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Allado vs. Diokno, G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994 cause for him to issue the warrants.

e warrants. They further

contend that the judge did not personally determine
Facts: the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence
On September 16, 1993, a Security Guard and a where the investigation was based from.
discharged Philippine Constabulary named
Escolastico Umbal executed a sworn statement Issue: Whether or not a warrant of arrest without
implicating petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and bail can be set aside and the case be dismissed for
Roberto Mendoza who are partners in the Law Firm lack of probable cause even if the accused was not in
of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. He accused them the custody of the court.
as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and
slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German Held: Yes. The Supreme Court issued a temporary
national. Based on that confession of Umbal, a restraining order enjoining the PACC from enforcing
search warrant was issued by Judge Roberto Barrios the warrant of arrest and the respondent judge
of the RTC of Manila. therein from further proceeding in the case on the
Then, the operatives of the Presidential Anti-Crime ground of lack of probable cause. As with other
Commission (PACC), armed with the search warrant earlier cases resolved by the high court, the accused
issued separately raided the dwellings of police is deemed to have submitted himself to the
officers who were also pointed by Umbal as the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative
perpetrators of the crimes. Several firearms and relief. Notwithstanding such, there is no requirement
ammunitions were found in the raid including Van that the accused be in the custody of the law.
Twest's Cartier sunglasses. So, the two lawyers and Various reliefs can be granted by the Supreme Court
their other co-defendants were charged with illegal to accused even if they are not in the custody of the
possession of firearms and ammunitions, law.
carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder,
and usurpation of authority. Their case was referred
by the PACC to the DOJ who took over the case.
After preliminary investigation, the Judge Roberto
Diokno found probable cause and issued a warrant
of arrest without bail. The petitioners questioned the
issued warrants of arrests. They claim that Judge
Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of his jurisdiction as there is lack of probable
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008 On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, decision for him to remain grounded until such time
vs. that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents. standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
international flight steward who was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a
airline company. repeated refusal to report for weight check would be
The proper weight for a man of his height and body dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of
structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight weight check dates, which he did not report to.
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a
Administration Manual of PAL. Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of company
standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated
PAL to send him to an extended vacation until November were not treated the same.
1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all
the excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by
went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal weight,
February 1989. “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him
“which spanned a period covering a total of almost five
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to (5) years,” his services were considered terminated
reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. “effective immediately.”

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates
are reasonable in view of the nature of the job of against petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That
petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight clearly shows that it is possible for him to lose weight
did not hamper the performance of his duties. given the proper attitude, determination, and self-
discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
NLRC affirmed. December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that “[t]he
issue is could I bring my weight down to ideal weight
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.”
petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly
failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only easily availed the assistance of the company physician,
invoked by petitioner for purposes of escaping the result per the advice of PAL.
of his dismissal for being overweight.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed. placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
HELD: YES becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to Labor Code that justifies his dismissal from the service.
no other conclusion than that they constitute a His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless
continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, “[v]oluntariness
the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall basically means that the just cause is solely attributable
under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. to the employee without any external force influencing

or controlling his actions. This element runs through all The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it
just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the has committed itself to safely transport its passengers.
nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew
voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of
in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).” PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of
discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the weight standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
bona fide occupational qualification defense. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to the employee as an act of social justice or based on
persons of a particular sex, religion, or national origin equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral
national origin is an actual qualification for performing character.
the job. The qualification is called a bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of
reasonableness of the company policy is used because it
is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it reflects
an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory
job performance.”

Social Justice Society v. Dangerous handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing x x x;
Drugs Board, G.R. No. 157870 (and
other consolidated petitions), November (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
3, 2008 domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
VELASCO, J.: regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
I. THE FACTS dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
These consolidated petitions challenge the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
constitutionality of Sec. 36 of R.A. 9165, the Comprehensive provisions of the Civil Service Law;
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of (1) candidates for public office; (2) xxx xxx xxx
students of secondary and tertiary schools; (3) officers and
employees of public and private offices; and (4) persons (f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with
a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
charged before the prosecutor’s office of a crime with an
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall
imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years
undergo a mandatory drug test;
and 1 day.
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
The challenged section reads: elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug
testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories
Sec. 36(g) is implemented by COMELEC Resolution
or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
No. 6486.
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two
(2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the II. THE ISSUES
positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x 1. Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing: Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for
candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a
xxx xxx xxx law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. Students
of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related 2. Are paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student 9165 unconstitutional?

Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Accordingly,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
III. THE RULING unconstitutional.

[The Court GRANTED the petition in G.R. No. 161658 Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented
and declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL. It the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3,
alsoPARTIALLY GRANTED the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified
9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the
36(f)UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Court thus permanently validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
enjoined all the concerned agencies from implementing Sec. effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if
36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.] proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o
1. YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
for candidates for senator; NO, Congress CANNOT enact test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
senator in addition to those laid down by the another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at
Constitution. the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little
an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance the drug-testing requirement.
candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, 2. NO, paragraphs (c) and (d) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) are NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL; YES, paragraphs (f)
age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification thereof is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any
other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and As to paragraph (c), covering students of secondary and
elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot tertiary schools
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force Citing the U.S. cases of Vernonia School
of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the District 47J v. Acton and Board of Education of
Constitution. Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County, et al. v. Earls, et al., the Court deduced and

applied the following principles: (1) schools and their under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their needing what was referred to in Vernonia as “swift and
students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights informal disciplinary procedures,” the probable-cause
than an adult, and are subject to the custody and standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the challenged administrative search in question.
health and well-being of their students and may adopt such
measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such The first factor to consider in the matter of
duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon
applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non- which the drug testing, which effects a search within the
discriminatory. meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In
this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for
Guided by Vernonia, supra, and Board of the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and
Education, supra, the Court is of the view and so holds the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The
that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management
educational institutions to require, as a condition for and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enrol is not workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of
requirements. impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

As to paragraph (d), covering officers and employees of Just as defining as the first factor is the character of
public and private offices the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to
a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is the
Constitution is couched and as has been enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or
held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a "narrowly focused"?
government search or intrusion. And whether a search at
issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For
balancing of the government-mandated intrusion on the one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and
individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions
compelling state interest. In the criminal context, specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under
personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug- a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee
testing policy for employees—and students for that matter— in a private establishment is under the law deemed

forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the
drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees,
testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search,
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we
in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
employees concerned shall be subjected to “random drug limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo,
test as contained in the company’s work rules and constitutional.
regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
work place.” Like their counterparts in the private sector,
government officials and employees also labor under
For another, the random drug testing shall be reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the promote a high standard of ethics in the public
mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness
shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test for private employees, the more reason that it should pass
and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more are required to be accountable at all times to the people and
important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled
laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) As to paragraph (f), covering persons charged before the
to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an prosecutor’s office with a crime with an imposable
accurate chain of custody. In addition, the IRR issued by the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 6 years and 1
DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the day
“need to know” basis; that the “drug test result and the
records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory
results.” Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
information or evidence relating to the violation of random, and suspicionless drug testing for
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result students emanates primarily from the waiver by the
of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
intrusion into the employees’ privacy, under RA 9165, is school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons
accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively private and public employees, the constitutional soundness
minimal. of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug

testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test
policy and requirement.
Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 164815
We find the situation entirely different in the case of
persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with Retroactive Effect of Laws on Penal Character
criminal offenses punishable with 6 years and 1 day G.R. No. 164815 September 3, 2009
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, Petitioner
case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's
office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or vs.
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines,
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly Respondent
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are FACTS:
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before On July 10, 1996, a duly issued warrant of arrest to the
the prosecutor’s office and peaceably submitting themselves petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily released. Valeroso was found and arrested and was
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to bodily searched and after which a firearm with live
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject
is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for firearm was later confirmed and revealed to have not
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA
been issued to the petitioner but to another person.
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in
forced to incriminate themselves.
the boarding house of his children. They pointed their
guns on him and tied him and pulled him out of the
room as the raiding team went back inside, searched
and ransacked the room. Later, an operative came out of
the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. The
firearm according to the petitioner was issued to Jerry
Valeroso by virtue of a Memorandum Receipt.
Jerry C. Valeroso was then charged with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a

revolver bearing serial number 52315 without securing Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of
the necessary license/permit. The petitioner through a Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and
letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered. seizure. Therefore, the evidence obtained is
inadmissible to court and cannot be used against
Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the
firearm and ammunition has merit and valid
1. Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and
seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested
lawfully may be searched so that the officer may
Human Rights Law Case Digest: Philippine Blooming
remove any weapons that the accused may be
Mills Employment Organization V. Philippine Blooming
used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare
Mills Co. (1973)
of the officers and to make sure that the arrest
will happen. This is also to find evidence that G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973
otherwise can be destroyed by the accused.
Further, a valid arrest allows the seizure of Lessons Applicable: Nature and Definition of Human
evidence or any weapons either on the person or Rights, Human Right is superior to property rights,
within the area of his immediate control. Based Social justice, jurisdiction over violation of constitutional
on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner right
did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed Laws Applicable: Bill of Rights on rights of free
outside the room where the gun was found; expression, rights of free assembly and rights of petition
therefore the room where the gun was found
could not be “in his immediate control.” FACTS:
Incidental searches without a warrant states that • March 2, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills discovered
officers are permitted to seize any weapon that that Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization
they can inadvertently found during the arrest (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration as a
under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the valid exercise of their constitutional right of freedom
firearm was not found accidentally but was expression in general and of their right of assembly and
actually searched and therefore not incidental. petition for redress of grievances in particular before

appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, reconsideration – dismissed since 2 days late
alleged abuses of the police officers of the municipality ISSUE:
of Pasig at Malacañang on March 4, 1969 to be 1. W/N to regard the demonstration against police
participated in by the workers in the first, second and officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad
third shifts (6am-2pm, 7am-4pm. and 8am-5pm faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the
respectively) collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
• March 3, 1969: Philippine Blooming Mills held 2 dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
meetings in the morning and afternoon where PBMEO employees, stretches unduly the compass of the
confirmed the demonstration which has nothing to do collective bargaining agreement, is an inhibition of the
with the Company because the union has no quarrel or rights of free expression, free assembly and petition
dispute with Management. That Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an YES. Set aside as null and void the orders of CFI and
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the reinstate the petitioners.
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any • In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement
demonstration for that matter should not unduly of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
prejudice the normal operation thus whoever fails to central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our
report for work the following morning shall be dismissed civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
for violation of the existing CBA Article XXIV: NO individual must be "protected to the largest possible
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE amounting to an illegal strike extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
• March 3, 1969 9:50 am: Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of his person
PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company: • The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of
REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the
1969 erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
• The Company filed for violation of the CBA. PBMEO derision of those who have no patience with general
answered that there is no violation since they gave prior principles.
notice. Moreover, it was not a mass demonstration for • The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well
strike against the company. as the right to petition are included among the
• Judge Joaquin M. Salvador: PBMEO guilty of immunities reserved by the sovereign people
bargaining in bad faith and PBMEO officers directly • The rights of free expression, free assembly and
responsible for ULP losing their status as employees petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
• September 29, 1969: PBMEO motion for essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness

and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these property rights.
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the o There was a lack of human understanding or
periodic establishment of the government through their compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs request of the Union for excuse from work for the day
as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The shifts in order to carry out its mass demonstration. And
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for demonstration held against the Pasig police, not against
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employer, which is as unchristian as it is
employees. unconstitutional.
• While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, o The most that could happen to them was to lose a
the primacy of human rights over property rights is day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the
recognized. day of the demonstration. One day's pay means much to
o Property and property rights can be lost thru a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support.
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-day salary
o a constitutional or valid infringement of human hoping that their demonstration would bring about the
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely desired relief from police abuses. But management was
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent of their right of free speech, free assembly and the right
o Rationale: Material loss can be repaired or to petition for redress.
adequately compensated. The debasement of the human o the dismissal for proceeding with the demonstration
being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a
never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of
dying day, even as he cries in anguish for retribution, Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues. promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
o injunction would be trenching upon the freedom economic security of all of the people," which guarantee
expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of
illegal picketing or strike Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall
• The pretension of their employer that it would suffer afford protection to labor ...". Under the Industrial Peace
loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to
from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the

exercise by employees of their right to self-organization legal services
for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the • enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered
promotion of their moral, social and economic well- no less by the organic law, is a most compelling reason
being." to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations
• The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair rule which impinges on such human rights. It is an
labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 particular case from its operation, whenever the
guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in purposes of justice require."
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an Ermita Malate v City of Manila 20 SCRA
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in 849 (1967)
the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
• violation of a constitutional right divests the court of J. Fernando
jurisdiction. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained
through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association,
finality of the judgment. There is no time limit to the and one of its members Hotel del Mar Inc. petitioned for
exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not the prohibition of Ordinance 4670 on June 14, 1963 to
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of be applicable in the city of Manila.
one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a
continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when They claimed that the ordinance was beyond the powers
exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be of the Manila City Board to regulate due to the fact that
rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be hotels were not part of its regulatory powers. They also
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of asserted that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance was
Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and
prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would violative of due process insofar because it would
be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest impose P6,000.00 license fee per annum for first
between an employer and its laborer, the latter class motels and P4,500.00 for second class
eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an motels; there was also the requirement that the
dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with the guests would fill up a form specifying their personal
required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the information.
financial resources with which to pay for competent

There was also a provision that the premises and "The presumption is towards the validity of a law.”
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses However, the Judiciary should not lightly set aside
would be open for inspection from city authorites. They legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of
claimed this to be violative of due process for being personal or property rights under the guise of police
vague. regulation.

The law also classified motels into two classes and O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co- Case
required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities was in the scope of police power. As
in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a underlying questions of fact may condition the
dining room or, restaurant and laundry. The petitioners constitutionality of legislation of this character, the
also invoked the lack of due process on this for being resumption of constitutionality must prevail in
arbitrary. the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation
It was also unlawful for the owner to lease any room or
being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours.
the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of facts,
There was also a prohibition for persons below 18 in the the presumption of validity must prevail and the
hotel. judgment against the ordinance set aside.”

The challenged ordinance also caused the automatic There is no question but that the challenged ordinance
cancellation of the license of the hotels that violated the was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices
ordinance. hurtful to public morals, particularly fornication and
prostitution. Moreover, the increase in the licensed fees
The lower court declared the ordinance was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind
unconstitutional. from operating for purpose other than legal" and at the
Hence, this appeal by the city of Manila. same time, to increase "the income of the city
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to
Whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety
violative of the due process clause? and general welfare of the people. In view of
the requirements of due process, equal protection and
Held: No. Judgment reversed. other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the
power must not be unreasonable or violative of due
Ratio: process.

There is no controlling and precise definition of due Lutz v. Araneta- Taxation may be made to supplement
process. It has a standard to which the governmental the state’s police power.
action should conform in order that deprivation of life,
In one case- “much discretion is given to municipal
liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
corporations in determining the amount," here the
What then is the standard of due process which must
license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it
exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite
were viewed purely as a police power measure.
to free the challenged ordinance from legal infirmity? It
is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting
to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
ruled out and unfairness avoided. violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in
democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
Due process is not a narrow or "technical conception
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
circumstances," decisions based on such a clause
and order of society and the general well-being.
requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into
fundamental principles of our society." Questions of due Laurel- The citizen should achieve the
process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
slavery to form or phrase. through education and personal discipline, so that there
may be established the resultant equilibrium, which
Nothing in the petition is sufficient to prove the
means peace and order and happiness for all.
ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due
process requirement. The freedom to contract no longer "retains its virtuality
as a living principle, unlike in the sole case of People v
Cu Unjieng case: Licenses for non-useful occupations
Pomar. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent
are also incidental to the police power and the right to
given way to the assumption by the government of the
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
right of intervention even in contractual
regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the
relations affected with public interest.
municipal corporations are allowed a much wider
discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the
municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, standard for the validity of governmental acts is much
oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
declined to interfere with such discretion. Eg. Sale of curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
liquors. permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider.

On the law being vague on the issue of personal he belongs, “a true detailed and sworn
information, the maintenance of establishments, and statement of assets and liabilities,
the “full rate of payment”- Holmes- “We agree to all the including a statement of the amounts and
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what sources of his income, the amounts of his
they omit but there is no canon against personal and family expenses and the
using common sense in construing laws as saying what amount of income taxes paid for the next
they obviously mean." preceding calendar year”.

 Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the

periodical submission “within the month of
January of every other year thereafter” of their
MORFE V MUTUC sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is
violative of due process as an oppressive exercise
BY MAROON 5 PARTNERS AND of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the
ASSOCIATES DECEMBER 29, 2011 SALN constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban
Declaratory relief (Appeal) against unreasonable search and seizure
construed together with the prohibition against
Date of Promulgation: January 31, 1968 self-incrimination.
Ponente: Fernando, J.  Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec:
Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI)  Acceptance of public position = voluntary
assumption of obligation
Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive
Secretary) et al.  Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable
Facts: measure of insuring the interest of general
welfare in honest and clean public service
 The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
and is therefore a legitimate exercise of
of 1960 (RA No. 3019)
police power.
 Every public officer within 30 days after its
 CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement
approval or after his assumption of office
exceeds the permissible limit of the police power
“and within the month of January of every
and is thus offensive to the due process clause
year thereafter”, as well as upon
termination of his position, shall prepare Issue/s:
and file with the head of the office to which

Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public comfort, safety and welfare of society” (Justice
officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power; 2. Malcolm)
Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the
 The power of sovereignty, the power to govern
right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable
men and things within the limits of its
search and seizure construed together with the
domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment
prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the
of rights)
personal integrity and official dignity of public officials.
 Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the
extension of police power to regulatory action
Ruling: Decision reversed. affecting persons in public or private life can
invoke the protection of due process.
 It has been held that due process may be relied
1. Presumption of validity upon by public official to protect the security of
tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to
 Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was property. Therefore he could also use due process
a reasonable requirement for employment so a to strike down what he considers as an
public officer can make of record his assets and infringement of his liberty.
liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did
not present evidence to rebut the presumption of  Under the Constitution, the challenged provision
validity. is allowable as long as due process is observed.

 “If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind  The standard for due process is
or the person, the standard for the validity of REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must
governmental acts is much more rigorous and not outrun the bounds of reason and result in
exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects sheer oppression.
the most rights of property, the permissible scope
 “It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions
of regulatory measure is wider.” (Ermita-Malate
and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of
Hotel v. Mayor of Manila)
public service with its ever-present temptation to
1. Exercise of Police power and the defense provided heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as
by the Due Process Clause arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that
imposed upon public officials and employees to file
 “inherent and plenary power in the state which such sworn statement of assets and liabilities
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the every two years after having done so upon

assuming office…There was therefore no  We are not aware of any constitutional provision
unconstitutional exercise of police power.” designed to protect a man’s conduct from judicial
inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice.
1. Right to privacy
1. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity
 Right to be let alone
 Only congressional power or competence, not the
 “It cannot be said that the challenged
wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for
statutory provision calls for disclosure of
declaring a statute invalid.
information which infringes on the right of a
person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the
rational relationship such a requirement
possesses with the objective of a valid statute
goes very far in precluding assent to an objection SJS V Atienza G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
of such character. This is not to say that a public
officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of J. Corona
constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize
that in subjecting him to such a further Facts:
compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities,
including the statement of the amounts of On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila
personal and family expenses, and the amount of enacted Ordinance No. 8027 and Atienza passed it the following
income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar day. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein
year, there is no unconstitutional from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and
intrusion into what otherwise would be a private operators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
sphere.” desist from operating their businesses within six months from the
date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the Pandacan oil
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
depots of Shell and Caltex.
 The constitutional guarantee against
But the city of Manila and the DOE entered into an MOU which only
unreasonable search and seizure does not give
freedom from testimonial compulsion. scaled down the property covered by the depots and did not stop
their operations. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared
1. Right against self-incrimination that the MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting
July 25, 2002. It was extended to 2003.

Petitioners filed for mandamus in SC urging the city to implement laws are regarded as the real parties in interest and they need not
Ordinance 8027. Respondent’s defense is that Ordinance No. 8027 show any specific interest. Petitioners are citizens of manila and
has been superseded by the MOU and the resolutions and that the thus have a direct interest in the ordinances.
MOU was more of a guideline to 8027.

Issues: On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon
1. Whether respondent has the mandatory legal duty to enforce respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and
Ordinance No. 8027 and order the removal of the Pandacan ordinances relative to the governance of the city. "One of these is
Terminals, and Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the
duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been
2. Whether the June 26, 2002 MOU and the resolutions ratifying it repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
can amend or repeal Ordinance No. 8027 other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of

an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for
Held: Yes to both, Petition granted
this is obvious. It might seriously hinder the transaction of public
Ratio: business if these officers were to be permitted in all cases to
question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing
1. Rule 65, Section 316 of the Rules of Court- mandamus may be duties upon them and which have not judicially been declared
filed when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station. The petitioner should have a well-defined, clear 2. Need not resolve this issue. Assuming that the terms of the MOU
and certain legal right to the performance of the act and it must be were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which
the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it
to be done. full force and effect only until April 30, 2003.

Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right, or to

compel compliance with a duty, which is questionable or over which
a substantial doubt exists. Unless the right to the relief sought is
unclouded, mandamus will not issue. When a mandamus PANDACAN OIL DEPOT MUST GO: SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS.
proceeding concerns a public right and its object is to compel a ATIENZA CASE DIGEST
public duty, the people who are interested in the execution of the

(Just the other day, the Supreme Court affirmed the authority of ordinances relative to the governance of the city,― including
Manila City to issue — and enforce — an Ordinance reclassifying Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron
certain areas within the city. The reclassification adversely affected Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas
the oil companies, which are now forced to relocate their oil Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the “oil companies―) and
terminals in Pandacan. This is a digest ofSocial Justice Society vs. the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the DOE, sought to
Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008. Other procedural issues intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the decision.
are not discussed.)
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the
Facts: interest of justice

The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally
Atienza, Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable
No. 8027 that was enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
Manila in 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described affected by such proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a
therein from industrial to commercial and directed the owners and motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the
operators of businesses disallowed under the reclassification to court. While the motions to intervene respectively filed by the oil
cease and desist from operating their businesses within six months companies and the DOE were filed out of time, these motions were
from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses granted because they presented novel issues and arguments.
situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals― of DOE’s intervention was also allowed considering the
the oil companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is transcendental importance of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No. 8027
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE)
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute
entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to
companies. They agreed that “the scaling down of the Pandacan
abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given
Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.― The
effect. Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared
Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97. In
unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.
the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was
effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the
period was extended up to 30 April 2003. provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are
irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 7 March 2007
conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second
Decision. The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty
is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
under the Local Government Code (LGC) to “enforce all laws and

clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier interfere by mandamus proceedings with the legislative or executive
law. The oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the departments of the government in the legitimate exercise of its
first category. powers, there is an exception – to enforce mere ministerial acts
required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. A writ of
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable
mandamus is the power to compel “the performance of an act
conflict between the two ordinances. However, there was no
which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office,
legislative purpose to repeal Ordinance No. 8027. There is no
trust or station.―
conflict since both ordinances actually have a common
objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial to The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy
commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial and adequate remedy to compel respondent to enforce Ordinance
(Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true that both ordinances relate to No. 8027, which was to seek relief from the President of the
the same subject matter, i.e., classification of the land use of the Philippines through the Secretary of the Department of Interior and
area where Pandacan oil depot is located, if there is no intent to Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the President’s power of
repeal the earlier enactment, every effort at reasonable supervision over local government units. This suggested process,
construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that both however, would be unreasonably long, tedious and consequently
can be given effect. injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and its
constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. A party need
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a
not go first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an
subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the
ordinance. Besides, the resort to an original action for mandamus
same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has
before the SC is undeniably allowed by the Constitution.
intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier
special law. The special law must be taken as intended to constitute Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid
an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance
Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a
to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the
certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area)
LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed
whereas Ordinance No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it
by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
covers the entire city of Manila.
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce Ordinance statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
No. 8027 or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against
be unreasonable. There is no showing that the Ordinance is
respondent in consideration of the separation of powers of the
executive and judiciary. However, while it is true that Courts will not

The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027 Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there
is a concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It was enacted
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
“for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring
Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the
health, public safety and general welfare― of the residents of
plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a
order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows
terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this objective,
from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex(the welfare
the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from
of the people is the supreme law).
industrial to commercial.
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature,
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security
such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the
and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to
particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
local governments. LGUs like the City of Manila exercise police
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist
power through their respective legislative bodies, in this case, the
target. As long as it there is such a target in their midst, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the
Charter of the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary
power to “reclassify land within the jurisdiction of the city.― for the protection of such interests. Clearly, the Sanggunian was in
the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of
police power In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may
be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government
properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty,
are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
from those of a particular class, require its exercise; and (2) the welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used
of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a
there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful reasonable relation to the end in view.

The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only
zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the depot is when the state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In
situated from industrial to commercial. A zoning ordinance is eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some
defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police
arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given political power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or
subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The
of needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from
businesses of the oil companies in their present location will no danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a
longer be permitted. The power to establish zones for industrial, noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In
commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power the regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the
itself and is exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents use or interest therein, hence there is no compensable taking.
of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other
within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
businesses situated in the affected area remain theirs. Only their
Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to
use is restricted although they can be applied to other profitable
be unjust.
uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
amounts to taking without compensation
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and
discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals
oppressive as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits
despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings
them from conducting operations in the City of Manila. However,
and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code,
the oil companies are not prohibited from doing business in other
Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code.
appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila merely exercised its
power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones it An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
established. constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The
requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and
must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
oppressive because they have invested billions of pesos in the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions
depot, and the forced closure will result in huge losses in income
only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. This argument
The law may treat and regulate one class differently from another
has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on
class provided there are real and substantial differences to
or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which
distinguish one class from another.

Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks petroleum products.― These powers can be exercised without
to prevent is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a emasculating the LGUs of the powers granted them. When these
terrorist attack. Unlike the depot, the surrounding community is not ambiguous powers are pitted against the unequivocal power of the
a high-value terrorist target. Any damage caused by fire or explosion LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances for the general
occurring in those areas would be nothing compared to the damage welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of the
caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself. Accordingly, there is latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the
a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance which Pandacan Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved
provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals in favor of the City of Manila.
removes the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously
purpose of the ordinance. The classification is not limited to the
protected under the Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the
conditions existing when the ordinance was enacted but to future
Constitution has been devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the
conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable to all
autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was specially promulgated by Congress
businesses and industries in the area it delineated.
to ensure the autonomy of local governments as mandated by the
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479 Constitution. There is no showing how the laws relied upon by the
oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of its power to
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is
enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992)
the land uses within its jurisdiction.
and RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes
enacted by Congress. However, a brief survey of decisions where Another reason that militates against the DOE’s assertions is
the police power measure of the LGU clashed with national laws that Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the
shows that the common dominator is that the national laws were President’s power over LGUs to one of general supervision.
clearly and expressly in conflict with the ordinances/resolutions of Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her alter egos, cannot
the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that there was no exercise the power of control over them. The President and his or
room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the
gave DOE general powers to “establish and administer programs activities of local governments, so long as they act within the scope
for the exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, of their authority. Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own
utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy discretion for the discretion exercised by the sanggunian of the City
resources― and “to encourage certain practices in the [oil] of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom of local officials must prevail
industry which serve the public interest and are intended to achieve as long as they are acting within the parameters of the Constitution
efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of and the law.

Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA Conclusion
7924 and EO 72
Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property.
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to
required to be submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally
Authority (MMDA) for review and if found to be in compliance with protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
its metropolitan physical framework plan and regulations, it shall property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not.
endorse the same to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a
(HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924 and Section 1 of E.O. few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail.
72. They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not go through
Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and
this review process, it is invalid.
validity of Ordinance No. 8027. Without a doubt, there are no
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority impediments to its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is
to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who
municipalities. This was only found in its implementing rules which have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the
made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and
comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the
admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very intervenors’ warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of
specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced.
in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack.
Just the same, the Court noted that it is not about to provoke a
It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly formulated as the
crisis by ordering the immediate relocation of the Pandacan
“Manila [CLUP] and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.― CLUPs are the
Terminals out of its present site. The enforcement of a decision,
ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for integration
specially one with far-reaching consequences, should always be
in its metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by the
within the bounds of reason, in accordance with a comprehensive
HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and
and well-coordinated plan, and within a time-frame that complies
policies. Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and
with the letter and spirit of our resolution. To this end, the oil
HLURB ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not present
companies have no choice but to obey the law.
any evidence to show that these were not complied with. In
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an
ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law was
not observed.

THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted
Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither
vs. sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded
that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH
Law but were not candidates for that election.
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of

the tarpaulin is a political question, hence not within the
ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.
2. Whether or not the petitioners violated the principle of
TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to exhaustion of administrative remedies as the case was not
property brought first before the COMELEC En Banc or any if its
3. Whether or not COMELEC may regulate expressions made
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins
by private citizens.
within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of
Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet 4. Whether or not the assailed notice and letter for the
(10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral removal of the tarpaulin violated petitioners’ fundamental
within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message right to freedom of expression.
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of
2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject 5. Whether the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-
of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience based or content-neutral regulation.
Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a 6. Whether or not there was violation of petitioners’ right to
check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The property.
electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the
adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH 7. Whether or not the tarpaulin and its message are
Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by considered religious speech.

In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to
the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be
HELD: abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.
The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the
exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It The Court held that the argument on exhaustion of
can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for
The concept of a political question never precludes judicial adjudication. Ripeness is the “prerequisite that something had by
review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a then been accomplished or performed by either branch or in this
fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo case, organ of government before a court may come into the
that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of picture.”
regulation of the tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging
Petitioners’ exercise of their right to speech, given the
the fundamental right to expression.
message and their medium, had understandable relevance
Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the especially during the elections. COMELEC’s letter threatening the
determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non- filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an
justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat of
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings
the government properly acted within such limits.
prolongs the violation of their freedom of speech.
A political question will not be considered justiciable if
there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence
constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official to support their position that they had the power to regulate the
actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this court. tarpaulin. However, the Court held that all of these provisions
pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not
candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC

does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions
preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non- “based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.” In
candidate in this case. contrast, content-neutral regulation includes controls merely on the
incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the
The Court held that every citizen’s expression with political
The Court held that the regulation involved at bar is
consequences enjoys a high degree of protection.
content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the
Moreover, the respondent’s argument that the tarpaulin is size of its medium.
election propaganda, being petitioners’ way of endorsing
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of
candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who
invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule
voted for it, holds no water.
as measure.
The Court held that while the tarpaulin may influence the
Under this rule, “the evil consequences sought to be
success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this
prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree
does not necessarily mean it is election propaganda. The tarpaulin
of imminence extremely high.’” “Only when the challenged act has
was not paid for or posted “in return for consideration” by any
overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass
candidate, political party, or party-list group.
constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
By interpreting the law, it is clear that personal opinions overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.”
are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents
The content of the tarpaulin is a political speech failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and
substantial state interest endangered by the posting of the tarpaulin
Political speech refers to speech “both intended and received as a as to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There
contribution to public deliberation about some issue,” “fostering is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-candidate
informed and civic minded deliberation.” On the other hand, petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of
commercial speech has been defined as speech that does “no more the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
than propose a commercial transaction.” The expression resulting
from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely political SIXTH ISSUE: Yes.
The Court held that even though the tarpaulin is readily
FIFTH ISSUE: Content-based regulation. seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of
petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise protected by
the Constitution.

Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective As Justice Brennan explained, the “government may take
confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally
unreasonable infringement of property rights is void, because it is applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious
repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to
protection of the laws. create without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish.”
The Court in Adiong case held that a restriction that
regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is “so broad Lemon test
that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property.”
A regulation is constitutional when:
Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
which provides that no person shall be deprived of his property 1. It has a secular legislative purpose;
without due process of law.
2. It neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
3. It does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
The Court held that the church doctrines relied upon by
petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the
Catholic religion in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not
suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as
religious speech solely on such basis. The enumeration of 1-UTAK V. COMELEC
candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubt as to its
nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech. vs.
Doctrine of benevolent neutrality COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion
under certain circumstances. Accommodations are government PONENTE: Reyes
policies that take religion specifically into account not to promote TOPIC: Election law, prior restraint of free speech, posting of
the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow individuals campaign materials on PUV and public terminals, captive-audience
and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their doctrine
purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate
the exercise of, a person’s or institution’s religion.

DOCTRINE: 5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs,
ferries, pedicabs and tricycles, whether motorized or not;
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and
fundamental right in any democracy. It includes not only the right to 6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus
vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a terminals, airports, seaports, docks, piers, train stations, and the
particular candidate. The right to express one’s preference for like.
a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause
to free speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to
for the revocation of the public utility franchise and will make the
convince others to vote for a candidate carries with it a heavy
owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or
presumption of invalidity.
terminal liable for an election offense under Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n) of these
Petitioner sought for clarification from COMELEC as regards
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No.
the application of REsolution No. 9615 particularly Section 7(g)
9615, which provided for the rules implementing R.A. No. 9006 in
items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-à-vis privately owned
connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
public utility vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals. The petitioner
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the
then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of
prohibited forms of election propaganda, pertinently provides:
the assailed provisions and allow private owners of PUVs and
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. – During the transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their
campaign period, it is unlawful: vehicles and transport terminals.

xxxx The COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214, which
denied the petitioner’s request to reconsider the implementation of
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
material outside of authorized common poster areas, in public Resolution No. 9615.
places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner
thereof. ISSUE:

(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include Whether or not Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
any of the following: Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 are constitutional.


HELD: The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is
an invalid content-neutral regulation repugnant to the free speech
The Supreme Court held that the said provisions of Resolution No.
9615 are null and void for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely
concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined
Resolution No. 9615 are prior restraints on speech
standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of to free speech, provided that the following requisites concur:
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the
1. The government regulation is within the constitutional
people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the
power of the Government;
freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals, to express their preference, through the 2. It furthers an important or substantial governmental
posting of election campaign material in their property, and interest;
convince others to agree with them.
3. The governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting of free expression; and
an election campaign material during an election period in PUVs and
4. The incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no
transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
public utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for
an election offense. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are
content-neutral regulations since they merely control the place
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right
where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the
to free expression of the owners of PUVs and transport
prohibition is still repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to
terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral regulation.
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to Resolution No. 9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated
operate. power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the
Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the
right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

The COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport of censorship, which undertakes selectively to shield the public from
terminals. some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive
than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional
when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home or the degree
grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC during
of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the
an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the
unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.
Constitution only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory
powers over the enjoyment or utilization “of all franchises or Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience
permits for the operation,” inter alia, of transportation and other doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive audience”
public utilities. The COMELEC’s constitutionally delegated powers may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive
of supervision and regulation do not extend to the ownership per se speech. The prohibition under Section 7(g)
of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under
to operate the same. the captive-audience doctrine; the commuters are not forced or
compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within
and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise
receive the messages contained in the posted election campaign
or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of transportation
materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the
utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used
same unbearably intrusive.
for public transport or on transport terminals is not only a form of
political expression, but also an act of ownership – it has nothing to Lehman’s case not applicable
do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting
of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals,
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, a case decided by the U.S.
justified under the captive-audience doctrine. Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which
prohibits political advertisements on government-run buses, was
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot,
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held
as a practical matter, escape from intrusive speech, the speech can
that the advertising space on the buses was not a public forum,
be restricted. The “captive-audience” doctrine recognizes that a
pointing out that advertisement space on government-run buses,
listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in
“although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a
circumstances in which the communication cannot be avoided.
part of commercial venture.” In the same way that other
commercial ventures need not accept every proffer of advertising

from the general public, the city’s transit system has the discretion applies equally to the members of the purported class. However,
on the type of advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles. the classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is
not based on substantial distinction and is not germane to the
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs
purpose of the law. A distinction exists between PUVs and
owned by the city government; the city government, as owner of
transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in
the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements
that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from
would be placed on its buses.
the government either a franchise or a permit to
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition
vehicles, i.e., the city government, in choosing the types of imposed under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No.
advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport
contrast, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 terminals; the prohibition does not in any manner affect the
curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals on franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and transport terminals.
the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
refuse political advertisements on their buses. Considering that vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership
what were involved were facilities owned by the city government, of PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the the public, remains private. If owners of private vehicles and other
instant case, the ownership of PUVs and transport terminals properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion
remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there
political views by proscribing the posting of election campaign is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred right to owners of
materials on their properties. PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the
distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport terminals from posting owners of private vehicles and properties is merely
election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause. superficial. Superficial differences do not make for a valid
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run classification.
afoul of the free speech clause, but also of the equal protection The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for
clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set
founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section them apart from private vehicles and other
1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. properties. Admittedly, any election campaign material that would
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by many
(6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not limited to existing conditions and people. However, election campaign materials posted on private

vehicles and other places frequented by the public, e.g.,commercial licensing from the Central Bank and having clandestinely
establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus, there is remitted the same to Hong Kong.
no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in
 After the filing of the deportation charges, a warrant of
the prohibition against posting of election campaign materials.
arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan, et al. pending
Summary investigation.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of  They were granted provisional liberty upon their filing of a
Resolution No. 9615 violate the free speech clause; they are surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash bond for P10,000.00.
content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional
power of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the  Qua Chee Gan, et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss the
objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the charges on the ground, among others, that such charges are
candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, not legal grounds for deportation ad that the Board has not
but are also violative of the equal protection clause, as there is no jurisdiction over such charges. The motion to dismiss was
substantial distinction between owners of PUV s and transport denied.
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties.  Qua Chee Gan, et al. then filed a petition for habeas corpus
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise and/or prohibition.
one’s political candidacy is clearly a significant part of our freedom  TIRAL COURT: Upheld the validity of the delegation by the
of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or President to the Deportation Board the power to conduct
reason is a violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic investigations for the purpose of determining whether the
way of life. stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the
security, welfare and interest of the State.

o The court also sustained the power of the

Qua Chee Gan v. The Deportation Board | Barrera, J
deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix
FACTS bonds for the alien's temporary release pending
investigation on the theory that the power to arrest
 Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien
Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and is essential to and complement the power to deport
Basilio King were charged before the Deportation Board aliens.
with having purchased $130,000.00 without the necessary

ISSUES/HELD  And although the charges against Qua Chee Gan are not
enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of profiteering, hoarding
[1] WoN the President has the power to deport aliens and if such or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central
power is validly delegated to the Deportation Board. –YES. Bank regulations, which is tantamount to economic
[2] WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order sabotage, is a ground for deportation under the provisions
the arrest of such aliens. –YES. BUT only when there is already an of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine
ORDER OF DEPORTATION. Immigration Act of 1940.


 Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien charged in

deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the
[1] Commissioner of Immigration in order to secure their
 Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of
Immigration the power to effect the arrest and expulsion of o However, the same did not authorize the arrest of
an alien, after previous determination by the Board of the alien pending investigation.
Commissioners, but such power was not intended to be
 It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu
delimited to the Immigration Commissioner as Sec. 69 of
proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special
the Administrative Code, although not expressly conferring
Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest
such power, lays down the procedure for such deportation
of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention
proceedings for the President.
during the investigation unless he files a bond for his
 Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be provisional release in such amount and under such
effected in 2 ways: conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the
o By order of the President, after due investigation,
pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised  However, Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Administrative Code, and upon whose authority the President's power to deport is
predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the power
o By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon to arrest.
recommendation by the Board of Commissioners,
under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613.  Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his
person is guaranteed by Sec. 1 Art III of the Constitution:

“...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may HARVEY V. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO [162 SCRA 840;
produce...” G.R. NO. 82544; 28 JUN 1988]
 Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement Facts: This is a petition for Habeas Corpus. Petitioners are the
— "to be determined by the judge" — to any public officer following: American nationals Andrew Harvey, 52 and Jonh Sherman
who may be authorized by the Legislature to make such 72. Dutch Citizen Adriaan Van Den Elshout, 58. All reside at
determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Pagsanjan Laguna respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor
Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of Immigration
 Therefore, the arrest of a foreigner, which is necessary to
and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their
carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only
residences. The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was
when there is already an order of deportation.
found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found
o However, during the investigation, it is not with two naked boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the
indispensable that the alien be arrested. “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has
been under his care and subjects confirmed being live-in for
o It is enough that a bond be required to insure the sometime now.
appearance of the alien during the investigation, as
was authorized in EO69. Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo
negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters
DISPOSITIVE and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
 Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the found.
Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing
of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond Petitioners were among the 22 suspected alien pedophiles. They
and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of were apprehended 17 February1988 after close surveillance for 3
said aliens, is declared illegal. month of the CID in Pagsanjan, Laguna. 17 of the arrested aliens
opted for self-deportation. One released for lack of evidence,
 The order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation another charged not for pedophile but working with NO VISA, the 3
Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant petitioners chose to face deportation proceedings. On 4
to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. March1988, deportation proceedings were instituted against aliens
for being undesirable aliens under Sec.69 of Revised

Administrative Code. of Rules on Criminal Procedure).

Warrants of Arrest were issued 7March1988 against petitioners for The rule that search and seizures must be supported by a valid
violation of Sec37, 45 and 46 of Immigration Act and sec69 of warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. There are at least three
Revised Administrative Code. Trial by the Board of Special Inquiry III exceptions to this rule. 1.) Search is incidental to the arrest.
commenced the same date. Petition for bail was filed 11March 1988 2.) Search in a moving vehicle. 3.) Seizure of evidence in plain view.
but was not granted by the Commissioner of Immigration. 4 In view of the foregoing, the searchdone was incidental to the
April1988 Petitioners filed a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The arrest.
court heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988.
The filing of the petitioners for bail is considered as a waiver of any
irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning
Issues: its validity. Furthermore, the deportation charges and the hearing
presently conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry made their
(1) Whether or Not the Commissioner has the power to arrest and detention legal. It is a fundamental rule that habeas corpus will not
detain petitioners pending determination of existence of probable be granted when confinement is or has become legal, although such
cause. confinement was illegal at the beginning.

(2) Whether or Not there was unreasonable searches and seizures The deportation charges instituted by the Commissioner of
by CIDagents. Immigration are in accordance with Sec37 (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940 in relation to sec69 of the Revised
(3) Whether or Not the writ of Habeas Corpus may be granted to Administrative code. Section 37 (a) provides that aliens shall be
petitioners. arrested and deported upon warrant of the Commissioner of
Immigration and Deportation after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of the existence of a ground for deportation against
Held: While pedophilia is not a crime under the Revised Penal Code, them. Deportation proceedings are administrative in character and
it violates the declared policy of the state to promote and protect never construed as a punishment but a preventive measure.
the physical, moral, spiritual and social well being of the youth. The Therefore, it need not be conducted strictly in accordance with
arrest of petitioners was based on the probable cause determined ordinary Court proceedings. What is essential is that there should
after close surveillance of 3 months. The existence of probable be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and
cause justified the arrest and seizure of articles linked to the deported. A fair hearing must also be conducted with assistance of a
offense. The articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest; counsel if desired.
therefore the articles are admissible evidences (Rule 126, Section12

Lastly, the power to deport aliens is an act of the State and done HELD:
under the authority of the sovereign power. It a police measure
Express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made
against the undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the
known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or
country is found to be injurious to the public good and tranquility of
implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after
the people.
having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a
Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a
Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport
YU vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO and represented himself as such in official documents even after he
had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989 reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with
FACTS: his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971.

On February 10, 1978, he was naturalized as a Philippine citizen. While normally the question of whether or not a person has
Despite his naturalization, he applied for and was issued Portuguese renounced his Philippine citizenship should be heard before a trial
Passport by the Consular Section of the Portuguese Embassy in court of law in adversary proceedings, this has become unnecessary
Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office certifies that his as this Court, no less, upon the insistence of petitioner, had to look
Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. He also declared his into the facts and satisfy itself on whether or not petitioner's claim
nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, to continued Philippine citizenship is meritorious.
specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in
Hongkong sometime in April 1980. Philippine citizenship, it must be stressed, is not a commodity or
were to be displayed when required and suppressed when
The CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn, filed convenient.
a petition for habeas corpus. An internal resolution of 7 November
1988 referred the case to the Court en banc. The Court en banc
denied the petition. When his Motion for Reconsideration was
denied, petitioner filed a Motion for Clarification.


Whether or not petitioner’s acts constitute renunciation of his

Philippine citizenship

Board of Commissioners V. De La Rosa CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
197 SCRA 863 – Civil Law – Preliminary Title – Conflict of Laws – vs.
Foreign Laws; How Proven – Proof of Foreign Laws – Processual THE HONORABLE JUDGE JESUS P. MORFE and FIRST
On July 6, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William INC., respondents.
Gatchalian, was recognized by the BOI as a native born Filipino
citizen. Santiago Gatchalian testified that he has 5 children. Natalio M. Balboa, F. E. Evangelista and Mariano
Abaya for petitioner.
On June 27, 1961, William Gatchalian then a twelve year old minor
arrived in Manila and sought admission as Filipino citizen which was Halili, Bolinao, Bolinao and Associates for
eventually granted by the board of special inquiry. However, the respondents.
Secretary of Justice issued a memorandum setting aside all
decisions and directed the Board of Commissions to review all cases CONCEPCION, C.J.:
where entry was allowed among which was that of William This is an original action for certiorari, prohibition and injunction,
Gatchalian. with preliminary injunction, against an order of the Court of First
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads:
accordance with Philippine law. WHEREFORE, upon the petitioner filing an injunction bond in the
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that in the absence of the amount of P3,000.00, let a writ of preliminary preventive and/or
evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are mandatory injunction issue, restraining the respondents, their
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. This is known agents or representatives, from further searching the premises and
as Processual Presumption. In this case, there being no proof of properties and from taking custody of the various documents and
Chinese law relating to marriage, there arises a presumption that it papers of the petitioner corporation, whether in its main office or in
is the same of that of Philippine law the said marriage then is any of its branches; and ordering the respondent Central Bank
declared valid. Therefore, William Gatchalian following the and/or its co-respondents to return to the petitioner within five (5)
citizenship of his father is a Filipino citizen. days from service on respondents of the writ of preventive and/or
mandatory injunction, all the books, documents, and papers so far
seized from the petitioner pursuant to the aforesaid search
G.R. No. L-20119 June 30, 1967
Upon the filing of the petition herein and of the requisite bond, we
issued, on August 14, 1962, a writ of preliminary injunction

restraining and prohibiting respondents herein from enforcing the associations" now in operation and other organizations using
order above quoted. different corporate names, but engaged in operations similar in
nature to said "associations" HAVE NEVER BEEN AUTHORIZED BY
The main respondent in this case, the First Mutual Savings and Loan
Organization, Inc. — hereinafter referred to as the Organization —
is a registered non-stock corporation, the main purpose of which,
according to its Articles of Incorporation, dated February 14, 1961,
is "to encourage . . . and implement savings and thrift among its
members, and to extend financial assistance in the form of loans," Such institutions violate Section. 2 of the General Banking Act,
to them. The Organization has three (3) classes of Republic Act No. 337, should they engage in the "lending of funds
"members,"1 namely: (a) founder members — who originally joined obtained from the public through the receipts of deposits or the
the organization and have signed the pre-incorporation papers — sale of bonds, securities or obligations of any kind" without
with the exclusive right to vote and be voted for ; (b) participating authority from the Monetary Board. Their activities and operations
members — with "no right to vote or be voted for" — to which are not supervised by the Superintendent of Banks and persons
category all other members belong; except (c) honorary members, dealing with such institutions do so at their risk.
so made by the board of trustees, — "at the exclusive discretion"
thereof — due to "assistance, honor, prestige or help extended in
the propagation" of the objectives of the Organization — without Moreover, on April 23, 1962, the Governor of the Bank directed the
any pecuniary expenses on the part of said honorary members. coordination of "the investigation and gathering of evidence on the
activities of the savings and loan associations which are operating
On February 14, 1962, the legal department of the Central Bank of
contrary to law." Soon thereafter, or on May 18, 1962, a member of
the Philippines — hereinafter referred to as the Bank — rendered
the intelligence division of the Bank filed with the Municipal Court
an opinion to the effect that the Organization and others of similar
of Manila a verified application for a search warrant against the
nature are banking institutions, falling within the purview of the
Organization, alleging that "after close observation and personal
Central Bank Act.2 Hence, on April 1 and 3, 1963, the Bank caused to
investigation, the premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila" — in
be published in the newspapers the following:
which the offices of the Organization were housed — "are being
ANNOUNCEMENT used unlawfully," because said Organization is illegally engaged in
banking activities, "by receiving deposits of money for deposit,
To correct any wrong impression which recent newspaper reports
disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise or transacts the business of
on "savings and loan associations" may have created in the minds of
a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and loan association . .
the public and other interested parties, as well as to answer
. without having first complied with the provisions of Republic Act
numerous inquiries from the public, the Central Bank of the
No. 337" and that the articles, papers, or effects enumerated in a
Philippines wishes to announce that all "savings and loan

list attached to said application, as Annex A thereof.3 are kept in (8) Credit Report
said premises, and "being used or intended to be used in the
(9) Solicitor's Report
commission of a felony, to wit: violation of Sections 2 and 6 of
Republic Act No. 337."4 Said articles, papers or effects are described (10) Promissory Note
in the aforementioned Annex A, as follows:
(11) I n d o r s e m e n t
(12) Co-makers' Statements
(1) General Journal
(13) Chattel Mortgage Contracts
(2) Columnar Journal or Cash Book
(14) Real Estate Mortgage Contracts
(a) Cash Receipts Journal or Cash Receipt Book
(15) Trial Balance
(b) Cash Disbursements Journal or Cash Disbursement Book
(16) Minutes Book — Board of Directors
(1) General Ledger
(1) Income and Expenses Statements
(2) Individual Deposits and Loans Ledgers
(2) Balance Sheet or Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(3) Other Subsidiary Ledgers
(1) Articles of Incorporation
(1) Application for Membership
(2) By-Laws
(2) Signature Card
(3) Prospectus, Brochures Etc.
(3) Deposit Slip
(4) And other documents and articles which are being used or
(4) Passbook Slip intended to be used in unauthorized banking activities and
operations contrary to law.
(5) Withdrawal Slip
Upon the filing of said application, on May 18, 1962, Hon. Roman
(6) Tellers Daily Deposit Report
Cancino, as Judge of the said municipal court, issued the warrant
(7) Application for Loan Credit Statement above referred to,5 commanding the search of the aforesaid

premises at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila, and the seizure of the question. After due hearing, on the petition for said injunction,
foregoing articles, there being "good and sufficient reasons to respondent, Hon. Jesus P. Morfe, Judge, who presided over the
believe" upon examination, under oath, of a detective of the Manila branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila to which said Case
Police Department and said intelligence officer of the Bank — that No. 50409 had been assigned, issued, on July 2, 1962, the order
the Organization has under its control, in the address given, the complained of.
aforementioned articles, which are the subject of the offense
Within the period stated in said order, the Bank moved for a
adverted to above or intended to be used as means for the
reconsideration thereof, which was denied on August 7, 1962.
commission of said off offense.
Accordingly, the Bank commenced, in the Supreme Court, the
Forthwith, or on the same date, the Organization commenced Civil present action, against Judge Morfe and the Organization, alleging
Case No. 50409 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, an original that respondent Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion and
action for "certiorari, prohibition, with writ of preliminary injunction in excess of his jurisdiction in issuing the order in question.
and/or writ of preliminary mandatory injunction," against said
At the outset, it should be noted that the action taken by the Bank,
municipal court, the Sheriff of Manila, the Manila Police
in causing the aforementioned search to be made and the articles
Department, and the Bank, to annul the aforementioned search
above listed to be seized, was predicated upon the theory that the
warrant, upon the ground that, in issuing the same, the municipal
Organization was illegally engaged in banking — by receiving money
court had acted "with grave abuse of discretion, without jurisdiction
for deposit, disbursement, safekeeping or otherwise, or transacting
and/or in excess of jurisdiction" because: (a) "said search warrant is
the business of a savings and mortgage bank and/or building and
a roving commission general in its terms . . .;" (b) "the use of the
loan association, — without first complying with the provisions of
word 'and others' in the search warrant . . . permits the
R.A. No. 337, and that the order complained of assumes that the
unreasonable search and seizure of documents which have no
Organization had violated sections 2 and 6 of said Act.6 Yet
relation whatsoever to any specific criminal act . . .;" and (c) "no
respondent Judge found the searches and, seizures in question to
court in the Philippines has any jurisdiction to try a criminal case
be unreasonable, through the following process of reasoning: the
against a corporation . . ."
deposition given in support of the application for a search warrant
The Organization, likewise, prayed that, pending hearing of the case states that the deponent personally knows that the premises of the
on the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued ex Organization, at No. 2745 Rizal Avenue, Manila,7 were being used
parte restraining the aforementioned search and seizure, or, in the unlawfully for banking and purposes. Respondent judge deduce,
alternative, if the acts complained of have been partially performed, from this premise, that the deponent " knows specific banking
that a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be forthwith transactions of the petitioner with specific persons," and, then
issued ex parte, ordering the preservation of the status quo of the concluded that said deponent ". . . could have, if he really knew of
parties, as well as the immediate return to the Organization of the actual violation of the law, applied for a warrant to search and seize
documents and papers so far seized under, the search warrant in only books" or records:

covering the specific purportedly illegal banking transactions of the mere disagreement with Judge Cancino, who issued the warrant, on
petitioner with specific persons who are the supposed victims of the credibility of said statement, would not justify the conclusion
said illegal banking transactions according to his knowledge. To that said municipal Judge had committed a grave abuse of
authorize and seize all the records listed in Annex A to said discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction.
application for search warrant, without reference to specific alleged Upon the other hand, the failure of the witness to mention
victims of the purported illegal banking transactions, would be to particular individuals does not necessarily prove that he had no
harass the petitioner, and its officers with a roving commission or personal knowledge of specific illegal transactions of the
fishing expedition for evidence which could be discovered by normal Organization, for the witness might be acquainted with specific
intelligence operations or inspections (not seizure) of books and transactions, even if the names of the individuals concerned were
records pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No 337 . . ." unknown to him.

The concern thus shown by respondent judge for the civil liberty Again, the aforementioned order would seem to assume that an
involved is, certainly, in line with the function of courts, as ramparts illegal banking transaction, of the kind contemplated in the
of justice and liberty and deserves the greatest encouragement and contested action of the officers of the Bank, must always connote
warmest commendation. It lives up to the highest traditions of the the existence of a "victim." If this term is used to denote a party
Philippine Bench, which underlies the people's faith in and whose interests have been actually injured, then the assumption is
adherence to the Rule of Law and the democratic principle in this not necessarily justified. The law requiring compliance with certain
part of the World. requirements before anybody can engage in banking obviously
seeks to protect the public against actual, as well as potential,
At the same time, it cannot be gainsaid the Constitutional injunction
injury. Similarly, we are not aware of any rule limiting the use of
against unreasonable searches and seizures seeks to forestall, not
warrants to papers or effects which cannot be secured otherwise.
purely abstract or imaginary evils, but specific and concrete ones.
Indeed, unreasonableness is, in the very nature of things, a The line of reasoning of respondent Judge might, perhaps, be
condition dependent upon the circumstances surrounding each justified if the acts imputed to the Organization consisted
case, in much the same way as the question whether or not of isolated transactions, distinct and different from the type of
"probable cause" exists is one which must be decided in the light of business in which it is generally engaged. In such case, it may be
the conditions obtaining in given situations. necessary to specify or identify the parties involved in said isolated
transactions, so that the search and seizure be limited to the
Referring particularly to the one at bar, it is not clear from the order
records pertinent thereto. Such, however, is not the situation
complained of whether respondent Judge opined that the above
confronting us. The records suggest clearly that the transactions
mentioned statement of the deponent — to the effect that the
objected to by the Bank constitute the general pattern of the
Organization was engaged in the transactions mentioned in his
business of the Organization. Indeed, the main purpose thereof,
deposition — deserved of credence or not. Obviously, however, a

according to its By-laws, is "to extend financial assistance, in the Phil. 33), the search and seizure complained of have not been
form of loans, to its members," with funds deposited by them. proven to be unreasonable.

It is true, that such funds are referred to — in the Articles of Wherefore, the order of respondent Judge dated July 2, 1962, and
Incorporation and the By-laws — as their "savings." and that the the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction issued in compliance
depositors thereof are designated as "members," but, even a therewith are hereby annulled, and the writ of preliminary
cursory examination of said documents will readily show that injunction issued by this Court on August 14, 1962, accordingly,
anybody can be a depositor and thus be a "participating member." made permanent, with costs against respondent First Mutual
In other words, the Organization is, in effect, open to the "public" Savings and Loan Organization, Inc. It is so ordered.
for deposit accounts, and the funds so raised may be lent by the
Organization. Moreover, the power to so dispose of said funds is
placed under the exclusive authority of the "founder members," and
"participating members" are expressly denied the right to vote or be Stonehill v. Diokno
voted for, their "privileges and benefits," if any, being limited to 20 SCRA 283 (1967)
those which the board of trustees may, in its discretion, determine Concepcion, CJ
from time to time. As a consequence, the "membership" of the
"participating members" is purely nominal in nature. This situation Facts:
is fraught, precisely, with the very dangers or evils which Republic 1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42
Act No. 337 seeks to forestall, by exacting compliance with the search warrants against the petitioner and the corporation to
requirements of said Act, before the transactions in question could search persons and premises of several personal properties
be undertaken. due to an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
It is interesting to note, also, that the Organization does not Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised Penal
seriously contest the main facts, upon which the action of the Bank Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were
is based. The principal issue raised by the Organization is predicated conducted in the both the residence of the petitioner and in the
upon the theory that the aforementioned transactions of the corporation's premises.
Organization do not amount to " banking," as the term is used in
Republic Act No. 337. We are satisfied, however, in the light of the 2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null
circumstance obtaining in this case, that the Municipal Judge did not and void as their issuance violated the Constitution and the
commit a grave abuse of discretion in finding that there was Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a
probable cause that the Organization had violated Sections 2 and 6
petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition,
of the aforesaid law and in issuing the warrant in question, and that,
mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects from
accordingly, and in line with Alverez vs. Court of First Instance (64
being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against

the petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects convinced Anita to seal the package making it ready for shipment.
found in the petitioner's residence. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the
package as part of standard operating procedures. Upon opening the
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample
legality of the search and seizure in both premises of the substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and
invited agents to his office to inspect the package. In the presence of
the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found
RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the dried-marijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in
residences but not those done in the corporation's premises. violation of R.A. 6425 and was found guilty by the court a quo. Andre
The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional
since a corporation has a personality separate and distinct right of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his
package was inadmissible as evidence against him.
from the personality of its officers or herein petitioner
regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each Issue:
in the said corporation, and whatever office they hold therein.
Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which
cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object Ruling:
belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents,
papers, and things seized from the offices and the premises). The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner
Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the
individual and the state.

The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures

therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not meant
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that
ANDRE MARTI (193 SCRA 57) Case Mr Job Reyes was the one who opened the box in the presence of the
NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the NBI
Digest agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes
into a warrantless search and siezure proscribed by the constitution.
Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
Facts: search.

On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond
Reyes went to Manila Packaging and Export Forwarders to send reasonable doubt of the crime charged was AFFIRMED.
packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and
ask if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually

Constitution. In answering yes to that question, the Court rejected
the shopping center's argument that California's broader free
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, speech right amounted to a "taking" of the shopping center under
federal constitutional law.

447 U.S. 74 (1980), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision issued

on June 9, 1980 which affirmed the decision of the California A typical "Please Do Not Contribute" sign at a California shopping
Supreme Court in a case that arose out of a free speech dispute center.
between the Pruneyard Shopping Center in Campbell, California,
and several local high school students (who wished to solicit Footnote two of the decision quotes the relevant portions of
signatures for a petition against United Nations General the California Constitution, which states in Article 1, § 2
Assembly Resolution 3379).[1]

Every person may freely speak, write and publish
Case[ his or her sentiments on all subjects, being

In American constitutional law, this case is famous for its role in

responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may
not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press. ”
establishing two important rules:
and Article 1, § 3
 under the California Constitution, individuals may peacefully

“ ”
exercise their right to free speech in parts of private shopping [P]eople have the right to . . . petition government
centers regularly held open to the public, subject to for redress of grievances.
reasonable regulations adopted by the shopping centers
 under the U.S. Constitution, states can provide their citizens
The vote to uphold the California decision was unanimous,
with broader rights in their constitutions than under the
although four justices disagreed with part of the reasoning in
federal Constitution, so long as those rights do not infringe on
Justice William Rehnquist's opinion for the majority.
any federal constitutional rights
Justices Thurgood Marshall, Byron White, and Lewis Powell filed
This holding was possible because California's constitution separate concurring opinions. Justice Harry Blackmun filed a brief
contains an affirmative right of free speech which has been "statement" indicating that he was joining in all of Justice
liberally construed by the Supreme Court of California, while the Rehnquist's opinion except for one sentence.
federal constitution's First Amendment contains only
Because of the Pruneyard case, people who visit shopping
a negative command to Congress to not abridge the freedom of
centers in California may regularly encounter people seeking
speech. This distinction was significant because the U.S.
money or attention for various causes, including charitable
Supreme Court had already held that under the federal First
solicitations, qualifying petitions for amendments to the state
Amendment, there was no implied right of free speech within a
constitution, voter registration drives, and sometimes a beggar. In
private shopping center.[2] The Pruneyard case, therefore, raised
turn, many shopping centers have posted signs to explain that
the question of whether an implied right of free speech could
they do not endorse the views of people exercising their right to
arise under a state constitution without conflicting with the federal

free speech, and that if patrons do not give them money, the The shopping center industry strongly "detests"
speakers will go away. the Pruneyard decision since it has resulted in numerous test
cases by protesters in California and elsewhere trying to find the
Subsequent developments[edit] boundaries of the Pruneyard rule.[10] Shopping centers have
regularly imposed restrictions on unwanted solicitors and
Although 39 other states have free speech clauses in their appealed the resulting legal cases in the hope of convincing the
constitutions that look like California's – indeed, California California judiciary that Pruneyard should be overturned, or at
borrowed its clause from a similar one in the New York least limited.[10] Since Golden Gateway, decisions by the
Constitution – at least 13 of those states have declined to follow intermediate Courts of Appeal have generally limited the scope of
California in extending the right of free speech into private the Pruneyard rule to the facts of the original case. For example,
shopping centers.[3] In refusing to follow Pruneyard, the state starting in 1997, the parking lots of many Costco warehouse
supreme courts of New York and Wisconsin both attacked it as club stores in California became sites of conflict involving a large
an unprincipled and whimsical decision.[4] In 2003, the European number of political activist groups who had gradually become
Court of Human Rights also considered and refused to aware of their rights under Pruneyard. In 1998, Costco's
follow Pruneyard, in a United Kingdom case.[5] Only New management imposed several restrictions, including a complete
Jersey, Colorado, and Massachusetts have followed California, ban on soliciting at stand-alone stores, a rule that no group or
albeit with some reservations. In a 2000 decision, Puerto Rico (a person could use Costco premises for free speech more than 5
U.S. territory) also adopted Pruneyard's right of free speech, days out of any 30, and the complete exclusion of solicitors on
although the case was complicated by the presence of a branch the 34 busiest days of the year.
office of a government agency (Puerto Rico Telephone, since In 2002, these restrictions were upheld as reasonable by the
privatized) in the shopping center (the Mayagüez Mall).[6] Some Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, and the
commentators have suggested the Pruneyard rule could be Supreme Court of California denied review.[11] Costco's stand-
applied to speech on the Internet, including speech activities alone stores lacked the social congregation attributes of the multi-
in virtual worlds, like Linden Labs' Second Life, although the tenant shopping center at issue in Pruneyard. As for the
courts have not addressed this theory.[7] restrictions on the stores in shopping centers, they were held to
In the decades since Pruneyard was decided, the Supreme Court be reasonable because Costco had developed a strong factual
of California has become much more conservative, especially record at trial which proved that hordes of unwanted solicitors had
after three liberal justices (including Chief Justice Rose Bird) were significantly interfered with its business operations – they had
removed by the electorate in 1986 for their opposition to damaged its reputation, obstructed access to its stores, and
the death penalty.[8] traumatized Costco employees.
In the 2001 Golden Gateway decision, a 4–3 majority of the Court In 2007, the Supreme Court of California confronted
significantly narrowed Pruneyard by holding for a variety of the Pruneyard decision once more, in the context of a complex
reasons that California's free speech right does not apply to labor dispute involving San Diego's Fashion Valley Mall and
private apartment complexes – yet they also refused to the San Diego Union-Tribune. On December 24, 2007, a 4-3
overrule Pruneyard.[9] Thus, California's right of free speech in majority of a sharply divided court once again refused to
private shopping centers still survives. overrule Pruneyard, and instead, ruled that under the California
Constitution, a union's right of free speech in a shopping center

includes the right to hand out leaflets urging patrons converse at leisure, but does not apply to any other open portions
to boycott one of the shopping center's tenants.[12]Justice Ming of shopping centers merely intended to facilitate the efficient
Chin, in his dissent joined by Justices Marvin Baxter and Carol movement of shoppers in and out of tenants, including concrete
Corrigan, expressed his sympathy with several of the most aprons and sidewalks which shoppers simply walk across as they
common critiques of the Pruneyard decision: move between parking lots and big-box stores. In other words,
the court effectively immunized most (but not all) strip malls and
"Pruneyard was wrong when decided. In the nearly three decades
shopping centers from Pruneyard, except for those with areas
that have since elapsed, jurisdictions throughout the nation have
analogous to public gathering areas such as plazas, atriums,
overwhelmingly rejected it. We should no longer ignore this tide of
or food courts. Miriam Vogel, a former Court of Appeal justice
history. The time has come for us to forthrightly
who argued for the shopping center tenant
overrule Pruneyard and rejoin the rest of the nation in this
(Kroger subsidiary Ralphs), characterized the decision "a great
important area of the law. Private property should be treated as
victory for retailers as far as putting another nail in
private property, not as a public free speech zone."[13]
the Pruneyard coffin."[17] However, the decision was not a
In the aftermath of the Fashion Valley case, the California Courts complete loss for free speech advocates, as the court separately
of Appeal briefly began to apply Pruneyard more broadly. In upheld the right of a union to protest on the employer's premises
2010, the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District, in an under the state Moscone Act by a 6-1 majority (the majority,
opinion authored by then-Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye (now Chief though, was badly split as to why).
Justice of California), held that it is unconstitutional
under Pruneyard for shopping mall giant Westfield Group to
promulgate rules discriminating in favor of commercial speech in
its malls and against noncommercial speech.[14] The plaintiff had
been detained by Westfield security after attempting to discuss
the principles of his Christian faith with strangers at the Westfield Serrano vs. NLRC / ISETANN - GR No. 117040 Case
Galleria at Roseville.
In 2011, the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District
disagreed with the Fourth Appellate District's analysis of blackout FACTS:
days in the Costco case, and held that it was unreasonable
for Westside Pavilion to prohibit animal rights protesters from Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the
protesting on certain blackout days and to require them to protest
out of aural and visual range of the targeted tenant (an alleged head of Security Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure,
retailer for puppy mills).[15] Isetann phased out its entire security section and engaged the
services of an independent security agency. Petitioner filed a
On December 27, 2012, the Supreme Court of California
reaffirmed Pruneyard but narrowed its applicability to the facts of complaint for illegal dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in
the original case.[16] The entire court concurred in Associate his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had retrenched its
Justice Joyce Kennard's holding that Pruneyard applies only to security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that
"common areas" of shopping centers that are designed and private respondent failed to accord due process to petitioner; that
furnished to encourage shoppers to linger, congregate, relax, or
private respondent failed to use reasonable standards in selecting

employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC BPI vs. Casa Montessori Internationale, G. R. No. 149454 &
reversed the decision and ordered petitioner to be given separation 149507, May 28, 2004
Facts: CASA Montessori International opened an account with BPI,
with CASA’s President as one of its authorized signatories. It
discovered that 9 of its checks had been encashed by a certain
Whether or not the hiring of an independent security agency by the
Sonny D. Santos whose name turned out to be fictitious, and was
private respondent to replace its current security section a valid
used by a certain Yabut, CASA’s external auditor. He voluntarily
ground for the dismissal of the employees classed under the latter.
admitted that he forged the signature and encashed the checks.

RULING: RTC granted the Complaint for Collection with Damages against BPI
An employer’s good faith in implementing a redundancy program is ordering to reinstate the amount in the account, with interest. CA
not necessarily put in doubt by the availment of the services of an took account of CASA’s contributory negligence and apportioned
independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated the loss between CASA and BPI, and ordred Yabut to reimburse
employees to promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that both.
management acted in a malicious or arbitrary manner, the Court
will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer. BPI contends that the monthly statements it issues to its clients
contain a notice worded as follows: “If no error is reported in 10
If termination of employment is not for any of the cause provided days, account will be correct” and as such, it should be considered a
by law, it is illegal and the employee should be reinstated and paid waiver.
backwages. To contend that even if the termination is for a just
cause, the employee concerned should be reinstated and paid Issue:Whether or not waiver or estoppel results from failure to
backwages would be to amend Art 279 by adding another ground report the error in the bank statement
for considering dismissal illegal.
Held: Such notice cannot be considered a waiver, even if CASA
If it is shown that the employee was dismissed for any of the causes failed to report the error. Neither is it estopped from questioning
mentioned in Art 282, the in accordance with that article, he should the mistake after the lapse of the ten-day period.
not be reinstated but must be paid backwages from the time his
employment was terminated until it is determined that the This notice is a simple confirmation or "circularization" -- in
termination of employment is for a just cause because the failure to accounting parlance -- that requests client-depositors to affirm
hear him before he is dismissed renders the termination without theaccuracy of items recorded by the banks. Its purpose is to obtain
legal effect. from the depositors a direct corroboration of the correctness of

theiraccount balances with their respective banks. Planters Products Inc vs Fertiphil Corp G.R. No. 166006 March 14, 2
Every right has subjects -- active and passive. While
FACTS: Petitioner PPI and respondent Fertiphil are private
the activesubject is entitled to demand its enforcement, the passive
corporations incorporated under Philippinelaws, both engaged in
one is duty-bound to suffer such enforcement. On the one hand, BPI
the importation and distribution of fertilizers, pesticides and
could not have been an active subject, because it could not have
agriculturalchemicals. Marcos issued Letter of Instruction (LOI)
demanded from CASA a response to its notice. CASA, on the other
1465, imposing a capital recovery component of Php10.00 perbag of
hand, could not have been a passive subject, either, because it had
fertilizer. The levy was to continue until adequate capital was
no obligation to respond. It could -- as it did -- choose not to
raised to make PPI financiallyviable. Fertiphil remitted to the
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), which was then remitted
thedepository bank of PPI. Fertiphil paid P6,689,144 to FPA from
Estoppel precludes individuals from denying or asserting, by their
1985 to 1986.After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA voluntarily
own deed or representation, anything contrary to that established
stopped the imposition of the P10 levy. Fertiphildemanded from PPI
as the truth, in legal contemplation. Our rules on evidence even
a refund of the amount it remitted, however PPI refused. Fertiphil
make a juris et de jure presumption that whenever one has, by
filed a complaintfor collection and damages, questioning the
one’s ownact or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another
constitutionality of LOI 1465, claiming that it was
to believe a particular thing to be true and to act upon that belief,
unjust,unreasonable, oppressive, invalid and an unlawful imposition
one cannot -- in any litigation arising from such act or omission -- be
that amounted to a denial of due process.PPI argues that Fertiphil
permitted to falsify that supposed truth.
has no locus standi to question the constitutionality of LOI No. 1465
because itdoes not have a "personal and substantial interest in the
In the instant case, CASA never made any deed or representation
case or will sustain direct injury as a result of its enforcement." It
that misled BPI. The former’s omission, if any, may only be deemed
asserts that Fertiphil did not suffer any damage from the imposition
an innocent mistake oblivious to the procedures and consequences
because"incidence of the levy fell on the ultimate consumer or the
of periodic audits. Since its conduct was due to such ignorance
farmers themselves, not on the sellerfertilizer company.
founded upon an innocent mistake, estoppel will not arise. A person
who has no knowledge of or consent to a transaction may not be
estopped by it. "Estoppel cannot be sustained by mere argument or
doubtful inference x x x." CASA is not barred from questioning BPI’s ISSUE: Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the
error even after the lapse of the period given in the notice. constitutionality of LOI No. 1465.

What is the power of taxation?


Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine G.R. No. 159796 July 17, 2007
of standing is a mereprocedural technicality which may be
waived.The imposition of the levy was an exercise of the taxation Ponente: NACHURA, J.:
power of the state. While it is true that thepower to tax can be used
as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy FACTS
was revenuegeneration. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if
revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantialpurposes, then Petitioners Romeo P. Gerochi, Katulong Ng Bayan (KB), and
the exaction is properly called a tax.Police power and the power of Environmentalist Consumers Network, Inc. (ECN) (petitioners), come
taxation are inherent powers of the State. These powers are distinct before this Court in this original action praying that Section 34 of
andhave different tests for validity. Police power is the power of the Republic Act (RA) 9136, otherwise known as the Electric Power
State to enact legislation that mayinterfere with personal liberty or Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA), imposing the Universal
property in order to promote the general welfare, while the power Charge, and Rule 18 of the Rules and Regulations (IRR) which seeks
of taxation is the power to levy taxes to be used for public purpose. to implement the said imposition, be declared unconstitutional.
The main purpose of police power isthe regulation of a behavior
or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The "lawful Petitioners also pray that the Universal Charge imposed upon the
consumers be refunded and that a preliminary injunction and/or
subjects" and"lawful means" tests are used to determine
temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued directing the respondents to
the validity of a law enacted under the police power. Thepower of
refrain from implementing, charging, and collecting the said charge.
taxation, on the other hand, is circumscribed by inherent and
constitutional limitations.
Congress enacted the EPIRA on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took
effect. On April 5, 2002, respondent National Power Corporation-
Strategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent
Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from
the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification. On
May 7, 2002, NPC filed another petition with ERC, praying that the
proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge
be approved for withdrawal from the Special Trust Fund (STF)
managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management
Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of watershed
areas. On December 20, 2002, the ERC issued an Order provisionally
approving the computed amount as the share of the NPC-SPUG from the
Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the

National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution 3) The imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-users is
Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis. On oppressive and confiscatory and amounts to taxation without
August 13, 2003, NPC-SPUG filed a Motion for Reconsideration asking representation as the consumers were not given a chance to
the ERC, among others,[14] to set aside the Decision. On April 2, 2003, be heard and represented.
ERC authorized the NPC to draw up to P70,000,000.00 from PSALM for
its 2003 Watershed Rehabilitation Budget subject to the availability of
funds for the Environmental Fund component of the Universal Charge.
Respondent PSALM through the Office of the Government Corporate
Counsel (OGCC) and Respondents Department of Energy (DOE), ERC,
and NPC, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends:
On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric
Company, Inc. (PECO) charged petitioner Romeo P. Gerochi and all 1) Unlike a tax which is imposed to provide income for public
other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective purposes, the assailed Universal Charge is levied for a specific
electric bills starting from the month of July 2003. regulatory purpose, which is to ensure the viability of the
country's electric power industry.
2) It is exacted by the State in the exercise of its inherent police
power. On this premise, PSALM submits that there is no undue
Petitioners submit that the assailed provision of law and its IRR which delegation of legislative power to the ERC since the latter merely
sought to implement the same are unconstitutional on the following exercises a limited authority or discretion as to the execution and
grounds: implementation of the provisions of the EPIRA.
3) Universal Charge does not possess the essential
1) The universal charge provided for under Sec. 34 of the characteristics of a tax, that its imposition would redound to the
EPIRA and sought to be implemented under Sec. 2, Rule 18 benefit of the electric power industry and not to the public, and
of the IRR of the said law is a tax which is to be collected that its rate is uniformly levied on electricity end-users, unlike a
from all electric end-users and self-generating entities. The tax which is imposed based on the individual taxpayer's ability
power to tax is strictly a legislative function and as such, to pay.
the delegation of said power to any executive or 4) Imposition of the Universal Charge is not oppressive and
administrative agency like the ERC is unconstitutional, confiscatory since it is an exercise of the police power of the
giving the same unlimited authority. The assailed State and it complies with the requirements of due process.
provision clearly provides that the Universal Charge is to be
determined, fixed and approved by the ERC, hence leaving
to the latter complete discretionary legislative authority.
2) The ERC is also empowered to approve and determine where PECO argues that it is duty-bound to collect and remit the amount
the funds collected should be used. pertaining to the Missionary Electrification and Environmental Fund

components of the Universal Charge, pursuant to Sec. 34 of the EPIRA
and the Decisions in ERC Case Nos. 2002-194 and 2002-165.Otherwise,
PECO could be held liable under Sec. 46[24] of the EPIRA, which 2nd ISSUE
imposes fines and penalties for any violation of its provisions or its IRR.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three

ISSUE branches of government has exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in
matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere. A logical
1) Whether or not, the Universal Charge imposed under corollary to the doctrine of separation of powers is the principle of non-
Sec. 34 of the EPIRA is a tax delegation of powers, as expressed in the Latin maxim potestas delegata
2) Whether or not there is undue delegation of non delegari potest (what has been delegated cannot be delegated). This
legislative power to tax on the part of the ERC. is based on the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not
only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the
HELD instrumentality of his own judgment and not through the intervening mind
of another.
In the face of the increasing complexity of modern life, delegation of
legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is
allowed as an exception to this principle. Given the volume and variety
The conservative and pivotal distinction between these two powers of interactions in today's society, it is doubtful if the legislature can
rests in the purpose for which the charge is made. If generation of promulgate laws that will deal adequately with and respond promptly to
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the the minutiae of everyday life. Hence, the need to delegate to
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that administrative bodies - the principal agencies tasked to execute laws in
revenue is incidentally raised does not make the imposition a tax. In their specialized fields - the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
exacting the assailed Universal Charge through Sec. 34 of the EPIRA, the to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required
State's police power, particularly its regulatory dimension, is invoked. for the valid exercise of this power of subordinate legislation is that the
Such can be deduced from Sec. 34 which enumerates the purposes for regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law and that the
which the Universal Charge is imposed. From the aforementioned regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards
purposes, it can be gleaned that the assailed Universal Charge is not prescribed by the law. These requirements are denominated as the
a tax, but an exaction in the exercise of the State's police power. completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Public welfare is surely promoted.

Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and excessive, oppressive or confiscatory is an issue which essentially
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the involves questions of fact, and thus, this Court is precluded from
delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. The second test reviewing the same.
mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from Finally, every law has in its favor the presumption of
running riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in its constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a
entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its essential terms clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that
and conditions, and that it contains sufficient standards. is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. Indubitably,
petitioners failed to overcome this presumption in favor of the
1st test - Although Sec. 34 of the EPIRA merely provides that within one EPIRA. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which
(1) year from the effectivity thereof, a Universal Charge to be determined, would warrant a pronouncement that Sec. 34 of the EPIRA and
fixed and approved by the ERC, shall be imposed on all electricity end- Rule 18 of its IRR are unconstitutional and void.
users, and therefore, does not state the specific amount to be paid as
Universal Charge, the amount nevertheless is made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the law itself. Moreover, contrary to
the petitioners contention, the ERC does not enjoy a wide latitude of WHEREFORE, the instant case is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
discretion in the determination of the Universal Charge. Thus, the law is
complete and passes the first test for valid delegation of legislative power.

2nd test - Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the
total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and
affordability of the supply of electric power[59] and watershed
rehabilitation and management[60] meet the requirements for valid
delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to
formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards.

From the foregoing disquisitions, we therefore hold that there is no

undue delegation of legislative power to the ERC.

Petitioners failed to pursue in their Memorandum the contention in

the Complaint that the imposition of the Universal Charge on all end-
users is oppressive and confiscatory, and amounts to taxation without
representation. Hence, such contention is deemed waived or
abandoned. Moreover, the determination of whether or not a tax is