IN RE CUNANAN

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law
was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%

1952 …………………….71%

1953……………………..72%

1954……………………..73%

1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be
deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation
of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the
Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations.
Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing
partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955
was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following
reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had
inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to
practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of
Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to
substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it
void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing
Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally
fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of
law.

SALAZAR VS ACHACOSO

FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having
ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent
Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.

The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that
petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure
and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises.
Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman
Development (Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any.
Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and
saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly
receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated
properties. They alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was
a private residence, it was robbery.

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred
are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for
certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue
warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it
be done by a mere prosecuting body.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article
38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly
issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly
the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue
warrants of arrest and search:

The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose
of deportation