Thornton v. Thornton, G.R. No. 154598, Aug. 16, 2004 Petition granted.
Petition granted. CA should take cognizance of the case because nothing
FACTS:
Petitioner was an American, respondent was a Filipino. They were married
and had one daughter. After 3 years, the woman grew restless and bored
as a plain housewife and wanted to return to her old job as GRO in a
nightclub. One day, the woman left the family home together with their
daughter and told her servants that she was going to Basilan. The
husband filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court
in Makati City but was dismissed because the child was in Basilan. When
he went to Basilan, he didn’t find them and the barangay office issued a
certification that respondent was no longer residing there. Petitioner filed
another petition for habeas corpus in CA which could issue a writ of
habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country. The petition was denied
by CA on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case since
RA 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive
jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of CA) and B.P 129 (The judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.)
ISSUE:
W/N CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
custody of minors in light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts
exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions.
HELD:
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in RA 8369 revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus
involving custody of minors. The reasoning of CA cant be affirmed
because it will result to iniquitous, leaving petitioners without legal course
in obtaining custody. The minor could be transferred from one place to
another and habeas corpus case will be left without legal remedy since
family courts take cognizance only cases within their jurisdiction. Literal
interpretation would render it meaningless, lead to absurdity, injustice, and
contradiction. The literal interpretation of “exclusive” will result in grave
injustice and negate the policy to protect the rights and promote welfare of
children.
THORNTON v THORNTON
G.R. No. 154598/ August 16, 2004
CORONA
Facts –
• Review on the resolution of CA dismissing the petition of
habeas corpus on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of
substance.
• Petitioner, an American and respondent, a Filipino was married
in the Philippines and has a daughter.
• After 3 years, whenever petitioner was out of the country,
respondent was also often out with her friends, leaving her
daughter in the care of the househelp.
• 2001, respondent left the family home with her daughter
without notifying her husband and told the servant that she is
bringing the child in Basilan.
• Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Family Court
of Makati but was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction since the
child is in Basilan.
• Petitioner went to Basilan and search, but was unsuccessful.
He again filed writ of Habeas Corpus in the Court of Appeals
1
 but was denied on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
over the case.
• CA ruled that R.A. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave
family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for
habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed by R.A. 7902 ( An Act
Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas
Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980).
Issue –
• Whether CA has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in
cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in
RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
such petitions.
Ruling –
• The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since
there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue
writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors.
• According to CA, Family Courts have exclusive jurisdiction
within such cases. SC disagree on that reasoning because
individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they
are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek
redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in
their respective territorial jurisdictions.
• Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another,
the petitioner in a habeas corpus will be left without legal
remedy.
• The Family Court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions of habeas
corpus where the custody of the minors is at issue as based on
Section 20 on the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in relation to minors.
• The literal interpretation of the word “exclusive” will result in
grave injustice and negate the policy to promote the right and
welfare of the children.
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• Petition for habeas corpus is Granted. Serving officer shall
search for the child all over the country.
Doctrine – ( F. Repeal of Laws)
• SC holds that the Family Code Act of 1997 did not empower the family
courts to exclusively issue writs of habeas corpus and it did not revoke
the capacity of SC and CA to issue writs of habeas corpus.
• In relation to the word ―exclusive, although it is assumed that the
language of the laws should follow common understanding, the spirit of
the law and intention of the lawmakers come first than legal
technicalities.
• The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
• Also, in cases where the territorial jurisdiction for the enforcement of
the writ cannot be determined with certainty, the Court of Appeals can
issue the same writ enforceable throughout the Philippines as provided
in Sec. 2, Rule 102, Rev. Rules of Court.
• Sec.5 - Jurisdiction of Family Court - The Family courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases: b)
Petition for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation
to the latter.
• Section 20 of the Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors provides that
a petition for habeas corpus may be filed in the Supreme Court,
Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted,
the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
2

Madrinan v. Madrinan
July 12, 2007
Corona
SUMMARY:
The husband petitioner took 3 of his children from their home so the
wife files for a writ of habeas corpus with the CA. The husband is
questioning the jurisdiction of the CA because according to him under
Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by
respondent wife. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence
that the Court of Appeals should have cognizance of this case since
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there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs
of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not
divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors.
DOCTRINE: Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has concurrent
jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving custody of
minors.
FACTS:
Petitioner Felipe N. Madriñan and respondent Francisca R. Madriñan were
married with three sons and a daughter
After a bitter quarrel petitioner left their home and took their three sons with
him to Albay and subsequently to Laguna.
Thus respondent wife filed a petition for habeas corpus of their 3 sons in
the CA,
Petitioner husband filed a memorandum alleging that the wife is unfit and he
also questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals claiming that
under Section 5(b) of RA 8369 (otherwise known as the "Family Courts
Act of 1997") family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear
and decide the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent wife.
The CA rendered a decision asserting its authority to take cognizance of the
petition and ruling that, under Article 213 of the Family Code, respondent wife
was entitled to the custody of 2 minor sons who were at that time aged six
and four, subject to the visitation rights of husband. With respect to Ronnick
(the eldest) who was then eight years old, the court ruled that his custody
should be determined by the proper family court in a special proceeding on
custody of minors under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Hence this petition of husband.
ISSUE: Petitioner husband challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
over the petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is
lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. He invokes Section 5(b) of RA
8369:
3
Section 5. Jurisdiction of Family Courts. – The Family Courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
b) Petitions for guardianship, custody of children, habeas corpus in relation to
the latter;
xxx xxx xxx
SC RATIO: Petitioner husband is wrong.
1. In Thornton v. Thornton, this Court resolved the issue of the Court of
Appeals’ jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases
involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369
giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions:
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is
nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.
SC rule therefore that RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving
the custody of minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus
relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions
of RA 8369, RA 7092 [An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals] and BP 129 [The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980] are
absolutely incompatible since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving
the custody of minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in
harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 – that family courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in
petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.
2. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over petitions for habeas
corpus was further affirmed by A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004)
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in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in
Relation to Custody of Minors:
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has been settled with the
adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and
Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of the
rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified petition for a writ of
habeas corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court.
The writ shall be enforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable
to a Family Court or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner
resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and decision on the
merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court have concurrent jurisdiction with family courts in habeas
corpus cases where the custody of minors is involved.9 (emphases
supplied)1avvphi1
3. SC notes that after petitioner moved out of their Parañaque
residence on May 18, 2002, he twice transferred his sons to
provinces covered by different judicial regions. This situation is what
the Thornton interpretation of RA 8369’s provision on jurisdiction
precisely addressed:
[The reasoning that by giving family courts exclusive jurisdiction over habeas
corpus cases, the lawmakers intended them to be the sole courts which can
issue writs of habeas corpus] will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving
individuals like [respondent] without legal recourse in obtaining custody of
their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are
looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family
courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial
jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to
another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas
4
corpus case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could
not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed [RA
8369].
4. Moreover, a careful reading of Section 5(b) of RA 8369 reveals that
family courts are vested with original exclusive jurisdiction in custody
cases, not in habeas corpus cases. Writs of habeas corpus which
may be issued exclusively by family courts under Section 5(b) of RA
8369 pertain to the ancillary remedy that may be availed of in
conjunction with a petition for custody of minors under Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court. In other words, the issuance of the writ is merely
ancillary to the custody case pending before the family court. The writ
must be issued by the same court to avoid splitting of jurisdiction,
conflicting decisions, interference by a co-equal court and judicial
instability.
The rule therefore is: when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial
officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such court or officer.11 Once a court acquires
jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it does so to the exclusion of all
other courts, including related incidents and ancillary matters.
RULING: Petition is denied.
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Madrinan vs. Madrinan, 527 SCRA 487, GR No. 159374, July 12, 2007
(Special Proceedings – Court of Appeals and Supreme Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts of Habeas Corpus involving
custody of minors)
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were married, and after a bitter quarrel,
petitioner left the conjugal abode bringing with him their three sons (2 of
which are minors) to Albay and to Laguna subsequently.
Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals for
their their 2 minor sons on the ground that petitioner’s act disrupted their
education and deprived them of their mother’s care.
Petitioner filed a memorandum alleging that respondent was unfit to take
custody of their children and questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals claiming that under Section 5(b) of RA 8369, family courts have
exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for habeas
corpus filed by respondent.
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision asserting its authority to take
cognizance and ruling, that under the Family Code, respondent was
entitled to custody of the minors.
5
Petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of
petition for habeas corpus and insists that jurisdiction over the case is Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so granted, the writ
lodged in the family courts under RA 8369. shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

Issue:

WON the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases
involving custody of minors.

Held:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in a previous jurisprudence that The Court
of Appeals should has cognizance of this case since there is nothing in RA
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving
the custody of minors. RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving
the custody of minors.

The concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court

with family courts in said cases was further affirmed by A.M. No.
03-03-04-SC (April 22, 2004) in Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of
Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors which provides that:

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus. – A verified

petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of minors
shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall be enforceable
within its judicial region to which the Family Court belongs.

xxx xxx xxx

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Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013
Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City
a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to
R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being
threatened of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support
and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the
conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a
modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment
on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to
answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it
would be an “axercise in futility.”
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of
the modified TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied
the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection
orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.
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Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues:
1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the
issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and
that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.
2. WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.
3. WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262
runs counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
4. WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the
policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
5. WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family
Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not
be raised in the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’
7
 Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that Jurisdiction of Family Courts
it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not
FACTS:
violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its
protection. Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf
of her minor children, a verified petition before the RTC of Bacolod City for
the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband,
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a
The essence of due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s
as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.
violative of the right to due process.

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s
contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of
the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous
social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court,
it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a
mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay
officials. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the Government while
executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive,
not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of
BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur,
the RTC issued a TPO effective for thirty (30) days.
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support;
failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children, private respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte.
The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days.
Petitioner filed before the CA challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for
being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the
constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case,
which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.

Garcia vs. Drilon G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

Civpro Wave3 digest 8
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before
the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has
limited authority and jurisdiction that is “inadequate to tackle the complex
issue of constitutionality.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Family Court has jurisdiction on the issue of
constitutionality of a statute.
RULING:
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of
the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise
known as the “Family Courts Act of 1997,” family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children. In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court
designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least
one Family Court in each of several key cities identified.
To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262
now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under
the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court
shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence
against women and their children under this law. In the absence of such
court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the complainant.
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Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City
remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to
pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings,
land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
statute, “this authority being embraced in the general definition of the
judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by the
criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law.” The Constitution vests
the power of judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or
validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential
decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all RTCs. We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA that, “plainly
the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have
jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it
speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases
where such constitutionality happens to be in issue.” Section 5, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the
law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod
City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of
this Court.
9

Evelyn Tolosa v. NLRC et al.
GR 149578, April 10, 2003
FACTS:
Evelyn Tolosa was the widow of Capt. Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by
Qwana-Kawin through its manning agent, Asia Bulk Transport Phils., Inc.
(ABTPI) to be the master of the vessel named M/V Lady Dona. He officially
began work on 11/1/1992 when he assumed command of the vessel in
Yokohama, Japan. The vessel was en route to Long Beach, CA, USA with a
passage through Hawaii. Capt. Tolosa was allegedly in good health.
During the 'channelling activities' when the vessel departed Yokohama Capt.
Tolosa was drenched in rainwater. The next day, 11/7/1992, he had slight
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fever and hereafter his health worsened until his death on 11/18/1992. Upon
arrival in CA, Pedro Garate, Chief Mate of the vessel narrated that as Capt.
Tolosaa's condition worsened, an able seaman watched him 24h/day, that on
11/10/1992 the Chief Engineer contacted Asia Bulk which left Garate and
Mario Asis, Second Mate and in-charge of the crew and officer's health as
in-charge, that on 11/17/1992 as Capt. Tolosa was worsening, a telex was
sent to Asia Bulk requesting immediate airlift and thereafter an airlift was
scheduled for 11/19/1992, that however, on 11/18/1992 at 0753H GMT, Capt.
Tolosa died.
Due to Capt. Tolosa's death Evelyn filed a complaint/position paper with the
POEA against Qwana-Kawin thru its resident-agent Mr. Fumiro Nakagawa,
Pedro Garate and Mario Asis as respondents.
After hearings and submission of pleadings the case was transferred to the
DOLE's NLRC and raffled to a Labor Arbiter. Labor Arbiter Sampang ruled in
favor of Evelyn. NLRC dismissed petitioner's case for lack of jurisdiction. CA
sustained the NLRC.
ISSUE(S):
1. Does the NLRC have jurisdiction over the case?
2. Is petitioner Evelyn entitled to the monetary awards granted by the LA?
RULING:
1. No, NLRC has no jurisdiction over the case as petitioner's claim is based
on a quasi-delict or tort under Art. 217 of the LC. This court has in a long
line of cases held that the allegations in the complaint determine the
nature of the action and consequently, the jurisdiction of the courts.
Indeed, petitioner sued Garate and Asis for gross negligence. Petitioner's
complaint/ position paper refers to and extensively discusses the
negligent acts of shipmates Garate and Asis, who had no
employer-employee relations with Capt. Tolosa. Even the LA himself
classified petitioner's case as "complaint for damages, blacklisting and
watchlisting (pending injury) for gross negligence resulting in the death of
compalinants husband, Capt. Tolosa."
The case clearly does not involve the adjudication of a labor dispute, but
the recovery of damages based on a quasi-delict. In Georg GMBH and
Co. v. Isnani, the court ruled that the "jurisdiction of the LA and the NLRC
under Art. 217 of LC is limited to disputes arising from an
10
 employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference
to the LC, other labor disputes, or their CBA."
In addition, petitioner seeks the following awards; (1) loss of earning
capacity denominated therein as "actual damages" or "lost income" and
(2) blacklisting. Such is recoverable based on quasi-delict provided in Art.
2206 of the Civil Code, not the LC. LA and NLRC have jurisdiction to
award not only reliefs provided by labor laws but also damages governed
by the civil code, these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a
reasonable caussal connection with the LC, other labor statutes or
CBA's. Loss of earning capacity and blacklisting are not to be equated
with wages, overtime pay, or separation pay, and other labor benefits
generally cognized in labor disputes. Rather, loss of earning capacity is a
relief or claim arising from a quasi-delict or similar cause within the realm
of civil law.
2. No, contrary to petitioner's claim that the award has already reached
finality for failure of private respondents to file a timely appeal before the
NLRC since the same was not raised in the tribunals a quo. Well-settled
is the rule that issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Thus, points of law, theories, and arguments not brought to
the attention of the CA need not and ordinarily will not, be considered by
this court. Petitioner's allegation cannot be accepted by this court on its
face; to do so would be tantamount to a denial of respondents' right to
due process.
Petition denied. CA decision affirmed.
[G.R. No. 149578. April 10, 2003]
EVELYN TOLOSA, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, QWANA KAIUN (through its resident-agent, FUMIO
NAKAGAWA), ASIA BULK TRANSPORT PHILS. INC., PEDRO
GARATE and MARIO ASIS, respondents.
FACTS
Evelyn Tolosa, was the widow of Captain Virgilio Tolosa who was hired by
Qwana-Kaiun, through its manning agent, Asia Bulk, to be the master of
the Vessel named M/V Lady Dona. CAPT. TOLOSA had a monthly
compensation of US$1700, plus US$400.00 monthly overtime
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allowance. His contract officially began on November 1, 1992, as
supported by his contract of employment when he assumed command of
the vessel in Yokohama, Japan. The vessel departed for Long Beach
California, passing by Hawaii in the middle of the voyage. At the time of
embarkation, CAPT. TOLOSA was allegedly shown to be in good health.
“During ‘channeling activities’ upon the vessel’s departure from Yokohama
sometime on November 6, 1992, CAPT. TOLOSA was drenched with
rainwater. The following day, November 7, 1992, he had a slight fever
and in the succeeding twelve (12) days, his health rapidly deteriorated
resulting in his death on November 18, 1992. It was alleged that the
request for emergency evacuation of Capt Tolosa was too late.
Because of the death of CAPT. TOLOSA, his wife, EVELYN, as petitioner,
filed a Complaint/Position Paper before the POEA against Qwana-Kaiun,
thru its resident-agent, Mr. Fumio Nakagawa, ASIA BULK, Pedro Garate
and Mario Asis, as respondents. The case was however transferred to the
NLRC, when the amendatory legislation expanding its jurisdiction, and
removing overseas employment related claims from the ambit of POEA
jurisdiction.
Petitioner argues that her cause of action is not predicated on a quasi
delict or tort, but on the failure of private respondents -- as employers of
her husband (Captain Tolosa) -- to provide him with timely, adequate and
competent medical services under Article 161 of the Labor Code.
Respondents aver that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter, since her cause did not arise from an employer-employee
relation, but from a quasi delict or tort. Further, there is no reasonable
causal connection between her suit for damages and her claim under
Article 217 (a)(4) of the Labor Code, which allows an award of damages
incident to an employer-employee relation.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over the subject matter.
HELD
11

The SC held that the NLRC and the labor arbiter had no jurisdiction over
petitioner’s claim for damages, because that ruling was based on a quasi
delict or tort per Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
After carefully examining the complaint/position paper of petitioner, we are
convinced that the allegations therein are in the nature of an action based
on a quasidelict or tort. It is evident that she sued Pedro Garate and Mario
Asis for gross negligence. Petitioner’s complaint/position paper refers to
and extensively discusses the negligent acts of shipmates Garate and
Asis, who had no employer-employee relation with Captain Tolosa. The
SC stressed that the case does not involve the adjudication of a labor
dispute, but the recovery of damages based on a quasi delict. The
jurisdiction of labor tribunals is limited to disputes arising from
employer-employee relations.
Not every dispute between an employer and employee involves matters
that only labor arbiters and the NLRC can resolve in the exercise of their
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters
and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code is limited to disputes
arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their
collective bargaining agreement.”
Petitioner cannot anchor her claim for damages to Article 161 of the Labor
Code, which does not grant or specify a claim or relief. This provision is
only a safety and health standard under Book IV of the same Code. The
enforcement of this labor standard rests with the labor secretary. Thus,
claims for an employer’s violation thereof are beyond the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter. In other words, petitioner cannot enforce the labor standard
provided for in Article 161 by suing for damages before the labor arbiter.
It is not the NLRC but the regular courts that have jurisdiction over actions
for damages, in which the employer-employee relation is merely incidental,
and in which the cause of action proceeds from a different source of
obligation such as a tort. Since petitioner’s claim for damages is
predicated on a quasi delict or tort that has no reasonable causal
connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217, other labor
statutes, or collective bargaining agreements, jurisdiction over the action
lies with the regular courts -- not with the NLRC or the labor arbiters.
Petition is denied.

While it is true that labor arbiters and the NLRC have jurisdiction to award
not only reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the
Civil Code, these reliefs must still be based on an action that has a
reasonable causal connection with the Labor Code, other labor statutes,
or collective bargaining agreements. The central issue is determined
essentially from the relief sought in the complaint.

“Claims for damages under paragraph 4 of Article 217 must have a

reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in the
article in order to be cognizable by the labor arbiter. Only if there is such
a connection with the other claims can the claim for damages be
considered as arising from employer-employee relations.” In the present
case, petitioner’s claim for damages is not related to any other claim under
Article 217, other labor statutes, or collective bargaining agreements.

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 Sometime on January 26, 1998, the respondent Standard Chartered Bank
and petitioner Eduardo G. Eviota executed a contract of employment under
which the petitioner was employed by the respondent bank as
Compensation and Benefits Manager, VP (M21). Petitioner came up with
many proposals which the bank approved and made preparations of. He
was also given privileges like car, renovation of the office, and even a trip to
Singapore at the company’s expense. However, the petitioner abruptly
resigned from the respondent bank barely a month after his employment
and rejoined his former employer. On June 19, 1998, the respondent bank
filed a complaint against the petitioner with the RTC of Makati City for
damages brought about his abrupt resignation.
Though petitioner reimbursed part of the amount demanded by Standard,
he was not able to pay it full.
Standard alleged that assuming arguendo that Eviota had the right to
terminate his employment with the Bank for no reason, the manner in and
circumstances under which he exercised the same are clearly abusive and
contrary to the rules governing human relations, governed by the Civil
Code.
Further, Standard alleged that petitioner also violated the Labor Code
when he terminated his employment without one (1) notice in advance.
This stipulation was also provided in the employment contract of Eviota
with Standard, which would also constitute breach of contract.
The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
action for damages of the respondent bank was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under paragraph 4, Article 217 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, as amended. The petitioner averred that the
respondent bank’s claim for damages arose out of or were in connection
with his employer-employee relationship with the respondent bank or some
aspect or incident of such relationship. The respondent bank opposed the
motion, claiming that its action for damages was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the trial court. Although its claims for damages incidentally
involved an employer-employee relationship, the said claims are actually
predicated on the petitioner’s acts and omissions which are separately,
specifically and distinctly governed by the New Civil Code.

ISSUE

Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

EVIOTA vs CA Case Digest
HELD
FACTS

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The SC held that the RTC has jurisdiction. Case law has it that the nature
of an action and the subject matter thereof, as well as which court has
jurisdiction over the same, are determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for in relation to the law involved. Not
every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or
vice-versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. A money
claim by a worker against the employer or vice-versa is within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the labor arbiter only if there is a “reasonable causal
connection” between the claim asserted and employee-employer
relation. Absent such a link, the complaint will be cognizable by the
regular courts of justice.
Actions between employees and employer where the employer-employee
relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a
different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular court. The jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter under Article 217 of the
Labor Code, as amended, is limited to disputes arising from an
employer-employee relationship which can only be resolved by reference
to the Labor Code of the Philippines, other labor laws or their collective
bargaining agreements.
Jurisprudence has evolved the rule that claims for damages under
paragraph 4 of Article 217, to be cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, must
have a reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in
that article. Only if there is such a connection with the other claims can the
claim for damages be considered as arising from employer-employee
relations.
prejudice of the private respondent, its banking operations and the conduct
of its business. Anent its third cause of action, the petitioner made false
and derogatory statements that the private respondent reneged on its
obligations under their contract of employment; thus, depicting the private
respondent as unworthy of trust.
The primary relief sought is for liquidated damages for breach of a
contractual obligation. The other items demanded are not labor benefits
demanded by workers generally taken cognizance of in labor disputes,
such as payment of wages, overtime compensation or separation
pay. The items claimed are the natural consequences flowing from breach
of an obligation, intrinsically a civil dispute.
It is evident that the causes of action of the private respondent against the
petitioner do not involve the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines
and other labor laws but the New Civil Code. Thus, the said causes of
action are intrinsically civil. There is no causal relationship between the
causes of action of the private respondent’s causes of action against the
petitioner and their employer-employee relationship. The fact that the
private respondent was the erstwhile employer of the petitioner under an
existing employment contract before the latter abandoned his employment
is merely incidental.
Petition is denied.

In this case, the private respondent’s first cause of action for damages is
anchored on the petitioner’s employment of deceit and of making the
private respondent believe that he would fulfill his obligation under the
employment contract with assiduousness and earnestness. The petitioner
volte face when, without the requisite thirty-day notice under the contract
and the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended, he abandoned his
office and rejoined his former employer; thus, forcing the private
respondent to hire a replacement. The private respondent was left in a
lurch, and its corporate plans and program in jeopardy and
disarray. Moreover, the petitioner took off with the private respondent’s
computer diskette, papers and documents containing confidential
information on employee compensation and other bank matters. On its
second cause of action, the petitioner simply walked away from his
employment with the private respondent sans any written notice, to the

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 FACTS

Antonio D. Todaro (Todaro) filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint
for Sum of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against
Pioneer International Limited (PIL), Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc.
(PCPI), Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI), John G. McDonald
(McDonald) and Philip J. Klepzig (Klepzig).

Todaro alleged that PIL is a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete
and concrete aggregates business; PPHI is the company established by
PIL to own and hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines;
PCPI is the company established by PIL to undertake its business of
ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying operations in the
Philippines; McDonald is the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL;
and, Klepzig is the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI;
Todaro has been the managing director of Betonval Ready concrete, Inc.
(Betonval), a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete and concrete
aggregate production; he resigned from Betonval in February 1996; in
May 1996, PIL contacted Todaro and asked him if he was available to join
them in connection with their intention to establish a ready-mix concrete
plant and other related operations in the Philippines; Todaro informed PIL
of his availability and interest to join them; subsequently, PIL and Todaro
came to an agreement wherein the former consented to engage the
services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which,
he would be employed as the manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete
operations should the company decide to invest in the Philippines;
subsequently, PIL started its operations in the Philippines; however, it
refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a permanent
basis. Instead of filing an Answer, PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately
moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the complaint states
no cause of action, that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the complaint, as the same is within the jurisdiction of the NLRC,
and that the complaint should be dismissed on the basis of the doctrine
of forum non conveniens. RTC dismissed the MTD which was affirmed by
the CA.
PIONEER CONCRETE PHILIPPINES v. TODARO
254 SCRA 153 June 8, 2007

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ISSUE
W/N the RTC should have dismissed the case on the basis of forum non
conveniens due to a presence of a foreign element
RULING
NO. Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of
said doctrine depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the case
ofCommunication Materials and Design, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, this
Court held that "xxx [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the
case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently
resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent
decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has
or is likely to have power to enforce its decision."
The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for
a motion to dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does
not include said doctrine as a ground. This Court further ruled that while it
is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are
established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court’s desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on
this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination,
hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Note: the case was also being dismissed on the ground that there was no
cause of action but SC held that there was cause of action, to sustain a
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that
the claim for relief does not exist, rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated, or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain. And it was also
argued in this case that jurisdiction is with the NLRC and not with the RTC.
SC held it was with RTC, SC has consistently held that where no
employer-employee relationship exists between the parties and no issue
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is involved which may be resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other
labor statutes or any collective bargaining agreement, it is the RTC that
has jurisdiction.
LOCSIN v NISSAN LEASE PHILS INC
FACTS:
On January 1, 1992, Locsin was elected Executive Vice President and
Treasurer (EVP/Treasurer) of NCLPI. As EVP/Treasurer, his duties and
responsibilities included: (1) the management of the finances of the
company; (2) carrying out the directions of the President and/or the Board
of Directors regarding financial management; and (3) the preparation of
financial reports to advise the officers and directors of the financial
condition of NCLPI. Locsin held this position for 13 years, having been
re-elected every year since 1992, until January 21, 2005, when he was
nominated and elected Chairman of NCLPI’s Board of Directors.
On August 5, 2005, a little over seven (7) months after his election as
Chairman of the Board, the NCLPI Board held a special meeting at the
Manila Polo Club. One of the items of the agenda was the election of a
new set of officers. Unfortunately, Locsin was neither re-elected Chairman
nor reinstated to his previous position as EVP/Treasurer.
Aggrieved, on June 19, 2007, Locsin filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with prayer for reinstatement, payment of backwages, damages and
attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter against NCLPI and Banson, who
was then President of NCLPI.
On July 11, 2007, instead of filing their position paper, NCLPI and Banson
filed a Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that the Labor Arbiter did not have
jurisdiction over the case since the issue of Locsin’s removal as
EVP/Treasurer involves an intra-corporate dispute.
On August 16, 2007, Locsin submitted his opposition to the motion to
dismiss, maintaining his position that he is an employee of NCLPI.
On March 10, 2008, Labor Arbiter Concepcion issued an Order denying
the Motion to Dismiss, holding that her office acquired “jurisdiction to
16
arbitrate and/or decide the instant complaint finding extant in the case an
employer-employee relationship.”
NCLPI, on June 3, 2008, elevated the case to the CA through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. NCLPI raised the issue on
whether the Labor Arbiter committed grave abuse of discretion by denying
the Motion to Dismiss and holding that her office had jurisdiction over the
dispute.
On August 28, 2008, the CA reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter’s
Order denying the Motion to Dismiss and ruled that Locsin was a
corporate officer. The CA concluded that Locsin does not have any
recourse with the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC since the removal of a
corporate officer, whether elected or appointed, is an intra-corporate
controversy over which the NLRC has no jurisdiction. Instead, according
to the CA, Locsin’s complaint for “illegal dismissal” should have been filed
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), pursuant to Rule 6 of the Interim Rules
of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies.
Failing to obtain a reconsideration of the CA’s decision, Locsin filed the
present petition.
ISSUE:
WON the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction?
HELD:
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
The CA correctly ruled that no employer-employee relationship exists
between Locsin and Nissan. Locsin was undeniably Chairman and
President, and was elected to these positions by the Nissan board
pursuant to its By-laws. As such, he was a corporate officer, not an
employee. The CA reached this conclusion by relying on the submitted
facts and on Presidential Decree 902-A, which defines corporate officers
as “those officers of a corporation who are given that character either by
the Corporation Code or by the corporation’s by-laws.” Likewise, Section
25 of the Corporation Code provides that corporate officers are the
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president, secretary, treasurer and such other officers as may be provided
for in the by-laws. Even as Executive Vice-President/Treasurer, Locsin
already acted as a corporate officer because the position of Executive
Vice-President/Treasurer is provided for in Nissan’s By-Laws. Article IV,
Section 4 of these By-Laws specifically provides for this position.
An “office” is created by the charter of the corporation and the officer is
elected by the directors or stockholders. On the other hand, an “employee”
usually occupies no office and generally is employed not by action of the
directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of the corporation
who also determines the compensation to be paid to such employee.
In this case, Locsin was elected by the NCLPI Board, in accordance with
the Amended By-Laws of the corporation. Locsin, therefore, at the time of
his severance from NCLPI, was the latter’s corporate officer.
Given Locsin’s status as a corporate officer, the RTC, not the Labor
Arbiter or the NLRC, has jurisdiction to hear the legality of the termination
of his relationship with Nissan. The RTC should exercise jurisdiction
based on the following:
Prior to its amendment, Section 5(c) of PD 902-A provided that
intra-corporate disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the SEC. However,
after RA8799 took effect, Subsection 5.2, Section 5 of the said law
transferred said jurisdiction to the RTC.
Based on the above jurisdictional considerations, we would be forced to
remand the case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings if we were to
dismiss the petition outright due to the wrongful use of Rule 65. We cannot
close our eyes, however, to the factual and legal reality, established by
evidence already on record, that Locsin is a corporate officer whose
termination of relationship is outside a labor arbiter’s jurisdiction to rule
upon.
Under these circumstances, we have to give precedence to the merits of
the case, and primacy to the element of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the
power to hear and rule on a case and is the threshold element that must
exist before any quasi-judicial officer can act. In the context of the present
case, the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the termination
17
dispute Locsin brought, and should not be allowed to continue to act on
the case after the absence of jurisdiction has become obvious, based on
the records and the law. In more practical terms, a contrary ruling will only
cause substantial delay and inconvenience as well as unnecessary
expenses, to the point of injustice, to the parties. This conclusion, of
course, does not go into the merits of termination of relationship and is
without prejudice to the filing of an intra-corporate dispute on this point
before the appropriate RTC.

The petition is dismissed and the CA decision is affirmed.

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., vs. MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias

GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIABAGUIO,
G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

FACTS:

Spouses Serafin and Felicitas commenced a civil case against spouses

Sibonghanoy to recover from them a sum of P1, 908.00 with legal interest.
A writ of attachment was issued by the court against the defendants’
properties but the same was soon dissolved. After trial, the court rendered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and after the same had become final and
executor, the court issued a writ of execution against the defendants. The
writ being unsatisfied, the plaintiffs moved for the issuance of the writ of
execution against the Surety’s bond. Subsequently, the Surety moved to
quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without summary
hearing. This was denied by the RTC. The Surety appealed in the CA,
which was denied. This time, the surety just asked for an extension in
order for them to file the motion for reconsideration. But instead of filing for
a motion for reconsideration, it filed a motion to dismiss saying that by
virtue of R.A. 296 which is the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1948,
section 88 of which placed within the exclusive original jurisdiction
of inferior courts all civil action where the value of the subject matter
does not exceed P2,000.00. The Court of First Instance therefore has no
jurisdiction over the case. The question of jurisdiction was filed by the
Surety only 15 years from the time the action was commenced in the
Court of First Instance.

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ISSUE:

WON THE CASE SHOULD BE DISMISSED DUE TO THE LACK OF

JURISDICTION

HELD:

No. After voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse

decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction
or power of the court. The rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred upon the courts exclusive by law as by law and as the lack of it
affect the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the
objection may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However,
considering the facts and circumstances of the present cases, a party may
be barred by laches from involving this plea for the first time on appeal for SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias
the purpose of annulling everything done in the case. A party cannot GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO G.R. No. L-21450 - -
invoke a court’s jurisdiction and later on deny it to escape a penalty. April 15, 1968

FACTS:

The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the
sum of exactly P 1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and
Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia
Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on
July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act
of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of
original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest,
is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c] and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and
throughout the entire proceeding the appellant never raised the question
of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate

jurisdiction over all cases in which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in
issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the Supreme Court along
with the records of the case.

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ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance during the pendency of the
appeal will prosper.
RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different
ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and
unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to
assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of
public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement
of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question
of time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of
permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.
It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
sure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs.
Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of
explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court
had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties
was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and
conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can
not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
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Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause
and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs.
Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis
etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess,
16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed
and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a
penalty.
Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in
the resolution of the Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the
effect that we frown upon the "undesirable practice" of a party submitting
his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in
Pindañgan etc. vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962;
Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092;
Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial Relation et al.,
G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.
The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a
quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack
of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of
the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of
the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it
invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and
submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an
adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke
up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct
on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings
had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and
compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.
20
Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record,
We have become persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote
in toto, with approval, the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x
granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby
affirmed, with costs against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity
Company, Inc.

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CALIMLIM vs HON. RAMIREZ G.R. No. L-34362 November 19, 1982
FACTS:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent
Court to compel Manuel Magali to surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT
No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and a new one issued
in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and
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the title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with
the order of the Court directing him to surrender the said title. This
prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte petition
to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name.
The said petition was granted by the respondent Court and the Register
of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the corporation,
TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over
the parcel of land had been cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent
Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying for the cancellation of TCT No.
68568 but the court dismissed the petition.
Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation
of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then
resorted to the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the
conveyances and sales that had been made with respect to the property,
covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed to have
bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private
respondent Francisco Ramos, however, failed to obtain a title over the
property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse claim
annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners.
Francisco Ramos filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is
barred by prior judgement or by statute of limitations. Resolving the said
Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of
estoppel by prior judgment.
Issue:
W/N dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior
judgment
HELD:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein
petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492 for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568
as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil case. In
order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among
others, that the judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a
court with the proper jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proceeding in
which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there is lack of
22
jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the
judgment or order cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy.
This essential element of the defense of bar by prior judgment or res
judicata does not exist in the case.
The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC Record No. 39492 was an
apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a
land registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of
the Land Registration Act wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance,
acting as a land registration court, is a court of limited and special
jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation of
issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving
ownership or title to real property.
G.R. No. 151821 April 14, 2004
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BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, as Successor-in-Interest of BPI
Investment Corporation, petitioner, vs. ALS MANAGEMENT &
DEVELOPMENT CORP., respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.
DOCTRINE:
The jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Regulatory Board (HLURB)
over cases enumerated in Section 1 of PD 1344 is exclusive. It has
sole jurisdiction in:
a. A complaint of specific performance for the delivery of a
certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot;
b. For claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is perfected
or not; and
c. For determining whether there is a perfected sale of contract.
Before us is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, seeking to set aside the decision of the CA.
Facts:
1. "On July 29, 1985, [petitioner] BPI Investment Corporation filed a
complaint for a Sum of Money against ALS Management and
Development Corporation, alleging inter alia that on July 22, 1983,
[petitioner] and [respondent] executed at Makati, Metro Manila a
Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished condominium unit of the
Twin Towers Condominium located at Ayala Avenue, corner
Apartment Ridge Street, Makati, Metro Manila designated as Unit
E-4A comprising of 271 squares [sic] meters more or less,
together with parking stalls identified as G022 and G-63.
2. The Condominium Certificate of Title No. 4800 of the Registry of
Deeds for Makati, Metro Manila was issued after the execution of
the said Deed of Sale.
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 3. [Petitioner] advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses
in causing the issuance and registration of the Condominium
Certificate of Title.
4. Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is
stipulated that the VENDEE [respondent] shall pay all the
expenses for the preparation and registration of this Deed of Sale
and such other documents as may be necessary for the issuance
of the corresponding Condominium Certificate of Title.
5. After the [petitioner] complied with its obligations under the said
Deed of Sale, [respondent], notwithstanding demands made by
[petitioner], failed and refused to pay [petitioner] its legitimate
advances for the expenses mentioned above without any valid,
legal or justifiable reason.
6. [Respondent] averred among others that it has just and valid
reasons for refusing to pay [petitioner’s] legal claims.
a. In clear and direct contravention of Section 25 of
Presidential Decree No. 957 which provides that ‘No fee
except those required for the registration of the deed of
sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the
issuance of such title’, the [petitioner] has jacked-up or
increased the amount of its alleged advances for the
issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate
of Title in the name of the [respondent], by including
therein charges which should not be collected from
buyers of condominium units.
b. "[Respondent] further averred that [petitioner] represented
to the [respondent] that the condominium unit will be
delivered completed and ready for occupancy not later
than December 31, 1981. [Respondent] relied solely upon
the descriptions and warranties contained in the
aforementioned brochures and other sales propaganda
materials when [respondent] agreed to buy Unit E-4A of
the Twin Tower(s) for the hefty sum of P2,048,900.00
considering that the Twin Towers was then yet to be built.
In contravention of [petitioner’s] warranties and of good
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engineering practices, the condominium unit purchased
by [respondent] suffered from the following defects and/or
deficiencies:
7. Trial court ruled:
1. Ordering the [respondent] to pay [petitioner] the sum of
P26,300.45, with legal interest from the filing of the complaint
up to full payment thereof, representing the amount spent for
the registration of the title to the condominium unit in
[respondent’s] name;
2. Ordering [petitioner] to deliver, replace or correct at
[petitioner’s] exclusive expense/cost or appoint a licensed
qualified contractor to do the same on its behalf, the following
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit owned by the
[respondent.
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] the following:
a. The sum of P40,000.00 representing reimbursement
for expenses incurred for the materials/labor in
installing walls/floor titles in 2 bathrooms and bar
counter cabinet.
b. The sum of P136,608.75, representing unearned
income
c. The sum of P27,321.75 per month for a period of
twenty-one (21) months (from May 1985 to January
1987), representing unearned income
8. Court of Appeals sustained the trial court’s finding that "while
[petitioner] succeeded in proving its claim against the [respondent]
for expenses incurred in the registration of [the latter’s] title to the
condominium unit purchased, x x x for its part [respondent] in turn
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 succeeded in establishing an even bigger claim under its
counterclaim."11
9. Hence, this Petition.12
Issues:
Whether or not the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the respondent’s
counterclaim--being one for specific performance (correction of
defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit) and damages? YES!
And, whether or not petitioner could still deny the trial court’s jurisdiction
after prceeding with the trial? NO!
The Petition is partly meritorious.
Held:
Contending that it was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) -- not the RTC -- that had jurisdiction over respondent’s
counterclaim, petitioner seeks to nullify the award of the trial court.
As mandated by PD No. 957, the jurisdiction of the HLURB is
encompassing. Hence, we said in Estate Developers and Investors
Corporation v. Sarte:15
"x x x. While PD 957 was designed to meet the need basically to protect
lot buyers from the fraudulent manipulations of unscrupulous subdivision
owners, sellers and operators, the ‘exclusive jurisdiction’ vested in the
NHA is broad and general -‘to regulate the real estate trade and business’
in accordance with the provisions of said law."
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases enumerated in
Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, we have ruled that the board
has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of specific performance for the delivery
of a certificate of title to a buyer of a subdivision lot;16 for claims of refund
regardless of whether the sale is perfected or not;17 and for determining
whether there is a perfected contract of sale.18
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Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim -- being one for specific
performance (correction of defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit)
and damages -- falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by
Section 1 of PD No. 1344.
In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial, and only after a
judgment unfavorable to it did it raise the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it may
no longer deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, for estoppel bars it from doing
so. This Court cannot countenance the inconsistent postures petitioner
has adopted by attacking the jurisdiction of the regular court to which it
has voluntarily submitted.24
The Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of submitting one’s case
for decision, and then accepting the judgment only if favorable, but
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if it is not.25
We also find petitioner guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the
question of jurisdiction earlier. From the time that respondent filed its
counterclaim on November 8, 1985, the former could have raised such
issue, but failed or neglected to do so. It was only upon filing its appellant’s
brief26 with the CA on May 27, 1991, that petitioner raised the issue of
jurisdiction
Thus, we struck down the defense of lack of jurisdiction, since the
appellant therein failed to raise the question at an earlier stage. It did so
only after an adverse decision had been rendered.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals MODIFIED, as follows:
Hereby DELETED is the requirement on the part of petitioner to (1) deliver
storage facilities on the ground floor; (2) pay P136,608.75 for unearned
income for the five-month period that the lease contract was allegedly
suspended; (3) correct the alleged passageway in the balcony; (4) pay
P40,000.00 as reimbursement for completion work done by respondent; (5)
pay P27,321.75 per month for a period of twenty-one months for the
alleged unearned income during the period when the condominium unit
remained vacant. Petitioner, however, is ORDERED to pay P51,000 as
temperate damages for the termination of the lease contract because of
the defects in the condominium unit. All other awards are AFFIRMED.
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 BPI v. ALS Management & Development Corporation
G.R. No. 151821. April 14, 2004

Panganiban, J:

Doctrine:

“Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any
double-dealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by
deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the
elementary principles of justice and good faith. There is no denying that,
in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction
throughout the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they
voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of
said court. It is now too late in the day for them to repudiate the
jurisdiction they were invoking all along.”

Facts:

Petitioner BPI Investment Corporation filed a complaint for a Sum of

Money against respondent, alleging that on July 22, 1983, both executed
at Makati, Metro Manila a Deed of Sale for one (1) unfurnished
condominium unit of the Twin Towers Condominium comprising of 271
square meters more or less, together with parking stalls identified as G022
and G-63.
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Petitioner advanced the amount of P26,300.45 for the expenses in
causing the issuance and registration of the Condominium Certificate of
Title. Under the penultimate paragraph of the Deed of Sale, it is stipulated
that respondent, as vendee, shall pay all the expenses for the preparation
and registration of this Deed of Sale and such other documents as may be
necessary for the issuance of the corresponding Condominium Certificate
of Title. After the petitioner complied with its obligations under the said
Deed of Sale, respondent, notwithstanding demands made by petitioner,
failed and refused to pay without any valid, legal or justifiable reason.
Respondent claimed that it has just and valid reasons for refusing to pay
petitioner’s legal claims as petitioner jacked-up or increased the amount of
its alleged advances for the issuance and registration of the Condominium
Certificate of Title, by including therein charges which should not be
collected from buyers of condominium units. Furthermore, it was claimed
that the condominium unit purchased by respondent suffered defects
and/or deficiencies in contravention with the warrantied given by the
petitioners.
The trial court ordered the respondent to pay the sum of P26,300.45, with
legal interest from the filing of the complaint up to full payment thereof,
representing the amount spent for the registration of the title to the
condominium unit while petitioner was ordered to repair the defects in the
condominium unit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue:
Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
Yes, the the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Ratio:
Promulgated on July 12, 1976, PD No. 957 -- otherwise known as “The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree” -- provides that
the National Housing Authority (NHA) shall have “exclusive authority to
regulate the real estate trade and business.” Meanwhile, PD No. 1344
entitled “Empowering the National Housing Authority to Issue Writs of
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Execution in the Enforcement of Its Decisions Under Presidential Decree
No. 957” expanded the jurisdiction of the NHA to include “claims
involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer,
broker or salesman; and cases involving specific performance of
contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or
condominium unit against the owner, developer, broker or salesman.”
By virtue of Executive Order No. 648, the regulatory functions of the NHA
were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC). Pursuant to Executive Order No. 90 dated December 17, 1986,
the functions of the HSRC were transferred to the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the HLURB over cases
enumerated in Section 1 of PD No. 1344 is exclusive. Thus, the SC has
ruled that the board has sole jurisdiction in a complaint of specific
performance for the delivery of a certificate of title to a buyer of a
subdivision lot; for claims of refund regardless of whether the sale is
perfected or not, and for determining whether there is a perfected contract
of sale. Clearly then, respondent’s counterclaim being one for specific
performance (correction of defects/deficiencies in the condominium unit)
and damages falls under the jurisdiction of the HLURB as provided by
Section 1 of PD No. 1344.
The question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time, provided that such
action would not result in the mockery of the tenets of fair play. As an
exception to the rule, however, the issue may not be raised if the party is
barred by estoppel. In the present case, petitioner proceeded with the trial,
and only after a judgment unfavorable to it did it raise the issue of
jurisdiction. Thus, it may no longer deny the trial court’s jurisdiction, for
estoppel bars it from doing so. The SC cannot countenance the
inconsistent postures petitioner has adopted by attacking the jurisdiction
of the regular court to which it has voluntarily submitted.
The undesirable practice of submitting one’s case for decision, and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction if it is not is frowned upon by the Court Petitioner was found
guilty of estoppel by laches for failing to raise the question of jurisdiction
earlier. From the time that respondent filed its counterclaim on November
8, 1985, the former could have raised such issue, but failed or neglected
27
to do so. It was only upon filing its appellant’s brief with the CA on May 27,
1991, that petitioner raised the issue of jurisdiction for the first time.

A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different

ways and for different reasons. Thus, we speak of estoppel in pais, of
estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in
general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. The
doctrine of laches or of ‘stale demands’ is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of
stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of
time but is principally a question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting G.R. NO. 154295. July 29, 2005]
a right or claim to be enforced or asserted. METROMEDIA TIMES CORPORATION and/or ROBINA
GOKONGWIE-PE, Petitioners, v. Johnny Pastorin, Respondent.
The Court applied the ruling in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, which state:
“Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any
FACTS:
double-dealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by
deliberately taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the
elementary principles of justice and good faith. There is no denying that, Johnny Pastorin (Respondent) was employed by Metromedia Times
in this case, petitioners never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout Corporation (Petitioner) on 10 December 1990 as a Field
the entire proceedings in the trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and Representative/Collector. His task entailed the periodic collection of
willingly submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of said court. It is now receivables from dealers of petitioner's newspapers.
too late in the day for them to repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking
all along.” Respondent, because of tardiness was supposedly terminated by the
petitioner company, but because of the timely intervention of the union,
the dismissal was not effected.

However, he incurred another infraction when he obtained a loan from a

magazine dealer and when he was not able to pay the loan, he
stopped collecting the outstanding dues of the dealer/creditor. After
requiring him to explain, respondent admitted his failure to pay the loan
but gave no definitive explanation for the same.

Thereafter, he was penalized with suspension. He was also not allowed

to do field work, and was transferred to a new position. Despite the
completion of his suspension, respondent stopped reporting for work and
sent a letter communicating his refusal to accept the transfer. He then filed
a complaint for constructive dismissal, non-payment of backwages and
other money claims with the labor arbiter.

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The complaint was resolved in favor of respondent. Petitioner lodged an
appeal with the NLRC, raising as a ground the lack of jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter over respondent’s complaint. Significally, this issue was not
raised by petitioner in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and ruled that the LA has no
jurisdiction over the case, it being a grievance issue properly cognizable
by the voluntary arbitrator. However, the CA reinstated the ruling of the
CA. The CA held that the active participation of the party against whom
the action was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction
of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action is pending, is
tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide
by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on
impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the
LA during appeal.
HELD:
The SC held that petitioner is not estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the LA during appeal.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter
of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or
agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been
qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling
in the cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been applied to situations which were obviously not
contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances involved in
Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the accepted concept of
non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has been ignored and, instead a
blanket doctrine had been repeatedly upheld that rendered the supposed
ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the exception, but rather the general rule,
virtually overthrowing altogether the time honored principle that the issue of
jurisdiction is not lost by waiver or by estoppel.
The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction
seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or
not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon
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the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal,
from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same 'must exist as a matter of
law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel.
However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no
jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted,
on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position—that the lower court had
jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no
bearing thereon.
Applying the general rule that estoppel does not confer jurisdiction,
petitioner is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the labor
arbiter before the NLRC on appeal.
Decision of the CA is set aside.
Lourdes Eristngcol vs CA, G.R. No.167702. March 20, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner, owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village, Makati City
started constructing a house on her lot but for alleged violation of its
Construction Rules and Regulations, respondent UVAI, an association of
homeowners at Urdaneta Village, imposed on her a penalty of
P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the
village and working on her property. This prompted petitioner to file the
subject complaint before the RTC. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss
on ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter arguing that it is
the Home Insurance Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) which has jurisdiction
over intra-corporate disputes involving homeowners associations.
Petitioner argues that the subject matter of her complaint is properly
cognizable by the regular courts and need not be filed before a specialized
body or commission.
ISSUE:
Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB)*** which has jurisdiction?
29
HELD:

HLURB has jurisdiction. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the rule that in

determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, we should consider
not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy. To determine the nature of
an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the
averments of the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed
for. Ostensibly, Eristingcol’s complaint, designated as one for declaration
of nullity, falls within the regular courts’ jurisdiction. However, we have, on
more than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not
determinative of the nature of the action. A scrutiny of the allegations
contained in Eristingcol’s complaint reveals that the nature of the question
subject of this controversy only superficially delves into the validity of
UVAI’s Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes into the proper
interpretation and application of UVAI’s by-laws, specifically its
construction rules. Essentially, the conflict between the parties arose as
Eristingcol, admittedly a member of UVAI, now wishes to be exempt from
the application of the canopy requirement set forth in UVAI’s Construction
Rules. ***(E.O. No. 535, which amended Republic Act No. 580 creating
the HIGC, transferred to the HIGC the regulatory and administrative
functions over homeowners’ associations originally vested with the SEC
as well as controversies arising from intra-corporate or partnership
relations. Thereafter, with Republic Act No. 8763, the foregoing powers
and responsibilities vested in the HIGC, with respect to homeowners’
associations, were transferred to the HLURB.)

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