CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

TAN VS. BALAJADIA G.R. No. 169517

Facts:

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case against them with
the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion
and violation of city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that
he is a practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez
Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippiness showed that respondent has never been
admitted to the Philippine Bar.Hence, petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect
contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.

In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-
affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of
Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty.
Aquinos complaint-affidavit.It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-
affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the same secretary; one
for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00 oclock in the morning and another for the parking
incident on the same date but which occurred at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon. Respondent insists
that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 oclock parking incident correctly alleged that he
is a businessman with office address at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Road, Baguio City. However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 oclock parking
incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously referred to him as a practicing
lawyer because Atty. Aquinos secretary copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquinos
complaint-affidavit. Hence, it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a practicing lawyer
based in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session
Road, Baguio City, which statement referred to the person of Atty. Aquino and his law office
address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquinos secretary, executed an affidavit admitting the mistake in the
preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent alleged that he did not read the complaint-
affidavit because he assumed that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations
with respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he had no intention of
misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made liable for indirect contempt
for having made untruthful statements in the complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the
blame to Atty. Aquinos secretary.

Issue:

whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt

Ruling:

Section 3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:

(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;

In several cases, we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be an
attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable
by fine or imprisonment or both. The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section
3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts are
punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of the court, and obstruct the
orderly administration of justice. In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is
the rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the evidence makes
it clear that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondents claim that he never
intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the
secretary of Atty Aquino. The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave
rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the documentary
evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5
of respondents complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a practicing lawyer was
the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself, establish intent as to make him liable for indirect
contempt. In the cases where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of his client;[1appearing
before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law
despite being previously denied admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law
and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge that he is not
licensed to do so.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent acted as an attorney
or that he intended to practice law. Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondents deliberate intent to
misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such without authority, he is hereby warned to be
more careful and circumspect in his future actions.

The petition is DISMISSED. Respondent is WARNED to be more careful and

circumspect in his future actions.
 Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000

Facts:

Respondent is a successful bar passer who was allowed only to take oath but not to sign
the roll of attorneys pending the resolution of the complaint of the petitioner who charges
respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave
misrepresentation. Apparently, the respondent appeared as counsel to an
election candidate before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Masbate
before he took his oath and signed the rolls of attorneys. In his comment, respondent alleges he
only provide specific assistance and advice not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.
He contends that he did not sign the pleadings as a lawyer. The Office of the Bar Confidant was
tasked to investigate and its findings disclosed that according to the minutes of the meeting of the
MBEC, the respondent actively participated in the proceeding and signed in the pleading as
counsel for the candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent is fit for admission to the bar.

Ruling:

The court held that respondent did engaged in unauthorized practice of law. It held that
all the activities he participated during that time involves the practice of law despite the fact that
he is not yet a member of the Bar. The right to practice law is not a right but a privilege extended
to those morally upright and with the proper knowledge and skills. It involves strict regulation,
one of which is on the moral character of its members. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites
for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. Because the court finds respondent not
morally fit to be admitted in the Bar, notwithstanding the fact that he already took his oath, he
was denied admission to the bar.
 IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
B.M. No. 2540 September 24, 2013

MICHAEL A. MEDADO, Petitioner.

Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of
Laws in 1979 and passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of
82.7.

On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine International Convention
Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.He was scheduled to sign in the Roll
of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he
had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went
home to his province for a vacation.

Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to
Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that
what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance record.

By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he was mainly
doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved in litigation practice.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing
of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; and "the
matter of signing in the Roll of Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten."

In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seminars, he
was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.

Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll number.

About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, praying that he
be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the matter on 21
September 2012 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February
2013.The OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence,
gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.It explained that, based on his answers during the
clarificatory conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing
in the Roll of Attorneys.
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject
to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent to suspension from the
practice of law.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys would be akin to
imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the
most serious ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.

In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.

For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the
instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called
this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged
his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant
why it took him this long to file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:

Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka kung anong
mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination
of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And, finally it’s the right thing to do. I
have to come here … sign the roll and take the oath as necessary.

For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of
law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted
as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates that petitioner strove to
adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he has prima facie
shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner, having held
various positions at the Laurel Law Office,Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National
Oil Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.

All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar.1âwphi1 While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and
moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.

That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years
of inaction.

Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30
years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this behavior by characterizing
his acts as "neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of
judgment."
We disagree.

While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal consequences of
his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful
justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia
factiexcusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated under an honest
mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-
taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a
valid justification. At that point, Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the
act of signing therein that would have made him so.When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose to
continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney
or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a finding, however, is in the
nature of criminal contempt and must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of
hearings. In this case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt
of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making any
finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed
against him.

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 9 -A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed
under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer's duty to prevent the
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As
aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession.

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9have warranted the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law.As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot
suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin
to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this
Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we
likewise see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is
warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing
any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt
with severely by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED.
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR
after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for
his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner is NOT ALLOWED to
practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that constitutes practice of law
before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt will be severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the
country.
 CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH
COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

A.C. No. 7813 April 21, 2009

CARLITO P. CARANDANG, vs. ATTY. GILBERT S. OBMINA

Facts:

This is a complaint filed by Carlito P. Carandang against Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina. Atty.
Obmina was counsel for Carandang in an Ejectment case he filed. Carandang brought suit for
Atty. Obmina’s failure to inform Carandang of the adverse decision in said case and for failure to
appeal the decision. The Commission on Bar Discipline, issued an Order directing respondent
Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina to submit his Answer. However, what the Commission received was a
Manifestation by a certain Atty. Ma. Carmencita C. Obmina-Muaña, allegedly daughter
of respondent. She further alleged that her father is already a permanent resident of the United
States of America since March 2001 and had already retired from the practice of law.

On the scheduled Mandatory Conference, Commission directed Atty. Muaña to produce

and present before the Court the alleged withdrawal of appearance filed by her father and
proof that her father is now really a permanent resident of the United States of America.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Obmina is liable for failure serve his client with competence and
diligence pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics and to inform his client as to
the status of his case pursuant to Rule 18.03 of Canon 18.

Ruling:

There is nothing on record that will show that Atty. Obmina notified complainant in any
manner about the decision. Blame should not be attributed solely to the respondent because it
was observed that complainant is partly to blame for his loss for failure to maintain contact with
Atty. Obmina. The Supreme Court held that “clients should maintain contact with their counsel
from time to time and inform themselves of the progress of their case, thereby exercising that
standard of care which an ordinary prudent man bestows upon his business.” Nonetheless, the
Court underscored the duty of respondent to notify his client as to what happened to his case.
However, the respondent who has in his possession the complete files and address of the
complainant, should have exerted more efforts to notify Mr. Carandang as to what happened to
his case. Whether the decision is adverse to or in favor of his client, respondent is duty bound to
notify the clients pursuant to Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Ethics. That as a result of the
respondent’s failure to notify the complainant, the latter lost the case leading to his eviction. The
Court ordered that Atty. Gilbert S. Obmina be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
one (1) year. Although the said respondent is reportedly in the United States of America and
accordingly retired from the practice of law, the Commission resolved not to close its eyes on the
negligence that respondent has committed while in the active practice.
 Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. Icawat
A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000

Facts:

Atty. Miguel Icawat was the lawyer for Teodulfo Basas and some other laborers in their
complaint against their employer. The NLRC rendered an adverse decision. Basas and his fellow
workers, however, insisted that they appeal the decision. Atty. Icawat, however, failed to file the
required memorandum of appeal. Basas filed an administrative complaint, also alleging that
Atty. Icawat issued a receipt for an amount less than that which they had paid him.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent observed competence and diligence in serving his client

Held:

No. Respondent's failure to file the memorandum of appeal required by the NLRC Rules
of Procedure reveals his poor grasp of labor law. Respondent practically admitted that he did not
file the memorandum. His failure to file the memorandum clearly prejudiced the interests of his
clients. Respondent manifestly fell short of the diligence required of his profession, in violation
of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a lawyer shall
serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 further provides that a lawyer shall
not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. For his failure to issue the proper receipt for the money he received from his
clients, respondent also violated Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
states that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the
client. The Court fined Atty. Icawat in the amount of PhP 500, with a warning that a repetition
of the same offense or a similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
 Corazon T. Reontoy v. Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit (302 SCRA 604)

Facts:

On January 28, 1998 the SC found Ibadlit administratively liable and suspended him
from the practice of law for 1 year for failing to appeal within the reglementary period the
decision rendered against his client. His reason was, an appeal would only be futile. SC declared
that it was highly improper for him to have adopted such opinion. SC said that a lawyer was
without authority to waive his client’s right to appeal and that his failure to appeal within the
reglementary period constituted negligence and malpractice, proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides “(a) lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.” This
is a motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not said lawyer violated Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

Held:

Suspension lowered to 2 months – his arguments are partly persuasive, he believed in

good faith that his client’s case was weak and that she accepted his explanation that the adverse
decision was not worth appealing anymore. Besides, it was only several years later that she
complained when no more relief was available to her. Also, complainant had reasonable
opportunity to hire another counsel for a second opinion whether to appeal from the judgment or
file a petition for relief, that he did not commit to handle his client’s case on appeal and that the
testimonies of complainant and her brother were unpersuasive. This is also his first offense.
 Cases Regarding Judges’ Delaying in Deciding Cases

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE SANTIAGO E. SORIANO

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1683 September 11, 2013

Facts:

In connection with the judicial audit and inventory of pending cases in the MTCC,
Branch 2, San Fernando City, La Union and in the MTC, Naguilian, La Union, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA)directed Judge Soriano to decide the enumerated cases submitted for
decision which were already beyond the reglementary period to decide. The judicial audit team
found that in the MTCC, Branch 2, San Fernando City, La Union, out of the 59 cases submitted
for decision, 57 cases were already beyond the reglementary period to decide. A similar finding
was made in the MTC, Naguilian, La Union wherein out of 41 cases submitted for decision, 39
cases were already beyond the reglementary period to decide.

MTCC, Branch 2, San Fernando City, La Union

In a letter dated 1 September 2004, Judge Soriano, as Acting Presiding Judge of MTCC, San
Fernando, La Union, submitted to the OCA a tabulated report of the status of cases, in
compliance with the directive in the Memorandum dated 2 July 2004.

The OCA issued another Memorandum dated 7 January 2005 addressed to Judge Soriano, noting
that 51 cases still remain unresolved. The OCA then directed Judge Soriano to decide the
remaining unresolved cases and to resolve the pending motions or incidents in the other cases.

Judge Soriano submitted another tabulated report of the cases in his letter dated 28 April 2005.
He requested for an extension of 60 days to decide and resolve the remaining cases and
unresolved motions, which the OCA granted.

MTC, Naguilian, La Union

In a November 2004 Memorandum, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. directed
Judge Soriano, as Presiding Judge of MTC, Naguilian, La Union, to decide the cases submitted
for decision which were already beyond the reglementary period to decide, and to take
appropriate action on cases which have not been acted upon, including those with pending
motions. In another November 2004 Memorandum, then Court Administrator Velasco directed
Ms. Rosie M. Novencido, OIC Clerk of Court of MTC, Naguilian, La Union, to explain why the
records of the listed cases could not be located.
Ms. Novencido explained in a letter sent to the OCA that before she was designated OIC Clerk
of Court on 5 August 2002, there was no inventory of records. She stated that the cases listed
were filed long before she was designated as OIC and that despite diligent efforts by the entire
staff, they could not locate the records of the listed cases.

On 25 July 2006, Judge Soriano compulsorily retired from service. In his letter dated 28 July
2006, Judge Soriano submitted an inventory of pending cases and the cases submitted for
decision at the MTC, Naguilian, La Union.

In a Resolution dated 1 August 2007, the Court resolved to:

1. TREAT the Report of the Judicial Audit Team as an administrative complaint, and to RE-
DOCKET the same as a regular administrative matter against respondent Judge;

2. DEEM AS SATISFACTORY the explanation of Ms. Rosie M. Novencido, then OIC Clerk of
Court, MTC, Naguilian, La Union, and consider the matter under consideration CLOSED and
TERMINATED insofar as Ms. Novencido is concerned;

3. DIRECT Hon. Asuncion F. Mandia, Acting Presiding Judge, MTC, Naguilian, La Union, and
the Clerk of Court thereof to inform the Court, thru the Office of DCA Perez, of the STATUS of
the following cases, to wit: Crim. Case Nos. 2345-B, 2169, 2188, 2203, 2211, 2217, 2218, 2240,
2251, 2257, 2345, 2365, 2366, 2526, 2590, 2768, 2801, 2849, 3367, 3378 and 3988, found
during the audit conducted of the MTC, Naguilian, La Union (from 22 March to 5 April 2004) as
"cannot be located" and to cause the reconstitution of the missing records, if any, and submit
proof of the reconstitution thereof, all within sixty (60) days from notice; and

4. REQUIRE Judge Santiago E. Soriano to comment on the Report of the Judicial Audit Team
within ten (10) days from notice.

In his letter dated 4 October 2007, Judge Soriano stated that he had already decided most of the
cases enumerated in the Resolution, except those cases which were missing during the term of
Clerk of Court Teresita Bravo. Judge Soriano requested for one month to verify the cases still
undecided, which the Court granted in a Resolution dated 5 December 2007.

Meanwhile, in a letter dated 15 November 2007, incumbent Presiding Judge Romeo M. Atillo,
Jr., of MTC, Naguilian, La Union, informed the Court that aside from Criminal Case No. 2211,
reconstitution was no longer possible for the other missing records.

On 9 November 2009, Judge Soriano wrote a letter to the Deputy Court Administrator,
requesting for the release of his retirement benefits. Judge Soriano stated that the Court could
withhold a portion of his retirement benefits to answer for whatever administrative penalty he
might incur in the administrative matter against him.
The Court, in a Resolution dated 24 March 2010, allowed the release of Judge Soriano’s
retirement benefits provided that the amount of P40,000 be withheld pending resolution of this
administrative matter. The Court also directed Judge Soriano to show cause why he should not
be held in contempt of court for his failure to submit his report on the undecided cases as
directed in the Resolutions dated 5 December 2007 and 6 October 2008.

Judge Soriano apologized to the Court through his letter dated 21 May 2010, explaining that he
neglected to submit the report on the undecided cases because he knew that his branch clerk of
court already submitted to the OCA copies of the decided cases.

The Court, in a Resolution dated 21 July 2010, noted Judge Soriano’s explanation and required
him to submit the report on the undecided cases within ten days from notice.

Judge Soriano requested for an extension of 15 days to submit the required report, which the
Court granted. Judge Soriano eventually submitted to the Court the required report, with the
request that the contempt charge against him be dismissed and the P40,000 deducted from his
retirement benefits be returned.

In a Resolution dated 14 September 2011, the Court resolved to:

1. DIRECT the OCA to: (a) VERIFY the present status of the cases left undecided, the incidents
or motions left unresolved, and the dormant cases left unacted upon, all by Judge Santiago E.
Soriano at the MTC, Naguilian and MTCC, San Fernando City, both in the province of La
Union; and (b) SUBMIT to the Court a report thereon within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
information required; and

2. NOTE the letter dated 15 November 2007 of Judge Romeo M. Atillo, Jr., MTC, Naguilian, La
Union, and DIRECT Judge Atillo to SUBMIT within fifteen (15) days from notice a written
report to the Court, through the OCA, on any further development regarding the reported missing
case records.

Meanwhile, in a letter dated 3 September 2012, Judge Soriano prayed for the early resolution of
this administrative matter and requested that his monthly pension be released, considering that he
should have received his monthly pension beginning 25 July 2011, five years after he
compulsorily retired on 25 July 2006 at the age of 70 years old.

The OCA’s Report and Recommendation

In its Memorandum dated 3 January 2013, the OCA stated its findings as reported in its
Memorandum dated 9 July 2012, thus:

Municipal Trial Court, Naguilian, La Union

1. Of the sixteen (16) undecided cases listed above, four (4) cases, namely, Criminal Case No.
4289, Civil Case Nos. 286 and 287, and LRC No. 002-02, were actually decided by Judge
Santiago E. Soriano before he retired compulsorily on July 25, 2006, but all beyond the
mandated period; four (4) cases namely, Criminal Case Nos. 3300, 3361, 3927 and 4274, remain
undecided up to the present and the respective records thereof are missing and could no longer be
found; two (2) cases, namely, Criminal Case Nos. 3663 and 3664, were decided jointly by
Acting Presiding Judge Asuncion F. Mandia; five (5) cases, namely, Criminal Case Nos. 2834,
4001, 4002, 4149 and 4154, were decided by Judge Romeo M. Atillo, Jr.; and Criminal Case No.
3922 was reported to have been decided on July 11, 2006, but no copy of the decision was
attached to the letter-report;

2. Of the five (5) cases with unresolved incidents or motions listed above, the incidents in four
(4) cases, namely, Criminal Case Nos. 3347 and 3351, SP No. 01-03 and Civil Case No. 192,
were resolved by Judge Soriano before his compulsory retirement; and the incident, i.e., motion
for new trial, in Civil Case No. 282 remains unresolved up to the present; and

3. The records of two (2) of the dormant cases listed above, namely, Criminal Case No. 4117 and
Civil Case No. 210, are missing and could no longer be found. All the other dormant cases have
already been disposed of by Judge Atillo, Jr.

Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, San Fernando City, La Union

1. Of the twenty-seven (27) undecided cases listed above, two (2) cases, namely, Criminal Case
No. 31268 and Civil Case No. 3864, were actually decided by Judge Soriano before his
compulsory retirement but beyond the mandated period, and the remaining cases were decided or
disposed of by Judge Corpuz;

2. With respect to the two (2) cases with unresolved incidents or motions listed above, Civil Case
No. 3851 was decided by Judge Corpuz on October 28, 2008, but it was not reported whether the
subject motion for reconsideration of the July 10, 2003 Order declaring defendant in default,
which was submitted for resolution on September 24, 2003, was resolved; and the motion for
reconsideration of the June 26, 2003 Order in LRC No. N-95-04, which was submitted for
resolution on January 21, 2004, was ordered denied by Judge Corpuz on September 15, 2006;
and

3. With respect to the two (2) dormant cases listed above, namely, Civil Case No. 3487 and LRC
No. N-95-67, both were dismissed by Judge Corpuz on September 29, 2005 and October 11,
2006, respectively.

xxxx

The result of the verification of the status of the cases earlier found to have been left undecided
by retired Judge Soriano at the MTC, Naguilian and MTCC, Branch 2, San Fernando City, both
in the province of La union, showing that he failed to decide a total of thirty-six (36) cases
submitted for decision , which were already all due for decision at the time he compulsorily
retired on July 25, 2006, confirms our findings against retired Judge Soriano in our March 11,
2011 Memorandum. Worse, the records in four (4) of said cases could no longer be accounted
for and were confirmed by Judge Atillo to be missing and beyond recovery. The thirty-two (32)
other cases were decided by the judges who succeeded retired Judge Soriano in the MTC,
Naguilian and MTCC, Branch 2, San Fernando City, both in the Province of La Union.

The OCA also noted that Judge Soriano decided 12 cases on 25 July 2006, which was the day his
compulsory retirement took effect. The OCA stressed that when Judge Soriano reached the
compulsory retirement age of 70 on 25 July 2006, he is considered automatically retired on that
date and could no longer exercise the powers and functions of his office, particularly
promulgation of decisions.

On Judge Soriano’s request for the release of his monthly pension beginning 25 July 2011, the
OCA found no legal impediment thereto. The OCA stated that when Judge Soriano retired from
the Judiciary on 25 July 2006, he had rendered a total of 41 years, 7 months, and 24 days in
government service, thus, entitling him to receive gratuity benefits granted under Republic Act
No. 910 (RA 910), as amended by Republic Act No. 9946 (RA 9946).

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Soriano is guilty of Gross Inefficiency and Gross Ignorance of the Law

Ruling:

Yes. Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary
mandates judges to "perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently, fairly and with reasonable promptness." Similarly, Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct exhorts judges to dispose of the court’s business promptly and to decide cases
within the required periods. Section 15(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that all cases
and matters must be decided or resolved by the lower courts within three months from the date of
submission of the last pleading.

In this case, the judicial audit team found that out of the 59 cases submitted for decision in the
MTCC, Branch 2, San Fernando City, La Union, 57 cases were already beyond the reglementary
period to decide. A similar finding was made in the MTC, Naguilian, La Union wherein out of
41 cases submitted for decision, 39 cases were already beyond the reglementary period to decide.
The OCA then directed Judge Soriano to decide the remaining unresolved cases and to resolve
the pending motions or incidents in the other cases. However, Judge Soriano still failed to decide
a total of thirty-six (36) cases submitted for decision in the MTC and MTCC combined, which
were already all due for decision at the time he compulsorily retired on 25 July 2006.

Clearly, Judge Soriano has been remiss in the performance of his judicial duties. Judge Soriano’s
unreasonable delay in deciding cases and resolving incidents and motions, and his failure to
decide the remaining cases before his compulsory retirement constitutes gross inefficiency which
cannot be tolerated. As held in numerous cases, inexcusable failure to decide cases within the
reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of an
administrative sanction on the defaulting judge.

Undue delay in rendering a decision or order is classified as a less serious charge under Section
9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is punishable by (1) suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one month nor more than three months, or (2) a fine of more
than P10,000 but not exceeding P20,000.

Judge Soriano’s inefficiency in managing his caseload was compounded by gross negligence as
evinced by the loss of the records of at least four cases which could no longer be located or
reconstituted despite diligent efforts by his successor. Judge Soriano was responsible for
managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court services,especially the
speedy disposition of cases.Under Rule 3.08, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge is
mandated to diligently discharge administrative responsibilities and maintain professional
competence in court management. Furthermore, a judge should organize and supervise the court
personnel to ensure the prompt and efficient dispatch of business, and require at all times the
observance of high standards of public service and fidelity. Judge Soriano failed in this respect.

Furthermore, the Court finds Judge Soriano guilty of gross ignorance of the law. As found by the
OCA, Judge Soriano decided 12 cases on 25 July 2006, which was the day his compulsory
retirement took effect. Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judges shall hold
office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office. Thus, Judge Soriano was automatically retired from service
effective 25 July 2006, and he could no longer exercise on that day the functions and duties of
his office, including the authority to decide and promulgate cases.

Gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge under Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court and is punishable by a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.

For gross inefficiency and gross ignorance of the law, the Court finds sufficient the OCA’s
recommended fine ofP40,000, which will be taken from the amount previously withheld from
Judge Soriano’s retirement benefits.

On Judge Soriano’s request for the release of his monthly pension beginning 25 July 2011, the
Court agrees with the OCA that it should be released immediately. This is in accordance with
RA 910, as amended by RA 9946, which provides that:

SEC. 3. Upon retirement, a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a Judge of the regional trial court,
metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court in cities, municipal trial court, municipal circuit
trial court, shari’a district court, shari’a circuit court, or any other court hereafter established
shall be automatically entitled to a lump sum of five (5) years’ gratuity computed on the basis of
the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, representation
and other allowances such as personal economic relief allowance (PERA) and additional
compensation allowance he/she was receiving on the date of his/her retirement and thereafter
upon survival after the expiration of five (5) years, to further annuity payable monthly during the
residue of his/her natural life pursuant to Section 1 hereof x x x.

The Court finds retired Judge Santiago E. Soriano guilty of gross inefficiency and gross
ignorance of the law, and fines him P40,000 to be taken from the amount withheld from his
retirement benefits. The Court orders the immediate release of the annuity payable monthly to
Judge Soriano under Republic Act No. 910, as amended by Republic Act No. 9946, beginning 25
July 2011.
 OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE BORROMEO R.
BUSTAMANTE, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, ALAMINOS CITY,
PANGASINAN

A.M. No. MTJ-12-1806 April 7, 2014

(Formerly A.M. No. 11-4-36-MTCC)

Facts:

Considering the impending retirement of Judge Bustamante, a judicial audit of the MTCC
was conducted on September 21, 2010 by a team from the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA). In a Memorandum1 dated October 6, 2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Raul
Bautista Villanueva (Villanueva) informed Judge Bustamante of the initial audit findings that, as
of audit date, there were 35 cases for decision (21 of which were already beyond the
reglementary period) and 23 cases with pending incidents for resolution (19 of which were
already beyond the reglementary period) in Judge Bustamante’s court. At the end of his
Memorandum, DCA Villanueva gave Judge Bustamante the following directives:

1. EXPLAIN in writing within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof your failure to: [a] decide
within the reglementary period Civil Case Nos. 1847, 1870, 1937, 1978, 2056 and 2205, LRC
Nos. 28, 65 and 70, and Criminal Case Nos. 5428, 6468, 6469, 6558, 7222, 7721, 8163, 8390,
8395, 8654, 9022 and 9288; and, [b] resolve the incidents in Civil Case Nos. 1668 and 2132,
Criminal Case Nos. 8004, 8005, 8006, 8580, 9015, 9016, 9190, 9191, 9196, 9232 and 9235;

2. DECIDE with dispatch the cases enumerated in item (I) above, and to SUBMIT copies of the
decisions to this Office within three (3) days after your compulsory retirement; and

3. RESOLVE with dispatch the incidents for resolution in the cases enumerated in item (II)
above, and to SUBMIT copies of the resolution to this Office within the same period indicated in
the immediately preceding paragraph.2

Judge Bustamante submitted a letter3 dated November 8, 2010,4 addressed to DCA Villanueva,
in which he explained:

I have the honor to inform you that I have decided all the cases, Civil, LRC and Criminal Cases
submitted before my last day in office on November 5, 2010 except Civil Cases Nos. 1937
(Bustillo vs. Sps. Rabago) and 2056 (Cale vs. Pader, et al.) because of lack of TSN taken when I
was not yet the Presiding Judge. I found out that there is [a] need to retake the testimonies of the
witness concerned so as to attain substantial justice.

As to why I failed to decide the said cases within the reglementary period, it was because of the
volume of work in this court. As it was noticed by the Auditors when they came over to audit, I
have already started deciding with drafts attached to the records but I was overtaken by more
pressing matters that I have to take immediate attention, like urgent motions, motions to dismiss,
motions to quash, approval of bails. All of these are in addition to my trial duties.

I have to work as early as 7:30 o’clock in the morning, and sometimes at 7:00 o’clock, with the
desire to finish everything on time. I burned my candle at night just [to] comply with my duties
within the time frame but because of human frailties, I failed to do so on time because as I said[,]
of the volume of work in this court. But nonetheless I have decided all the cases submitted for
decision before I retired except, as above stated, Civil Cases Nos. 1737 and 2056 because of the
reasons already stated.

Judge Bustamante further accounted for the cases with incidents for resolution, as follows:

In Civil Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Civil Cases Nos. 1668 and 2132.
However, the motion to dismiss by defendant Celeste in Civil Case No. 2222, considering the
opposition of the plaintiff because of their counterclaim, I believed the motion needs further
hearing, hence, the motion was not resolved. Similarly, the motion to dismiss in Civil Case No.
2254 needs further hearing, and if no order setting the motion for hearing, it may be an oversight
because of the submission of several cases for decision almost at the same time.

In Criminal Cases, I have resolved the demurrer to evidence in Crim. Cases Nos. 9015 & 9016
(People vs. Paltep vda. De Perio) and Crim. Cases Nos. 9148 & 9149 (People vs. Anselmo, Jr.)
while Crim. Case No. 9196 was set for further hearing.

On the motion to suspend proceedings in Crim. Cases Nos. 9190 & 9191, it may have been an
oversight because these cases are the off-shoots of Civil Case No. 2222 and pre-trial conference
for the marking of documentary evidence has been subsequently set but the counsel for the
accused failed to appear.

The motion to dismiss in Crim. Cases Nos. 8615, 8616 & 8617, was not resolved because of the
prayer of the parties in open court for them to await the resolution of the civil cases they filed
before the Regional Trial Court, as they are working for the settlement of these civil cases, which
may have [an] effect in these cases.

The other incidents were set for hearing so that the court could judiciously resolve the matter.5

In support of his compliance, Judge Bustamante submitted to the OCA copies of the decisions
and resolutions he referred to in his letter.

The OCA submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated March 24, 2011, reporting viz:

(1) Judge Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33
cases decided by Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were
already beyond the reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond
the reglementary period, 10 were decided more than a year after their respective due dates
(ranging from 1 year and 8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10 were
decided within a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond
the due dates).

(2) Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his court,
all of which were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from 5 days to
3 years, 8 months, and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending
incidents in his court, Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing;
(b) there is a need to await the resolution of other cases pending before other courts; and (c)
oversight. The OCA noted, though, that Judge Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the
pending incidents for hearing or holding in abeyance the resolution of the same until the related
cases before other courts have already been decided.

Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases and
resolving pending incidents, the OCA recommended that:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that retired Judge Borromeo R.

Bustamante, formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, be
FINED in the amount of P20,000.00 for gross inefficiency.

In a Resolution7 dated February 8, 2012, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative
matter.

Judge Bustamante wrote the Court a letter dated July 3, 2013, stating that although he already
retired from the service on November 6, 2010, he has yet to receive his retirement benefits
(except for his accumulated leave credits), because of the pendency of the instant administrative
matter against him. Consequently, Judge Bustamante prayed that the administrative matter be
resolved soonest so he could already receive his retirement benefits or that his retirement benefits
be released but a certain amount commensurate to the fine that the Court might impose be
withheld.

Issue:

Whether the respondent judge committed delay in deciding cases

Held:

Yes. Decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of
a member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the
judiciary so the ends of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its
commitment to provide litigants their constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of their cases.
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge
must decide cases within 90 days from submission. As the Court summed up in Re: Report on
the Judicial Audit Conducted in the RTC, Br. 4, Dolores, Eastern Samar.

Section 15, Article VIII of the Constitution states that judges must decide all cases within three
months from the date of submission. In Re: Report on the Judicial Audit Conducted at the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (Branch 1), Surigao City, the Court held that:

A judge is mandated to render a decision not more than 90 days from the time a case is submitted
for decision. Judges are to dispose of the court’s business promptly and decide cases within the
period specified in the Constitution, that is, 3 months from the filing of the last pleading, brief or
memorandum. Failure to observe said rule constitutes a ground for administrative sanction
against the defaulting judge, absent sufficient justification for his non-compliance therewith.

Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that judges should administer justice
without delay. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 states that judges shall dispose of the court's business
promptly and decide cases within the required periods. In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Javellana, the Court held that:

A judge cannot choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension
granted by this Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required period
constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.

The Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Canon 3, Rule 3.05 mandates judges to attend
promptly to the business of the court and decide cases within the periods prescribed by law and
the Rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, lower court judges are also mandated to decide cases
within 90 days from submission.

Judges must closely adhere to the Code of Judicial Conduct in order to preserve the integrity,
competence and independence of the judiciary and make the administration of justice more
efficient. Time and again, we have stressed the need to strictly observe this duty so as not to
negate our efforts to minimize, if not totally eradicate, the twin problems of congestion and delay
that have long plagued our courts.

In Office of the Court Administrator v. Garcia-Blanco, the Court held that the 90-day
reglementary period is mandatory. Failure to decide cases within the reglementary period
constitutes a ground for administrative liability except when there are valid reasons for the delay.
(Citation omitted.)

This Court has always emphasized the need for judges to decide cases within the constitutionally
prescribed 90-day period. Any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief,
deprives the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Not only does it magnify the
cost of seeking justice, it undermines the people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary, lowers
its standards, and brings it to disrepute.10

A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day requirement; he/she should
instead persevere in its implementation.11 Heavy caseload and demanding workload are not
valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases.12 The Court usually
allows reasonable extensions of time to decide cases in view of the heavy caseload of the trial
courts. If a judge is unable to comply with the 90-day reglementary period for deciding cases or
matters, he/she can, for good reasons, ask for an extension and such request is generally
granted.13 But Judge Bustamante did not ask for an extension in any of these cases. Having
failed to decide a case within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the
Court, Judge Bustamante is liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction.1âwphi1

Equally unacceptable for the Court is Judge Bustamante’s explanation that he failed to decide
Civil Case Nos. 1937 and 2056 because of the lack of Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN).
These two cases were allegedly heard when he was not yet the presiding judge of the MTCC.
Relevant herein is the ruling of the Court in Re: Problem of Delays in Cases Before the
Sandiganbayan14:

The Constitution provides that a case shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the
court itself. In Administrative Circular No. 28, dated July 3, 1989, the Supreme Court provided
that "A case is considered submitted for decision upon the admission of the evidence of the
parties at the termination of the trial. The ninety (90) days period for deciding the case shall
commence to run from submission of the case for decision without memoranda; in case the court
requires or allows its filing, the case shall be considered submitted for decision upon the filing of
the last memorandum or the expiration of the period to do so, whichever is earlier. Lack of
transcript of stenographic notes shall not be a valid reason to interrupt or suspend the period for
deciding the case unless the case was previously heard by another judge not the deciding judge in
which case the latter shall have the full period of ninety (90) days from the completion of the
transcripts within which to decide the same." x x x (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)

The OCA reported that contrary to his claim, Judge Bustamante substantially heard Civil Case
Nos. 1937 and 2056, until the two cases were submitted for decision on November 20, 2009 and
February 27, 2010, respectively. Even if it were true that the two cases were heard by the
previous presiding judge of the MTCC, there is no showing that from the time the cases had been
submitted for decision until Judge Bustamante’s retirement on November 6, 2010, Judge
Bustamante made an effort to have the TSN completed. Although technically, the 90-day period
would have started to run only upon the completion of the TSN, the Court finds Judge
Bustamante’s lack of effort to have the TSN completed as the root cause for the delay in
deciding the two cases.
The Court is likewise unconvinced that the pending incidents in several cases were left
unresolved because of the need for further hearings in the same. The incidents were already
submitted for resolution and, as the OCA observed, Judge Bustamante only saw the need for
further hearings in said cases after the conduct of the judicial audit. In addition, Judge
Bustamante did not submit any order setting the cases for hearing.

Least acceptable of Judge Bustamante’s explanations for his delay in deciding cases and/or
resolving pending incidents was oversight. A judge is responsible, not only for the dispensation
of justice but also for managing his court efficiently to ensure the prompt delivery of court
services. Since he is the one directly responsible for the proper discharge of his official
functions, he should know the cases submitted to him for decision or resolution, especially those
pending for more than 90 days.15

There is no dispute that Judge Bustamante failed to decide cases and resolve pending incidents
within the reglementary period, and without authorized extension from the Court and valid
reason for such failure, Judge Bustamante is administratively liable for undue delay in rendering
a decision or order.

Under the amendments to Rule 14016 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision
or order is a less serious charge, for which the respondent judge shall be penalized with either (a)
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months; or (b) a fine of more thanP10,000.00, but not more than P20,000.00.

Considering the significant number of cases and pending incidents left undecided/unresolved or
decided/resolved beyond the reglementary period by Judge Bustamante; as well as the fact that
Judge Bustamante had already retired and can no longer be dismissed or suspended, it is
appropriate to impose upon him a penalty of a fine amounting to P20,000.00, to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.

The Court finds retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante, former Presiding Judge of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, GUILTY of undue delay in rendering decisions
and orders, and imposes upon him a FINE of P20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
 ATTY. MANUEL J. JIMENEZ, JR., Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MICHAEL M. AMDENGAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court, Angono,
Rizal, Respondent.

Facts:

The plaintiff Merced filed with the MTC an ejectment Complaint against the defendant
Nelson Cana on 23 January 2009. Summons was duly served on the defendant on 02 February
2009 per certification of the lower court's process server. Despite the summons, the defendant
did not file an Answer to the Complaint. As a result, the plaintiff filed a Motion for
Judgment3 asking for the grant of the reliefs prayed for in her Complaint. The Motion was
opposed by the defendant and, on 22 July 2009, was denied by the MTC, which considered him
to have voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction. Consequently, it granted him 10 days to file his
Answer,4 which he did on 17 August 2009, stating therein his affirmative defenses.

The preliminary conference of the parties was originally set by the MTC on 25 September 2009,
but was later reset to 16 October 2009. During the preliminary conference, respondent judge
referred the case for mediation. Due to the inability of the parties to arrive at a settlement, the
case was referred back to the MTC for trial on the merits. On 04 December 2009, respondent
ordered the parties to file their respective position papers within 30 days, after which the case
was to be submitted for resolution.6 On 04 January 2010, the parties simultaneously filed their
Position Papers under the Rules of Summary Procedure.

It was only on 17 February 2010 that respondent judge issued an order submitting the case for
decision.8 On 03 March 2010, he promulgated his ruling,9 in which he noted that the plaintiff
had failed to refer her Complaint to the Lupon for the mandatory barangay conciliation
proceedings as required under the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law. Thus, her ejectment
Complaint was dismissed without prejudice.

On 07 April 2010, complainant filed the instant administrative case charging respondent judge
with (1) gross inefficiency and negligence and (2) gross ignorance of law and jurisprudence.
Complainant specifically alleged that respondent was guilty of gross inefficiency for failing to
resolve the ejectment case within a period of 30 days as mandated under the Rules of Summary
Procedure. Likewise, the latter was charged with gross ignorance of law for having dismissed the
case on the ground of failure to comply with the barangay conciliation procedure.

On 06 May 2010, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) required respondent judge to file
his Comment on the Complaint-Affidavit within 10 days. In the Comment he filed on 06 July
2010, he answered the first charge of gross inefficiency by admitting that after the ejectment case
was deemed submitted for resolution on 04 January 2010, he indeed failed to resolve it within
the prescribed 30-day period. Although he offered no excuse for that lapse, he prayed that
whatever sanction would be given to him must be tempered and mitigated by mercy and
compassion, given that he was already 69 years old and already blind in his left eye.

On the second charge of gross ignorance of the law, he believed that in the event his ruling was
not in accordance with law and jurisprudence, complainant should have availed himself of the
proper remedies under the rules, instead of resorting to an administrative Complaint, which
should thus be dismissed. On 30 July 2012, complainant rebutted these allegations in his Reply
to the Comment of respondent judge. On 19 August 2012, the latter filed his Rejoinder

The Findings of the OCA

On 31 August 2010, the OCA promulgated its report and recommendation on the case. It found
respondent judge guilty of gross inefficiency for having failed to resolve the ejectment case
within the prescribed 30-day period after the filing of the parties’ respective Position Papers,
pursuant to Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.
As he had incurred a one-month delay in resolving the ejectment case, it recommended that he be
fined P20,000 pursuant to Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

The OCA found no merit in the charge of gross ignorance of the law allegedly committed by
respondent judge for dismissing the ejectment Complaint on the ground that it had not been
referred to the Lupon. It noted that complainant was already assailing the propriety of the Order,
which it deemed to be judicial in nature. It held that the proper remedy for correcting the actions
of judges should rest on judicial adjudication, and not on the filing of administrative complaints
against them. Thus, the second charge was dismissed for being judicial in nature.

The OCA noted that respondent had previously been fined ₱20,000 for gross ignorance of law
and/or procedure in the administrative case Atty. Pablo B. Francisco v. Judge Michael M.
Amdengan, docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-09-1739. In that ejectment case, respondent entertained a
motion to suspend proceedings similar to a Motion for Postponement, a prohibitive pleading
under the Rules on Summary Procedure.

Issue:

Whether respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law inefficiency for failing to
resolve the ejectment case within a period of 30 days as mandated under the Rules of Summary
Procedure
Ruling:

After a thorough review of the records, we AFFIRM the OCA findings in part.

It was sufficiently established that respondent judge committed undue delay in rendering a
Decision in the subject ejectment Complaint. An action for ejectment is governed by the Rules of
Summary Procedure, Section 10 of which provides:

Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment.- Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and
position papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment.

However should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the
said period, issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit
affidavits or other evidence on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order.
Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last clarificatory
affidavits, or the expiration of the period for filing the same.

The court shall not resort to the clarificatory procedure to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment.

This provision is mandatory, considering the nature of an ejectment case as we have explained
in Teroña v. Hon. Antonio de Sagun.We quote below the pertinent portion of that Decision:

The strict adherence to the reglementary period prescribed by the RSP [Rules on Summary
Procedure] is due to the essence and purpose of these rules. The law looks with compassion upon
a party who has been illegally dispossessed of his property. Due to the urgency presented by this
situation, the RSP provides for an expeditious and inexpensive means of reinstating the rightful
possessor to the enjoyment of the subject property. This fulfills the need to resolve the ejectment
case quickly.

Despite the simultaneous submissions of the parties’ respective Position Papers on 04 January
2010, respondent judge – through an Order dated 17 February 2010 – still submitted the case for
decision. By that time, the mandatory period of 30 days within which to render judgment on the
case had already lapsed. By issuing the Order dated 17 February 2010 purportedly submitting the
case for decision, he was subverting Section 10 of the Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent
considered his Order the start of the 30-day period within which to render a decision. The ruling
was already due on 04 February 2010, reckoned from the date the parties last filed their
respective Position Papers. He could not have extended the period by the mere issuance of an
Order, when the rules clearly provide for a mandatory period within which to decide a case.
Hence, he was guilty of undue delay in rendering a decision.

Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or an order
is classified as a less serious charge, punishable by either suspension from office without salary
and other benefits for not less than one ( 1) nor more than three (3) months, or a fine of more
than P1 0,000 but not exceeding P20,000. We take into consideration his candid admission and
acceptance of his infraction as factors in imposing only a fine. We also take into account his age
and frail health, although these factors do not in any way absolve him from liability or excuse
him from diligently fulfilling his duties.

As for the dismissal of the charge of gross ignorance of the law, we sustain the OCA's
recommendation. Indeed, complainant is already assailing the propriety of the Decision rendered
by respondent judge. The administrative Complaint, however, contains no allegation that the
dismissal of the ejectment case was marred by unethical behavior on his part. Thus, an
administrative complaint against him is not the proper remedy to assail his judgment.

In Rodriguez v. Judge Rodolfo S. Gatdula, 17 we have explained that administrative complaints

against judges cannot be pursued simultaneously with the judicial remedies accorded to parties
aggrieved by the erroneous orders or judgments of the former. Administrative remedies are
neither alternative to judicial review nor do they cumulate thereto, where such review is still
available to the aggrieved parties and the case has not yet been resolved with finality. In the
instant case, complainant had the available remedy of appeal when her ejectment Complaint was
dismissed. Hence, the OCA correctly dismissed the second charge against respondent judge.

OCA decision is affirmed:

1) Finding respondent Judge Michael M. Amdengan GUILTY of Undue Delay in Rendering a

Decisionand accordingly FINE him in the amount of PI 0,000 with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely; and

2) DISMISSING the charge of gross ignorance of the law for being judicial in nature.
 Judge’s Abuse of Authority

State Prosecutors Comilang and Suega-Lagman vs. Judge Belen

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216

Facts:

State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) Order
No. 05-07 dated February 7, 2005, was designated to assist the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. On February 16, 2005, he appeared before Judge Belen
of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays
because of his inquest duties in the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Laguna. Thus, on February
21, 2005, he moved that all cases scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge
Belen be deferred because he was set to appear for preliminary investigation in the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office on the same day.

Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his February 24, 2005 Order in Criminal
Case No. 12654-2003-C entitled People of the Philippines v. Jenelyn Estacio(Estacio Case)
requiring him to (1) explain why he did not inform the court of his previously-scheduled
preliminary investigation and (2) pay a fine of P500.00 for the cancellation of all the scheduled
hearings.

In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed his Explanation with Motion for
Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Early
Resolution. On May 30, 2005, Judge Belen directed him to explain why he should not be cited
for contempt for the unsubstantiated, callous and reckless charges extant in his Reiterative
Supplemental Motion, and to pay the postponement fee in the amount of P1,200.00 for the 12
postponed cases during the February 17, 2005 hearing.

In his comment/explanation, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the contents of

his Reiterative Supplemental Motion were based on his personal belief made in good faith and
with grain of truth. Nonetheless, Judge Belen rendered a Decision dated December 12, 2005
finding State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt of court and for payment of P20,000.00 as
penalty. His motion for reconsideration having been denied on February 16, 2006, he filed a
motion to post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the said Decision, which Judge Belen
granted and fixed in the amount of P20,000.00.
On April 12, 2006, State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94069 assailing Judge Belens May 30, 2005 Order and
December 12, 2005 Decision in the Estacio Case. On April 24, 2006, the CA issued a temporary
restraining order (TRO) enjoining Judge Belen from executing and enforcing his assailed Order
and Decision for a period of 60 days, which was subsequently extended with the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.

Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order on September 6, 2007 requiring State
Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to appear on
September 26, 2007 to explain why he should not be cited indirect contempt of court. In his
Compliance, State Prosecutor Comilang cited the CAs injunctive writ putting on hold all actions
of the RTC relative to its May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision during the
pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94069. He also manifested that he was waiving his appearance on
the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge against him.

Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order[6] dated September 26, 2007 directing State
Prosecutor Comilang to explain his defiance of the subpoena and why he should not be cited for
indirect contempt. Judge Belen likewise ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to issue
a subpoena for him to appear in the October 1, 2007 hearing regarding his failure to comply with
previously-issued subpoenas on September 18, 2007, and on October 8, 2007 for the hearing on
the non-filing of his supersedeas bond. State Prosecutor Comilang moved[7] to quash
the subpoenas for having been issued without jurisdiction and in defiance to the lawful order of
the CA, and for the inhibition of Judge Belen.

In an Order[8] dated October 1, 2007, Judge Belen denied the motion to quash subpoenas, held
State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of court for his failure to obey a duly
served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to suffer two days'
imprisonment. He was also required to post a supersedeas bond amounting to P30,000.00 to stay
the execution of the December 12, 2005 Decision.[9]

Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit[10] on October 18, 2007

before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) charging Judge Belen with manifest
partiality and malice, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of
the law in issuing the show cause orders, subpoenas and contempt citations, in grave defiance to
the injunctive writ issued by the CA. State Prosecutor Comilang alleged that Judge Belen's acts
were intended to harass, oppress, persecute, intimidate, annoy, vex and coerce him, and to place
him in a disadvantageous and compromising position, as he was prosecuting the libel case
instituted by herein complainant State Prosecutor Lagman against Judge Belen when he was still
a practicing lawyer, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15332-SP and pending before Branch 32 of
the RTC of San Pablo City. This libel case eventually became the basis for Administrative Case
No. 6687 for disbarment against Judge Belen.
To further show Judge Belens flagrant violation of his oath of office, State Prosecutors Comilang
and Lagman jointly filed a letter-complaint[11] dated September 28, 2007 addressed to the
Office of the Chief Justice, which the OCA treated as a supplemental complaint. They averred
that State Prosecutor Jorge Baculi, who found probable cause to indict Judge Belen with libel in
Criminal Case No. 15332-SP, was also harassed and oppressed by Judge Belen with his baseless
and malicious citation for contempt and with the use of foul, unethical and insulting statements.

The OCA directed Judge Belen to comment on State Prosecutors Comilang and Lagman's
charges against him.

In his Joint Comment[12] dated March 7, 2008, Judge Belen claimed that the allegations against
him are factually misplaced and jurisprudentially unmeritorious, as his assailed orders were
issued in accordance with the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence. He explained that the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA only enjoined him from enforcing, executing and
implementing the May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision, but it never prohibited
him from asking State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his failure to comply with the order
requiring the posting of supersedeas bond to defer the implementation of the mentioned
judgment, in accordance with Section 11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He thus prayed for the
dismissal of the instant administrative complaint, claiming to have discharged his judicial
functions not in a gross, deliberate and malicious manner.

In its Report[13] dated November 27, 2009, the OCA found Judge Belen to have violated
Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by failing to separately docket or consolidate with the
principal case (the Estacio Case) the indirect contempt charge against State Prosecutor
Comilang. It also found Judge Belen to have blatantly violated the injunctive writ of the CA
when he issued the orders requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain why he failed to post a
supersedeas bond which, given the antecedents of his administrative cases, showed manifest bias
and partiality tantamount to bad faith and grave abuse of authority.

Judge Belen was likewise found to have violated the following provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct:

Canon 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF

IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES
Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.

Canon 3 A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH

IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES

Rule 3.01 A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.

Thus, the OCA recommended, inter alia, that Judge Belen be adjudged guilty of manifest bias
and partiality, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law and accordingly, be
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and
with prejudice to reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations and government financial
institutions.

Issue

whether Judge Belen's actuations showed manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, grave
abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law warranting his dismissal from service as RTC
Judge of Branch 36, Calamba City

Ruling

After a careful evaluation of the records of the instant case, the Court concurs with the findings
and recommendations of the OCA, but only in part.

Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. Proceedings for indirect contempt may be

initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an order or any
other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt.
In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending
in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be docketed,
heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the
contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. (Emphasis supplied)

Indirect contempt proceedings, therefore, may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu
proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified petition and upon
compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings.[14] In the second instance, the
verified petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in
its discretion orders the contempt charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action, to
be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision.

In this case, the contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge
Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to
show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. As such, the requirements of the
rules that the verified petition for contempt be docketed, heard and decided
separately or consolidated with the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge
Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be
docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action, i.e., the Estacio Case.

However, Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the
implementation of his May 30, 2005 Order and December 12, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
94069.

A preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy, an adjunct to the main case subject to the
latters outcome. Its sole objective is to preserve the status quo until the court hears fully the
merits of the case. Its primary purpose is not to correct a wrong already consummated, or to
redress an injury already sustained, or to punish wrongful acts already committed, but to preserve
and protect the rights of the litigants during the pendency of the case.[15] The status quo should
be that existing ante litem motam or at the time of the filing of the case.[16]
The CA's Resolution dated July 12, 2006 states in part:

In order not to render the issues in this case moot and academic, We had in our Resolution of
April 24, 2006 granted a Temporary Restraining Order for 60 days from notice directing the
respondent Judge to refrain from executing his order of May 30, 2005 and decision of December
12, 2005 declaring petitioner in contempt of court and ordering him to pay a postponement fee of
P1,200 and penalty of P20,000. Considering that the TRO is about to expire, for the same
reasons provided under Section 3(b) and (c) Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, let a writ of
preliminary injunction issue, to be effective during the pendency of this case, ordering the
respondent Judge to refrain from enforcing his disputed issuances of May 30, 2005 and
December 12, 2005. The petitioner is exempted from posting the bond, since no private interests
are affected in this case.

As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the CA's disquisition is clear and categorical. In complete
disobedience to the said Resolution, however, Judge Belen proceeded to issue (1) the September
6, 2007 Order[18] requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the
supersedeas bond and to require his presence in court on September 26, 2007, as well as to
explain why he should not be cited for indirect contempt; (2) the September 26, 2007
Order[19] seeking State Prosecutor Comilang's explanation for his defiance of
the subpoena requiring his presence at the hearing of even date, and directing, once again, his
attendance at the next hearing on October 1, 2007 and to explain once more why he should not
be cited for indirect contempt; and (3) the October 1, 2007 Order[20] finding State Prosecutor
Comilang guilty of indirect contempt and sentencing him to pay a fine of P30,000.00 and to
suffer two days' imprisonment.

Hence, in requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond,
in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt
proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his non-compliance with
the issued subpoenas, Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of
preliminary injunction aimed to preserve.

Respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, having been found guilty of grave abuse of
authority and gross ignorance of the law, is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all
benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
and controlled corporations and government financial institutions. He shall
forthwith CEASE and DESIST from performing any official act or function appurtenant to his
office upon service on him of this Decision.
 Belen vs. Judge Belen A.M. No. RTJ-08-2139

Facts:

Complainant Michael B. Belen filed a Verified Complaint dated 7 March 2001 with the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) of the Supreme Court, charging Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen
with grave abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a judge. According to
complainant, sometime in March 2004, respondent judge filed a case for Estafa against
complainants father, Nezer D. Belen, but the same was dismissed for lack of probable cause by
Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Victoria Sunega-Lagman in a Resolution dated 28 July
2004. Respondent judge filed an Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Disqualif[ication])
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City, alleging,inter alia, that Sunega-
Lagman was always absent during the hearings in the preliminary investigation in the estafa
case. Respondent judge likewise filed a complaint for disciplinary action against Sunega-Lagman
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline, docketed as CBD
Case No. 06-1700. To refute the allegations of respondent judge against Sunega-Lagman,
complainant executed an Affidavit dated 19 May 2006, which was submitted by Sunega-Lagman
as evidence in the CBD case. Complainants Affidavit stated that the allegations of respondent
judge against Sunega-Lagman were false; that Sunega-Lagman was present during the
preliminary investigation hearings dated 14, 21 and 29 April 2004, and that she was absent only
once, on 6 May 2004, when she was already on maternity leave; and that it was respondent judge
who was absent during the hearings.

Thereafter, respondent judge allegedly started harassing and threatening complainant with the
filing of several cases against the latter. On 11 January 2007, at 10:00 in the morning,
complainant received a mobile phone text message from the caretaker of his piggery, informing
him that respondent judge arrived and was taking pictures of the piggery. Complainant rushed to
the area and saw respondent judge, accompanied by the Municipal Agriculturist and Sanitary
Inspector and the Barangay Chairman, inspecting complainants piggery.

Respondent judge also wrote several letters addressed to certain local government authorities and
employees, requesting information on complainants piggery and poultry business; advising them
of the alleged violations by the complainant of the National Building Code and certain
environmental laws; and reminding the local government authorities of their duty to forestall the
issuance of municipal clearance and license to complainants business establishment.
Respondent judge also filed a criminal case against complainant for violations of Section 8 of
Presidential Decree No. 984 and Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 953, docketed as I.S. No.
07-246/07-247, before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna.

In his Comment, respondent judge alleged that he never neglected his duties as a judge; that as a
landowner and citizen of the Republic of the Philippines, he had the right to file criminal
complaints against violators of environmental laws to protect the environment; and that he had
the right, under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6173, to secure public information from
government offices, especially about the complainant who was violating numerous laws.
Respondent judge also claimed that he did not use the courts official stationery or letterhead in
his correspondence with government authorities and employees of Alaminos, Laguna. He
emphasized that the courts official letterhead should appear as:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

4TH JUDICIAL REGION

BRANCH 36

CALAMBA CITY

Respondent judge claimed that he used his personal stationery or letterhead, and signed the same
in his private, not judicial, capacity.

On 11 March 2008, the OCA submitted its Report finding respondent judge guilty of violating
Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary. The OCA
stated that while respondent judge did not actually use the courts official letterhead but his own
personal stationery, his letters indicated that he is the presiding judge of an RTC in Calamba
City, and even stated that his letters were from the chambers of the presiding judge. It is apparent
from the acts of respondent judge that he intended to use the prestige of his judicial position to
promote his personal interest.

The OCA recommended that (a) the administrative case against respondent judge be re-docketed
as a regular administrative matter; and (b) that respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen be
fined in the amount of P11,000 for violation of Section 4, Canon 1 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
In a Resolution dated 13 August 2008, the Supreme Court resolved, among others, to re-docket
the administrative complaint against respondent judge as a regular administrative matter.
Subsequently, the OCA, in compliance with the Courts Resolution, designated Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia as the investigating justice of the administrative case.

Issue:

whether respondent judge violated Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary when he used a letterhead indicating his
position as the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36. According to Justice
Garcia, while the computer-printed letterhead of respondent judge is not the official letterhead of
the RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, the use of the same reflects respondent judges designation
and position in the judiciary, and indicates that the letters came from the chambers of the
presiding judge of Branch 36. Undoubtedly, respondent judge was trying to use the prestige of
his judicial office for his own personal interest.

Ruling

Respondent judge wrote letters to government authorities and employees to secure public
information regarding complainants piggery and poultry business; to inform addressees of the
laws allegedly being violated by complainant; and to remind the addressees of their duties as
government officials or employees and warn them of the possible legal effects of neglect of
public duties. In writing these letters, respondent judges use of his personal stationery with
letterhead indicating that he is the Presiding Judge of RTC of Calamba City, Branch 36, and
stating that the letter was from [his] chambers, clearly manifests that respondent judge was trying
to use the prestige of his office to influence said government officials and employees, and to
achieve with prompt and ease the purpose for which those letters were written. In other words,
respondent judge used said letterhead to promote his personal interest. This is violative
of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary. We quote these sections below:
CANON 1
INDEPENDENCE

SECTION. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial
conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the
private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of
a judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities.

As the Report stated, [repondent judges] use of the letterhead and his designation as a Judge in a
situation of potential dispute gave the appearance that there is an implied or assured consent of
the court to his cause. This circumstance, to our mind, was what marked the respondent Judges
use of his letterhead and title as improper. In other words, the respondent Judges transgression
was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but in not being very careful and discerning in
considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his letterhead and his title.

The use of a letterhead should not be considered independently of the surrounding circumstances
of the use - the underlying reason that marks the use with the element of impropriety or
appearance of impropriety. In the present case, the respondent Judge crossed the line of propriety
when he used his letterhead to report a complaint involving an alleged violation of church rules
and, possibly, of Philippine laws. Coming from a judge with the letter addressed to a foreign
reader, such report could indeed have conveyed the impression of official recognition or notice
of the reported violation.

The same problem that the use of letterhead poses, occurs in the use of the title of Judge or
Justice in the correspondence of a member of the Judiciary. While the use of the title is an
official designation as well as an honor that an incumbent has earned, a line still has to be drawn
based on the circumstances of the use of the appellation. While the title can be used for social
and other identification purposes, it cannot be used with the intent to use the prestige of his
judicial office to gainfully advance his personal, family or other pecuniary interests. Nor can the
prestige of a judicial office be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, or to convey
or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the
judge. (Canon 2, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct) To do any of these is to cross into
the prohibited field of impropriety.

In view of the foregoing, we find respondent judge guilty of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1
and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba City,
Branch 36, GUILTY of violation of Section 4 of Canon 1 and Section 1 of Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, and FINE him P11,000, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
 Tan vs. Judge Casuga-Tabin A.M. No. MTJ-09-1729

Facts

Noryn S. Tan (complainant) filed a Complaint dated April 2, 2007 against Judge Maria Clarita
Casuga-Tabin (respondent) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
4, Baguio Cityfor denial of due process relative to Criminal Case No. 118628.

Complainant avers: On November 9, 2006, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Quezon City
Police District (QCPD) served her a warrant of arrest dated October 13, 2006, issued by
the MTCCBaguio City, Branch 4, presided by respondent, relative to Criminal Case No. 118628
for alleged violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. It was only then that she learned for the first
time that a criminal case was filed against her before the court. She was detained at the Quezon
City Hall Complex Police Office and had to post bail of P1,000.00 before the Office of the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City for her temporary
release. Upon verification, she learned that respondent issued on August 8, 2006 an Order
directing her to appear before the court on October 10, 2006 for arraignment. It was sent by mail
to PNP Quezon City for service to her. However, she did not receive any copy of the Order and
up to the present has not seen the same; hence, she was not able to attend her arraignment. She
also found out that there was no proof of service of the Order or any notice to her of the
arraignment. This notwithstanding, respondent issued a warrant for her arrest. Complainant
alleges that she was deeply aggrieved and embarrassed by the issuance of the warrant for her
arrest despite the fact that she was never notified of her arraignment. Complainant prayed that
the appropriate investigation be conducted as to the undue issuance of a warrant for her arrest.

In her Comment dated July 5, 2007, respondent answered: She issued the warrant of arrest
because when the case was called for appearance, the complainant, as accused therein, failed to
appear. Prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, her staff sent by registered mail the court's
Order dated August 8, 2006 addressed to complainant through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104,
Quezon City directing complainant to appear on October 10, 2006 at 8:30 a.m. for the
arraignment and preliminary conference in Criminal Case No. 118628, as proven by Registry
Receipt No. 0310. It is true that the return on the court's Order dated August 8, 2006 had not yet
been made by the QC Police on or before October 10, 2006. Nonetheless, she issued the warrant
of arrest in good faith and upon the following grounds: (a) under Sec. 3 of Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, the court was entitled to presume that on October 10, 2006, after the lapse of a little
over two months, official duty had been regularly performed and a letter duly directed and
mailed had been received in the regular course of mail; and (b) Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rule on
Summary Procedure in Special Cases provides that bail may be required where the accused does
not reside in the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. The warrant
of arrest she issued was meant to implement this provision, which was not repealed by the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, since complainant is a resident of Quezon City and not
of Baguio City. If her interpretation was erroneous, she (respondent) believes that an
administrative sanction for such error would be harsh and unsympathetic. She has nothing
personal against complainant and did not want to embarrass or humiliate her. She issued the
warrant in the honest belief that her act was in compliance with the rules. She prays that the case
against her be dismissed and that a ruling on the interpretation of Secs. 10 & 12, of the 1983
Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, in relation to Sec. 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure be made for the guidance of the bench and bar.

The OCA, in its agenda report dated September 28, 2007, recommended that the case be
dismissed for lack of merit. It held: Prior to the filing of the information, a preliminary
investigation was conducted by the provincial prosecutor resulting in the Resolution dated July
11, 2006 recommending the filing of the case; it was incredulous for complainant to claim that
she came to learn for the first time of the filing of the criminal case when the warrant of arrest
was served on her; furthermore, there was already a complete service of notice as contemplated
in Sec. 10, Rule 13[of the Rules of Court; hence the requirement of notice was fully satisfied by
the service of the Order dated August 8, 2006 and the completion of the service thereof.

Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court on November 12, 2007 issued a
Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated January 8, 2008 alleging: The issue in
this case was not whether complainant was aware of the criminal complaint against her, but
whether the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her despite the absence of notice should be
administratively dealt with; complainant was never notified of the arraignment; thus, she was not
able to attend the same; respondent admitted in her Comment that no return had yet been made
on or before October 10, 2006, the date respondent ordered the warrant to be issued; her
explanation of good faith was therefore unjustifiable; neither could respondent invoke the
presumption of regularity of performance of official duty, since the complainant did not actually
receive any notice; respondent in an Order dated March 14, 2007 admitted that since she did not
usually wear eyeglasses during hearings, she thought that the acknowledgment receipt at the
back of the Order referred to the copy sent to complainant; later scrutiny, however, showed that
it pertained to the one sent to the prosecutor's office; Section 10, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court
did not apply to the instant case; the Order was addressed and sent to PNP Quezon City;
assuming that the Order was properly served on the PNP, it was not equivalent to a service on
complainant; there was no actual delivery of the Order to the complainant; hence, there was no
personal service; neither was it served by ordinary mail or by registered mail; thus, the rule on
completeness of service had not been satisfied; complainant was not aware of and therefore did
not attend the preliminary investigation of her case; no proof can be shown that she was ever
notified of the said preliminary investigation, much less of the filing of the same.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2008, the Court required respondent to Comment on
complainant's Motion for Reconsideration.

Complainant filed a Comment stating: Complainant's motion did not raise any new issue or
ground that would merit the reconsideration of the Court's November 12, 2007 Resolution;
complainant failed to rebut the presumption that she was notified of the scheduled arraignment;
what complainant propounded was a mere self-serving denial that she never received the
subpoena intended for her; there was no explanation why she would be able to receive a warrant
of arrest; which was coursed in the same manner as the subpoena, in a little less than a month,
but allegedly to receive the subpoena in almost two months; if complainant's assertion was to be
believed, the effect would be to paralyze the operation of courts in the provinces that had to
inevitably rely on the police resources of Metro Manila; arraignments could not proceed and
trials could not go on; it was reasonable to follow as a rule that once a pleading or any other
official document was received in the ordinary course of sending them, it must be presumed that
others of the same nature were also delivered to the named addressees; to believe otherwise
would be to delay justice for those residing outside Metro Manila.

Issue

Whether respondent judge is guilty of abuse of authority

Held

Yes.

Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court
shall not order the arrest of the accused, unless the accused fails to appear whenever required.
This is clearly provided in Section 16 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which
states:

Sec. 16. Arrest of accused. - The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure
to appear whenever required. Release of the person arrested shall either be in bail or on
recognizance by a responsible citizen acceptable to the court. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, respondent claims that the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of complainant was
justified, since complainant failed to appear during the arraignment in spite of an order requiring
her to do so. Respondent admits, however, that a copy of the Order dated August 8, 2006, was
sent to complainant through the Chief of Police, PNP, 1104, Quezon City.

While it is true that the Rules of Court provides for presumptions, one of which is that official
duty has been regularly performed, such presumption should not be the sole basis of a magistrate
in concluding that a person called to court has failed to appear as required, which in turn justifies
the issuance of a warrant for her arrest, when such notice was not actually addressed to her
residence but to the police in her city. So basic and fundamental is a person's right to liberty that
it should not be taken lightly or brushed aside with the presumption that the police through which
the notice had been sent, actually served the same on complainant whose address was not even
specified.

Respondent further admitted in her Comment dated July 5, 2007 that when she proceeded with
the arraignment on October 10, 2006 as scheduled, no return had yet been made by the Quezon
City Police. Nevertheless, she issued the warrant of arrest, arguing that she did so on the
presumption that regular duty had been performed, and that the Order had been received in the
regular course of mail; and since Sec. 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure provides that
bail may be required where the accused does not reside in the place where the violation of the
law or ordinance was committed, the warrant of arrest she issued was justified since complainant
is a resident of Quezon City and not of Baguio City.

The Court disagrees.

Sections 10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases (As Amended)
state:

Sec. 10. Duty of the Court. - On the basis of the complaint of information and the affidavits
accompanying the same, the court shall make a preliminary determination whether to dismiss the
case outright for being patently without basis or merit, or to require further proceedings to be
taken. In the latter case, the court may set the case for immediate arraignment of an accused
under custody, and if he pleads guilty, may render judgment forthwith. If he pleads not guilty,
and in all other cases, the court shall issue an order, accompanied by copies of all the affidavits
submitted by the complainant, directing the defendant(s) to appear and submit his counter-
affidavit and those of his witnesses at a specified date not later than ten (10) days from receipt
thereof.

Failure on the part of the defendant to appear whenever required, shall cause the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest if the court shall find that a probable cause exists after an examination in
writing and under oath or affirmation of the complainant and his witnesses. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

Sec. 12. Bail not required; Exception. --- No bail shall be required except when a warrant of
arrest is issued in accordance with Section 10 hereon or where the accused (a) is a recidivist; (b)
is fugitive from justice; (c) is charged with physical injuries; (d) does not reside in the place
where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed, or (e) has no known residence.

Section 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure was not reproduced in the 1991 Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure, while Section 10 was revised and portions thereof reproduced in
Sections 12 and 16 of the 1991 Rules on Summary Procedure. Granting, arguendo, that Sections
10 and 12 of the 1983 Rules on Summary Procedure in Special Cases were not repealed by the
1991 Revised Rules, still it does not justify the warrant of arrest issued in this case. Section 12
talks of instances when bails are required, one of which is when the accused does not reside in
the place where the violation of the law or ordinance was committed. It does not state, however,
that a warrant of arrest shall immediately issue even without actual notice to the
accused. Respondent's interpretation ascribes to the rules those which were not expressly stated
therein and unduly expands their meaning.

The Court also notes that in an Order dated March 14, 2007, a copy of which was attached by
complainant to her Motion for Reconsideration, respondent admitted that:

As a point of clarification, during the hearing on October 10, 2006, when the case was called and
the accused failed to appear, the Court verified from the staff if the Accused was notified to
which said staff answered in the affirmative, showing to the Court a copy of the Order dated
August 8, 2006, setting this case for Appearance of the Accused on October 10, 2006. At the
back of the Order was an attached Acknowledgment Receipt. A quick glance of the said receipt,
and without eyeglasses of the Presiding Judge, as she does not usually wear one during Court
sessions, made this Court believed that indeed, that was the Acknowledgment Receipt proving
that the Accused was served with a copy of the said Order.

The attention of the Court was called upon receipt of the Accused's Motion for Clarification and
a closer look on the Acknowledgment Receipt shows that the same was for the City Prosecutor's
Office.
From this, it can be inferred that respondent issued the warrant of arrest on the mistaken belief
that complainant was actually notified of the arraignment. A closer scrutiny of the records
however showed that the Acknowledgment Receipt pertained to the copy of the City Prosecutor's
Office and not that of complainant's.

Whatever the real reasons behind respondent's issuance of complainant's warrant of arrest --
whether from the mistaken belief that complainant was actually notified, or the presumption that
the police had served a copy of the order on complainant or that the rules allow immediate
issuance of warrants of arrests whenever the accused does not reside in the locality where the
crime was committed -- the fact is, respondent failed to uphold the rules, for which she should be
held administratively liable.

The Court has held that a judge commits grave abuse of authority when she hastily issues a
warrant of arrest against the accused in violation of the summary procedure rule that the accused
should first be notified of the charges against him and given the opportunity to file his counter-
affidavits and countervailing evidence.

While judges may not always be subjected to disciplinary action for every erroneous order or
decision they render, that relative immunity is not a license to be negligent, abusive and arbitrary
in their prerogatives. If judges wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by law, there will not
only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic
requirements of due process.While there appears to be no malicious intent on the part of
respondent, such lack of intent, however, cannot completely free her from liability. When the law
is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to her office to know and simply apply it.

Considering that this is respondent's first administrative infraction in her more than 8 years of
service in the judiciary, which serves to mitigate her liability, the Court holds the imposition of a
fine in the amount of P10,000.00 to be proper in this case.

Judge Maria Clarita Casuga-Tabin, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4, Baguio City is
hereby found guilty of abuse of authority for which she is fined in the sum ofP10,000.00.
 Problem Areas in Legal Ethics

CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.

List of Cases
1. Tan vs. Balajadia G.R. No. 169517
2. Aguirre v Rana B.M. No. 1036 June 10, 2000
3. In Re: Petition To Sign In The Roll Of Attorneys B.M. No. 2540 September 24,
2013Michael a. Medado, petitioner.
4.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND

DILIGENCE.

List of Cases
1. Teodulfo B. Basas vs. Atty. Miguel I. Icawat
2. A.C. No. 4282. August 24, 2000

3. Corazon T. Reontoy v. Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit (302 SCRA 604)

 CASES REGARDING JUDGES’ DELAYING IN DECIDING CASES

List of Cases

1. Office of the Court Administrator vs. Judge Santiago E. Soriano

2. Atty. Manuel Jimenez, jr., complainant, vs. Judge Michael M. Amdengan, respondent.

JUDGE’S ABUSE OF AUTHORITY

List of Cases

1. State Prosecutors Comilang and Suega-Lagman vs. Judge Belen A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216
2. State Prosecutors Comilang and Suega-Lagman vs. Judge Belen A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216
3. Tan vs. Judge Casuga-Tabin A.M. No. MTJ-09-1729

Submitted by: Glaize Shaye C. Santos Llb. III

Submitted to: Atty. Adenn Sigua