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 CIVIL PROCEDURE

People v. Lacson, G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003

In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a time-bar of one year or two
years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused
and with a priori notice to the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in fixing
the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests and those of the accused for the orderly and
speedy disposition of criminal cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due process. The Court believed
that the time limit is a reasonable period for the State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the
consent of the accused and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient that the rule becomes a
denial of justice. The petitioners failed to show a manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.

Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003

This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him
even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure
sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation,
no redemption can be affected any longer.

Spouses Rosales v. Spouses Alfonso, G.R. No. 137792, August 12, 2003

This is the mortgagor’s equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated, may be exercised by him
even beyond the 90-day period ‘from the date of service of the order,’ and even after the foreclosure
sale itself, provided it be before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation,
no redemption can be affected any longer.

OAMINAL v. CASTILLO, G.R. No. 152776, October 8, 2003

The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief — to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration — are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having invoked the trial court’s
jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents cannot — after failing to obtain the relief prayed for
— repudiate the very same authority they have invoked.
People v. Ortega, 276 SCRA 166 (2003)


An accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or
information. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information would
be a violation of this constitutional right.

CHING vs. CA, G.R. NO. 124642, FEBRUARY 23, 2004)

Upon application of the third person through a motion to set aside the levy on attachment, the court
shall order a summary hearing for the purpose of determining whether the sheriff has acted rightly or
wrongly in the performance of his duties in the execution of the writ of attachment. The court may
order the sheriff to release the property from the erroneous levy and to return the same to the third
person. In resolving the application, the court cannot pass upon the question of title to the property
with any character of finality but only insofar as may be necessary to decide if the sheriff has acted
correctly or not.

Perez v. Ombudsman, GR. No. 131445, May 27, 2004

Appeals from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases are no
longer appealable to the SC but to the CA via a petition for review (Rule 43) (Fabian v. Desierto, GR. No.
129742, Sept. 16, 1998). However, the remedy of an aggrieved party from a decision or order of the
Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal case is to file a petition for certiorari before the SC.

Bacolod City Water District v. Labayen, G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004

A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the
application for preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court, a judge may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date
of issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction
is denied, the temporary restraining order would be deemed automatically vacated.

Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005

Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are indispensable parties; as such,
an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of the said parties. The mere fact that Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. has repudiated the co-ownership between him and the respondent does not deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition,
the plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co- owner of the subject property; and, second, the
conveyance of his lawful shares.

IN RE: Stephanie Garcia, GR 148311, March 31, 2005

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the adopter, possess in
general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem which creates
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation.

Ocampo v. Tirona, G.R. No. 147382, April 6, 2005

Interpleader is a remedy whereby a person who has property whether personal or real, in his
possession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially, without claiming any right in both, or claims an
interest which in whole or in part is not disputed by the conflicting claimants, comes to court and asks
that the persons who claim the said property or who consider themselves entitled to demand
compliance with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves, in order to determine finally
who is entitled to one or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protect a person against a
double liability but to protect him against a double vexation in respect of one liability.

Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 151857, April 28, 2005

Court of Appeals ignored the existence of the tax return extant on the record. As a general rule, courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of records in other cases tried or pending in the
same court, even when those cases were heard or are actually pending before the same judge.
However, an exception is when reference to such records is sufficiently made without objection from
the opposing parties.

Neypes v. CA, GR 141524, September 14, 2005

The aggrieved party has a “fresh period” of 15 days from the denial of motion for reconsideration or
new trial within which to file his appeal. This applies to Rules 40, 41, 42, 43 and 45.

Jumamil v. Café, G.R. No. 144570, September 21, 2005

The requisites of an action for declaratory relief are:1) the subject matter of the controversy must be a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, statute, executive order or regulation, or ordinance; 2)
the terms of said documents and the validity thereof are doubtful and require judicial construction; 3)
there must have been no breach of the documents in question; 4) there must be an actual justiciable
controversy or the “ripening seeds” of one between persons whose interests are adverse; 5) the issue
must be ripe for judicial determination; and 6) adequate relief is not available through other means or
other forms of action or proceeding.

Audi AG v. Mejia, G.R. No. 167533, July 27, 2007; De los Reyes v. People, G.R. No. 138297, January 27,
2006

Hierarchy of courts meant that while the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial
Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue original writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus, such concurrence does not accord litigants unrestrained freedom of choice
of court to which filing thereof may be directed. Petitions should be filed with the court of lower level
unless the importance of the issue involved deserves the action of a higher court.

Stronghold Insurance vs. Republic-Asahi, G.R. No. 147561, June 22, 2006

Generally, death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation and only
obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.
Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from
a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor as these claims are not actually extinguished.

SPOUSES VERSOLA VS. CA, G.R. NO. 164740, JULY 31, 2006

It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges that such property is a family
home. This claim for exemption must be set and proved to the sheriff. Failure to do so would estopped
the party from later claiming the exemption.

Omictin vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148004, January 22, 2007

The court cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction
of an administrative tribunal prior to resolving the same, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services in determining
technical or intricate matters of fact.
INFANTE VS. ARAN BUILDERS, INC., G.R. NO.156596, 24 AUGUST 2007

If the action affects title to or possession of real property or any interest therein, the action for revival
must be filed with the court having jurisdiction over the place where the real property or any portion
thereof is situated. Otherwise, the action for revival of judgment is a personal action wherein the venue
lies with the residence of either the plaintiff or defendant, at the option of the plaintiff.

Silverio vs. CA G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction
a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing
petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry
and the public interest.

Concha v. Lumocso, G.R. No. 158121, December 12, 2007

In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance of, or for cancellation of title, to or to
quiet title over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve “title to, or
possession of, real property, or any interest therein.”

Canlas vs. Napico, G.R. No. 182795, June 5, 2008

The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court, which in this case was
affirmed with finality, is not included among the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted
Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available.

Hao v. Andres, A.M. No. P-07-2384, June 18, 2008

The rules provide that property seized under a writ of replevin is not to be delivered immediately to the
plaintiff. Under Section 6, Rule 60, the Sheriff should have waited no less than 5 days in order to give the
complainant an opportunity to object to the sufficiency of the bond.

People vs. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification
would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason
thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural
steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with.
VILLARIN VS MUNASQUE, G.R. No. 169444, September 17, 2008

Based on the foregoing, the sheriff is required to first demand of the judgment obligor the immediate
payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution before a levy can be made. The sheriff shall
demand such payment either in cash, certified bank check or any other mode of payment acceptable to
the judgment obligee. If the judgment obligor cannot pay by these methods immediately or at once, he
can exercise his option to choose which of his properties can be levied upon. If he does not exercise this
option immediately or when he is absent or cannot be located, he waives such right, and the sheriff can
now first levy his personal properties, if any, and then the real properties if the personal properties are
insufficient to answer for the judgment.

Secretary of Defense vs. Manalo, G.R. No. 180906, October 7, 2008

The writ applies to extralegal/extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof while
a search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a
judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court.

Fermin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179695, December 18, 2008

The Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding since they
both deal with the eligibility or qualification of a candidate. The distinction mainly in the fact that a
“Section 78” under Section 253 of the OEC, petition is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo
warranto is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate

Montañer vc CA, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009

A special proceeding, “by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,” has one
definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no
definite adverse party.

Ocampo vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 187879, July 5, 2010

The principal object of the appointment of a temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it
can pass to the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs,
pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Sarmiento v. Manalite Home Owners Association, G.R. No. 182953, October 11, 2010

In forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint, and prove, that he was in prior physical
possession of the property in dispute until he was deprived thereof by the defendant by any of the
means provided in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules either by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or
stealth. In unlawful detainer, there must be an allegation in the complaint of how the possession of
defendant started or continued, that is, by virtue of lease or any contract, and that defendant holds
possession of the land or building “after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.

Philippine Business Bank vs. Chua, 15 November 2010

A partial summary judgment as a rule is not appealable sepearately from the judgment in the entire
case, unless allowed by the court under Sec.1(f) Rule 41. Hence, the failure to appeal separately from a
partial summary judgment or to challenge it by a special civil action for certiorari does not make the
same final and executory.

Yu v. Samson Tatad, G.R. No. 170979, February 9, 2011

While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh period to
appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules
of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal
case. Section 39 of BP 129 categorically states that [t]he period for appeal from final orders, resolutions,
awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to
recognize any distinction.

Galang v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011

A petition for certiorari was filed questioning an interlocutory order of a trial court in an electoral
protest was within the appellate jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Since it is the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in election
contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has jurisdiction to issue
a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
HEIRS OF RETERTA VS MORES & LOPEZ, G.R. No. 159941, August 17, 2011

The concept of ‘final’ judgment, as distinguished from one which has ‘become final’ (or ‘executory’ as of
right [final and executory]), is definite and settled. A ‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes
of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the
merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial declares categorically what the rights
and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses
an action on the ground, for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the
Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants
is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move
(which among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking
of an appeal), this is what is referred to as the final judgment for purposes of appeal.

Torbela vs. Rosario, G.R. No. 140528 G.R. No. 140553, December 7, 2011

It is true that in express trusts and resulting trusts, a trustee cannot acquire by prescription a property
entrusted to him unless he repudiates the trust. Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the
beneficiary against the trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where (a)
the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust, and (c) the
evidence thereon is clear and conclusive.

Georgia T. Estel, vs. Recaredo P. Diego, Sr. and Recaredo R. Diego, Jr., G.R. No. 174082, January 16,
2012

Verification is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the instant case, one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and
when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct.

SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA and ERNESTO S. DE MESA, vs. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR. and
MA. RUFINA D. ACERO,SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L. SAMONTE and REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS., G.R. No.
185064, January 16, 2012

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing,
however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with
the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution.
The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.
Panay Railways Inc., Vs. Heva Management And Development Corporation, Pamplona Agro-Industrial
Corporation, And Spouses Candelaria Dayot And Edmundo Dayot, G. R. No. 154061, January 25, 2012)

Statutes and rules regulating the procedure of courts are considered applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage. Procedural laws and rules are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent. The effect of procedural statutes and rules on the rights of a litigant may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. This retroactive application does not violate any right of a
person adversely affected. Neither is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that, as a general
rule, no vested right may attach to or arise from procedural laws and rules. It has been held that “a
person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the
trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.” More so
when, as in this case, petitioner admits that it was not able to pay the docket fees on time. Clearly, there
were no substantive rights to speak of when the RTC dismissed the Notice of Appeal.

Nenita Gonzales, Et. Al. Vs. Mariano Bugaay And Lucy Bugaay, G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012

In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to
ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a
motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders its
judgment. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the demurrer and dismissing the
Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer
an available remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had correctly done.

Juana Complex I Homeowners Association, Inc., et al. vs. Fil-Estate Land, Inc., G.R. No. 152272, March
5, 2012

The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or
not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of
said complaint. Stated differently, if the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
asserted by the defendant.

Romero vs CA, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

In testament to this, it has been held that it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to (1) approve
the sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication; (2) to
determine who are the heirs of the decedent; (3) the recognition of a natural child; (4) the status of a
woman claiming to be the legal wife of the decedent; the legality of disinheritance of an heir by the
testator; and (5)to pass upon the validity of a waiver of hereditary rights.
Leo C. Romero and David Amando C. Romero vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, Aurora C. Romero and
Vittorio C. Romero, G.R. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the
properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively.
This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate
the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed
among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings.

RODOLFO NOEL LOZADA, JR., VIOLETA LOZADA and ARTURO LOZADA, vs. PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL ARROYO, EDUARDO ERMITA, AVELINO RAZON, ANGEL ATUTUBO and SPO4 ROGER
VALEROSO,* G.R. Nos. 184379-80, April 24, 2012

The privilege of the writ of amparo is envisioned basically to protect and guarantee the rights to life,
liberty, and security of persons, free from fears and threats that vitiate the quality of this life. It is an
extraordinary writ conceptualized and adopted in light of and in response to the prevalence of extra-
legal killings and enforced disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined by the indiscriminate
filing of amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire to secure Amparo reliefs and protection
and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations.

Eloisa Merchandising, Inc. And Trebel International, Inc., Vs. Banco De Oro Universal Bank And
Engracio M. Escasinas, Jr., In His Capacity As Ex-Officio Sheriff Of The Rtc Of Makati City, G.R. No.
192716, June 13, 2012

While under the present Rules, it is now the duty of the clerk of court to set the case for pre-trial if the
plaintiff fails to do so within the prescribed period, this does not relieve the plaintiff of his own duty to
prosecute the case diligently. This case had been at the pre-trial stage for more than two years and
petitioners have not shown special circumstances or compelling reasons to convince us that the
dismissal of their complaint for failure to prosecute was unjustified.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Hi-Tri Development Corporation and Luz R. Bakunawa., G.R.
No. 192413, June 13, 2012

Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the issuance of individual notices
upon respondents was a jurisdictional requirement, and that failure to effect personal service on them
rendered the Decision and the Order of the RTC void for want of jurisdiction. Escheat proceedings are
actions in rem, whereby an action is brought against the thing itself instead of the person. Thus, an
action may be instituted and carried to judgment without personal service upon the depositors or other
claimants . Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res.]Consequently, a judgment of
escheat is conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement, as publication is considered a general and
constructive notice to all persons interested.

Equitable v. Special Steel, G.R. No. 175350, June 13, 2012

A writ of preliminary attachment is too harsh a provisional remedy to be issued based on mere
abstractions of fraud. Rather, the rules require that for the writ to issue, there must be a recitation of
clear and concrete factual circumstances manifesting that the debtor practiced fraud upon the creditor
at the time of the execution of their agreement in that said debtor had a preconceived plan or intention
not to pay the creditor.

Paglaum Management & Development Corp. And Health Marketing Technologies, Inc., Vs. Union Bank
Of The Philippines, Notary Public John Doe, And Register Of Deeds Of Cebu City And Cebu Province, $J.
King & Sons Co., Inc. Intervenor, G.R. No. 179018, June 18, 2012

Civil Case No. 01-1567, being an action for Annulment of Sale and Titles resulting from the extrajudicial
foreclosure by Union Bank of the mortgaged real properties, is classified as a real action. In Fortune
Motors v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that a case seeking to annul a foreclosure of a real estate
mortgage is a real action, viz: An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different
from an action to annul a private sale of real property. (Muñoz v. Llamas, 87 Phil. 737, 1950). While it is
true that petitioner does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of the property in question,
his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages are closely intertwined with the issue of
ownership of the building which, under the law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of
which is petitioner’s primary objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or
rescission of a sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective and
nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.

Egardo Navia, Ruben Dio and Andrew Buising vs. Virginia Pardico, for and in behalf in representation
of Benhur Pardico., G.R. No. 184467, June 19, 2012

For the protective writ of amparo to issue, allegation and proof that the persons subject thereof are
missing are not enough. It must also be shown and proved by substantial evidence that the
disappearance was carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a
political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the same or give information on the fate or
whereabouts of said missing persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of the
law for a prolonged period of time. Simply put, the petitioner in an amparo case has the burden of
proving by substantial evidence the indispensable element of government participation.
Spouses Ramon Villuga And Mercedita Villuga, Vs. Kelly Hardware And Construction Supply Inc.,
Represented By Ernesto V. Yu, Executive Vice-President And General Manager, G.R. No. 176570, July
18, 2012

A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings
on their face appear to raise issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving
party show that such issues are not genuine.

Theodore And Nancy Ang, Represented By Eldrige Marvin B. Ceron, Vs. Spouses Alan And Em Ang,
Respondents. G.R. No. 186993, August 22, 2012

Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in interest in the case below as
he does not stand to be benefited or injured by any judgment therein. He was merely appointed by the
petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose of filing and prosecuting the complaint
against the respondents. Such appointment, however, does not mean that he is subrogated into the
rights of petitioners and ought to be considered as a real party in interest.

Planters Development Bank, Vs. Julie Chandumal, G.R. No. 195619 05 September 2012

In this case, the sheriff resorted to substituted service of summons due to his failure to serve it
personally. In Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, the Court detailed the requisites for a valid substituted
service of summons, summed up as follows: (1) impossibility of prompt personal service – the party
relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or
there is impossibility of prompt service; (2) specific details in the return – the sheriff must describe in
the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service; (3) a
person of suitable age and discretion – the sheriff must determine if the person found in the alleged
dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant
is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to
immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons,
which matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons; and (4) a competent
person in charge, who must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in
the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.
Dare Adventure Farm Corporation Vs. Spouses Felix and Nenita Ng, Spouses Martin and Azucena Ng
and Agripina R. Goc-ong, et al. G.R. No. 161122. September 24, 2012

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional in nature that it may be
availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final
resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud.
Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by
parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or resolutions.

In the matter of the petition for the writ of Amparo and the writ of Habeas Data in favor of Francis
Saez, petitioner vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO, GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, P/DIR. GEN.
AVELINO RAZON, 22Nn MICO, CAPT. LAWRENCE BANAAG, SGT. CASTILLO, CAPT. ROMMEL GUTIERREZ,
CAPT. JAKE OBLIGADO, CPL. ROMAN ITO QUINT ANA, PVT. JERICO DUQUIL, CPL. ARIEL FONTANILLA, A
CERTAIN CAPT. ALCA YDO, A CERTAIN FIRST SERGEANT, PVT. ZALDY OSlO, A CERTAIN PFC. SONNY, A
CERTAIN CPL. JAMES, A CERTAIN JOEL, RODERICK CLANZA and JEFFREY GOMEZ, respondents, G.R. No.
183533, September 25, 2012

Given that the totality of the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to support his claims, the
reliefs prayed for, therefore, cannot be granted. The liberality accorded to amparo and habeas data
cases does not mean that a claimant is dispensed with the onus of proving his case. “Indeed, even the
liberal standard of substantial evidence demands some adequate evidence.

Living @ Sense, Inc. vs. Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. G.R. No. 193753. September 26, 2012

The nature of the solidary obligation under the surety does not make one an indispensable party. An
indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action,
and who shall be joined mandatorily either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable
parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, thus, without their presence to a suit or
proceeding, the judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of an indispensable party
renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.

Emilio A.M. Suntay III vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay., G.R. No. 183053, October 10, 2012

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is
the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate. This is the same consideration which Section 6,
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator
for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and
economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste,
improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer
the estate correctly. In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be
appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but
an interest therein greater than any other candidate.

Napoleon D. Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers, Rosa D. Neri-Millan, Douglas

D. Neri, Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos and Victoria D. Illut- Piala vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

Thus, a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the minor under parental authority, does not have
the power to dispose or encumber the property of the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a
judicial guardian of the ward’s property and even then only with courts’ prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the Rules of Court.

Neri, at al. vs. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy., G.R. No. 194366, October 10, 2012

Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favor
of spouses Uy, all the heirs of Anunciacion should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and
Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas were not properly
represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total
nullity.

Fe V. Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie F. Aparejado, represented by Edgar Aparejado Vs. Hon.
Judge Maximino R. Ables, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. Edison Rural, et al. G.R. No. 171855.
October 15, 2012

It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case is
conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the
plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. As a necessary
consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the
answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost entirely
depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.
SM Land, Inc. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and Watsons Personal Care Store, Phils., Inc. Vs. City of
Manila, Liberty Toledo, in her official capacity as the City Treasurer of Manila, et al. G.R. No. 197151.
October 22, 2012

In fact, this Court has held that even if there was complete non-compliance with the rule on certification
against forum shopping, the Court may still proceed to decide the case on the merits, pursuant to its
inherent power to suspend its own rules on grounds, as stated above, of substantial justice and
apparent merit of the case.

Natividad Lim vs. National Power Corporation, Sps. Roberto Ll. Arcinue and Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No.
178789. November 14, 2012

Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an
answer is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the
order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure
under the former rule where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim’s failure to file the
required answer can give rise to default.

Natividad Lim vs. National Power Corporation, Sps. Roberto Ll. Arcinue and Arabela Arcinue, G.R. No.
178789. November 14, 2012

Lim points out that an answer-in-intervention cannot give rise to default since the filing of such an
answer is only permissive. But Section 4, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires the
original parties to file an answer to the complaint-in-intervention within 15 days from notice of the
order admitting the same, unless a different period is fixed by the court. This changes the procedure
under the former rule where such an answer was regarded as optional. Thus, Lim’s failure to file the
required answer can give rise to default.

Leticia Diona, rep. by her attorney-in-fact, Marcelina Diona Vs. Romeo A. Balangue, Sonny A.
Balangue, Reynaldo A. Balangue, and Esteban A. Balangue, Jr. G.R. No. 173559. January 7, 2013

While under Section 2, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based
only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due
process as additional ground to annul a judgment. In Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, this Court declared
that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspection thereof, its patent
nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.
Executive Secretary, et al. Vs. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 199324. January 7, 2013

It is a deeply ingrained doctrine in Philippine remedial law that a preliminary injunctive writ under Rule
58 issues only upon a showing of the applicant’s “clear legal right” being violated or under threat of
violation by the defendant. “Clear legal right,” within the meaning of Rule 58, contemplates a right
“clearly founded in or granted by law.” Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right precludes
the grant of preliminary injunctive relief. For suits attacking the validity of laws or issuances with the
force and effect of law, as here, the applicant for preliminary injunctive relief bears the added burden of
overcoming the presumption of validity inhering in such laws or issuances. These procedural barriers to
the issuance of a preliminary injunctive writ are rooted on the equitable nature of such relief, preserving
the status quo while, at the same time, restricting the course of action of the defendants even before
adverse judgment is rendered against them.

Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company v. Absolute Management Corporation, G.R. No. 170498. January
9, 2013

A distinctive character of Metrobank’s fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature – the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that may or
may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be
included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

Rivulet Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Anthony Parungao, Narciso B. Nieto, in their capacity as

Undersecretaries of Legal Affairs and Field Operations of the Department of Agrarian Reform, et al.,
G.R. No. 197507. January 14, 2013

Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority,
justice and dignity, and signifies not only a willful disregard of the court’s order, but such conduct which
tends to bring the authority of the court and the administration of law into disrepute or, in some
manner, to impede the due administration of justice. To be considered contemptuous, an act must be
clearly contrary to or prohibited by the order of the court. Thus, a person cannot be punished for
contempt for disobedience of an order of the Court, unless the act which is forbidden or required to be
done is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or uncertainty as to what
specific act or thing is forbidden or required.

Special People, Inc. Foundation, represented by its Chairman, Roberti P. Cericos v. Nestor M. Canda, et
al., G.R. No. 160932. January 14, 2013

A key principle to be observed in dealing with petitions for mandamus is that such extraordinary remedy
lies to compel the performance of duties that are purely ministerial in nature, not those that are
discretionary. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or
the exercise of its own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. The duty is
ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion or judgment.

Juanita Ermitañ o, represented by her Attorney-in-fact, Isabelo Ermitañ o v. Lailanie M. Paglas; G.R. No.
174436. January 23, 2013

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that the only question that the courts resolve in
ejectment proceedings is: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the
possession de facto and not to the possession de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the
property is questionable. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or
material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party
litigants. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon the
same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is, however,
merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to
the property.

Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is
mind-boggling how this rule could possibly apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court
limited the application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a
special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It
is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is
seriously misplaced.

Secretary Leila M. De Lima, Director Nonnatus R. Rojas and Deputy Director Reynaldo O. Esmeralda v.
Magtanggol B. Gatdula; G.R. No. 204528. February 19, 2013

If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge
views as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo case. These measures
must be detailed enough o that the judge may be able to verify and monitor the actions taken by the
respondents. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. After
the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when
the threats to the petitioner’s life, liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that
renders the judgment. Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation should a
subsequent case be filed – either criminal or civil. Until the full satisfaction of the judgment, the
extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of
constitutional rights.

RET. LT. GEN. JACINTO C. LIGOT, et al. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE ANTI-
MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL G.R. No. 176944, March 6, 2013.

Lt. Gen. Ligot, et al. filed a petition for certiorari when the CA extended the freeze order against their
properties. Ligot, et al. should have filed a petition for review on certiorari, and not a petition for
certiorari, to assail the CA resolution which extended the effectivity period of the freeze order over their
properties.

HEIRS OF FAUSTINO MESINA and GENOVEVA S. MESINA, rep. by NORMAN MESINA v. HEIRS OF
DOMINGO FIAN, SR., rep. by THERESA FIAN YRAY, et al. G.R. No. 201816, April 8, 2013

The non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. At any stage of a
judicial proceeding and/or at such times as are just, parties may be added on the motion of a party or on
the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite
the order of the court, that court may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
order. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.

SPOUSES DEO AGNER and MARICON AGNER vs. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC. G.R. No. 182963,
June 3, 2013.

Prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin, since there is nothing in
Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules of Court that requires the applicant to make a demand on the possessor
of the property before an action for a writ of replevin could be filed.

REINIER PACIFIC INTERNATIONAL SHIPPING, INC. and NEPTUNE SHIP MANAGEMENT SVCS, PTE., LTD.
v. CAPTAIN FRANCISCO B.GUEVARRA. G.R. No. 157020, June 19, 2013.

The clarification provided in A.M. 00-2-14-SC actually covers a situation where the due date falls on a
Saturday, Sunday, or holiday. Precisely, what such clarification wanted to address is the erroneous claim
that “the period of extension” in such a case “is to be reckoned from the next working day and not from
the original expiration of the period.” The correct rule, according to the clarification, is that “any
extension of time to file the required pleading should x x x be counted from the expiration of the period
regardless of the fact that said due date is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.”

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING v. ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY. G.R. No.
179736, June 26, 2013.

The allegation of petitioners that they are not the owners of the subject property, thus making them
unable to remove the installed surveillance cameras on the corporation’s building, cannot be upheld
especially when the corporation who is managed by the family of petitioners. They are thus considered
parties-in-interest in the present case.

FLORD NICSON CALAWAG v. UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES VISAYAS, ET AL./ MICAH P. ESPIA, ET AL.
v. DR. CARLOS BAYLON, ET AL. G.R. No. 207412/207542, August 07, 2013

Accordingly, the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction presents a fourth requirement: it
is justified only in a clear case, free from doubt or dispute. When the complainant’s right is thus doubtful
or disputed, he does not have a clear legal right and, therefore, the issuance of injunctive relief is
improper.

STA. RITA & CO., INC. AND ARLENE STA. RITA KANAPI v. ANGELINE M. GUECO. G.R. No.193078, August
28, 2013

Persons who are not parties to a case, either as petitioners, defendants or intervenors, they cannot
participate in the proceedings of the same. Consequently, they also cannot be adversely affected by the
outcome of such proceeding. A complaint-in-intervention cannot be treated as an independent action as
it is merely an ancillary to and a supplement of the principal action. The complaint-in-intervention
essentially latches on the complaint for its legal efficacy so much so that the dismissal of the complaint
leads to its concomitant dismissal.

SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSATIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA v. WILLIAM FRANCISCO. G.R. No.
198718, November 27, 2013

Although the end result of the respondent’s claim was the transfer of the subject property to his name,
the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a personal action, because it sought Fernando’s
execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract which he had previously made. Section 2, Rule
4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondent’s action. It provides that personal
actions “may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or
where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident
defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.” Considering the respondent’s
statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the RTC of Imus was
proper.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY
VINGSON SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP v. JOVY CABCABAN. UDK no. 14817, January 13, 2014

Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases
of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases
involving the rightful custody over a minor. The general rule is that parents should have custody over
their minor children. But the State has the right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for
such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them
emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and
properly counselled.

Heirs of Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr., represented by their co-heirs and attorneys-in-fact, Mercedes A. Favis
and Nelly Favis-Villafuente v. Juana Gonzales, her son Mariano Favis, all minors represented herein by
their parents, Sps. Mariano Favis and Larcelita D. Favis,G.R. No. 185922, January 15, 2014

Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the time for but before filing
the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the
motion to dismiss based on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the
opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived. There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to
this Rule, namely, lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and
prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at a compromise has been
made but had failed is not one of the exceptions.

MAGDALENA T. VILLASI v. FILOMENO GARCIA G.R. NO. 190106, January 15, 2014

Indeed, the power of the court in executing judgments extends only to properties unquestionably
belonging to the judgment debtor alone. An execution can be issued only against a party and not against
one who did not have his day in court. The right of a third-party claimant to file a terceria is founded on
his title or right of possession. Corollary thereto, before the court can exercise its supervisory power to
direct the release of the property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the
claimant must first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon. However, the
Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building as they were unable to
present credible evidence to prove their ownership. All that the Spouses raised were their postulation as
title holders of the land and the presumption of ownership over improvements built thereon; whereas
Villasi, on the other hand, was able to show documentary proof of ownership.

THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO. G.R. NO. 156407, JANUARY 15, 2014

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The
trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to
belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator.

LZK HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK. G.R. NO.
187973, January 20, 2014

By its very nature, an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a non-litigious proceeding.
It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one’s right of possession as purchaser in a foreclosure
sale. It is not an ordinary suit filed in court, by which one party sues another for the enforcement of a
wrong or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

LZK Holdings and Development Corporation v. Planters Development Bank, G.R. No. 187973, January
20, 2014

All the elements of the doctrine are present in this case. The final judgment in G.R. No. 167998 was
rendered by the Court pursuant to its jurisdiction over the review of decisions and rulings of the CA. It
was a judgment on the merits of Planters Bank’s right to apply for and be issued a writ of possession.
Lastly, the parties in G.R. No. 167998 are the same parties involved in the present case.

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO. G.R. NO. 175723 , February 4, 2014

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original
jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from
the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction. On the strength of the constitutional provisions under
Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the
tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari in these cases.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR. G.R. NO. 189538, February 10, 2014

While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot
nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties
had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage
as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate
of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the
marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC. G.R. NO. 171590, February 12,
2014

Non-payment of docket fees on one’s counterclaim is a jurisdictional defect. Anent the counterclaims
interposed by defendant for the collection of certain sum of money adverted earlier hereof, this Court
could not exercise jurisdiction over the same as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefor.
Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory in the answer, the matters therein
alleged were not connected with the plaintiff’s complaint. The counterclaims could stand independently
from the plaintiff’s complaint hence they are a sic permissive counterclaims.

SPOUSES SILVESTRE O. PLAZA AND ELENA Y. PLAZA v. GUILLERMO LUSTIVA, ELEODORA VDA. DE
MARTINEZ AND VICKY SAYSON GOLOSENO. G.R. NO. 172909, MARCH 5, 2014

A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy; it is auxiliary, an adjunct of, and subject to the
determination of the main action. It is deemed lifted upon the dismissal of the main case, any appeal
therefrom notwithstanding. Upon the dismissal of the main case by the RTC, the question of issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and academic. Upon the dismissal of the main
action, the question of the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction automatically died with it.

SURVIVING HEIRS OF ALFREDO R. BAUTISTA v. FRANCISCO LINDO AND WELHILMINIA LINDO, et al.
G.R. NO. 208232. MARCH 10, 2014

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of
pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the RTCs would depend
on the amount of the claim. But where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a
sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be
estimated in terms of money, and, hence, are incapable of pecuniary estimation. These cases are
cognizable exclusively by RTCs.

GREGORIO DE LEON, DOING BUSINESS AS G.D.L. MARKETING vs. HERCULES AGRO INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION AND/OR JESUS CHUA AND RUMI RUNGIS MILK G.R. No. 183239, June 02, 2014

The CA correctly ordered that De Leon’s appellant’s brief be stricken off the records. De Leon’s motion
for time praying for an additional 10 days to file his motion for partial reconsideration is validly denied
by the RTC, since such motion is a transgression of the mandatory prohibition on the filing of a motion
for extension to file a motion for reconsideration. Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must comply with the statute or rules. The
perfection of appeal in the manner and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same renders the judgment final and executory.

JULIET VITUG MADARANG and ROMEO BARTOLOME, represented by his attorneys-in-fact and acting
in their personal capacities, RODOLFO and RUBY BARTOLOME vs. SPOUSES JESUS D. MORALES and
CAROLINA N. MORALES G.R. No. 199283, June 9, 2014

A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after petitioner learns of the judgment,
final order, or proceeding and within six (6) months from entry of judgment or final order. The double
period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should be strictly complied with. A petition
for relief of judgment filed beyond the reglementary period is dismissed outright. Under Section 1, Rule
38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for relief from judgment may be filed on the ground of
fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. A motion for reconsideration is required before a
petition for certiorari is filed to grant the court which rendered the assailed judgment or order an
opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. In this case, petitioners had until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of
appeal, considering that their former counsel received a copy of the order denying their motion for
reconsideration of the trial court’s decision on June 24, 2010. Since petitioners filed their notice of
appeal only on August 11, 2010, the trial court correctly denied the notice of appeal for having been
filed out of time. Even if we assume that petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment within
the reglementary period, petitioners failed to prove that their former counsel’s failure to file a timely
notice of appeal was due to a mistake or excusable negligence.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY, represented by its Administrator MELQUIADES A. ROBLES vs.
AURORA A. SALVAÑA G.R. No. 192074, June 10, 2014

The present rule is that a government party is a “party adversely affected” for purposes of appeal
provided that the government party that has a right to appeal must be the office or agency prosecuting
the case. The grant of the right to appeal in administrative cases is not new. In Republic Act No. 2260 or
the Civil Service Law of 1959, appeals “by the respondent” were allowed on “the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service rendered in an administrative case involving discipline of subordinate
officers and employees.” Thus, LRTA had standing to appeal the modification by the Civil Service
Commission of its decision.

VIRGINIA S. DIO and H.S. EQUITIES, LTD vs. SUBIC BAY MARINE EXPLORATORIUM, INC., represented
by its Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, TIMOTHY DESMOND G.R. No. 189532, June 11, 2014

Petitioners filed counterclaim against respondents. However, the latter alleged that the dismissal of the
main action results to the dismissal of the counterclaims. The Court ruled that as the rule now stands,
the nature of the counterclaim notwithstanding, the dismissal of the complaint does not ipso jure result
in the dismissal of the counterclaim, and the latter may remain for independent adjudication of the
court, provided that such counterclaim, states a sufficient cause of action and does not labor under any
infirmity that may warrant its outright dismissal. Stated differently, the jurisdiction of the court over the
counterclaim that appears to be valid on its face, including the grant of any relief thereunder, is not
abated by the dismissal of the main action. The court’s authority to proceed with the disposition of the
counterclaim independent of the main action is premised on the fact that the counterclaim, on its own,
raises a novel question which may be aptly adjudicated by the court based on its own merits and
evidentiary support.

HELEN CABLING assisted by her husband ARIEL CABLING vs. JOSELIN TAN LUMAPAS as represented by
NORY ABELLANES, G.R. No. 196950, June 18, 2014

Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which is made applicable to extrajudicial foreclosures of
real estate mortgages, the possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property in a capacity adverse to the judgment
obligor. It contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse title or right,
such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary, who possesses the property in his own right, and is
not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of another co-owner or the owner of
the property.

CHARLIE LIM vs. SPOUSES DANILO LIGON and GENEROSA VITUG-LIGON G.R. No. 183589, June 25, 2014
As a result of the finality of the judgment in the ejectment case, Spouses Ligon were evicted from the
subject property. They filed a complaint against defendant Lim for Quieting of Title and Recovery of
Possession to restore them to their possession of the subject property. The legal limitation, despite the
finality of the ruling in the ejectment case, is that the concept of possession or prior possession which
was established in favor of defendant’s predecessors-in-interest in the ejectment case pertained merely
to possession de facto, and not possession de jure. The favorable judgment in favor of defendant’s
predecessors-in-interest cannot therefore bar an action between the same parties with respect to who
has title to the land in question.

Heirs of Telesforo Julao v. Spouses De Jesus, G.R. No. 176020, September 29, 2014

The assessed value must be alleged in the complaint to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint, which
contains the concise statement of the ultimate facts of a plaintiff’s cause of action.

GEORGE PIDLIP P. PALILEO and JOSE DE LA CRUZ vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK G.R. No. 193650,
October 8, 2014

The service and filing of pleadings by courier service, as made by the respondent to the petitioners, is a
mode not provided in the Rules. Realizing its mistake, PDB re-filed and re-sent the omnibus motion by
registered mail, which is the proper mode of service under the circumstances. By then, however, the 15-
day period had expired. PDB’s Notice of Appeal, which was filed only on September 7, 2006, was tardy;
it had only up to August 1, 2006 within which to file the same. The trial court therefore acted regularly in
denying PDB’s notice of appeal.

JOY MARGATE LEE vs. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGA G.R. No. 203254, October 08, 2014

A Habeas Data Petition is dismissible if it fails to adequately show that there exists a nexus between the
right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Moreover, it is
equally dismissible if it is not supported by substantial evidence showing an actual or threatened
violation of the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim.

SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUE vs. RAMON ONG G.R. No. 205249, October 15, 2014

Personal service of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A
defendant’s address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in
what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant. What is determinative of the
validity of personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
CECILIA PAGADUAN vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION et al G.R. No. 206379, November 19, 2014

The principle of res judicata is applicable either by way of “bar by prior judgment” or by “conclusiveness
of judgment.” Here, Salvador’s defense was res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment. Contrary to
Salvador’s contention , however, there appears to be no identity of issues and facts in the two
administrative cases. The first case involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or not
Salvador falsified her PDS. The second one involved facts necessary to resolve the issue of whether or
not Salvador was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Falsification was the main issue in the
first case, while it was no longer an issue in the second case. The only fact to consider in the second
administrative complaint is the fact of conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. It must be borne
in mind that both administrative complaints were based on different grounds. The grounds were
separate and distinct from each other and entailed different sets of facts.

EAGLE RIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN vs. CAMERON
GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, November 24, 2014

Cameron Granville filed a motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 10, 2013 decision. Cameron
Granville posited that the motion for production was filed out of time and that the rule on parole
evidence is applicable. However, the Court ruled that the availment of a motion for production, as one
of the modes of discovery, is not limited to the pre-trial stage. Rule 27 does not provide for any time
frame within which the discovery mode of production or inspection of documents can be utilized. The
rule only requires leave of court “upon due application and a showing of due cause.”

Fortune Life Insurance Co., Inc. v. COA, G.R. No. 213525, January 27, 2015

The reglementary periods under Rule 42 and Rule 64 are different. In the former, the aggrieved party is
allowed 15 days to file the petition for review from receipt of the assailed decision or final order, or
from receipt of the denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. In the latter, the petition is filed
within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. The filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if allowed under the procedural rules of the Commission
concerned, interrupts the period; hence, should the motion be denied, the aggrieved party may file the
petition within the remaining period, which shall not be less than five days in any event, reckoned from
the notice of denial. We ruled in Pates v. Commission on Elections that the belated filing of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64 on the belief that the fresh period rule should apply was fatal to the
recourse. As such, the petitioner herein should suffer the same fate for having wrongly assumed that
the fresh period rule under Neypes applied.
Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. United Planners Consultants, Inc., G.R. No.
212081, February 23, 2015

Execution is fittingly called the fruit and end of suit and the life of the law. A judgment, if left
unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party. While it appears that the
Special ADR Rules remain silent on the procedure for the execution of a confirmed arbitral award, it is
the Court’s considered view that the Rules’ procedural mechanisms cover not only aspects of
confirmation but necessarily extend to a confirmed award’s execution in light of the doctrine of
necessary implication which states that every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is deemed to
include all incidental power, right or privilege.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION vs. EDGARDO V. GUEVARA G.R. No.
167052, March 11, 2015

In an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, the Court has limited review over the decision
rendered by the foreign tribunal. The Philippine courts cannot pass upon the merits of the case pursuant
to the incorporation clause of the Constitution, unless there is proof of want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

TEOFILO B. ADOLFO vs. FE T. ADOLFO G.R. No. 201427, March 18, 2015

Judgment on the pleadings is proper where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the
material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer would “fail to tender an issue” if it does
not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse
party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all. Now, if
an answer does in fact specifically deny the material averments of the complaint and/or asserts
affirmative defenses (allegations of new matter which, while admitting the material allegations of the
complaint expressly or impliedly, would nevertheless prevent or bar recovery by the plaintiff), a
judgment on the pleadings would naturally be improper.

CASTILLEJOS CONSUMNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (CASCONA) vs. JOSE S. DOMINGUEZ, ET AL. G.R. No.
189949, March 25, 2015

A criminal contempt involves a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the court or
a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the
court into disrepute or disrespect. Civil contempt on the other hand, consists in failing to do something
ordered to be done by a court in a civil action for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is,
therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order is made.
SAN LORENZO RUIZ BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS GROUP, INC. AND OSCAR VIOLAGO, PETITIONERS, vs.
MA. CRISTINA F. BAYANG G.R. No. 194702, April 20, 2015

It is settled that the “fresh period rule” in Neypes applies only to judicial appeals and not to
administrative appeals. The “fresh period rule” shall apply to Rule 40 (appeals from the Municipal Trial
Courts to the Regional Trial Courts); Rule 41 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals or Supreme Court); Rule 42 (appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals);
Rule 43 (appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals); and Rule 45 (appeals by certiorari
to the Supreme Court). Obviously, these Rules cover judicial proceedings under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

People v. Larrahaga, G.R. Nos. 138874-75, July 21, 2005

An object evidence, when offered in accordance with the requisites for its admissibility, becomes
evidence of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than witnesses put together. The presence of
the victim’s ravished body in a deep ravine with handcuffs on her wrist is a physical evidence that
bolsters the testimony of the witness.

Imelda S. Enriquez vs. Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-2011, August 7, 2006

A preliminary investigation is a proceeding distinct from an inquest. A “preliminary investigation” is an

inquiry or proceeding to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for
trial. “An inquest” is a summary inquiry conducted by a prosecutor for the purpose of determining
whether the warrantless arrest of a person was based on probable cause.”

MERENCILLO V. PEOPLE (2007)

Minor discrepancies or inconsistencies do not impair the essential integrity of the prosecution’s
evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses’ honesty. The test is whether the testimonies agree on
essential facts and whether the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide with each
other so as to make a consistent and coherent whole. Thus, inconsistencies and discrepancies in details
which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime cannot be successfully invoked as grounds for
acquittal.
El Greco Ship Maning and Management Corporation vs. Commissioner of Customs, G.R. No. 177188,
December 4, 2008

It does not apply to administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings as administrative bodies are not bound
by the technical niceties of the rules obtaining in the court of law.

People of the Philippines vs. Ng Yik bun, et al, G.R. No. 180452. January 10, 2010.

An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is
considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’ contention, there was indeed a valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto. Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding
the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an
ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta
Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a
distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags
containing a white substance into a white L-300 van. Evidently, the arresting police officers had probable
cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when
Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their
leader. Thus, the arrest of accused- appellants – who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and
in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425, as amended – is
valid.

Bureau of Customs v. Peter Sherman, et al, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011.

It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the government
whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully executed. Corollary to this
power is the right to prosecute violators. Thus, all criminal actions commenced by complaint or
information are prosecuted under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of
special laws, however, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation of special
prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public prosecutor; but this designation
does not detract from the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case.

Marino B. Icdang v. Sandiganbayan, et al, G.R. No. 185960, January 25, 2012

Petitioner claims that his right to due process was violated when his counsel failed to assist him during
the promulgation of the judgment. He faults the Sandiganbayan for proceeding with the promulgation
despite the petitioner not then being assisted by his counsel, and being a layman he is not familiar with
court processes and procedure. Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides: The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused and any
judge of the court in which it was rendered.However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative.” There is nothing in the
rules that requires the presence of counsel for the promulgation of the judgment of conviction to be
valid. While notice must be served on accused and his counsel, the latter’s absence during the
promulgation of judgment would not affect the validity of the promulgation. Indeed, no substantial right
of the accused on the merits was prejudiced by such absence of his counsel when the sentence was
pronounced.

Luz vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

It is the State that has the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all that was alleged was that
petitioner was alone at the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police
officers. These circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.

Anna Lerima Patula vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012

Sec. 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that explains why testimony
that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right
of the opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the
transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is
not in court. It is then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness, being
the only means of testing the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies, is essential to the
administration of justice.

P/Insp. Ariel S. Artillero v. Orlando C. Casimiro, etc., et al, G.R. No. 190569, April 25, 2012

There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the Complainant or requires the
prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accused’s counter-affidavit. To illustrate the non-
mandatory nature of filing a Reply in preliminary investigations, Section 3 (d) of Rule 112 gives the
prosecutor, in certain instances, the right to resolve the Complaint even without a counter-affidavit, viz:
“(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, of if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits
within the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall resolve the complaint based on the
evidence presented by the complainant.” On the other hand, petitioner was entitled to receive a copy of
the Counter- affidavit filed by Aguillon.
Manila Electric Company, represented by Manolo C. Fernando v. Vicente Atilano, et al., G.R. No.
166758, June 27, 2012

The determination of probable cause for the filing of an information in court is an executive function
which pertains at the first instance to the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of Justice. As a
rule, in the absence of any grave abuse of discretion, courts are not empowered to substitute their own
judgment for that of the executive branch; the public prosecutor alone determines the sufficiency of
evidence that will establish probable cause in filing a criminal information and courts will not interfere
with his findings unless grave abuse of discretion can be shown. In this case, the Supreme Court found
no error in the public prosecutor’s determination that no probable cause existed to justify the filing of a
criminal complaint.

People of the Philippines vs. Val Delos Reyes, G.R. No. 130714 & 139634, October 16, 2012

At the outset, the Court notes that these cases were elevated to Us on automatic review in view of the
RTC’s imposition of the death penalty upon appellant in its June 25, 1997 Decision. However, with the
Court’s pronouncement in the 2004 case of People vs. Mateo, providing for and making mandatory the
intermediate review by the CA of cases involving the death penalty, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the proper course of action would be to remand these cases to the appellate court for
the conduct of an intermediate review.

RAMONCITA O. SENADOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 201620, March 6, 2013

If the subject matter of the offense is generic and not identifiable, an error in the designation of the
offended party is fatal and would result in the acquittal of the accused. However, if the subject matter of
the offense is specific and identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RAFAEL R. LAGOS, et al. G.R. No. 184658, March 6, 2013.

A motion to file a demurrer was granted after the prosecution’s presentation of the testimonies of the
apprehending officers because the prosecution failed to present the testimony of the confidential
informant. It has long been settled that the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal. An
acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his
acquittal. This rule, however, is not without exception. The rule on double jeopardy is subject to the
exercise of judicial review by way of the extraordinary writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The Supreme Court finds and so holds that the grant of the demurrer for this reason alone was
not supported by prevailing jurisprudence and constituted grave abuse of discretion.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Hon, Rosabella M. Tormis, AM No. MTJ-12-1817, March 12, 2013

Whenever a criminal case falls under the Summary Procedure, the general rule is that the court shall not
order the arrest of the accused unless he fails to appear whenever required. In this case, Judge Tormis
claimed that the issuance of the warrant of arrest against the accused in the Librando case was justified
because of the accused’s failure to appear during her arraignment despite notice. However, as clearly
found by the OCA, Judge Tormis’ order requiring the accused to appear and submit her counter-affidavit
and those of her witnesses within ten days from receipt of the order was not yet served upon the
accused when she issued the warrant. In doing so, Judge Tormis issued the warrant of arrest in violation
of the Rule on Summary Procedure that the accused should first be notified of the charges against him
and given the opportunity to file his counter-affidavits and other countervailing evidence.

PEOPLE vs. GULLERMO LOMAQUE, GR 189297, June 5, 2013

A variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to
evidence showing that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. While the
information clearly states that the crime was committed by appellant’s insertion of his penis inside
AAA’s vagina, the latter solemnly testified on the witness stand that appellant merely put his penis in
her mouth. Nevertheless, appellant failed to register any objection that the Information alleged a
different mode of the commission of the crime of rape. Thus, appellant’s conviction for rape by sexual
assault must be sustained, the variance notwithstanding.

Iris Kristine Balois Alberto vs. CA, GR No. 182130, June 19, 2013

Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, exists when the facts are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof. It does not mean “actual and positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty.
Rather, it is based merely on opinion and reasonable belief. Accordingly, probable cause does not
require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction; it is enough that it is
believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.

RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 161075. JULY 15, 2013

An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a prejudicial
question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the defendant for estafa through
falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or
innocence of the accused.
Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161075, July 15, 2013

It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case. This was precisely the Court’s thrust in G.R.
No. 148193, thus: Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, iun the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. xxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of alleged fraud
committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an independent civil action
under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the
suspension of the criminal case at bar.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL. G.R. No. 166836, September 4, 2013

The pendency of an administrative case for specific performance brought by the buyer of residential
subdivision lots in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) to compel the seller to deliver
the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of the fully paid lots is properly considered a ground to suspend a
criminal prosecution for violation of Section 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957 on the ground of a
prejudicial question. The administrative determination is a logical antecedent of the resolution of the
criminal charges based on non-delivery of the TCTs.

LETICIA I. KUMMER v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013

Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court permits a formal amendment of a complaint even after the
plea but only if it is made with leave of court and provided that it can be done without causing prejudice
to the rights of the accused. It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the
jurisprudence, the change in the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal
amendment – it does not change the nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused.

Mary Rose A. Boto vs. Senior Assistant City Prosecutor Villena, A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations shall be filed simultaneous or
separately with the Regional Trial Court of the province or city where the libellous article is printed and
first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HALIL GAMBAO y ESMAIL, EDDIEKARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y
SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL, NORA EVAD y MULOK, THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON
a.k.a LARINA PERPENIAN and JOHNDOES, G.R. No. 172707, October 1, 2013

The manner, by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance
where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by
the accused.

Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 196842, October 9, 2013

The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary
investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office,
had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II vs. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ, and affirmed
in subsequent cases: The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate
offenses committed by public officers and employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating
agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors, however, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan may take over, at any stage, from any
investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.

People of the Philippines vs. Roberto Velasco, G.R. No. 190318, November 27, 2013

Jurisprudence tells us that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to
raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before
arraignment, thus, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court
acquired jurisdiction of the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise,
the objection is deemed waived. Nevertheless, even if appellant’s warrantless arrest were proven to be
indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not provide salvation to appellant’s cause because
jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. CONSUELO C. ALIGA. G.R. NO 166995, JANUARY 13, 2014

A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such case, the People is
burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court
simply because of its alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on
said evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in the
findings and conclusions of the trial court.

People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Feliciano Jr., et. al, G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014

It should be remembered that every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating
circumstance of “wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information in order for all the
evidence, introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.

JOEL C. MENDEZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF TAX APPEALS G.R. No. 179962, June
11, 2014

Dr. Joel Mendez was charged with tax evasion. However, the prosecutor filed amended complaint which
changed the date of the commission of the offense. The court ruled that amendments that do not
charge another offense different from that charged in the original one; or do not alter the prosecution’s
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form of defense he has or will
assume are considered merely as formal amendments.

WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE vs. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH
UY G.R. No. 183994, June 30, 2014

Speedy trial is a relative term and necessarily a flexible concept. In determining whether the accused’s
right to speedy trial was violated, the delay should be considered in view of the entirety of the
proceedings. The factors to balance are the following: (a) duration of the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c)
assertion of the right or failure to assert it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Surely, mere
mathematical reckoning of the time involved would not suffice as the realities of everyday life must be
regarded in judicial proceedings which, after all, do not exist in a vacuum, and that particular regard
must be given to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. While the Court recognizes the
accused’s right to speedy trial and adheres to a policy of speedy administration of justice, we cannot
deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity to fairly prosecute criminals. Unjustified postponements
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what offend the right of the accused to
speedy trial.
People v. Cogaed, G.R. No. 200334, July 30, 2014

There are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. In the Rules of Court,
searches incidental to lawful arrests are allowed even without a separate warrant. This court has taken
into account the “uniqueness of circumstances involved including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.”

GODOFREDO ENRILE AND DR. FREDERICK ENRILE, vs. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS G.R. No. 166414,
October 22, 2014

The preliminary investigation is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether
a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty
thereof. The scope of the investigation does not approximate that of a trial before the court; hence,
what is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused
committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. As
the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the
victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not before
or during the preliminary investigation.

ESTHER P. MAGLEO vs. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN and BRANCH CLERK OF
COURT ATTY. ADONIS LAURE, BOTH OF BRANCH 166, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, PASIG CITY, A.M. No.
RTJ-12-2336, November 12, 2014

Accused’s Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is
tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be appealed. The current scenario, however, is an
exception to the general rule. The demurrer to evidence was premature because it was filed before the
prosecution rested its case. The RTC had not yet ruled on the admissibility of the formal offer of
evidence of the prosecution when Magleo filed her demurrer to evidence. Hence, Judge Quinagoran had
legal basis to overturn the order granting the demurrer to evidence as there was no proper acquittal.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC ET AL. G.R. No. 183551, November 12,
2014

It must be stressed that in our criminal justice system, the public prosecutor exercises a wide latitude of
discretion in determining whether a criminal case should be filed in court, and the courts must respect
the exercise of such discretion when the information filed against the person charged is valid on its face,
and that no manifest error or grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to the public prosecutor. In this
case, there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to hold them
liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
Moreover, a review of the resolutions of the MCTC, the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC, and the CA
shows that there is substantial basis to support finding of probable cause against the respondents.
Hence, as the Information was valid on its face and there was no manifest error or arbitrariness on the
part of the MCTC and the Provincial Prosecutor, the RTC and the CA erred when they overturned the
finding of probable cause against the respondents.

RETIRED SP04 BIENVENIDO LAUD vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES et al, G.R. No. 199032, November
19, 2014

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants
to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said
section have been complied with, as in this case. As in ordinary search warrant applications, they “shall
particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as
prescribed in the Rules of Court.” “The Executive Judges of these RTCs and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges” are
authorized to act on such applications and “shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in
places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.” The Court observes that all the above-stated
requirements were complied with in this case. As the records would show, the search warrant
application was filed before the Manila-RTC by the PNP and was endorsed by its head, PNP Chief Jesus
Ame Versosa, particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized in connection
with the heinous crime of Murder. Finding probable cause therefor, Judge Peralta, in his capacity as 2nd
Vice-Executive Judge, issued Search Warrant which, as the rules state, may be served in places outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the said RTC.

FELILIBETH AGUINALDO and BENJAMIN PEREZ vs. REYNALDO P. VENTUS and JOJO B. JOSON, G.R. No.
176033, March 11, 2015

Arraignment was suspended pending the resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration before the DOJ.
However, the lapse of almost 1 year and 7 months warranted the application of the limitation of the
period for suspending arraignment. While the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for
suspension of the arraignment, the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a
period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore,
that after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion to defer arraignment.
 EVIDENCE

National Power Corporation vs. Codilla, G.R. No. 170491. April 3, 2007

The evidence offered by NAPOCOR were photocopies. The Court held that the photocopies were not
equivalent to the original documents based on the Rules on Electronic Evidence. The information
contained in the photocopies submitted by NAPOCOR will reveal that not all of the contents therein,
such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or
produced electronically.

MCC Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Ssangyong Corporation, G.R. No. 170633. October 17, 2007

The Court held that the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are not electronic
evidence. Thus, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of
their original as decreed in the law.

Pacasum vs. People, G.R. No. 180314, April 16, 2009

Only a photocopy of the Employee Clearance was presented in evidence. The Court held that the
photocopy is admissible as evidence since an exception to the best evidence rule is when the document
sought to be presented is in the possession of the person against whom it is to be offered and such
party fails to present it even after reasonable notice.

Latip v. Chua, G.R. No. 177809, October 16, 2009

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.

Elenita C. Fajardo vs. People of the Philippines., G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011

Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer, who has a right to be in
the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. It applies when
the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior
justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery
of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the
item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he
can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a
piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery
inadvertent.

People vs. Cardenas, G.R. No. 190342. March 21, 2012

Non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA 9165 and its IRR relative to the custody,
photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void
the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. What is essential is “the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

CIR vs. Petron Corporation, G.R. No. 185568, 21 March 2012

CIR and Petron jointly stipulated before the CTA that Petron did not participate in the procurement and
issuance of the Tax Credit Certificates. This stipulation of fact by the CIR amounts to an admission and,
having been made by the parties in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial, is treated as a judicial admission.

Ogawa v. Menigishi, 676 SCRA 14, 21, July 9, 2012

The burden of proof lies with the party who asserts his/her right. In a counterclaim, the burden of
proving the existence of the claim lies with the defendant.

APOLONIO GARCIA, in substitution of his deceased mother, Modesta Garcia, and CRISTINA SALAMAT
v. DOMINGA ROBLES vda de CAPARAS. G.R. No. 180843, April 17, 2013.

Under the Dead Man’s Statute Rule, if one party to the alleged transaction is precluded from testifying
by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. Thus, the alleged admission
of the deceased Pedro Caparas that he entered into a sharing of leasehold rights with Modesta Garcia
and Cristina Salamat cannot be used as evidence against Dominga Caparas as the latter would be unable
to contradict or disprove the same.
EAGLERIDGE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, MARCELO N. NAVAL and CRISPIN I. OBEN v. CAMERON
GRANVILLE 3 ASSET MANAGEMENT, INC. G.R. No. 204700, April 10, 2013.

Under Section 17, Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Court, when part of a writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached writing or record is given in evidence, any other writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence.

THERESITA, JUAN, ASUNCION, PATROCINIA, RICARDO, and GLORIA, ALL SURNAMED DIMAGUILA v.
JOSE AND SONIA A. MONTEIRO. G.R. NO. 201011, January 27, 2014

As to the hearsay rule, Section 44 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court similarly provides that entries in
official records are an exception to the rule. The rule provides that entries in official records made in the
performance of the duty of a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a
duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The document’s
trustworthiness consists in the presumption of regularity of performance of official duty. Cadastral maps
are the output of cadastral surveys. The DENR is the department tasked to execute, supervise and
manage the conduct of cadastral surveys. As such, they are exceptions to the hearsay rule and are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.

ALBERTO ALMOJUELA y VILLANUEVA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 183202, June 2, 2014

Although based on the evidence adduced by both parties, no direct evidence points to Almojuela as the
one who stabbed Quejong. A finding of guilt is still possible despite the absence of direct evidence.
Conviction based on circumstantial evidence may result if sufficient circumstances, proven and taken
together, create an unbroken chain leading to the reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, was the author of the crime.

People v. Yau, G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014

It has been an established rule in appellate review that the trial court’s factual findings, such as its
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, the probative weight of their testimonies, and the
conclusions drawn from the factual findings, are accorded great respect and have even conclusive
effect. Such factual findings and conclusions assume even greater weight when they are affirmed by the
CA. In the case at bench, the RTC gave more weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses compared to those of the accused appellants. After a judicious review of the evidence on
record, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the factual findings of the RTC and the CA, and
their respective assessment and calibration of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.
FEDERICO SABAY vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 192150, October 01, 2014

Section 34 of Rule 132 of our Rules on Evidence provides that the court cannot consider any evidence
that has not been formally offered. This rule, however, admits of an exception. The Court, in the
appropriate cases, has relaxed the formal-offer rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be
admitted. Jurisprudence enumerated the requirements so that evidence, not previously offered, can be
admitted, namely: first, the evidence must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the evidence must have been incorporated in the records of the case. In the present case, we
find that the requisites for the relaxation of the formal-offer rule are present. As it is correctly observed,
Godofredo identified the Certification to File an Action during his cross-examination. Although the
Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit “1” and attached to the
records of the case.

NEDLLOYD LIJNEN B.V. ROTTERDAM AND THE EAST ASIATIC CO., LTD. vs. GLOW LAKS ENTERPRISES,
LTD. G.R. No. 156330, November 19, 2014

It is well settled that foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under the
rules of private international law, a foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. In the
absence of pleading and proof, the laws of the foreign country or state will be presumed to be the same
as our local or domestic law. This is known as processual presumption. While the foreign law was
properly pleaded in the case at bar, it was, however, proven not in the manner provided by Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. While a photocopy of the foreign statute relied upon by the
court a quo to relieve the common carrier from liability, was presented as evidence during the trial, the
same however was not accompanied by the required attestation and certification.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANECITO ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG G.R. No. 208749, November 26, 2014

Res gestae means the “things done.” It refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the
commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.” There are then three
essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the time to
contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and
its immediate attending circumstances.

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