Transmission Line Tower Failures

क्षतिग्रस्ि ट्रांसतिशन लरइन टॉवरों पर तवशेषज्ञों की स्थरयी सतिति की ररपोटट
(तिसम्बर 2015 – तसिम्बर 2016)

REPORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS
ON FAILURE OF EHV TRANSMISSION LINE TOWERS
(DECEMBER 2015 -- SEPTEMBER 2016)
भररि सरकरर
Government of India
के न्द्रीय तवद्यु ि प्ररतिकरण
Central Electricity Authority
तवद्युि ित्र
ां रलय
=
Ministry of Power
नई तिल्ली
New Delhi
(विद्युत अविवियम,2003 की िारा 73(एल) के तहत के .वि.प्रा. के दावयत्ि का वििवहि करते हुए )
(In fulfilment of CEA’s obligation under section 73(l) of Electricity Act, 2003)
CENTRAL ELECTRICITY AUTHORITY
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sl. No. Description Page No.
1. Executive Summary 2
2. Report of Standing Committee of Experts 11
3. Annexure – A 42
Minutes of the Meeting
4. Annexure-B 50
Report / Data submitted by Concerned

Utilities on Tower Failure along with
photographs
5. Annexure- C 168
Composition of Standing Committee of

Experts
Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period December 2015 to September 2016 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1.0 A Standing Committee of experts in the field of design & operation of EHV
Transmission line (from CEA, PGCIL & research/academic institutes) constituted by
Central Electricity Authority in 1999 as per old Electricity (Supply) Act No. 54 of 1948,
continues to carry out investigation of failure of transmission line towers of Power
utilities as per the Section 73(1) of Electricity Act 2003. Office order vide which
Standing Committee was constituted is enclosed at Annexure- C
1.1 Over the years the Indian Standards for design of transmission line tower has undergone
changes. The three wind zones in the country have been modified to six wind zones and
design is being revised accordingly. Further revision in Indian Standard is likely to
include the change in wind speed pattern in some part of the country (i.e.) transmission
line towers have to be designed for higher wind zones in such areas. The Indian Standard
IS: 802 (Part-1) was first published in 1967 and subsequently revised in 1973, 1977, 1995
and 2015. The standard in its third revision was split in to two sections(section-1;
covering Material and Loads) and (section-2: covering Permissible Stresses).
1.2 Major modification made in revision of IS:802 (Part-1/Section-1)- 2015 are as follows:
a) Material requirement for bolts and nuts have been modified.
b) Light angle towers for use in straight runs with line deviation>50 but<150 and
medium angle towers (150 to 300) have been included.
c) Drag co-efficient for evaluating wind load on towers have been stipulated for
different sections (such as angles and circular sections).
The change in Drag Co-efficient for different solidity ratios are as follows:
As per IS 802:1995 As per IS 802:2015

Solidity ratio Drag Coefficient Solidity ratio Drag Coefficient
upto 0.05 3.6 upto 0.05 --
0.1 3.4 0.1 1.9
0.2 2.9 0.2 1.8
0.3 2.5 0.3 1.7
0.4 2.2 0.4 1.7
0.5 & above 2.0 0.5 1.6
0.75 1.6
1.00 2.0
d) Load combination for sag tension of conductor and ground wire / optical ground
wire(OPGW) and for climate loads have been modified.
IS:802(1995) IS:802(2015)
The average height of conductor/ground wire The average height will be taken up to the
shall be taken up to clamping point of top clamping point of conductor/ ground wire/
conductor/ ground wire on tower less two-third OPGW on tower less two-third the sag at
the sag at minimum temperature and no wind. minimum temperature and no wind.
As per new provision, the design tension for top, middle & bottom conductor will be
different under full wind condition.
e) Narrow front wind load has been identified as an applicable load for suspension
towers.
These loads are caused by higher wind velocity in narrow width acting on tower and
insulator and no wind is considered acting on wires under this condition.
f) Transverse load conditions have been modified.

 For suspension tower, the transverse load on wire(conductor/groundwire/OPGW)
due to deviation (under security condition) shall be corresponding to 75% of full
wind pressure at every day temperature.
 For tension and dead end towers, the transverse load on
conductor/groundwire/OPGW due to deviation(under security condition) shall be
corresponding to 100% of full wind pressure at every day temperature.
 But for tension and dead end towers, the transverse load due to wind on
wire(conductor/groundwire/OPGW) under security condition shall be
corresponding to 75% of full wind pressure at every day temperature which was
100% in pre-revised IS i.e. IS :802 (1995)
g) Vertical erection loads in safety requirement have been modified.

The erection load at lifting points for 400kV & higher voltage, assumed as acting at
locations specified below.
Tension Tower with Vertical Distance from the Tip

Load (N) of Cross Arm (mm)
Twin bundle conductor 10,000 600
Triple / Quadruple bundle conductor 20,000 1000
Hexabundle conductor 30,000 1000
Octa bundle conductor 40,000 1000
The Erection load for tension towers with hexa&octa bundle conductors have been
included in the revised Indian Standard, as indicated above.
h) Wind load consideration in longitudinal load calculation for security requirement has
been redefined.
For suspension tower, tension and dead end towers, the longitudinal load(under
security condition) shall be corresponding to 75% of full wind pressure at every day
temperature which was 100% for tension & dead end towers as per pre-revised IS
i.e. IS:802(1995)
i) The Reliability level has been modified as indicated below:
IS:802(1995) IS:802(2015)
Triple and quadruple circuit towers upto The clause has been
400 kV lines to be designed corresponding deleted.
to the reliability level 2.
The objective of above revisions is optimization of design. In the process, the design
margin might have changed.
1.3 Infact transmission lines designed according to old standards / old design philosophy are
in operation in various parts of the country under different transmission utilities /
transmission licensees which cannot be replaced in one go. Steps are being taken from
time to time to strengthen such towers when any major failure occurs in those old lines.
But all efforts are being made to design new transmission line as per latest standard and
best practices.
1.4 The objective of Standing Committee is to visit site of failure, investigate the cause of
failure and to discuss the cause of failure of towers of the transmission lines of power
utilities in different parts of the country and recommend remedial measures to prevent
repetition of such failures in future. In most of the cases, the visit to site of failure do not
materialise and analysis of cause of failure is being done based on information provided
by the utilities and their participation in the Standing Committee meeting. As per the
requirement of the Standing committee, all utilities / transmission licensees are supposed
to report the failure of towers of 220kV and above voltage class transmission lines to
CEA. Infact, number of failure cases remains unreported as many of Power Transmission
utilities (State Transmission utilities, Private Transmission utilities/licensees) in the
country neither report the failure of towers of transmission line nor participate in such
national level meeting.
1.5 The meeting of Standing Committee of Experts was held in CEA on 02.12.2016 to
discuss the cause of failure of the transmission line towers of different voltage levels
belonging to various Power transmission utilities/licensees and failed during the period
from December,2015 to September,2016. During this period, the failure of towers of
various transmission lines of only two utilities [PGCIL &DTL.] were reported to CEA.
Accordingly, the Committee discussed in detail the nature and cause of failure of towers
of transmission lines of these two utilities. Apart from the discussion on tower failures
during above mentioned period, discussions held withspecial inviteesfrom Transmission
Licensees and Experts in the field to share their experience on failure of
towers.Representative from National Institute of Wind Energy (NIWE) was also invited
to discuss about sharing of the wind data from measuring/monitoring station of NIWE
and how their data can be best used for the wind speed mapping of the country as NIWE
have more than 800 wind data measuring stations all over the country. However, due to
some urgent engagement, NIWE representative could not attend the meeting and matter
would be discussed in the next meeting.
1.6 During the presentation made by CPRI, it was brought to notice that most of the cases of
failure oftowers duringtesting have occurred under loading corresponding to security
condition. The failed towers are generally strengthened and retested. But in case of
failure(s) under reliability condition, complete collapse of tower used to taken place. In
some cases, bolts are responsible for failure of tower during testing, because either
number of bolts are not adequate in the design and/or proper care has not been taken
during erection of tower.Failure of towers also takes place during the waiting period of
five minutes under full load condition.CPRI representative mentioned that in the last 5
years, the average percentage of failure of towers (66 kV to 765kV) during testing is
23%. It is observed that the failure rates are more at higher voltage level.
1.7 Use of steel pole structures is increasing, particularly in urban areas due to space
constraints and reduced requirement of foot prints. At present, there is no Indian standard
for steel pole structures for use in EHV transmission line.
1.8 During the meeting, Structural Engineering Research Centre (SERC) highlighted about
the development of Glass Fibre Reinforced Polymer (GFRP) based material for
strengthening of members of existing towers of line without replacement of existing
member and without requiring any additional nuts & bolts and hence shut down period of
line would be reduced. The clipping work can be taken up even under live condition
depending upon location of member on the tower. The pilot project taken up by PGCIL
for strengthening of tower members using steel clipping material (without replacement of
existing member) was also brought to notice of members.
1.9 The pattern of failure of towers of lines of various voltage levels can be broadly classified
as under:
 Towers have buckled from stub level leading to complete collapse of towers with/without
damage to tower foundation.
 Towers have buckled from the top of 1stpanel (normal tower) level with/without damage
to tower foundation.
 Towers have buckled from bottom cross arm level or top cross arm level or peak broken
without any damage to lower portion of the tower and foundation.
 Uprooting of foundation Chimney.
 Damage to foundation as well as tower due to soil erosion and inadequate protection to
foundation of towers.
 Shearing of stubs of leg members of towers.
2.0 The major cause of failure of towers are as under:

a) The high wind velocity during storm, cyclone and local phenomenon of whirlwind and
gale etc. might have exceeded the wind speed for which the tower is designed. This type
of wind is difficult to predict. The probability of such occurrences is low & the tower
design will be uneconomical if such situation is considered in the design.
b) Theft/sabotage of tower members, generally the theft of secondary members(connected

with one or two bolts) of the towers, by the local people makes the tower structurally
weak which ultimately leads to failure during high speed wind/ storms/whirlwind/
cyclone etc.
c) It is also difficult to take into account demolishing activities by miscreants like

cutting/blasting the main members of the tower, during design or construction stage.
d) Many lines are in operation with towers designed according to old Indian Standards (IS:
802 -1977). The Indian Standard has been revised subsequently in the year 1995 and
2015 to incorporate new design concepts. Though suspension towers in some of the
vulnerable lines have been strengthened, it is not prudent to abandon/strengthen all these
lines currently in operation. However, based on frequency of failure, the towers need to
be strengthened.
e) Lack of proper soil investigation and deficiency in design/construction of foundation of

towers may also result in failure of towers.
f) Sometimes, proper protection has not been provided for foundation of towers in steep
slope/hilly terrain. Many times landslide causes erosion of soil below foundation which
in turn causes the failure of foundation and subsequently failure of towers.
g) Tower foundation failure (located near river bank) due to erosion of soil below
foundation by flash floods.
h) Shear failure of stubs of leg members of towers due to torsional forces on account of
sinking of some of the legs.
3.0 BRIEF DETAILS OF FAILURE OF TOWERS OF VARIOUS TRANSMISSION

LINES REPORTED TO CEA
3.1 The number of towers failed & lines affected at various voltage level during the period from
December,2015 to September, 2016 is tabulated below:
No. of
Date of
Sl. towers Name of
Name of Transmission line occurrence
No. failed utility
of Failure
400 kV D/C Nellore- Triuvalem
1. 4.12.2015 1 PGCIL
transmission line
400 kV D/C Rourkela- Sundergarh PGCIL

2 24.01.2016 2
transmission line
400 kV S/C Uri-II-Wagoora transmission

3. 28.01.2016 1 PGCIL
line
765 kV Angul- Sundergarh- Ckt-I
4. 12.02.2016 1 PGCIL
transmission line
765 kV Gaya- Fatehpur transmission
5 Line 07.03.2016 1 PGCIL
400 kV Jeypore- Indravati transmission

6. 15.03.2016 2 PGCIL
line
765 kV S/C Moga- Meerut
7. transmission line 13.05.2016 1 PGCIL
765 kV S/C Bina- Gwalior-III

8. 21.05.2016 1 PGCIL
transmission line
9. 765 kV S/C Bhiwani- Fagi 23.05.2016 9 PGCIL
transmission line
400 kV D/C Jind- Bhiwani
400 kV D/C Farakka- Sagardighi

11. 27.05.2016 1 PGCIL
transmission line
220 kV D/C Hissar- Hissar
400 kV D/C Jind- Bhiwani

13. Transmissionline 29.05.2016 4 PGCIL
765 kV S/C Meerut- Greater Noida

14. 13.06.2016 1 PGCIL
transmission line
220 kV D/C Kakrapar- Haldarwa
15. 04.07.2016 2 PGCIL
transmission line
220 kV D/C Mariani- Mokokchung
16. 12.07.2016 2 PGCIL
transmission line
400 kV D/C (Quad) Kishanganj-
17. Patna transmission line 26.07.2016 1 PGCIL
400 kV D/C (Quad) Kishanganj-

18. Patna transmission line 01.09.2016 4 PGCIL
400 kV D/C Bamnauli- Jhatikara

19 22.05.2016 1 DTL
transmission line
3.2 Some of the failure sites in respect of transmission lines listed above i.e. the line at Sl.
No. 7,9, 12,13, 14,17 & 18 was jointly visited by representatives of CEA &PGCIL and
line at Sl.No. 19 was visited jointly by representatives of CEA, PGCIL &DTL and
preliminary reports on the finding were submitted.
3.3 The number of suspension and tension towers at various voltage level, failed during
above mentioned period are indicated below:
Sl. Voltage Level No. of Lines No. of Towers failed

No. affected
Suspension Tension Total
Towers Towers
1 765 kV 6 11 3 14
PGCIL 6 11 3
2 400kV 9 10 8 18
PGCIL 8 10 7
DTL 1 0 1
3 220 kV 3 2 4 6
PGCIL 3 2 4
Total 18 23 15 38
3.4 Out of 38 Nos. of failed towers,23Nos.(60.52%) are of suspension type towers and rest
15 Nos.( 40.48%) are tension type towers.
3.5 In plain terrains, percentage of tangent / suspension towers are normally much more
compared to tension / angle towers and hence there is tendency to optimize the design
(without much safety margin in design) in order to economize the cost of transmission
lines.
3.6 Intensity of wind has changed in some part of the country, but the wind map of India has
not been revised accordingly by BIS.SERC informed that revised map was submitted to
BIS for inclusion in relevant standard, which has not been incorporated so far. The members
of the Committee decided that CEA should write to BIS for revision of wind map both in IS
875 and IS 802. Chief Engineer, PSE&TD informed the members that CEA would also
request BIS to take initiative for formulating standard for the design of Steel Pole structures
in line with international standards.
4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS & REMEDIAL MEASURES SUGGESTED BY THE

COMMITTEE
Details of failure including minutes of meeting, photographs and other information

relating to each transmission lines are given in subsequent sections of the report.
4.1 The recommendations and remedial measures to be taken by the concerned utilities in
respect of their transmission lines is summarized as under:
A. Failure of transmission lines of PGCIL
a) PGCIL was advised to take utmost care during erection of towers to avoid failure due to
erection deficiencies and also to submit material test reports of the failed towers
[For765 kV S/C Jaipur(Fagi)-Bhiwani Ckt-I transmission line,400 kV D/C Jind-
Bhiwani Transmission Line]
b) The Committee recommended that the frequency of patrolling of lines must be
increased in theft prone areas and missing members should be replaced as early as
possible to avoid failure of towers due to theft of tower members. Assistance of local
people should be taken in theft prone areas to minimize the theft and damage to
towers.
[For 765 kV S/C Angul- Sundargarh-Ckt-Itransmission Line,400kV Rourkela –
Sundargarh – Raigarh LILO – I Transmission Line & 765 kV S/C Meerut-
Greater Noida Transmission Line]
c) Coping of chimneys of tower foundation, wherever required, should be taken up to
avoid rusting of stubs.
d) The material test reports of members of the failed tower should be examined to
ascertain the quality of steel material used.
e) Powergrid should strengthen the failed towers of the 765kV S/C line [with Delta
configuration and designed for wind zone-4] in line with in case of 765kV S/C Gaya-
Fatehpur transmission line as suggested by the Standing Committee in the previous

meeting held on 08.12.2015.
[ For 765 kV S/C Gaya-Varanasi-Fatehpur transmission line, 765 kV S/C Bina-
Gwalior-III Transmission Line & 765 kV S/C Meerut-Greater Noida
Transmission Line,]
f) In case of repeated failure of towers of transmission lines [designed according to
IS:802(1977)], strengthening of towers need to be done by providing hip bracings up
to the bottom cross arm level.
[ For 400 kV S/C Jeypore- Indravati Transmission Line & 400 kV S/C Farakka-
Sagardighi Transmission Line,]
g) Pile type foundations may be considered for towers in flood prone areas based on soil
investigation reports and latest high flood data.
[For 400 KV D/C (QUAD) Kishanganj - Patna transmission line]
h) Proper drainage and protection work/retaining walls should be provided for tower
foundations especially in steep slope/hilly terrain to avoid damage to foundations of
tower(s). Committee recommended for early completion of strengthening of tower.
[For 400kV D/C (Quad) Nellore – Tiruvalem Transmission Line & 220 kV D/C
Mariani-Mokokchung Transmission Line]
i) In case of more failure occurs in the line [designed according to IS:802(1995), review
of design of towers for strengthening need to be done. PGCIL was also advised to
submit material test report of failed towers.
[ For 765 kV S/C Moga- Meerut Transmission Line ]
j) In case of damage of foundation of towers, the foundation design/construction and
soil investigation report need to be examined.
[For 400kV S/C Uri II – Wagoora Transmission Line & 220KV D/C Kakrapar –
Haldarwa Transmission Line]
B) Failure of transmission lines of DTL
a) Committee noted that Dead End towers are normally designed for maximum deviation
angle taking into account dead end condition and are supposed to be strong and reliable.
The probabilities of failure of such structure is very rare. Hence, DTL should take
necessary action to replace the tower at location No.173 of Bamnauli – Ballabgarh
400kV line with a new tower along with new foundation and should take utmost care to
avoid erection deficiencies and repetition of such failure of towers in future.
4.2 The Committee also recommended the following measures in general for lines of all
utilities.
a) Utmost care must be taken during erection of towers to avoid failure due to erection
deficiencies.
b) Regular patrolling of the lines is required for smooth and trouble free operation of line.
c) Frequency of patrolling of lines must be increased in theft prone areas and missing
members should be replaced as early as possible to avoid failure of towers due to theft
of tower members.
d) Assistance of local people should be taken in theft prone areas to minimize the theft
and damage to towers.
e) Possibility of strengthening of members of failed towers by adopting new technologies

like clipping of members using GFRP clipping/steel clipping should be explored as a
pilot project.
f) Coping of chimneys of tower foundation, wherever required, should be taken up to
avoid rusting of stubs.
g) Proper drainage and protection work/retaining walls should be provided for tower
tower(s).
h) The material test reports of members of the failed tower should be examined to
ascertain the quality of steel material used.
i) In case of repeated failure of towers of transmission lines, designed according to IS:802
(1977), strengthening of towers need to be done by providing hip bracings up to the
bottom cross arm level.
j) Pile type foundations may be considered for towers in flood prone areas based on soil
k) In case of damage of foundation of towers, the foundation design/construction and soil
investigation report need to be examined.
l) Tower should be tested as per provisions of relevant IS and observed until specified
waiting period is over.
m) Providing proper revetment & use of geo-synthetic material in foundation, concrete
encasing & painting of stub in water logging areas etc. may also be considered,
wherever required.
4.3 The committee also decided that:
a) CEA would request BIS to take initiative for formulating standard for the design of
Steel Pole structures in line with international standards.
b) CEA would take upwith BIS for revision of wind map both in IS 875 and IS 802 based
on input from SERC which highlights about the change in wind zone in some part of
the country.
Report
of
Standing Committee
of
Experts
REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO INVESTIGATE

FAILURE OF TOWERS DURING THE PERIOD DECEMBER 2015 TO
SEPTEMBER 2016
1.0 As per CEA Order No. 5-41/98/Secy/CEA/809, dated 30.9.1999 and subsequent
amendments thereof, a Standing Committee comprising of experts from CEA, PGCIL,
CPRI, Academic Institute, SERC and State Utilities was constituted as per Chapter II
Para 3 (viii) of the Electricity (Supply) Act No.54 of 1948 to investigate failure of
transmission line towers of power utilities. As per the Electricity Act, 2003, CEA
continues to be authorized under Section 73 (l) to carry out or cause to be carried out, any
investigation for the purpose of generating or transmitting or distributing electricity. The
scope and terms of reference of the Committee are as follows:
 To investigate the causes of failure of towers

 To avert recurrence of such failures in future
The meeting of Standing Committee of Experts was held in CEA on 02.12.2016 to

discuss the cause of failure of the transmission line towers of different voltage levels
belonging to various Power transmission utilities/licensees which failed during the period
from December, 2015 to September, 2016. During this period, the failure of towers of
various transmission lines of only two utilities [PGCIL & DTL.] was reported to CEA.
Accordingly, the Committee discussed in detail the nature and cause of failure of towers
of transmission lines of these two utilities. Apart from the discussion of tower failures
during above mentioned period, discussion was held with invitees of Transmission
Licensees/Experts in the field to share their experience on failure of towers.
Representative from National Institute of Wind Energy (NIWE) was also invited to
discuss about sharing of the wind data from measuring/monitoring station of NIWE and
how their data can be best used for the wind speed mapping of the country as NIWE have
more than 800 wind data measuring stations all over the country. However, due to some
urgent engagement, NIWE representative could not attend the meeting and matter could
not be discussed.
2.0 OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & REMEDIAL MEASURES

SUGGESTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON FAILURE OF TOWERS OF
VARIOUS POWER UTILITIES
2.1 DETAILS OF FAILURE OF TOWERS OF VARIOUS TRANSMISSION LINES OF

POWERGRID
2.1.1 The towers of following 765kV, 400kV and 220kV Transmission Lines of POWERGRID
had failed during above mentioned period.
Sl. Date of occurrence No. of towers failed

Name of Transmission line
No. Of Failure
400 kV D/C Nellore- Triuvalem
1. 4.12.2015 1
transmission line
400 kV D/C Rourkela- Sundergarh

2 24.01.2016 2
transmission line
400 kV S/C Uri-II- Wagoora
3. 28.01.2016 1
transmission line
765 kV Angul- Sundergarh- Ckt-I
4. 12.02.2016 1
transmission line
765 kV Gaya- Fatehpur transmission
5 07.03.2016 1
line
400 kV Jeypore- Indravati transmission
6. 15.03.2016 2
line
765 kV S/C Moga- Meerut transmission
7. 13.05.2016 1
line
765 kV S/C Bina- Gwalior-III
8. 21.05.2016 1
transmission line
765 kV S/C Bhiwani- Fagi transmission 9

9. 23.05.2016
line
400 kV D/C Jind- Bhiwani transmission

10. 23.05.2016 1
line
400 kV D/C Farakka- Sagardighi
11. 27.05.2016 1
transmission line
220 kV D/C Hissar- Hissar
12. 29.05.2016 2
transmission line
400 kV D/C Jind- Bhiwani Transmission
13. 29.05.2016 4
line
765 kV S/C Meerut- Greater Noida
14. 13.06.2016 1
transmission line
220 kV D/C Kakrapar- Haldarwa
15. 04.07.2016 2
transmission line
220 kV D/C Mariani- Mokokchung
16. 12.07.2016 2
transmission line
400 kV D/C (Quad) Kishanganj- Patna
17. 26.07.2016 1
transmission line
400 kV D/C (Quad) Kishanganj- Patna
18. 01.09.2016 4
transmission line
2.1.2 DETAILS IN RESPECT OF EACH TRANSMISSION LINE
1. 400kV D/C (Quad) Nellore – Tiruvalem Transmission Line failed on 04.12.2015

(One tower at Location No: 13)
Brief Background
400 kV D/C Nellore Thiruvalem transmission line was constructed by M/S KEC. The tower
parts for the line were also supplied by M/S KEC. The line was commissioned on 15.04.2014.
The length of line is 172.9 km. The towers of this portion were designed for wind zone 5
(50m/s) as per IS 802-1995. This is the first case of tower vulnerability noticed in the line.
Observations
On 04.12.2015, villagers informed that soil erosion have taken place in the foundation of
location no. 13 of the transmission line. During inspection on 05.12.2015, it was observed that
the Kalleru canal flowing 15-20 m away from the tower location had breached and the flood
water inundated the foundations of the tower location. Soil upto the frustum bottom level was
washed away in respect of legs A, C and D. Frustums of legs C and D were slightly tilted and
cracks developed in chimney. Due to displacement of foundation, mainly of legs C& D, the
tower belt member in the BC and CD section of tower got damaged and slightly bent. The
legs B and C were found to be slightly deformed.
Probable Cause of Failure
There was heavy cyclonic rain in Nellore District between 09.11.2016 and 20.11.2016 and
further continuous less intensity rain till 02.12.2016. The Kalleru canal, flowing 15-20 m
away from the tower location had breached and caused soil erosion at the base of tower. The
erosion of soil below the foundations had resulted in tilting of frustums of the tower and
cracking of the chimneys.
Restoration
Back filling of the tower legs has been done with the sand bags. The tower after repairs was
re-energized on 26.04.2016
Committee recommended for early completion of strengthening of damaged tower

foundations by providing proper protection to tower foundation. Use of pile foundation
would be considered, if the failure is repeated.
2. 400kV Rourkela – Sundargarh – Raigarh LILO – I Transmission Line failed on

24.01.2016 (Two towers at Location Nos. 21(DD+0) & 22(DA+0))
Brief Background
The 400 kV Rourkela-Raigarh transmission line was LILO at Sundergarh 400kV substation.
The LILO section was constructed by M/S Gammon. The tower parts for the line were also
supplied by M/S Gammon. The LILO line section was commissioned on 01.06.2013. Total
length of Rourkela-Sundergarh line is 142.5 km. This is the first case of tower failure in the
line. Towers of this section were designed for wind zone 3(44m/s) as per IS 802-1995.
Observations
It was reported that in the LILO section, towers at location No. 21 (DD+0) and location No.
22 (DA+0) had collapsed. Due to fall of both towers of the line, the underneath LT lines of
WESCO crossing under the 400 kV line got affected which is reported to have caused
damage of 2 Nos. transformers of WESCO and damaged some wiring and electrical
appliances of consumers of the adjacent village.
Stubs of all the 4 legs of Tower at location No. 21 (DD+0) have been damaged including
damages of chimney. Two (2) stubs of tower at location No. 22 (DA+0) have also been
damaged including chimney. Adjacent towers at location No. 20 and location No. 23 were
intact. It was observed that around 35 to 40 nos. of tower members of location No. 22
(DA+0) were missing/theft/hanging. The tower at location No. 21 (DD+0) was already
vulnerable with its deformed Leg-D which was to be rectified. District Collector,
Sundergarh was apprised of the situation at site and requested him to provide administrative
and police help during restoration activities as Kepsey villagers were obstructing the work
due to distruption of LT power supply in their village. An FIR was to be lodged with police
regarding theft of tower parts at location No. 22.
Due to sizeable quantity of theft/missing tower members in 1st and 2nd panel of tower at
location No. 22 (DA+0), it might have reduced the structural strength of the suspension tower
ultimately leading to collapse of this tower, which might have subsequently pulled the tower
at location No. 21 (DD+0).
Restoration
The Line was restored on 21.02.2016.

Committee advised Powergrid to increase frequency of patrolling of the line in affected area
and to take help of local people to avoid theft and damages to the towers.
3. 400kV S/C Uri II – Wagoora Transmission Line failed on 26.01.2016 (One tower at
location no. 135 (D+9))
Brief Background
400 kV S/C Uri-II Wagoora line was constructed by M/s Tata Projects limited. The line was
commissioned on 21.12.2011. The towers of this line were designed for basic wind speed of
39 m/s corresponding to Wind Zone-II as per IS 802-1995. The towers were designed in
Horizontal configuration with Twin Moose conductor. The line used to carry 60-120 MW
power in the winter season and about 250 MW in summer season. This line is the only
alternate route for flow of power from Uri in case of failure of Uri-I-Wagoora transmission
line.
Observations
The tower is situated in village Khaitengan near Baramulla. Villagers informed PGCIL
officials on 26.01.2016 that tower at location No. 135 has got some damage. The tower is
located in hilly terrain and its foundations started sinking into the soil. The leg D of tower
had totally sheared from the stub and hung in air. The stub of leg –A was also sheared off
and rested on ground along with bracings and portion of stub. The leg- B was sunk into the
ground for about 1.6 m depth. The stub of Leg-C was cracked at concrete level but was
intact. The tower was slightly tilted towards right when looking from Uri to Wagoora side..
The failure of towers could be due to sinking of leg B causing uneven distribution of load on
tower which resulted in shearing of stubs of leg A & D at concrete level and development of
crack in stub of leg C.
Restoration
For permanent restoration, survey of affected section was carried out and tower at location
No. 135 is to be shifted to a new location, about 65 meters uphill side from the original
position, which is not prone to sinking. The line was restored on 16.04.2016.
Committee discussed whether shearing of stubs could be due to sinking. Members of the
Committee were of the opinion that due to sinking of one of the legs and the tower being on a
hill slope, it might have subjected to torsional forces. Since the tower is designed only for
tension and compression forces, torsional forces might have caused the shear failure of stubs.
Committee requested Powergrid to submit material test report of the failed tower members.
4. 765 kV S/C Angul- Sundargarh Transmission Line-Ckt-Itransmission Line failed on

12/02/2016 (1 no. Angle towers at Loc. No. 42A/0)
Brief Background
765 kV S/C Angul-Sundargarh Line-I was constructed by M/s.IVRCL. The line was
commissioned on 25.01.2016. The towers of this line were designed for wind zone 4 (wind
speed of 47 m/s). The towers in this line were designed for both Horizontal & Delta
Configuration with Quad ACSR Bersimis Conductor. The Line tripped at 20:46 Hrs. on
12/02/2016 due to collapse of one angle towers at Loc. No. 42A/0.
Observations
It was observed that one angle tower at Loc. No. 42A/0 (B+0) of Delta configuration, had
collapsed from ground level and all four stubs were bent whereas all adjacent towers were in
intact. The affected tower had fallen in right side in transverse direction facing Sundargarh.
The affected tower was located in a plain open stretch of cultivated field having very few
trees. It was observed that the failure/damages in locations/stretches might have been caused
by Sabotage accompanied with planned removal of Tower Parts & Bolts upto waist level.
M/s IVRCL had lodged FIR with police on 13.02.2016 stating that this incident was due to
theft of tower members, tension plate & Bolt Nuts etc.
Sabotage accompanied with planned removal of Tower Parts & Bolts, above stub upto waist
level, might have caused weakening of tower structure and collapse of the tower.
Restoration
Line was restored on normal towers on 06.03.2016 at 18:28 Hrs.
Tower at Loc. No. 42A/0(B+0)
The Committee requested Powergrid to increase the frequency of patrolling in the area and to
take help of local people in theft prone areas to avoid the theft of members of the towers.
5. 765 KV S/C Gaya-Varanasi-Fatehpur transmission line failed on 07.03.2016 (Location.

No. 715 (A+3))
Brief Background
The affected portion of 765 kV S/C Gaya- Fatehpur transmission line was constructed by
M/s. Kalpataru. The line was commissioned on 31/03/2012. The towers of this line were
designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-
1995. The towers were designed in delta configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMISE
Conductor. Earlier, following incidents of tower collapse had occurred in this line:
Date of tower No. of towers Probable cause of tower

Section affected
collapse affected collapse
11/ 12th April’ 2012 314 (A+0) 1 Localized storm
305(A+3), 306(A+0),
311(A+0), 315(A+3),
320(A+0), 321(A+0),
322(A+0), 323(A+0),
31st May’ 2014 15 Localized cyclone
324(A+0), 325(A+0),
326(A+0), 327(A+0),
328(A+0), 329(A+0),
330(A+0)
14th May’ 2015 283(A+3) , 284(A+0) 2 Localized cyclone
12th June’ 2015 334 (A+0) 1 Localized cyclone
Observations
765 kV S/C Gaya-Fatehpur transmission line was under shut down from 07-03-2016 for
LILO arrangement of the line at Varanasi. During routine inspection/Patrolling of the
affected area on 08-03-2016, one tower at Loc. No. 715 near village Hisampur Mouza
Mangarh was found partially damaged from cross arm level. On enquiry from villagers it was
informed that the tower was damaged during localized cyclone at around 1100 PM on 07-03-
2016.It was observed that the tower has failed from waist level and fallen in transverse
direction in the direction of wind (i.e. left side while facing Fatehpur). All the four stubs of
the tower along with foundation were found intact. Many insulators of insulator strings were
intact but some insulators were damaged. Phase conductors were partially damaged. Some
Babool trees in the vicinity were also broken. This tower was located in a plain cultivated
field having very few trees. Therefore, the stretch might have experienced critical wind
during the storm
The failure of towers may have been caused by localized cyclone in the area which has
resulted in higher wind load on phase conductors, earthwire and tower than the design values.
Loc. No. 715 (A+3)

Restoration
Line was restored on conventional towers on 8th April’ 2016.
The committee noted that the pattern of failure is similar to that of failure of towers of this
line discussed in the previous standing committee meeting held on 08.12.2015 and suggested
that the strengthening of towers has to be carried out accordingly.
6. 400 kV S/C Jeypore- Indravati Transmission Line failed on 15.03.2016 (Two towers at
Location Nos. Loc. No. 119 &120)
Brief Background
400 kV S/C Jeypore- Indravati line was constructed by M/s.SAE/OSEB (OHPC Period). The
line was commissioned on 24.03.1990. The towers of this line were designed for medium
wind zone as per IS 802:1977. The towers are S/C horizontal type having I-I-I configuration.
Conductor configuration is Twin Moose. There was no previous history of tower collapse in
this line. The line tripped at 01:00 Hrs. on 15/03/2016 due to collapse of 02 nos. of
Suspension towers at Loc. No. 119 &120.
Observations
It was observed that tower at location No. 119 (A+0) had collapsed from ground level and
all four stubs were bent whereas the adjacent tower at location No. 120(A+3) collapsed from
+3 m extension section. Both the towers were fallen in right side in transverse direction
facing Indrāvati. These towers were located in a plain stretch of cultivated field having very
few trees. Many LT Poles, trees , LT Transformers, tin & wooden roofs were also severely
damaged near the affected area.
The failure of towers might have been caused by localized cyclone i.e. whirl wind, in the area
resulting in large wind load on phase conductors and earthwires as well as on tower itself
exceeding the design values.
Tower at Loc. No. 119 (A+0) Tower at Loc. No. 120 (A+3)
Restoration
The line was restored on 23.03.2016 at 22:08 Hrs.

Members of the Committee were of the opinion that PGCIL should check the adequacy of
tower designed according to new IS:802 (2015). PGCIL stated that strengthening of old
towers conforming to new IS:802 (2015) would be difficult as existing tower may not meet
the design requirement of new IS:802(2015).
Committee observed that the towers were designed according to old code IS 802:1977. Since
it was the first failure observed in this line, Committee suggested PGCIL to strengthen the
towers with hip bracings upto bottom cross arm level, if further failure occurs in the line.
7. 765 kV S/C Moga-Meerut Transmission Line failed on 13-05-2016 (LOCATION NO.:

649)
Brief Background
765 kV S/C Meerut-Moga transmission line was constructed by M/s. KEC and the line was
charged in May,2015. Line length is 337.074 kms. The towers of this line have been
designed for wind speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The
single circuit towers were designed in horizontal configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMIS
Conductor. The two peaks of the towers are carrying the two galvanized steel earth wire
parallel to each other. Insulator strings used for the horizontal configuration Suspension
tower are “DI” “V” “DI” ( Double “I” having 120 kN composite long rod insulators) whereas
for tension towers, it is “QT” (Quad tension) strings with 210 KN composite long rod
insulator. The transmission line tripped on 13/05/2016 at around 5:18PM because of tower
failure at location No.649 (A+0).
Observations
The team of officers from Powergrid and CEA had visited the site of failure on 16.05.2016.
Tower failure location No. 649(AH+0) is located in open wheat field at the back side of
400kV Dhuri S/S of PSTCL in Bhallwan village. It was observed that Tower had failed
above the waist level and the damaged portion was still attached and hanging after being bent
from the middle of top girder point. None of the conductor or earthwire had snapped.
Insulators were in damaged condition. The tower was still standing and other side cross arm
and earthwire peak appears to be intact. Adjacent towers were intact and no missing
members were seen. It was reported that a high intensity localized cyclonic storm with very
high wind velocity was experienced in this area which induced the tower damage. Uprooted
trees, broken branches, fallen transformer etc. were also seen in the vicinity of tower. The
foundations of the said tower were intact. Back to back of stub and diagonal dimensions
along with level difference between different legs of the tower were checked and no
appreciable difference were observed when compared with the dimensions indicated in the
structural drawing. Failed tower was examined for missing members and bolts/nuts. It was
found that there were no missing members; however, there were holes in some of the leg
members which were not filled with bolt & nut. Coping of foundation was not proper. This is
the first failure of 765kV S/C (horizontal configuration) towers in this line since its
commissioning.
Location no.-649(AH+0)
The intensity of wind storm was very high which caused devastating damages to the trees,
houses, LT lines and other properties etc. The intensity/ speed of wind might have exceeded
the limit for which the tower was designed resulting into the failure of tower.
Restoration
The line was restored on 24.05.2016.
The committee recommended to review design of towers for strengthening, as the towers
were designed according to old code IS:802 (1995), in case more failure occurs in such lines.
Committee requested Powergrid to submit material test report of the failed tower members.
8. 765 kV S/C Bina-Gwalior-III Transmission Line failed on 21.05.2016 (Location No 614)
Brief Background
765 kV S/C Bina-Gwalior-III transmission line was constructed by M/s LANCO. The line
was commissioned on 07.05.2014. The towers of this line were designed for basic wind
speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The towers were
designed in Delta configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMIS Conductor.765 kV S/C Bina-
Gwalior-III transmission line tripped at 20:33 Hrs on 21.05.2016 due to collapse of one tower
at location No. 614(A+0)
Observations
The tower is situated in cultivated field with very few trees in the vicinity. Tower collapsed
and bent above third panel level. Adjacent towers were checked thoroughly for missing tower
members and Bolts & Nuts. None of the tower members and Bolts & Nuts were found
missing. Discussion with the local people in the nearby villages revealed that exceptionally
high wind condition prevailed for some time in the area and tower had collapsed under high
wind conditions. In absence of metrological data, it is difficult to assess the speed of wind on
the day of failure of tower.
The failure of towers might have been caused by localized cyclone in the area resulting in
large wind load on phase conductors and earthwires as well as on tower body exceeding the
design values.
Restoration
Restoration of the line on normal towers was done on 30.05.2016.
The committee noted that the pattern of failure is similar to that of failure of towers of 765
kV Gaya- Fatehpur S/C Line (Designed for Wind Zone-4) discussed in the previous standing
committee meeting held on 08.12.2015 and suggested that the strengthening of towers has to
be carried out in line with above mentioned line. Committee requested Powergrid to submit
material test report.
9. 765 kV S/C Jaipur(Fagi)-Bhiwani Ckt-I transmission line Failed On 23.05.2016

(Location No. 65/4 (SA+0), 66/0 (SE+0), 66/1(SA+0), 66/2 (SA+0), 67/0 (SD+0), 67/1
(SA+0), 67/2 (SA+0) and67A/0 (SB+0))
Brief Background
765 kV S/C Jaipur-Bhiwani ckt-I transmission line was constructed by M/s. NCC. The line
was commissioned on 24-08-2015.The towers of this line were designed for basic wind speed
of 47 m/s corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The towers were designed in
Horizontal configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMIS Conductor. The line tripped at 20:37
Hrs. on 23-05-2016 due to collapse of 8 no. of towers at Location No. 65/4 (SA+0), 66/0
(SE+0), 66/1(SA+0), 66/2 (SA+0), 67/0 (SD+0), 67/1 (SA+0), 67/2 (SA+0) and 67A/0
(SB+0) during localized storm. One cross-arm of tower at location no. 65/3 (SA+0) also
damaged during the storm.
Observations
The team of officers from Powergrid and CEA had visited the site of failure on 24-05-2016.
It was observed that towers at 3 locations had collapsed, 6 meters above ground level. The
foundations were found intact and the towers had fallen in transverse direction. Towers at 5
locations had fallen completely on ground (all four stubs bent and some chimneys cracked).
Rusting of stubs noticed. Earthing was not proper. Bolts were missing at joint connecting
bracings with leg member. Cover plate of butt joint in bottom leg member was missing.
Many extra holes were observed in the tower members which were not plugged/filled.
Coping of chimneys were not done properly. Anti-climbing devices were missing in some
failed towers as well as healthy towers. Some of the bolts joining the members were thrown
out by shear forces cutting bolts of members and shearing of some lattice members. These
towers were located in a plain cultivated field having large number of trees in the vicinity. It
was observed that the few nut & bolts were missing which might have sheared at the time of
failure. Enquiry with local people revealed that high wind condition prevailed for some
period in the area. Number of trees was uprooted in the vicinity.
Based on the observation and investigation, the committee is of the view that the towers
might have collapsed/failed due to erection deficiencies observed during the visit (i.e.
missing bolts, non-filling of extra holes, not providing proper cover plates etc.) as well as
heavy wind conditions prevailed in the area leading to failure of so many towers.
Restoration
The line was restored on normal towers on 14.06.2016
Location no. 67/0, Tower Type- ‘SD+0’ Location no. 65/4, Tower Type- ‘SA+0’
Recommendation
The Committee advised Powergrid to take care of the erection deficiencies mentioned above
and submit material test reports of the failed towers at the earliest.
10. 400 kV D/C Jind-Bhiwani Transmission Line Failed on 23.05.2016 & on 29.05.2016
[(Location No. 170) & (Location no. 12,13,14 &15)]
Brief Background
400 kV D/C Jind-Bhiwani transmission line was designed by Powergrid and constructed by
M/S Aravali Infrastructure Limited, New Delhi. The length of the line is 82.23 km. The line
was commissioned on 31.03.2013. The suspension towers of this line were designed for basic
wind speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995 with I-I-I
insulator string in vertical configuration for Twin ACSR Moose conductor. The line tripped
at 20:37 Hrs. on 23.05.2016 due to collapse of one tower at location No. 170(DA). While the
restoration work of tower at location no. 170 (DA) was in progress, two (2) more towers at
location No. 13(DA) and 14(DA) which had collapsed during localized storm on 29.05.2016.
Earthwire peak of towers at location No. 12(DA) and 15(DA) was also damaged due to
failure of towers at location no. 13(DA) & 14 (DA).
Observations
This is the third incidence of tower failure in this line. Earlier 4 towers had failed on
11.03.2014 and 5 towers on 29.06.2014 due to localized cyclone/high velocity winds.
The tower No. 170 was partially damaged above bottom cross arm level. Erection of the
tower and stringing completed on 30.05.2016. Only Earthwire peak of tower at location no.
12 damaged. Tower no.13 was collapsed from about 6-meter height from ground level. All
stubs were intact. Tower at location No. 14 collapsed from ground level. All four stubs were
damaged and need rectification. In tower at location No. 15, only earthwire peak was
damaged.
It was observed that coping of chimneys of foundation was not done, foundation
reinforcements were visible on top of chimney, stubs were rusted, ACD and Earthing
connection was not visible at location no. 13 and 14. There were deep depressions near two
foundations at location No. 13 which are to be back filled with soil.
Powergrid was requested to provide structural drawing and foundation drawing during the
investigation. However, the same was not provided to CEA even after repeated requests.
Loc. No. 14
Failure of the towers might have been caused by localized wind storm prevailed in the area
resulting in excessive wind pressure on phase conductors and tower members.
.
Loc. No. 170 Loc. No-13
Restoration
Line was restored on conventional towers on 13.06.2016
Recommendations
The committee advised Powergrid to rectify all erection deficiencies mentioned above and
submit material test reports of the failed towers.
11. 400 kV S/C Farakka-Sagardighi Transmission line failed on 27.05.2016 (Location no.
19 (A+0))
Brief Background
400 kV S/C Farakka-Sagardighi transmission line was constructed by M/s EMC. The line
was commissioned on 01.12.1994. The towers of this line were designed for Medium wind
zone as per IS 802-1977. The towers were of horizontal configuration with Twin Moose
conductor and I-I-I Insulator strings. The Line tripped at 02:06 Hrs. on 27-05-2016 due to
partial collapse of tower at location no. 19 (A+0).
Earlier, following incidents of tower collapse had occurred in this line:
Sl. No. Date of Collapse Section affected Type of Tower(s) affected

1 12th February’ 2009 17 to 21 A type
2 27th May’ 2009 17 to 19 A type
Observations
The tower was located in cultivated field and there were no trees in the vicinity of tower
collapse. It was observed that the tower had collapsed above K-frame. All stubs were intact.
The towers were checked for missing/ theft members and bolts & nuts thoroughly to the
extents possible. No tower members/ bolts were found missing. During discussions with the
local people in the nearby villages, it was revealed that very high wind condition prevailed
for some time in the area and the tower was damaged due to high wind conditions.
Failure of the suspension tower might have been caused by localized heavy wind conditions
prevailing in the vicinity of transmission line which would have exerted high wind pressures
on the tower than the designed limit and damaged the tower.
Restoration
Line was restored on normal towers on 02-06-2016.
Committee observed that the towers were designed according to old code of IS 802:1977.
Since this was the third failure of the line and in the same section, Committee suggested
PGCIL to strengthen the towers by providing hip bracing up to the bottom cross arm level.
Committee also suggested Powergrid to explore the possibility of live line clamping method
of members with GFRP material designed by SERC, Chennai / Steel clamping to strengthen
the towers. Committee also asked Powergrid to submit material test reports of the failed
tower.
12. 220KV D/C Hisar-Hisar (I/A) Transmission Line failed on 29.05.2016 (Tower at
Location No. 2 (DA+18))
Brief Background
220KV D/C Hisar- Hisar (I/A) transmission line was constructed by M/s Transpower Engg
Ltd., Mumbai and the line was commissioned on 01-09-1994. The towers of this line were
designed for medium wind zone as per IS 802-1977. The towers were of vertical
configuration with ACSR zebra Conductor. The Transmission Line tripped at 18:03 Hrs. on
29.05.2016 due to collapse of 1 no. of tower at Location No. 2 (DA+18)
Observations
The team of officers from Powergrid and CEA had visited the site of failure on 01.06.2016. It
was observed that the tower at location no. 2 has collapsed from stub level and fallen in the
transverse direction. This tower was located just outside Hissar substation boundary wall.
Adjacent towers were checked thoroughly for missing/ theft of tower members, bolts & nuts
but no tower members or bolt were found missing. Coping of the chimney of foundations
was not done. On enquiry from villagers, it was informed that severe localized cyclone
coupled with thunderstorm had occurred in the evening of 29th May’ 2016 and created wide
spread damages in the area with uprooting of trees, lighting poles and damage to the
buildings causing disruption of traffic on the highways & roads.
It was also reported that 8 towers of 220 kV D/C Hisar (POWERGRID)-Sangwan (HVPNL)
transmission line of HVPNL have also collapsed during the storm in vicinity of “Sangwan”.
38 LT transformers, 1100 LT poles and more than 500 trees were damaged /up-rooted during
the storm.
Severe localized cyclone had occurred in the evening of 29th May’ 2016. Speed of the
cyclonic wind might have exceeded the designed wind speed leading to collapse of tower.
Restoration
Both circuits of 220kV Hisar (POWERGRID)-Hisar (I/A ) line have been permanently
restored on 08.07.2016.
Committee asked Powergrid to submit material test reports of the failed tower.
13. 765 kV S/C Meerut-Greater Noida Transmission Line failed on 13.06.2016

(Tower at Location No. 464 (A+3))
Brief Background
765 kV S/C Meerut-Greater Noida transmission line (part of 765 kV S/C Meerut-Agra line)
was constructed by M/s. EMCO. The line was commissioned on 01-06-2013. The towers of
this line were designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as
per IS 802-1995. The towers were designed in Delta configuration with Quad ACSR
BERSIMISE conductor. The line tripped at 19:55 Hrs. on 13-06-2016 due to collapse of 1 no.
of tower at Location No. 464 (A+3).
Observations
The team of officers from Powergrid and CEA had visited the site of failure on 15.06.
2016.The tower was located in cultivated field with very few trees in the vicinity. The Tower
completely collapsed on the ground and all the four stubs were found bent. As the restoration
work was started on 14.06.2016 and more than half of the tower was already dismantled by
the time the team reached the site, inspection of adjacent tower was carried out and the
following observations made.
1. One of the redundant member of the bottom most panel in longitudinal face was missing.
2. Few redundant members and one bracing were recently replaced with new ones.
3. The gusset plate associated the replaced members did not have proper dimensions.
4. ACD was partially damaged.
5. Some bolts and nuts were missing.
6. In a highway crossing span, Sag of one of the two ground wires appeared to be more than
the other.
PGCIL was requested to rectify the above discrepancies observed during visit of team to site
of failure and PGCIL was also requested to submit the material test report of the failed tower
members.
Discussion with the local people in the nearby villages revealed that exceptionally high wind
condition prevailed for some time in the area and tower has collapsed under high wind
conditions.
Since the inspection of the adjacent tower clearly indicates the chances of sabotage/theft, the
probable cause of failure of the tower due to theft of member could not be overruled. The
sabotage/theft of members might have caused the tower structurally weak leading to failure
of tower under local storm in the area.
Restoration
Line was restored on ERS on 17.06.2016 and on normal tower on 27-06-2016.
The Committee also noted that the pattern of failure of tower is similar to that of failure of
towers of 765 kV Gaya- Fatehpur S/C Line (Designed for Wind Zone-4) discussed in the
previous standing committee meeting held on 08.12.2015 and suggested that the
strengthening of towers has to be carried out in line with that line. PGCIL was also advised
by Committee to increase the frequency of patrolling of line in the affected area and to take
help of local people to avoid theft and damage to towers. Committee also requested
Powergrid to submit material test report of failed tower.
14. 220KV D/C Kakrapar – Haldarwa Transmission Line failed on 04.07.2016

(Towers at location No. 7(DD+0) and 8(DC+3))
Brief Background
220 kV Kakrapar-Haldarwa D/C line (74 kms) was designed by M/s HTPS and constructed
by M/s SAE (I) Ltd. The line was commissioned on 01-12-1992. Construction of the line was
carried out by M/s Gujrat Electricity Board on deposit work basis and subsequently handed
over to POWERGRID. This line was under satisfactory operation for the last 24 years and
such type of tower failures were not observed in past. The line tripped at around 17:41 Hrs.
on 04.07.2016 due to collapse of towers at location no. 7 & 8 during heavy windstorm and
rain.
The towers were designed according to old IS 802:1977.
Observations
The location of failure was approximately 1.7 kms from Kakrapar end of transmission line
and was situated in cultivated land near village Rajwad, Tehsil: Mandvi, Surat. The site was
accessible through Ahmedabad- Mumbai highway and village roads. The tower at loc. No. 7
collapsed in the traverse direction and chimney at this location had came out from 2 pits. The
tower at loc. No. 8 was in hanging condition as one chimney came out due to the sudden jerk
caused by tower collapsed at location no 7. The towers were checked thoroughly for missing/
theft of tower members and bolts & nuts and no tower members were found missing.
Adjacent towers in the vicinity were also checked and no missing members were observed.

Due to localized heavy wind conditions in the vicinity of transmission line with wind
blowing in the transverse direction of line, tower at location no. 7 might have failed. The
uprooting of two chimneys at location no. 7 and one chimney at location no. 8 could be due
to improper soil investigation and deficiency in foundation design.
Restoration
Line was restored on normal towers on 20.07.2016.
The Committee advised Powergrid to check the soil investigation report and foundation
design of the failed towers. PGCIL was also requested to submit material test report of the
failed tower members.
Failed tower at location no. 7 Failed tower at location no. 8
15. 220 kV D/C Mariani-Mokokchung Transmission Line failed on 12.07.2016 (Location

no. 56 (DC+3) & 57 (DC+0) )
Brief Background
The line was constructed as part of Palatana transmission project. Construction of the line
was done by M/s C&C Ltd. Total line length is 49 km. Towers for the line were supplied by
M/s Steel Products Limited, Kolkata. 220 kV towers designed by M/s RPG for wind zone 4
(47 m/s) with single Zebra conductor as per IS 802:1995. The line was commissioned on
17.07.2015. This was the first tower failure in the line. The 220KV Mariani-Mokokchung
Ckt-II transmission line tripped on 12.07.2016 at 01:11 Hr.
Observations
The line tripped with indication of fault at 24.5 km from Mariani end (Zone-1, R-Y phase )
and with indication of Zone-1, R-Y-B phase fault at Mokokchung end. During this period
Mariani-Mokokchung Ckt-1 was opened due to high voltage. The line tripped on SOTF when
attempted to charge the line from Mariani end. Subsequent to deployment of off line fault
locater followed by ground patrolling, it was observed that heavy landslide has occurred in
the stretch covering tower location 56 & 57(Chanki area in Nagaland) of the transmission
line. Complete deformation of the bottom part of tower & damage to foundation of tower at
location no 56 (DC+3) had taken place, resulting in complete failure of the tower. In the
tower at location no. 57 (DC+0), deformation in leg members of first and second section of
tower and its foundation had taken place due to complete sliding away of the supporting soil.
It was observed that massive landslide had taken place at various stretches in the entire hill
accommodating the tower locations from 52 to 59. Further, the situation was aggravated by
the continuous rainfall in the area during the last few weeks.
The failure of towers might have been caused by the landslides triggered by continuous rain
for few weeks. The landslide might have caused the complete sliding away of the supporting
soil which might have caused the deformation in tower.
Failure of tower at location no. 56 Landslide near the location no. 57
Restoration
The stability of soil strata near existing location 56 & 57 having been completely disturbed,
the casting of new foundations in their vicinity is not viable. As such, establishing a direct
connectivity between location 55 & 58 , thereby avoiding the completely instable stretch
from location 56 to 57 is found to be a suitable option. In view of span limits of the existing
towers at location nos. 55 & 58, towers of suitable design shall have to be installed at
location 55 & 58 to avoid the unstable stretch.
Considering the steep slope and instability in the are due to landslides, restoration of line on
ERS was not feasible. The power flow of the line was diverted through 132 kV Mariani-
Mokokchung line of Nagaland State electricity department. Permanent restoration of the line
was under progress and expected by December 2016.
Committee noted the above and suggested Powergrid to explore the possibility of providing
protection/ retaining wall for foundation of towers in hilly terrain to avoid such incidences in
future.
16. 400 KV D/C (QUAD) Kishanganj - Patna transmission line failed on 26.07.2016
(Location No. 51(DD+18))
Brief Background
400 kV D/C(Quad) Patna-Kishanganj transmission line was constructed by M/S EMC in year
2016 under the transmission system scheme for transfer of power from generation projects in
Sikkim to NR/WR(Part-B) scheme The towers of this line have been designed for Wind
Zone-IV as per IS:802-1995. The length of the line is 346.72 Km. The line was
commissioned on 28-03-2016 and this is the first failure of the line after commissioning.
The line was taken under shut down on 26.07.2016 from 09.56 Hr, for line crossing works
near Patna Substation. At about 12.00 Hrs. line maintenance employee received a phone from
the Mukhia of Simalbadi village that tower at location no. 51 of this line collapsed in river
Kankai. The line was taken under shutdown and during patrolling, it was observed that one
tension tower (DD+18) at location no. 51 of this line has completely fallen and partly
submerged due to flash flood in nearby Kankai river. The tower is situated near village
Simalbadi approximately 55 km from Purnea sub-station.
Observations
The team of officers from Powergrid and CEA had visited the site of failure on 29.07. 2016.It
was observed that houses, agricultural fields nearby the failed tower location were badly
affected by flood water and the affected location in the right bank of Kankai river was only
accessible through boat. The Collapsed tower at location no.51 was partially (two
foundations) submerged in water at the time of visit of team. The stub of one leg had bent
and the other sheared. This tower was erected on normal foundation (FS type). As per the
data/map available, the Kankai river was flowing about 128 meters away from the tower
Location no.51 in 2014. Committee enquired regarding the theft of the members for the
collapsed tower. It was informed by the site that there was no theft of the tower members. No
missing tower members were observed in the collapsed tower. There was no wind storm on
the day of failure.
The water level data of Kankai river at Chardariya Gauging Station of Central Water
Commission shows that the water level crossed the danger level of 46.90 m and reached the
maximum level of 47.430m on 26.07.2016, the day of failure. District Magistrate, Purnea had
visited the village during the floods, prior to the failure of the tower and inspected the flood
protection works at river bank.
Tower at location no. 51 might have collapsed due to erosion of soil below the foundations
i.e. due to failure of foundation at Leg ‘C’ & ‘D’. The intensity of the flash flood was severe
enough to wash away the foundations of the collapsed tower.
Restoration
Restoration of line on normal tower is in progress.
It is also not possible to reroute the line beyond the flood plain of the river as all possible
routes on the left and right of the current alignment is also in the meandering zone of the
river. Rerouting of line will increase line length and pile foundation cannot be avoided in the
alternate route.
Considering the fact that the affected location will be under constant threat of being washed
away by the Kankai river, whose course is quite unpredictable, the team of experts from CEA
& PGCIL had suggested for providing pile foundation at location no. 51 as a permanent
measure.
After deliberation the committee advised PGCIL to consider the use of Pile foundation at
location no.51 after soil investigation in view of threat from Kankai river.
17. 400 KV D/C (QUAD) Kishanganj - Patna transmission line failed on 01.09.2016
(Location No. 128D/0 (DD+25), 128E/0 (DD+25), 128F/0 (DD+25), 128G/0 (DD+25)&
129/0 (DD+09))
Brief Background
400 kV D/C Patna-Kishanganj transmission line was constructed by M/S EMC in year 2016
under the transmission system scheme for transfer of power from generation projects in
Sikkim to NR/WR(Part-B). The towers of this line have been designed for Wind Zone-IV as
per IS: 802-1995. The length of the line is 346.72 Km. The line was commissioned on 28-
03-2016 and this is the second failure of the line after commissioning. On 1st September
2016, due to unprecedented flash flood in Ganga river, two tension towers (DD+25m Extn.)
at location no. 128F/0 and 128G/0 of this line got collapsed.
Observations
400 kV D/C (Quad) Patna-Kishanganj transmission line was under breakdown with effect
from 26.07.2016 due to complete collapse of one tension tower (DD+18) at location no. 51
near village Simalbadi, approximately 55 km from Purnea sub-station. The Line was charged
with antitheft charging from Patna S/S end. The team of officers from Powergrid and CEA
had visited the site of failure on 09.11.2016 and taken an overview of the area which was
affected during the devastating flood in the river.
It was observed that water level in Ganga has lowered drastically compared to high flood
level condition. The site was approachable on cultivated land from right bank side. The
affected tower at location No. 128G/0 near the right bank was damaged heavily by the river
current. It was informed by site officials that this location was completely in dry bank
location and the stream was about 150m away from the location during construction of Pile
foundation of this tower. The tower including pile foundation of two legs was washed away
by river current and the chimneys of other two legs were damaged. The adjacent tower at
Location no. 128F/0 is situated in the current flow of water. Huge deposition of silt was
observed near this tower location. The collapsed tower was seen on the downstream side of
the tower location, partly submerged and entangled with debris. All the four chimneys of the
pile foundation were damaged. Towers at location No. 128 E/0 , 128D/0 in left bank side &
129/0 in right bank were in standing condition with major damages in cross arms, minor
damages in plan bracing & Hip bracings. PGCIL officers informed that the river shifted its
course towards right bank during this year. Unprecedented flood situation was observed in
the river and chimneys of pile foundations got fully submerged in water. On the date of
investigation, the water level has been receded and it was just below the pile cap at location
no. 128F/0.
It was reported that conductors were stolen at the right bank side between location No.
128G/0 & 129/0 after the failure. Committee enquired regarding the theft of the members of
the collapsed towers. It was informed by the site staff that it was very difficult to assess the
theft of the tower members as the site was not approachable during high flood. However, no
missing of tower members was observed during the last patrolling prior to flood.
The 400kV D/C Purnea-Biharsharif Transmission line of M/S Sterlite is also traversing
across the river about 600m downstream of PGCIL line and one of the tower with pile
foundations of four legs had also been washed away during the flood.
Powergrid also submitted the water level data of the river recorded at Hatida station of
Central Water Commission which is about 25 Km upstream of tower failure location. The
maximum water level recorded on 21.08.2016 was 43.17 meters against the HFL of 43.15m
for that location.
Tower at location no. 128G/0 might have collapsed first during high flood. After its fall in
water, probably, all floating debris got entrapped within the tower members fallen in river.
The ferocious river current caused extra-ordinary load on the pile foundation and this
uprooted pile foundation of two legs nearer to right bank. Tower at location No. 128/F also
failed in the same manner, however, the pile foundations were not uprooted but all the four
chimneys damaged.
Location no. 128F/0 Location no. 128G/0

Restoration
The restoration work is in progress.
Considering the vulnerability of the river Ganga, Committee opined that the existing tower at
location No. 128G/0 is to be shifted suitably towards right bank replacing with DD+25m
tower and raised chimney to get the requisite navigation clearance of Ganga.
The design of pile foundation at the new location of 128G/0 shall also based on new soil
investigation report and latest high flood data. Tower at location no.128/F to be erected on
existing foundation after repairing the chimneys.
2.2 DETAILS OF FAILURE OF TOWERS OF VARIOUS TRANSMISSION LINES OF DTL:
1. 400 kV D/C Bamnauli-Jhatikara transmission line failed on 22.05.2016 (Location no.

169 (Dead End Tower))
Brief Background
The line was originally commissioned as 400kV D/C Bawana-Bamnauli transmission line in
2000 and LILO of this line at 400kV TikriKalan (Formerly Mundka) substation was
completed in 2010. Again LILO of the same line at 765kV PGCIL Jhatikara S/Stn. was
commissioned on 30.09.2012 as Bamnauli-Jhatikara transmission line. The length of line is
10.2km. M/s. KEC Ltd. had executed the line construction. The part of the over head line
was converted into underground cable to create space for Gas based power plant to be
constructed by IPGCL/PPCL. The modification was carried out in December 2013 by M/s
BHEL for M/s. PPCL/IPGCL (Indra Prastha Generation Corporation Limited). The
suspension tower at location No. 169 was converted into Dead end tower (D+0). The tower
was designed for Quad bundled conductor as per IS: 802:1995 for wind zone-4 to withstand
wind speed of 169.2 kms/hr. No previous failure of the line was reported. The tower schedule
submitted by DTL shows that the line with towers at location no. 2 to 19 was commissioned
in 2012 and Towers at location No.155 to 168 commissioned in 2000. Due to heavy wind
storm on 22.05.2016, the Dead end tower at Location No.169 along with Gantry structure
have failed and the two structures crumbled down on the ground.
Observations
The team comprising of officers from CEA, Powergrid and DTL had visited the site of tower
failure on 25.05.2016.It was observed that the tower had buckled from first panel and had
fallen in longitudinal direction simultaneously damaging the gantry structure due to the
upward pulling force. All the foundations were found intact. The stubs of three legs were
intact while the fourth one got twisted and sheared. A number of bolts in joints used for
connecting leg members, other members, etc. were found to be missing. At some of the joints
in leg/bracings, almost half of the bolts/nuts were missing. Further, some of the bolts used
were undersized. Many of the members were having extra holes which were not
plugged/filled with bolts. There was mismatch of bolts & holes. Some of the bolts were
rusted. MS Earthing strip was welded with the stub instead of providing with bolts & nuts.
The adjacent tower at location No.168 of the line was found to be intact and no visible
damage observed. The foundations were intact and no missing members/bolts were noticed.
The chimneys of foundations were not visible and buried in soil.
The team also visited location No.173 (Dead End Tower) of the 2nd 400kV D/C
Bamnauli-Ballabhgarh Transmission line. The tower at location No. 169 of Bamnauli-
Jhatikara line & location no. 173 of Bamnauli - Ballabhgarh line were constructed during
same period. The tower/line was designed for Quad bundled conductor configuration. A
part of this line was also converted into underground cable transmission system. It was
noticed that some of the lattice members of existing tower at location No.173 were
bent/buckled. The slope of the tower upto bottom cross arm level was not uniform. Few
bracing members of tower were welded with leg members/stubs. Many bolts in the joints are
missing /mismatching. Some of the bolts used were undersized. The length of threads of
bolt used in the joints was not adequate. Extra holes were left in many members which were
not plugged/filled. The condition of this DE tower is similar to the failed DE tower at
location No.169 of Bamnauli-Jhatikara line and may fail at any time.
The back to back distance of the leg members at the top of stub of failed tower at location
No.169 was measured at site and the measured length of transverse face and longitudinal face
were found to be different from the drawings. Coping of the foundation Chimneys was not
done. The Chemical & Mechanical properties of steel used in structure are found to be in
conformity with IS 2062:2006
The structurally weak tower due to missing bolts, visible erection deficiencies highlighted
above and additional wind force on tower due to storm might have resulted in collapse of
tower.
Restoration
The line was restored on ERS on 08.06.2016.
Committee noted that Dead End towers are normally designed for maximum deviation angle
taking into account dead end condition and are supposed to be strong and reliable. The
probabilities of failure of such structure are very rare. Hence DTL / IPGCL was asked to
take more care at the time of erection of towers to avoid such incidence of failure due to
erection deficiencies in future. Committee asked DTL / IPGCL to take early necessary
action for removing the tower at location No.173 of Bamnauli-Ballabhgarh line and
replacing it with a new tower including new foundations.
3.0 General Observations and decisions of the Committee:
3.1 Committee observed that major causes of failure of towers are as under:
b) Theft/sabotage of tower members, generally the theft of secondary members (connected

with one or two bolts) of the towers, by the local people makes the tower structurally
weak which ultimately leads to failure during high speed wind/ storms/ whirlwind /
cyclone etc.

802 -1977). The Indian Standard has been revised subsequently in the year 1995 and
2015 to incorporate new design concepts. Though suspension towers in some of the
vulnerable lines have been strengthened, it is not prudent to abandon/strengthen all these
lines currently in operation. However, based on frequency of failure, the towers need to
be strengthened.

slope/hilly terrain. Many times landslide causes erosion of soil below foundation which
in turn causes the failure of foundation and subsequently failure of towers.
g) Tower foundation failure (located near river bank) due to erosion of soil below
foundation by flash floods.
h) Shear failure of stubs of leg members of towers due to torsional forces on account of
sinking of some of the legs
3.2 The Committee also recommended the following measures in general for lines of all
utilities.
deficiencies.
members should be replaced as early as possible to avoid failure of towers due to theft of
tower members.
d) Assistance of local people should be taken in theft prone areas to minimize the theft and
damage to towers.

like clipping of members using GFRP clipping/steel clipping should be explored as a
pilot project.
f) Coping of chimneys of tower foundation, wherever required, should be taken up to avoid

rusting of stubs.
tower(s).
h) The material test reports of members of the failed tower should be examined to ascertain
the quality of steel material used.
i) In case of repeated failure of towers of transmission lines, designed according to IS:802

j) Pile type foundations may be considered for towers in flood prone areas based on soil
k) In case of damage of foundation of towers, the foundation design/construction and soil

l) Tower should be tested as per provisions of relevant IS and observed until specified
waiting period is over.
m) Providing proper revetment & use of geo-synthetic material in foundation, concrete

encasing & painting of stub in water logging areas etc. may also be considered,
wherever required
3.3 The committee also decided that:
a) CEA would request BIS to take initiative for formulating standard for the design
of Steel Pole structures in line with international standards.
b) CEA would take up with BIS for revision of wind map both in IS 875 and IS 802 based
on input from SERC which highlights about the change in wind zone in some part of the
country.
4.0 MINUTES OF MEETING, PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION REPORT AND

PHOTOGRAPHS OF FAILED TOWER
The Minutes of meeting of Standing Committee are enclosed at Annexure-A. The

Preliminary Investigation Reports on failure of tower(s) at different locations for the
above lines along with photographs of failed towers are enclosed at Annexure – B.
Director (PSE&TD) & Member Secretary Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) & Chairman
Standing Committee of Experts Standing Committee of Experts
to investigate failure of Towers to investigate failure of Towers
ANNEXURE -A
Minutes
of the
Meeting
Minutes of Meeting of the Standing Committee of Experts on Failure of Transmission

Line Towers held in CEA, New Delhi on 02/12/2016 in respect of failure of towers in 132
kV & Higher Voltage Transmission Lines during the period from December, 2015 to
September, 2016.
List of participants is at Annexure- I.
1. Chief Engineer PSE&TD & Chairman of the Standing Committee of Experts welcomed the
participants including invitees of Transmission Licensees/Experts in the field and
highlighted about the number of failure of towers of transmission lines of different voltage
levels belonging to various Utilities, the various types of failure of towers during the period
from December, 2015 to September, 2016. He informed that the representative from
National Institute of Wind Energy (NIWE) was invited to discuss about sharing of the wind
data from measuring/monitoring station of NIWE and how their data can be best used for
the wind speed mapping of the country as NIWE have more than 800 wind data measuring
stations all over the country. Due to some urgent engagement, NIWE representative could
not attend the meeting.
2. Chief Engineer PSE&TD then requested invitees & experts to share their experience on
failure of towers. Dr. M. Selvaraj, Joint Director of CPRI and Mr. B.B. Shah of M/s Adani
made presentations on failure of towers during testing and their observations on failure of
towers, in general.
3. Representative from CPRI stated that most of the cases of failure of towers during testing
has occurred under loading corresponding to security condition. The failed towers are
generally strengthened and retested. But it is observed that in case of failure(s) under
reliability condition, complete collapse of tower has taken place. He also stated that failure
of towers have also taken place during the waiting period of five minutes under full load
condition and hence suggested that tower should be tested as per provisions of relevant IS
and observed until specified waiting period is over.
4. Representative from M/s. Adani Transmission Ltd. (ATL) stated that under full loading
condition, deflection of tower increases continuously. The waiting period should be
sufficient enough to transfer load from loading point to the base of the tower.
Representative from CPRI replied that when load is removed, the tower is supposed to
come back to its original position because it operates within elastic limit although some
residual deflection will remain. Chief Engineer (PSE&TD) mentioned that deflection of
tower is not specified in the design criteria for lattice structure, but in case of pole structure,
deflection limit is specified. Representative from M/s. ATL suggested that the actual
deflection can be measured using strain gauge method. Representative from PGCIL stated
that strain gauges also have limitations as it is difficult to determine the exact positions to
put strain gauges on the tower body. Representative form SERC also supported his view
and said that the strain gauges are also not reliable once the material exceeds yield stress
limit. Representative from M/s. ATL added that a jerk is generally experienced on the
tower body on removal of the applied load. It is always desirable to observe the behavior of
structure/tower under loading conditions for waiting period as stated in the IS 802.
5. Representative from CPRI stated that limitation of deflection in Pole structure is not
specified in the regulation. He also stated that the deflection of Pole structure may alter the
clearance provided. Representative from M/s. ATL added that British code is followed in
the design of Pole type towers in India but it does not specify about the residual deflection
of tower. PGCIL representatives also seconded that there is no acceptance criteria for
residual deflection. Representative from M/s. STERLITE supplemented that if the tower
fails to return to its original position after application of load, it will certainly fail before the
expected life time of the transmission line due to changing environmental conditions,
particularly increase in wind speed in some part of the country.
6. Representative from CPRI stated that many a times, bolts are responsible for failure of
tower during testing, because either number of bolts are not adequate in the design and/or
proper care has not been taken during erection of tower. PGCIL representative mentioned
that the bolts may fail during testing because of the fitment error.
7. CPRI representative mentioned that in the last 5 years, the average percentage of failure of
towers (66 kV to 765kV) during testing is 23%. It is observed that the failure rates is more
at higher voltage level.
8. PGCIL stated that the intensity of wind has changed in some part of the country, but the
wind map of India has not been revised accordingly by BIS. Representative of SERC
informed that revised map was submitted to BIS for inclusion in relevant standard, which
has not incorporated so far. The members of the Committee decided that CEA should write
to BIS for revision of wind map both in IS 875 and IS 802. Chief Engineer, PSE&TD
informed the members that CEA would also request BIS to take initiative for formulating
standard for the design of Steel Pole structures in line with international standards.
9. Then, Chief Engineer PSE&TD requested Mr. B.B. Shah from M/s. ATL to go ahead with
his presentation (enclosed at Annexure-III). He highlighted various causes of failure of
transmission line towers. On query regarding the raising the chimney heights to about 5-
6m, he stated that problem is being faced during erection of raised chimneys as proper stub
setting becomes difficult. Director, TCD, CEA supported his views and said that the raised
chimneys should be avoided as far as possible because a small error in stub setting may
cause a change in stub angle leading to change in the slope of tower, which is not desirable.
Representative from M/s. ATL highlighted further that the funnel effect of wind and
increase in wind speed due to diversion/obstruction by trees, increase in terrain roughness
coefficient for towers located near large water body, theft of tower members, local tornado
effect, soil erosion around chimney and rusting of stub etc are some of the reasons for
tower failure. He suggested that precautions like strengthening of suspension towers,
immediate replacement of missing members, strengthening of existing members with
additional Steel clamps, providing proper revetment & use of geosynthetic material in
foundation, providing concrete encasing and painting of stub in water logging areas etc.
should be taken up to reduce the failure rate.
10. The representative of SERC, Chennai informed the committee members about R&D
initiative taken by SERC regarding strengthening of tower members without replacing the
members or nuts & bolts. He said that SERC is developing Glass Fiber Reinforced
Polymer (GFRP) based material for strengthening members of tower in existing line
without requiring any nuts & bolts and minimizing the shut down time of line.
Representative from PGCIL reported that they have taken up a pilot project for
strengthening of tower members using steel clipping materials, but shut down would be
required while using them. He supported the idea of SERC as it will be easier to use GFRP
clipping arrangement compared to steel clipping which would be heavier in comparison to
GFRP.
11. The committee observed that some of the failed towers of various lines of PGCIL were
designed according to old IS:802(1977). Members of committee were of the opinion that
PGCIL should check the adequacy of existing tower according to IS:802(2015). PGCIL
stated that strengthening of old tower conforming to new IS:802(2015) would be difficult
as the existing towers may not meet the design requirement according to new IS code and
may need replacement, which is not desirable. PGCIL suggested to strengthen such towers
by providing hip bracings up to bottom cross arm level.
12. Then the Utilities (Powergrid and DTL) discussed in detail on tower failure of the
following lines:
(A) Transmission lines of Powergrid
(i) 400kV D/C (Quad) Nellore – Tiruvalem Transmission Line failed on 04.12.2015 (One
tower at Location No: 13)
(ii) 400kV Rourkela – Sundargarh – Raigarh LILO – I Transmission Line failed on 24.01.2016
(Two towers at Location Nos. 21(DD+0) & 22(DA+0))
(iii) 400kV S/C Uri II – Wagoora Transmission Line failed on 26.01.2016 (One tower at
location no. 135 (D+9))
(iv) 765 kV S/C Angul- Sundargarh Transmission Line-Ckt-I transmission Line failed on
12/02/2016 (1 no. Angle towers at Loc. No. 42A/0)
(v) 765 KV S/C Gaya-Varanasi-Fatehpur transmission line failed on 07.03.2016 (Location.

No. 715 (A+3))
(vi) 400 kV S/C Jeypore- Indravati Transmission Line failed on 15.03.2016 (Two towers at
Location Nos. Loc. No. 119 &120)
(vii) 765 kV S/C Moga-Meerut Transmission Line failed on 13-05-2016 (Location No.: 649)
(viii) 765 kV S/C Bina-Gwalior-III Transmission Line failed on 21.05.2016 (Location No. 614)
(ix) 765 kV S/C Jaipur(Fagi)-Bhiwani Ckt-I transmission line Failed On 23.05.2016 (Location
No. 65/4 (SA+0), 66/0 (SE+0), 66/1(SA+0), 66/2 (SA+0), 67/0 (SD+0), 67/1 (SA+0), 67/2
(SA+0) and 67A/0 (SB+0))
(x) 400 kV D/C Jind - Bhiwani Transmission Line Failed on 23.05.2016 (Location No. 170)
& on 29.05.2016(Four towers at location No.12, 13, 14 & 15 (all DA type))
(xi) 400 kV S/C Farakka-Sagardighi Transmission line failed on 27.05.2016 (Location no. 19
(A+0))
(xii) 220KV D/C Hisar-Hisar (I/A) Transmission Line failed on 29.05.2016 (Tower at Location
No. 2 (DA+18))
(xiii) 765 kV S/C Meerut-Greater Noida Transmission Line failed on 13.06.2016 (Tower at
Location No. 464 (A+3))
(xiv) 220KV D/C Kakrapar – Haldarwa Transmission Line failed on 04.07.2016 (Towers at
location No. 7 (DD+0) and 8(DC+3))
(xv) 220 kV D/C Mariani-Mokokchung Transmission Line failed on 12.07.2016 (Location no.
56 (DC+3) & 57 (DC+0))
(xvi) 400 KV D/C (QUAD) Kishanganj - Patna transmission line failed on 26.07.201 (Location
No. 51 (DD+18))
(xvii) 400 KV D/C (QUAD) Kishanganj - Patna transmission line failed on 01.09.2016
(Location No. 128D/0 (DD+25), 128E/0 (DD+25), 128F/0 (DD+25), 128G/0 (DD+25) &
129/0 (DD+09))
(B) Transmission Lines of DTL:
400 kV D/C Bamnauli-Jhatikara transmission line failed on 22.05.2016 (Location no. 169
(Dead End Tower))
13. Committee observed that major cause of failure of towers are as under:
b) Theft of tower members, generally the theft of secondary members (connected with one or
two bolts) of the towers by the local people makes the tower structurally weak which
ultimately leads to failure during storms/whirlwind/cyclone etc;

802 -1977). The Indian Standard has been revised subsequently in the year 1995 and 2015
to incorporate new design concepts. Though suspension towers in some of the vulnerable
lines have been strengthened, it is not prudent to abandon/strengthen all these lines
currently in operation. However, based on frequency of failure, the towers need to be
strengthened.

slope/hilly terrain. Many times landslide causes erosion of soil below foundation which in
turn causes the failure of foundation and subsequently failure of towers.
14. Committee suggested the following remedial measures.
deficiencies.
members should be replaced as early as possible to avoid failure of towers due to theft of
tower members.
d) Assistance of local people should be taken in theft prone areas to minimize the theft and
damage to towers.

like live line clipping of members (GFRP clipping/steel clipping) should be explored as a
pilot project.
f) Coping of chimneys of tower foundation, wherever required, should be taken up to avoid

rusting of stubs.
tower(s).
h) The material test reports of members of the failed tower should be submitted to ascertain
the quality of steel material used.
i) Powergrid should strengthen the failed towers of the 765kV S/C line [with Delta
configuration and designed for wind zone-4] in line with 765kV S/C Gaya-Fatehpur
transmission line as suggested by the Standing Committee in the previous meeting held on
08.12.2015.
j) In case of repeated failure of towers of transmission lines, designed according to IS:802

k) Pile type foundations may be considered for towers in flood prone areas based on soil
l) In case of damage of foundation of towers, the foundation design/construction and soil

m) DTL should take necessary action to replace the tower at location No.173 of Bamnauli –
Ballabgarh 400kV line with a new tower along with new foundation and should take
utmost care to avoid erection deficiencies and repetition of such failure of towers in future.
The meeting ended with a vote of thanks to the chair.
ANNEXURE-I
List of Participants
Central Electricity Authority

1. Shri. S.K.Ray Mohapatra , Chief Engineer, PSE&TD Division
2. Shri. Neeraj Kumar, Director, TCD Division
3. Shri. Amit Kumar, Deputy Director, TCD Division
4. Shri. C.N.Devarajan, Deputy Director, PSE&TD Division
5. Ms. Kavita Jha, Deputy Director, PSE&TD Division
6. Shri. Mohit Mudgal, Assistant Director, PSE&TD Division
Powergrid Corporation of India Ltd.
1. Shri. A. K. Vyas, Addl. GM (Engg.TL)
2. Shri. Abhishek, Asst. GM(Engg.TL)
Central Power Research Institute, Bengaluru
1. Dr. M. Selvaraj, Joint Director
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
1. Dr. P.K.Umesha, Chief Scientist, Head, TTRS
Wapcos Ltd.
1. Shri. Vijay Pal, Consultant
Delhi Transco Limited

1. Shri. Loveleen Singh, GM (T)
IEEMA
1. Shri. J. Pande, Sr. Director
2. Shri. Naveen Upreti, Sr. Executive officer
KPTL
1. Shri. Milind B. Nene, Sr. V.P.
2. Shri. P.K. Chaubey, V.P.
Sterlite Power
1. Shri. S.C. Ghosal, V.P.(Projects)
2. Shri. Jeetendra Bisht, Customer Decision Strategy
3. Shri. K.R. Suri, Consultant
Adani Transmission Limited

1. Shri. Bipin B Shah, Sr. V.P.
ANNEXURE -B
Report / Data
submitted by
Concerned Utilities
on
Tower Failure
along with
photographs
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
400kV D/C (Quad) Nellore – Tiruvalem Transmission Line
POWER GRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LTD.

GURGAON
December 2015
400 KV NELLORE-TVLM D/C LINE LOC. NO.13.
Leg C
LEG D LEG-D
LEG-D
LEG-C Leg D
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
400kV Rourkela – Sundargarh – Raigarh LILO – I

Transmission Line

GURGAON
January 2016
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
400kV S/C Uri II – Wagoora Transmission Line

GURGAON
January 2016
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
765 kV S/C ANGUL- SUNDARGARH

TRANSMISSION LINE-I

February, 2016
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILURES IN 765 KV S/C
ANGUL-SUNDARGARH TRANSMISSION LINE-I OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 765 kV S/C Angul-Sundargarh Transmission Line-I tripped at 20:46 Hrs. on

12/02/2016 due to collapse of 01 no. of Angle towers at Loc. No. 42A/0 due
to sabotage accompanied with planned removal of Tower Parts & Bolts, all
over stub to waist cross section en masse.
2.0 Brief History
2.1 765 kV S/C Angul-Sundargarh line-I was constructed by M/s.IVRCL. The line was
commissioned on 25.01.2016.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for wind zone 4 (47 m/s). The towers were
designed in both Horizontal & Delta Configuration with Quad ACSR Bersimis
Conductor.
3.0 Tower Spotting Details
The details of tower spotting in the affected sections are as follows. Collapsed tower
locations are indicated in bold font:
Sl. Loc No. Type Span Angle of Dev. Extent of Damage

No. of (m)
Tower
1. C+0 Healthy, no damage
42/0 21°46'50"L
(Delta)
413
2. B+0 Collapsed from ground level, all
42A/0 14°06'00"R
(Delta) four stubs bent.
393
3. A+0 Healthy, no damage
42A/1
(Delta)
420
4. B+7.5 Healthy, no damage
43/0 08°41'04"R
(Delta)
Page- 1
3.1 Observations in respect of Failure/damages to Tower Locations:
It was observed that 01 number tower was collapsed from ground level whereas all
other towers are in healthy condition from extension section. The affected towers
have fallen in right side in transverse direction facing Sundargarh. Photographs
indicating the extent of damage are attached at Annexure-I.
The affected towers were located in a plain stretch of cultivated field having very
few trees.
4.0 Anticipated Causes of Failures/Damages
Based on the discussions with concerned site officials, it is observed that the
failure/damages in locations/stretches have been caused by Sabotage
accompanied with planned removal of Tower Parts & Bolts, all over stub to waist
cross section en masse. M/s IVRCL had already lodged FIR on 13.02.2016 about
this incident against theft of tower members, tension plate & Bolt Nuts etc. Copy of
the FIR enclosed at Annexure-II.
5.0 Restoration Plan

Immediate action has been taken for restoration of the line and line was restored on
permanent towers on 06.03.2016 @ 18:28 Hrs.
------------
Page- 2
Annexure-I
Page- 3
Page- 4
Annexure-II
Page- 5
Page- 6
Page- 7
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURES
765 kV S/C GAYA-VARANSI-FATEHPUR

TRANSMISSION LINE

GURGAON
March 2016
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE ON 765 KV S/C GAYA-
FATEHPUR TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 765 kV S/C Gaya-Fatehpur transmission line was under shut down from 07-03-2016
for LILO arrangement of the line at Varansi. During routine inspection on 08-03-
2016, one tower at Loc. No. 715 near village Hisampur Mouza Mangarh was found
damaged. On enquiry from villagers it was informed that the tower was damaged
during localized cyclone at around 1100 PM on 07-03-2016.
1.2 During ground patrolling of the affected area on 8th March’ 2016, it was observed
that one A+3 type tower at Loc. No. 715 has partially damaged from cross arm
level.
1.3 As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dated 05/09/2002,

every incident of tower failure must be reported to CEA for investigation by a
Standing Committee of Experts constituted by CEA. The incident was intimated to
CEA on 09-03-2016. A team comprising of following officials was deputed to the site
of tower failures for site investigations & getting firsthand information/ details from
site representatives.
1. Sh. Gopal Ji, GM (Engg-TL)

2. Sh. Suresh Kumar, DGM, Allahabad
3. Sh. Rajeev Kumar, Asst. GM (AM)
The above mentioned team visited the affected locations on 09-03-2016 and carried
out investigations.
2.0 Brief History
Page- 1
2.1 the affected potion of 765 kV S/C Gaya- Fatehpur line was constructed by M/s.
Kalpataru. The line was commissioned on 31/03/2012.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/sec
corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The towers were designed in
delta configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMISE Conductor.
2.3 Earlier, following incidents of tower collapse had occurred in this line:
Date of tower Section affected No. of towers Probable cause of
collapse affected tower collapse
11/ 12th April’ 2012 314 (A+0) 1 Localized storm
31st May’ 2014 305(A+3), 306(A+0), 15 Localized cyclone
311(A+0), 315(A+3),
320(A+0), 321(A+0),
322(A+0), 323(A+0),
324(A+0), 325(A+0),
326(A+0), 327(A+0),
328(A+0), 329(A+0),
330(A+0)
14th May’ 2015 283(A+3) , 284(A+0) 2 Localized cyclone
12th June’ 2015 334 (A+0) 1 Localized cyclone

The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as under. Failed tower
Sl. Loc Type Span Angle of Dev. Wt. Wt. Wt. Span
No No. of (m) Span - Span - Total (m)
Tower Left (m) Right
(m)
1. 712 C+0 6º35’45” LT 193 187 380
372
2. 713 A+0 185 183 368
380
3. 714 A+0 197 190 387
362
4. 715 A+3 172 197 369
Page- 2
400
5. 716 A+0 203 194 397
388
6. 717 A+0 195 190 385
379
7. 718 A+0 189 192 381
388
8. 719 A+0 196 188 384
376
9. 720 A+0 188 197 385
392
10 721 C+0 25º51’14” RT 195 193 388
3.1 Observations in respect of Failure/ damages to Tower Locations
When the team reached the site of tower failure locations, the status of collapsed
towers was intact i.e. nothing was removed from site.
It was observed that the tower has failed from waist level and fallen in transverse
direction in the direction of wind (i.e. left side while facing Fatehpur). This tower
was located in a plain cultivated field having very few trees. Therefore, the stretch
might have experience critical wind during the storm.
Following are observations of the team after visiting site of tower failure location:-
I) Location no. 715, Tower Type- ‘A+3’
i) The tower was partially damaged and failed above waist level. The tower fell
in the transverse direction.
ii) All the four stubs of the tower alongwith foundation were found intact.
iii) Many insulators of insulator strings were intact but some insulators were
damaged.
iv) Phase conductors were partially damaged.
v) Some Babool trees in the vicinity were also broken
Page- 3
Loc. No. 715 (A+3)
Damaged Tree in affected area
Page- 4
Damaged Tree in affected area
4.0 Anticipated Causes of Failures/ Damages
Based on the site visit, discussions with concerned site officials and examination of
photographs taken after the reported failures, it is observed that the failure of towers
have been caused by localized cyclone in the area which has resulted in higher
wind load on phase conductors, earthwire and tower than the design values.
Immediate action has been taken for restoration of the line and line restored on
conventional towers on 8th April’ 2016.
Page- 5
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURES
400 kV S/C JEYPORE- INDRAVATI

TRANSMISSION LINE

JEYPORE SUBSTATION
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILURES IN 400 KV S/C
JEYPORE- INDRAVATI TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 400 kV Jeypore- Indravati S/c transmission line tripped at 01:00 Hrs. on
15/03/2016 due to collapse of 02 nos. of Suspension towers at Loc. No. 119
&120 during localized cyclone.
1.2 A team comprising of following officials from Regional AM, in charges of

Jeypore and Indravati was deputed to the site of tower failures for
investigations & getting firsthand information/details.
1. Sh. A K Behera DGM (AM/BBSR)

2. Sh. V Ramprasad, DGM/Jeypore SS
3. Sh. A Mudali, Manager/Indravati SS
The above mentioned team visited the affected locations on 20.03.16 and
carried out investigations.
2.0 Brief History
2.1 400 kV S/C Jeypore- Indravati line was constructed by M/s.SAE/OSEB (OHPC
Period). The line was commissioned on 24.03.1990.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for medium wind zone as per IS 802:1977.
These are S/C horizontal towers having I-I-I configuration. Conductor configuration
is Twin Moose.
2.3 There is no previous history of tower collapse on this line:
Page- 1
The details of tower spotting in the affected sections are as follows. Collapsed tower
Sl. Loc. Forward Extent of damage

No. No. Type of Angle of Span
Tower Deviation (Meters)
1 118 B+3 0’0’ 450 Healthy, no damage
2 119 A+0 335 Collapsed from ground level, all
four stubs bent.
3 120 A+3 430 Collapsed from +3 meter
extension section.
4 121 A+0 410 Healthy, no damage
5 122 B+0 0’0’ 395 Healthy, no damage
6 123 A+0 400 Healthy, no damage
7 124 B+0 5’ RT 389 Healthy, no damage
3.1 Observations in respect of Failure/damages to Tower Locations:
It was observed that 01 number tower was collapsed from ground level whereas
another one tower collapsed from extension section. All these affected towers have
fallen in right side in transverse direction facing Indrāvati. Photographs indicating
the extent of damage are attached at Annexure-I.
All these affected towers were located in a plain stretch of cultivated field having
very few trees. Therefore, the stretch might have experience critical wind during the
storm.
4.0 Anticipated Causes of Failures/Damages
Based on the site visit and discussions with concerned site officials, it is observed
that the failure/damages in locations/stretches have been caused by Natural
calamity i.e Whirl Wind, Heavy rains with storms in the area which has resulted in
large wind load on phase conductors and earth wire as well as on tower itself.
Page- 2
Team also found that so many LT Poles, Trees, LT Transformers, Tin & wooden
roofs were also severely collapsed or damaged near the affected area.

Immediate action has been taken for restoration of the line and line was restored
on 23.03.2016 @ 22:08 Hrs.
------------
Page- 3
Annexure-I
Tower at Loc. No. 119 (A+0)
Tower at Loc. No. 120 (A+3)
Page- 4
Damage of LT poles near Murlabai Village
Page- 5
Page- 6
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
765 kV S/C MEERUT-MOGA TRANS. LINE

(LOCATION NO.: 649)

CORPORATE ENGINEERING
GURGAON
MAY 2016
POWERGRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED
REF:CC/Engg/TL/ NR-II /Tower Failure/2016
Sub: Report on tower failure at location no. 649
1.0 Background
1.1 Tripping in 765 kV S/C Meerut-Moga transmission line was reported on

13/05/2016 at around 5:18PM because of tower failure under severe storm at
location no-649. Details of failed tower are given below:
Sl. No. Location no. Tower type
1 649 A+0
The above tower is of horizontal configuration type.
1.2 A committee comprising of the following representatives from Corporate

Engineering, Corporate AM and Regional AM was constituted to investigate
the cause of failure/collapse of tower:
a) Rajeev Kumar, Astt. GM (Asset Mgmt),CC

b) Manoj Kumar Singh, CDE (Engg-TL),CC
c) Md. Farooq, Chief Manager (Asset Mgmt), NR-II, Jammu
1.3 As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dtd.

05.09.2002, every incident of tower failure must be reported to CEA for
investigation by a Standing Committee of Experts constituted by CEA. The
incident was intimated to CEA on 16.05.2016. CEA nominated Ms Noopur
Chaudhary for investigation of tower failure at the above mentioned
location. The committee members along with CEA representative visited the
tower failure site on 16.05.2016 and carried out the detailed investigations.
2.0 Brief History
2.1 765 kV S/C Meerut-Moga transmission line was constructed by M/s. KEC
and the line was charged in May-2015. Line length is 337.074 kms.
2.2 The towers of this line have been designed for wind speed of 47 m/sec
corresponding to Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The single circuit towers
were designed in horizontal configuration with Quad ACSR BERSIMIS
Conductor. The two peaks of the towers are carrying the two galvanized
steel earth wire parallely.
2.3 Insulator strings used for the horizontal configuration Suspension tower are
“DI” “V” “DI” ( Double “I” having 120 kN composite long rod insulators)
whereas for tension towers, it is “QT” (Quad tension) strings with 210 KN
composite long rod insulator.
The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as follows. Failed
tower location is indicated in bold font:
Sl. Loc No. Type of Tower Span Remarks

No. (m)
1 648 AH+0
380
2 649 AH+0
3 400
4 650 AH+0
245 132kV D/C
Line
5 651 EH+25
4.0 Observations
The committee observations after visit of tower failure location no. 649 are as
follows:
(a) Tower failure location No. 649(AH+0) is located in open wheat field in
which very few low height trees are there at some distance from the failed
tower. This location is at the back side of 400kV Dhuri S/S of PSTCL and
located in Bhallwan village. The site is accessible through the metaled road
upto about 500m away from the tower locations which finally leads to the
wheat field in which tower had been spotted.
(b) When the committee reached at site of tower failure, the status of failed
tower was intact i.e. nothing was removed from site. Tower has failed from
above the waist level in the middle of one side of K-frame portion (right
side when viewed from Meerut to Moga) and the damaged portion was
still attached and hanging after being bent from the middle of top girder
point. None of the conductor or earthwire has been snapped. Insulators are
in damaged condition. The tower was still standing and other side cross
arm and earthwire peak seemed to be intact. Adjacent towers were intact
and no missing members were seen.
(c) It was reported that a high intensity localized cyclonic storm with very
high wind velocity was experienced in this area which induced the tower
damage (Photograph of damaged tower enclosed at Annexure-I). The
failed tower is in open cultivated wheat field. Uprooted trees, broken
branches, fallen transformer etc. bear the testimony of catastrophic nature
of the storm. The photographs, enclosed at Annexure-II, tell the story of
destruction caused by the storm. Catastrophic nature of the storm and
damages caused by the storm has been reported in the local newspaper also
(Paper cutting is enclosed at Annexure-III). This was also confirmed by the
local villagers. Along approx. 100m corridor in the direction of storm, the
signature of damage was all pervasive.
(d) The foundation of the said tower was all intact.
(e) During the visit to the tower failure location, back to back of stub and
diagonal dimensions along with level difference between different legs of
the tower were checked and no appreciable difference were observed when
compared with the values indicated in the drawing.
(f) Failed tower was examined for missing members and bolts/nuts. It was
found that there were no missing members. Also, bolts/nuts were found in
place.
(g) This is the first failure of 765kV S/C ( horizontal configuration) towers in
this line after commissioning
5.0 Probable cause of failure
The committee is of the view that the intensity of wind storm was very high
which caused devastating damages to the trees, houses, LT lines and other
properties etc. It is opined that the intensity/ speed of wind may have
exceeded the limit for which the tower was designed resulting into the
failure of tower.
ANNEXURE-I
(PHOTOGRAPH OF FAILED TOWER)
Location no.-649(AH+0)
ANNEXURE-II
(PHOTOGRAPHS OF OTHER DAMAGES CAUSED BY STORM)

ANNEXURE-III
(NEWS PAPER REPORT OF STORM)

REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
765 kV S/C Bina-Gwalior-III Transmission Line

GURGAON
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILUREIN 765 KV S/C BINA-
GWALIOR-IIITRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 765 kV S/C Bina-Gwalior-III transmission line tripped at 20:33 Hrs on 21.05.16 due to
collapse of 1 no. of tower at Location No 614 during localized storm.
1.2 As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dated 05/09/2002, every
incident of tower failure must be reported to CEA for investigation by a Standing
Committee of Experts constituted by CEA. The incident was intimated to CEA on
23.05.2016
1.3 A team comprising of following officials from Regional AMalong with site representative
visited the affected locations on 23.5.16 for site investigations & getting firsthand
information/details from site.
a. Shri S.K.Chand, DGM, Gwalior

b. Shri CVV Subba Rao, Chief Manager, Bina
c. Shri S.Shaikh, Manager (AM/FQA), RHQ-Vadodara
2.0 Brief History
2.1 765 kV S/C Bina-Gwalior-III transmission line was constructed by M/s LANCO.The line was
commissioned on 07.05.14.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to
Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The towers were designed in Deltaconfiguration with
Quad ACSR BERSIMIS Conductor.
3.0 Observations:
3.1 Tower Spotting Details: The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as
follows:
Page- 1
Sl. Loc. Type of Forward Angle of Wt. Span Wt. Span – Wt. Span
No. No. Tower Span Dev. - Left (m) Right(m) Total (m)
(m)
1. 615 16º06'01"L
C(Delta)+0 283.580 153 154 307
T
2. 614 A(Delta)+0 291.138 226 168 394
3. 613 A(Delta)+0 300.907 252 172 424
4. 612 A(Delta)+0 297.331 129 122 251
5. 611 A(Delta)+0 302.074 178 117 295
6. 01º44'17"
610 B(Delta)+0 307.680 RT 183 161 344
3.2 Observations in respect of Failure/damages to Tower at Loc. No.614:
The tower is situated in cultivated field with very few trees in the vicinity. Tower collapsed
and bent from K Frame level.
3.3 Adjacent towers were checked thoroughly for missing tower members and Bolts & Nuts.
None of the tower members and Bolts & Nuts were found missing.
3.4 Discussion with the local people in the nearby villages revealed that exceptionally high
wind condition prevailed for some time in the area and tower hascollapsed under high
wind conditions. Newspaper clip in this regard is attached at Annexure-I.
Page- 2
Immediate action has been taken for restoration of the line and line was restored on
permanent tower on 30.05.16.
5.0 Reasons for failures:
Based on the investigation and observation of the committee, it can be concluded that
localized heavy wind conditions prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line with wind
blowing in the transverse direction of line had initiated the tower failure. Velocity of the
wind would have been higher than the designed limit.
6.0 Material testing:
Tower material for testing for determining the UTS (Ultimate Tensile Strength) and
Chemical composition has been done and report is enclosed.
Page- 3
Annexure-I
Page- 4
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURES
765 kV S/C JAIPUR-BHIWANI CKT-I TL

GURGAON
May 2016
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILURES IN 765 KV S/C JAIPUR-BHIWANI
CKT-I TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 765 kV S/C Jaipur-Bhiwani ckt-I transmission line tripped at 20:37 Hrs. on 23-05-2016 due
to collapse of 8 no. of tower at Location No. 65/4 (SA+0), 66/0 (SE+0), 66/1(SA+0), 66/2
(SA+0), 67/0 (SD+0), 67/1 (SA+0), 67/2 (SA+0) and 67A/0 (SB+0) during localized storm. One
cross-arm of tower at location no. 65/3 (SA+0) also damaged during the storm.
As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dated 05/09/2002, every

Committee of Experts constituted by CEA. The incident was intimated to CEA on 24-05-
2016 and CEA deputed Smt. Kavita Jha & Sh. Mohit to the Site for detailed investigation. A
team comprising of following officials from CC-Engg & CC-AM along with CEA
representative visited the affected locations on 24-05-2016 for site investigations & getting
firsthand information/ details from site representatives.
1. Sh. A. K. Vyas, Addl. GM (Engg-TL)

3. Sh. Vivek Sundariyal, Dy. Manager AM)
4. Sh. Vikas Kumar, Sr. Engineer (Engg-TL)
2.0 Brief History
2.1 765 kV S/C Jaipur-Bhiwani ckt-I transmission line was constructed by M/s. NCC. The line
was commissioned on 24-08-2015.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/s corresponding to
Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The towers were designed in Horizontal configuration
with Quad ACSR BERSIMIS Conductor.
Page- 1
3.0 Tower Spotting Details:
The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as follows:

Sl. Loc No. Type of Span Angle of Dev. Wt. Span Wt. Span Wt. Span
No. Tower (m) - Left (m) - Right Total (m)
(m)
1. 65/3 SA+0 172 190 362
376
2. 65/4 SA+0 185 183 368
381
3. 66/0 SE+0 43°40'46"R 197 200 397
395
4. 66/1 SA+0 194 193 387
390
5. 66/2 SA+0 196 181 377
382
6. 67/0 SD+0 22°14'30"L 200 197 397
380
7. 67/1 SA+0 183 218 401
388
8. 67/2 SA+0 169 188 357
382
9. 67A/0 SB+0 03°13'41"R 193 193 386
4.0 Observations in respect of Failure/ damages to Tower Locations
4.1 When the team reached the site of tower failure locations, the status of collapsed towers
was intact i.e. nothing was removed from site.
It was observed that the towers at 3 locations has collapsed 6 meters above ground level
(foundations were found intact) and fallen in transverse direction. Also, towers at 5
locations has fallen complete on ground (stubs were bent). These towers are located in a
plain cultivated field having large number of trees in the vicinity.
Following are observations of the team after visiting site of tower failure location:-
Page- 2
a) Location no. 65/3, Tower Type- ‘SA+0’
i) One cross-arm of this tower was damaged.

ii) All the four stubs of the tower alongwith foundation were found intact.
b) Location no. 65/4, Tower Type- ‘SA+0’:
i) Tower collapsed from about 6 meters above ground level.

ii) All the four stubs of the tower were found intact.
Page- 3
c) Location no. 66/0, Tower Type- ‘SE+0’:
i) Tower collapsed above waist level.

ii) Upper portion of the tower detached due to shearing of main members and lying in
alignment of the conductor.
d) Location no. 66/1, Tower Type- ‘SA+0’

i) Tower completely collapsed to ground.
ii) All the four stubs of the tower were found bent.
e) Location no. 66/2, Tower Type- ‘SA+0’

i) Tower completely collapsed to ground.
Page- 4
f) Location no. 67/0, Tower Type- ‘SD+0’:
i) Tower completely collapsed to the ground.

g) Location no. 67/1, Tower Type- ‘SA+0’

Page- 5
h) Location no. 67/2, Tower Type- ‘SA+0’:

i) Location no. 67A/0, Tower Type- ‘SB+0’
i) Tower collapsed 6 meters above ground level.

ii) All the four stubs of the tower were found intact.
4.2 The towers were checked for missing/ theft of tower members and bolts & nuts thoroughly
to the extents possible despite constraints due to jumbling / entangling of many members
and shearing of some nuts and bolts. No tower members found missing. However, few nuts
and bolts were found missing at the time of investigation. The inspection on connecting leg
Page- 6
bracing indicated that these bolts nuts were installed initially and would have sheared
during collapse of towers.
4.3 Damage to Trees in the vicinity:

Discussion with the local people in the nearby villages revealed that exceptionally high
wind condition prevailed for some time in the area and towers have pulled under high
wind conditions as number of trees collapsed/ uprooted in the vicinity. Few Photographs of
damaged trees are placed below. Newspaper reports also indicated that heavy wind with
lightening conditions prevailed in the area at the time of tower failure. Copy of newspaper
cutting is enclosed at Annexure-1.
Page- 7
Page- 8
blowing in the transverse direction of line had initiated the tower failure. It appears that
the failure has initially spotted on the location no 67 /1 or 67/2 as the tower at location
67/0 collapsed slightly in the longitudinal direction. As a consequence of this failure
adjacent towers also started collapsing.
6.0 Restoration Plan:

Immediate action has been taken for restoration of the line on conventional towers. Line
restored on permanent towers on 14-06-2016.
7.0 Material testing

Site has been directed to send the tower material for testing for determining the MTS
(Maximum Tensile strength), UTS (Ultimate Tensile Strength) and Chemical composition.
Page- 9
Annexure-I
NEWSPAPER CUTTING
Page- 10
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURES
400 kV D/C JIND BHIWANI I & II TRANSMISSION LINE

GURGAON
May 2016
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILURES IN 400 KV D/CJIND-BHIWANI CKT-
I& IITRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
400 kV D/C Jind- Bhiwani Ckt-I& II transmission line tripped at 20:37 Hrs. on 23-05-2016
due to collapse of 1 no. of tower at Location No.170. While the work of restoration of
tower was in progress, 2 towers at Location No. 13 (DA) and 14 (DA) collapsed during
localized storm on 29th May’ 2016. Earthwire peak of towers at loc. No. 12 and 15 was also
damaged.

Committee of Experts constituted by CEA. Both the incidents were reported to CEA and
CEA deputed Shri C N Devrajan and Shri Farhad to the Site on 1st June’ 2016 for detailed
investigation.
A team comprising of following officials from CC-Engg & CC-AM, Regional AM along with
CEA representatives visited the affected locations on 01-06-2016 for site investigations &
getting firsthand information/details from site representatives.

2. Sh. Girish Kumar Gupta, CDE (Engg.TL)
3. Mohammad Farooq, Ch. Manager (AM), RHQ, Jammu
1.0 Brief History
2.1 400 kV D/C Jind-Bhiwani Transmission Line was designed by POWERGRID and constructed
by M/s Aravali Infrastructure Limited, New Delhi. The length of the total line is 82.23 km.
The line was commissioned on March 31st, 2013. The suspension towers of this line were
designed for wind zone: 4 (47 m/s) as per IS:802-1995 with “I-I-I” insulator string in vertical
configuration for Twin ACSR MOOSE conductor.
2.2 This is the third incidence of tower failure in this line. Following is the history of previous
incidents of collapse of towers on this line:
Page- 1
Sl. Date of Collapse Section No. of towers Probable Cause of failure
No. affected affected
1 11-03-2014 193-196 4 Localized cyclone/ high velocity winds
2 29-06-2014 31-35 5 Localized cyclone/ high velocity winds
2.0 Observations during site visit:

Sl. Loc Type of Span Angle of Wt. Span Wt. Span - Wt. Span Wt. Span Wt. Span - Wt. Span
No No. Tower (m) Dev. - Left (m) Right Total (m) - Left (m) Right Total (m)
HOT (m) HOT COLD (m)
COLD
1. 169 (DA) 0°0'00" 221 224 445 230 233 463
400
2. 170 (DA) 0°0'00" 176 174 350 167 164 331
400
3. 171 (DA) 0°0'00" 226 199 425 236 210 446
1. 11 (DA) 0°0'00" 174 199 373 185 189 374

375
2. 12 (DA) 0°0'00" 176 197 373 186 178 364
372
3. 13 (DA) 0°0'00" 175 204 379 194 190 384
383
4. 14 (DA) 0°0'00" 179 194 373 193 181 374
365
5. 15 (DA) 0°0'00" 171 181 352 184 170 354
342
6. 16 (DA) 0°0'00" 161 179 340 172 106 278
2.2 Following are the location wise details of damages:
a. Loc. No. 170: Tower partially damaged above bottom cross arm level. Erection of
tower and stringing completed on 30-05-2016.
b. Loc. No. 12: Only Earthwire peak damaged
c. Loc. No. 13: Tower collapsed from about 6 meters above ground level. All stubs are
intact.
Page- 2
d. Loc. No. 14: Tower collapsed from ground level. All four stubs damaged and need
rectification.
e. Loc. No. 15: Only Earthwire peak damaged.
2.3 Photographs of affected towers are attached at Annexure-I.
2.4 The towers were checked for missing/theft members and bolts& nuts thoroughly to the
extents possible despite constraints due to jumbling / entangling of many members and
shearing of some nuts and bolts. No tower members/ bolts & nuts were found missing.
2.5 As confirmed through newspaper reports, heavy wind coupled with thunderstorm,
hailstorm, lightening had prevailed in the area on 29th May’ 2016 and resulted in uprooting
of tree, loss of property and disruption of power network. Copy of newspaper clips is
attached at Annexure-II.
blowing in the transverse direction of line had initiated the tower failure.
Failure of tower at Loc. No. 170 would have occurred on 23-05-2016 due to localized storm
resulting in excessive wind pressure on conductors and tower members.
On 29th May’ 2016, it appears that the failure has initiated at Loc. No. 14 due to localized
storm/ high intensity winds and other towers were damaged/ collapsed as a consequential
effect.
Immediate action been taken for restoration of the line on permanent towers and line was
restored on 13-06-2016.
Site has been advised to send the tower material for testing for determining the UTS
(Ultimate Tensile Strength) and Chemical composition.
Page- 3
Annexure-I
Loc. No. 170
Page- 4
Loc. No. 14
Loc. No-13
Page- 5
Annexure-II
NEWSPAPER CUTTING
Page- 6
Page- 7
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
400 kV S/C FARAKKA-SAGARDIGHI TRANSMISSION LINE

GURGAON
May’ 2016
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILURES IN 400 KV S/C FARAKKA-
SAGARDIGHI TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
400 kV S/C Farakka-Sagardighi transmission line tripped at 02:06 Hrs. on 27-05-2016 due to
partial collapse of tower at location no. 19 (A+0) during localized storm.

2016. Due to preoccupation, CEA could not depute any official to the Site for detailed
investigation. A team comprising of following officials from Regional-AM and Site visited
the affected location on 28-05-2016 for site investigations & getting firsthand information/
details from site representatives:
1. Sh. K. Rajendra, Chief Manager (AM), ER-II, Kolkata

2. Sh. Ujjal Mukhopadhyay, Chief Manager (TL), Farakka
2.0 Brief History
2.1 400 kV S/C Farakka-Sagardighi transmission line was constructed by M/s EMC. The line
was commissioned on 01.12.1994.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for Medium wind zone as per IS 802-1977. These are
S/C horizontal towers having Twin Moose conductor with I-I-I configuration.
2.3 Following is the previous history of tower collapse on this line:
Sl. Date of Collapse Section Type of Tower(s)

No. affected affected
1 12th February’ 2009 17 to 21 A type
2 27th May’ 2009 17 to 19 A type
Page- 1
Sl. Loc No. Type of Span Angle of Dev. Weight Wind Span
No. Tower (m) HOT COLD
1. 14 B 6°20’ 0” RT 367 367 365
400
2 15 A 394 394 395
390
3 16 A 388 388 390
390
4 17 A 389 388 390
390
5 18 A 387 387 390
390
6 19 A 381 381 385
380
7 20 A 389 388 382.5
385
8 21 A 400 401 390
395
9 22 A 394 393 397.5
400
10 23 A 388 388 395
390
11 24 A 387 386 387.5
385
12 25 B 0° 0’ 0” 405 408 390
3.0 Observations in respect of Failure/ damages to Tower Location
3.1 When the team reached the site of tower failure locations, the status of collapsed towers
3.2 The tower was located in cultivated field and no trees were there in the vicinity of tower
collapse. It was observed that the tower was collapsed above K-frame. All stubs were
intact.
3.3 The towers were checked for missing/ theft members and bolts & nuts thoroughly to the
extents possible. No tower members/ bolts were found missing.
Page- 2
3.4 During discussions with the local people in the nearby villages, it was revealed that very
high wind condition prevailed for some time in the area and tower had damaged due to
high wind conditions.
4.0 Reasons for failure:
localized heavy wind conditions prevailed in the vicinity of transmission line and would
have exerted wind pressures higher than the designed limit.
5.0 Restoration Plan:
Immediate action has been taken for restoration of damaged tower and line restored on
conventional tower on 02-06-2016.
Page- 3
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
220KV D/C Hisar-Hisar (I/A) TRANSMISSION LINE

GURGAON
May 2016
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILURES IN 220KV D/C Hissar-Hissar(I/A)
TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 220KV D/C Hisar- Hisar (I/A) transmission line tripped at 18:03 Hrs. on 29.05.2016 due to
collapse of 1 no. of tower at Location No. 2 (DA+18), during localized storm.

2016 and CEA deputed Sh. C N Devrajan & Sh. Faraz to the site for detailed investigation. A
team comprising of following officials from CC-Engg & CC-AM, Regional AM along with CEA
firsthand information/details from site officials:

2. Sh. Girish Kumar Gupta, CDE (Engg.TL)
3. Md. Farooq, Ch. Manager (AM), RHQ, Jammu
2.0 Brief History
2.1 220KV D/C Hissar- Hissar (I/A) transmission line was constructed by M/s Transpower Engg
Ltd., Mumbai and the line was commissioned on 01-09-1994.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for medium wind zone as per IS 802-1977. The
towers are in Vertical configuration with ACSR zebra Conductor.

The details of tower spotting in the relevant section are as follows:
Page- 1
Sl. No Loc No. Type of Span Angle of Dev. Wt. Span Wt. Span – Wt. Span
Tower (m) - Left (m) Right (m) Total (m)
Gantry
47
1 1 DD+0 0 43 63 106
193
2 2 DA+18 0 130 160 290
250
3 3 DD+3 0 90 165 255
184
4 4 DD+0 0
4.0 Observations in respect of Failure/damages to Tower Locations
When the team reached the site of tower failure location, the status of collapsed tower
It was observed that the tower at location no 2 has collapsed from stub level and fallen in
the transverse direction. This tower is located just outside Hisar substation boundary wall.
Photographs of collapsed tower are attached at Annexure-I.
Adjacent towers were checked for missing/ theft of tower members, bolts & nuts
thoroughly but no tower members or bolt were found missing.
The storm has caused wide spread damage in the HISAR district-like uprooting of trees
causing disruption of traffic on the highways and roads, uprooting of lighting poles, damage
to buildings etc. (photos attached at Annexure 2).
On enquiry from the villagers, it was informed that a severe localized cyclone coupled with
thunderstorm had occurred in the evening of 29 th May’ 2016 and created a lot of damage
in the area. Photographs of uprooted/ broken trees are attached at Annexure-II.
Towers on following HVPNL lines have also collapsed during above localized cyclone:
(a) 8 Nos. of towers of 22O KV Hisar (POWERGRID)-Sangwan (HVPNL) D/C transmission
line collapsed in vicinity of “Sangwan”. The line is owned by HVPNL.
Page- 2
(b) 38 LT transformers, 1100 no. LT poles and more than 500 trees were damaged /up-
rooted during this incident.
Local Newspaper clipping of the incident is attached at Annexure-III.
As mentioned at para 4.0 above, severe localized cyclone had occurred in the evening of
29th May’ 2016. Speed of the cyclone would have been higher than the designed wind
speed and would have been the cause of collapse of tower.
One circuit of the line restored on ERS towers on 3rd June’ 2016. For permanent
restoration, DD+18 M tower has been used. Casting of foundation and erection of tower
has been completed by 15thJune-2016. However, restoration on permanent tower delayed
due to non-availability of shut down of following under crossing lines of HVPNL:
132KV Hansi (HVPNL)-BBMB (Hissar) line.

132KV Hansi (HVPNL)-Hissar Cantt. (HVPNL) line.
220KV D/C Hissar (Powergrid)-Sangwan (HVPNL) line
Both circuits of 220KV Hisar (POWERGRID)-Hisar (I/A HVPNL) D/C line have been
permanently restored on 08.07.2016.
Page- 3
ANNXURE-I
PHOTOGRAPHS OF COLLAPSED TOWER : 220KV D/C HISAR-HISAR(I/A) LINE
Page- 4
Page- 5
ANNEXURE-II
Damaged Street Light Poles
Damaged/Uprooted trees in Hisar S/S
Page- 6
Uprooted trees in Hisar S/S
Page- 7
Damaged/ Uprooted trees in Hisar S/S
Damaged Trees in Hisar S/S
Page- 8
Damaged trees in Hisar S/S
Page- 9
Trees fallen on NH-10 (Hansi-Hisar) near Hansi
Page- 10
Page- 11
NEWSPAPER CLIPINGS
ANNEXURE-III
Page- 12
Page- 13
Page- 14
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
765 kV S/C Meerut-Greater Noida Transmission Line

GURGAON
June 2016
SUB: REPORT ON TOWER COLLAPSE / FAILURES IN 765 KV S/C MEERUT-
GREATER NOIDA TRANSMISSION LINE OF POWERGRID
1.0 BACKGROUND
1.1 765 kV S/C Meerut-Greater Noida transmission line tripped at 19:55 Hrs. on 13-06-2016
due to collapse of 1 no. of tower at Location No. 464 (A+3) during localized storm.
1.2 As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dated 05/09/2002, every
2016 and CEA deputed Ms. Nupur Choudhari & Sh. Farhad to the Site for detailed
investigation.
1.3 A team comprising of following officials from CC-Engg & CC-AM along with CEA
firsthand information/ details from site representatives.

2. Sh. Abhishek, Asst. GM (Engg-TL)
2.0 Brief History
2.1 765 kV S/C Meerut-Greater Noida transmission line (part of 765 kV S/C Meerut-Agra line)
was constructed by M/s. EMCO. The line was commissioned on 01-06-2013.
2.2 The towers of this line were designed for basic wind speed of 47 m/sec corresponding to
Wind Zone-4 as per IS 802-1995. The towers were designed in Delta configuration with
Quad ACSR BERSIMISE Conductor.
3.0 Observations:
3.1 Tower Spotting Details: The details of tower spotting in the relevant sections are as
follows:
Page- 1
Sl. Loc. Type of Forward Angle of Wt. Span Wt. Span – Wt. Span
No. No. Tower Span Dev. - Left (m) Right (m) Total (m)
(m)
1. 461 D+9 403 47'50'11' RT 233 126 359
2. 462 A+0 393 194 170 364
3. 463 A+0 398 187 199 386
4. 464 A+3 398 216 211 427
5. 465 B+0 395 06'54'39' RT 190 182 372
6. 466 C+3 249 03'04'11' RT 125 205 330
3.2 Observations in respect of Failure/ damages to Tower at Loc. No. 464 (A+3):
The tower is situated in cultivated field with very few trees in the vicinity. Tower
completely collapsed to the ground and all the four stubs of the tower were found bent.
3.3 Adjacent towers were checked thoroughly for missing tower members and Bolts & Nuts.
None of the tower members and Bolts & Nuts were found missing.
3.4 Discussion with the local people in the nearby villages revealed that exceptionally high
wind condition prevailed for some time in the area and tower has collapsed under high
wind conditions. Newspaper clip in this regard is attached at Annexure-I.
Page- 2
Immediate action has been taken for restoration of the line and line was restored on ERS
tower on 17-06-2016. Line was restored on permanent tower on 27-06-2016.
blowing in the transverse direction of line had initiated the tower failure. Velocity of the
wind would have been higher than the designed limit.
6.0 Material testing:
Site has been advised to send the tower material for testing for determining the UTS
(Ultimate Tensile Strength) and Chemical composition.
Page- 3
Annexure-I
Page- 4
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
220KV D/C Kakrapar – Haldarwa Transmission Line

GURGAON
JULY’ 2016
POWERGRID CORPORATION OF INDIA LIMITED
CORPORATE ENGINEERING - TL
REF:CC/Engg/TL/220/K-H//Tower Failure
Sub: Report on tower failure at location no. 7 & 8 (Tension Tower) of 220
kV D/C Kakrapar – Haldarwa Transmission Line on 04.07.2016.
1.0 Background
1.1 220 kV Kakrapar-Haldarwa D/C line tripped at around 1741 Hrs. on

04.07.16 due to collapse of towers at location No. 7 and 8 during heavy
windstorm and rains.
1.2 A committee comprising of the following officials from Regional AM, CC-
Engineering & CC-AM Departments was constituted to investigate the
cause of failure/ collapse of towers and to suggest the remedial measures
to avoid such incidents in future:
1. Shri Sunil Kumar, DGM (AM), WR-II, Baroda

2. Shri Vivek Sundariyal, Dy Mgr (AM),CC, Gurgaon
3. Shri Shrikant Gajbhe ,Engineer (Engg-TL), CC, Gurgaon
1.3 As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dtd.

05.09.2002, every incident of tower failure must be reported to CEA for
investigation by a Standing Committee of Experts constituted by CEA.
The incident was intimated to CEA while CEA has not deputed anyone to
the site. The above mentioned Committee visited the affected locations
on 12.07.2016 and carried out investigations.
2.0 Brief History
220 kV Kakrapar-Haldarwa D/C line (74 kms) was designed by M/s HTPS and
constructed by M/s SAE (I) Ltd. The line was commissioned on 01-12-92.
Construction of the line was carried out by M/s Gujrat Electricity Board on
deposit work basis and subsequently handed over to POWERGRID. This line was
under satisfactory operation for the last 24 years and such type of tower failures
were not observed in past.
3.0 Tower Spotting Details:
Sl. Loc. No. Type of Span Angle of

No. Tower (m) Dev.
1. 6 DA+0
270
2. 7 DD+0 58˚00' RT
270
3. 8 DC+3
316
4. 9 DD+6 09˚30' RT
219
4.0 Observations
The committee visited the site of tower collapse on 12.07.16 and carried out the
investigation. The observations are as follows:
The location of failure is approximately 1.7 kms from Kakrapar end of

transmission line and is situated in cultivated land near village Rajwad, Tashil:
Mandvi, Surat. The site is accessible through Ahemdabad- Mumbai highway and
village roads.
4.1 The tower at loc. No. 7 collapsed in the traverse direction and chimney at
this location has come out from 2 pits.
Failed tower at location no. 7
4.2 The towers at loc. No. 8 was in hanging condition as one chimney came
out due to the sudden jerk caused by tower collapsed at location no 7.
Failed tower at location no. 8

4.3 The towers were checked for missing/ theft of tower members and bolts &
nuts thoroughly and no tower members were found missing.
4.4 Adjacent towers in the vicinity were also checked and no missing
members were observed.
Based on the investigation and observation of the committee, it can be concluded

that due to localized heavy wind conditions in the vicinity of transmission line
with wind blowing in the transverse direction of line, tower at location no. 7
failed. The sudden jerk would have caused uprooting of two chimneys at location
no. 7 and one chimney at location no. 8.
6.0 Immediate remedial measures
There was no power flow in the line as Kakrapar Atomic Power Plant was under
planned maintenance. Therefore, Emergency Restoration was not deployed. Line
restoration work was taken up on war footing and line was restored on normal
towers on 20.07.2016.

Site has been directed to send the tower material for testing for determining the
MTS (Maximum Tensile strength), UTS (Ultimate Tensile Strength) and
Chemical composition.
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
220 kV D/C Mariani-Mokokchung Transmission Line

GURGAON
July 2016
REPORT ON DAMAGE TO TOWER LOC.56 & 57 OF 220KV D/C MARIANI-
MOKOKCHUNG TRANSMISSION LINE ON 12.07.2016.
12.07.2016 01:11 Hr: The 220KV Mariani-Mokokchung Ckt-II transmission line tripped with the
following relay indication:
Mariani : Z1,R-Y ph, 24.5KM
Mokokchung : Z1, R-Y-B ph
During this period , 220KV Mariani-Mokokchung Ckt-I was under open condition for containing high
voltage.
12.07.2016 02:22 Hr: Attempt was made to charge 220KV Mariani-Mokokchung Ckt-I from Mariani
end but the same immediately tripped on SOTF.
12.07.2016 03:12 Hr: Attempt was made to charge 220KV Mariani-Mokokchung Ckt-II from
Mariani end but the same immediately tripped on SOTF.
Subsequent to deployment of offline fault locator followed by ground patrolling , it was observed
that heavy landslide has occurred in the stretch covering tower location 56 & 57( Chanki area under
Nagaland) of the transmission line- leading the following damages:
Loc. 56(DC+3): Complete deformation of the bottom part of tower & damage to its foundation
resulting in complete failure of the tower.
Loc. 57(DC+0): Deformation in leg members( first & second section) of the tower & foundation
triggered by complete sliding away of the supporting soil.
Some photographs pertaining to the incidence are appended:
(L)Failure of tower at loc.56(R ) Landslide near

the location
View of landslide along the line
It is observed that massive landslide has taken place at various stretches in the entire hill
accommodating the tower locations from 52 to 59. Further, the situation has been aggravated by
the continuous rainfall in the area during the last few weeks.
Brief History of line:
The line was constructed as part of Palatana transmission project. Construction of the line was done
by C&C Ltd. Total line length is 49 km. Towers for the line were supplied by M/s Steel Products
Limited, Kolkata. 220 kV towers designed by M/s RPG for wind zone 4 (47 m/s) with single Zebra
conductor as per IS 802:1995 were used in the line with revised tower spotting data.
The line was commissioned on 17.07.2015. This is the first tower failure in the line.
Further course of action:
a) Temporary Restoration: Prospect for installing ERS as a temporary measure has been
explored for connecting loc.55 to loc.58. However, in view of steep slope & instability in the
area caused by landslide, installation of ERS is found to be not feasible-given the steep uplift
ERS is likely to suffer in addition to dearth of stable location where ERS along with its
supporting guys can be implanted.
Currently, the power flow of the line is being diverted through the 132 kV Mariani-
Mokokchung line of Nagaland State Electricity Department.
b) Permanent Restoration: Stability of the soil strata near existing location 56 & 57 having
been completely disturbed, casting of new foundations in their vicinity is not viable. As such,
establishing a direct connectivity between location 55 & 58, thereby avoiding the completely
instable stretch from loc.56 to 57, is found to be a sustainable option. In view of span limits
of the of the existing towers at 55 & 58, towers of higher design shall have to be installed at
loc. 55 & 58 & directly strung in between.
Permanent restoration of the line is expected by end of December 2016.

REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
IN
400 KV D/C (QUAD) KISHANGANJ - PATNA TRANSMISSION

LINE
(Location No. 51)

GURGAON
OCTOBER – 2016
Report on tower failure at location no. 51 of 400 kV D/C(Quad) Patna-
Kishanganj Transmission Line on 26.07.2016
1.0 Background
1.1 400 kV D/C (Quad) Patna-Kishanganj transmission line was under shut down on
26.07.2016 from 09.56 Hrs, for line crossing works near Patna Substation. At about
12.00 Hrs., line maintenance employee received a phone from the mukhia of
Simalbadi village that tower at location no. 51 of this line collapsed in river Kankai.
The line was declared under breakdown and immediate patrolling was
commenced. During patrolling, it was observed that one tension tower (DD+18) at
location no. 51 of this line has completely fallen and submerged due to flash flood
in nearby Kankai river. The tower is situated near village Simalbadi approximately
55 kms from Purnea sub-station.
Details of tower type/foundation for above section are given below:
Sl. Location Tower Span Angle of

Foundation type
no. no. type (m) deviation
1 49 DD+0 370 37’35” RT PS
399
2 50 DD+18 240 16’52” RT FS
580
3 51 DD+18 0 FS
397
4 52 DD+0 070 24’57” RT PS
314
5 53 DA+0 0 PS
376
1.2 Competent Authority has constituted a committee of following mambers:

a) Shri A. K. Singh, AGM, Purnea, ER-I
b) Shri N. C. Adak, DGM (CC- Engg-TL), Gurgaon
c) Shri S. K. Rai, Asst. GM , RHQ Patna, ER-I
d) Shri Rajeev Kumar, Asst. GM (CC- AM), Gurgaon
1.3 A committee comprising of the following executives visited the affected site to investigate
the cause of failure:
e) Shri A. K. Singh, AGM, Purnea, ER-I
f) Shri N. C. Adak, DGM (CC- Engg-TL), Gurgaon
g) Shri Kundan Srivastava, Dy, Manager (RHQ-Engg), Patna, in place of Shri. S.K. rai ,
Asst. GM (RHQ-Engg), Patna
h) Shri Pankaj Dwivedi, Dy. Manager (CC- Engg-TL), Gurgaon
i) Shri Vivek Sundariyal, Dy. Manager (CC- AM), Gurgaon, in place of Shri. Rajeev
Kumar, Asst. GM (CC-AM), Gurgaon
1.4 As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dtd. 05.09.2002, every
26.07.2016 and CEA deputed Shri C. N. Devarajan, Dy. Director to the Site for detailed
investigation. The CEA representative along with Sh. Subhash Kumar, Asst. GM, Purnea,
Sh. Sumit Sashi, Manager (TL), Saharsa, Sh. Sanjeev Kumar, Dy. Manager (TL-AM), Purnea
and above mentioned committee members visited the affected locations on 29.09.2016 and
carried out the detailed investigations.
1.5 History of the line
400 kV D/C Patna-Kishanganj transmission line was constructed under transmission

system for transfer of power from generation projects in Sikkim to NR/WR(Part-B) scheme
by M/S EMC in year 2016. The towers of this line have been designed for Wind Zone-IV as
per IS:802-1995. The length of the line is 346.72 Kms. The line was commissioned on 28-03-
2016 and this is the first failure of the line after commissioning. On 26th July 2016, due to
flash flood in Kankai river, one tension tower (DD+18) at location no. 51 of this line got
collapsed.
Collapsed tower at location no 51
Committee visit at the affected site
1.6 Observations and recommendations of the committee
The committee visited the site on 29th September 2016 and taken an overview of the area which
was affected during the recent devastating flood in river Kankai flowing in the vicinity of the
transmission line. The following are the observation of the committee:
(a) Upon reaching the site, it was observed that the area nearby the affected tower locations
was completely flooded and the affected location was only accessible through boat. The
nearby houses were also found flooded because of the flood water.
(b) Collapsed tower at location no.-51 was partially submerged in the water at the time of
committee visit. This tower was erected on normal foundation (FS type). As per the data
available, the Kankai river was flowing about 128 meters away from the tower Location in
2014 (Copy of google map is also enclosed at Annexure-I).
(c) Committee enquired regarding the theft of the members for the collapsed tower. It was
informed by the site that there was no theft of the tower members. No missing tower
members were observed in the collapsed tower.
Based on the site feedback, local enquiry from the villagers and observation of the committee,
it appears that tower at location no. 51 has collapsed due to erosion of soil below the
foundation i.e. due to failure of foundation at Leg ‘D’ . Committee is of the view that the
intensity of the flash flood was severe enough to wash away the foundation of the collapsed
tower.
Action for restoration of the line can be taken up immediately after the receding of flood water.
1.8 Recommendations
Considering the fact that the affected location will be under constant threat of being washed
away by the Kankai river, whose course it quite unpredictable, the opinion of the committee is
to provide pile type foundation at location no. 51 as a permanent measure.
It is also not possible to reroute the line beyond the flood plain of the river as all possible
routes on left and right of the current alignment is also in meandering zone of the river. In
addition, in case of rerouting, the line length and in turn no. of towers will increase
considerably and pile foundations cannot be avoided in the alternate route also.
For development of design and drawing of pile foundation, soil investigation may be carried
at tower location no. 51 immediately and river data/ hydrological data along with soil
investigation report may be furnished to CC engineering
Annexure-I
REPORT
ON
TOWER FAILURE
IN
400 KV D/C (QUAD) KISHANGANJ - PATNA TRANSMISSION

LINE (GANGA RIVER CROSSING )
(Location No. 128D/0, 128E/0, 128F/0,128G/0 & 129/0 )

GURGAON
NOVEMBER – 2016
Report on tower failure at Location No. 128D/0, 128E/0, 128F/0,128G/0 & 129/0 of 400 kV
D/C(Quad) Patna-Kishanganj Transmission Line on 01.09.2016
1.0 Background
1.1 400 kV D/C (Quad) Patna-Kishanganj transmission line was under breakdown with
effect from 26.07.2016 due to complete collapse of one tension tower (DD+18) at
location no. 51 near village Simalbadi approximately 55 kms from Purnea sub-
station. The Line was charged with antitheft charging from Patna S/S end. In the
meantime on 01.09.2016 at 00:53 towers at location No. 128D/0, 128E/0,
128F/0,128G/0 & 129/0 collapsed due to unprecedented flash flood in river Ganga.
After getting the message of tower failure, the patrolling gang was sent to site but
unable to reach to the nearby site of the failure location to ascertain the exact
damage due to very high river current and no boat’s man was ready to go to site.
1.2 The Line is crossing the river Ganga in-between village Mahendrapur (left bank)
and Samho (right bank). Details of tower type/foundation for above section are
given below:
Sl. Location Tower Span Angle of

Foundation type
no. no. type (m) deviation
1 127A DD+0 70 30’00” RT Normal
400
2 128/0 DD+09 110 33’18” LT Pile foundation
273
3 128A/0 DD+25 000 00’00” Pile foundation
540
4 128B/0 DD+25 000 00’00” Pile foundation
540
5 128C/0 DD+25 000 00’00” Pile foundation
480
6 128D/0 DD+25 000 00’00” Pile foundation
540
7 128E/0 DD+25 000 00’00” Pile foundation
540
8 128F/0 DD+25 000 00’00” Pile foundation
540
9 128G/0 DD+25 000 00’00” Pile foundation
330
10 129/0 DD+09 170 44’27” RT Pile foundation
1.3 Competent Authority has constituted a committee of following members:
a) Shri M.Q.Huda , AGM, RHQ Patna, ER-I
c) Shri S. K. Rai, Asst. GM , RHQ Patna, ER-I
d) Shri Rajeev Kumar, Asst. GM (CC- AM), Gurgaon
1.4 A committee comprising of the following executives visited the affected site to investigate
the cause of failure:
a) Shri M.Q.Huda , AGM, RHQ Patna, ER-I
c) Shri Sunil Kumar, DGM ,Patna, ER-I
d) Shri S. K. Rai, Asst. GM , RHQ Patna, ER-I
e) Shri Neeraj Joshi, Engineer (CC- AM), Gurgaon, in place of Shri. Rajeev Kumar, Asst.
GM (CC-AM), Gurgaon
f) Shri Neeraj Kumar, Dy Manager (AM), RHQ Patna.
1.5 As per the Office Memorandum No. 5-41\Secy\CEA\2001\2070 dtd. 05.09.2002, every
01.09.2016 and CEA deputed Shri C. N. Devarajan, Dy. Director and Shri Mohit Mudgal,
Assistant Director to the Site for detailed investigation. The CEA representative along with
above mentioned committee members visited the affected locations on 09.11.2016 and
carried out the detailed investigations.
1.6 History of the line
400 kV D/C Patna-Kishanganj transmission line was constructed under transmission

system for transfer of power from generation projects in Sikkim to NR/WR(Part-B) scheme
by M/S EMC in year 2016. The towers of this line have been designed for Wind Zone-IV as
per IS:802-1995. The length of the line is 346.72 Kms. The line was commissioned on 28-03-
2016 and this is the second failure of the line after commissioning. On 1st September 2016,
due to unprecedented flash flood in Ganga river, Two Number of tension tower (DD+25m
Extn.) at location no. 128F/0 and 128G/0 of this line got collapsed.
View of both Collapsed tower at location no 128F/0 & 128G/0
Collapsed tower at location no 128F/0
Collapsed tower at location no 128G/0

Damaged tower at location no 129/0
1.7 Observations and recommendations of the committee
The committee visited the site on 9th November 2016 and taken an overview of the area which
was affected during the recent devastating flood in river. The following are the observation of
the committee:
(a) Upon reaching the site, it was observed that water level in Ganga has lowered drastically
compared to high flood level condition. The site is approachable on cultivated land from
right bank side. The right bank nearby the affected tower at location No. 128G/0 was
damaged heavily by the river current. It is informed by site that this location was
completely in dry bank location and the stream was about 150m away from the location
during construction of Pile foundation. Presently the river is flowing about 30m beyond the
tower location. The tower including pile foundation in two legs are found to be washed
away by river current.
(b) Collapsed tower at Location no. 128F/0 is situated on the island location. As informed by
site this location was in mid-stream river channel during construction of pile foundation.
Huge deposition of silt is observed near this tower location. The collapsed tower is present
in the transverse direction on the downstream side of the tower location.
(c) Towers at location No. 128 E/0 , 128D/0 & 129/0 are in standing condition with major
damages in different cross arms, minor damages in plan bracing & Hip bracings.
Conductors were missing (cut by thief) from the right bank side in-between location No.
128G/0 & 129/0.
(d) Committee enquired regarding the theft of the members for the collapsed tower. It was
informed by the site that it was very difficult to assess the theft of the tower members as the
site was not approachable during high flood of the river. No missing tower members were
observed during last patrolling prior to flood.

Based on the site feedback, local enquiry from the villagers and observation of the committee,
it appears that tower at location no. 128G/0 has collapsed during high flood period. After its
fall in water, probably, all floating debris got entrapped within the tower members fallen in
river. The ferocious river current caused extra-ordinary load on the pile foundation and this
uprooted pile foundation of two legs nearer to right bank.
1.9 Recommendations
Considering the vulnerability of the river Ganga committee opined that the existing tower at
location No. 128G/0 is to be shifted suitably towards location No.129/0 with DD+25m tower
and raised chimney to get the requisite navigation clearance of Ganga.
For development of design and drawing of pile foundation, soil investigation may be carried at
shifted tower location no. 128G/0 immediately and latest river data/ hydrological data along
with soil investigation report may be furnished.
ANNEXURE -C
Composition
of
Standing Committee
of
Experts
Report on failure of Transmission line towers during the period December 2015 to September 2016

Transmission Line Tower Failures

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Transmission Line Tower Failures

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क्षतिग्रस्ि ट्रांसतिशन लरइन टॉवरों पर तवशेषज्ञों की स्थरयी सतिति की ररपोटट

(तिसम्बर 2015 – तसिम्बर 2016)

Sl. No. Description Page No.

2. Report of Standing Committee of Experts 11

Minutes of the Meeting

Report / Data submitted by Concerned

Composition of Standing Committee of

a) Material requirement for bolts and nuts have been modified.

As per IS 802:1995 As per IS 802:2015

f) Transverse load conditions have been modified.

g) Vertical erection loads in safety requirement have been modified.

Tension Tower with Vertical Distance from the Tip

i) The Reliability level has been modified as indicated below:

 Uprooting of foundation Chimney.

 Shearing of stubs of leg members of towers.

2.0 The major cause of failure of towers are as under:

b) Theft/sabotage of tower members, generally the theft of secondary members(connected

c) It is also difficult to take into account demolishing activities by miscreants like

e) Lack of proper soil investigation and deficiency in design/construction of foundation of

3.0 BRIEF DETAILS OF FAILURE OF TOWERS OF VARIOUS TRANSMISSION

400 kV D/C Rourkela- Sundergarh PGCIL

400 kV S/C Uri-II-Wagoora transmission

400 kV Jeypore- Indravati transmission

765 kV S/C Bina- Gwalior-III

400 kV D/C Farakka- Sagardighi

400 kV D/C Jind- Bhiwani

765 kV S/C Meerut- Greater Noida

400 kV D/C (Quad) Kishanganj-

400 kV D/C Bamnauli- Jhatikara

Sl. Voltage Level No. of Lines No. of Towers failed

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS & REMEDIAL MEASURES SUGGESTED BY THE

Details of failure including minutes of meeting, photographs and other information

A. Failure of transmission lines of PGCIL

Fatehpur transmission line as suggested by the Standing Committee in the previous

B) Failure of transmission lines of DTL

e) Possibility of strengthening of members of failed towers by adopting new technologies

4.3 The committee also decided that:

REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS TO INVESTIGATE

 To investigate the causes of failure of towers

The meeting of Standing Committee of Experts was held in CEA on 02.12.2016 to

2.0 OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS & REMEDIAL MEASURES

2.1 DETAILS OF FAILURE OF TOWERS OF VARIOUS TRANSMISSION LINES OF

Sl. Date of occurrence No. of towers failed

400 kV D/C Rourkela- Sundergarh

765 kV S/C Bhiwani- Fagi transmission 9

400 kV D/C Jind- Bhiwani transmission

2.1.2 DETAILS IN RESPECT OF EACH TRANSMISSION LINE

1. 400kV D/C (Quad) Nellore – Tiruvalem Transmission Line failed on 04.12.2015

Probable Cause of Failure

Committee recommended for early completion of strengthening of damaged tower

2. 400kV Rourkela – Sundargarh – Raigarh LILO – I Transmission Line failed on

Probable Cause of Failure

The Line was restored on 21.02.2016.

Probable Cause of Failure

4. 765 kV S/C Angul- Sundargarh Transmission Line-Ckt-Itransmission Line failed on

Probable Cause of Failure

Line was restored on normal towers on 06.03.2016 at 18:28 Hrs.

Tower at Loc. No. 42A/0(B+0)

5. 765 KV S/C Gaya-Varanasi-Fatehpur transmission line failed on 07.03.2016 (Location.

Date of tower No. of towers Probable cause of tower

14th May’ 2015 283(A+3) , 284(A+0) 2 Localized cyclone

12th June’ 2015 334 (A+0) 1 Localized cyclone

Probable Cause of Failure

Loc. No. 715 (A+3)