QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS (Case Digests) What are judicial or quasi judicial acts?
A. IN GENERAL
1. TEODORO C. SANTIAGO, JR. Minor, Represented by his Mother, Mrs.
Angelita C. Santiago vs. MISS JUANITA BAUTISTA, ROSALINDA ALPAS,
REBECCA MATUGAS, MILKITA INAMAC, ROMEO AGUSTIN, AIDA CAMINO,
LUNA SARMAGO, AURORA LORENA, SOLEDAD FRANCISCO and MR. FLOR
MARCELO, G.R. No. L-25024, March 30, 1970
Facts:
The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As the
school year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of Students
For Honor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the
purpose of selecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the
school Principal, as chairman, and the members of the committee deliberated
and finally adjudged Socorro Medina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr.
as first, second and third honors, respectively. The school's graduation exercises
were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; but three days before that date, the "third
placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by his mother, and with his father as
counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honor students" thus made,
by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of First Instance of
Cotabato, committee members along with the District Supervisor and the
Academic Supervisor of the place.
Issue:
WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling:
"NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”
Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of
teachers refer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to the real grave
abuse of discretion that would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission
of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not be corrected by means of
certiorari.
It is difficult, if not impossible, precisely to define what are judicial or quasi
judicial acts, and there is considerable conflict in the decisions in regard thereto,
in connection with the law as to the right to a writ of certiorari. It is clear,
however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed, rather than of the
office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether or not it is the
discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that the
proceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that
word is used when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are
quasi judicial. It is enough if the officers act judicially in making their decision,
whatever may be their public character.
The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what are
administrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine. The
exercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative or
administrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerial
duties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may be
said generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the
law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in
controversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, and
undertakes to determine those questions, he acts judicially.
A judicial function is an act performed by virtue of judicial powers; the exercise
of a judicial function is the doing of something in the nature of the action of the
court.
In order that a special civil action of certiorari may be invoked in this
jurisdiction the following circumstances must exist:
 That there must be a specific controversy involving rights of persons or
property and said controversy is brought before a tribunal, board or
officer for hearing and determination of their respective rights and
obligations.
 The tribunal, board or officer before whom the controversy is brought
must have the power and authority to pronounce judgment and render
a decision on the controversy construing and applying the laws to that
end.
 The tribunal, board or officer must pertain to that branch of the
sovereign power which belongs to the judiciary, or at least, which does
not belong to the legislative or executive department.
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It might be true, as pointed out by appellant, that he received a copy of the
programme of the graduation exercises held by the Sero Elementary School in
the morning of the very day of that graduation exercises, implying that he
could not have attached then a copy thereof (to show the decision of the
committee of teachers in the ranking of students complained of) to his petition.
The stubborn fact remains, however, that appellant had known of such decision
of the said committee of teachers much earlier, as shown by the circumstance
that according to him, even before the filing of his petition with the lower court
on the 19th of May, 1965, he had personally appealed the said committee's
decision with various higher authorities of the above-named school, who merely
passed the buck to each other. Moreover, appellant mentions in his petition
various other documents or papers — as the Service Manual for Teachers
allegedly violated by appellees in the constitution of their committee; altered
grading sheets; and erasures in his Grade I certificate — which appellant never
bothered to attach to his petition. There could be no doubt then that he
miserably failed to comply with the requirement of Rule 65 above-mentioned.
With this conclusion, it is no longer necessary to pass upon the other two errors
assigned by appellant.
2. HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as
Superintendent of City Schools of Manila vs. THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN
LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and
APOLINARIO ESBER, G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991
Facts:
Some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers
(ACT) undertook what they described as a mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight' their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought
to the latter's attention. According to them they had decided to undertake said
"mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government
to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the
Secretary of Education. Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of
Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum
directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings against
those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. "For failure to heed
the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were
administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5)
days to answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety
(90) days 'pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807' and temporarily replaced. An
investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in
accordance with P.D. 807."
Issue:
WON the Commission on Human Rights has jurisdiction, adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific
type of cases, like alleged human rights violation involving civil or political
rights.
Ruling:
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power
to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it
may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in
accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted
by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any
person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the
assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may
be required by its findings.
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. "x x 'It may be said generally that the
exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal
rights of parties are, with respect to a matter in controversy; and whenever an
officer is clothed with that authority, and undertakes to determine those
questions, he acts judicially.' x x."
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC.
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3. RUPERTO vs. TORRES, FEB. 25, 1957 (UNREP)
xxx
B. JURISDICTION
1. ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the
National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as
Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, G.R. No. L-50444,
August 31, 1987
Facts:
Jose Hernando acquired ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa
Heights Subdivision from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation. On 28
August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private
respondent Virgilio Yuson. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop
the subdivision project, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the
period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly
installment payments falling due thereafter. On October 14 1976, the president
of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the
required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and
requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly
installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo
Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture
of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Mr. Yuson brought
his dispute with Antipolo Realty before public respondent NHA.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the
reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for
Reconsideration asserting that the jurisdiction to hear and decide Mr. Yuson's
complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA.
The motion for reconsideration was denied by respondent NHA, which
sustained its jurisdiction to hear and decide the Yuson complaint.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not NHA has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Yes.
Ruling:
NHA was upheld by the SC.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise
and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only.
Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative
agencies is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for
special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the
resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a
companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained
crowded and clogged. In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial
powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling
act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of
the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers,
the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and
determine the rights of private parties under such contracts.
Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and
Condominium Buyers' Decree", states that National Housing Authority. — The
National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this decree.
Presidential Decree No. 1344, clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial
dimensions of the grant of regulatory authority to the NHA in the following
manner:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate
trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in
Presidential Decree No. 957, the National Housing Authority shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot
or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and
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 C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory
obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units
against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in
the NHA are indicated in the second and third preambular paragraphs of the
statute. There is no question that under Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA
was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of contracting
parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements,
as well as to ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
2. ERDULFO C. BOISER doing business under the name and style PREMIERE
AUTOMATIC TELEPHONE NETWORK vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CO., CONRADO HERNANDEZ, ROMAN JUEZAN
and WILSON MORRELL, G.R. No. L-61438, June 24, 1983
Facts:
Boiser, the petitioner has been operating a telephone system in Tagbilaran City
and other municipalities in the province of Bohol since April 15, 1965, doing
business under the name and style of Premiere Automatic Telephone Network.
Sometime in August, 1965, the petitioner and private respondent Philippine
Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) entered into a contract
denominated as "Interconnecting Agreement" whereby PLDT bound itself to
provide Premiere with long distance and overseas facilities through the use of
the PLDT relay station in Mandaue City, Province of Cebu. The arrangement
enabled subscribers of Premiere in Bohol to make or receive long distance and
overseas calls to and from any part of the Philippines and other countries of the
world. Petitioner on the other hand had the obligation to preserve and maintain
the facilities provided by respondent PLDT, provide relay switching services
and qualified radio operators, and otherwise maintain the required standards in
the operation of facilities under the agreement. On February 27, 1979, without
any prior notice to the petitioner, respondent PLDT issued a "circuit
authorization order" to its co- respondents, PLDT employees Roman Juezan and
Wilson Morrell to terminate the connection of PLDT's relay station with the
facilities of the petitioner's telephone system in the province of Bohol.
Petitioner avers that this order was in gross violation of the aforecited
"Interconnecting Agreement." The petitioner was compelled to seek judicial
relief. It instituted Civil Case No. 17867 with the then Court of First Instance of
Cebu now a Regional Trial Court, for injunction and damages.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge has the authority in trying and hearing the
case considering the issue is of the complaint for which the said order was
issued properly devolves within the jurisdiction of the National
Telecommunication Commission.
Ruling:
The petition for writs of certiorari and prohibition is granted. The issuance of
the order devolves within the jurisdiction of the National Telecommunications
Commission and not with the regular courts. The questioned resolution of the
Court of Appeals is set aside.
3. DAVAO NEW TOWN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. COMMISSION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS (COSLAP), et al., G.R. No. 141523,
June 8, 2005
Facts:
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction with temporary restraining
order to annul the Resolution of public respondent Commission on Settlement
of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COSLAP Case No. 98-343 and to restrain COSLAP
from enforcing the same for lack of jurisdiction. Subject of the instant petition is
a huge tract of land consisting of 131.2849 hectares situated at Sto. Niño,
Tugbok, Davao City, which was a portion of a bigger landholding belonging to
the late Roman Cuison, Jr. The latter mortgaged the property to the Philippine
Banking Corporation (Bank), which, after emerging as the highest bidder in the
foreclosure proceedings, consolidated its ownership over the property and
subdivided the land into two parcels, namely: the first, covered by TCT No. T-
162663; and the second, covered by TCT No. T-162664, which is the property
subject of the instant dispute (“Cuison property”). Sometime in 1989, the
government acquired the Cuison property for distribution to the beneficiaries of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Among the beneficiaries
were herein private respondents who are members of the Sto. Niño Farmers
Cooperative (SNFC), Association of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBA) and
Nagkahiusang Mag-uuma ng Ramie (NAMAR-FADC-KMP). Private respondents
were individually issued with certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs).
After compulsory acquisition proceedings, the certificate of title issued in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines was cancelled and replaced by TCT No.
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CL-850 issued in the names of the aforesaid organizations. Claiming that the
disputed property had already been classified as “urban/urbanizing” and
therefore beyond the coverage of the CARP, the Bank filed a complaint docketed
as DARAB Case No. XI-10-12-DC-93 on September 23, 1993 with the Office of
the Provincial Adjudicator. Named respondents were the Regional Director for
Region XI of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, the Register of Deeds of
Davao City, SNFC, ARBA and NAMAR-FADC-KMP. Respondent officials therein
and SNFC stood by their assertion that the Cuison property was agricultural as
per certification issued on June 30, 1990 by the Regional Officer of the Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). In addition, they questioned the city
zoning ordinance classifying the Cuison property as “urban/urbanizing” for
being without the approval of the HLURB. Evidence presented by the Bank
consisted of a certification issued by the HLURB on October 13, 1993 correcting
its prior classification that the Cuison property was agricultural and a written
official classification from the Davao City Zoning Administrator stating that
Resolution No. 984, Ordinance No. 363, series of 1982 categorized the Cuison
property as “urban/urbanizing.”
Issue:
Whether or not COSLAP has jurisdiction on the said case.
Ruling:
The petition for certiorari is granted. The Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudicatory Board (DARAB) has the jurisdiction over the case. The Cuison
property was not agricultural land and, therefore, outside the coverage of the
CARP.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
1. AMERICAN TOBACCO COMPANY, et al. vs. THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS,
ATTYS. AMANDO L. MARQUEZ, TEOFILO P. VELASCO, RUSTICO A. CASIA
and HECTOR D. BUENALUZ, G.R. No. L-26803, October 14, 1975
Facts:
ATC et al filed before the Philippine Patent Office concerning the use of trade
mark and trade name. ATC et al challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the
“Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine Patent Office in Trademark
Cases” as amended, authorizing the Director of Patents to designate any ranking
official of said office to hear “inter partes” proceedings. Said Rule likewise
provides that “all judgments determining the merits of the case shall be
personally and directly prepared by the Director and signed by him.” These
proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or
trade name, interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining
the question of priority of adoption and use of a trade-mark, trade name or
service-mark, and cancellation of registration of a trade-mark or trade name
pending at the Patent Office. Petitioners filed their objections to the authority of
the hearing officers to hear their cases, alleging that the amendment of the Rule
is illegal and void because under the law the Director must personally hear and
decide inter partes case. Said objections were overruled by the Director of
Patents, hence, the present petition for mandamus, to compel the Director of
Patents to personally hear the cases of petitioners, in lieu of the hearing officers.
Issue:
Whether or not the hearing done by hearing officers are within due process.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that the power to decide resides solely in the administrative
agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a
hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be
made. The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own
judgment and discretion does not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of
practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and
report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It
is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the
officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the requirements
of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same
officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived
of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and
the decision is supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that
the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is no
abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual
decision remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that
to “give the substance of a hearing, which is for the purpose of making
determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must
consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.”
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2. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ, G.R. No.
139465, January 18, 2000
Facts:
Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the “extradition Treaty Between
the Government of the Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The
Philippine Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of
Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the
extradition of private respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States.
On the same day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of the aforestated
extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through counsel, wrote a letter to Justice
Secretary requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U.S
Government and that he be given ample time to comment on the request after
he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the petitioner denied
the request for the consistency of Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty
stated in Article 7 that the Philippine Government must present the interests of
the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for extradition.
Issue:
Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process rights or the
government’s ironclad duties under a treaty.
Ruling:
Petition dismissed.
The human rights of person, whether citizen or alien, and the rights of the
accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over treaty
rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the
individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles
of international law incorporated in our Constitution as part of the law of the
land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situation in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule
of international law and the provision of the constitution or statute of the local
state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark Jimenez copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez)
a reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of international law form part of the
law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are
confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the
local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both
since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to
be made between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the
reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound
by it in all circumstances.
The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does
not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied
in most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative enactments.
Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate priori takes effect – a treaty
may repeal a statute and a statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
Constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the
Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in conflict
with the constitution.
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3. PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his
capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, G.R. No. L-12426,
February 16, 1959
Facts:
A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On
May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had
scheduled for June 27, 1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who
are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
The petitioner contends that one who has passed the bar examinations and is
licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in
good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office
and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law. The respondent, in reply,
maintains the prosecution of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely
the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice so as to include engineers
and other individuals who passed the examination can practice before the
Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests,
this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.
Issue:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and
the prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the
practice of law.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance
before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the
practice before the patent Office involves the interpretation and application of
other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established
in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice of law is not
limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by
the legal mind of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law
provides that any party may appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order
or decision of the director. Thus, if the transactions of business in the Patent
Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is
not the case.
4. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD (DARAB)
of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR), REPRESENTED by DAR
SECRETARY ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN vs. JOSEFINA S. LUBRICA, in her
capacity as Assignee of the rights and interest of FEDERICO SUNTAY, G.R.
No. 159145, April 29, 2005
Facts:
Federico Suntay (deceased) has filed a petition for fixing and payment of just
compensation of his land covered by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or the otherwise
known as R.A. 6657. The initial payment offered by DAR through the Land bank
of the Philippines (LBP) is at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand
One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68), however it was not
agreed by Federico Suntay and appealed for a much higher compensation. After
a period of summary Administrative proceedings of the matter the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (RARAD) rendered a decision in favor of
Mr. Suntay of the land valued at One Hundred Fifty-Seven Million Five Hundred
Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100
(P157,541,951.30). However LBP contested the decision of the RARAD and filed
a petition for just compensation at the RTC of San Jose Occidental Mindoro
against Mr. Suntay, DAR and RARAD. Unfortunately the move of the LBP was not
considered by RTC because LBP failed to pay the docket fee as required by the
court on a certain period before the court had to take action on the matter.
On the other hand RARAD had issued writ of execution for the payment of Four
Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One Hundred Forty-One Pesos and
68/100 (P4,251,141.68) by the LBP to Mr. Suntay. Instead of paying the land
compensation, LBP had filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary Injunction [16] before
the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against Suntay and RARAD. The petition,
docketed as DSCA No. 0252, prayed for the nullification of the following
issuances of the RARAD. On September 12, 2001, the DARAB issued an Order
enjoining the RARAD from momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001
Decision and directing the parties to attend the hearing for the purpose of
determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent injunction.
Page 7 of 27
At this instance, On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-
interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Prohibition,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The petition, impleading DARAB and Land
Bank as respondents, sought to enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with
DSCA No. 0252, mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which
confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant DAR jurisdiction
over special civil actions for certiorari. On the same day, the Court of Appeals
granted Lubrica's prayer for a temporary restraining order. This
notwithstanding, DARAB issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on October 3,
2001, directing RARAD not to implement its January 24, 2001 Decision and the
other orders in relation thereto, including the Writ of Execution.
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has to take cognizance to act in the Certiorari
petition of the LBP with regard to the writ of execution issued by the RARAD
against the LBP.
Ruling:
NO. The Supreme Court had held that the DARAB has no jurisdiction to act on
any petition on certiorari lodge on them because being a quasi-judicial court
they have limited powers. Jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine
a cause or causes of action must exist as a matter of law. It is settled that the
authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the
power to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all courts
by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the particular courts which
have such power are expressly designated. In the case at bar, the absence of a
specific statutory grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of
certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited jurisdiction,
cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Bank's petition for certiorari. Neither the
quasi-judicial authority of the DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such
self-conferment of authority.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
D. DUE PROCESS IN QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
1. ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor,
and NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs. THE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., G.R. No. L-
46496, February 27, 1940
Facts: This case involved a motion for new trial of the National Labor Union,
Inc. The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., prays for the vacation of the
judgment rendered by the majority of the Court and the remanding of the case
to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers, among others, that
(1) Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of
leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off
the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported
by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native
dealers in leather; (2) the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio
Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army; (3) the National
Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal;
and (4) the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have
obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
Issue:
Whether or not the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations is
granted.
Ruling:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The interest of justice would be better served
if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents
referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the
main issue involved. Thus, the failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is
not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of
Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such
evidence as may be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the
requirements set forth.
Page 8 of 27
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. That of having something to support its decision;
4. The evidence must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;
6. Judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a
subordinate in arriving at a decision; and
7. Should render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved and the reason for the
decision rendered.
2. DOMINADOR DANAN and ADORACION FERNANDEZ vs. HON. A. H.
ASPILLERA, and HON. ALEJANDRO A. GALANG, Commissioners of PUBLIC
SERVICE COMMISSION and CORTISAN & COMPANY, INC., G.R. No. L-17305,
November 28, 1962
SYLLABUS
1.PUBLIC SERVICE; COMMISSION; APPEAL FROM DECISION AND ORDER; TIME
WITHIN WHICH TO FILE PETITION FOR REVIEW. — A petition for review of the
order of the Public Service Commission filed with the Supreme Court thirty-two
(32) days after the petitioner received a copy of the order, denying his motion
for reconsideration and reopening, should be denied for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period, which is thirty (30) days.
2.ID.; ID.; Ex Parte REVOCATION CERTIFICATES ILLEGAL. — The practice of the
Public Service Commission of revoking certificates without giving the operator
previous notice and opportunity to explain his side, violates the due process
clause of the Constitution, the express provisions of section 16 (n) of the Public
Service Act, and the doctrines of the Supreme Court (Bohol Land Trans. vs.
Jureidini, 53 Phil., 560; Pangasinan Trans, vs. Halili, 95 Phil., 694; Collector vs.
Buan, G. R. No. L-11438, 31 July 1958).
Facts:
Petitioner spouses were holders of a certificate of public convenience for the
installation, maintenance, and operation of a 4-ton ice plant in Orion, Bataan,
issued to them by the Public Service Commission in 1958, which ice plant was
acquired by purchase from third persons.
On January 29, 1960, the engineer of the Public Service Commission inspected
applicants' ice plant in the municipality of Orion, Bataan, and found out that
petitioner stopped the operation of their ice plant since October 1956, and have
not resumed operation of the plant up to the time of inspection, so that there
has been abandon of service for almost three (3) years. On February 1, 1960,
engineer made a report recommending for the revocation of the certificate of
public convenience of the petitioner. For abandonment or non-operation, the
said certificate was cancelled and revoked on 2 February 1960, one day after
the report of the engineer.
On 4 February 1960, the Commission granted to respondent Cortisan & Co., Inc.,
a certificate of public convenience to install and operate a 10-ton ice plant in the
same municipality of Orion, Bataan, after trial and with due notice to herein
petitioners. The latter failed to appear during the hearing on 4 February 1960
due to an alleged accident they met on their way to Manila. In this connection,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on 12 February 1960, for
which reason the permit granted to Cortisan & Co., Inc., remained in full force
and effect.
Again petitioners filed a joint motion (1) for reconsideration of the aforequoted
order dated 2 February 1960 case no. 107481 and (2) for the reopening of Case
No. 129277, which motion was set for formal hearing on 29 March 1960.
Counsels for both parties appeared, and the motion was heard.
Thereafter, the petitioners' joint motion for the reconsideration of the
Commissioner's order dated 2 February 1960, in Case No. 107481, as well as
their motion for the reopening of Case No. 129277, were both denied in an
order dated 5 April 1960, copy of which was admittedly received by petitioners
on 21 July 1960. Hence, petitioner went to Supreme Court by way of Petition for
Review.
Issue:
WON the Commission violated the constitutional rights of the petitioner for not
giving due notice and hearing.
Page 9 of 27
Ruling:
Yes. This Court, however, cannot help expressing its concern for the
Commission's ex-parte revocation of certificate without giving the operators
previous notice and opportunity to explain their side. This practice violates the
due process clause of the Constitution, the express provision of section 16 (n) of
the Public Service Act, and the doctrines of this Court (Bohol Land Trans. vs.
Jureidini, 53 Phil. 560; Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Halili, L-6075, 31 August 1954;
Collector vs. Buan, L-11498, 31 July 1958). The Public Service Commission
should at all times, maintain a due regard the constitutional rights of parties
litigant. Also, the Commissioners (who are not judges in the true sense) would
do well to ponder the implications (of Article 32, No. 6, of the New Civil Code)
on the individual responsibility of public officers and employees who impair a
person’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law.
The instant "Petition For Review", (docketed as G.R. No. L-17305,) was filed
before this Tribunal on 22 August 1960 or thirty-two (32) days after petitioners
admittedly received a copy of the said order denying their joint motion for
reconsideration and reopening previously adverted to.
Section 36 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, which reorganized the Public Service
Commission, provides:
SEC. 36. Any order, ruling or decision of the Commission may be reviewed
on the application of any person or public service affected thereby, by
certiorari in appropriate cases, or by petition, to be known as Petition for
Review, which shall be filed within thirty days (30) days from the
notification of such order, ruling, or decision or, in case a petition for the
reconsideration of such order, ruling, or decision is filed in accordance
with the preceding section and the same as denied, it shall be filed within
fifteen (15) days after notice of the order denying reconsideration. Said
petition shall be placed on file in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme
Court who shall furnish copies thereof to the Secretary of the Commission
and other parties interested. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 43, of the Rules of Court states:
SECTION 1. Petition for Review. — Within thirty (30) days from notice of
an order or decision issued by the Public Service Commission . . . any party
aggrieved thereby may file, in the Supreme Court, a written petition for
the review of such order or decision.
As much as the Supreme Court recognizes the Constitutional requirement of
notice and hearing is the FUNDAMENTAL of procedural due process in
administrative body exercising its quasi-judicial function, However, the SC
cannot give due consideration on the petitioner's petition because it was filed
beyond the reglementary period.
3. PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA vs. POLICE DIRECTOR REYNALDO P. VARILLA,
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, POLICE OFFICE and
ATTY. RUFINO JEFFREY L. MANERE, REGIONAL LEGAL AFFAIRS SERVICE,
G.R. No. 180146, December 18, 2008
Facts:
Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP), was assigned to the
Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon City, when the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) issued Special Order No. 1044 dropping him from
the rolls for failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement Course
(LEEC) at the Special Training Unit, National Capital Region Police Office
(NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig City. Montoya had been absent without
official leave (AWOL) for a period of 67 days.
Four months after he was dropped from the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the
National Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998, he went to
the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his Sick Leave Form approved
by the station commander. Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already
been forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form was not
approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend the LEEC was beyond his
control, since he was suffering from arthritis with on and off symptoms of
severe body pain.
Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal Division, the NCR
Regional Director issued Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No.
1044. Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8 June to 8
July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his administrative liability. The 67
days when Montoya went on absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately
deducted from his leave credits.
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were conducted by
Hearing Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Francisco Don C. Montenegro of
the Central Police District Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the NCR
Page 10 of 27
Regional Director rendered a Decision dismissing Montoya from the police
service for Serious Neglect of Duty (due to AWOL), effective immediately.
Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed with the CPD office a Petition for
Review/Motion for Reconsideration of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR
Regional Director, which he addressed to the PNP Chief. Montoya's
Petition/Motion was denied for lack of jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action
involving demotion or dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional
director may only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).
Montoya next filed an appeal of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional
Director before the RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging lack
of due process considering that he was not even notified of any hearing by the
Summary Hearing Officer and was thus deprived of the opportunity to present
evidence in his defense. The Summary Hearing Officer in the Summary
Dismissal Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal from police
service based on his failure to report for the LEEC, without even looking into his
side of the controversy.
RAB-NCR rendered its Decision granting Montoya's appeal and ordering his
reinstatement.
NCR Regional Director authorized Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.)
Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere (Manere) to appeal several RAB-NCR decisions
involving different police officers, including the Decision dated 11 December
2002 on Montoya's case, before the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG).
Montoya, together with the other police personnel reinstated in the service by
RAB-NCR (hereinafter collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before
the DILG an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of the
NCR Regional Director.
NCR Regional Director issued Special Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et al.,
without prejudice to the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the
CSC.
CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution No. 05-1200 which recognized the
right of the PNP disciplining authorities to appeal the decision of the RAB-NCR
to the DILG. CSC set aside the 10 November 2003 Order of DILG Secretary Lina
and affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya, et
al., from police service.
CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et al.
Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application for Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Preliminary Injunction.
Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 96022,
since there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC in issuing
Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500.
Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, but
it was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to due process of petitioner was violated.
Ruling:
Yes. The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar.
Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less stringent and
often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not exempt from
basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and procedural due
process is applicable to administrative proceedings.
In particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings has also been
recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondent's legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel,
to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford
a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.
Page 11 of 27
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were flawed from the
very beginning when these were conducted without due notice to him. The NCR
Regional Director, through Manere, never contested the fact that the Hearing
Officer proceeded with his investigation without giving notice to Montoya.
Without notice, Montoya was unable to attend the hearings, present written or
oral arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was completely deprived
of the opportunity to be heard on the administrative charges against him and
was irrefragably denied due process.
The Decision dated 23 June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing
Montoya from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the
latter's due process.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution dated
18 October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Philippine National Police is ORDERED to reinstate
petitioner PO2 Ruel C. Montoya to the police service without loss of seniority
rights and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering the period
effective from the time of his dismissal from the service up to his reinstatement.
4. HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS, et al. vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS, et al., G.R. No. 110379, November 28, 1997
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; REQUIREMENTS. — In administrative
proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which
may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard
personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence
in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartially; and (4) a finding by said
tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to
the parties affected.
2. POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
INVOLVING PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS; RA 4670 KNOWN AS THE MAGNA
CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS; SECTION 9 THEREOF; NOT
COMPLIED WITH IN CASE AT BAR. — In the present case, the various
committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as required by Section 9
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers' organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be
heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers' organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized
representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670.
Under this section, the teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its
choice of representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating
committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of
education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant
case, there is no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a
teachers' organization as its representative in said committee.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RA 4670 HAS NOT BEEN REPEALED BY THE GENERAL
LAW, PD 807; REPEALS BY IMPLICATION ARE NOT FAVORED; CASE AT BAR. —
Contrary to petitioners' asseverations, RA 4670 is applicable to this case. It has
not been expressly repealed by the general law, PD 807, which was enacted
later, nor has it been shown to be inconsistent with the latter. It is a
fundamental rule of statutory construction that "repeals by implication are not
favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so clearly repugnant and
patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. This is based on the rationale
that the will of the legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of
construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of Congress in
repealing statutes. Their function is to try to harmonize, as much as possible,
seeming conflicts in the laws and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and a
co-existence." Thus, a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special
law, "unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the
general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law."
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the legislative
Page 12 of 27
intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in
connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers.
Clearly, private respondents' right to due process of law requires compliance
with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis non est recedendum
(From the words of the statute there should be no departure.)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BECAUSE THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS
CASE ARE VOID, NO DELINQUENCY OR MISCONDUCT MAY BE IMPUTED TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT. — It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals
committed no reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision setting
aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the unqualified
reinstatement of private respondents and the payment to them of salaries,
allowances, bonuses and other benefits that accrued to their benefit during the
entire duration of their suspension or dismissal. Because the administrative
proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct may
be imputed to private respondents. Moreover, the suspension or dismissal
meted on them is baseless. Private respondents should, as a consequence, be
reinstated and awarded all monetary benefits that may have accrued to them
during the period of their unjustified suspension or dismissal. This Court will
never countenance a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a
cornerstone of our legal system.
SYNOPSIS
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño issued a return to
work order to all public school teachers who had participated in walkouts and
strikes. Secretary Cariño filed administrative charges against the striking
teachers. The Secretary also placed the teachers under preventive suspension.
The teachers filed an injunctive suit with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City
charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with fraud and deceit.
However, the trial court did not issue a restraining order. The teachers
amended their complaint and made it one for certiorari and mandamus. The
DECS Secretary through the Solicitor General, contended that in accordance
with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not interfere in the
administrative proceedings. Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee
rendered a decision finding the striking teachers guilty as charged and ordered
their dismissal. The trial court also dismissed the petition for certiorari and
mandamus for lack of merit. The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Supreme Court which issued a resolution en banc declaring void the trial
court's order of dismissal and reinstating the action, even as it ordered the
teachers' reinstatement pending decision of their case. The trial court rendered
its decision declaring the dismissal of the teachers null and void. The trial court
held that Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers," is the primary law that governs the conduct of
investigation in administrative cases filed against public school teachers, with
Pres. Decree No. 807 as its supplemental law. As a result, the committee tasked
to investigate the charges filed against the teachers was illegally constituted and
all acts done by said body possess no legal color whatsoever. From this adverse
decision of the trial court, former DECS Secretary Cariño filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision
holding in the main that private respondents were denied due process in the
administrative proceedings instituted against them. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process.
Ruling:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include
the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondent’s legal rights;
(2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel,
to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights;
(3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford
a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or
made known to the parties affected.
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings
involving public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that
the committee to hear public schoolteachers’ administrative cases should be
composed of the school superintendent of the division as chairman, a
representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’
organization and a supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various
committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges against private
respondents did not include “a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or national teacher’s organization” as required by Section 9
of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent
Page 13 of 27
jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void.
They could not provide any basis for the suspension or dismissal of private
respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers’ organization in
these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be
heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied with
because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We
disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their respective teachers’
organizations does not ipso facto make them authorized representatives of such
organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the
teachers’ organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of
representative to be included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such
right to designate cannot be usurped by the secretary of education or the
director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its
investigating committee was ever designated or authorized by a teachers’
organization as its representative in said committee. Sec 9 of RA 4670 was
repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a
previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret
laws so as to harmonize them.
The Court ordered the DECS to reinstate the private respondents and award all
monetary benefits that may have accrued to them during the period of their
unjustified suspension or dismissal.
5. HON. ERLINDA C. PEFIANCO, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports vs. MARIA LUISA C. MORAL,
G.R. No. 132248, January 19, 2000
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; MOTIONS; BASIS FOR DENYING
MOTION TO DISMISS MUST BE CLEARLY AND DISTINCTLY STATED. — Section
3, Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily requires that the
resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons
therefor — Clearly, the above rule proscribes the common practice of
perfunctorily denying motions to dismiss "for lack of merit." Such cavalier
disposition often creates difficulty and misunderstanding on the part of the
aggrieved party in taking recourse therefrom and likewise on the higher court
called upon to resolve the issue, usually on certiorari. The challenged Order of
the trial court dated 23 April 1997 falls short of the requirements prescribed in
Rule 16. The Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the
trial court's jurisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies
without stating the basis why petitioner's motion to dismiss was being denied.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; MAY BE DISPENSED WITH
WHEN ORDER OF LOWER COURT IS A PATENT NULLITY. — Certiorari will not
lie unless the lower court, through a motion for reconsideration, has been given
an opportunity to correct the imputed errors on its act or order. However, this
rule is not absolute and is subject to well-recognized exceptions. Thus, when the
act or order of the lower court is a patent nullity for failure to comply with a
mandatory provision of the Rules, as in this case, a motion for reconsideration
may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may assail the act or order of
the lower court directly on certiorari.
3. ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; PETITION FOR MANDAMUS; DOES NOT LIE TO
REQUIRE ANYONE TO FULFILL DISCRETIONARY DUTY. — It is settled that
mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone
to fulfill a discretionary duty. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded
and it must be the imperative duty of respondent to perform the act required. It
never issues in doubtful cases. While may not be necessary that the duty be
absolutely expressed, it must nevertheless be clear. The writ will not issue to
compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or is his duty not to
do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ
neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a
power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. In her petition
for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear
legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the
ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof.
Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
4. ID.; ID.; CERTIORARI; PROPER; REMEDY TO ANNUL TRIAL COURT'S
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER WHERE SAME WAS RENDERED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION. — The trial court's Order of 23 April 1997 denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss is not a mere error of judgment as the Court of Appeals held,
but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
because, to capsulize, the Order is a patent nullity for failure to comply with the
provisions of the rules requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should
clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor; and, respondent is clearly not
entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the DECS resolution
Page 14 of 27
dismissing her from service, and there is no law or rule which imposes a
ministerial duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report, hence her petition clearly lacked a cause of action. In such
instance, while the trial court's order is merely interlocutory and non-
appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it is
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
5. ID.; JUDGMENT; DISPOSITIVE PART; ORDERS ISSUED BY COURT MUST
STATE CLEARLY AND COMPREHENSIVELY THE BASIS FOR THEIR ISSUANCE.
— We cannot even discern the bearing or relevance of the discussion therein on
mandamus, vis-a-vis the ground relied upon by petitioner in her motion to
dismiss, i.e., lack of cause of action, and the dispositive portion of the order. The
order only confused petitioner and left her unable to determine the errors
which would be the proper subject of her motion for reconsideration. Judges
should take pains in crafting their orders, stating therein clearly and
comprehensively the reasons for their issuance, which are necessary for the full
understanding of the action taken. Where the court itself has not stated any
basis for its order, to be very strict in requiring a prior motion for
reconsideration before resort to higher courts on certiorari may be had, would
be to expect too much. Since the judge himself was not precise and specific in
his order, a certain degree of liberality in exacting from petitioner strict
compliance with the rules was justified.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE AND
SPORTS; RESOLUTION THEREOF ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY IN CASE
AT BAR. — Respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the DECS
resolution dismissing her from the service. By her failure to do so, nothing
prevented the DECS resolution from becoming final and executory. Obviously, it
will serve no useful purpose now to compel petitioner to furnish her with a
copy of the investigation report.
7. ID.; ID.; NO LEGAL DUTY TO FURNISH RESPONDENT WITH COPY OF
INVESTIGATION REPORT IN CASE AT BAR. — There is no law or rule which
imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon
that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the
findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative
decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable
opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during
the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had been
accorded these rights.
8. ID.; ID.; RESOLUTION THEREOF SHOULD BE BASIS OF RESPONDENT'S
FURTHER REMEDIES IN CASE AT BAR. — Respondent's assertion that the
investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action would be
appropriate to take under the circumstances," hardly merits consideration. It
must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an internal
communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee,
and it is not generally intended for the perusal of respondent or any other
person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary. More importantly, the DECS
resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, that is, it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law
upon which respondent's removal from office was grounded. This resolution,
and not the investigation report, should be the basis of any further remedies
respondent might wish to pursue, and we cannot see how she would be
prejudiced by denying her access to the investigation report.
Facts:
On 26 July 1994, former DECS Secretary Ricardo T. Gloria filed a complaint
against respondent, then Chief Librarian, Catalog Division, of the National
Library for dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. The complaint charged respondent with the pilferage of
some historical documents from the vaults of the Filipiniana and Asian Division
(FAD) of the National Library which were under her control and supervision as
Division Chief and keeping in her possession, without legal authority and
justification, some forty-one (41) items of historical documents which were
missing from the FAD vaults of the National Library. After several hearings on
the complaint, Secretary Gloria issued a resolution finding respondent guilty of
the administrative offenses and ordered the dismissal of respondent from the
government service with prejudice to reinstatement and forfeiture of all her
retirement benefits and other remuneration. Respondent did not appeal the
judgment. Thereafter, respondent filed a Petition for the Production of the DECS
Investigation Committee Report purportedly to guide her on whatever action
would be most appropriate to take under the circumstances. Her petition was,
however, denied. Respondent then instituted an action for mandamusand
injunction against Secretary Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the
DECS Investigation Committee Report and that the DECS Secretary be enjoined
from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said
report. Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case, but the trial
court denied his motion. On appeal by Secretary Gloria, the Court of Appeals
dismissed Secretary Gloria's petition holding that petitioner Gloria acted
prematurely, not having filed any motion for reconsideration. Moreover, the
appellate court ruled that the order denying the motion to dismiss was
Page 15 of 27
interlocutory and thus not appealable. Secretary Gloria's motion for
reconsideration was, however, denied by the appellate court. Hence, the instant
petition for review. Secretary Gloria was subsequently replaced by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the judge’s denial of the motion was proper.
Ruling:
No. The challenged Order of the trial court was a patent nullity for failure to
comply with the requirements prescribed in Rule 16 of the Rules of Court
requiring that a resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly
state the reasons therefor. Thus, when the act or order of the lower court is a
patent nullity for failure to comply with a mandatory provision of the Rules, a
motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with and the aggrieved party may
assail the act or order of the lower court directly on certiorari.
Respondent is not entitled to the writ of mandamus as she did not appeal the
DECS resolution dismissing her from the service. Moreover, respondent
miserably failed to demonstrate that she had a clear legal right to the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that it was the ministerial duty of
petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Furthermore,
there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish
respondent with a copy of the investigation report. Hence, the trial court's
denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss was not a mere error of judgment but a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In such
instance, while the trial court's order was merely interlocutory and non-
appealable, certiorari is the proper remedy to annul the same since it was
rendered with abuse of discretion. Hence, the Court granted the petition,
reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and dismissed the mandamus case.
6. WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and General Manager
of GSIS vs. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M. VELASCO, G.R. No. 157383,
August 10, 2010
Facts:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS, received two
separate Memoranda dated May 23, 2002 from petitioner charging them with
grave misconduct.
Molina was charged for allegedly committing the following acts:
1) directly and continuously helping some alleged disgruntled employees to
conduct concerted protest actions and/or illegal assemblies against the
management and the GSIS President and General Manager;
2) leading the concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22, 2002
during office hours within the GSIS compound; and
3) continuously performing said activities despite warning from his immediate
superiors.
Velasco was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on Office
Decorum for leaving his office without informing his supervisor of his
whereabouts; and gross insubordination for persistently disregarding
petitioner's instructions that Velasco should report to the petitioner's office.
Petitioner required respondents to submit their verified answer within seventy
two (72) hours. Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner
ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety (90) days without
pay, effective immediately. The following day, a committee was constituted to
investigate the charges against respondents.
Respondents denied the charges against them. Instead, they averred that
petitioner was motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them
falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for lack of factual
and legal basis. They strongly expressed their opposition to petitioner acting as
complainant, prosecutor and judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) an
Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive Suspension Order. 10 They contended that the
acts they allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave
misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not act as the
complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time, respondents filed with the
CSC a Petition to Transfer Investigation to this Commission.
CSC failed to resolve respondents' motions to lift preventive suspension order
and to transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC.
Respondents filed with the CA a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).
CA rendered a decision in favor of respondents. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.
Page 16 of 27
Issue:
Whether the respondents were fully accorded the requisite opportunity to be
heard, were in fact heard and being heard, and whether the conduct of
preliminary investigation in administrative proceedings is an essential requisite
to the conduct of adjudication.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court En Banc recently affirmed the Court of Appeals decision
declaring the preventive suspension of two Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) lawyers null and void and awarding them their back salaries
during the period of their unjustified suspension.
Respondents Maria Molina and Albert Velasco, both Attorney V of the GSIS,
were denied due process of the law when petitioner Winston Garcia, in his
capacity as GSIS President and General Manager, sans the requisite preliminary
investigation issued two separate Memoranda charging the respondents with
allegedly committing acts constituting grave misconduct and ordering their
preventive suspension for 90 days without pay.
The Court held that although the Civil Service Rules do not specifically provide
that a formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is null and
void, it is, however, “mandatory for the disciplinary authority to conduct a
preliminary investigation or at least respondent should be given the
opportunity to comment and explain his side.” The Court adds “this is done
prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the comment required therein is
different from the answer that may later be filed by respondents.” No exception
is provided by the CSC Rules, not even an indictment in flagranti, as claimed by
the petitioner, held the Court.
The Court explained that even if the complainant is the disciplining authority
himself, he could comply with such requirement by issuing a “memorandum
requiring the respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken
against them instead of immediately issuing formal charges. With respondents'
comments, petitioner would have properly evaluated both sides of the
controversy before making a conclusion that there was a prima facie case
against the respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal
charges.”
The Court stressed the cardinal precept “that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction. The violation of a
party's right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be
glossed over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right to
due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for
lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true in quasi-judicial and administrative
proceedings, for the constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the type of
proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where he stands to lose the
same.”
E. CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS
1. POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SOLAR
TEXTILE FINISHING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991
Facts:
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation was involved in bleaching,
rinsing and dyeing textiles with wastewater being directly discharged into a
canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan- Tinerejos River. Petitioner Board, an
agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the
effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate
applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, have been
remarkably forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis-a-vis
Solar. Solar, on the other hand, seemed very casual about its continued
discharge of untreated, pollutive effluents into the river. Petitioner Board issued
an ex parte Order directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utilizing
its wastewater pollution source installations. Solar, however, with preliminary
injunction against the Board, went to the Regional Trial Court on petition for
certiorari, but it was dismissed upon two (2) grounds, i.e., that appeal and not
certiorari from the questioned Order of the Board as well as the Writ of
Execution was the proper remedy, and that the Board's subsequent Order
allowing Solar to operate temporarily had rendered Solar's petition moot and
academic. Dissatisfied, Solar went on appeal to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the case to that
court for further proceedings. In addition, the Court of Appeals declared the
Writ of Execution null and void. At the same time, the CA said that certiorari was
a proper remedy since the Orders of petitioner Board may result in great and
irreparable injury to Solar; and that while the case might be moot and academic,
"larger issues" demanded that the question of due process be settled. Petitioner
Board moved for reconsideration, without success.
Page 17 of 27
Arguing that that the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution were issued in
accordance with law and were not violative of the requirements of due process;
and the ex parte Order and the Writ of Execution are not the proper subjects of
a petition for certiorari, Oscar A. Pascua and Charemon Clio L. Borre for
petitioner asked the Supreme Court to review the Decision and Resolution
promulgated by the Court of Appeals entitled "Solar Textile Finishing
Corporation v. Pollution Adjudication Board," which reversed an order of the
Regional Trial Court. In addition, petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No.
984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the
operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such
establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of
which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the
Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the
effluent discharges of Solar into the River provided prima facie evidence of
violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other
hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to
life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant
case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no
finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court on the
ground that Solar had been denied due process by the Board.
Ruling:
The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution were entirely within the
lawful authority of petitioner Board. Ex parte cease and desist orders are
permitted by law and regulations in situations like here. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in
the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and
general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and
animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield
to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved,
through the exercise of police power. Hence, the trial court did not err when it
dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy was
an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal.
The Court gave due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals and its Resolution were set aside. The Order of petitioner
Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial court were
reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of
the basis of the Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before
the Board.
F. RIGHT TO COUNSEL
1. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR — CAR,
Represented by his Heirs vs. Honorable APOLONIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V.
BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL Members of Investigating
Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON.
FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO,
CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary of the Office of the
President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, G.R. No. 117565, November
18, 1997
Facts:
Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio,
the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his
office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and
that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00.
Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two
weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992,
but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he
moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of
counsel.
The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel
appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case
submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the
dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel
Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
Issue:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel
during an administrative inquiry?
Page 18 of 27
Ruling:
The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded
a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right
and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more
reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the
right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent
counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in
the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created
by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be
held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is
not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his
side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity attended the
proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and
his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
G. QUANTUM OF EVIDENCE
1. EDUARDO B. PRANGAN vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
(NLRC), MASAGANA SECURITY SERVICES CORPORATION, and/or VICTOR C.
PADILLA, G.R. No. 126529, April 15, 1998
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES
LIKE THE NLRC ARE ACCORDED RESPECT AND FINALITY IF SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR; THE DAILY TIME RECORDS
SUBMITTED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO CONCLUDE THAT PETITIONER WORKED ONLY
FOR FOUR HOURS DAILY; REASONS. — Findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies
like the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter,
are accorded with respect even finality if supported by substantial evidence. In
this regard, we have defined substantial evidence as such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. Absent such quantum of evidence, the Court is not precluded from
making its own independent evaluation of facts. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that matters concerning an employee's actual hours of work are within
the ambit of management prerogative. However, when an employer alleges that
his employee works less than the normal hours of employment as provided for
in the law, he bears the burden of proving his allegation with clear and
satisfactory evidence. In the instant petition, the NLRC, in declaring that
petitioner only worked for four hours, relied solely on the supposed daily time
records of the petitioner submitted by the private respondent. We, however, are
of the opinion that these documents cannot be considered substantial evidence
as to conclude that petitioner only worked for four hours. It is worth
mentioning that petitioner, in his Sur-Rejoinder to Respondents' Rejoinder,
unequivocably stated that: "Complainant (petitioner herein) never made nor
submitted any daily time record with respondent company considering the fact
that he was assigned to a single post and that the daily time records he allegedly
submitted with respondent company are all falsified and his signature
appearing therein forged." Private respondent hardly bothered to controvert
petitioner's assertion, much less bolster its own contention. As petitioner's
employer, private respondent has unlimited access to all relevant documents
and records on the hours of work of the petitioner. Yet, even as it insists that
petitioner only worked for four hours and not twelve, no employment contract,
payroll, notice of assignment or posting, cash voucher or any other convincing
evidence which may attest to the actual hours of work of the petitioner was
even presented. Instead, what the private respondent offered as evidence was
only petitioner's daily time record, which the latter categorically denied ever
accomplishing, much less signing. In said alleged daily time record, it showed
that petitioner started work at 10:00 p.m. and would invariably leave his post at
exactly 2:00 a.m. Obviously, such unvarying recording of a daily time record is
improbable and contrary to human experience. It is impossible for an employee
to arrive at the workplace and leave at exactly the same time, day in and day
out. The very uniformity and regularity of the entries are "badges of
untruthfulness and as such indices of dubiety."
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE FACT THAT THE PERSONAL DATA SHEET OF PETITIONER
SHOWS ON ITS FACE THAT HIS HOURS OF WORK ARE FROM 7:00 P.M. TO 7:00
A.M. PLACE PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN ESTOPPEL FROM ASSAILING THE
CONTENT OF IT'S OWN DOCUMENT. — Another consideration which militates
Page 19 of 27
against private respondent's claim is the fact that in the personnel data sheet of
the petitioner, duly signed by the former's operation manager, it shows on its
face that the latter's hours of work are from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. or twelve
hours a day. Hence, private respondent is estopped from assailing the contents
of its own documents. Further, the attendance sheets of Cat House Bar and
Restaurant showed that petitioner worked from 7:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. daily,
documents which were never repudiated by the private respondent. All told,
private respondent has not adequately proved that petitioner's actual hours of
work is only four hours. Its unexplained silence contravening the personnel
data sheet and the attendance sheets of Cat House Bar Restaurant presented by
the petitioner showing he worked for twelve hours, has assumed the character
of an admission. No reason was proffered for this silence despite private
respondent, being the employer, could have easily done so. As is well-settled, if
doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the employee. Since it is
a time-honored rule that in controversies between a laborer and his master,
doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writings should be resolved in the former's favor.
Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 65 filed by petitioner Eduardo B.
Prangan questioning the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) for dismissing his appeal for lack of merit. The records of the case reveal
that petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter against private
respondent for underpayment of wages, non-payment of salary from August 16-
31, 1993, overtime pay, premium pay for holiday, rest day, night shift
differential, uniform allowance, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay
from the year 1990 to 1993. In its decision, the Labor Arbiter held that private
respondents Masagana Security Service Corporation (MSSC) and/or Victor
Padilla liable to petitioner for the amount of Nine Thousand Nine Hundred
Thirty Two Pesos and Sixteen Centavos (P9,932.16) representing the premium
pay for holiday and rest days, night shift differential, service incentive leave pay,
13th month pay, uniform allowance and unpaid salary. Not satisfied with the
above-mentioned monetary award, petitioner appealed to the NLRC contending
that the Labor Arbiter erred in concluding that he only worked for four hours
and not twelve hours a day. The NLRC, however, dismissed petitioner's appeal
for lack of merit and affirmed in toto the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Hence, this instant petition.
Issue:
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
NLRC (a) declaring that he rendered only four hours and not twelve hours of
work, and (b) affirming the monetary award.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court finds merit in the petition. The NLRC, in declaring that
petitioner only worked for four hours, relied solely on the supposed daily time
records of the petitioner submitted by the private respondent. The Court,
however, is of the opinion that these documents cannot be considered
substantial evidence as to conclude that petitioner only worked for four hours.
Even as private respondent insists that petitioner worked for only four hours
and not twelve, yet no employment contract, payroll, notice of assignment or
posting, cash voucher or any other convincing evidence was presented to
bolster its own contention. When an employer alleges that his employee works
less than the normal hours of employment as provided by law, he bears the
burden of proving his allegation with clear and satisfactory evidence. All told,
private respondent has not adequately proved that petitioner's actual hours of
work is only four hours. In view thereof, the instant petition is hereby granted
and the decision of the NLRC is set aside and vacated.
H. DECISION, APPEAL AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
1. HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON.
REY B. BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR
MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. HON. RENATO C.
CORONA, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO,
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, G.R. No.
131457, April 24, 1998
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION; SUPREME COURT; DISPOSITION
OF CASES; "CASES" ARE DECIDED WHILE "MATTERS" ARE RESOLVED;
REFERRAL TO EN BANC REFERS TO "CASES" NOT "MATTERS". — A careful
reading of Article VIII, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution, however, reveals the
intention of the framers to draw a distinction between cases, on the one hand,
and matters, on the other hand, such that cases are "decided" while matters,
which include motions, are "resolved." Otherwise put, the word "decided" must
refer to "cases"; while the word "resolved" must refer to "matters," applying the
Page 20 of 27
rule of reddendo singula singulis. This is true not only in the interpretation of
the above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3), but also of the other provisions of
the Constitution where these words appear. With the aforesaid rule of
construction in mind, it is clear that only cases are referred to the Court en banc
for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained. Conversely,
the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the required three votes is not
obtained in the resolution of a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the second
sentence of the aforequoted provision speaks only of "case" and not "matter."
The reason is simple. The above-quoted Article VIII, Section 4(3) pertains to the
disposition of cases by a division. If there is a tie in the voting, there is no
decision. The only way to dispose of the case then is to refer it to the Court en
banc. On the other hand, if a case has already been decided by the division and
the losing party files a motion for reconsideration, the failure of the division to
resolve the motion because of a tie in the voting does not leave the case
undecided. There is still the decision which must stand in view of the failure of
the members of the division to muster the necessary vote for its
reconsideration. Quite plainly, if the voting results in a tie, the motion for
reconsideration is lost. The assailed decision is not reconsidered and must
therefore be deemed affirmed. Such was the ruling of this Court in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998.
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION;
SECOND MOTION MUST BE FILED WITH LEAVE OF COURT SUPPORTED WITH
EXTRAORDINARY PERSUASIVE REASONS. — True, there are exceptional cases
when this Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, such as
where there are extraordinarily persuasive reasons. Even then, we have ruled
that such second motions for reconsideration must be filed with express leave
of court first obtained. In this case, not only did movants fail to ask for prior
leave of court, but more importantly, they have been unable to show that there
are exceptional reasons for us to give due course to their second motions for
reconsideration. Stripped of the arguments for referral of this incident to the
Court en banc, the motions subject of this resolution are nothing more but
rehashes of the motions for reconsideration which have been denied in the
Resolution of November 17, 1998. To be sure, the allegations contained therein
have already been raised before and passed upon by this Court in the said
Resolution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISMISSAL BASED ON FINALITY OF CASE, NOT A QUESTION OF
TECHNICALITY BUT OF SUBSTANCE AND MERIT; CASE AT BAR. — The crux of
the controversy is the validity of the "Win-Win" Resolution dated November 7,
1997. We maintain that the same is void and of no legal effect considering that
the March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President had already become
final and executory even prior to the filing of the motion for reconsideration
which became the basis of the said "Win-Win" Resolution. This ruling, quite
understandably, sparked a litany of protestations on the part of respondents
and intervenors including entreaties for a liberal interpretation of the rules. The
sentiment was that notwithstanding its importance and far-reaching effects, the
case was disposed of on a technicality. The situation, however, is not as simple
as what the movants purport it to be. While it may be true that on its face the
nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution was grounded on a procedural rule
pertaining to the reglementary period to appeal or move for reconsideration,
the underlying consideration therefor was the protection of the substantive
rights of petitioners. The succinct words of Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban
are quoted in the November 17, 1998 opinion of Mr. Justice Martinez, viz.: "Just
as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the
winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution
of his/her case." In other words, the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision
accordingly vested appurtenant rights to the land in dispute on petitioners as
well as on the people of Bukidnon and other parts of the country who stand to
be benefited by the development of the property. The issue in this case,
therefore, is not a question of technicality but of substance and merit.
4. ID.; ACTIONS; INTERVENTION; INTERVENORS MUST HAVE ACTUAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE INTEREST IN CONTROVERSY; SEASONAL FARMWORKERS IN
CASE AT BAR WITHOUT SUFFICIENT INTEREST OVER LAND IN
CONTROVERSY. — In their present motions, intervenors insist that they are real
parties in interest inasmuch as they have already been issued certificates of
land ownership award, or CLOAs, and that while they are seasonal farmworkers
at the plantation, they have been identified by the DAR as qualified beneficiaries
of the property. These arguments are, however, nothing new as in fact they have
already been raised in intervenors' earlier motion for reconsideration of our
April 24, 1998 Decision. Again as expressed in the opinion of Mr. Justice
Martinez, intervenors, who are admittedly not regular but seasonal
farmworkers, have no legal or actual and substantive interest over the subject
land inasmuch as they have no right to own the land. Rather, their right is
limited only to a just share of the fruits of the land. Moreover, the "Win-Win"
Resolution itself states that the qualified beneficiaries have yet to be carefully
and meticulously determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Absent
any definitive finding of the Department of Agrarian Reform, intervenors cannot
as yet be deemed vested with sufficient interest in the controversy as to be
qualified to intervene in this case. Likewise, the issuance of the CLOA's to them
does not grant them the requisite standing in view of the nullity of the "Win-
Win" Resolution. No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and
void.
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Facts:
This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by herein
respondent and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of our April
24, 1998 Decision nullfying the so-called "win win" Resolution dated November
7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, and
denying the applicants Motion For Leave To Intervene.
The issue in this case stems from a proposed agro-economic development of the
disputed land which the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao,
Bukidnon intend to undertake. Expressing full support for the proposed project,
the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon on March 4, 1193 enacted
Ordinance No. 24 converting or reclassifying the subject 144-hectare land from
agricultural to industrial/institutional use. It was intended to provide an
opportunity to attract investors, who can inject new economic vitality, provide
more jobs and raise the income of its people. Bukidnon Provincial Board also
supported the said project.
Issue:
Whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is
subject to the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Ruling:
Local Government Units need not obtain the approval of the DAR to convert or
reclassify lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use. It should be stressed
that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final and executory,
vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the province of
Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR Management
and Development Corporations, and all others who should be benefited by the
said decision. The issue here is not a question of technicality but that of
substance and merit. Whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal
authority to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, the March 29,
1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed the issue. Converting
the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would open great
opportunities for employment and bring about real development in the area
towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality.
Procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject
property for agro-industrial purposes cannot be allowed to defeat the very
purpose of the law granting autonomy to local government units in the
management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section
20 of R.A. No. 7160 is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local governments units autonomy in their
local affairs including the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands
and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities.
The motions filed by petitioners assailing the Resolution of this Court dated
November 17, 1998 partake of the nature of a second motion for
reconsideration which is clearly prohibited by Rule 56, Section 4, in relation to
Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. However, in exceptional
cases, the Court may entertain a second motion for reconsideration, but the
same must be filed with express leave of court. Petitioners failed to secure the
required prior leave from the Court and the issue raised had been settled in the
case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. CA in the negative.
A careful reading of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution reveals that
there is a distinction between "cases" and "matters", that "cases" are decided
while "matters" are resolved. Therefore, only "cases" are referred to the Court
en banc for decision whenever the required number of votes is not obtained and
does not apply in the resolution of motions for reconsideration.
Motions denied with finality.
I. RES JUDICATA
1. GODELIVA S. DULAY vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES, as a formal party and in his Official Capacity, THE DIRECTOR
OF THE BUREAU OF FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his Official
Capacity, and ANGELES DICO, in her Private Capacity, G.R. No. 48766,
February 9, 1993
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; BUREAU OF FISHERIES AND AQUATIC RESOURCES;
DECISIONS AND ORDERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, UPON THEIR
FINALITY, HAVE THE FORCE OF A FINAL JUDGMENT UNDER THE DOCTRINE
OF RES JUDICATA; RESPONDENT DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU GRAVELY
ABUSED HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE ALLOWED THE RE-OPENING OF THE
FISHPOND CONFLICT INVOLVED HEREIN. — It is already well-settled in our
jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies
rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have, upon their finality, the
Page 22 of 27
force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of
res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter
once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial
and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards
acting within their jurisdiction. DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs.
Juan Quibete," was decided by the Office of the President on November 14,
1969. Since the same was not brought to the courts for judicial review, the same
has long become final and executory. DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles
Dico vs. Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent Application No. V-3-385 of private
respondent Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision dated May 30, 1967
rejected her application. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. The findings of fact in said DANR case, which
were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are
deemed conclusive by operation of law. Said DANR case, not having been
brought likewise to the courts for judicial review, has also become final and
executory. Private respondent points out that the Director of Lands, Ramon N.
Casanova, treated her motion for reconsideration as a petition for relief from
judgment. That may be so but Director Casanova's action was not in accord with
the administrative rules on appeal. Actually, the next step that private
respondent should have taken from the July 9, 1970 Decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources was to appeal the same to the Office of the
President within 30 days from receipt of said Decision. Private respondent
received the Decision on September 21, 1970 and should have appealed the
same by October 24, 1970, the last day of filing. Instead she filed a motion for
reconsideration only on November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July 9, 1970 decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447 had
become final and executory. The matter having become final as of August or
September 1970, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to give
due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of October 28, 1977
requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved herein.
Facts:
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office of the
President, both of which have attained finality.
DANR Case No. 2898 (Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete):
 By a barter agreement entered into between Quibete and Padios, the
former exchanged his parcel of land for the latter's fishpond area.
 In 1932, Quibete applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit over the
area. It was later approved in 1949.
 In 1958, Dico filed her fishpond application to occupy the area covered
by petitioner's fishpond lease agreement -- disapproved on the ground
that the area she applied had already been awarded to Quibete. MR was
denied.
 Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his rights and interests
over the area to Retirado (whose heirs subsequently sold it to
Petitioner Dulay).
 Dico filed a protest with the Philippine Fisheries Commission. Protest
dismissed.
 Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed her appeal.
 Appealed to the Office of the President. Appeal dismissed.
DANR Case No. 3447 (Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete):
 While DANR Case No. 2898 was still pending, private respondent
Angeles Dico filed with the Director of Lands a free patent application
for a dry portion of Lot 489-C covered by Fishpond Permit of Quibete.
 The Director of Lands rejected the application of private respondent
Dico.
 A motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondent
Dico appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
 That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case No. 2898
aforesaid, the Secretary affirmed the decision of the Director of Lands.
 Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's decision but her motion was
denied. A second motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.
 Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and
interests over the area in question and was subsequently issued a
fishpond lease agreement.
 In 1977, Angeles Dico submitted a letter-petition to the respondent
officials requesting for a `reopening of the fishpond conflict based on
newly discovered evidence'.
 It was there alleged that the Fishpond Permit of Juan Quibete did not
cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C). She prayed that petitioner's
Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled.
 Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res
judicata. She argued that the two administrative decisions involving the
same parties, subject matter and cause of action, have already become
final.
 Private respondent Dico argues that res judicata does not apply in cases
where the government has to exercise its inherent power to regulate.
 Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in
abeyance and ordered that an investigation be conducted.
Page 23 of 27
  Petitioner filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction or restraining order. TRO granted.
Issue:
WON res judicata applies in this case.
Ruling:
Yes. It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders
of administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority,
have, upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within
the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids
the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority
applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or
administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction.
DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete," was decided by
the office of the President on November 14, 1969. Since the same was not
brought to the courts for judicial review, the same has long become final and
executory.
DANR Case No. 3447 not having been brought likewise to the courts for judicial
review, has also become final and executory.
The next step that private respondent should have taken from the Decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case 3447 was to
appeal the same to the office of the President within 30 days from receipt of
said Decision.
Private respondent received the Decision on September 21, 1970 and should
have appealed the same by October 24, 1970. Instead she filed a motion for
reconsideration only on November 3, 1970. Clearly, the July 9, 1970 decision of
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in DANR Case No. 3447 had
become final and executory.
Moreover, a careful review of her alleged "newly discovered evidence" does not
support the charge of fraud allegedly committed by Quibete and Retirado.
The matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond and which rights
he sold to Retirado was investigated TWICE. Both investigations - more than
three years apart with investigators from different offices - showed that Juan
Quibete occupied and improved Lot 489-C although in the different documents,
including maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot 487.
Thus, no merit can be given to private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence
as all these HAD already been studied thoroughly in separate investigations.
The matter having become final, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to
give due course to private-respondent's letter-petition requesting for a re-
opening of the fishpond conflict involved herein.
The temporary restraining order is hereby made PERMANENT.
2. CARLITO C. ENCINAS, Petitioner, vs. PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR., and
PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG, G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013
Facts:
Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire Officer I in Nueva Ecija.
They claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner – who was
then Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija – informed them that unless they
gave him five thousand pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their
station at Cabanatuan City and transferred to far-flung areas. Respondent
Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly be transferred to the Cuyapo
Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent Joel S. Caubang (Caubang) to Talugtug
Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to pay
petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents
came up short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (P2,000),
prompting petitioner to direct them to come up with the balance within a week.
When they failed to deliver the balance, petitioner issued instructions
effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and Caubang to Cuyapo and
Talugtug, respectively.
Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents filed with the Bureau
of Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP Complaint) on 27 March 2000
for illegal transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990. The record is
not clear as to why this Complaint was later docketed by the BFP for
preliminary investigation for violation of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
Page 24 of 27
Respondents likewise filed with the CSC Regional Office in San Fernando,
Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the CSC Field Office in Cabanatuan City,
their Joint Affidavit/Complaint (CSCRO Complaint). This time, they accused
petitioner of violation of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.
6.That we executed this affidavit to file a complaint against C. Insp.
Carlito C. Encinas BFP for violation of Section 4 (C) R.A. 6713, that is
"Justness and sincerity. — Public officials and employees shall remain
true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity
and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good
customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."
The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the above-quoted provision as
Section 4 (c), but it should be denoted as Section 4 (A) (c).
On 27 October 2000, after a fact-finding investigation was conducted in
connection with his alleged extortion activities, petitioner was formally charged
with dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of service. He was required to file an answer within five (5) days from notice.
CSC Regional Office Ruling: Finding petitioner administratively liable for grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service, and ordered
his dismissal from service.
CSC Ruling: Petitioner's appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its
Resolution No. 080941 dated 19 May 2008 (CSC Resolution). 50 It ruled that
there was no forum-shopping committed by respondents, and that substantial
evidence existed to hold petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
CA Ruling: Subsequently, the CA, in its assailed Decision, denied petitioner's
appeal. The CA ruled that it was not the letter-complaint filed by respondents
that commenced the administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it
was the formal charge filed by Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint
merely triggered the CSCRO's fact-finding investigation. Considering that the
Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, it need not contain
a certification of non-forum-shopping.
The CA similarly ruled that respondents' act of simultaneously filing Complaints
against petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP did not constitute forum-
shopping. While it was conceded that the two Complaints were founded on the
same set of facts involving the same parties, they were nonetheless based on
different causes of action — more specifically, the BFP Complaint was for
alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC Complaint was for violation of
the provisions of R.A. No. 6713. Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata
applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
With regard to the administrative liability of petitioner, the CA found that
substantial evidence supported the CSC's findings. It likewise ruled that the
testimonies of the witnesses of petitioner were incompetent and immaterial, as
these could prove something else entirely, but did not disprove petitioner's
extortion. Also, the withdrawal of a complaint does not result in outright
dismissal or discharge a person from any administrative liability.
Issues:
I. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.
II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of service.
Ruling:
The Petition is devoid of merit. We rule that petitioner is administratively liable
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
under the Administrative Code of 1987; thus, we affirm his dismissal from
service.
I. Respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping.
We rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint does not constitute res judicata
in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-shopping on the
part of respondents.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays down the rule that an existing
final judgment or decree on the merits, rendered without fraud or collusion by a
court of competent jurisdiction upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all other actions or suits,
Page 25 of 27
in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction, on the
points and matters in issue in the first suit.
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur:
(a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and
(d) there must be between the first and the second actions
(i) identity of parties,
(ii) identity of subject matter, and
(iii) identity of cause of action.
A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it
determines the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts,
irrespective of formal, technical or dilatory objections;" or when the judgment is
rendered "after a determination of which party is right, as distinguished from a
judgment rendered upon some preliminary or formal or merely technical
point."
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the
definition above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05
July 2005 was the result of a fact-finding investigation for purposes of
determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be
filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were determined therein with
finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative
powers. Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in
nature, as opposed to administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial
character.
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves:
(a) taking and evaluating evidence;
(b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and
(c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.
The exercise of quasi-judicial functions involves a determination, with respect
to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what the legal rights and
obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the facts
obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the
parties.
The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative
body is exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication
signifies the exercise of the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights
and obligations of the parties. Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to
evaluate the evidence submitted to an agency based on the facts and
circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial
discretion and judgment.
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion
that they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact-finding
investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an
administrative offense should be filed against petitioner.
The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at
determining the existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to
proceed with an administrative action. This process can be likened to a public
prosecutor's preliminary investigation, which entails a determination of
whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty, and
whether a crime has been committed.
II. The CA was correct in ruling that there was substantial evidence to hold
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
On the substantive issue, petitioner claims that the findings are based on a
misapprehension of facts. The dismissal of respondents from service allegedly
placed their credibility in question.
We do not agree. We find petitioner administratively liable for his act of
demanding P5,000 from respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment.
At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the findings of fact of administrative
bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned findings are
not supported by substantial evidence. These factual findings carry even more
weight when affirmed by the CA, in which case they are accorded not only great
respect, but even finality. These findings are binding upon this Court, unless it is
shown that the administrative body has arbitrarily disregarded or
Page 26 of 27
misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an extent as to compel a
contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated. This rule is
rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts. By reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling
under their jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those
matters.

This Court will not disturb the factual findings of both the CSC and the CA,
absent any compelling reason to do so. The conclusion reached by the
administrative agencies involved — after their own thorough investigations and
hearings, as well as their consideration of the evidence presented before them
and their findings thereon, especially when affirmed by the CA — must now be
regarded with great respect and finality by this Court.

We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the service would not
suffice to discredit them as witnesses.

In view of the foregoing, we rule that petitioner's act of demanding

money from respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment
constitutes grave misconduct. We have defined grave misconduct as
follows:

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action,

more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer; and
the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. (Emphasis supplied)

Considering that petitioner was found guilty of two (2) offenses, then the
penalty of dismissal from the service — the penalty corresponding to the most
serious offense — was properly imposed.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DENIED. The

Decision dated 20 November 2008 and the Resolution dated 30 March 2009
issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 104074 are hereby AFFIRMED.

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