RULE 76

CASE 48 Guevara vs Guevara

GR No L-5405

Facts

-26 August 1931- Victorino L. Guevara, resident of Bayambang, Pangasinan executed a

will. The will contains the distribution of assorted movables and residential lot of
Victorino L. Guevara among his children, Rosario and Ernesto Guevara and
stepchildren, Vivencio, Edwigis, Dionista, Candida and Pio Guevara.

-Victorino Guevara also bequeathed to his 2nd wife Augustia Posada various movables,
portion of 25 ha to be taken out of a 259 odd ha parcel outlined in Plan Psu-68618 And
another 5 ha in settlement of her widow’s usufruct.

-Ernesto Guevara was appointed executor without bond

-12 July 1933- Victorino executed a deed of sale in favor of Ernesto Guevara, conveying
to the latter the southern hall of the 259 ha lot heretofore mentioned and expressly
recognized Ernesto Guevara as owner of the northern half.

-1 November 1932- Victorino and Ernesto jointly applied for registration of the big parcel
in view of the sale from the former to the latter. The decree was issued in the name of
Ernesto Guevara exclusively and for the whole tract, a certificate of title being issued in
his sole name on 12 October 1933.

-27 September 1933- Victorino Guevara died but his will was not filed for probate

-1937- Rosario Guevara, claiming to be a recognized natural child of the deceased

Victorino and on the assumption that he had died intestate, brought suit against Ernesto
Guevara to recover 423,492 sq m.

-CA rendered decision in favor of Rosario but SC modified judgment upon certiorari.

-Ernesto Guevara appeared and opposed the probate. Pedro L. Quinto, counsel for
Rosario in the former litigation, was allowed to intervene in view of his duly recorded
attorney’s lien

-31 January 1946- Ernesto Guevara, through counsel filed a motion to dismiss petition
on grounds:

a. petition itself alleged that will was revoked

b. whatever right to probate the parties may have has already prescribed
c. purpose of the probate was solely to have petitioner Rosario declared on
acknowledged natural child of the deceased.

-9 December 1946- motion to dismiss was denied

Issues

1. Whether or not the original of the record on appeal did not comply with the Rules of
Court?

2. Whether or not CA has jurisdiction over the case?

3. Whether or not the petition for probate of the will of Victorino L. Guevara is
barred by the statute of limitations, considering that the testator died on September
27, 1933, and that the petition for probate of said will was filed twelve (12) years
later, or, to be exact, on October 5, 1945.

Held

1. No. The first ground is predicated upon the fact that, instead of transcribing the
motions, petitions, orders and resolutions incorporated in the original record on appeal,
Respondents herein merely attached to the original copy of said record on appeal, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, their own copies of said motions,
petitions, orders and resolutions. Accordingly, the copy of said record on appeal
furnished to Petitioner herein did not contain or enclose the aforementioned parts of
the record. It appears, however, that the Respondents were given several extensions of
time within which to comply with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and that
Respondents eventually did so. There being no question about the authority of the court
of first instance to grant said extensions of time, it is clear that the first ground, relied
upon by Petitioner herein, is untenable.

2. No. Petitioner maintains the negative, upon the ground that the appeal involved only
questions of law. This is not correct, for the very motion for reconsideration
adverted to above, indicated that the appeal raised some issues of fact, such
as, for instance, whether or not the will in question was in the possession of
Respondent Rosario Guevara and whether Respondent Quinto had been authorized by
her to perfect the appeal on her behalf. At any rate, the case is now before us and, upon
examination of the record and consideration of all the issues therein raised, we are of
the opinion that, had the appeal been forwarded directly to this Court, we would have
disposed of it in the manner set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the review
of which is sought by herein Appellant.

3. No. Section 1299 declares that any

person interested in the estate ‘may at any time after the death of the testator, petition
the court having jurisdiction to have the will proved.’ This implies that there is no
arbitrary time limit.’

Section 1317 declares:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary If the court is satisfied, upon the proof

taken or from the facts found by the jury that the will was duly executed and that the will
testator at the time of its execution was of sound and disposing mind and not acting
under duress menace fraud, or undue influence, a certificate of the proof and the facts
found, signed by the judge and attested by the seal of the court, must be attached to the
will.’

Under Section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no
debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the
estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate and divide the estate in
accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless
those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of
the will to the court for probate, because such suppression of the will is contrary to law
and public policy. The law enjoins the probate of the will and public policy requires it,
because unless the will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted
to be done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as
may have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate among
themselves to the exclusion of others.’

“In holding the statute of limitations applicable to the probate of wills, the court below
failed to notice that its doctrine was destructive of the right of testamentary disposition
and violative of the owner’s right to control his property within the legal limits. The
appealed order in fact leaves wills at the mercy and whim of custodians and heirs
interested in their suppression.

Ruling

Petition denied

CASE 49 full case

G.R. No. 45642 September 25, 1937

FRANCISCO SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF LAGUNA and SABINA RIVERA, respondents.
Crispin Oben for petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez for respondent Rivera.

IMPERIAL, J.:

The petitioner instituted special proceeding No. 3109 in the court of First Instance of Laguna and, in
the petition filed by him, prayed for the probate of the will allegedly made on May 13, 1924, by his
deceased mother Damiana Capistrano, who died in the municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna, on
December 21, 1936. The petition was opposed by the respondent Sabina Rivera, who filed a
pleading entitled "Opposition and Counter-Petition." In her pleading the respondent, after opposing
the probate of said will for the reasons stated therein, prayed for the probate of the will of the
deceased alleged made on May 11, 1930, copy of which was attached thereto, and for the issuance,
to that effect, of the order setting the hearing thereof and directing such publications as required by
law. The court denied the motion for publication and ordered the respondent to institute another
proceeding and apply separately for the probate of the alleged will. The respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration and the court, on March 31, 19937, issued an order setting aside the former one and
directing that the will presented by the respondent be set for hearing, that the publications required
by law be made and that said will be heard jointly with the will presented by the petitioner in the
same proceeding instituted by the latter. Sometime later, the court ordered that the expenses for the
publications made in the newspapers be defrayed by the respondent. The petitioner filed two
motions for reconsideration which were denied and, finally, instituted this certiorari proceeding. In
order that the hearing and publications ordered by the court may be carried out, the respondent, on
July 20, 1937, deposited P24 and filed the original of the will the probate of which had been sought
by her.

I. The petitioner raises only one question of law, to wit: that the court acquired no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the counter-petition for the probate of the second will, or to set the same for hearing of
said will to be held in the same proceeding jointly with the first will, on the ground that the
respondent had not previously filed her pleading nor paid the fees of the clerk of court fixed by
section 788 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 3395. The pertinent part of said
section, as amended, reads as follows:

SEC. 788. Fees of clerks of Court of First Instance. — Fees shall assessed in accordance
with the following schedule:

xxx xxx xxx

(g) For all clerical services in the allowance of wills, granting letters of administration,
appointment of guardians, trustees, settlement of the accounts of executors, administrators,
guardians, trustees, and recording final and interlocutory orders, judgment, and decrees
therein, filing all inventories and appraisements, and for all other work as clerk pertaining to
any one estate, fees payable out of the estate shall be collected in accordance with the value
of the property involved in each proceeding, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance in probate matters is determined in the following
sections of the above-cited Code:

SEC. 599. Jurisdiction. — Courts of First Instance shall have jurisdiction in all matters
relating to the settlement of estate and probate of wills of deceased persons, the
appointment and removal of guardians and trustees, and the powers, duties, and rights of
 guardians and wards, trustees, and cestuis que trust. This jurisdiction shall be called probate
jurisdicton.

SEC. 600. Where resident's estate settled. — If an inhabitant of the Philippine Islands dies,
whether a citizen or alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resided at the time of
his death.

SEC. 601. Where nonresident's estate settled. — If a person resided out of the Philippine
Islands at the time of his death, his will shall be allowed and recorded, and letters
testamentary or of administration shall be granted in the Court of First Instance of any
province in which he had estate.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 626. Custodian of will to deliver. — The person who has the custody of a will shall,
within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will into the court
which has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will.

SEC. 627. Executor to present will and accept or refuse trust. — A person named as
executor in a will, shall within thirty days after he knows of the death of the testator, or within
thirty days after he knows that he is named executor, if he obtained such knowledge after
knowing of the death of the testator, present such will to the court which has jurisdiction,
unless the will has been otherwise returned to said court, and shall, within such period,
signify to the court his acceptance of the trust, or make known in writing his refusal to accept
it.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a will is delivered to a court having
jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all concerned may
appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall cause public notice thereof to be given
by publication in such newspapers as the court directs general circulation in the province,
three weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until
such notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under oath, reduced
to writing and signed by the witnesses.

Under the foregoing provisions, a Court of First Instance acquires jurisdiction to probate a will when
it is shown by evidence before it: (1) That a person has died leaving a will; (2) in the case of a
resident of this country, that he died in the province where the court exercises territorial jurisdiction;
(3) in the case of a nonresident, that he has left a estate in the province where the court is situated,
and (4) that the testament or last will of the deceased has been delivered to the court and is in the
possession thereof.

The law is silent as to the specific manner of bringing the jurisdictional allegations before the court
but practice and jurisprudence have established that they should be made in the form of an
application and filed with the original of the will attached thereto. It has been the practice in some
courts to permit attachment of a mere copy of the will to the application, without prejudice to
producing the original thereof at the hearing or when the court so requires. This precaution has been
adapted by some attorneys to forestall its disappearance, which has taken place in certain cases.
According to the facts alleged and admitted by the parties, it is evident that the court has acquired
jurisdiction to probate the second will, in view of the presence of all the jurisdictional facts above-
stated. The respondent's counter-petition should, in this case, be considered as a petition for the
probate of the second will, the original of which was filed by her on July 20, 1937.

II. The payment of the fees of the clerk of court for all services to be rendered by him in connection
with the probate of the second will and for the successive proceedings to be conducted and others to
be issued, in accordance with section 788, as amended, is not jurisdiction in the sense that its
omission does not deprive the court of its authority to proceed with the probate of a will, as expressly
provided for by section 630. It is the inevitable duty of the court, when a will is presented to it, to
appoint hearing for its allowance and to cause notice thereof to be given by publication. The duty
imposed by said section is imperative and noncompliance therewith would be a mockery at the law
and at last will of the testator. Section 785 (a) of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended recently
by Act No. 3250, permits the remission or postponement of the payment of the clerk's fees in cases
of poverty, at the discretion of the court, and if this were done in one case and the payment of the
fees for filing the application were jurisdictional, is claimed, then the court, in admitting the will to
probate and in allowing it, would have acted entirely without jurisdiction. Finally, it should be taken
into consideration that the court, in this case, did not exempt the respondents from paying the fees in
question but merely failed to make provision therefor.

III. When the court ordered that the second will be set for hearing that publication be made thereof
and that said will be heard in the same proceeding jointly with the first will, it merely ordered the
consolidation of the two applications and the two hearing on the probate of both wills, instead of
conducting separate hearing, undoubtedly because it understood that the form so chosen was the
most convenient for the parties and their attorneys.

There are three ways of consolidation action or special proceedings where the questions at issue
and the parties in interest are the same. The first consists in recasting the cases already instituted,
conducting only one hearing and rendering only one decision; the second takes place when the
existing cases are consolidated, only one hearing held and only one decision rendered; and the third
takes place when, without recasting or consolidating the cases, the principal one is heard, the
hearing on the others being suspended until judgment has been rendered in the first case. The
court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, may adopt any of these three forms of consolidation
whenever in its opinion the proceeding is beneficial to and convenient for the parties. The power so
exercised is discretionary. In the case under consideration, the court acquired jurisdiction from the
moment the counter-petition was presented and the second will came to its possession and under its
control and, consequently, it likewise had full discretion to order, as it did, the probate thereof in the
proceeding already instituted for the purpose of rendering later only one decision. It should
furthermore be taken into consideration that the consolidation so ordered was the form most
convenient for and beneficial to the parties as well as to the court because if the first will were
opposed on the ground that it was revoked by the second will, the best evidence of the revocation
would be said second will and once the publications are made, if the second will was executed with
the formalities prescribed by law, the court could order the probate thereof, without the necessity of
multiplying the proceedings.

The decisions inserted hereinbelow are in support of the consolidation of special proceedings in the
cases where more than one will of a deceased person has been presented:

The question involved in the two cases is, which, if either, of the instruments presented for
probate is the last will of Margaret Roulett. The trial of one case would not necessarily
determine the other, as a verdict in one for the caveat would not establish the instrument
propounded in the other, and a verdict in Roulett's case, finding that the paper offered by him
was the last will of Margaret Roulett, would not be binding upon Mulherin, because he is not
a party to Roulett's proceeding. We are, therefore, of the opinion, in view of the
complications that might arise from separate trials and the facility with which the whole
matter may be determined by consolidating the cases, that the trial judge might, in his
discretion, pass an order directing that the two cases be consolidated and heard together,
and in this manner have all the issues disposed of by a judgment binding and conclusive
upon all the parties before the court. In such trial the person who filed the first application in
the court of ordinary would be entitled to open and conclude. (Roulett vs Mulherin, 100 Ga.,
594.)

In probate proceeding it was a proper course to try the validity of two alleged wills, the latest
of which had been lost or destroyed at the same time, and evidence as to the revoking
clause in the lost will was admissible, but its effect on the earlier will must be determined in
view of the admissibility of the latter will to probate as a will. (In re Thompson's Estate, 1987
Pac., 795.).

Where two wills are offered for probate and applications consolidated, submission of both for
determination as to whether one, or if not that the other, is true will, held not erroneous.
(Lillard vs Tolliver, 285 S. W., 576.).

Where two instruments are propounded by different parties as wills, and several application
are made for probate, they will be consolidated and tried together as one proceeding. (In
re Potter's Will, 155 N. Y. S., 939.).

The question of consolidation is discretionary with the court. In both of the above-entitled
proceedings, the parties are identical. No issues have been tried in either proceeding. It
therefore would be an unnecessary expense to both the parties in interest and the country,
and an unnecessary delay in the determination of both proceedings, not to consolidate them.
I am therefore of the opinion that a seasonable demand was made for a jury trial of the
issues raised by the objections filed to the probate of the will dated May 8, 1912, and that the
proceedings should be consolidated, and also that the issues raised in said proceedings can
be more speedily and conveniently tried before the acting surrogate and a jury. (In re Potter's
Will, 158 N.Y., 1001.)

Where separate scripts are propounded for probate as the last will and testament of an
alleged testator, the probate proceedings in a proper case may be consolidated for trial. (In
re Martin's Will, 141 N. Y. S., 784.)

Consolidation of proceedings. — At common law the court could order all testamentary
papers to be produced in court in a proceeding to probate any one of them, and now, under
the statutory procedure in effect in the various jurisdiction, the validity of two or more papers
claimed to be the last will and testament of deceased may be tried at the same time, or a
consolidation of separate proceedings to probate or contest various testamentary papers
purported to be by the same testator may be made. A motion for such a consolidation,
however, is addressed to the surrogate presiding at the trial and should be made when the
trial of the probate proceeding comes on for the hearing and not prior thereto, or before the
surrogate sitting for the dispatch of chambers business. (68 C. J., 1038. 1039, sec. 830.).

The court may, in its discretion, consolidate proceedings instituted by different persons for
the purpose of having different instrument each probated as the last will and testament of
decedent. Separate contests of a will and a codicil, or of two wills, each claimed to be the
 last will of testator, may be consolidated by the court and heard together. (Page on Wills,
Page 375, paragraph 323.)

It is the conclusion of this court, therefore, that the respondent court did not act in excess of its
sound discretion in issuing the other of March 31, 1937, and for the foregoing reasons, the remedy
applied for is hereby denied, with costs to the petitioner. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

CASE 50

G.R. No. L-23372 June 14, 1967 BENGZON J.P, J.:

IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN. CIPRIANO DURAN and MIGUEL DURAN, petitioners-
appellants,vs.JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and appellee.

FACTS:
Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in Guinobatan Albay. Among his alleged heirs are
Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers and sisters; nephews and nieces.

Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his
hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina Duran, for the consideration of P2,500.00.

A year later, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of Albay a petition for intestate proceedings
to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking that he be named the administrator. Josefina Duran filed an
opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in
the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation.

Cipriano contended that the deed of assignment did not operate to render him a person without interest
in the estate. Relying on In re Irene Santos, L-11848, May 31, 1962, it is argued that an assignment by one
heir of his share in the estate to a co-heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement court
to be effective; and that the assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested in the estate,
even after said assignment is approved by the court.

ISSUE:
Whether Cipriano did not lose his interest in the estate, thus, he could file for a petition for administration
and settlement of an estate as an "interested person" under Rule 79.

RULING:
The situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between co-heirs pendente lite, during the course
of settlement proceedings, properly and validly commenced. At the time of said assignment, therefore,
the settlement court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a result, any
assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. And since the approval the court is not
deemed final until the estate is closed the assigning heir remains an interested person in proceedings
even after said approval, which can be vacated is given.

In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement proceedings was pending.
The properties subject matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court.
Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same
does not need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial partition is valid as
between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are not
followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding creditors and non-participating heirs only
(Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud,
lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for that purpose.
And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement proceedings, for until the deed of
assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he is left without
that "interest" in the estate required to petite for settlement proceedings.

CASE 51

Basa vs Mercado Case Digest

Persons and Family Relations GR No. L- 42226 :

Facts: Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa, deceased. On January 30, 1932,
the same judge approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared him the only
heir of the deceased under the will and closed the administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934,
the herein petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that said proceedings be
reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there was a
failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing prescribed in
the following section of the Code of Civil Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of
section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that
although the trial judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for
"three weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will, the first
publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the hearing took place on the
27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the date of the first publication instead of three
full weeks before the day set for the hearing. The appellants also contend that the trial court
erred in ruling that the weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was
published, was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.

Issues: Whether the 21 days requirement for publication be followed pursuant to the sec. 630
of Code of Civil Procedure?

Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper considered a newspaper of general

circulation?

Held: In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three
full weeks before the date set for the hearing on the will. In other words the first publication of
the notice need not be made twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. The
record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it
is published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona
fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the
trial court ordered the publication to be made inIng Katipunan precisely because it was a
"newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that
publication of the notice, referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the
newspaper with the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general
circulation.

CASE 52

Cayetano v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-54919, May 30, 1984.

[GUTIERREZ, JR., J.]

FACTS

The testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a
permanent resident of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that the testatrix died in Manila while
temporarily residing with her sister; that during her lifetime, the testatrix made
her last will and testament according to the laws of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that
after the testatrix death, her last will and testament was presented, probated,
allowed, and registered with the Registry of Wills at the County of Philadelphia,
U.S.A. An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner
alleging among other things that the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and
void. The petitioner maintains that since the respondent judge allowed the
reprobate of Adoracion’s will, Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for him.

ISSUES

[1]Whether or not the Philippine law will apply to determine the intrinsic validity
of a will executed by an undisputed foreigner.

[2] Whether or not Philippine law will apply to determine the capacity to succeed
of Adoracion’s heirs.
RULING

[1] NO. It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16(2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
law of the decedent must apply. This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v.
Bellis (20 SCRA 358).“It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress has not intended
to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically
chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent’s
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.”

[2] NO. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
(Article 1039, Civil Code) The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the
law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent. Although
the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and
that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the
petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would be contrary to
the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the specific
provisions of Philippine Law.

RULE 77

CASE 62

Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Fisher

GR. No. L-11622

January 28, 1961

DOCTRINE:

“Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.”

FACTS:
Walter G. Stevenson was born in the Philippines of British parents, married in Manila to another
British subject, Beatrice. He died in 1951 in California where he and his wife moved to.

In his will, he instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to certain real and personal properties, among
which are 210,000 shares of stocks in Mindanao Mother Lode Mines (Mines).

Ian Murray Statt (Statt), the appointed ancillary administrator of his estate filed an estate and
inheritance tax return. He made a preliminary return to secure the waiver of the CIR on the
inheritance of the Mines shares of stock.

In 1952, Beatrice assigned all her rights and interests in the estate to the spouses Fisher.

Statt filed an amended estate and inheritance tax return claiming ADDITIOANL EXEMPTIONS, one
of which is the estate and inheritance tax on the Mines’ shares of stock pursuant to a reciprocity
proviso in the NIRC, hence, warranting a refund from what he initially paid. The collector denied
the claim. He then filed in the CFI of Manila for the said amount.

CFI ruled that (a) the ½ share of Beatrice should be deducted from the net estate of Walter, (b)
the intangible personal property belonging to the estate of Walter is exempt from inheritance
tax pursuant to the reciprocity proviso in NIRC.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the estate can avail itself of the reciprocity proviso in the NIRC granting
exemption from the payment of taxes for the Mines shares of stock.

RULING:

NO.

Reciprocity must be total. If any of the two states collects or imposes or does not exempt any
transfer, death, legacy or succession tax of any character, the reciprocity does not work.

In the Philippines, upon the death of any citizen or resident, or non-resident with properties,
there are imposed upon his estate, both an estate and an inheritance tax.

But, under the laws of California, only inheritance tax is imposed. Also, although the Federal
Internal Revenue Code imposes an estate tax, it does not grant exemption on the basis of
reciprocity. Thus, a Filipino citizen shall always be at a disadvantage. This is not what the
legislators intended.

SPECIFICALLY:

Section122 of the NIRC provides that “No tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of
intangible personal property

(a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time
of his death did not impose a transfer of tax or death tax of any character in respect of
intangible personal property of citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country,
or

(b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death
allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country."

On the other hand, Section 13851 of the California Inheritance Tax Law provides that intangible
personal property is exempt from tax if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a
territory or another State of the United States or of a foreign state or country which then imposed
a legacy, succession, or death tax in respect to intangible personal property of its own residents,
but either:.

Did not impose a legacy, succession, or death tax of any character in respect to intangible
personal property of residents of this State, or

Had in its laws a reciprocal provision under which intangible personal property of a non-resident
was exempt from legacy, succession, or death taxes of every character if the Territory or other
State of the United States or foreign state or country in which the nonresident resided allowed a
similar exemption in respect to intangible personal property of residents of the Territory or State
of the United States or foreign state or country of residence of the decedent."
CASE 63

B.E. Johannes, et al v. Honorable George R. Harvey, et al

FACTS

Mrs. Carmen Theodora Johannes died intestate in Singapore

There remained the husband, B. E. Johannes, the brothers, Frederick Charles D'Almeida and
Alfred D'Almeida, and the sister, Ida D'Almeida Johannes. Of these, the husband, the
brother Frederick, and the sister Ida, were residents of Singapore, while the brother Alfred
was in Manila.

The husband of the deceased was named the administrator of the property of the deceased
wife, which was locally situated within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Singapore.

The brother Alfred D' Almeida was, on his petition, appointed administrator of the Manila
estate of the deceased consisting of P109,732.55. This sum was on deposit in the Manila
banks under and by virtue of guardianship proceedings for the deceased, which were finally
terminated by the discharge of the guardian, the Philippine Trust Company,
 The burden of the relator's contention is that the Honorable George R. Harvey, as CFI judge
of the City of Manila, has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing Alfred D'Almeida
administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit in the Philippines, and that an
administration in the jurisdiction is unnecessary.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

W/N administration in the Philippines is unnecessary.

W/N CFI Judge Harvey has acted in excess of his jurisdiction in appointing Alfred as the
administrator of the funds of the estate on deposit in the Philippines.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

NO. Administration in the Philippines is necessary.

It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies
intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a
grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the
country in which it is granted. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in
the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts or to be distributed
among his heirs.

The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to pay the claims of
creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to the domiciliary
jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin.

The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the deceased in
Singapore. What is sought in the Philippine Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary
to the domiciliary administration.

NO. Judge Harvey did not act in excess of jurisdiction in appointing Alfred as the administrator of the
estate in Philippines.
 It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an administrator
is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name someone else.

The Code of Civil Procedure, while naming the surviving husband or wife as one to whom
administration can be granted, leaves this to the discretion of the court to determine, for it
may be found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the responsibility. Moreover, non
residence is a factor to be considered in determining the propriety of the appointment.

Undoubtedly, if the husband should come into this jurisdiction, the court would give
consideration to the petition that he be named the ancillary administrator for local
purposes. Ancillary letters should ordinarily be granted to the domiciliary representative, if
he applies therefore, or to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express statutory
requirement the court may in its discretion appoint some other person.

An order of a Court of First Instance appointing an administration of the estate of a

deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties thereunder
and is appealable.

The writ prayed for cannot be granted.

CASE 64

Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

o PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation

o SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person
dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of
assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
o SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary
administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the
Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two
stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As
ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession
of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator,
refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an
order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new
stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order,
arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the
possession of County Trust Company of New York.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the
decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case,
set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration
of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well
as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the
jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant
of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in
which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the
[Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a
country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of
the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock
certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's
right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books
of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For
appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted
jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as
immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application.
"In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation
being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is
insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

CASE 65

G.R. No. L-32636 March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.

A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS: Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appealed from
a decision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by
the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized to carry on this appeal. We
think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the moving party in these
proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of
First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance
of the will (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42
Phil., 780).

It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia,
on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of
West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., and as certified to by the Director of the
National Library, should govern.

ISSUE: Whether or not the laws of West Virginia should govern.

RULING: The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of
the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as
facts.(In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not
met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as
provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested
by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original, under the sale of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced
to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will
was executed.

Note: In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on
this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to
indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two competent
witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and of each
other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses to the
will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove
execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West
Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony
of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine
Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal administration
in the Philippine Islands.
 While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant
presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents
attached to the petition. One of these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be
the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph Country, State of West
Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L.
MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown
by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country,
West Virginia, appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the
estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application
for the probate of the will in the Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the
proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929. These facts are
strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West
Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply
with Civil Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been
proved and allowed in West Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased
left any property at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any
in West Virginia.

Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded
Edward Randolph Hix from Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific
pronouncements on the validity or validity of this alleged divorce.

For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant.

CASE 66

In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner-appellant,
vs.In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSE B. SUNTAY,
FEDERICO C. SUNTAY, administrator-appellee./1954, J. Padilla.

Doctrine: There are matters to be established in order to prove a will proved outside the Philippines, among these are:
(a) that the foreign court was, under the laws of said foreign country, a probate court with jurisdiction over the
proceedings; (b) the law of the foreign country on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills; (c) the legal
requirements for the execution of a valid will in such foreign country. Note: In the absence of proof of the foreign law, it
is presumed that it is the same as that in the Philippines.

Facts:

- Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino resident citizen, died in city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China. He entered into
a contract of marriage twice in his lifetime.
- He had children, including the administrator-appellee Federico, with the late Manuela T. Cruz. He also had a son
herein petitioner-appellant Silvino with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him.
- Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan (special proceedings No. 4892). After
the death of Apolonio Suntay, Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate.
- On 15 October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the probate of a
last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines in November 1929 by the late Jose
B. Suntay. But it was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof
and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. Appeal was taken and SC remanded the
case to CFI Bulacan upon the finding that the evidence is sufficient to prove the loss of the will.
- Nonetheless, the probate court denied motion for continuance of the hearing by the surviving widow and dismissed
the petition. In the meantime Pacific War supervened.
- After liberation, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed
in the Philippines in November 1929 (Exhibit B) or of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China, on 4 January 1931
(Exhibit N). He claimed that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded
and probated in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China.
- The witnesses who testified to the provisions of the lost will are Go Toh, an attesting witness, Anastacio Teodoro and
Ana Suntay. Manuel Lopez, who was an attesting witness to the lost will, was dead at the time of the hearing of this
alternative petition.
- CFI disallowed the alleged last will and testament executed in November 1929 and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Amoy, China.

Issue (TOPICAL): WON the last will and testament executed in Amoy, China should be allowed and recorded by the
CFI? [NO, because certain facts as to the due execution of the China will were not established.]

Ratio: As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule
78. Section 1 of the rule provides:
Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed,
and recorded by the proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.
Section 2 provides:
When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance
in the Philippines, by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall
fix a time and place for the hearing, and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented
for allowance.
Section 3 provides:
If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a
certificate of its allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be
attached a copy of the will, shall be filed and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as
if originally proved and allowed in such court.

1. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid
will in China in 1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.

2. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel for the appellant to the Consul General of the
Republic of China set forth in Exhibits R-1 and R-2, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because
apart from the fact that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on
the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his
right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to trade matters.

3. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of
taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does
not purport to probate the will. In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and
on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating
or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceedings
in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must
be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such
notice was received by the interested parties residing in the.

4. The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a deposition or to a
perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so it does not measure or come up to the standard of such proceedings
in the Philippines for lack of notice to all interested parties and the proceedings were held at the back of such interested
parties.

Decision: The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to probate or allow the will which
was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have
been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and
allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in the municipal district court of
Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and,
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
RULE 78

CASE 70

Rioferio v. CA
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and
Kalookan City.He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he
married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents.
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada,

legitimate children of Alfonso, discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City.

On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the

Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the
property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the
properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed
to register them in his name.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging
to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings

YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance
with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and
value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from
representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
 situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two

exceptions,
1. If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
2. When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of
and he is made a party defendant
Note: Ma’am pointed out that property fraudulently registered in favor of another (like
when paramour registered a land owned by decedent in her favor) still forms part of the
estate of the decedent.

CASE 71

FACTS:

Carlos Moran Sison was appointed, without compensation, as judicial administrator of

the estate of Margarita David. He filed a bond of P5,000, the premium of which as well
as renewal fee he charged as disbursement items in his accounting.

Teodoro, one of the heirs, objected on the grounds that they are not necessary
expenses of administration and should not be charged against the estate.

ISSUE:

o Whether or not a judicial administrator, serving without compensation, is entitled to charge as an

expense of administration the premiums paid on his bond

HELD:

IN resolving the case, the Supreme Court cited the case of Sulit vs. Santos, 56 Phil 626,
where the Court ruled that the expense incurred by an executor or administrator to
produce a bond is not a proper charge against the estate. The Court further commented
in that case that the ability to give bond is in the nature of a qualification for office. The
execution and the approval of the bond constitute a condition precedent to acceptance
of the responsibilities of the trust.

The difference between Sulit vs. Santos, and the present case is that in the former, the
administrator accepted the trust with the emolument that the law allows where in the
latter, the administrator accepted the same without compensation.

Still, the difference is of no merit. It is far-fetched to conclude that the giving of a bond
by an administrator is a necessary expense in the care, management and settlement of
the estate within the meaning of the law, because these expenses are incurred "after
the executor or administrator has met the requirement of the law and has entered upon
the performance of his duties."