G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004
Kathylyn was left alone in
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25, sentencing appellant
Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime
of Rape with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of
the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity in the amount of
P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00,
exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00, actual
damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages
amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the
following Information:
That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at
Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to
have carnal knowledge of a certain KATHYLYN D.
UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, and with use of a bladed weapon stab
the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in
the death of the victim, and on the occasion or by
reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, and by means of force and violence had
carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. Uba against her
will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The facts are:
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her
first cousin, seventeen year old Kathylyn Uba, were
on the ground floor of the house of their
grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal,
Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by
their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband, appellant Joel
Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan.
Kathylyn handed the letter to appellant earlier that
morning.3
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband,
together with Isabel Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan
some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband
departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended to go to
Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave,
she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the
house of their aunt, Anita Wania.
the house.4
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly
Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at
the back of the house. They went inside the house through
the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita
asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that
he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. 5
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from
Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards
the back of the house.6 She later noticed appellant, who was
wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back
and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this
unusual as appellant and his wife used to live in the house of
Isabel Dawang.7
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her
near her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt
without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he
would not be getting the lumber he had stacked, and that
Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were
"reddish and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband
was as he had something important to tell him. Judilyn’s
husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and
went towards the back of the house of Isabel. 8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home
and found that the lights in her house were off. She called out
for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground
floor was open. She noticed that the water container she
asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She
went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if
Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a
rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in
the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid. 9
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found
out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter,
Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived.
Isabel was given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam
and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her
intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile,
neighbors had arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of
Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report
that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawang’s house.
Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the
house and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with
multiple stab wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that
appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of
Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim
pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene
of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered
with blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied
any knowledge of Kathylyns’s death,11 however, he was placed
under police custody.
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could
relieve himself. Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him
to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano
dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running away!). Police Officer
Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station
and saw appellant running away. Appellant was approximately
70 meters away from the station when Police Officer Abagan
recaptured him.12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide.
When he was arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded
"not guilty."
After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise
known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly,
sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his Brief, appellant
assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH
WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE
PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR
DOUBTFULNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE
DOUBT.
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses should be resolved against appellant. This Court will
not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in
determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears
in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of
which has been misinterpreted.13 Well-entrenched is the rule
that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses
are entitled to great weight on appeal unless cogent reasons
are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the
disturbance of the same; the reason being that the former is
in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the
witnesses and observing their deportment, conduct and
attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of
weight which would affect the result of the case, the trial
judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate
court’s highest respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that
the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 16
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated
in light of the well-settled rule which provides that an accused
can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as
sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused
committed the crime.17
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11)
wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised, were found on the
victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small
intestines to spill out of her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s
body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at
9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death
may be approximated from between nine (9) to twelve (12)
hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other
words, the estimated time of death was sometime between
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the
timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant
lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was testified to by
witnesses.
It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report
by the attending physician, Dr. Pej Evan C. Bartolo, indicates
that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were
noted on the victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of
semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony,
Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the
vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse
with the victim.21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures
submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the
victim was manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her
right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault
on her virtue.22
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the
Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm specimen from the
vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of
appellant’s gene type.
DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all
living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the same in each cell and
it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in
a person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva,
sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine,
skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly,
because of polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no
two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable
exception of identical twins.25
DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a
uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a crime, or to
exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological
evidence has been left. For purposes of criminal investigation,
DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and
exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a
more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently
facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal
of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect
to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same
principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual
assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin
tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from
clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be
transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. 27Forensic
DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly
collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can
be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the
scene of the crime.28
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which
conducted the DNA tests in this case, used the Polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem
Repeat (STR) analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a
specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially within
hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become
much easier since it became possible to reliably amplify small
samples using the PCR method.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts
should consider, inter alia, the following factors: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the
possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure
followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the
tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.29
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was
duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert witness on DNA
print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s
testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA
profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject
of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant
showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19,
TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are
identical with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal
canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found
in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in
open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances
in science and technology in the Philippine criminal justice
system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from
the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in
other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the
U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used
as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert,
were allowed greater discretion over which testimony they
would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of
scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates
directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar,
the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing
STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is
relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on
scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular
biology.
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen
found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the trial court appreciated
the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to
sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant
and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998,
appellant’s wife left the house because of their frequent
quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn
Uba, a letter from his estranged wife in the early morning on
June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania and
Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the
kitchen of the house of Isabel Dawang, acting strangely and
wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at
12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt, and again at 1:30 p.m.,
this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left
when the husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7)
Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white shirt
coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day
Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8) The door leading to the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a
rope; (9) The victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of
blood with her intestines protruding from her body on the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained
pants, bra, underwear and shoes scattered along the
periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the
victim’s vagina (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty
white shirt found in the crime scene was found to be positive
with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared
with the DNA profile of the appellant are identical; and (13)
Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was
subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of
guilt.35
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a
conviction, must form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion
of others, is the perpetrator of the crime. To determine
whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences are derived
are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant
contends that the blood sample taken from him as well as the
DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain
silent as well as his right against self-incrimination under Secs.
12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not
against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the
accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as
part of object evidence.
We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-
appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and DNA, as
there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v.
Gallarde,39 where immediately after the incident, the police
authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence
of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right
against self-incrimination. The accused may be compelled to
submit to a physical examination to determine his
involvement in an offense of which he is accused.
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted
himself for blood sampling which was conducted in open
court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the
prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the ground
that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-
post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in
the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post
facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling
requires a factual determination of the probative weight of
the evidence presented.
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be
sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and bloodied shirt,
notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at
Isabel Dawang’s house during the time when the crime was
committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident.
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing
evidence an impossibility to be in two places at the same
time, especially in this case where the two places are located
in the same barangay.40 He lives within a one hundred (100)
meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a
mere five minute walk to reach one house from the other.
This fact severely weakens his alibi.
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that
the court a quo committed reversible error in convicting him
of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted
on reasonable doubt.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly
established evidence and never on mere conjectures or
suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes
"something more than a minimum of probative value,"
suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a
"plus value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial
court from being satisfied by matters of slight value, capable
of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions.
Evidence without "plus value" may be logically relevant but
not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial
court to balance the probative value of such evidence against
the likely harm that would result from its admission.
The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when
there is relevant evidence from which the court can properly
find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires moral
certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral
certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs
the understanding and satisfies the reason and judgment of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is
certainty beyond reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the
circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory
conclusion that the accused, and no one else, committed the
offense charged.43 In view of the totality of evidence
appreciated thus far, we rule that the present case passes the
test of moral certainty.
However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of
meeting the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt,
motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to
the identity of the culprit.44
Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of
the victim, testified that she last saw the victim alive in the
morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel
Dawang.45 She witnessed the appellant running down the
stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the
same house.46 She also testified that a few days before the
victim was raped and killed, the latter revealed to her that
"Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the
school."47 The victim told Judilyn about the incident or
attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her
naked and violated body was found dead in her
grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998.48 In addition, Judilyn
also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of
appellant, separated from her husband, "this Joel Yatar
threatened to kill our family."49 According to Judilyn, who was
personally present during an argument between her aunt and
the appellant, the exact words uttered by appellant to his wife
in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your
family and your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not
contradicted by appellant.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim
was evident in the instant case. It is a rule in criminal law that
motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony
of witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before
or immediately after the commission of the offense, deeds or
words that may express it or from which his motive or reason
for committing it may be inferred.51
Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn
Uba, and by reason or on the occasion thereof, in order to
conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips
by stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely
demise.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with
homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a
woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by
means of force, threat or intimidation; and (3) by reason or on
the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force,
threat or intimidation, appellant killed the woman.52However,
in rape committed by close kin, such as the victim’s father,
step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother,
it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of
violence and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is
intact does not negate a finding that rape was committed as
mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital
organ, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen,
suffices for conviction of rape.55 The strength and dilatability
of the hymen are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch
without laceration during intercourse. Absence of hymenal
lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when
the victim is of tender age.56
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s
aunt. He is seven years older than the victim Kathylyn Uba.
Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house
of his mother-in-law, together with the victim and his wife.
After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his
mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by affinity within the
third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have
moral ascendancy over the victim.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of
death is imposed when by reason or on the occasion of the
rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of
this Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is
unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty,
they nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the
law is not unconstitutional, and that the death penalty can be
lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of
P100,000.00,57 actual damages incurred by the family of the
victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to
P93,190.00,58 and moral damages of P75,000.0059 should be
awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence.
Exemplary damages cannot be awarded as part of the civil
liability since the crime was not committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.60
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC
of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-
98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for
the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be ORDERED to
pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex
delicto in the amount of P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual
damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
exemplary damages is DELETED.
Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art.
83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 25 of Rep.
Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith
forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.*, Puno*, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they
Supreme Court are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful shares
Manila over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. [9] Nena did not
THIRD DIVISION reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile.
Hence, on September 6, 1989, Carlos and Felicidad,
NENA LAZALITA* TATING, G.R. No. 155208 represented by her son Salvador, filed a complaint with the
Petitioner, RTC of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental against Nena praying for
the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Present: Daniela in her favor, cancellation of the TCT issued in the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., name of Nena, and issuance of a new title and tax declaration
Chairperson, in favor of the heirs of Daniela.[10] The complaint also prayed
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., for the award of moral and exemplary damages as well as
CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ. attorneys fees and litigation expenses. On March 19, 1993,
the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint with leave of court
FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA, epresented by SALVADOR for the purpose of excluding Ricardo as a party plaintiff, he
MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT OF having died intestate and without issue in March 1991. [11] He
APPEALS, Promulgated: left Carlos, Felicidad, Julio, and Nena as his sole heirs.
Respondents. March 27, 2007 In her Answer, Nena denied that any fraud or
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x misrepresentation attended the execution of the subject Deed
DECISION of Absolute Sale. She also denied having received the letter of
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: her uncle, Carlos. She prayed for the dismissal of the
Assailed in the Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the complaint, and in her counterclaim, she asked the trial court
Court are the Decision[1] dated February 22, 2002 and the for the award of actual, exemplary and moral damages as well
Resolution dated August 22, 2002 of the Court of Appeals as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.[12]
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 64122, which affirmed the Trial ensued. On November 4, 1998, the RTC
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, rendered judgment with the following dispositive portion:
Negros Occidental, Branch 60. WHEREFORE, in view of all the
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in
of land denominated as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd-31182, favor of the plaintiffs and against the
located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City, Negros Occidental. The defendant, and hereby declaring the
subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was document of sale dated October 14,
owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as 1969 (Exh. Q) executed between Daniela
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-4393 Solano Vda. de Tating and Nena Lazalita
issued by the Registry of Deeds of the City of Cadiz.[3] Tating as NULL and VOID and further
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her ordering:
granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). 1. The Register of Deeds of Cadiz
The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed City to cancel TCT No. 5975
of Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. and in lieu thereof to issue a
[4]
Subsequently, title over the subject property was new title in the names of
transferred in the name of Nena.[5] She declared the property Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso
in her name for tax purposes and paid the real estate taxes owner of one-fourth () portion
due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988. of the property; Felicidad
[6]
However, the land remained in possession of Daniela. Tating Marcella, Pro-indiviso
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement owner of one-fourth () portion;
claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso owner
property; the true agreement between her and Nena was of one-fourth () portion and
simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of Nena Lazalita Tating, Pro-
the latter to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the indiviso owner of one-fourth ()
subject property for the purpose of helping her defray her portion, all of lot 56 after
business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not payment of the prescribed
secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the fees;
title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property 2. The City Assessor of the City
reconveyed to her.[7] of Cadiz to cancel Tax
Daniela died on July 29, 1988[8] leaving her children as her Declaration No. 143-00672
heirs, namely: Ricardo, Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who and in lieu thereof issue a new
predeceased Daniela and was represented by herein Tax Declaration in the names
petitioner. of Carlos Tating, Pro-indiviso
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that portion; Felicidad Tating
when Daniela died they discovered the sworn statement she Marcella, Pro-indiviso portion;
 Julio Tating, Pro-indiviso
portion; and Nena Lazalita
Tating, Pro-indiviso portion, all
of lot 56 as well as the house
standing thereon be likewise
declared in the names of the
persons mentioned in the
same proportions as above-
stated after payment of the
prescribed fees;
3. The defendant is furthermore
ordered to pay plaintiffs the
sum of P20,000.00 by way of
moral damages, P10,000.00 by
way of exemplary
damages, P5,000.00 by way of
attorneys fees and P3,000.00
by way of litigation expenses;
and to
4. Pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Nena filed an appeal with the CA. On February 22,
2002, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the judgment of
the RTC.[14]
Nenas Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated August 22, 2002.[15]
Hence, herein petition for certiorari anchored on the
ground that the CA has decided the instant case without due
regard to and in violation of the applicable laws and Decisions
of this Honorable Court and also because the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, which it has affirmed, is not supported by
and is even against the evidence on record.[16]
At the outset, it must be stated that the filing of the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is inappropriate. Considering that the assailed Decision
and Resolution of the CA finally disposed of the case, the
proper remedy is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
The Court notes that while the instant petition is
denominated as a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, there is no allegation that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion. On the other hand, the petition
actually avers errors of judgment, rather than of jurisdiction,
which are the proper subjects of a petition for review
on certiorari. Hence, in accordance with the liberal spirit
pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice, the
Court decided to treat the present petition for certiorari as
having been filed under Rule 45, especially considering that it
was filed within the reglementary period for filing the same.
[17]
As to the merits of the case, petitioner contends that
the case for the private respondents rests on the proposition
that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated October 14, 1969 is
simulated because Danielas actual intention was not to
dispose of her property but simply to help petitioner by
providing her with a collateral. Petitioner asserts that the sole
evidence which persuaded both the RTC and the CA in holding
that the subject deed was simulated was the Sworn
Statement of Daniela dated December 28, 1977. However,
petitioner argues that said Sworn Statement should have
been rejected outright by the lower courts considering that
Daniela has long been dead when the document was offered
in evidence, thereby denying petitioner the right to cross-
examine her.
Petitioner also contends that while the subject deed was
executed on October 14, 1969, the Sworn Statement was
purportedly executed only on December 28, 1977 and was
discovered only after the death of Daniela in 1994.
[18]
Petitioner argues that if the deed of sale is indeed
simulated, Daniela would have taken action against the
petitioner during her lifetime. However, the fact remains that
up to the time of her death or almost 20 years after the Deed
of Absolute Sale was executed, she never uttered a word of
complaint against petitioner.
Petitioner further asserts that the RTC and the CA erred in
departing from the doctrine held time and again by the
Supreme Court that clear, strong and convincing evidence
beyond mere preponderance is required to show the falsity or
nullity of a notarial document. Petitioner also argues that the
RTC and the CA erred in its pronouncement that the
transaction between Daniela and petitioner created a trust
relationship between them because of the settled rule that
where the terms of a contract are clear, it should be given full
effect.
In their Comment and Memorandum, private respondents
contend that petitioner failed to show that the CA or the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in arriving at their
assailed judgments; that Danielas Sworn Statement is
sufficient evidence to prove that the contract of sale by and
between her and petitioner was merely simulated; and that,
in effect, the agreement between petitioner and Daniela
created a trust relationship between them.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
The CA and the trial court ruled that the contract of
sale between petitioner and Daniela is simulated. A contract
is simulated if the parties do not intend to be bound at all
(absolutely simulated) or if the parties conceal their true
agreement (relatively simulated).[19] The primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is
the intention of the parties. [20] Such intention is determined
from the express terms of their agreement as well as from
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts.[21]
In the present case, the main evidence presented by
private respondents in proving their allegation that the
subject deed of sale did not reflect the true intention of the
parties thereto is the sworn statement of Daniela
dated December 28, 1977. The trial court admitted the said
sworn statement as part of private respondents evidence and
gave credence to it. The CA also accorded great probative
weight to this document.
There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject
sworn statement. However, the admissibility of evidence
should not be equated with weight of evidence.[22] The
admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence while the weight of evidence pertains to
evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and
persuade.[23] Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of
evidence.[24]It is settled that affidavits are classified as hearsay
evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant
but by another who uses his own language in writing the
affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them.[25] Moreover, the
adverse party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine
the affiant.[26] For this reason, affidavits are generally rejected
for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are placed
on the witness stand to testify thereon.[27] The Court finds that
both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the
sworn statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer
available to take the witness stand as she is already dead, the
RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on
Danielas sworn statement for purposes of proving that the
contract of sale between her and petitioner was simulated
and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created
between them.
Private respondents should have presented other
evidence to sufficiently prove their allegation that Daniela, in
fact, had no intention of disposing of her property when she
executed the subject deed of sale in favor of petitioner. As in
all civil cases, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
material allegations of his complaint and he must rely on the
strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
evidence of the defendant.[28] Aside from Danielas sworn
statement, private respondents failed to present any other
documentary evidence to prove their claim. Even the
testimonies of their witnesses failed to establish that Daniela
had a different intention when she entered into a contract of
sale with petitioner.
In Suntay v. Court of Appeals,[29] the Court ruled that
the most protuberant index of simulation is the complete
absence, on the part of the vendee, of any attempt in any
manner to assert his rights of ownership over the disputed
property.[30] In the present case, however, the evidence clearly
shows that petitioner declared the property for taxation and
paid realty taxes on it in her name. Petitioner has shown that
from 1972 to 1988 she religiously paid the real estate taxes
due on the said lot and that it was only in 1974 and 1987 that
she failed to pay the taxes thereon. While tax receipts and
declarations and receipts and declarations of ownership for
taxation purposes are not, in themselves, incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute at least proof that the
holder has a claim of title over the property. [31] The voluntary
declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes
manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain
title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
the State and all other interested parties, but also the
intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government.
[32]
Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership.[33] On the other hand, private respondents
failed to present even a single tax receipt or declaration
showing that Daniela paid taxes due on the disputed lot as
proof that she claims ownership thereof. The only Tax
Declaration in the name of Daniela, which private
respondents presented in evidence, refers only to the house
standing on the lot in controversy. [34] Even the said Tax
Declaration contains a notation that herein petitioner owns
the lot (Lot 56) upon which said house was built.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that if
the subject Deed of Absolute Sale did not really reflect the
real intention of Daniela, why is it that she remained silent
until her death; she never told any of her relatives regarding
her actual purpose in executing the subject deed; she simply
chose to make known her true intentions through the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977, the existence
of which she kept secret from her relatives; and despite her
declaration therein that she is appealing for help in order to
get back the subject lot, she never took any concrete step to
recover the subject property from petitioner until her death
more than ten years later.
It is true that Daniela retained physical possession of
the property even after she executed the subject Absolute
Deed of Sale and even after title to the property was
transferred in petitioners favor. In fact, Daniela continued to
occupy the property in dispute until her death in 1988 while,
in the meantime, petitioner continued to reside in Manila.
However, it is well-established that ownership and possession
are two entirely different legal concepts. [35] Just as possession
is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is non-possession
inconsistent with ownership. The first paragraph of Article
1498 of the Civil Code states that when the sale is made
through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be
equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of
the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or
cannot clearly be inferred. Possession, along with ownership,
is transferred to the vendee by virtue of the notarized deed of
conveyance.[36] Thus, in light of the circumstances of the
present case, it is of no legal consequence that petitioner did
not take actual possession or occupation of the disputed
property after the execution of the deed of sale in her favor
because she was already able to perfect and complete her
ownership of and title over the subject property.
As to Danielas affidavit dated June 9, 1983,
submitted by petitioner, which confirmed the validity of the
sale of the disputed lot in her favor, the same has no
probative value, as the sworn statement earlier adverted to,
for being hearsay. Naturally, private respondents were not
able to cross-examine the deceased-affiant on her
declarations contained in the said affidavit.
However, even if Danielas affidavit of June 9, 1983 is
disregarded, the fact remains that private respondents failed
to prove by clear, strong and convincing evidence beyond
mere preponderance of evidence [37] that the contract of sale
between Daniela and petitioner was simulated. The legal
presumption is in favor of the validity of contractsand the
party who impugns its regularity has the burden of proving its
simulation.[38] Since private respondents failed to discharge
the burden of proving their allegation that the contract of sale
between petitioner and Daniela was simulated, the
presumption of regularity and validity of the October 14,
1969 Deed of Absolute Sale stands.
Considering that the Court finds the subject contract
of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and not
fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss
the issue as to whether or not a trust relationship was created
between them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 64122, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Branch 60, in Civil Case No.
278-C, are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the
private respondents is DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 with the use of his right hand at the right
sub costal area which caused Bolanons
-versus- death. Not only because it was testified to
by Augusto Mendoza but corroborated by
Rodolfo Estao, the victims uncle who
RODRIGO SALAFRANCA brought Bolanon to the hospital and who
y BELLO, relayed to the court that when he aided
Accused-Appellant. Bolanon and even on their way to the
hospital while the latter was suffering from
hard breathing, victim Bolanon was able to
say that it was Rodrigo Salafranca who
stabbed him.[3]
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
The RTC appreciated treachery based on the testimony
of Prosecution witness Mendoza
BERSAMIN, J.:
on how Salafranca had effected his attack
against Bolanon, observing that by encircling his (accused) left
An ante-mortem declaration of a victim of murder,
arm, while behind the victim on the latters neck and stabbing
homicide, or parricide that meets the conditions of
the victim with the use of his right hand, Salafranca did not
admissibility under the Rules of Court and pertinent
give Bolanon any opportunity to defend himself. [4] The RTC
jurisprudence is admissible either as a dying declaration or as
noted inconsistencies in Salafrancas and his witness
a part of the res gestae, or both.
testimonies, as well as the fact that he had fled from his
residence the day after the incident and had stayed away in
Rodrigo Salafranca y Bello was charged with and
Bataan for eight years until his arrest. The RTC opined that
tried for murder for the fatal stabbing of Johnny Bolanon, and
had he not been hiding, there would be no reason for him to
was ultimately found guilty of the felony by the Regional Trial
immediately leave his residence, especially because he was
Court, Branch 18, in Manila on September 23, 2004. On
also working near the area.[5]
appeal, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
The RTC disposed thus:
(CA) through its decision promulgated on November 24, 2005.
[1]
With the above observations and findings,
accused Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby found
Salafranca has come to the Court on a final appeal,
guilty of the crime of Murder defined and
continuing to challenge the credibility of the witnesses who
punished under Article 248 as amended by
had incriminated him.
Republic Act No. 7659 in relation to Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code with the
The established facts show that past midnight on July
presence of the qualifying aggravating
31, 1993 Bolanon was stabbed near the Del Pan Sports
circumstance of treachery (248 par. 1 as
Complex in Binondo, Manila; that after stabbing Bolanon, his
amended) without any mitigating nor other
assailant ran away; that Bolanon was still able to walk to the
aggravating circumstance attendant to its
house of his uncle Rodolfo B. Estao in order to seek help; that
commission, Rodrigo Salafranca is hereby
his uncle rushed him to the Philippine General Hospital by
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
taxicab; that on their way to the hospital Bolanon told Estao
perpetua.
that it was Salafranca who had stabbed him; that Bolanon
eventually succumbed at the hospital at 2:30 am despite
He shall be credited with the full extent of
receiving medical attention; and that the stabbing of Bolanon
his preventive imprisonment under Article
was personally witnessed by Augusto Mendoza, then still a
29 of the Revised Penal Code.
minor of 13 years, who was in the complex at the time. [2]
His body is hereby committed to the
As stated, Salafranca fled after stabbing Bolanon. He
custody of the Director of the Bureau of
evaded arrest for a long period, despite the warrant for his
Correction, National
arrest being issued. He was finally arrested on April 23, 2003,
Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City thru the City
and detained at the Manila City Jail.
Jail Warden of Manila.
After trial, the RTC convicted Salafranca, stating:
He is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs
The evidence is clear that it was
of the victim the sum of P50,000.00
Rodrigo Salafranca who delivered two (2)
representing death indemnity.
stabbing blows to the victim while holding
Johnny Bolanon with his left arm encircled
There being no claim of other damages, no
around Bolanons neck stabbing the latter
pronouncement is hereby made.

SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings and conclusions of
the RTC,[7] citing the dying declaration made to his uncle
pointing to Salafranca as his assailant, [8] and Salafrancas
positive identification as the culprit by Mendoza. [9] It stressed
that Salafrancas denial and his alibi of being in his home
during the incident did not overcome the positive
identification, especially as his unexplained flight after the
stabbing, leaving his home and employment, constituted a
circumstance highly indicative of his guilt.[10]
Presently, Salafranca reiterates his defenses, and insists that
the State did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appeal lacks merit.
Discrediting Mendoza and Estao as witnesses against
Salafranca would be unwarranted. The RTC and the CA
correctly concluded that Mendoza and Estao were credible
and reliable. The determination of the competence and
credibility of witnesses at trial rested primarily with the RTC
as the trial court due to its unique and unequalled position of
observing their deportment during
testimony, and of assessing their credibility and appreciating
their truthfulness, honesty and candor. Absent a substantial
reason to justify the reversal of the assessment made and
conclusions reached by the RTC, the CA as the reviewing court
was bound by such assessment and conclusions,
[11]
considering that the CA as the appellate court could
neither substitute its assessment nor draw different
conclusions without a persuasive showing that the RTC
misappreciated the circumstances or omitted significant
evidentiary matters that would alter the result.[12] Salafranca
did not persuasively show a misappreciation or omission by
the RTC. Hence, the Court, in this appeal, is in no position to
undo or to contradict the findings of the RTC and the CA,
which were entitled to great weight and respect.[13]
Salafrancas denial and alibi were worthless in the
face of his positive identification by Mendoza as the assailant
of Bolanon. The lower courts properly accorded full faith to
such incrimination by Mendoza considering that Salafranca
did not even project any ill motive that could have impelled
Mendoza to testify against him unless it was upon the truth.
[14]
Based on Mendozas account, Salafranca had attacked
Bolanon from behind and had encircled his left arm over the
neck (of Bolanon) and delivered the stabbing blow using the
right(hand) and coming from wnnt (sic) up right sideways and
another one encircling the blow towards below the left
nipple.[15] Relying on Mendozas recollection of how Salafranca
had attacked Bolanon, the RTC found treachery to be
attendant in the killing. This finding the CA concurred with.
We join the CAs concurrence because
Mendozas eyewitness account of the manner of attack
remained uncontested by Salafranca who merely insisted on
his alibi. The method and means Salafranca employed
constituted a surprise deadly attack against Bolanon from
behind and included an aggressive physical control of the
latters movements that ensured the success of the attack
without any retaliation or defense on the part of Bolanon.
According to the Revised Penal Code,[16] treachery is present
when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense
which the offended party might make.
The Court further notes Estaos testimony on the
utterance by Bolanon of statements identifying Salafranca as
his assailant right after the stabbing incident. The testimony
follows:
Q Can you tell what happened on the said
date?
A My nephew arrived in our house with a
stab wound on his left chest.
Q What time was that?
A 12:50 a.m.
Q When you saw your nephew with a stab
wound, what did he say?
A Tito dalhin mo ako sa Hospital sinaksak
ako.
Q What did you do?
A I immediately dressed up and brought him
to PGH.
Q On the way to the PGH what transpired?
A While traveling toward PGH I asked my
nephew who stabbed him?, and he
answered, Rod Salafranca.
Q Do you know this Rod Salafranca?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How long have you known him?
A Matagal na ho kasi mag-neighbor kami.
Q If you see him inside the courtroom will
you be able to identify him?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Will you look around and point him to us?
A (Witness pointing to a man who answered
by the name of Rod Salafranca.)
 COURT
When he told you the name of his assailant
what was his condition?
A He was suffering from hard breathing so I
told him not to talk anymore because
he will just suffer more.
Q What happened when you told him that?
A He kept silent.
Q What time did you arrive at the PGH?
A I cannot remember the time because I
was already confused at that time.
Q When you arrived at the PGH what
happened?
A He was brought to Emergency Room.
Q When he was brought to the emergency
room what happened?
A He was pronounced dead.[17]
It appears from the foregoing testimony that
Bolanon had gone to the residence of Estao, his uncle, to seek
help right after being stabbed by Salafranca; that Estao had
hurriedly dressed up to bring his nephew to the Philippine
General Hospital by taxicab; that on the way to the hospital,
Estao had asked Bolanon who had stabbed him, and the latter
had told Estao that his assailant had been Salafranca; that at
the time of the utterance Bolanon had seemed to be having a
hard time breathing, causing Estao to advise him not to talk
anymore; and that about ten minutes after his admission at
the emergency ward of the hospital, Bolanon had expired and
had been pronounced dead. Such circumstances qualified the
utterance of Bolanon as both a dying declaration and as part
of the res gestae, considering that the Court has recognized
that the statement of the victim an hour before his death and
right after the hacking incident bore all the earmarks either of
a dying declaration or part of the res gestae either of which
was an exception to the hearsay rule.[18]
A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible
as evidence due to its hearsay character, may nonetheless be
admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a)
that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding
circumstances of the declarants death; (b) that at the time the
declaration is made, the declarant is under a consciousness of
an impending death; (c) that the declarant is competent as a
witness; and (d) that the declaration is offered in a criminal
case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the
declarant is a victim.[19]
All the requisites were met herein. Bolanon communicated his
ante-mortem statement to Estao, identifying Salafranca as the
person who had stabbed him. At the time of his statement,
Bolanon was conscious of his impending death, having
sustained a stab wound in the chest and, according to Estao,
was then experiencing great difficulty in breathing. Bolanon
succumbed in the hospital emergency room a few minutes
from admission, which occurred under three hours after the
stabbing. There is ample authority for the view that the
declarants belief in the imminence of his death can be shown
by the declarants own statements or from circumstantial
evidence, such as the nature of his wounds, statements made
in his presence, or by the opinion of his physician. [20] Bolanon
would have been competent to testify on the subject of the
declaration had he survived. Lastly, the dying declaration was
offered in this criminal prosecution for murder in which
Bolanon was the victim.
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the res
gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the
hearsay rule when the following requisites concur, to wit: (a)
the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b)
the statements are made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.[21]
The requisites for admissibility of a declaration as part of
the res gestae concur herein. Surely, when he gave the
identity of the assailant to Estao, Bolanon was referring to a
startling occurrence, i.e., his stabbing by Salafranca. Bolanon
was then on board the taxicab that would bring him to the
hospital, and thus had no time to contrive his identification of
Salafranca as the assailant. His utterance about Salafranca
having stabbed him was made in spontaneity and only in
reaction to the startling occurrence. The statement was
relevant because it identified Salafranca as the perpetrator.
The term res gestae has been defined as those circumstances
which are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated
act and which are admissible when illustrative of such act.
[22]
In a general way, res gestae refers to the circumstances,
facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of
deliberation and fabrication.[23] The rule
on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime when the circumstances are such
that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or
utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and
there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and
to fabricate a false statement.[24] The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the
act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes
as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also
whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.[25]
We modify the limiting of civil damages by the CA
and the RTC to only the death indemnity of P50,000.00. We
declare that the surviving heirs of Bolanon were entitled by
law to more than such indemnity, because the damages to be
awarded when death occurs due to a crime may include: (a)
civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim (which
was granted herein); (b) actual or compensatory damages; (c)
moral damages; (d) exemplary damages; and (e) temperate
damages.[26]
We hold that the CA and the RTC should have further
granted moral damages which were different from the death
indemnity.[27] The death indemnity compensated the loss of
life due to crime, but appropriate and reasonable moral
damages would justly assuage the mental anguish and
emotional sufferings of the surviving family of the victim.
[28]
Although mental anguish and emotional sufferings of the
surviving heirs were not quantifiable with mathematical
precision, the Court must nonetheless strive to set an amount
that would restore the heirs of Bolanon to their moral status
quo ante. Given the circumstances, the amount of P50,000.00
is reasonable as moral damages, which, pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence,[29] we are bound to award despite the absence
of any allegation and proof of the heirs mental anguish and
emotional suffering. The rationale for doing so rested on
human nature and experience having shown that:
xxx a violent death invariably and
necessarily brings about emotional pain and
anguish on the part of the victims family. It
is inherently human to suffer sorrow,
torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal
killing. Such violent death or brutal killing
not only steals from the family of the
deceased his precious life, deprives them
forever of his love, affection and support,
but often leaves them with the gnawing
feeling that an injustice has been done to
them.[30]
The CA and the RTC committed another omission
consisting in their non-recognition of the right of the heirs of
Bolanon to temperate damages. It is already settled that
when actual damages for burial and related expenses are not
substantiated by receipts, temperate damages of at
least P25,000.00 are warranted, for it would certainly be
unfair to the surviving heirs of the victim to deny them
compensation by way of actual damages.[31]
Moreover, the Civil Code provides that exemplary
damages may be imposed in criminal cases as part of the civil
liability when the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances.[32] The Civil Code permits such
damages to be awarded by way of example or correction for
the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages.[33] Conformably
with such legal provisions, the CA and the RTC should have
recognized the entitlement of the heirs of the victim to
exemplary damages because of the attendance of treachery.
It was of no moment that treachery was an attendant
circumstance in murder, and, as such, inseparable and
absorbed in murder. The Court explained so in People v.
Catubig:[34]
The term aggravating circumstances
used by the Civil Code, the law not having
specified otherwise, is to be understood in
its broad or generic sense. The commission
of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one
on the public as it breaches the social order
and the other upon the private victim as it
causes personal sufferings, each of which is
addressed by, respectively, the prescription
of heavier punishment for the accused and
by an award of additional damages to the
victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift
to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the
attendance of aggravating circumstances,
whether ordinary or qualifying, in its
commission. Unlike the criminal liability
which is basically a State concern, the
award of damages, however, is likewise, if
not primarily, intended for the offended
party who suffers thereby. It would make
little sense for an award of exemplary
damages to be due the private offended
party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or
qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should
only be of consequence to the criminal,
rather than to the civil, liability of the
offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect
of the case, an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying, should
entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
For the purpose of fixing the exemplary damages,
the sum of P30,000.00 is deemed reasonable and proper,
[35]
because we think that a lesser amount could not result in
genuine exemplarity.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on November 24, 2005,
but MODIFIES the awards of civil damages by adding to the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded as death indemnity the
amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages; P25,000.00 as
temperate damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages,
all of which awards shall bear interest of 6% per annum from
the finality of this decision.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 107383. February 20, 1996.]
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return
documents and papers taken by her from private respondents
clinic without the latters knowledge and consent.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and
in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and
cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and
his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks,
diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The
documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a
case for legal separation and for disqualification from the
practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her
husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the
documents and papers and for damages against petitioner.
The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described
in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately
return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00,
as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and
attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of
preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and
petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or
submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers
in question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
There is no question that the documents and papers in
question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin,
and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner,
without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial
court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to
private respondent and enjoined her from using them in
evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the trial courts decision, petitioners only
ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court
ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i
to J-7 of respondents comment in that case) were admissible
in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioners attorney,
Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct. For this reason it is contended that the Court of
Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondents complaint.
Petitioners contention has no merit. The case against
Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case,
charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the
injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint
against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following
defense of Atty. Felix, Jr. which it found to be impressed with
merit:2
On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of
respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:
xxx xxx xxx
4. When respondent refiled Cecilias case for legal separation
before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was admittedly an
order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia
from using the documents Annex A-I to J-7. On September 6,
1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court
on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining
order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the
order of the trial court. Hence, during the enforceability of
this Courts order, respondents request for petitioner to admit
the genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes
cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr.
Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the
questioned annexes. At that point in time, would it have been
malpractice for respondent to use petitioners admission as
evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in
the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is-
not malpractice.
Significantly, petitioners admission was done not thru his
counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath. Such verified
admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable
in evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his
admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husbands
admission and use the same in her action for legal separation
cannot be treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative
case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of
the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr.
Martins admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did
not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial
court. By no means does the decision in that case establish
the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was
acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the
time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the
order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this
Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial
courts order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition
against the further use of the documents and papers became
effective again.
 Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence
[to be] inviolable3is no less applicable simply because it is the
wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity)
who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is
to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when
public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by
law.4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither
husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without
the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by
one from the other during the marriage, save for specified
exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication;
quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one
knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the
duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Romero, and Puno, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 128538. February 28, 2001]

SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE
 INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC., DANILO ARRIETA and
LEOPOLDO HALILI, respondents.
RESOLUTION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review, pursuant to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated in November 12, 1996 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45742
entitled State Investment House, Inc., v. Danilo Arrieta, et al.,
and SCC Chemical Corporation. The questioned decision
affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 33, dated March 22, 1993, in Civil Case No. 84-
25881, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff the
following: a) To pay plaintiff State Investment House, Inc., the
sum of P150,483.16 with interest thereon at 30% per annum
reckond (sic) from April, 1984 until the whole amount is fully
paid; b) To pay plaintiff an amount equivalent to 25% of the
total amount due and demandable as attorneys fees and to
pay the cost(s) of suit.
SO ORDERED.[1]
Equally challenged in this petition is the Resolution of
the appellate court dated February 27, 1997, denying SCC
Chemicals Corporations motion for reconsideration.
The background of this case, as culled from the decision
of the Court of Appeals, is as follows:
On December 13, 1983, SCC Chemicals Corporation (SCC
for brevity) through its chairman, private respondent Danilo
Arrieta and vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo,
obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc.,
(hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan
carried an annual interest rate of 30% plus penalty charges of
2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon
non-payment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the
payment of the loan, Danilo Arrieta and private respondent
Leopoldo Halili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement
binding themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation
on the maturity date. SCC failed to pay the loan when it
matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC, Arrieta and
Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was
made.
On August 2, 1984, SIHI filed Civil Case No. 84-25881 for
a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHIs lack of cause of action.
Petitioner contended that the promissory note upon which
SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no
binding effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were
allowed to meet out-of-court in an effort to settle the dispute
amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following
stipulation of facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the
plaintiff and the defendant and that it has jurisdiction to try
and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the
defendant have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in
this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the
defendant SCC Chemical Corporation dated April 4, 1984
together with a statement of account of even date which
were both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant
SCC Chemical Corporation the latter acting through
defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and Pablito Bermundo executed
a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount of
P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984. [2]
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of
whether or not the defendants were liable to the plaintiff and
to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-
examination of said witness was postponed several times due
to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The
case was calendared several times for hearing but each time,
SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite notice. SCC was
finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to
cross-examine the witness of SIHI and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its
decision in favor of SIHI.
Aggrieved by the verdict, SCC elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
45742.
On appeal, SCC contended that SIHI had failed to show,
by a preponderance of evidence, that the latter had a case
against it. SCC argued that the lone witness presented by SIHI
to prove its claim was insufficient as the competency of the
witness was not established and there was no showing that
he had personal knowledge of the transaction. SCC further
maintained that no proof was shown of the genuineness of
the signatures in the documentary exhibits presented as
evidence and that these signatures were neither marked nor
offered in evidence by SIHI. Finally, SCC pointed out that the
original copies of the documents were not presented in court.
On November 12, 1996, the appellate court affirmed in
toto the judgment appealed from.
On December 11, 1996 SCC filed its motion for
reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its
resolution dated February 27, 1997.
 Hence, petitioners recourse to this Court relying on the
following assignments of error:
I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT PROVED ITS CAUSE OF
ACTION AND OVERCAME ITS BURDEN OF PROOF.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT.
We find the pertinent issues submitted for resolution to
be:
(1) Whether or not the Court of Appeals made an
error of law in holding that private respondent
SIHI had proved its cause of action by
preponderant evidence; and
(2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
upholding the award of attorneys fees to SIHI.
Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that SIHI
introduced documentary evidence through the testimony of a
witness whose competence was not established and whose
personal knowledge of the truthfulness of the facts testified
to was not demonstrated. It argues that the same was in
violation of Sections 36[3] and 48,[4] Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court and it was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to
have ruled otherwise. In addition, SCC points out that the sole
witness of SIHI did not profess to have seen the document
presented in evidence executed or written by SCC. Thus, no
proof of its genuineness was adduced. SIHI thus ran afoul of
Section 2,[5] Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which requires
proof of due execution and authenticity of private documents
before the same can be received as evidence. Petitioner
likewise submits that none of the signatures affixed in the
documentary evidence presented by SIHI were offered in
evidence. It vehemently argues that such was in violation of
the requirement of Section 34,[6] Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. It was thus an error of law on the part of the appellate
court to consider the same. Finally, petitioner posits that the
non-production of the originals of the documents presented
in evidence allows the presumption of suppression of
evidence provided for in Section 3 (e),[7] Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, to come into play.
Petitioners arguments lack merit; they fail to persuade
us.
We note that the Court of Appeals found that SCC failed
to appear several times on scheduled hearing dates despite
due notice to it and counsel. On all those scheduled hearing
dates, petitioner was supposed to cross-examine the lone
witness offered by SIHI to prove its case. Petitioner now
charges the appellate court with committing an error of law
when it failed to disallow the admission in evidence of said
testimony pursuant to the hearsay rule contained in Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge;
hearsay excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts
which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules.
Petitioners reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court is misplaced. As a rule, hearsay evidence is excluded
and carries no probative value.[8] However, the rule does
admit of an exception. Where a party failed to object to
hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible. [9] The rationale
for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to
cross-examine. It is settled that it is the opportunity to cross-
examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to
by a witness are hearsay. [10] However, the right to cross-
examine may be waived. The repeated failure of a party to
cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right.
Petitioner was afforded several opportunities by the trial
court to cross-examine the other partys witness. Petitioner
repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No
error was thus committed by the respondent court when it
sustained the trial courts finding that petitioner had waived
its right to cross-examine the opposing partys witness. It is
now too late for petitioner to be raising this matter of hearsay
evidence.
Nor was the assailed testimony hearsay. The Court of
Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a
competent witness as he testified to facts, which he knew of
his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his
testimony were satisfied.
Respecting petitioners other submissions, the same are
moot and academic. As correctly found by the Court of
Appeals, petitioners admission as to the execution of the
promissory note by it through private respondent Arrieta and
Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the
genuineness of signatures. The admission having been made
in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be
treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4, [11] Rule 129 of
the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof.
Nor will petitioners reliance on the best evidence
rule[12] advance its cause. Respondent SIHI had no need to
present the original of the documents as there was already a
judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of
the promissory note and receipt of the demand letter. It is
now too late for petitioner to be questioning their
authenticity. Its admission of the existence of these
documents was sufficient to establish its obligation. Petitioner
failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of
payment or other forms of extinguishment of said obligation.
No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate
court when it held petitioner liable on its obligation, pursuant
to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 1159. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of
law between the contracting parties and should be complied
with in good faith.
On the second issue, petitioner charges the Court of
Appeals with reversible error for having sustained the trial
courts award of attorneys fees. Petitioner relies on Radio
Communications of the Philippines v. Rodriguez, 182 SCRA
899,909 (1990), where we held that when attorneys fees are
awarded, the reason for the award of attorneys fees must be
stated in the text of the courts decision. Petitioner submits
that since the trial court did not state any reason for awarding
the same, the award of attorneys fees should have been
disallowed by the appellate court.
We find for petitioner in this regard.
It is settled that the award of attorneys fees is the
exception rather than the rule, hence it is necessary for the
trial court to make findings of fact and law, which would bring
the case within the exception and justify the grant of the
award. Otherwise stated, given the failure by the trial court to
explicitly state the rationale for the award of attorneys fees,
the same shall be disallowed. In the present case, a perusal of
the records shows that the trial court failed to explain the
award of attorneys fees. We hold that the same should
thereby be deleted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The decision dated November 12, 1996 of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the
award of attorneys fees to private respondent SIHI is hereby
deleted. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127240. March 27, 2000]

ONG CHIA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. marie
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of
Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato[2] admitting petitioner
Ong Chia to Philippines citizenship.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In
1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila
on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in
the Philippines where he found employment and eventually
started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he
had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a
verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A.
No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law,
as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as
required in 2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in
3 of the law, stated -
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition
for citizenship under the provisions of Letter
of Instruction No.270 with the Special
Committee on Naturalization, Office of the
Solicitor General, Manila, docketed as SCN
Case No.031776, but the same was not
acted upon owing to the fact that the said
Special Committee on Naturalization was
not reconstituted after the February, 1986
revolution such that processing of petitions
for naturalization by administrative process
was suspended;
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications
and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony.
So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the
testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court
whether the State intended to present any witness against
him, he remarked: novero
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of
the petitioner himself which is rather
surprising, in the sense that he seems to be
well-versed with the major portion of the
history of the Philippines, so, on our
part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please,
that petitioner really deserves to be
admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And
for this reason, we do not wish to present
any evidence to counteract or refute the
testimony of the witnesses for the
petitioner, as well as the petitioner himself.
[3]
Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the
petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The
State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the
names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state
all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473,
7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of
2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his
previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also
in contravention of 2; and (5) failed to support his petition
with the appropriate documentary evidence.[4]
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977
petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special
Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767, [5] in
which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong
Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto
Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other
name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended
that his petition must fail.[6] The state also annexed income tax
returns[7] allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to
show that his net income could hardly support himself and his
family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a
proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the
Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner
claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married
twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church
in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the
benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in
1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953
marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a
copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract [8] and a Joint-
Affidavit[9] executed by petitioner and his wife. These
documents show that when petitioner married Ramona
Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because
petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as
husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage.
This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he
started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.ella
The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of Residence,[10] petitioner resided at
"J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address
in his petition.
On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and
denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that
due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not
precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower
court and brought up for the first time on appeal.[11] The
appellate court held:
As correctly observed by the Office of the
Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed
to state in this present petition for
naturalization his other name, "LORETO
CHIA ONG," which name appeared in his
previous application under Letter of
Instruction No.270. Names and pseudonyms
must be stated in the petition for
naturalization and failure to include the
same militates against a decision in his
favor...This is a mandatory requirement to
allow those persons who know (petitioner)
by those other names to come forward and
inform the authorities of any legal objection
which might adversely affect his application
for citizenship.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in
his petition for naturalization that he
formerly resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and
"Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to
state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is
mandatory and failure of the petitioner to
comply with it is fatal to the petition. As
explained by the Court, the reason for the
provision is to give the public, as well as the
investigating agencies of the government,
upon the publication of the petition, an
opportunity to be informed thereof and
voice their objections against the petitioner.
By failing to comply with this provision, the
petitioner is depriving the public and said
agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating
the purpose of the law
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in
a proper and irreproachable manner when
he lived-in with his wife for several years,
and sired four children out of wedlock. It
has been the consistent ruling that the
"applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his
wife without the benefit of clergy and
begetting by her three children out of
wedlock is a conduct far from being proper
and irreproachable as required by the
Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore
disqualifies him from becoming a citizen of
the Philippines by naturalizationnigel
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual
income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is
not lucrative income. His failure to file an
income tax return "because he is not liable
for income tax yet" confirms that his income
is low. . ."It is not only that the person
having the employment gets enough for his
ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown
that the employment gives one an income
such that there is an appreciable margin of
his income over expenses as to be able to
provide for an adequate support in the
event of unemployment, sickness, or
disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public
charge." ...Now that they are in their old
age, petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are
living on the allowance given to them by
their children. The monthly pension given
by the elder children of the applicant cannot
be added to his income to make it lucrative
because like bonuses, commissions and
allowances, said pensions are contingent,
speculative and precarious
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE
COURT CAN DENY AN APPLCATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF
DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE THE
TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF
THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.
II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN KNOWN
BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS
PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER
STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES
HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES OF
RESIDENCE.
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO CONDUCT
HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND
IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD. brando
Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court
erred in considering the documents which had merely been
annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis
of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision.
Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary
value,"[12] so it was argued, because under Rule 132, 34 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no
evidence which has not been formally offered.
The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule
143[13] of the Rules of Court which provides that -
These rules shall not apply to land
registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency
proceedings, and other cases not herein
provided for, except by analogy or in a
suppletory character and whenever
practicable and convenient. (Emphasis
added)
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of
evidence (Rule 132, 34) now being invoked by petitioner is
clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition
for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be
applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since
reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the
first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical
and convenient course of action considering that decision in
naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res
judicata.[14] Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of
the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents. Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of
the State to present and formally offer its documentary
evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to
object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of
his fundamental right to procedural due process.[15] We are
not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the
admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is
to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility.[16] Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived
of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents
submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have
included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed
with the Court of Appeals, thus: nigella
The authenticity of the alleged petition for
naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which
was supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI
270 has not been established. In fact, the
case number of the alleged petition for
naturalization is 031767 while the case
number of the petition actually filed by the
appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is
totally unreliable and should not be
considered by the Honorable Court in
resolving the instant appeal.[17]
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is
trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical
error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No.
031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the
correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation
Sheet[18] of the Special Committee on Naturalization which
was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this,
petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of
the documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely,
the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage
contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns - are all public documents. As
such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing
of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the
authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough
to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we
shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include
the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance
with 7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's
Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms
part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for
naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant
Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published,[19] with the petition and the other annexes, such
publication constitutes substantial compliance with 7.[20] This
is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to
give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity
to check on the background of the applicant and prevent
suppression of information regarding any possible
misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another.[21] It is settled, however, that
naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the
applicant.[22] As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, 7 clearly
provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in
the petition his present and former places of residence.
[23]
This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in
naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of
"substantial compliance" with the requirement under the
Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant
petition ought to be denied. Marinella WHEREFORE, the
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED. Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing,
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.