ANG LADLAD VS.
COMELEC We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition
for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied
the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that
since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they
are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable
under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this
instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations
against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does
not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to
benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on
moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution
and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on
moral and legal grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong
Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors
(labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under
the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is
not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law
shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government
action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to
be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric
of society.
our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst.
Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the
remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly
needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws
is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals
cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and
a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and
PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
FACTS: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by
respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. (Glaxo) as medical
representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had
undergone training and orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which
stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and abide by
existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing
or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-
employees or employees of competing drug companies and
should management find that such relationship poses a possible
conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Code of
Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides these conditions; that
otherwise, the management and the employee will explore the
possibility of a “transfer to another department in a non-
counterchecking position” or preparation for employment
outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo’s products in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. Subsequently,
Tecson entered into a romantic relationship with Bettsy, an
employee of Astra Pharmaceuticals3(Astra), a competitor of
Glaxo. Bettsy was Astra’s Branch Coordinator in Albay. She
supervised the district managers and medical representatives of
her company and prepared marketing strategies for Astra in that
area.
Even before they got married, Tecson received several
reminders from his District Manager regarding the conflict of
interest which his relationship with Bettsy might engender. Still,
love prevailed, and Tecson married Bettsy in September 1998.
Tecson’s superior reminded him that he and Bettsy should
decide which one of them would resign from their jobs. Tecson
requested for time to comply with the company policy against
entering into a relationship with an employee of a competitor
company. He explained that Astra, Bettsy’s employer, was
planning to merge with Zeneca, another drug company; and
Bettsy was planning to avail of the redundancy package to be
offered by Astra.
Tecson again requested for more time resolve the problem.
Thereafter, Tecson applied for a transfer in Glaxo’s milk division,
thinking that since Astra did not have a milk division, the
potential conflict of interest would be eliminated. His application
was denied in view of Glaxo’s “least-movement-possible” policy.
Glaxo transferred Tecson to the Butuan City-Surigao City-Agusan
del Sur sales area. Tecson asked Glaxo to reconsider its
decision, but his request was denied. Tecson defied the transfer
order and continued acting as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE: Because the parties failed to
resolve the issue at the grievance machinery level, they
submitted the matter for voluntary arbitration, but Tecson
declined the offer. On November 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) rendered
its Decision declaring as valid Glaxo’s policy on relationships
between its employees and persons employed with competitor
companies, and affirming Glaxo’s right to transfer Tecson to
another sales territory.
CA sustained; MR denied.
Petitioner’s Contention: that Glaxo’s policy against employees
marrying employees of competitor companies violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because it creates invalid
distinctions among employees on account only of marriage.
They claim that the policy restricts the employees’ right to
marry; that Tecson was constructively dismissed
GLAXO argues: that the company policy prohibiting its
employees from having a relationship with and/or marrying an
employee of a competitor company is a valid exercise of its
management prerogatives and does not violate the equal
protection clause;
The policy is also aimed at preventing a competitor company
from gaining access to its secrets, procedures and policies; that
Tecson can no longer question the assailed company policy
because when he signed his contract of employment, he was
aware that such policy was stipulated therein.
ISSUE: WON Glaxo’s policy against its employees marrying
employees from competitor companies is valid
HELD: The Court finds no merit in the petition.
Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs
and information from competitors, especially so that it and Astra
are rival companies in the highly competitive pharmaceutical
industry.
The prohibition against personal or marital relationships with
employees of competitor companies upon Glaxo’s employees is
reasonable under the circumstances because relationships of
that nature might compromise the interests of the company. In
laying down the assailed company policy, Glaxo only aims to
protect its interests against the possibility that a competitor
company will gain access to its secrets and procedures.
That Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interests
cannot be denied. No less than the Constitution recognizes the
right of enterprises to adopt and enforce such a policy to protect
its right to reasonable returns on investments and to expansion
and growth.
Indeed, while our laws endeavor to give life to the constitutional
policy on social justice and the protection of labor, it does not
mean that every labor dispute will be decided in favor of the
workers. The law also recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and enforcement in the
interest of fair play.21
EQUAL-PROTECTION: Glaxo does not impose an absolute
prohibition against relationships between its employees and
those of competitor companies. Its employees are free to
cultivate relationships with and marry persons of their own
choosing. What the company merely seeks to avoid is a conflict
of interest between the employee and the company that may
arise out of such relationships.
Moreover, records show that Glaxo gave Tecson several chances
to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his
relationship with Bettsy.
PETITION DENIED.
______________
Other Issue on Constructive dismissal:
The Court finds no merit in petitioners’ contention that Tescon
was constructively dismissed when he was transferred from the
Camarines Norte-Camarines Sur sales area to the Butuan City-
Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area, and when he was
excluded from attending the company’s seminar on new
products which were directly competing with similar products
manufactured by Astra. Constructive dismissal is defined as a
quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely;
when there is a demotion in rank or diminution in pay; or when
a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer
becomes unbearable to the employee.30 None of these
conditions are present in the instant case.
Star Paper Corp., vs Simbol (2006)
G.R. 164774
Facts: Star Paper Corporation employed Ronaldo Simbol on Oct
1993. He met Alma Dayrit, also an employee of the company,
whom he married. Before marriage, Josephine Ongsitco the
manager advised the couple that one of them must resign if
they decided to get married pursuant to a company policy to
which Simbol complied. On February 5, 1997 Comia was hired
by the company. She met Howard Comia, a co-employee, whom
she married on June 1, 2000. Ongsitco likewise reminded them
the company policy, Comia resigned on June 30, 2000.Estrella
was also hired on July 29, 1994. She met Luisito Zuñiga also a
co-worker. Petitioners stated that Zuñiga, a married man, got
Estrella pregnant. The company allegedly could have terminated
her services due to immorality but she opted to resign on
December 21, 1999.
Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint and states that the
company policy was decreed pursuant to what the respondent
corporation perceived as management prerogative. On appeal to
the NLRC, the Commission affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. In its assailed Decision dated August 3, 2004, the Court
of Appeals reversed the NLRC decision.
Issue: Whether or not the questioned policy violates the rights
of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code?
Held: The Court ruled on the side of the respondents.
Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides:
It shall be unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or
tacitly that upon getting married a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely
by reason of her marriage.
It is significant to note that respondents were hired after they
were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the
marriage of Simbol to Alma Dayrit could be detrimental to its
business operations. It must be reasonable under the
circumstances to qualify as a valid exercise of management
prerogative.
The questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the
Labor Code but it creates a disproportionate effect. The failure
of petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing
the questioned policy cannot prejudice the employee’s right to
be free from arbitrary discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one company.
ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008 (569 SCRA 467)
FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international
flight steward who was dismissed because of his failure to
adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is
from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as
mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to
send him to an extended vacation until November 1985. He was
allowed to return to work once he lost all the excess weight. But
the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his
ideal weight, petitioner remained overweight. On January 3,
1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain
grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the
weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two
weeks for weight checks, which he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a
repeated refusal to report for weight check would be dealt with
accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates,
which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of
Administrative Charge for violation of company standards on
weight requirements. Petitioner insists that he is being
discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the
same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that
due to his inability to attain his ideal weight, “and considering
the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period
covering a total of almost five (5) years,” his services were
considered terminated “effective immediately.”
LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are
reasonable in view of the nature of the job of petitioner.
However, the weight standards need not be complied with
under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties.
NLRC affirmed.
CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus,
petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to
meet the prescribed weight standards. It is obvious that the
issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for
purposes of escaping the result of his dismissal for being
overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.
HELD: YES
A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other
conclusion than that they constitute a continuing qualification of
an employee in order to keep the job. The dismissal of the
employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code.
In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against
petitioner’s claims that obesity is a disease. That he was able to
reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is
possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the
clarificatory hearing on December 8, 1992, petitioner himself
claimed that “[t]he issue is could I bring my weight down to
ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it
now.”
Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily
availed the assistance of the company physician, per the advice
of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in
the context of his work as flight attendant, becomes an
analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that
justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be
unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly
puts it, “[v]oluntariness basically means that the just cause is
solely attributable to the employee without any external force
influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through
all just causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature
of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a
recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although it lacks
the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).”
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide
occupational qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs
may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or
national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion,
or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the
job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational
qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test of reasonableness of the
company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is
valid “provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.”
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has
committed itself to safely transport its passengers. In order to
achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most
particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the
aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as
imposing strict norms of discipline upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
standards for cabin crew is flight safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the
employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This is
so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is
it reflective of his moral character.
VERSION 2: Issue: Was the dismissal valid?
Held: SC upheld the legality of dismissal. Separation pay,
however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act
of social justice or based on equity. This is so because his
dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of
his moral character.
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work
as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article
282(e) of the Labor Code. His obesity may not be unintended,
but is nonetheless voluntary. “[V]oluntariness basically means
that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without
any external force influencing or controlling his actions. This
element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whether
they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross
and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered
voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article
282(a), (c), and (d).”
Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of
a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer
can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual
qualification for performing the job.
Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
The Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the
Magna Carta for Disabled Persons contain provisions similar to
BFOQ.
Argument that BFOQ is a statutory defense must fail
Meiorin Test (US jurisprudence) in determining whether an
employment policy is justified:
(1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a
purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job;
2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary to the accomplishment of that work-related purpose;
and
(3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably
necessary in order to accomplish the legitimate work-related
purpose.
In Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order
to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove:
(1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the
essential operation of the job involved; and
(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or
substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be
unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is
used because it is parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid “provided it
reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory
job performance.”
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier,
from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy,
is bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the
passengers it transports.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight
standards for cabin crew is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid
that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order
to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the
passengers when something goes wrong.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed
employee as an act “social justice,” or based on “equity.”
Provided the dismissal:
Entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just cause
(1) was not for serious misconduct; and
(2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.
Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-half
(1/2) month’s pay for every year of service.
Obergefell v. Hodges
Primary Holding
Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, all
states must license a marriage between two people of the same
sex and recognize such a marriage if it was lawfully licensed and
performed in another state.
Facts
In Ohio, John Arthur was suffering from the latter stages of
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), a terminal illness.
Recognizing the need to make critical end-of-life decisions,
Arthur sought to have the Ohio Registrar identify his partner,
James Obergefell, as his surviving spouse on his death
certificate so that Obergefell could receive the benefits due to a
spouse. Arthur and Obergefell had married in Maryland two
years earlier. The Registrar planned to certify Obergefell as
Arthur's spouse on the death certificate, believing that
discrimination against same-sex couples was unconstitutional.
The state of Ohio prohibited same-sex marriage, however, and
its Attorney General's Office mobilized to defend that ban.
Also in Ohio, four same-sex couples brought a claim seeking the
right to list both parents on the birth certificates of their
children. In this case, known as Henry v. Wymyslo, three of the
couples lived in Ohio, and all of the children were born there.
Henry v. Wymyslo was heard before the same judge who
reviewed the Obergefell case, District Judge Timothy S. Black.
In Tennessee, four same-sex couples sued to force the state to
recognize their marriages, which had been performed in
California and New York. (One of the New York couples later left
the case.) They argued that Tennessee's refusal to recognize
same-sex marriages violated its own rule that a marriage
validated where it is celebrated is valid everywhere.
In Michigan, April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse brought a claim on
behalf of themselves and three children whom they sought to
jointly adopt. All of the children, one boy and two girls, had
special needs. The two nurses challenged a state law prohibiting
adoption by same-sex couples and limiting second-parent
adoption to married couples, while defining marriage as
between opposite-sex individuals only.
In Kentucky, Gregory Bourke and Michael DeLeon brought a
claim on behalf of themselves and DeLeon's two adopted
children. Three other couples, one with four children, joined
their claim. While Bourke and DeLeon were legally married in
Ontario, Canada, the other couples were married in Iowa,
California, and Connecticut.
The couples prevailed in the federal district courts of all four
states. In Obergefell, District Judge Black issued a temporary
restraining order, which the state did not appeal, and planned
oral arguments on whether a permanent injunction should be
granted. Unfortunately, Arthur died before arguments were
held, and the state moved within a week to dismiss the case as
moot. Black denied the motion and ruled two months later that
Ohio must recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states on death certificates. He also issued an order in Henry v.
Wymyslo that required states to recognize same-sex marriages
performed in other states, although he stayed the enforcement
of his ruling with respect to matters other than the birth
certificates sought in this specific case.

All four of these cases were appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which
reversed the trial court decisions in each of them and reinstated
the state bans on same-sex marriage. (Some observers,
including the dissenting justice in the Sixth Circuit's 2-1 decision,
speculated that the court took this view deliberately to force the
Supreme Court to resolve the ensuing circuit split and provide a
definitive answer on the issue of marriage equality.) The
Supreme Court then consolidated the cases for review. Since the
federal government previously had announced its support for
marriage equality, U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, Jr.
joined the plaintiffs' lawyers for oral argument before the Court.
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be
released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the
time the opinion is issued.The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of
Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United
States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321 .
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
OBERGEFELL et al. v. HODGES, DIRECTOR, OHIO
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth
circuit
No. 14–556. Argued April 28, 2015—Decided June 26, 2015[1]
Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee define marriage as a
union between one man and one woman. The petitioners, 14
same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners are
deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home
States, claiming that respondent state officials violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or
to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given full
recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners’ favor, but
the Sixth Circuit consolidated the cases and reversed.
Held: The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a
marriage between two people of the same sex and to recognize
a marriage between two people of the same sex when their
marriage was lawfully licensed and performed out-of-State.
Pp. 3–28.
(a) Before turning to the governing principles and precedents, it
is appropriate to note the history of the subject now before the
Court. Pp. 3–10.
(1) The history of marriage as a union between two persons of
the opposite sex marks the beginning of these cases. To the
respondents, it would demean a timeless institution if marriage
were extended to same-sex couples. But the petitioners, far
from seeking to devalue marriage, seek it for themselves
because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and
responsibilities, as illustrated by the petitioners’ own
experiences. Pp. 3–6.
(2) The history of marriage is one of both continuity and
change. Changes, such as the decline of arranged marriages
and the abandonment of the law of coverture, have worked
deep transformations in the structure of marriage, affecting
aspects of marriage once viewed as essential. These new
insights have strengthened, not weakened, the institution.
Changed understandings of marriage are characteristic of a
Nation where new dimensions of freedom become apparent to
new generations.
This dynamic can be seen in the Nation’s experience with gay
and lesbian rights. Well into the 20th century, many States
condemned same-sex intimacy as immoral, and homosexuality
was treated as an illness. Later in the century, cultural and
political developments allowed same-sex couples to lead more
open and public lives. Extensive public and private dialogue
followed, along with shifts in public attitudes. Questions about
the legal treatment of gays and lesbians soon reached the
courts, where they could be discussed in the formal discourse of
the law. In 2003, this Court overruled its 1986 decision
in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 , which upheld a Georgia
law that criminalized certain homosexual acts, concluding laws
making same-sex intimacy a crime “demea[n] the lives of
homosexual persons.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 . In
2012, the federal Defense of Marriage Act was also struck
down. United States v. Windsor, 570 U. S. ___. Numerous
same-sex marriage cases reaching the federal courts and state
supreme courts have added to the dialogue. Pp. 6–10.
(b) The Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a
marriage between two people of the same sex. Pp. 10–27.
(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs.
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U. S. 438
; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 –486. Courts must
exercise reasoned judgment in identifying interests of the
person so fundamental that the State must accord them its
respect. History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but
do not set its outer boundaries. When new insight reveals
discord between the Constitution’s central protections and a
received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed.
Applying these tenets, the Court has long held the right to marry
is protected by the Constitution. For example, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U. S. 1 , invalidated bans on interracial unions,
and Turner v. Safley, 482 U. S. 78 , held that prisoners could
not be denied the right to marry. To be sure, these cases
presumed a relationship involving opposite-sex partners, as
did Baker v. Nelson, 409 U. S. 810 , a one-line summary
decision issued in 1972, holding that the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal
question. But other, more instructive precedents have expressed
broader principles. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra, at 574. In
assessing whether the force and rationale of its cases apply to
same-sex couples, the Court must respect the basic reasons why
the right to marry has been long protected.
See, e.g.,Eisenstadt, supra, at 453–454. This analysis compels
the conclusion that same-sex couples may exercise the right to
marry. Pp. 10–12.
(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal
force to same-sex couples. The first premise of this Court’s
relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice
regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual
autonomy. This abiding connection between marriage and
liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans under
the Due Process Clause. See 388 U. S., at 12. Decisions about
marriage are among the most intimate that an individual can
make. See Lawrence, supra, at 574. This is true for all persons,
whatever their sexual orientation.
A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right
to marry is fundamental because it supports a two-person union
unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals.
The intimate association protected by this right was central
to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects
the right of married couples to use contraception, 381 U. S., at
485, and was acknowledged in Turner, supra, at 95. Same-sex
couples have the same right as opposite-sex couples to enjoy
intimate association, a right extending beyond mere freedom
from laws making same-sex intimacy a criminal offense.
See Lawrence, supra, at 567.
A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it
safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from
related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 . Without
the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers,
children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser. They also suffer the significant material costs of being
raised by unmarried parents, relegated to a more difficult and
uncertain family life. The marriage laws at issue thus harm and
humiliate the children of same-sex couples.
See Windsor, supra, at ___. This does not mean that the right to
marry is less meaningful for those who do not or cannot have
children. Precedent protects the right of a married couple not to
procreate, so the right to marry cannot be conditioned on the
capacity or commitment to procreate.
Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear
that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order.
See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 . States have contributed to
the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the
center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no
difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect
to this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the
constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage
and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex couples
would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples
out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too
may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long
have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the
central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now
manifest. Pp. 12–18.
(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from
the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The
Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are
connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights
secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and
are not always co-extensive, yet each may be instructive as to
the meaning and reach of the other. This dynamic is reflected
in Loving, where the Court invoked both the Equal Protection
Clause and the Due Process Clause; and in Zablocki v. Redhail,
434 U. S. 374 , where the Court invalidated a law barring fathers
delinquent on child-support payments from marrying. Indeed,
recognizing that new insights and societal understandings can
reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental institutions that
once passed unnoticed and unchallenged, this Court has invoked
equal protection principles to invalidate laws imposing sex-based
inequality on marriage, see, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450
U. S. 455 –461, and confirmed the relation between liberty and
equality, see, e.g., M. L. B. v. S. L. J., 519 U. S. 102 –121.
The Court has acknowledged the interlocking nature of these
constitutional safeguards in the context of the legal treatment of
gays and lesbians. See Lawrence, 539 U. S., at 575. This
dynamic also applies to same-sex marriage. The challenged laws
burden the liberty of same-sex couples, and they abridge central
precepts of equality. The marriage laws at issue are in essence
unequal: Same-sex couples are denied benefits afforded
opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a
fundamental right. Especially against a long history of
disapproval of their relationships, this denial works a grave and
continuing harm, serving to disrespect and subordinate gays and
lesbians. Pp. 18–22.
(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the
liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.
Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to
marry. Baker v. Nelson is overruled. The State laws challenged
by the petitioners in these cases are held invalid to the extent
they exclude same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same
terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. Pp. 22–23.
(5) There may be an initial inclination to await further
legislation, litigation, and debate, but referenda, legislative
debates, and grassroots campaigns; studies and other writings;
and extensive litigation in state and federal courts have led to
an enhanced understanding of the issue. While the Constitution
contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for
change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative
action before asserting a fundamental right. Bowers, in effect,
upheld state action that denied gays and lesbians a fundamental
right. Though it was eventually repudiated, men and women
suffered pain and humiliation in the interim, and the effects of
these injuries no doubt lingered long after Bowers was
overruled. A ruling against same-sex couples would have the
same effect and would be unjustified under the Fourteenth
Amendment. The petitioners’ stories show the urgency of the
issue they present to the Court, which has a duty to address
these claims and answer these questions. Respondents’
argument that allowing same-sex couples to wed will harm
marriage as an institution rests on a counterintuitive view of
opposite-sex couples’ decisions about marriage and parenthood.
Finally, the First Amendment ensures that religions, those who
adhere to religious doctrines, and others have protection as they
seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central
to their lives and faiths. Pp. 23–27.
(c) The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize
same-sex marriages validly performed out of State. Since same-
sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in
all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to
recognize a lawful same-sex marriage performed in another
State on the ground of its same-sex character. Pp. 27–28.
772 F. 3d 388, reversed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Roberts,
C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ.,
joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Thomas, J.,
joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in wh48/ich Scalia,
J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and
Thomas, JJ., joined.