criminal law, they
provide or regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply to procedural laws.
It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights

acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in
respect of transactions or considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies
or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of
the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retroactive
law, or the general rule against the retroactive operation of statutes." The general rule against giving statutes
retroactive operation whose effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not
prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither
create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with procedure only is presumptively
applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive
application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a
person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes
constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that "a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant
cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing
rules of procedure."
Thus, the provision of Batas Bilang 129 in Section 39 thereof prescribing that "no record on appeal shall be
required to take an appeal" is procedural in nature and should therefore be applied retroactively to pending
actions. Hence, the question as to whether an appeal from an adverse judgment should be dismissed for failure
of appellant to file a record on appeal within thirty days as required under the old rules, which question is
pending resolution at the time Batas Bilang 129 took effect, became academic upon the effectivity of said law
because the law no longer requires the filing of a record on appeal and its retroactive application removed the
legal obstacle to giving due course to the appeal. A statute which transfers the jurisdiction to try certain cases
from a court to a quasi-judicial tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to claims that accrued before its
enactment but formulated and filed after it took effect, for it does not create new nor take away vested rights.
The court that has jurisdiction over a claim at the time it accrued cannot validly try the claim where at the time
the claim is formulated and filed the jurisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a quasi-judicial tribunal,
for even actions pending in one court may be validly taken away and transferred to another and no litigant can
acquire a vested right to be heard by one particular court.
9.18. Exceptions to the rule.
The rule that procedural laws are applicable to pending actions or proceedings admits certain exceptions. The
rule does not apply where the statute itself expressly or by necessary implication provides that pending actions
are excepted from its operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair vested rights. Under
appropriate circumstances, courts may deny the retroactive application of procedural laws in the event that to
do so would not be feasible or would work injustice. Nor may procedural laws be applied retroactively to pending
actions if to do so would involve intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts."
We hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given retroactive effect
in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner. Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem
the subject lot and this right is a substantive right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well
as the decisions of this Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure which if
applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the
retroactive application of this procedural rule with the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the
loss of the subject lot when he faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he
made the redemption. The subject lot may only be 34,829 square meters but as petitioner claims, "it is the only
property left behind by their father, a private law practitioner who was felled by an assassin's bullet."14
Petitioner fought to recover this lot from 1988. To lose it because of a change of procedure on the date of
reckoning of the period of redemption is inequitous. The manner of exercising the right cannot be changed and
the change applied retroactively if to do so will defeat the right of redemption of the petitioner which is already
vested.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 15, 1998 and its Resolution dated
November 9, 1998 in CA-G.R. SP-41738 are annulled and set aside. The Orders dated June 10, 1996 and July
24, 1996 of the RTC of Davao City, 11th Judicial Region, Branch 11, in Civil Case No. 19049-88 are reinstated.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.1âwphi1.nêt
Footnote
1 Rollo, p. 48.
2 Id., p. 58.
3 Decision, CA-G.R. SP No. 41738, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 48-52.
4 Id., p. 3; id., p. 16.
5 Rollo, p. 18.
6 Id., pp. 18-19.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Rollo, p. 59.
10 97 Phil. 325 (1955).
11 Id., pp. 328-329.
12 Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I, 7th ed., p. 398-400.
13 Statutory Construction, 1986 ed., pp. 269-272.
14 See p. 28, Petition; Rollo, p. 41.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177407 February 9, 2011
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON, Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision 1 dated September
22, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by
petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza), which, in turn, assailed the Orders 2 issued by public respondent Board of
Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February
4, 1995. Sometime in 1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly,
ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests. The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however,
that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing. Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondent’s husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross
negligence and/or incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney
operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel
Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including
petitioner, consists of the removal of private respondent’s fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and
non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent Editha
Sioson, also named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of
documentary evidence are her Exhibits "A" to "D," which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both
in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:
"EXHIBIT ‘A’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked
as Annex ‘2’ as it was actually originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III’s counter affidavit filed with the
City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said
office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the ultrasound examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked
as Annex ‘2’ to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000,
with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint;
"EXHIBIT ‘B’ – the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as
Annex ‘3’ as it was actually likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III’s counter-affidavit filed with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal complaint filed by the herein
complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the
examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the
document marked as Annex ‘3’ which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex ‘3’ to
the counter-affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable
Board in answer to this complaint.
"EXHIBIT ‘C’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as
Annex ‘4,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.

"EXHIBIT ‘D’ – the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as
Annex ‘16,’ on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final report of the same examination which is the
document appended as Annexes ‘4’ and ‘1’ respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr. Judd dela Vega
and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is
marked as Annex ‘4’ is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex
‘1’ is a certified photocopy. Both documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that
which are written on Exhibit ‘D.’
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondent’s [Editha Sioson’s] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that
said exhibits are inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and
intended to establish matters which are hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which
they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order
dated May 26, 2004. It reads:
"The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza,
[therein respondents] De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED
by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they may serve in the resolution of this case.
"Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the respondents.
"SO ORDERED."
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons stated in his
comment/objections to the formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should
first admit the evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case. According to the
Board, it can determine whether the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x
x x.3
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the
BOM’s Orders which admitted Editha Sioson’s (Editha’s) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004 WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE
RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004 OF
RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT AND
INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF
PROFESSIONAL LICENSE – A PROPERTY RIGHT OR ONE’S LIVELIHOOD.4
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.

Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM,
admitting in evidence the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an
appeal separate from the judgment that completely or finally disposes of the case. 5 At that stage, where there is no appeal,
or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner
is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion. Embedded in the CA’s finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave
abuse of discretion is the issue of whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence
are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not
been properly identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose.
Thus, petitioner contends that the exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies
such as the BOM.6 Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence, 7 in connection
with evidence which may appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly
irrelevant, immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court,
if they are thereafter found relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant
or incompetent, can easily be remedied by completely discarding them or ignoring them.8
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be
accorded the same pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals 9 teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all.
On the other hand, the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioner’s insistence that the admission of Editha’s exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of
his medical license is misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation
Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only
apply in these proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical
errors in the admission of evidence which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the
proceedings.10
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner
because, at any rate, the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical
locations at the time she was operated on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted
and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16,
1996, and May 20, 1999, filed in connection with Editha’s medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries
interpreting the results of the examination. These exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin III’s counter
affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City, which was investigating the criminal complaint for
negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled her surgical procedure. To lay

the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her "kidneys were both in their proper
anatomical locations at the time" of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Editha’s exhibits, that her "kidneys were both in their proper anatomical
locations at the time" of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. 11
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. 12 Thus,
they likewise provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice,
both mandatory and discretionary.13 Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology, 14 include the
structural make-up and composition of living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that
Editha’s kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical
locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable.1awphil Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. – When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of
the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and
the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing
the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of
Editha’s kidneys. As previously discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys at the time of her operation
at the RMC may be established not only through the exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Editha’s kidneys. To further drive
home the point, the anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Editha’s kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still
be established through a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.15 Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino
testified that the Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits "because [it] transferred from the previous
building, x x x to the new building."16 Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Editha’s
formal offer of evidence and, thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
WE CONCUR:
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio per Raffle dated August 2, 2010.
** Additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad per Raffle dated August 2, 2010.
1 Penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Juan Q.
Enrique, Jr. and Vicente S.E. Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 95-106.
2 Dated May 26, 2004 and October 8, 2004, respectively; id. at 408-411.
3 Id. at 95-99.
4 Id. at 677-678.
5 Raymundo v. Isagon Vda. de Suarez, G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 384, 403-404.
6 Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 451 Phil. 839, 845-846 (2003).
7 Francisco, EVIDENCE RULES 128-134 (3rd ed. 1996), p. 9.
8 Id., citing People v. Jaca, et al., 106 Phil. 572, 575 (1959).
9 358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998).
10 Rollo, p. 101.
11 RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1.
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction
of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their
seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive
and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. – A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of
public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
14 Science of life, definition of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary.
16 TSN, July 17, 2003; rollo, pp. 347-348.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 153660 June 10, 2003
PRUDENCIO BANTOLINO, NESTOR ROMERO, NILO ESPINA, EDDIE LADICA, ARMAN QUELING, ROLANDO
NIETO, RICARDO BARTOLOME, ELUVER GARCIA, EDUARDO GARCIA and NELSON MANALASTAS, petitioners,
vs.
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC., respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals1
dated 21 December 2001 which affirmed with modification the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
promulgated 30 March 2001.2
On 15 February 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services,
Inc., People's Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor
practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." They thus
prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration of their regular employment status.
For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective
affidavits, the claims of fifty-two (52) complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera
conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative
to their alleged employment with respondent firm.
In substance, the complainants averred that in the performance of their duties as route helpers, bottle segregators, and
others, they were employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc. They further maintained that when respondent
company replaced them and prevented them from entering the company premises, they were deemed to have been illegally
dismissed.
In lieu of a position paper, respondent company filed a motion to dismiss complaint for lack of jurisdiction and cause of
action, there being no employer-employee relationship between complainants and Coca-Cola Bottlers, Inc., and that
respondents Lipercon Services, People's Specialist Services and Interim Services being bona fide independent contractors,
were the real employers of the complainants.3 As regards the corporate officers, respondent insisted that they could not be
faulted and be held liable for damages as they only acted in their official capacities while performing their respective duties.
On 29 May 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants
to their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages
which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of
31 May 1998, already amounted to an aggregate of P1,810,244.00.4
In finding for the complainants, the Labor Arbiter ruled that in contrast with the negative declarations of respondent
company's witnesses who, as district sales supervisors of respondent company denied knowing the complainants
personally, the testimonies of the complainants were more credible as they sufficiently supplied every detail of their
employment, specifically identifying who their salesmen/drivers were, their places of assignment, aside from their dates of
engagement and dismissal.
On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship
between the complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the latter's decision.
In a resolution dated 17 July 2001 the NLRC subsequently denied for lack of merit respondent's motion for consideration.
Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an
employer-employee relationship existed between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the
affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome,
Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm
the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints
for lack of sufficient evidence. In the same Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando
Nieto were declared regular employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination.5 Thus -
x x x (T)he labor arbiter conducted clarificatory hearings to ferret out the truth between the opposing claims of the
parties thereto. He did not submit the case based on position papers and their accompanying documentary
evidence as a full-blown trial was imperative to establish the parties' claims. As their allegations were poles apart,
it was necessary to give them ample opportunity to rebut each other's statements through cross-examination. In
fact, private respondents Ladica, Quelling and Nieto were subjected to rigid cross-examination by petitioner's
counsel. However, the testimonies of private respondents Romero, Espina, and Bantolino were not subjected to
cross-examination, as should have been the case, and no explanation was offered by them or by the labor arbiter
as to why this was dispensed with. Since they were represented by counsel, the latter should have taken steps so
as not to squander their testimonies. But nothing was done by their counsel to that effect. 6
Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the favorable judgment of
the NLRC be reinstated.
In essence, petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have given weight to respondent's claim of failure to
cross-examine them. They insist that, unlike regular courts, labor cases are decided based merely on the parties' position
papers and affidavits in support of their allegations and subsequent pleadings that may be filed thereto. As such, according
to petitioners, the Rules of Court should not be strictly applied in this case specifically by putting them on the witness stand
to be cross-examined because the NLRC has its own rules of procedure which were applied by the Labor Arbiter in coming
up with a decision in their favor.
In its disavowal of liability, respondent commented that since the other alleged affiants were not presented in court to affirm
their statements, much less to be cross-examined, their affidavits should, as the Court of Appeals rightly held, be stricken
off the records for being self-serving, hearsay and inadmissible in evidence. With respect to Nestor Romero, respondent
points out that he should not have been impleaded in the instant petition since he already voluntarily executed a Compromise
Agreement, Waiver and Quitclaim in consideration of P450,000.00. Finally, respondent argues that the instant petition
should be dismissed in view of the failure of petitioners 7 to sign the petition as well as the verification and certification of
non-forum shopping, in clear violation of the principle laid down in Loquias v. Office of the Ombudsman.8
The crux of the controversy revolves around the propriety of giving evidentiary value to the affidavits despite the failure of
the affiants to affirm their contents and undergo the test of cross-examination.
The petition is impressed with merit. The issue confronting the Court is not without precedent in jurisprudence. The oft-cited
case of Rabago v. NLRC9 squarely grapples a similar challenge involving the propriety of the use of affidavits without the
presentation of affiants for cross-examination. In that case, we held that "the argument that the affidavit is hearsay because
the affiants were not presented for cross-examination is not persuasive because the rules of evidence are not strictly
observed in proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC where decisions may be reached on the basis of
position papers only."
In Rase v. NLRC,10 this Court likewise sidelined a similar challenge when it ruled that it was not necessary for the affiants
to appear and testify and be cross-examined by counsel for the adverse party. To require otherwise would be to negate the
rationale and purpose of the summary nature of the proceedings mandated by the Rules and to make mandatory the
application of the technical rules of evidence.
Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC11 succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules
of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes
that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily
and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no
compelling reason to deviate therefrom.
To reiterate, administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules
obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent
application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,12
that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance
in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an
administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the
necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based
on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits.

As to whether petitioner Nestor Romero should be properly impleaded in the instant case, we only need to follow the
doctrinal guidance set by Periquet v. NLRC13 which outlines the parameters for valid compromise agreements, waivers and
quitclaims -
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily entered into
and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an
unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in
to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily,
with full understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable,
the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking.
In closely examining the subject agreements, we find that on their face the Compromise Agreement14 and Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim15 are devoid of any palpable inequity as the terms of settlement therein are fair and just. Neither can we glean
from the records any attempt by the parties to renege on their contractual agreements, or to disavow or disown their due
execution. Consequently, the same must be recognized as valid and binding transactions and, accordingly, the instant case
should be dismissed and finally terminated insofar as concerns petitioner Nestor Romero.
We cannot likewise accommodate respondent's contention that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the petition as well
as the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court will
cause the dismissal of the present appeal. While the Loquias case requires the strict observance of the Rules, it however
provides an escape hatch for the transgressor to avoid the harsh consequences of non-observance. Thus -
x x x x We find that substantial compliance will not suffice in a matter involving strict observance of the rules. The
attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party who
executed the same. Petitioners must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the certification. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction (underscoring
supplied).
In their Ex Parte Motion to Litigate as Pauper Litigants, petitioners made a request for a fifteen (15)-day
extension, i.e., from 24 April 2002 to 8 May 2002, within which to file their petition for review in view of the
absence of a counsel to represent them.16 The records also reveal that it was only on 10 July 2002 that Atty.
Arnold Cacho, through the UST Legal Aid Clinic, made his formal entry of appearance as counsel for herein
petitioners. Clearly, at the time the instant petition was filed on 7 May 2002 petitioners were not yet represented
by counsel. Surely, petitioners who are non-lawyers could not be faulted for the procedural lapse since they could
not be expected to be conversant with the nuances of the law, much less knowledgeable with the esoteric
technicalities of procedure. For this reason alone, the procedural infirmity in the filing of the present petition may
be overlooked and should not be taken against petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the NLRC dated 30 March 2001 which affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 29 May 1998
ordering respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., to reinstate Prudencio Bantolino, Nilo Espina, Eddie Ladica, Arman
Queling, Rolando Nieto, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas to their former positions
as regular employees, and to pay them their full back wages, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages
are yet to be computed upon proof of his dismissal, is REINSTATED, with the MODIFICATION that herein petition is
DENIED insofar as it concerns Nestor Romero who entered into a valid and binding Compromise Agreement and Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim with respondent company.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio
Morales and Sergio L. Pestano,former Ninth Division, Court of Appeals.

2 Penned by Commissioner Victoriano Calaycay, Second Division, NLRC, concurred in by Presiding
Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Angelita A. Gacutan.

3 Original Records, p. 41.
4 Id. at 545.
5 Rollo, p. 26.

6 Id. at 32.
7 Of the seven (7) petitioners only Ricardo Bartolome signed the verification and certification of non-forum
shopping
8 G.R. No. 139396, 15 August 2000, 338 SCRA 62.
9 G.R. No. 82868, 5 August 1991, 200 SCRA 158.
10 G.R. No. 110637, 7 October 1994, 237 SCRA 523.
11 G.R. No. 121582, 16 October 1997, 280 SCRA 853.
12 G.R. No. 119332, 29 August 1997, 278 SCRA 368.
13 G.R. No. 91298, 22 June 1990, 186 SCRA 724.
14 Rollo, p. 82, Annex "A."
15 Id. at 84, Annex "B."
16 Petitioners' counsel of record, Atty. Armando Ampil, had signified his intention to withd raw from the case in
view of his commitment in other equally important cases.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 184362 November 15, 2010
MILLENNIUM ERECTORS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
VIRGILIO MAGALLANES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Virgilio Magallanes started working in 1988 as a utility man for Laurencito Tiu (Tiu), Chief Executive Officer of
Millennium Erectors Corporation (petitioner), Tiu’s family, and Kenneth Construction Corporation. He was assigned to
different construction projects undertaken by petitioner in Metro Manila, the last of which was for a building in Libis, Quezon
City. In July of 2004 he was told not to report for work anymore allegedly due to old age, prompting him to file on August 6,
2004 an illegal dismissal complaint1 before the Labor Arbiter.
In its Position Paper,2 petitioner claimed that respondent was a project employee whom it hired for a building project in Libis
on January 30, 2003, to prove which it submitted the employment contract3 signed by him; that on August 3, 2004,
respondent’s services were terminated as the project was nearing completion; and he was given financial assistance4 in the
amount of ₱2,000, for which he signed a quitclaim and waiver. 5 Petitioner likewise submitted a termination report to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) dated August 17, 2004.
Rebutting respondent’s claim that he was employed since 1988, petitioner contended that it was incorporated only in
February 2000, and Kenneth Construction Corporation which was established in 1989 and dissolved in 2000, was a
separate and distinct entity.
By Decision6 of November 25, 2005, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint, holding that
respondent knew of the nature of his employment as a project employee, he having executed an employment contract
specifying therein the name of and duration of the project from January 2003 until its completion; and that the services of
respondent were terminated due to the completion of the project as shown by the termination report submitted to the DOLE.
The Labor Arbiter noted that respondent admitted having been assigned to several building projects and that he failed to
give pertinent details of his dismissal – such as who terminated him, when he was terminated, and what were the "overt"
acts leading to his dismissal.
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) set aside the Labor Arbiter’s Decision7 of February 6, 2007
holding that respondent was a regular, not a project employee, as the employment contract he supposedly signed contained
the date of commencement but not a specific date when it would end, contrary to the rule that the duration and scope of
similar contracts should be clearly set forth therein; and that based on the payrolls 8 petitioner submitted and contrary to its
claim that respondent was hired in January 2003, he had been employed in 2001, not 2003, lending weight to his claim that
he had worked for petitioner for 16 years prior to the filing of his complaint.
The NLRC thus concluded that while respondent’s work as a utility man may not have been necessary or desirable in the
usual business of petitioner as a construction company, that he performed the same functions continuously for 16 years
converted an otherwise casual employment to regular employment, hence, his termination without just or authorized cause
amounted to illegal dismissal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the NLRC decision, contending that respondent’s motion for reconsideration which
it treated as an appeal was not perfected, it having been belatedly filed; that there was no statement of the date of receipt
of the appealed decision; and that it lacked verification and copies thereof were not furnished the adverse parties.
Petitioner’s motion was denied.
The Court of Appeals, to which petitioner appealed, affirmed the NLRC’s ruling by Decision 9 of April 11, 2008. Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution10 of August 28, 2008, it filed the present petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the Labor Arbiter’s Decision dismissing the complaint had become final and executory following
respondent’s failure to perfect his appeal, maintaining that the requirements for perfection of an appeal and for proof of
service are not mere rules of technicality which may easily be set aside.
The petition fails.
The NLRC did not err in treating respondent’s motion for reconsideration as an appeal, the presence of some procedural
flaws including the lack of verification and proof of service notwithstanding.
In labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. They are merely tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration rather than promotion
of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided. Technicalities should not be permitted to stand in the way of equitably
and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. Where the ends of substantial justice shall be better
served, the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed. 11 (emphasis supplied)
Respecting the lack of verification, Pacquing v. Coca-Cola Philippines, Inc.12 instructs:
As to the defective verification in the appeal memorandum before the NLRC, the same liberality applies. After all, the
requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition affecting
the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Verification is
simply intended to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and correct and not the product of the
imagination or a matter of speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith. The court or tribunal may order the
correction of the pleading if verification is lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the rules may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may
thereby be served. (emphasis supplied)
As for the requirement on proof of service, it may also be dispensed with since in appeals in labor cases, non-service of
copy of the appeal or appeal memorandum to the adverse party is not a jurisdictional defect which calls for the dismissal of
the appeal.13
On the merits of the case, the Court finds that, indeed, respondent was a regular, not a project employee.
Saberola v. Suarez14 reiterates the well-settled definition of "project employee," viz:
A project employee is one whose "employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to
be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season." (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)1avvphi1
And Equipment Technical Services v. Court of Appeals15 emphasizes the difference between a regular employee and a
project employee:
As the Court has consistently held, the service of project employees are coterminus [sic] with the project and may be
terminated upon the end or completion of that project or project phase for which they were hired. Regular employees, in
contrast, enjoy security of tenure and are entitled to hold on to their work or position until their services are terminated by
any of the modes recognized under the Labor Code. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s various payrolls dating as early as 2001 show that respondent had been employed by it. As aptly observed by
the appellate court, these documents, rather than sustaining petitioner’s argument, only serve to support respondent’s
contention that he had been employed in various projects, if not for 16 years, at the very least two years prior to his dismissal.
Assuming arguendo that petitioner hired respondent initially on a per project basis, his continued rehiring, as shown by the
sample payrolls converted his status to that of a regular employee. Following Cocomangas Beach Hotel Resort v. Visca, 16
the repeated and continuing need for respondent’s services is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability, of
his services to petitioner's business and, as a regular employee, he could only be dismissed from employment for a just or
authorized cause.
Petitioner having failed to discharge its burden of proving that it terminated the services of respondent for cause and with
due process, the challenged decision must remain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTURO D. BRION LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

ATTESTATION
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court’s Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1 CA rollo, pp. 32.
2 Id. at 46-53.
3 Id. at 54.
4 See Cash Voucher, id. at 56.
5 Id. at 57.
6 Id. at 27-29. Penned by Labor Arbiter Jose G. de Vera.
7 Id. at 20-26. Penned by Commissioner (now Court of Appeals Associate Justice) Angelita A. Gacutan and
concurred in by Presiding Commissioner Raul T. Aquino and Commissioner Victoriano R. Calaycay.

8 Id. at 64-65.
9 Rollo, pp. 24-34. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and concurred in by Associate
Justices Rebeccca de Guia-Salvador and Vicente S. E. Veloso.

10 Id. at 35. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Rebeccca de Guia-Salvador and Vicente S. E. Veloso.

11 Tres Reyes v. Maxim’s Tea House, G.R. No. 140853, February 27, 2003, 398 SCRA 288.
12 G.R. No. 157966, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA 344, 356-357.
13 Remerco Garments Manufacturing v. Minister of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. L-56176-77 February 28,
1985, 135 SCRA 167.

14 G.R. No. 151227, July 14, 2008, 558 SCRA 135, 142.
15 G.R. No. 157680, October 08, 2008, 568 SCRA 122, 130.
16 G.R. No. 167045, August 29, 2008, 563 SCRA 705.

SECOND DIVISION
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, G.R. No. 172129
Petitioner, Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION CARPIO MORALES,

(Formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON,
INC.), TINGA,
Respondent. VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
September 12, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assailing and seeking to set aside the Decision 1 dated
December 22, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78280 which modified the March 18, 2003 Decision2
of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) in CTA Case No. 6133 entitled Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Formerly Southern Energy
Quezon, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and ordered the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to refund or issue
a tax credit certificate (TCC) in favor of respondent Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (MPC) in the amount representing its
unutilized input value added tax (VAT) for the second quarter of 1998. Also assailed is the CA’s Resolution3 of March 31,
2006 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
MPC, formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc., and also formerly known as Hopewell (Phil.) Corporation, is a domestic firm
engaged in the generation of power which it sells to the National Power Corporation (NPC). For the construction of the
electrical and mechanical equipment portion of its Pagbilao, Quezon plant, which appears to have been undertaken from
1993 to 1996, MPC secured the services of Mitsubishi Corporation (Mitsubishi) of Japan.
Under Section 134 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6395, the NPC’s revised charter, NPC is exempt from all taxes. In Maceda v.
Macaraig,5 the Court construed the exemption as covering both direct and indirect taxes.
In the light of the NPC’s tax exempt status, MPC, on the belief that its sale of power generation services to NPC is,
pursuant to Sec. 108(B)(3) of the Tax Code,6 zero-rated for VAT purposes, filed on December 1, 1997 with Revenue
District Office (RDO) No. 60 in Lucena City an Application for Effective Zero Rating. The application covered the
construction and operation of its Pagbilao power station under a Build, Operate, and Transfer scheme.
Not getting any response from the BIR district office, MPC refiled its application in the form of a "request for ruling" with
the VAT Review Committee at the BIR national office on January 28, 1999. On May 13, 1999, the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue issued VAT Ruling No. 052-99, stating that "the supply of electricity by Hopewell Phil. to the NPC, shall
be subject to the zero percent (0%) VAT, pursuant to Section 108 (B) (3) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997."
It must be noted at this juncture that consistent with its belief to be zero-rated, MPC opted not to pay the VAT component
of the progress billings from Mitsubishi for the period covering April 1993 to September 1996—for the E & M Equipment
Erection Portion of MPC’s contract with Mitsubishi. This prompted Mitsubishi to advance the VAT component as this

serves as its output VAT which is essential for the determination of its VAT payment. Apparently, it was only on April 14,
1998 that MPC paid Mitsubishi the VAT component for the progress billings from April 1993 to September 1996, and for
which Mitsubishi issued Official Receipt (OR) No. 0189 in the aggregate amount of PhP 135,993,570.
On August 25, 1998, MPC, while awaiting approval of its application aforestated, filed its quarterly VAT return for the
second quarter of 1998 where it reflected an input VAT of PhP 148,003,047.62, which included PhP 135,993,570
supported by OR No. 0189. Pursuant to the procedure prescribed in Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, MPC filed on
December 20, 1999 an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input VAT in the amount of PhP 148,003,047.62.
Since the BIR Commissioner failed to act on its claim for refund and obviously to forestall the running of the two-year
prescriptive period under Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), MPC went to the CTA via a petition for
review, docketed as CTA Case No. 6133.
Answering the petition, the BIR Commissioner, citing Kumagai-Gumi Co. Ltd. v. CIR,7 asserted that MPC’s claim for
refund cannot be granted for this main reason: MPC’s sale of electricity to NPC is not zero-rated for its failure to secure an
approved application for zero-rating.
Before the CTA, among the issues stipulated by the parties for resolution were, in gist, the following:
1. Whether or not [MPC] has unapplied or unutilized creditable input VAT for the 2nd quarter of 1998 attributable to zero-
rated sales to NPC which are proper subject for refund pursuant to relevant provisions of the NIRC;
2. Whether the creditable input VAT of MPC for said period, if any, is substantiated by documents; and
3. Whether the unutilized creditable input VAT for said quarter, if any, was applied against any of the VAT output tax of
MPC in the subsequent quarter.
To provide support to the CTA in verifying and analyzing documents and figures and entries contained therein, the Sycip
Gorres & Velayo (SGV), an independent auditing firm, was commissioned.
The Ruling of the CTA
On the basis of its affirmative resolution of the first issue, the CTA, by its Decision dated March 18, 2003, granted MPC’s
claim for input VAT refund or credit, but only for the amount of PhP 10,766,939.48. The fallo of the CTA’s decision reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED
to REFUND or in the alternative, ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of the petitioner its unutilized input VAT
payments directly attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales for the second quarter of 1998 in the reduced amount of
P10,766,939.48, computed as follows:
Claimed Input VAT P148,003,047.62

Less: Disallowances
a.) As summarized by SGV & Co. in its initial report (Exh. P)
I. Input Taxes on Purchases of Services:
1. Supported by documents
other than VAT Ors P 10,629.46
2. Supported by photocopied VAT OR 879.09
II. Input Taxes on Purchases of Goods:
1. Supported by documents other than
VAT invoices 165,795.70
2. Supported by Invoices with TIN only 1,781.82
3. Supported by photocopied VAT
invoices 3,153.62
III. Input Taxes on Importation of Goods:
1. Supported by photocopied documents
[IEDs and/or Bureau of Customs
(BOC) Ors] 716,250.00
2. Supported by broker’s computations 91,601.00 990,090.69
b.) Input taxes without supporting documents as
summarized in Annex A of SGV & Co.’s
supplementary report (CTA records, page 134) 252,447.45
c.) Claimed input taxes on purchases of services from
Mitsubishi Corp. for being substantiated by dubious OR 135,996,570.008
Refundable Input P10,766,939.48
SO ORDERED.9
Explaining the disallowance of over PhP 137 million claimed input VAT, the CTA stated that most of MPC’s purchases
upon which it anchored its claims for refund or tax credit have not been amply substantiated by pertinent documents, such
as but not limited to VAT ORs, invoices, and other supporting documents. Wrote the CTA:
We agree with the above SGV findings that out of the remaining taxes of P136,246,017.45, the amount of P252,477.45
was not supported by any document and should therefore be outrightly disallowed.
As to the claimed input tax of P135,993,570.00 (P136,246,017.45 less P252,477.45 ) on purchases of services from
Mitsubishi Corporation, Japan, the same is found to be of doubtful veracity. While it is true that said amount is
substantiated by a VAT official receipt with Serial No. 0189 dated April 14, 1998 x x x, it must be observed, however, that
said VAT allegedly paid pertains to the services which were rendered for the period 1993 to 1996. x x x
The Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, MPC appealed the CTA’s Decision to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 78280. On December 22, 2005, the CA rendered its assailed decision modifying that of the CTA decision by granting
most of MPC’s claims for tax refund or credit. And in a Resolution of March 31, 2006, the CA denied the BIR
Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration. The decretal portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals
dated March 18, 2003 is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue is ordered to
refund or issue a tax credit certificate in favor of petitioner Mirant Pagbilao Corporation its unutilized input VAT payments
directly attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales for the second quarter of 1998 in the total amount of
P146,760,509.48.
SO ORDERED.10
The CA agreed with the CTA on MPC’s entitlement to (1) a zero-rating for VAT purposes for its sales and services to tax-
exempt NPC; and (2) a refund or tax credit for its unutilized input VAT for the second quarter of 1998. Their disagreement,
however, centered on the issue of proper documentation, particularly the evidentiary value of OR No. 0189.
The CA upheld the disallowance of PhP 1,242,538.14 representing zero-rated input VAT claims supported only by
photocopies of VAT OR/Invoice, documents other than VAT Invoice/OR, and mere broker’s computations. But the CA
allowed MPC’s refund claim of PhP 135,993,570 representing input VAT payments for purchases of goods and/or
services from Mitsubishi supported by OR No. 0189. The appellate court ratiocinated that the CTA erred in disallowing
said claim since the OR from Mitsubishi was the best evidence for the payment of input VAT by MPC to Mitsubishi as
required under Sec. 110(A)(1)(b) of the NIRC. The CA ruled that the legal requirement of a VAT Invoice/OR to
substantiate creditable input VAT was complied with through OR No. 0189 which must be viewed as conclusive proof of
the payment of input VAT. To the CA, OR No. 0189 represented an undisputable acknowledgment and receipt by
Mitsubishi of the input VAT payment of MPC.
The CA brushed aside the CTA’s ruling and disquisition casting doubt on the veracity and genuineness of the Mitsubishi-
issued OR No. 0189. It reasoned that the issuance date of the said receipt, April 14, 1998, must be taken conclusively to
represent the input VAT payments made by MPC to Mitsubishi as MPC had no real control on the issuance of the OR.
The CA held that the use of a different exchange rate reflected in the OR is of no consequence as what the OR
undeniably attests and acknowledges was Mitsubishi’s receipt of MPC’s input VAT payment.
The Issue
Hence, the instant petition on the sole issue of "whether or not respondent [MPC] is entitled to the refund of its input VAT
payments made from 1993 to 1996 amounting to [PhP] 146,760,509.48."11

The Court’s Ruling
As a preliminary matter, it should be stressed that the BIR Commissioner, while making reference to the figure PhP
146,760,509.48, joins the CA and the CTA on their disposition on the propriety of the refund of or the issuance of a TCC
for the amount of PhP 10,766,939.48. In fine, the BIR Commissioner trains his sight and focuses his arguments on the
core issue of whether or not MPC is entitled to a refund for PhP 135,993,570 (PhP 146,760,509.48 - PhP 10,766,939.48 =
PhP 135,993,570) it allegedly paid as creditable input VAT for services and goods purchased from Mitsubishi during the
1993 to 1996 stretch.
The divergent factual findings and rulings of the CTA and CA impel us to evaluate the evidence adduced below,
particularly the April 14, 1998 OR 0189 in the amount of PhP 135,996,570 [for US$ 5,190,000 at US$1: PhP 26.203 rate
of exchange]. Verily, a claim for tax refund may be based on a statute granting tax exemption, or, as Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation12 would have it, the result of legislative grace. In such case, the claim is
to be construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer,13 meaning that the claim cannot be made to rest on vague
inference. Where the rule of strict interpretation against the taxpayer is applicable as the claim for refund partakes of the
nature of an exemption, the claimant must show that he clearly falls under the exempting statute. On the other hand, a tax
refund may be, as usually it is, predicated on tax refund provisions allowing a refund of erroneous or excess payment of
tax. The return of what was erroneously paid is founded on the principle of solutio indebiti, a basic postulate that no one
should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another. The caveat against unjust enrichment covers the government. 14
And as decisional law teaches, a claim for tax refund proper, as here, necessitates only the preponderance-of-evidence
threshold like in any ordinary civil case.15
We apply the foregoing elementary principles in our evaluation on whether OR 0189, in the backdrop of the factual
antecedents surrounding its issuance, sufficiently proves the alleged unutilized input VAT claimed by MPC.
The Court can review issues of fact where there are
divergent findings by the trial and appellate courts
As a matter of sound practice, the Court refrains from reviewing the factual determinations of the CA or reevaluate the
evidence upon which its decision is founded. One exception to this rule is when the CA and the trial court diametrically
differ in their findings,16 as here. In such a case, it is incumbent upon the Court to review and determine if the CA might
have overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.17 In the instant case, the CTA, unlike the CA, doubted the veracity of OR No. 0189
and did not appreciate the same to support MPC’s claim for tax refund or credit.
Petitioner BIR Commissioner, echoing the CTA’s stand, argues against the sufficiency of OR No. 0189 to prove unutilized
input VAT payment by MPC. He states in this regard that the BIR can require additional evidence to prove and ascertain
payment of creditable input VAT, or that the claim for refund or tax credit was filed within the prescriptive period, or had
not previously been refunded to the taxpayer.
To bolster his position on the dubious character of OR No. 0189, or its insufficiency to prove input VAT payment by MPC,
petitioner proffers the following arguments:
(1) The input tax covered by OR No. 0189 pertains to purchases by MPC from Mitsubishi covering the period from 1993 to
1996; however, MPC’s claim for tax refund or credit was filed on December 20, 1999, clearly way beyond the two-year
prescriptive period set in Sec. 112 of the NIRC;
(2) MPC failed to explain why OR No. 0189 was issued by Mitsubishi (Manila) when the invoices which the VAT were
originally billed came from the Mitsubishi’s head office in Japan;
(3) The exchange rate used in OR No. 0189 was pegged at PhP 26.203: USD 1 or the exchange rate prevailing in 1993 to
1996, when, on April 14, 1998, the date OR No. 0189 was issued, the exchange rate was already PhP 38.01 to a US
dollar;
(4) OR No. 0189 does not show or include payment of accrued interest which Mitsubishi was charging and demanded
from MPC for having advanced a considerable amount of VAT. The demand, per records, is embodied in the May 12,
1995 letter of Mitsubishi to MPC;

(5) MPC failed to present to the CTA its VAT returns for the second and third quarters of 1995, when the bulk of the VAT
payment covered by OR No. 0189—specifically PhP 109,329,135.17 of the total amount of PhP 135,993,570—was billed
by Mitsubishi, when such return is necessary to ascertain that the total amount covered by the receipt or a large portion
thereof was not previously refunded or credited; and
(6) No other documents proving said input VAT payment were presented except OR No. 0189 which, considering the fact
that OR No. 0188 was likewise issued by Mitsubishi and presented before the CTA but admittedly for payments made by
MPC on progress billings covering service purchases from 1993 to 1996, does not clearly show if such input VAT
payment was also paid for the period 1993 to 1996 and would be beyond the two-year prescriptive period.
The petition is partly meritorious.
Belated payment by MPC of its obligation for creditable input VAT
As no less found by the CTA, citing the SGV’s report, the payments covered by OR No. 0189 were for goods and service
purchases made by MPC through the progress billings from Mitsubishi for the period covering April 1993 to September
1996—for the E & M Equipment Erection Portion of MPC’s contract with Mitsubishi. 18 It is likewise undisputed that said
payments did not include payments for the creditable input VAT of MPC. This fact is shown by the May 12, 1995 letter 19
from Mitsubishi where, as earlier indicated, it apprised MPC of the advances Mitsubishi made for the VAT payments, i.e.,
MPC’s creditable input VAT, and for which it was holding MPC accountable for interest therefor.
In net effect, MPC did not, for the VATable MPC-Mitsubishi 1993 to 1996 transactions adverted to, immediately pay the
corresponding input VAT. OR No. 0189 issued on April 14, 1998 clearly reflects the belated payment of input VAT
corresponding to the payment of the progress billings from Mitsubishi for the period covering April 7, 1993 to September
6, 1996. SGV found that OR No. 0189 in the amount of PhP 135,993,570 (USD 5,190,000) was duly supported by bank
statement evidencing payment to Mitsubishi (Japan).20 Undoubtedly, OR No. 0189 proves payment by MPC of its
creditable input VAT relative to its purchases from Mitsubishi.
OR No. 0189 by itself sufficiently proves payment of VAT
The CA, citing Sec. 110(A)(1)(B) of the NIRC, held that OR No. 0189 constituted sufficient proof of payment of creditable
input VAT for the progress billings from Mitsubishi for the period covering April 7, 1993 to September 6, 1996. Sec.
110(A)(1)(B) of the NIRC pertinently provides:
Section 110. Tax Credits. –
A. Creditable Input Tax. –
(1) Any input tax evidenced by a VAT invoice or official receipt issued in accordance with Section 113 hereof on the
following transactions shall be creditable against the output tax:
(a) Purchase or importation of goods:
xxxx
(b) Purchase of services on which a value-added tax has been actually paid. (Emphasis ours.)
Without necessarily saying that the BIR is precluded from requiring additional evidence to prove that input tax had indeed
paid or, in fine, that the taxpayer is indeed entitled to a tax refund or credit for input VAT, we agree with the CA’s above
disposition. As the Court distinctly notes, the law considers a duly-executed VAT invoice or OR referred to in the above
provision as sufficient evidence to support a claim for input tax credit. And any doubt as to what OR No. 0189 was for or
tended to prove should reasonably be put to rest by the SGV report on which the CTA notably placed much reliance. The
SGV report stated that "[OR] No. 0189 dated April 14, 1998 is for the payment of the VAT on the progress billings" from
Mitsubishi Japan "for the period April 7, 1993 to September 6, 1996 for the E & M Equipment Erection Portion of the
Company’s contract with Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan)."21
VAT presumably paid on April 14, 1998

While available records do not clearly indicate when MPC actually paid the creditable input VAT amounting to PhP
135,993,570 (USD 5,190,000) for the aforesaid 1993 to 1996 service purchases, the presumption is that payment was
made on the date appearing on OR No. 0189, i.e., April 14, 1998. In fact, said creditable input VAT was reflected in
MPC’s VAT return for the second quarter of 1998.
The aforementioned May 12, 1995 letter from Mitsubishi to MPC provides collaborating proof of the belated payment of
the creditable input VAT angle. To reiterate, Mitsubishi, via said letter, apprised MPC of the VAT component of the service
purchases MPC made and reminded MPC that Mitsubishi had advanced VAT payments to which Mitsubishi was entitled
and from which it was demanding interest payment. Given the scenario depicted in said letter, it is understandable why
Mitsubishi, in its effort to recover the amount it advanced, used the PhP 26.203: USD 1 exchange formula in OR No. 0189
for USD 5,190,000.
No showing of interest payment not fatal to claim for refund
Contrary to petitioner’s posture, the matter of nonpayment by MPC of the interests demanded by Mitsubishi is not an
argument against the fact of payment by MPC of its creditable input VAT or of the authenticity or genuineness of OR No.
0189; for at the end of the day, the matter of interest payment was between Mitsubishi and MPC and may very well be
covered by another receipt. But the more important consideration is the fact that MPC, as confirmed by the SGV, paid its
obligation to Mitsubishi, and the latter issued to MPC OR No. 0189, for the VAT component of its 1993 to 1996 service
purchases.
The next question is, whether or not MPC is entitled to a refund or a TCC for the alleged unutilized input VAT of PhP
135,993,570 covered by OR No. 0189 which sufficiently proves payment of the input VAT.
We answer the query in the negative.
Claim for refund or tax credit filed out of time
The claim for refund or tax credit for the creditable input VAT payment made by MPC embodied in OR No. 0189 was filed
beyond the period provided by law for such claim. Sec. 112(A) of the NIRC pertinently reads:
(A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. – Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively
zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the
issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except
transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
The above proviso clearly provides in no uncertain terms that unutilized input VAT payments not otherwise used for any
internal revenue tax due the taxpayer must be claimed within two years reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter
when the relevant sales were made pertaining to the input VAT regardless of whether said tax was paid or not. As
the CA aptly puts it, albeit it erroneously applied the aforequoted Sec. 112(A), "[P]rescriptive period commences from the
close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made and not from the time the input VAT was paid nor from the time
the official receipt was issued."22 Thus, when a zero-rated VAT taxpayer pays its input VAT a year after the pertinent
transaction, said taxpayer only has a year to file a claim for refund or tax credit of the unutilized creditable input VAT. The
reckoning frame would always be the end of the quarter when the pertinent sales or transaction was made, regardless
when the input VAT was paid. Be that as it may, and given that the last creditable input VAT due for the period covering
the progress billing of September 6, 1996 is the third quarter of 1996 ending on September 30, 1996, any claim for
unutilized creditable input VAT refund or tax credit for said quarter prescribed two years after September 30, 1996 or, to
be precise, on September 30, 1998. Consequently, MPC’s claim for refund or tax credit filed on December 10, 1999 had
already prescribed.
Reckoning for prescriptive period under
Secs. 204(C) and 229 of the NIRC inapplicable
To be sure, MPC cannot avail itself of the provisions of either Sec. 204(C) or 229 of the NIRC which, for the purpose of
refund, prescribes a different starting point for the two-year prescriptive limit for the filing of a claim therefor. Secs. 204(C)
and 229 respectively provide:
Sec. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes.— The Commissioner may –
xxxx
(c) Credit or refund taxes erroneously or illegally received or penalties imposed without authority, refund the value of
internal revenue stamps when they are returned in good condition by the purchaser, and, in his discretion, redeem or
change unused stamps that have been rendered unfit for use and refund their value upon proof of destruction. No credit
or refund of taxes or penalties shall be allowed unless the taxpayer files in writing with the Commissioner a claim
for credit or refund within two (2) years after the payment of the tax or penalty: Provided, however, That a return
filed showing an overpayment shall be considered as a written claim for credit or refund.
xxxx
Sec. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected.— No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for
the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or
collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, of any sum alleged to have been excessively
or in any manner wrongfully collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or
proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment
of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the
Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon
which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (Emphasis ours.)
Notably, the above provisions also set a two-year prescriptive period, reckoned from date of payment of the tax or penalty,
for the filing of a claim of refund or tax credit. Notably too, both provisions apply only to instances of erroneous payment or
illegal collection of internal revenue taxes.
MPC’s creditable input VAT not erroneously paid
For perspective, under Sec. 105 of the NIRC, creditable input VAT is an indirect tax which can be shifted or passed on to
the buyer, transferee, or lessee of the goods, properties, or services of the taxpayer. The fact that the subsequent sale or
transaction involves a wholly-tax exempt client, resulting in a zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transaction, does not,
standing alone, deprive the taxpayer of its right to a refund for any unutilized creditable input VAT, albeit the erroneous,
illegal, or wrongful payment angle does not enter the equation.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), the Court explained the nature of the VAT and
the entitlement to tax refund or credit of a zero-rated taxpayer:
Viewed broadly, the VAT is a uniform tax x x x levied on every importation of goods, whether or not in the course of trade
or business, or imposed on each sale, barter, exchange or lease of goods or properties or on each rendition of services in
the course of trade or business as they pass along the production and distribution chain, the tax being limited only to the
value added to such goods, properties or services by the seller, transferor or lessor. It is an indirect tax that may be
shifted or passed on to the buyer, transferee or lessee of the goods, properties or services. As such, it should be
understood not in the context of the person or entity that is primarily, directly and legally liable for its payment, but in terms
of its nature as a tax on consumption. In either case, though, the same conclusion is arrived at.
The law that originally imposed the VAT in the country, as well as the subsequent amendments of that law, has been
drawn from the tax credit method. Such method adopted the mechanics and self-enforcement features of the VAT as first
implemented and practiced in Europe x x x. Under the present method that relies on invoices, an entity can credit against
or subtract from the VAT charged on its sales or outputs the VAT paid on its purchases, inputs and imports.
If at the end of a taxable quarter the output taxes charged by a seller are equal to the input taxes passed on by the
suppliers, no payment is required. It is when the output taxes exceed the input taxes that the excess has to be paid. If,
however, the input taxes exceed the output taxes, the excess shall be carried over to the succeeding quarter or quarters.
Should the input taxes result from zero-rated or effectively zero-rated transactions or from the acquisition of capital goods,
any excess over the output taxes shall instead be refunded to the taxpayer or credited against other internal revenue
taxes.
xxxx
Zero-rated transactions generally refer to the export sale of goods and supply of services. The tax rate is set at zero.
When applied to the tax base, such rate obviously results in no tax chargeable against the purchaser. The seller of such
transactions charges no output tax, but can claim a refund of or a tax credit certificate for the VAT previously charged by
suppliers.23 (Emphasis added.)
Considering the foregoing discussion, it is clear that Sec. 112(A) of the NIRC, providing a two-year prescriptive period
reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales or transactions were made pertaining to the
creditable input VAT, applies to the instant case, and not to the other actions which refer to erroneous payment of taxes.
As a final consideration, the Court wishes to remind the BIR and other tax agencies of their duty to treat claims for refunds
and tax credits with proper attention and urgency. Had RDO No. 60 and, later, the BIR proper acted, instead of sitting, on
MPC’s underlying application for effective zero rating, the matter of addressing MPC’s right, or lack of it, to tax credit or
refund could have plausibly been addressed at their level and perchance freed the taxpayer and the government from the
rigors of a tedious litigation.
The all too familiar complaint is that the government acts with dispatch when it comes to tax collection, but pays little, if
any, attention to tax claims for refund or exemption. It is high time our tax collectors prove the cynics wrong.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated December 22, 2005 and the Resolution dated
March 31, 2006 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 78280 are AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the claim of
respondent MPC for tax refund or credit to the extent of PhP 135,993,570, representing its input VAT payments for
service purchases from Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan for the construction of a portion of its Pagbilao, Quezon power
station, is DENIED on the ground that the claim had prescribed. Accordingly, petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue
is ordered to refund or, in the alternative, issue a tax credit certificate in favor of MPC, its unutilized input VAT payments
directly attributable to its effectively zero-rated sales for the second quarter in the total amount of PhP 10,766,939.48.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
1 Rollo, pp. 32-44. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.

2 Id. at 47-63. Penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta concurred in by Associate Judges Juanito C. Castañeda, Jr. and Lovell R.
Bautista.
3 Id. at 45-46.
4 Sec. 13. Non-profit Character of the Corporation; Exemption from all Taxes, Duties, Fees, Imposts and other Charges by Government
and Governmental Instrumentalities. – The [NPC] shall be non-profit and shall devote all its returns x x x as well as excess revenues
from its operation, for expansion. To enable [NPC] to pay its indebtedness and obligations x x x [it] is hereby declared exempt:
(a) From the payment of all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, charges, costs and service x x x and duties to the Republic of the Philippines,
its provinces, cities, municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities;
(b) From all income taxes, franchise taxes and realty taxes x x x;

(c) From all import duties, compensating taxes and advanced sales tax, and wharfage fees on import of foreign goods required for its
operations and projects; and
(d) From all taxes, duties, fees, imposts, and all other charges imposed by the Republic of the Philippines, its provinces, cities,
municipalities and other government agencies and instrumentalities, on all petroleum products used by the Corporation in the
generation, transmission, utilization, and sale of electric power.
5 G.R. No. 88291, May 31, 1991, 197 SCRA 771.
_ftnref6[6] Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (%) Rate. – The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT-registered
persons shall be subject to zero-percent rate: x x x (3) Services rendered to persons whose exemption under special laws x x x
effectively subjects the supply of such services to zero percent (0%) rate.
7 CTA Case No. 4670, July 29, 1997.
_ftnref8[8] Should be 135,993,570.00 as per this petition and CA decision.

9 Supra note 2, at 62.
10 Supra note 1, at 43.
11 Rollo, p. 15._ftnref12[12] G.R. Nos. 167274-75, July 21, 2008.
13 Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 159490, February 18, 2008,
citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corp., G.R. No. 148191, November 25, 2003, 416 SCRA 436, 461.
_ftnref14[14] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., No. L-30644, March 9, 1987, 148 SCRA 315, cited
in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, supra.
_ftnref15[15] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, ibid.
_ftnref16[16] Uy v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 157851, June 29, 2007, 526 SCRA 73, 84.
_ftnref17[17] Samala v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130826, February 17, 2004, 423 SCRA 142, 146.
_ftnref18[18] Rollo, p. 57.
_ftnref19[19] Id. at 60.
_ftnref20[20] Id. at 57.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 37.
23 G.R. No. 153866, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 132, 141-143.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 164195 February 6, 2007
APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) are the registered owners of five parcels of agricultural lands
located in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao Province, to wit:
Apo Fruits Corporation
Transfer Certificate of Area (Ha.)

Title (TCT)1 No.
T-1133592 115.2179
T-1133663 525.1304
Hijo Plantation, Inc.4
TCT No. Area (Ha.)

T-10361 155.8408
T-10362 170.7980
T-10363 478.89205
On 12 October 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the above parcels of land to the government. 6 After the initial
processing at the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) 7 application of AFC and HPI,
it was referred to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for initial valuation. On 16 October 1996, AFC and HPI received
separately from the DAR’s Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Davao province a notice of land acquisition and
valuation, informing AFC that the value of the properties has been placed at ₱86,900,925.88 or ₱165,484.47 per hectare 8
while HPI’s properties were valued at ₱164,478,178.14.9 1awphi1.net Both AFC and HPI considered the valuations
unreasonably low and inadequate as just compensation for the properties.
On 5 November 1996, AFC rejected the valuation for both TCTs No. T-113366 and No.113359.10 AFC applied for the shifting
of the mode of acquisition for TCT No. 113359 11 from VOS to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme.12 HPI also
rejected the valuation of its three parcels of land covered by TCTs No. T-10361, No. T-10362 and No. T-10363. 13
Owing to the rejection by both AFC and HPI of LBP’s valuation, the DAR requested LBP to deposit the amounts equivalent
to their valuations in the names and for the accounts of AFC and HPI. 14 AFC thereafter withdrew the amount of
₱26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew the amount of ₱45,481,706.76, both in cash from LBP. The DAR PARO then directed
the Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs of AFC and HPI to the said properties and to issue a new one in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines.
After the issuance of the certificate of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, the Register of Deeds of Davao,
upon the request of the DAR, issued TCTs and Certificates of Land Ownership Award to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination of just compensation with the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB failed
and refused to render a decision on the valuation of the land. Hence, two complaints 15 for determination and payment of
just compensation were filed by AFC and HPI before Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as
a Special Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated.
Agrarian Case No. 54-200016 filed by AFC covers two parcels of land in San Isidro, Tagum, Davao, with an aggregate area
of 640.3483 hectares previously assessed by LBP with a valuation of ₱86,900,925.88.
On the other hand, Agrarian Case No. 55-200017 filed by HPI relates to the other three parcels of land in Tagum City, with
a total area of 814.5308 hectares, likewise, previously assessed by LBP with a valuation of ₱164,478,178.14.
Summons was served on 23 May 2000 to defendants DAR and LBP. The trial court appointed as Commissioners 18 persons
it considered competent, qualified and disinterested to determine the proper valuation of the properties.
LBP submitted its Answer on 26 July 2000,19 while the DAR Secretary, represented by PARO Pedro P. Gumabao, filed its
Answer20 on 18 August 2000.
The pre-trial order issued by the trial court reads:
This Court will determine the all-embracing concept of Just Compensation, and whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages,
and also whether the value of the land and improvements as determined by the Land Valuation of Land Bank for the
determination of just compensation, and whether the plaintiff has violated Section 13 of DARAB new rules and procedure.21

The commissioners, together with all the representatives of the parties, conducted an ocular inspection first on 25 August
200022 and again on 16 December 2000.23
On 21 May 2001, the court-appointed commissioners submitted their appraisal report.24
On 14 September 2001, the case was considered submitted for decision. 25
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision26 dated 25 September 2001, the fallo thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, consistent with all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by this Special Agrarian Court
where it has determined judiciously and now hereby fixed the just compensation for the 1,388.6027 hectares of lands and
its improvements owned by the plaintiffs: APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC., as follows:
First – Hereby ordering after having determined and fixed the fair, reasonable and just compensation of the
1,338.6027 hectares of land and standing crops owned by plaintiffs – APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC., based at only P103.33 per sq. meter, ONE BILLION THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE
MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,383,179,000.00), Philippine Currency,
under the current value of the Philippine Peso, to be paid jointly and severally to the herein PLAINTIFFS by the
Defendants-Department of Agrarian Reform and its financial intermediary and co-defendant Land Bank of the
Philippines, thru its Land Valuation Office;
Second – Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO
PLANTATION, INC., interests on the above-fixed amount of fair, reasonable and just compensation equivalent to
the market interest rates aligned with 91-day Treasury Bills, from the date of the taking in December 9, 1996, until
fully paid, deducting the amount of the previous payment which plaintiffs received as/and from the initial valuation;
Third – Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners’ fees herein taxed as
part of the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and
computed at Two and One-Half (2 ½) percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs’ land and standing crops plus interest equivalent to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury
Bills from date of taking until full payment;
Fourth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the attorney’s fees to plaintiffs equivalent
to, and computed at ten (10%) Percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs’ land and standing crops, plus interest equivalent to the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date
of taking until the full amount is fully paid;
Fifth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office to deduct from the total amount fixed as fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs’ properties the initial payment paid to the plaintiffs;
Sixth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay the costs of the suit; and
Seventh - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay all the aforementioned amounts thru The Clerk of Court of
this Court, in order that said Court Officer could collect for payment any docket fee deficiency, should there be
any, from the plaintiffs.27
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration28 on 5 October 2001 mainly on the ground that the trial court based its valuation on
the value of residential and industrial lands in the area forgetting that the lands involved are agricultural. LBP also sought a
reconsideration of the award of attorney’s fees, the interest on the compensation over the lands and the order of the trial
court regarding the payment of commissioners’ fees.
In an Order dated 5 December 2001,29 the trial court modified its decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the following modifications as they are hereby made
on the dispositive portion of this Court’s consolidated decision be made and entered in the following manner, to wit:
On the Second Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which now reads as follows, as modified:
Second - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay plaintiffs-APO FRUITS CORPORATION and HIJO PLANTATION, INC.,
interest at the rate of Twelve (12%) Percent per annum on the above-fixed amount of fair, reasonable and just compensation
computed from the time the complaint was filed until the finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final and
executory, the rate of TWELVE (12%) PERCENT per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until
payment thereof is satisfied, deducting the amounts of the previous payments by Defendant-LBP received as initial
valuation;
On the Third Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As Follows, As Modified:
Third - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the Commissioners’ fees herein taxed as part of
the costs pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, equivalent to, and computed at Two and
One-Half (2 ½) percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of plaintiffs’ land
and standing crops and improvements;
On the Fourth Paragraph of the Dispositive Portion which Now Reads As follows, As Modified:
Fourth - Hereby ordering Defendants – DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and severally the attorney’s fees to plaintiffs equivalent to, and
computed at ten (10%) Percent of the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just compensation of
plaintiffs’ land and standing crops and improvements.
Except for the above-stated modifications, the consolidated decision stands and shall remain in full force and effect in all
other respects thereof.30
From this Order, LBP filed a Notice of Appeal dated 27 December 2001. 31 The same was given due course in the Order of
the RTC dated 15 May 2002.32 In the same Order, the RTC set aside its Order dated 5 December 2001 granting execution
pending appeal.
Subsequently, the trial court, citing this Court’s ruling in the case of "Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon," 33 that a
petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper mode of appeal from a decision on the determination of just
compensation rendered by a special agrarian court, issued an Order dated 4 November 200234 recalling its Order dated 15
May 2002 and directed LBP to file a Petition for Review within the reglementary period. LBP filed a Motion for
Reconsideration35 claiming that the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon was not yet final at that time; hence, it
is not certain whether the decision in that case would have a retroactive effect and that appeal is the appropriate remedy.
This was denied by the trial court in its Order dated 12 February 2003. 36
On 28 March 2003, LBP filed a Petition for Certiorari 37 before the Court of Appeals assailing the 4 November 2002 and 12
February 2003 orders of the trial court.
The Court of Appeals found the petition of LBP meritorious. In a decision 38 dated 12 February 2004, the Court of Appeals
held:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed orders dated November 4, 2002 and February 12, 2003 are
NULLIFIED and, accordingly, SET ASIDE.39
AFC and HPI filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration 40 which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated 21 June
2004.41
Earlier, on 23 January 2003, DAR filed its own separate petition before the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for
Review.42 In a Resolution43 dated 2 April 2003, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition of the DAR for failure to state
the material dates under Rule 42, Section 2,44 of the Rules of Court. The appellate court held:

The importance of stating the material dates cannot be overemphasized. It is only through a statement thereof in the petition
can it be determined whether or not the petition was filed on time. For its failure to state the material dates, the petition can
and should be outrightly dismissed.
xxxx
The petition is also defective in that it failed to attach material portions of the record as would support the allegations in the
petition. More specifically, copies of the alleged motion for reconsideration filed by the DAR, the order denying it, and the
notice of appeal were not attached to the petition.
For all the foregoing, the court has no alternative but to dismiss the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.45
The Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 became final and executory
and entry of judgment was issued by the appellate court on 7 May 2003.46
On the other hand, from the decision of the Court of Appeals in the Petition filed by LBP in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, AFC
and HPI filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND RESOLUTION ARE IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT?
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP IS BOUND BY THE DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO.
74879 AND IS THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM FILING CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222?
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING BY RESPONDENT LBP OF CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222 IS ALREADY BARRED BY RES
JUDICATA?
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE ARLENE DE LEON CASE, GIVING ONLY
PROSPECTIVE EFFECT TO ITS EARLIER RESOLUTION AS TO THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM
DECISIONS OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURTS IS APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE?
V.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT LBP WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND/OR OF ITS RIGHT TO APPEAL?
VI.
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT PETITION (CA-G.R. SP NO. 76222) WAS MERELY INTERPOSED TO DELAY THE
EXECUTION OF SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT’S "DECISION" WHICH IS BASED ON EVIDENCE DULY PRESENTED
AND PROVED?47
AFC and HPI pray that the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222 be reversed and set
aside and that the Decision of the RTC dated 25 September 2001 in Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000 be
declared as final and executory.48
In the case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, decided on 10 September 2002, respondents are the registered
owners of a parcel of land. They voluntarily offered the subject property for sale to the government pursuant to Republic Act

No. 6657. Unable to agree on the valuation of the property offered by the DAR, respondents filed a petition with the RTC
(acting as a Special Agrarian Court) to fix the just compensation of the property. In due time, the RTC rendered judgment
fixing the compensation of the property. Before the Court of Appeals, the DAR and LBP filed separate petitions. The DAR
filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the RTC which was assigned to the Special 3rd Division of the appellate court.
LBP, on the other hand, raised the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of ordinary appeal. The same was
assigned to the 4th Division of the Court of Appeals. The petition of the DAR was given due course. On the other hand, the
Court of Appeals dismissed LBP’s ordinary appeal on the ground that the same was erroneous. LBP filed a petition for
review before this Court. In Land Bank, we explained:
A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from decisions of the Regional
Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the determination of just compensation to the landowners
concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There
is no room for a contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction, but only
application.49
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In a Resolution of this Court dated 20 March 2003, this Court emphasized the
prospective application of the Decision dated 10 September 2002.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration dated October 16, 2002 and the supplement to the motion for reconsideration
dated November 11, 2002 are PARTIALLY GRANTED. While we clarify that the Decision of this Court dated September
10, 2002 stands, our ruling therein that a petition for review is the correct mode of appeal from decisions of Special Agrarian
Courts shall apply only to cases appealed after the finality of this Resolution. 50 (Emphasis supplied.)
Essentially therefore, the rule is that a decision of the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court should be brought to the
Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review. The Court of Appeals will no longer entertain ordinary appeals thereon. However,
this rule applies only after the finality of the Resolution of this Court in Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon dated 20
March 2003.
In this case, the Court of Appeals correctly ruled when it gave due course to the appeal of LBP. LBP’s Notice of Appeal was
filed on 27 December 2001. This was given due course by the RTC in an Order dated 15 May 2002. LBP’s appeal was,
thus, perfected before this Court’s Resolution in the aforementioned Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon case. Hence,
the Court of Appeals could give due course to LBP’s petition.
Next we proceed to determine the issue of whether or not the petition of LBP before the Court of Appeals is barred by the
disposition of the Petition for Review filed by the DAR in CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 on the ground of res judicata.
The following are the elements of res judicata:
(a) The former judgment must be final;
(b) The court which rendered judgment must have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter;
(c) It must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) There must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. 51
In this case, the third element of res judicata, i.e., that the former judgment must be on the merits, is not present. It must be
remembered that the dismissal of CA-G.R. SP No. 74879 was based on technicality, that is, for failure on the part of the
DAR to state material dates required by the rules. Having been dismissed based on a technicality and not on the merits,
the principle of res judicata does not apply. Res judicata applies only where judgment on the merits is finally rendered on
the first.52
Having disposed of the procedural issues involved herein, we shall now proceed to resolve the substantive questions in this
case.
This Court is aware that in the instant case, since LBP’s appeal before the Court of Appeals is to be given due course, the
normal procedure is for us to remand the case to the appellate court for further proceedings. However, when there is enough
basis on which a proper evaluation of the merits of petitioner’s case may be had, the Court may dispense with the time-
consuming procedure in order to prevent further delays in the disposition of the case. 53 Indeed, remand of the case to the
lower court for further reception of evidence is not conducive to the speedy administration of justice and it becomes
unnecessary where the Court is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions, the
Court, in the public interest and expeditious administration of justice, has resolved action on the merits, instead of remanding
them for further proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case54 or where
the trial court had already received all the evidence of the parties.55 Briefly stated, a remand of the instant case to the Court
of Appeals would serve no purpose save to further delay its disposition contrary to the spirit of fair play.
It is already an accepted rule of procedure for us to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, 56 leaving
no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. If, based on the records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the
dispute can be resolved by us, we will do so to serve the ends of justice instead of remanding the case to the lower court
for further proceedings.57
The complete records of this case have already been elevated to this Court. The pleadings on record will fully support this
adjudication. We have painstakingly gone over all of LBP’s representations and arguments, and we found that the material
and decisive facts are hardly disputable. From another perspective, due consideration should also be given to AFC and HPI
for having voluntarily offered to sell their properties, a clear indication of AFC and HPI’s willingness to participate in the
agrarian reform program of the government. In turn, they must be given compensation that is just and timely. Records
indicate that the case has been dragging on for more than ten years now without the landowners having been fully
compensated. We cannot countenance such a glaring indifference to AFC and HPI’s rights as land owners – they should
be afforded all that is just and due them. To be sure, they deserve nothing less than full compensation to give effect to their
substantive rights.
While eminent domain lies as one of the inherent powers of the state, there is no requirement that it undertake a prolonged
procedure, or that the payment of the private owner be protracted as far as practicable. 58
It is not controverted that this case started way back on 12 October 1995, when AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the
properties to the DAR. In view of the failure of the parties to agree on the valuation of the properties, the Complaint for
Determination of Just Compensation was filed before the DARAB on 14 February 1997. Despite the lapse of more than
three years from the filing of the complaint, the DARAB failed to render a decision on the valuation of the land. Meantime,
the titles over the properties of AFC and HPI had already been cancelled and in their place a new certificate of title was
issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, even as far back as 9 December 1996. A period of almost 10 years
has lapsed. For this reason, there is no dispute that this case has truly languished for a long period of time, the delay being
mainly attributable to both official inaction and indecision, 59 particularly on the determination of the amount of just
compensation, to the detriment of AFC and HPI, which to date, have yet to be fully compensated for the properties which
are already in the hands of farmer-beneficiaries, who, due to the lapse of time, may have already converted or sold the land
awarded to them.
Verily, these two cases could have been disposed with dispatch were it not for LBP’s counsel causing unnecessary delay.
At the inception of this case, DARAB, an agency of the DAR which was commissioned by law to determine just
compensation, sat on the cases for three years, which was the reason that AFC and HPI filed the cases before the RTC.
We underscore the pronouncement of the RTC that "the delay by DARAB in the determination of just compensation could
only mean the reluctance of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay the claim of
just compensation by corporate landowners."60
To allow the taking of landowners’ properties, and to leave them empty-handed while government withholds compensation
is undoubtedly oppressive.61
It is in light of the foregoing that this Court will now undertake the final resolution of the present controversy which, as already
elucidated, is within the power of this Court to do.
The concept of just compensation embraces not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the owners of
the land, but also the payment of the land within a reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment, compensation
cannot be considered "just" inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope
with his loss.62 Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.63 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss. 64
The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. 65

The two main issues, thus, for determination of this Court are the date of the taking of the property and the amount of just
compensation.66
First, it is settled that the property was taken on 9 December 1996, when a Certificate of Title was issued in favor of the
Republic of the Philippines, and the Certificates of Title of AFC and HPI were cancelled. The farmer-beneficiaries
themselves took possession of the subject properties on 2 January 1997. 67
Second, on payment of just compensation, we have previously held:
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is willing to
sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed upon by the
parties. It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions offered by the vendee,
that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public interest on the time-honored
justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute).
The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.68 (Emphases supplied.)
Section 57 of Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law) provides:
SEC. 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions
for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under this Act. The
Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from
submission of the case for decision.
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, provides:
Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. – The decision of the Adjudicator on
land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next question now crops up, who shall determine just compensation? It is now settled that the valuation of property in
eminent domain is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court. The same
cannot be lodged with administrative agencies69 and may not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government.70
We now come to the issue of just compensation.
LBP argues that the trial court’s valuation of the subject landholdings has incorporated irrelevant and/or immaterial factors
such as the schedule of market values given by the City Assessor of Tagum, the comparative sales of adjacent lands and
the commissioners’ report.71
Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657, which is particularly relevant, providing as it does the guideposts for the determination
of just compensation, reads, as follows:
Sec. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by
the farmers and the farm-workers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine
its valuation.72

The RTC provided the following elucidation in its assailed decision:
The recommendation of the Commissioners’ Report for a value of ₱85.00 per sq.m. or ₱850,000.00 per hectare (sic) is
founded on evidence. The schedule of market values of the City of Tagum as per its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment
and Property Classification (Exhibit "J-6" and "CC-6") give the lowest value for residential land at ₱100/sq.m. for 4th class
residential land in 1993. In 1994, it gave the lowest value of ₱80.00/sq.m. for barangay residential lot. It appears that certain
portions of the land in question have been classified as Medium Industrial District (Exhibit "J-4" and "CC-4"). The lowest
value as for industrial land, 3rd class in a barangay is ₱130.00 sq.m. The average of these figures, using the lowest values
in Exhibit "6" and "CC-6" yields the figure of ₱103.33 which is even higher by 22.2% than that recommended by the
Commissioners. It is even of judicial notice that assessments made by local governments are much lower than real market
value. Likewise, the value of the improvements thereon, not even considered in the average of ₱103.33. If considered, this
will necessarily result in a higher average value.
In said Appraisal Report, mention has been made on "improvements," and our Supreme Court in Republic vs. Gonzales,
50 O.G. 2461, decreed the rule, as follows:
If such improvements are permanent in character, consisting of good paved road, playgrounds, water system, sewerage
and general leveling of the land suitable for residential lots together with electric installations and buildings, the same are
important factors to consider in determining the value of the land. The original cost of such improvements may be
considered, with due regard to the corresponding depreciation. (Davao vs. Dacudao, L-3741, May 8, 1952).
Note should be taken that in said Appraisal Report, permanent improvements on plaintiffs’ lands have been introduced and
found existing, e.g., all weather-road network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses, among others, wherein
substantial amount of capital funding have been invested in putting them up.
This Court, however, notes that the comparative sales (Exhibits "A" to "F") referred to in the Appraisal Report are sales
made after the taking of the land in 1996. However, in the offer of evidence, the plaintiff offered additional comparative sales
of adjacent land from late 1995 to early 1997, ranging from a high of ₱580.00/sq.meter in September 1996 (Exhibit "L-4" for
plaintiff Apo and "EE-4" for plaintiff Hijo) to a low of ₱146.02/sq.meter in October 1997 (Exhibits "L-2" and "EE-2"). The other
sales in 1996 were in January 1996 for ₱530.00/sq.meter ( Exhs. "L-3" and "EE-3") and in December 1996 for
₱148.64/sq.meter (Exhs. "L-2" and "EE-1"). On the other hand, the sale in December 1995 (Exhs. "L-5" and "EE-5") was
made for ₱530.00/sq.meter." The average selling price based on the foregoing transaction is ₱386.93/sq.meter. The same
is even higher by around 350% than the recommended value of ₱85.00, as per the Commissioners’ Report.
The Cuervo Appraisal Report, on the other hand, gave a value of ₱84.53/sq. meter based on the Capitalized Income
Approach. The said approach considered only the use of the land and the income generated from such use.
The just compensation for the parcels of land under consideration, taking into account the Schedule of Market Values given
by the City Assessor of Tagum (Exhs. "J-6" for Apo "CC-6" for Hijo), the comparative sales covering adjacent lands at the
time of taking of subject land, the Cuervo Report, and the Appraisal Report is hereby fixed at ₱103.33/sq.meter.
The valuation given by Cuervo and the Appraisal Report of ₱84.53 and ₱85.00, respectively, in this Court’s judgment, is
the minimum value of the subject landholdings and definitely cannot in anyway be the price at which plaintiffs APO and/or
HIJO might be willing to sell, considering that the parcels of land adjacent thereto were sold at much higher prices,
specifically from a low of ₱146.02/sq.meter to a high of ₱580.00. The average of the lowest value under the 1993 and 1994
Revision of Assessment and Property Classification (Exhibits "J-6" and "CC-6") were already at ₱103.33/sq.meter, even
without considering the improvements introduced on the subject landholdings.
Moreover, the Commission made the findings that "portions of the land subject of th(e) report may x x x increase to
₱330.00/sq.meter, specifically th(e) strips of land surrounding the provincial roads" and made the conclusion that "(c)learly,
the value recommended by th(e) Commission, which is only about ₱85.00/sq.meter is way below the x x x assessed values,
which effectively was fixed (as early as) 1994 or earlier than the Voluntary Offer to Sell of the above plaintiffs’ properties."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the said assessed values are presumed to be prevailing [in] December
1996, the time of taking of plaintiffs’ landholdings. The Commission further stated that the average of the said "assessed
values as submitted by the City Assessor of Tagum City (is) ₱265.00/sq.meter." This Court, therefore, finds it unfair that the
just compensation for the subject landholdings should only be fixed at ₱85.00/sq.meter.
It is similarly true, however, that the determination of just compensation cannot be made to the prejudice of defendants or
the government for that matter.

Thus, the selling price of ₱580.00/sq. meter nor the average selling price of ₱386.93/sq. meter or the average assessed
value of ₱265.00/sq. meter cannot be said to be the value at which defendants might be willing to buy the subject
landholdings.
This Court, therefore, finds the price of ₱103.33/sq. meter for the subject landholdings fair and reasonable for all the parties.
Said value is even lower than the lowest selling price of ₱148.64 for sale of adjacent land at the time of the taking of the
subject landholdings [in] December 1996. It approximates, however, the average of the lowest values under the 1993 and
1994 Revision of Assessment and Property Clarification (Exhs. "J-6" and "CC-6") of ₱103.33. The said figure will further
increase, if the Court will further consider the improvements introduced by plaintiffs, which should be the case. Moreover,
the said value of ₱103.33/sq. meter is more realistic as it does not depart from the government recognized values as
specified in the 1993 and 1994 Revised Assessment and Property Classification of Tagum City. This Court finds the
evidence of the plaintiffs sufficient and preponderant to establish the value of ₱103.33/sq. meter. 73
The trial court further rationalized its award thus:
It may be admitted that plaintiffs’ properties are agricultural; however, it is simply beyond dispute that in going about the
task of appraising real properties, as in the instant cases, "all the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may be shown and considered in estimating its value." (Manila Railroad
Company vs. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 287, 314). It is undeniable that plaintiffs’ agricultural lands as borne out from the records
hereof, and remaining unrebutted, shows that all weather-roads network, airstrip, pier, irrigation system, packing houses,
and among numerous other improvements are permanently in place and not just a measly, but substantial amounts
investments have been infused. To exclude these permanent improvements in rendering its valuation of said properties
would certainly be less than fair. x x x.
xxxx
The plaintiffs’ agricultural properties are just a stone’s throw from the residential and/or industrial sections of Tagum City, a
fact defendants-DAR and LBP should never ignore. The market value of the property (plus the consequential damages less
consequential benefits) is determined by such factors as the value of like properties, its actual or potential use, its size,
shape and location as enunciated in B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 584 (1992). To follow
Defendants-DAR and LBP logic, therefore, would in effect restrict and delimit the broad judicial prerogatives of this Court in
determining and fixing just compensation of properties taken by the State.
Proceedings before the Panel of Commissioners revealed that permanent improvements as mentioned above exist inside
the lands subject of this complaints. It was also established during the trial proper upon reception of the evidence of the
plaintiffs which clearly revealed the character, use and valuation of the lands surrounding the properties involved in these
cases, indicating the strategic location of the properties subject of these cases. The findings being that surrounding
properties have been classified as residential, commercial or industrial. And yet defendant-LBP refused to acknowledge the
factual basis of the findings of the Panel of Commissioners and insisted on its guideline in determining just compensation.
x x x.74
In arriving at its valuation of the subject properties, the RTC conducted a thorough and meticulous examination of all
determining factors. It did not rely merely on the report of Commissioners nor on the Cuervo appraiser’s report. It took into
consideration the schedule of market values of the City of Tagum per its 1993 and 1994 Revision of Assessment and
Property Clasisification, value of the permanent improvements thereon, as well as comparative sales of adjacent lands from
early 1995 to early 1997, among other factors.
Contrary to LBP’s claim, the above factors are neither irrelevant nor immaterial. When the trial court arrived at the valuation
of a landowner’s property taking into account its nature as irrigated land, location along the highway, market value,
assessor’s value and the volume and value of its produce, such valuation is considered in accordance with Republic Act
No. 6657.75
Even the Commissioners’ report which the trial court took into consideration may not be dismissed as irrelevant. In the first
place the trial court acting as a special agrarian court is authorized to appoint commissioners to assist in the determination
of just compensation.76 In this case the Commissioners’ report was submitted only after ocular inspections were conducted
on the landholdings to give them a better idea of their real value.77
Conspicuously, the trial court did not merely rely solely on the appraisal report submitted by the Commissioners. The trial
court conducted hearings for the purpose of receiving the parties’ evidence.

Clearly evident from the records of this case is that in the proceedings before the Commission constituted by the RTC of
Tagum City, Branch 2, to fix the just compensation for the properties, the LBP and the DAR were given all the opportunities
to justify their stances. Thus:
[T]he Commission set another hearing on February 23, 2001 at 9:00 a.m. at the Function Room, Marbella mansion, Rizal
Street, Davao City, to give the LBP the opportunity to present evidence. The LBP counsels, Attys. Batingana and Sembrano,
instead of presenting witnesses and other evidence, manifested that they will submit a position paper within fifteen (15)
days from the date of the hearing. This was granted by the Chairman of the Commission, who also gave the plaintiff the
opportunity to submit within five (5) days, if they so desire, their rejoinder.
Inspite of the lapse of the period, the LBP failed to file its position paper.
xxxx
The plaintiffs have presented evidence to establish the value of their properties before the Court-appointed Commissioners,
as well as before this Court. The Commissioners who acted and performed their assigned tasks under their Oaths of Office
are deemed a surrogate or extension of the Court itself. (Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 32 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
Defendant-DAR and Defendant-LBP failed to present evidence during the hearings set by the Commissioners on February
5, 2001, and February 23, 2001, for the presentation of their evidence. This Court gave Defendant Land Bank and Defendant
DAR additional opportunities to present evidence. Defendant Land Bank and DAR asked for extensions to submit their
evidence in its motion dated July 27, 2001, which was granted by the Court. All exhibits and other documents offered in
evidence were admitted, after which this Court issued an order that these two cases were submitted for resolution.78
Given the already exhaustive analysis made by the RTC, this Court is convinced that the trial court correctly determined the
amount of just compensation due to AFC and HPI.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Decision, dated 12 February
2004, and Resolution, dated 21 June 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76222, giving due course to LBP’s
appeal, are hereby AFFIRMED, this Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in consideration of public interest, the speedy
administration of justice, and the peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE COURSE to the present Petition and
decide the same on its merits. Thus, the Decision, dated 25 September 2001, as modified by the Decision, dated 5
December 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Tagum City, Branch 2, in Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-2000 is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes

1 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, Annex C, p. 13; Both land titles (TCTs No. 113359 and No.
113366) were previously covered by TCT No. 50976.
2 Id. at Annex A, p. 5.
3 Id at 6.
4 Id. at 135.
5 Rollo, p. 259.
6 Pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988, effective 15 June 1988. (Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, Annex B, p. 9.)
7 Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) – A scheme wherein landowner/s voluntarily offer their agricultural lands, including
improvements thereon, if any, for coverage. (Records, p. 592) DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998.
8 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 13.
9 Id. at 15.
10 Id. at 19.
11 Id. at 19.
12 Republic Act No. 6657, Sec. 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. – Landowners of agricultural lands subject to
acquisition under this Act may enter into a voluntary arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified
beneficiaries subject to the following guidelines:
(a) All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the DAR within the first year of the
implementation of the CARP. Negotiations between the landowners and qualified beneficiaries covering
any voluntary land transfer which remain unresolved after one (1) year shall not be recognized and such
land shall instead be acquired by the government and transferred pursuant to this Act.
(b) The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less favorable to the transferee than those of
the government’s standing offer to purchase from the landowner and to resell to the beneficiaries, if such
offers have been made and are fully known to both parties.
(c) The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for non-compliance by either party and shall be duly
recorded and its implementation monitored by the DAR.
14 Id. at 464.
15 Agrarian Case No. 54-2000 entitled, Apo Fruits Corporation v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform and Land Bank of
the Philippines, and Agrarian Case No. 55-2000 entitled, Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform and
Land Bank of the Philippines.
16 Records of Agrarian Case No. 54-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5.
17 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 1-5 .
18 Id. at 71. Appointed were: Atty. Cesar V. Arañas, Retired Provincial Assessor of Davao Province; Retired City
Assessor of Davao City; and Retired Director – Finance, Region XI, Davao City, to act as the Chairman of the
Panel of Commissioners;
Mr. Alfredo H. Silawan, incumbent City Assessor of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, to act as Member.
Mr. Wilfredo G. dela Cerna, incumbent City Treasurer of Tagum City, Davao del Norte, to act as Member.
19 Id. at 93.
20 Id. at 95.
21 Id. at 188.
22 Id. at 129.
23 Id. at 181.
24 Id. at 328. This Commission therefore recommends:
a) The amount of ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-ONE MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱1,131,600,000.00) under the current value of the Philippine Peso, computed as the JUST
COMPENSATION for the properties covered by these cases, to be paid jointly and severally by the
Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Land Bank of the Philippines and deposited in an authorized
bank;
b) Interest on the abovementioned amount equivalent to the market interest rates aligned with 91-day
treasury bills, from the date of taking in 1996, until fully paid, to be paid jointly and severally by the
Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Land Bank of the Philippines and deposited in an authorized
bank;
c) Defendants DAR/LBP jointly and severally pay all the fees payable to the Commissioners herein
named, taxed, as part of all the costs per Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
WHEREFORE, the Commission respectfully submits this Appraisal Report to this Honorable Special Agrarian
Court, with a firm belief that the amount arrived at is JUST.
The Panel of Commissioners pray for such other reliefs as may be just and equitable under the premises.
At Davao City and Tagum City, for the City of Tagum, this 17th day of May 2001.

(Sgd.)CESAR V. ARAÑAS (Sgd.)ALFREDO M. SILAWAN
Chairman Member
26 Id. at 747-795. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Erasto D. Salcedo.
27 CA rollo, pp. 131-133.
28 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 792; DAR also filed its Motion for Reconsideration on the
same date, i.e., 5 October 2001. (Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, p. 799.)
29 CA rollo, pp. 141-160.
30 Id. at 158-160.
31 Id. at 161.
32 Id. at 166.
33 437 Phil. 347 (2002).
34 CA rollo, pp. 47-48.
35 Id. at 168.
36 Id. at 49-54.
37 Id. at 2-46. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 76222.
38 Id. at 579-588. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador with Associate Justices Romeo A.
Brawner and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring.

39 Id. at 588.
40 Id. at 599.
41 Id. at 686.
42 Id. at 289-306. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74879.
43 Id. at 631-636. Penned by Associate Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona
and Edgardo F. Sundiam, concurring.

44 SEC. 2. Form and contents. – The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies x x x; (b) indicate the
specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; x x x.

45 CA rollo, pp. 633-636.
46 Id. at 638.
47 Rollo, p. 262.
48 Id. at 287-288.
49 Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, supra note 33 at 356.
50 Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon, 447 Phil. 495, 505 (2003).
51 TF Ventures, Inc. v. Matsuura, G.R. No 154177, 9 June 2004, 431 SCRA 526, 532-533.
52 David v. Navarro, G.R. No. 145284, 11 February 2004, 422 SCRA 499, 511.
53 Somoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78050, 23 October 1989, 178 SCRA 654, 663; Bach v. Ongkiko Kalaw,
G.R. No. 160334, 11 September 2006.

54 Real v. Belo, G.R. No. 146224, 17 January 2007; Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771, 778 (1997);
Heirs of Crisanta Y. Gabriel-Almoradie v. Court Appeals, G.R. No. 91385, 4 January 1994, 229 SCRA 15, 29;
Republic v. Central Surety & Insurance Co., 134 Phil. 631 (1968).
55 Samal v. Court of Appeals, 99 Phil 230, 233 (1956).
56 Bunao v. Social Security System, G.R. No. 159606, 13 December 2005, 477 SCRA 564, 571.
57 Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156413, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 658, 668; San Luis v. Court of Appeals,
417 Phil. 598, 605 (2001); Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 273 (1997); Golangco v. Court of Appeals,
347 Phil. 771, 778 (1997).
58 Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, 19 December 2005, 478 SCRA 474, 532.
59 Rocamora v. Regional Trial Court-Cebu (Branch VIII), G.R. No. L-65037, 23 November 1988, 167 SCRA 615,
624.
60 RTC Decision, p. 40; CA rollo, p. 124.
61 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 327 Phil. 1047, 1055 (1996).
62 Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, G.R. No. 137285, 16 January 2001, 349 SCRA
240, 264; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, id. at 1054, quoting Municipality of Makati v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 89898-99, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 207, 213.
63 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286, 313 (1915).
64 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467, 469 (1938); J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration,
G.R. No. L-21064, 18 February 1970, 31 SCRA 413, 432; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, G.R. Nos. L-
55166-67, 21 May 1987, 150 SCRA 89.
65 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208, 234 (1913).
66 Records of Agrarian Case No. 55-2000, Book I, pp. 332, 344.
67 Id. at 345.
68 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, 14
July 1989, 175 SCRA 343, 376.

69 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco, 464 Phil. 83, 84 (2004); Export Processing Zone Authority v. Dulay,
G.R. No. L-59603, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 305, 312; Belen v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-45390, 15 April
1988, 160 SCRA 291, 295, citing National Power Corporation v. Jocson, G.R. Nos. 94193-99, 25 February 1992,
206 SCRA 520, 540; Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad, G.R. No. 127198, 16 May 2005, 458 SCRA 441,
451; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil 1072 (1996), cited in Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals,
379 Phil. 141, 147 (2000).
70 Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, supra note 68 at 380.
71 Rollo, p. 351.
72 Otherwise stated, the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors
specified in Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 as amended.

1. the cost of the acquisition of the land;
2. the current value of like properties;
3. its nature, actual use and income;
4. the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations;
5. the assessment made by government assessors;
6. the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
government to the property; and
7. the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land,
if any.
These factors as provided under Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657 have been translated in a basic
formula in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by DAR Administrative Order
No. 11, Series of 1994, issued pursuant to the DAR’s rule-making power to carry out the object and
purposes of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended.
The formula stated in DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended, is as follows:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are present, relevant and applicable.
A.1 When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A.2 When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2 ((Land Bank of the Philippines v. Banal, G.R. No. 143276, 20 July 2004, 434 SCRA
543, 549-550.)
73 CA rollo, pp. 125-128.
74 Id. at 146-149.
75 Belen v. Court of Appeals, supra note 69 at 295; Land Bank of Philippines v. Natividad, supra note 69 at 452-
453.
76 Rule 67, Section 5, Revised Rules of Court.
77 B.H Berkenkotter and Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89980, 14 December 1992, 216 SCRA 584, 589.
78 CA rollo, pp. 112-121.

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FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 150274 August 4, 2006

The facts of the case are as follows:

Chief, Construction Section

All of Mountain Province Engineering District

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(Sgd.) SIMEON A. DATUMANONG

Hence, the instant petition to cite Secretary Datumanong in contempt of court.

Petition lacks merit.

Thus, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 16 the Court held:

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PROCEDURE IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

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Sec. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. –

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G.R. No. 168240 February 9, 2011

AURORA B. GO, Petitioner,

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

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Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

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1) A certification/verification of one of a number of principal parties is sufficient compliance. Although her

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The Parties’ Respective Arguments

Thus, we agree with the petitioner that the CA required pleadings

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1. ₱200,000.00 for moral damages;

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Gozo-Dadole and Pampio A. Abarintos.

Court of Appeals, 400 Phil. 395, 402-403 (2000).

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G.R. No. 141524 September 14, 2005

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

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G.R. No. 136368 January 16, 2002

The facts are as stated in the impugned Decision, viz:

'WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:

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SO ORDERED. (Annex 'B', Petition; Emphasis added).'

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Petitioner assails the aforequoted Decision as follows:

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April 18, 1994.

"(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

The Circular took effect on June 1, 1994.

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"9.17. Procedural laws.

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9.18. Exceptions to the rule.

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Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.1âwphi1.nêt

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G.R. No. 177407 February 9, 2011

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.

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