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HELD: Yes.
In the case at bar, Orpiada is not previously selected by the bank but was assigned to
work by CESI. The selection of Orpiada by CESI, was however subject to the acceptance of the
bank.
With respect to the payment of Orpiada’s wages, the bank remitted to CESI the daily rate
or Orpiada and CESI pays the latter his wages. He was also listed in the payroll of CESI with
SSS deduction.
In respect of the power of dismissal, the bank requested CESI to withdraw Orpiada’s
assignment, which resulted to the latter’s termination.
With regards to power of control, Orpiada performed his functions within the bank’s
premises and not in CESA/
Payment of wages and power of dismissal exist between CESI and Orpiada. However,
selection and control exist between Orpiada and the bank. Thus, it is necessary to determine the
relationship between the bank and CESI, whether the latter is a job (independent) contactor or a
labor-only contracting.
In the present case, the undertaking of CESI in favor of the bank was not the performance
of a specific job, but to produce its client – the bank – with a certain number of persons to work
as messengers. Thus, Orpiada utilized the premises and office equipment of the bank and not of
CESI.
Orpiada worked in the bank for a period of 16 months. Under the Labor Code, any
employee who has rendered at least 1 year, whether continuous or not, shall be considered as a
regular employee.
Therefore, CESI was only engaged in a labor-only contracting with petitioner and
Orpiada. As a result, petitioner is liable to Opiada as if Opiada had been directly employer by the
bank.
Wherefore, petition of certiorari is denied.
xxxxx
A few days after their arrival in Manila or on July 1, 1989, one James Nichols told private
respondent that they could not secure a reimbursement of their repatriation expenses nor could
they get their salaries for the month of June.
Petitioner’s Defense: [basta pasaway daw ung mga respondents] alleged that the incident was not
the first infraction committed by the two xxx
POEA held the dismissal to be illegal; NLRC affirmed; Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal.
HELD: YES.
An employer may dismiss or lay off an employee only for the just and authorized causes
enumerated in Articles 282 and 283 of the Labor Code. However, this basic and normal
prerogative of an employer is subject to regulation by the State in the exercise of its paramount
police power. One’ s employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right within the
protection of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law.
We agree with petitioners that the ship captain’s logbook is a vital evidence as Article 612 of the
Code of Commerce requires him to keep a record of the decisions he had adopted as the vessel’s
head. Thus, inHaverton Shipping Ltd. v. NLRC, 10 the Court held that a copy of an official entry
in the logbook is legally binding and serves as an exception to the hearsay rule.
However, the Haverton Shipping ruling does not find unqualified application in the case at bar.
In said case, an investigation of the incident which led to the seaman’s dismissal was conducted
before he was dismissed.11
Consequently, the facts appearing in the logbook were supported by the facts gathered at
the investigation. In this case, because no investigation was conducted by the ship captain
before repatriating private respondent, the contents of the logbook have to be duly identified
and authenticated lest an injustice result from a blind adoption of such contents which merely
serve as prima facie evidence of the incident in question.
Moreover, petitioners did not submit as evidence to the POEA the logbook itself, or even
authenticated copies of pertinent pages thereof, which could have been easily xeroxed or
photocopied considering the present technology on reproduction of documents. 13 What was
offered in evidence was merely a typewritten collation of excerpts from what couldbe the
logbook 14 because by their format, they could have been lifted from other records kept in the
vessel in accordance with Article 612 of the Code of Commerce.
Under the Table of Offenses and Corresponding Administrative Penalties appended to the
contract of employment entered into by petitioners and private respondent, the offense described
by the logbook entry may well fall under insubordination and may constitute assaulting
a superior officer “with the use of deadly weapon” punishable with dismissal if the victim is
indeed a “superior officer.” However, an “apprentice officer” cannot be considered a
“superior officer.”
The aforequoted entry in the logbook is so sketchy that, unsupported by other evidence, it leaves
so many questions unanswered.
Petitioners’ failure to substantiate the grounds for a valid dismissal was aggravated by the
manner by which the employment of private respondent was terminated. Thus, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 130, amending paragraph (b) of Article 278 of the Labor Code, imposed as a
condition sine qua non that any termination of employment under the grounds provided in
Article 283 must be done only after notice and formal investigation have been accorded the
supposed errant worker.
As regards the notice requirement, the Court has stated:
On the issue of due process . . . , the law requires the employer to furnish the worker whose
employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the cause or
causes for termination and shall afford him ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
with the assistance of a representative. Specifically, the employer must furnish the worker
with two (2) written notices before termination of employment can be legally effected: (a) notice
which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought;
and (b) the subsequent notice which informs the employee of the employer’s decision to dismiss
him. (Emphasis supplied.) 22
Neither is the ship captain’s having witnessed the altercation an excuse for dispensing with
the notice and hearing requirements. Serving notice to private respondent under the
circumstances cannot be regarded as an “absurdity and superfluity.”
Petition Denied.
HELD:
1. YES
It is evident that novation took place in this particular case. The parties impliedly
extinguished the first contract by agreeing to enter into the second contract to placate
Medequillo, Jr. who was unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila. The second contract
would not have been necessary if the petitioners abided by the terms and conditions of
Madequillo, Jr.’s employment under the first contract. The records also reveal that the 2nd
contract extinguished the first contract by changing its object or principal. These contracts were
for overseas employment aboard different vessels.
Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the first contract was a “previous valid contract” since it
had not yet been terminated at the time of Medequillo, Jr.’s repatriation to Manila. The
legality of his dismissal had not yet been resolved with finality. Undoubtedly, he was still
employed under the first contract when he negotiated with petitioners on the second
contract. As such, the NLRC correctly ruled that petitioners could only be held liable
under the second contract
1. YES
Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which Medequillo Jr. may
initiate money claims under the 1st contract commenced on the date of his repatriation. xxx
The start of the three (3) year prescriptive period must therefore be reckoned on February 1992,
which by Medequillo Jr.’s own admission was the date of his repatriation to Manila. It was at
this point in time that Medequillo Jr.’s cause of action already accrued under the first contract.
He had until February 1995 to pursue a case for illegal dismissal and damages arising from the
1st contract. With the filing of his Complaint-Affidavit on March 6, 1995, which was clearly
beyond the prescriptive period, the cause of action under the 1st contract was already time-
barred.
1. NO (only breach of contract)
Even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on the part of
petitioners.
Even if by the standard contract employment commences only “upon actual departure of the
seafarer”, this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment without
any valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor
performance of respondent while on board the first ship MV “Stolt Aspiration” cannot be
sustained to justify the non-deployment, for no evidence to prove the same was presented.
We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract
and the commencement of the employer-employee relationship.
The perfection of the contract, which in this case coincided with the date of execution thereof,
occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of
the terms and conditions therein.
Commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken
place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire.
Thus, even before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the
perfection of the employment contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach
of which may give rise to a cause of action against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had
happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable
for damages.
Further, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioners that the penalty is a mere
reprimand.
The breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law applicable at that time was
the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment. The penalty for
non-deployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.
Now, the question to be dealt with is how will the seafarer be compensated by reason of the
unreasonable non-deployment of the petitioners?
We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers
Act) which provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment. The law provides:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – xxxx the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or
by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including
claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Codeprovides that one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly
proved.
Appeal Denied, respondent is awarded a actual damages equivalent to his salary for nine (9)
months as provided by the Second Employment Contract.
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NOTES: