10 Nov 2017

Federalism and the Institutional Design Literature:

The Crucial Role of Political Science in Assessing
the Duterte Administration's Constitutional Overhaul Project

Gene Lacza Pilapil

I would like to thank the Association of Political Science

Organizations of the Philippines (APSOP)

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the Association of Political Science

Organizations of the Philippines (APSOP)

for having me as their speaker

for their First APSOP Annual Public Lecture on Political

Science.
 10 Nov 2017

Special thanks to the APSOP organizing team

who spent an enormous amount of time and effort
to make this first annual public lecture possible:

Ms. Myna Rafanan (UP Manila) Special thanks also to Professor Torres-Pilapil of UP Diliman
Ms. Dannah Victoria (UP Diliman)
for her heroic efforts in helping out the APSOP organizing team.
Mr. Aldin Marte-de Leon (UP Diliman)
Mr. Ralph Buella (UST)
Ms. Quisha Varez (UE)
and Mr. Leo Jaminola (UP Diliman)

I would also like to thank everyone in the audience today.

But special thanks to all the political science majors in the

audience.
Congratulations!
I consider myself so privileged to be able to lecture in front of so
many political science majors today.

I am happy to be part of your college political science life, even

if only for an afternoon.

It is my hope that the next generation of APSOP leaders

will continue with this annual public lecture.

Such that most members will see each other again next year
I would also like to congratulate APSOP
for the APSOP 2nd Annual Public Lecture
for introducing this Annual Public Lecture on Political Science.
with a different political science professor speaker

and a different topic of national importance

but the same lecture celebrating the power of our discipline.

 10 Nov 2017

It is my hope by
thatbeing
the next generation
introduced of best
to the APSOP leaders
scholarship Hence, this afternoon, we celebrate our discipline
in political science available for a given topic by meeting some of its biggest and most brilliant scholars
will continue with this annual public lecture.
thru this,
Such that most members will see each other again next year To support me in the
Filipino political science what I see as potentially
majors hopefullyndbecome arguments that I will
for the APSOP 2 Annual Public Lecture one of the most important make on the Duterte I will exclusively employ scholars
more self-conscious of the achievements of APSOP’s
awesome explanatory administration's who are “political scientists”
with a different annual public lecture
political science professor speaker
powers of their discipline federalism
and overall constitutional
and a different topic overhaul project, who teach
by in political science,
academic or
but the same lecture celebrating the power of our discipline. politics, or govt
degree departments

1. Highlight the pivotal role political science plays,

through the institutional design literature in political science,
Four Main Aims of the Lecture in assessing the Duterte administration’s federalism campaign
and broader constitutional overhaul project.

2. Emphasize to political science majors

the importance of adopting 3. Give a working knowledge of a federal political system
a more evidence-based and scholarship-based approach from its definition
when tackling crucial political issues facing the Philippines. to its key institutions.
 10 Nov 2017

4. Give fair warning on the grave dangers of constitutional overhauls

based on the nature of institutions and institutional changes Limitations
as seen from the vantage point of the institutional design literature.

This is just a two-hour lecture,

I will try to compress two UP courses I teach

This is just a two-hour lecture,

I will try to compress two UP courses I teach

Disclosure: I do not even get to finish the topics
of each course in one semester
 10 Nov 2017

This is just a two-hour lecture,

15th Jaime V. Ongpin Annual Memorial Lecture
so it barely scratches the surface of what needs to be said

My two-hour lecture today

is an expanded and updated version
of the one hour and twenty-minute lecture
I gave in 2016
as the speaker of the
15th Jaime V. Ongpin Annual Memorial Lecture.

www.ateneo.edu/fifteenth-jvo-annual-memorial-lecture
 10 Nov 2017

Jaime V.
Ongpin
Lecture is
also
available
on
Youtube

Thanks to Mr. Cedric Dela Cruz of UP Diliman

 10 Nov 2017

Outline

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

II. What is federalism?
Outline of the Lecture III. Three cautionary insights from the institutional
design literature for the federalism project in the
Philippines (and the overall charter change campaign)
IV. Three other cautionary insights

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

1. informal
institutions

I. Short Introduction social values

and norms
to the Institutional Design Literature rules that influence the strategies
of state and social actors
not written down
examples:
sitting down to listen to a lecture/
or standing in front to deliver a lecture

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

1. informal
institutions 2. formal institutions
social values
and norms
rules that influence the strategies rules that influence the strategies
of state and social actors of state and social actors
not written down
“written down somewhere
example: as laws, regulations,
bribe-giving to facilitate government transactions constitutions, treaties, and
so forth” (John M. Carey)
 10 Nov 2017

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

2. formal institutions

rules that influence the strategies

of state and social actors

“written down somewhere

as laws, regulations,
constitutions, treaties, and “parchment institutions”
so forth” (John M. Carey)

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

2. formal institutions

rules that influence the strategies

of state and social actors

“written down somewhere

as laws, regulations, “parchment institutions”
constitutions, treaties, and most important: constitution
so forth” (John M. Carey)

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

2. formal institutions most basic

“institutional
framework”
rules that influence the strategies of a democracy
of state and social actors (Alfred Stepan
and Cindy Skach)
“written down somewhere
as laws, regulations, “parchment institutions”
constitutions, treaties, and most important: constitution most important: constitution
so forth” (John M. Carey)
 10 Nov 2017

creates the fundamental formal an institution that creates

rules creating other institutions other institution/s
example:
1987 Philippine Constitution
most basic most important
“institutional formal
legislative branch framework” “meta-institution”
Article VI executive branch
of a democracy of politics
Article VII
(Alfred Stepan
judicial branch
and Cindy Skach)
Article VIII constitutional bodies
Article IX

local government
Article X other institutions most important: constitution
different other Articles

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
first half of the definition second half of the definition
differences in the arrangement of formal rules

one basic example: form of government

relation between the executive and legislative

horizontal
If separated = presidential
institutional design of a
If fused = parliamentary
country’s form of government
If hybrid = semi-presidential
 10 Nov 2017

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
second half of the definition second half of the definition
such as the studies how the design such as the studies how the design
form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions system of government political institutions

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
second half of the definition second half of the definition
such as the studies how the design such as the studies how the design
form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s
system of government political institutions system of government political institutions
electoral system, electoral system,
party system,

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
second half of the definition second half of the definition
such as the studies how the design such as the studies how the design
form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s
system of government political institutions system of government political institutions
electoral system, electoral system,
party system, party system,
legislative structure, legislative structure,
judicial system,
 10 Nov 2017

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
second half of the definition second half of the definition
such as the studies how the design such as the studies how the design
form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s
system of government political institutions system of government political institutions
electoral system, electoral system,
party system, party system,
legislative structure, legislative structure,
judicial system, judicial system,
and and
constitutional bodies constitutional bodies

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
second half of the definition second half of the definition
such as the studies how the design such as the studies how the design
form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s
system of government political institutions system of government political institutions
electoral system, electoral system,
party system, affects or will affect, among others, party system, affects or will affect, among others,
legislative structure, legislative structure, the accountability,
judicial system, judicial system,
and and
constitutional bodies constitutional bodies

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
second half of the definition second half of the definition
such as the studies how the design such as the studies how the design
form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s
system of government political institutions system of government political institutions
electoral system, electoral system,
party system, affects or will affect, among others, party system, affects or will affect, among others,
legislative structure, the accountability, legislative structure, the accountability,
judicial system, representation, judicial system, representation,
and and popular empowerment,
constitutional bodies constitutional bodies
 10 Nov 2017

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature
second half of the definition second half of the definition
such as the studies how the design such as the studies how the design
form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s form of government, (or redesign) of a country’s
system of government political institutions system of government political institutions
electoral system, electoral system,
party system, affects or will affect, among others, party system, affects or will affect, among others,
legislative structure, the accountability, legislative structure, the accountability,
judicial system, representation, judicial system, representation,
and popular empowerment, and popular empowerment,
constitutional bodies constitutional bodies
elite capture, elite capture,
and coherent policymaking
of the state

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

studies how the design

(or redesign) of a country’s
political institutions

(Johan P. Olsen)

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

studies how the design

(or redesign) of a country’s
“signifies purposeful and deliberate political institutions
intervention
that succeeds in establishing
new institutional structures and processes,
or rearranging existing ones,
thereby achieving intended outcomes
and improvements” (Johan P. Olsen)
 10 Nov 2017

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

other terms counts some of the biggest names

in the political science discipline
“constitutional engineering literature”
Today’s lecture would present arguments from, among others:

“constitutional design literature” Robert Kaufman

Matthew Shugart Scott Mainwaring
John Carey
“institutional approach” Stephan Haggard Alfred Stepan

“new institutionalism” Johan Olsen Larry Diamond Giovanni Sartori

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

counts some of the biggest names

in the political science discipline

Today’s lecture would present arguments from, among others:

including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science

"to the scholar who in the view of the Foundation has

made the most valuable contribution to political science”
 10 Nov 2017

I. Short introduction to the institutional design literature

Francis Fukuyama (2015)

counts some of the biggest names
in the political science discipline

Today’s lecture would present arguments from, among others:

including winners of the Johan Skytte Prize in Political Science

Juan Linz (1996) (2016)
Rein Taagepera (2008) Pippa Norris (2011)

Arend Lijphart (1997) Adam Przeworski (2010) Jon Elster (2016)

II. What is Federalism? II.A. Definition of Terms

One of the most famous definitions of federalism

is the shortest one

Daniel Elazar in his 1987 book, Exploring Federalism
 10 Nov 2017

One of the most famous definitions of federalism

is the shortest one

Daniel Elazar in his 1987 book, Exploring Federalism

“The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule.”

italicized part repeated like a mantra

in most discussions of federalism

One of the most famous definitions of federalism One of the most useful definitions of federalism

William H. Riker in his 1987 book, The Development of

is the shortest one American Federalism
Daniel Elazar in his 1987 book, Exploring Federalism

“The simplest possible definition is self-rule plus shared rule.”

sovereignty shared sovereignty

Ironically, nothing is simple here

interrelationship between the two

through shared federal institutions
 10 Nov 2017

One of the most useful definitions of federalism

William H. Riker in his 1987 book, The Development of

American Federalism

“orders of “The rule for identification is: a constitution is federal if

government” 1.) two levels of government rule the same land and
(central-local) people,
2.) each level has at least one area of action in which
it is autonomous, and
3.) there is some guarantee (even though merely a
statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each
government in its own sphere.”

One of the most useful definitions of federalism One of the most useful definitions of federalism

William H. Riker in his 1987 book, The Development of William H. Riker in his 1987 book, The Development of
American Federalism American Federalism

“The rule for identification is: a constitution is federal if federalism can “The rule for identification is: a constitution is federal if
“distribution range from
of powers” 1.) two levels of government rule the same land and 1.) two levels of government rule the same land and
people, highly people,
“legislative 2.) each level has at least one area of action in which centralized 2.) each level has at least one area of action in which
competences” it is autonomous, and (ex. Malaysia) it is autonomous, and
“scope” 3.) there is some guarantee (even though merely a to 3.) there is some guarantee (even though merely a
statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each highly statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each
“jurisdiction” decentralized
government in its own sphere.” government in its own sphere.”
(ex. Brazil)

One of the most useful definitions of federalism

William H. Riker in his 1987 book, The Development of

American Federalism William H. Riker in his 1975 article, “Federalism” in Handbook of
Political Science, Volume Five
“The rule for identification is: a constitution is federal if
1.) two levels of government rule the same land and
Riker: people,
“makes final 2.) each level has at least one area of action in which
decisions” it is autonomous, and
3.) there is some guarantee (even though merely a
statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each
government in its own sphere.”
 10 Nov 2017

William H. Riker in his 1975 article, “Federalism” in Handbook of

Political Science, Volume Five

"Federalism is a political organization in which the

activities of government are divided between
regional governments and a central government in
such a way that each kind of government has
some activities on which it makes final decisions.”

One of the most useful definitions of federalism One of the most useful definitions of federalism

William H. Riker in his 1987 book, The Development of William H. Riker in his 1987 book, The Development of
American Federalism American Federalism

“The rule for identification is: a constitution is federal if “The rule for identification is: a constitution is federal if
1.) two levels of government rule the same land and sovereignty 1.) two levels of government rule the same land and
Riker: people, of each people,
“makes final 2.) each level has at least one area of action in which government 2.) each level has at least one area of action in which
decisions” it is autonomous, and in its own it is autonomous, and
(sovereignty) 3.) there is some guarantee (even though merely a sphere is 3.) there is some guarantee (even though merely a
two sovereign statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each constitutionally statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each
levels of government in its own sphere.” guaranteed government in its own sphere.”
government one aspect of “shared sovereignty”

A current definition of federalism

“constitutional sovereignty”
not the sovereignty found in “sovereign countries ”
International IDEA in its 2015 primer, “Federalism”
“The rule for identification is: a constitution is federal if
sovereignty 1.) two levels of government rule the same land and
of each people,
government 2.) each level has at least one area of action in which
in its own it is autonomous, and
sphere is 3.) there is some guarantee (even though merely a
constitutionally statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each
guaranteed government in its own sphere.”
 10 Nov 2017

A current definition of federalism

International IDEA in its 2015 primer, “Federalism”

“Federalism is a system of government that establishes

a constitutionally specified division of powers between
different levels of government.”

single sovereign system of government single sovereign system of government

recognized by the Unitary recognized by the Unitary
constitution system of constitution system of
single relationship between the government single relationship between the government
“makes “makes
central central
final central government final central government
source of source of
decisions” decisions”
authority authority
powers a unitary system can range powers
can be vertical from highly centralized can be vertical
delegated (ex. Singapore) delegated

subordinate subordinate
to the to the
central local government central local government
 10 Nov 2017

single sovereign system of government single sovereign system of government

recognized by the Unitary recognized by the Unitary
constitution system of constitution system of
single relationship between the government single relationship between the government
“makes “makes
central central
final central government final central government
source of source of
decisions” decisions”
authority authority
No No
a unitary system can range powers a unitary system can range powers
from highly centralized are vertical to highly decentralized are vertical
(ex. Singapore) delegated (ex. Norway) delegated

subordinate subordinate
to the to the
central local government central local government

single sovereign system of government single sovereign system of government

recognized by the Unitary recognized by the Unitary
constitution system of constitution system of
single relationship between the government single relationship between the government
“makes “makes
central central
final central government final central government
source of source of
decisions” decisions”
authority authority
Many Many
a unitary system can range powers a unitary system can range powers
to highly decentralized are vertical to highly decentralized are vertical
(ex. Norway) delegated (ex. Norway) delegated

subordinate subordinate
to the to the
central local government central local government

single sovereign system of government single sovereign system of government

recognized by the Unitary recognized by the Unitary
constitution system of constitution system of
single relationship between the government single relationship between the government
“makes “makes
central central
final central government final central government
source of source of
decisions” decisions”
authority authority
Many Many
a unitary system can be more powers a unitary system can be more powers
decentralized than some vertical decentralized than some vertical
are are
centralized federal countries delegated centralized federal countries delegated
(ex. Indonesia over Malaysia) (ex. Indonesia over Malaysia)
subordinate subordinate may
to the to the also be
central local government central local government revoked
 10 Nov 2017

single sovereign system of government single sovereign system of government

recognized by the Unitary recognized by the Unitary
constitution system of constitution system of
single relationship between the government single relationship between the government
“makes “makes
central central
final central government final central government
source of source of
decisions” decisions”
authority authority
a unitary system can even have a unitary system can even have
constitutionally protected autonomous regions vertical constitutionally protected autonomous regions vertical
“constitutionally decentralized unions” “constitutionally decentralized unions”
(ex. Italy) (ex. Italy)
subordinate subordinate
to the to the
central local government central local government

system of government system of government

Federal Federal
system of system of
relationship between the government relationship between the government
sovereign central government central government

in certain policy
in certain policy areas where local
areas where central vertical government has vertical
government has exclusive
exclusive jurisdiction
jurisdiction

local government sovereign local government

system of government system of government

Federal Federal
system of system of
relationship between the government relationship between the government
central government central government
powers cannot be
in certain policy revoked because
areas where local they are not delegated again, federalism can
government has be highly centralized vertical
by the central
exclusive government (ex. Venezuela)
jurisdiction but guaranteed
by the constitution
sovereign local government sovereign local government
 10 Nov 2017

system of government system of government

Federal Federal
system of system of
relationship between the government relationship between the government
central government central government

again, federalism can again, federalism to

be highly centralized vertical highly decentralized vertical
(ex. Venezuela) (ex. United States)

sovereign local government sovereign local government

system of government system of government

Federal Federal
system of system of
relationship between the government relationship between the government
central government in certain
policy areas
where both
governments
again, federalism to central
vertical have government vertical
highly decentralized local
jurisdiction
(ex. United States) government
(concurrent/
shared) “federal
paramountcy”
sovereign local government

Handbook of Federal Countries in 2005 listed 25 federal countries:

II.B. List of Federal Countries

 10 Nov 2017

Handbook of Federal Countries in 2005 listed 25 federal countries:

Argentina India Switzerland

Australia Malaysia United Arab Emirates
Austria Mexico United States
Belgium F.S. Micronesia Venezuela
Bosnia and Nigeria
Herzegovina Pakistan
Brazil Russia
Canada Serbia and Montenegro
Comoros South Africa
Ethiopia Spain
Germany Saint Kitts-Nevis

Handbook of Federal Countries in 2005 listed 25 federal countries: Forum of Federations in November 2017 lists 24 federal countries:

Argentina India Switzerland

Australia Malaysia United Arab Emirates
Austria Mexico United States
Belgium F.S. Micronesia Venezuela
Bosnia and Nigeria
Herzegovina Pakistan
Brazil Russia
Canada Serbia and Montenegro
Comoros South Africa
Ethiopia Spain ?
Germany Saint Kitts-Nevis
 10 Nov 2017

Forum of Federations in November 2017 lists 24 federal countries:

Forum of Federations in November 2017 lists 24 federal countries:

Argentina Iraq Switzerland

Australia Malaysia United Arab Emirates
Austria Mexico United States
Belgium Nepal Venezuela
Bosnia and Herzegovina Nigeria
Brazil Pakistan
Canada Russia Not in the list:
Ethiopia South Africa Comoros
Germany Spain F.S. Micronesia
India Sudan Saint Kitts-Nevis

Provisional List: 27 Federal States Provisional List: 27 Federal States

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia

Cover 40 percent of the world’s population

 10 Nov 2017

6 countries are in the top 10 most populous countries

Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia

Cover 40 percent of the world’s population

6 countries are in the top 10 most populous countries 6 countries are in the top 10 most populous countries

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India (2) Spain Australia India (2) Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States Brazil Nepal United States (3)
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia

Cover 40 percent of the world’s population Cover 40 percent of the world’s population

6 countries are in the top 10 most populous countries 6 countries are in the top 10 most populous countries

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India (2) Spain Australia India (2) Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil (5) Nepal United States (3) Brazil (5) Nepal United States (3)
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan (6)
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia

Cover 40 percent of the world’s population Cover 40 percent of the world’s population
 10 Nov 2017

6 countries are in the top 10 most populous countries 6 countries are in the top 10 most populous countries

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India (2) Spain Australia India (2) Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil (5) Nepal United States (3) Brazil (5) Nepal United States (3)
Canada Nigeria (7) Venezuela Canada Nigeria (7) Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan (6) Comoros Pakistan (6)
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia (9)

Cover 40 percent of the world’s population Cover 40 percent of the world’s population

Provisional List: 27 Federal States Provisional List: 27 Federal States

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia

Cover 40 percent of the world’s population Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
but they constitute a minority of the total of 195 states (14%)

Provisional List: 27 Federal States

Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67%
 10 Nov 2017

Not electoral democracies Not electoral democracies

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016 Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67% 18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67%

107 out of 168 of unitary states are electoral democracies = 64%

Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
Freedom House Freedom in the World 2016
18 out of 27 of federal states are electoral democracies = 67%

My Provisional List: 27 Federal States

Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia
Philippines has a better HDI score than more than 1/3rd of these
federal countries out of 188 countries
 10 Nov 2017

My Provisional List: 27 Federal States Now, if we consider only federal states in Asia

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia
Philippines has a better HDI score than more than 1/3rd of these Philippines has a better HDI score than more than 1/3rd of these
federal countries (10 countries) federal countries (10 countries)

Now, if we consider only federal states in Asia If we consider only federal states in Asia that are electoral democracies

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia
Philippines has a better HDI score than more than half of these
federal countries (5 out of 8 countries)

If we consider only federal states in Asia that are electoral democracies The diversity of federal countries is important to keep in mind

Argentina Germany South Africa Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
Brazil Nepal United States Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia Ethiopia Russia
Australia is the only federal electoral democracy that outperforms when you listen to proponents of federalism in the Philippines
the Philippines in HDI score
 10 Nov 2017

who keep on highlighting just a few well-performing federal countries

Argentina Germany South Africa

Australia India Spain
Austria Iraq Sudan
Belgium Malaysia Saint Kitts-Nevis
Bosnia and Mexico Switzerland
Herzegovina F.S. Micronesia United Arab Emirates
II.C. Institutional Features of Federal Systems
Brazil Nepal United States
Canada Nigeria Venezuela
Comoros Pakistan
Ethiopia Russia

while ignoring the more problematic ones identified by various literature

This section is mainly based

on Ronald Watts’s 1996
book, Comparing Federal
Systems in the 1990s

Many texts in the slides are

direct quotes from this book

Did not rewrite many of his

terms because of the
technical nature of his
arguments
 10 Nov 2017

Professor
Department of Political Science
University of Melbourne

Different scholars list different numbers of common or essential

features of federalism

Duchacek =
II.D. Six common institutional features
of federal systems according to Watts Watts = lists 6 common features

Galligan = lists 4

Different scholars list different number of common or essential

features of federalism

Duchacek = lists 8 (“yardsticks of federalism”)

Watts = lists 6 common features

Galligan = lists 4
 10 Nov 2017

Different scholars list different number of common or essential

features of federalism

Duchacek = lists 8 (“yardsticks of federalism”)

Watts = lists 6 common features 1. Orders of Government

Galligan = lists 4

1. two orders of government each acting directly on their citizens

federal level
a.k.a.
“federal” (exs. US, Germany)
“central” (ex. South Africa)
“union government”
(ex. India)
“national” (ex. Sudan)
Tip: also think of federalism as a geographic distribution of power
geographically or
territorially defined
constituent level
a.k.a.
“states” (exs. Australia, Malaysia, US)
“provinces” (exs. Argentina, Canada)
“regions” (ex. Belgium) “communities”
“cantons” (ex. Switzerland)
“autonomous communities” (ex. Spain)
“Länder” (exs. Austria, Germany)

2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of

revenue resources between the two orders of government

2. Distribution of Powers
 10 Nov 2017

2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of Exclusive Legislative Powers

revenue resources between the two orders of government the federal government
a.k.a. “legislative competences” a.k.a. “jurisdiction”
involves the distribution of legislative powers and executive powers
between the federal and the constituent governments
assigned only to either
or
vary in terms of form and scope

the constituent government

Exclusive Concurrent Residual
Legislative Powers Legislative Powers Legislative Powers

Concurrent Legislative Powers a.k.a. Shared legislative powers Residual Legislative Powers

Identify which order of government has jurisdiction over matters

shared between the federal and the constituent governments not specified in the constitution as exclusive or concurrent

federal government constituent governments

may be legislated by both the federal
and the constituent governments
in case of conflicts
between them
in most instances,
federal legislation prevails
over constituent legislation
usually in federations created
by the process of devolution
from a formerly unitary state
(“holding-together federalism”)
exs. India, Belgium, Canada,
Nepal, and Nigeria
usually in federations created
by the process of aggregating
previously separate units
(“coming-together federalism”)
exs. Australia, Austria, Germany,
Switzerland, and the US

2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of Distribution of Powers in a Sample of Federal Countries (from IDEA)
revenue resources between the two orders of government

a.k.a. “legislative competences” a.k.a. “jurisdiction”

involves the distribution of legislative powers and executive powers
between the federal and the constituent governments

vary in terms of form and scope

economic immigration taxing powers

maintenance defense
and
of law and social affairs
monetary interregional
security transportation international relations
union
 10 Nov 2017

2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of 2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government revenue resources between the two orders of government

one type of constitutional asymmetry

asymmetrical  increase the jurisdiction asymmetrical

symmetrical (autonomy) of particular
one form: constitutional asymmetry one form: constitutional asymmetry
constituent states

all constituent
governments have equal
juridical status and
powers
differences in the status of
legislative and executive powers
assigned by the constitution to
the constituent governments
concessions made to the Borneo
states (Sabah and Sarawak)
when they joined the Malaysian
federation in 1963
differences in the status of
legislative and executive powers
assigned by the constitution to
the constituent governments
 10 Nov 2017

2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of 2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government revenue resources between the two orders of government

1. tax collection and revenue raising powers 1. tax collection and revenue raising powers
fiscal fiscal
2. intergovernmental financial transfers federalism federalism

should be a separate lecture

because of its complexity

Distribution of Taxing Powers Distribution of Taxing Powers

Concurrent Concurrent Concurrent Concurrent
Taxing Powers Federal Federal paramountcy
Taxing Powers Federal Federal paramountcy

Customs Canada, US, Customs Canada, US,

Switzerland, Australia, Belgium Switzerland, Australia, Belgium
Germany, Austria, Germany, Austria,
India, Malaysia, Spain, India, Malaysia, Spain,
Pakistan Pakistan

Excise Canada, Switzerland, US, Belgium India Excise Canada, Switzerland, US, Belgium India
Australia, Germany, Australia, Germany,
Austria, Malaysia, Austria, Malaysia,
Spain, Pakistan Spain, Pakistan

Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118. Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.

Distribution of Taxing Powers Distribution of Taxing Powers

Taxing Powers Concurrent Concurrent Taxing Powers Concurrent Concurrent
Federal Federal
Federal paramountcy Federal paramountcy
Switzerland, Austria, Switzerland, Austria,
India, Malaysia, US, Australia, Canada India, Malaysia, US, Australia, Canada
Corporate Income Germany*, Belgium Corporate Income Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan Spain, Pakistan

Canada, India, Canada, India,

Personal Income Austria, Malaysia US, Australia, Personal Income Austria, Malaysia US, Australia,
Switzerland, Switzerland,
Germany*, Belgium Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan Spain, Pakistan

Sales Switzerland, Sales Switzerland,

US, Australia, US, Australia,
Austria, Malaysia, Canada, India Austria, Malaysia, Canada, India
Germany*, Belgium Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan Spain, Pakistan

Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118. Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.
 10 Nov 2017

Distribution of Taxing Powers Distribution of Debt / Borrowing Powers

Taxing Powers Concurrent Concurrent Debt/Borrowing
Federal Federal Concurrent Concurrent
Federal paramountcy
Powers Federal paramountcy
Switzerland, Austria,
India, Malaysia, US, Australia, Canada
Corporate Income Germany*, Belgium Canada, US,
Spain, Pakistan
Foreign Austria, India, Switzerland,
Australia
Borrowing Malaysia Germany, Spain,
Canada, India,
Personal Income Austria, Malaysia US, Australia, Pakistan
Switzerland,
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan
Canada, US,
Sales Switzerland, Domestic Switzerland, Germany,
US, Australia, Australia
Austria, Malaysia, Canada, India Borrowing India, Malaysia, Spain,
Germany*, Belgium
Spain, Pakistan Pakistan
Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118. Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.

Distribution of Debt / Borrowing Powers 2. a formal constitutional distribution of powers and allocation of
revenue resources between the two orders of government
Debt/Borrowing Concurrent Concurrent
Federal
Powers Federal paramountcy

Canada, US,
Foreign Austria, India, Switzerland,
Australia 1. tax collection and revenue raising powers
Borrowing Malaysia Germany, Spain,
Pakistan
fiscal
2. intergovernmental financial transfers federalism
a.k.a. “equalization transfers”
Canada, US, “solidarity transfers”
Domestic Switzerland, Germany,
Borrowing Australia composed of conditional and unconditional grants
India, Malaysia, Spain,
Pakistan
roughly similar to the Philippines’ Internal Revenue Allotment

Based on Watts, Comparing Federal Systems in the 1990s, Appendix A, p. 118.

Fiscal imbalances that every federalism has to correct Fiscal imbalances that every federalism has to correct

1. vertical imbalances
2. horizontal imbalances
constitutionally assigned

≠
constitutionally assigned expenditure responsibilities inability of constituent
revenues for the federal revenue capacities
for the federal and governments to provide
and constituent governments of different
constituent governments their citizens with
constituent
services at the same level
governments vary
Main reason for the vertical imbalance (regional imbalances)

allocation of major taxing assignment of expensive

powers to the federal
governments
vs. expenditures to the
constituent governments
 10 Nov 2017

Correcting the horizontal and vertical imbalances

financial transfers from one level of government to another

federal governments constituent governments

exception financial transfers

Germany: interstate

conditional transfers unconditional transfers

(federal transfers to constituent (federal transfers to constituent
governments that have governments that have no conditions
conditions attached to them) attached to them)

3. Bicameralism

3. provision for the designated representation of distinct regional

views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided
by the particular form of the federal second chamber

principle of bicameralism in federalism

authoritarian regime except the

United Arab Emirates
and
microstate Saint Kitts and Nevis,
all federations are bicameral
 10 Nov 2017

3. provision for the designated representation of distinct regional 3. provision for the designated representation of distinct regional
views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided views within the federal policy-making institutions, usually provided
by the particular form of the federal second chamber by the particular form of the federal second chamber

Unlike the first Unlike the first

chamber, the second chamber, the second
chamber is the principle of bicameralism in federalism chamber is the principle of bicameralism in federalism
legislative institution legislative institution
which operates on which operates on
the basis of except the the basis of
representation as United Arab Emirates representation as
most distinct “shared-rule”
states and states
institution of federalism
Saint Kitts and Nevis,
all federations are bicameral

Manner of Selection Implications Sample Country Case/s Manner of Selection Implications Sample Country Case/s

Manner of Selection Implications Sample Country Case/s

4. Constitutional Entrenchment
 10 Nov 2017

4. a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and amendments of the constitution require the involvement of
requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units that affect its federal character both orders of government
(ex. distribution of power) US, Canada, India,
most federations require: and Malaysia

this is the principle of

constitutional entrenchment of federalism
approval in both houses
of the federal legislature
+ approval either by a special majority
of the constituent unit legislatures
or by a referendum requiring
a “double majority”
simple absolute “federally
majority majority weighted”
(Switzerland (Australia)
plain English: very difficult to and Canada) special majority
amend its federal character (US, India,
and Malaysia)

amendments of the constitution require the involvement of 4. a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable and
that affect its federal character both orders of government requiring the consent of a significant proportion of the constituent units
(ex. distribution of power) US, Canada, India,
and Malaysia clauses that cannot be In, short there is
most federations require:
changed by amendment forever in federalism!
approval in both houses
of the federal legislature
+ approval either by a special majority
of the constituent unit legislatures
or by a referendum requiring
a “double majority”
Qualify Watts: some
federal constitutions
this is the principle of
constitutional entrenchment of federalism
certain cases:
simple absolute “federally have “eternity clauses”
majority not possible
majority weighted” for their federal
(Australia) 1. overall majority and to revoke
(Switzerland character
special majority 2. majorities in a majority exs. plain English: very difficult to
and Canada)
(US, India, of constituent units Brazil and Germany amend its federal character
and Malaysia) (Switzerland and Australia)

5. an umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums)

to rule on disputes between governments

even more necessary need for processes to adjudicate

in federations disputes and resolve conflicts

5. Adjudication unavoidability of
referendum
overlaps of jurisdiction
(Switzerland)
between governments

and the consequent likelihood judicial

of intergovernmental “judicialization of politics”
competition and conflict
 10 Nov 2017

5. an umpire (in the form of courts or provision for referendums)

to rule on disputes between governments

two types of courts

supreme court constitutional court

6. Intergovernmental Collaboration
final adjudicator in relation to specializes in constitutional
all laws including the constitution interpretation

US, Canada, Australia, India, Germany, Belgium, and Spain

Malaysia, and Austria

6. processes and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration

for those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or
inevitably overlap

two important dimensions

III. Three Cautionary Insights

relations between the federal from the Institutional Design Literature
and unit governments inter-unit relations

exs. standing and ad hoc meetings involving ministers,

legislators, officials and agencies of different governments

 there is no consensus on the superiority of the

federal parliamentary /semi-presidential

III.1. First cautionary insight:
No consensus on the superiority to the to the
of one system of government to another or
unitary presidential

system of government form of government

or vice versa
 10 Nov 2017

While many scholars in the institutional design literature argue

for the superiority of a federal to a unitary system

Examples of top political scientists:

Alfred Stepan

While many scholars in the institutional design literature argue

for the superiority of a federal to a unitary system

Examples of top political scientists:

Alfred Stepan
Arend Lijphart

While many scholars in the institutional design literature argue for

the superiority of a federal to a unitary system

Examples of top political scientists:

Alfred Stepan
Arend Lijphart
Pippa Norris
 10 Nov 2017

While many scholars in the institutional design literature argue

for the superiority of a federal to a unitary system

Examples of top political scientists:

Alfred Stepan
Arend Lijphart
Pippa Norris
Larry Diamond

Many scholars, also in the same institutional design literature,

deny the superiority of a federal to a unitary system.

Examples of top political scientists:

Daniel Treisman
 10 Nov 2017

Many scholars, also in the same institutional design literature,

deny the superiority of a federal to a unitary system.

Examples of top political scientists:

Daniel Treisman
Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson
 10 Nov 2017

Many scholars, also in the same institutional design literature,

deny the superiority of a federal to a unitary system.

Examples of top political scientists:

Daniel Treisman
Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson
Jonathan Rodden

Many scholars, also in the same institutional design literature,

deny the superiority of a federal to a unitary system.

Examples of top political scientists:

Daniel Treisman
Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson
Jonathan Rodden
Erik Wibbels
 10 Nov 2017

These scholars find that there is no meaningful difference in the performance We can organize the counter-arguments of the critics of the federal
between federal and unitary systems on a number of key indicators. superiority camp via two intertwined institutional arguments:

For examples: 1. Institutional bundle

system of government
1. human development (HDI) a package of institutional features
2. economic performance (including public finance) whose performance depends on the specific design of these features
3. income inequality federal unitary
4. democratic stability just a few examples: just a few examples:
5. quality of democracy distribution of devil manner of recruitment
6. rule of law legislative/executive powers
is in the national/local
7. anti-corruption type of constitutional bureaucracy
in appointment/budgetary powers of
8. handling multiethnic conflicts entrenchment
the the president to/over bureaucracy
In fact, for a few scholars, their works show that unitary systems do better design of upper house
details level and type of decentralization
than federal ones in some of these indicators. mechanisms for intergovern-
mental coordination level and type of devolution

At the level of institutional bundle, helps explain performance Critics of the superiority argument give two intertwined reasons:

1. Institutional bundle 2. Institutional configuration

system of government how different types of
a package of institutional features institutions affect each other
whose performance depends on the specific design of these features (e.g. how the electoral system
federal unitary affects the form of government)
just a few examples: just a few examples:
distribution of devil manner of recruitment One of the most important
legislative/executive powers
is
in the national/local insights of the institutional
type of constitutional bureaucracy design literature
in appointment/budgetary powers of
this means that institutions must
entrenchment
the the president to/over bureaucracy not be analyzed independently
design of upper house
details level and type of decentralization from other institutions that may
mechanisms for intergovern-
level and type of devolution affect their functioning
mental coordination
 10 Nov 2017

At the level of institutional configuration, helps explain performance

2. Institutional configuration
system of government
performance also affected by the design of other institutions
federal system of government unitary system of government
just one
pair of two-P Multi-P devil
examples: party system is party system
Non- Regiona- in
Regionalized lized the
SMD details
electoral system electoral system
PR MM

Besides these institutional factors, scholars also raise non-institutional factors Besides these institutional factors, scholars also raise non-institutional factors
Examples: colonial heritage
political culture (non-formal institutions) that affect
institutional
length of democracy type of ethnic fragmentation
performance
political elite composition path dependence (institutional
geographical location endogeneity)
level of economic development
 10 Nov 2017

It is this particular combination of institutional and non-institutional

factors that explain the performance of a federal (or unitary) system

III.2. Second cautionary insight: Reform not Overhaul

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
(or any major
(or any major political
political institutions)
institutions)

examples:
Shugart and Mainwaring
Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman
 10 Nov 2017

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
Leubbert Prize
already functioning systems or forms of
for the Best
systems or forms of government
Book in
government
Comparative (or any major
(or any major political
Politics in 1995 political institutions)
institutions)
awarded by the
American
examples:
Political Science
Shugart and Mainwaring
Association
Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman
Rein Taagepera

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
(or any major
(or any major political
political institutions)
institutions)

examples:
Shugart and Mainwaring
Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman
Rein Taagepera
Francis Fukuyama
 10 Nov 2017

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government

revival of institutional design questions

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
revival of institutional design questions most important is the
= linked with the most recent wave form of government
of democratization
where from 1974-1994:
75 countries transited to democracies role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
including the Philippines in 1986 “The Perils of Presidentialism”

the recommendation of is to reform the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
fundamental
institutional choices for
new democracies:
picked up by Filipino parliamentary
most important is the
advocates by mid-1990s,
when we have already made our form of government
choice of form of government in
the 1987 Constitution role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
“The Perils of Presidentialism”
top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
fundamental
these regimes in transition institutional choices for
have no option but to make new democracies:
these constitutional choices most important is the
form of government
the difficulty and danger of these
choices are captured by the subtitle of
role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
Jon Elster et al.’s book on post-
communist transitions in Eastern Europe “The Perils of Presidentialism”
 10 Nov 2017

Note:
Not repair
But rebuild!

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
fundamental
even for many scholars arguing institutional choices for
the superiority of parliamentary new democracies:
and/or federal, there is no most important is the
recommendation to dump form of government
existing presidential/unitary
systems
ex. Adam Przeworski role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
“The Perils of Presidentialism”

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government
fundamental
even for many scholars arguing institutional choices for
the superiority of parliamentary new democracies:
and/or federal, there is no most important is the
recommendation to dump form of government
existing presidential/unitary
systems
ex. Adam Przeworski role of Juan Linz’s 1990 article
“The Perils of Presidentialism”

the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
even for many scholars arguing
the superiority of parliamentary
and/or federal, there is no
recommendation to dump
existing presidential/unitary
systems
ex. Adam Przeworski
the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
even for many scholars arguing
the superiority of parliamentary
and/or federal, there is no
recommendation to dump
existing presidential/unitary
systems
10 Nov 2017
is to reform the recommendation of is to reform
rather than top scholars for rather than
overhaul their democratic countries with overhaul their
systems or forms of already functioning systems or forms of
government systems or forms of government
government
even for many scholars arguing
If new presidential democracies, the superiority of parliamentary
not to attempt to shift and/or federal, there is no
ex. Ute Wachendorfer-Schmidt
to a parliamentary system recommendation to dump
existing presidential/unitary
systems
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
analogy: Sagada vs. Manila
Photo credit: Mr. Angel Juarez
 10 Nov 2017

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government

among the reasons why strongly

discouraged:
1. unnecessary: if there is no superiority,
then there is no need for overhaul

the recommendation of is to reform Philippine time frame

top scholars for rather than (depending on which
democratic countries with overhaul their proposed federal
already functioning systems or forms of constitution you read)
systems or forms of government
government

especially for especially for

federalism among the reasons why strongly federalism among the reasons why strongly
where state discouraged: where state discouraged:
governments, 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally governments, 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
constitutions, courts, and intellectually complex for lofty goals constitutions, courts, and intellectually complex for lofty goals
bureaucracy, etc. bureaucracy, etc.
would have to be (institutional bundle) would have to be (institutional bundle)
created + (institutional configuration) created + (institutional configuration)

At least four federal constitutions introduced since 2005

Jose Abueva (Citizens Movement for a Federal Philippines) in 2005

 10 Nov 2017

At least four federal constitutions introduced since 2005

Jose Abueva (Citizens Movement for a Federal Philippines) in 2005

Aquilino Pimentel et al. (Senate Joint Resolution no. 10) in 2008

At least four federal constitutions introduced since 2005

Jose Abueva (Citizens Movement for a Federal Philippines) in 2005

Aquilino Pimentel et al. (Senate Joint Resolution no. 10) in 2008

Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both

Houses 008) in 2016

At least four federal constitutions introduced since 2005

Jose Abueva (Citizens Movement for a Federal Philippines) in 2005

Aquilino Pimentel et al. (Senate Joint Resolution no. 10) in 2008

Eugene De Vera and Aurelio Gonzales, Jr. (Resolution of Both

Houses 008) in 2016

Federalism Study Group of the PDP Laban Federalism Institute in

August 2017
 10 Nov 2017

At least ten years (Abueva) the recommendation of

Philippine time frame is to reform
(depending on which Not clear it will take a number of years top scholars for rather than
proposed federal to execute (Pimentel et al. ) democratic countries with overhaul their
constitution you read) is Not clear also but will also take a number of already functioning systems or forms of
years to execute (De Vera and Gonzales) systems or forms of government
government
At least 6 ½ years to forever (PDP-Laban)
and
especially for
federalism among the reasons why strongly no democratic among the reasons why strongly
where state discouraged: country has been discouraged:
governments, 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally crazy enough to 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
constitutions, courts, and intellectually complex for lofty goals make these and intellectually complex for lofty goals
bureaucracy, etc. overhauls at the
would have to be (institutional bundle) same time! (institutional bundle)
created
+ (institutional configuration) + (institutional configuration)

Just when you think it is to reform

could not get crazier, rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of “You know, my
government advice to you is:
maintain a federal
and system, a
parliament, but be
no democratic among the reasons why strongly sure to have a
country has been discouraged: President… You
crazy enough to 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally copy the France
make these and intellectually complex for lofty goals system.”
overhauls at the
same time! (institutional bundle)
+ (institutional configuration)

Just when you think it is to reform

could not get crazier,
rather than
semi-presidentialism overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
dual executive
and
no democratic among the reasons why strongly
country has been discouraged:
crazy enough to 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
make these and intellectually complex for lofty goals
overhauls at the
same time! (institutional bundle)
+ (institutional configuration)
 10 Nov 2017

Just when you think it is to reform is to reform

very tricky could not get crazier,
executive rather than rather than
veto gates semi-presidentialism overhaul their overhaul their
systems or forms of systems or forms of
government government
dual executive
and institutional design
and
no democratic among the reasons why strongly literature has sobered among the reasons why strongly
country has been discouraged: from the enthusiasm of discouraged:
crazy enough to 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally the early 1990s on the 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
make these and intellectually complex for lofty goals power to get and intellectually complex for lofty goals
overhauls at the institutional design right
same time! (institutional bundle)
+ (institutional configuration)

And this is just about one aspect of the

institutional configuration: electoral system
 10 Nov 2017

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government

institutional design
and
literature has sobered among the reasons why strongly
from the enthusiasm of discouraged:
the early 1990s on the 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
power to get and intellectually complex for lofty goals
institutional design right
(this is true even for the institutional design literature on federalism)

hubris? is to reform Let me tell you a secret that shocks is to reform

Philippines’ constitutional rather than my students who hear it: rather than
overhaul project in 2016-17: and/or overhaul their After an extensive review of the overhaul their
height of intellectual irony systems or forms of literature of Filipino writings, systems or forms of
ignorance of government lectures, videos, etc. on federalism, government
the literature? the Philippines does not have a
and single expert on federalism. and
institutional design (I am also not an expert on
literature has clearly among the reasons why strongly federalism) among the reasons why strongly
sobered from the discouraged: discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally What the country 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
enthusiasm of the
and intellectually complex for lofty goals has are people who and intellectually complex for lofty goals
1990s on the power
write and talk about
to get institutional
federalism. quality of their output does not inspire confidence
design right
that they know what they are talking about

Because this country has a number

Let me tell you a secret that shocks is to reform
of experts on decentralization
my students who hear it: rather than
After an extensive review of the (Unfortunately, overhaul their
literature of Filipino writings, I am also not systems or forms of
lectures, videos, etc. on federalism, one of them) But also sad government
the Philippines does not have a
single expert on federalism. Not only frightening and
(I am also not an expert on
federalism) among the reasons why strongly among the reasons why strongly
discouraged: discouraged:
What the country 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
has are people who and intellectually complex for lofty goals and intellectually complex for lofty goals
write and talk about
federalism. quality of their output does not inspire confidence
that they know what they are talking about
 10 Nov 2017

Important qualification:
Dr. Abueva since late 2016 no longer supports federalism
 10 Nov 2017

No such thing exists in institutional design

at the level of system of government

This term is a red flag in institutional design

 10 Nov 2017

is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government

and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals

is to reform
“hyperrationality” (Croissant and Merkel) rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government

and
among the reasons why strongly
discouraged:
2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
and intellectually complex for lofty goals
 10 Nov 2017

is to reform is to reform
“hyperrationality” (Croissant and Merkel) rather than “hyperrationality” (Croissant and Merkel) rather than
overhaul their I call it in my classes: overhaul their
systems or forms of hyperinstitutionalism systems or forms of
government (exaggerated belief in government
institutional design)
the mistaken belief and and
that just because you Taagepera:
change the rules, among the reasons why strongly among the reasons why strongly
discouraged: discouraged:
politicians’ behaviors 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
will also change and intellectually complex for lofty goals and intellectually complex for lofty goals

is to reform
hyperrationality (Merkel and Croissant) rather than
I call it: overhaul their
hyperinstitutionalism systems or forms of
government

and
Taagepera: among the reasons why strongly
“excessive optimism” discouraged:
in institutional design 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally
easily leads to and intellectually complex for lofty goals
“excessive
disillusionment” My argument: undermining rather
afterwards than deepening democracy
 10 Nov 2017

is to reform is to reform
hyperrationality (Merkel and Croissant) rather than rather than
I call it: overhaul their overhaul their
hyperinstitutionalism systems or forms of systems or forms of
government government

and and
Taagepera: among the reasons why strongly among the reasons why strongly
“excessive optimism” discouraged: discouraged:
in institutional design 2. unbelievable: tasks too institutionally 3. Unsafe (highly risky): will be discussed
easily leads to and intellectually complex for lofty goals in cautionary insight no. 3
“excessive
disillusionment” My argument: undermining rather
afterwards than deepening democracy

the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government
government

reforms
1. More justifiable
 do not need constitutional revisions
two reform principles only legislation
from Larry Diamond  or constitutional amendments

the recommendation of is to reform the recommendation of is to reform

top scholars for rather than top scholars for rather than
democratic countries with overhaul their democratic countries with overhaul their
already functioning systems or forms of already functioning systems or forms of
systems or forms of government systems or forms of government
government government

reforms reforms
1. More justifiable 2. Less risky: Messed-up
 do not need constitutional revisions reforms are more reformable  do not need constitutional revisions
two reform principles only legislation only legislation
from Larry Diamond  or constitutional amendments If there are errors in the reforms,  or constitutional amendments
A. reform only in the face of manifest flaws easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
B. reform should correct those flaws as specifically as possible through new legislation/amendment

the recommendation of
top scholars for
democratic countries with
already functioning
systems or forms of
government
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
Sartori:
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party-system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
For scholars, may yet be the
most crucial prerequisite
before any talk of a
constitutional shift to
parliamentary form
Sartori:
undisciplined political
parties in a presidential
democracy
becoming disciplined in a
parliamentary shift is
“against all odds”
10 Nov 2017
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party-system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
is to reform
rather than
overhaul their
systems or forms of
government
piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation
 10 Nov 2017

For scholars, may yet be the is to reform

most crucial prerequisite rather than
before any talk of a overhaul their
constitutional shift to systems or forms of
parliamentary form government

Mainwaring and Shugart:

piecemeal reforms that move to a
more parliamentary-like direction
(example: party system reforms
against turncoatism)
or a more federal-like direction
(exs.: increased regional autonomy
or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation

For scholars, may yet be the is to reform For scholars, may yet be the is to reform
most crucial prerequisite rather than most crucial prerequisite rather than
before any talk of a overhaul their before any talk of a overhaul their
constitutional shift to systems or forms of constitutional shift to systems or forms of
parliamentary form government parliamentary form government

Mainwaring and Shugart: Croissant and Merkel:

piecemeal reforms that move to a piecemeal reforms that move to a
undisciplined political
more parliamentary-like direction more parliamentary-like direction
parties in a parliamentary
(example: party system reforms (example: party system reforms
shift “could exacerbate
against turncoatism) against turncoatism)
problems of governability
or a more federal-like direction or a more federal-like direction
and instability” more than
(exs.: increased regional autonomy (exs.: increased regional autonomy
in a presidential democracy
or a more robust local govt. code) or a more robust local govt. code)
involve only legislation involve only legislation

For scholars, may yet be the is to reform the recommendation of is to reform

most crucial prerequisite rather than top scholars for rather than
before any talk of a overhaul their democratic countries with overhaul their
constitutional shift to systems or forms of already functioning systems or forms of
parliamentary form government systems or forms of government
government
Croissant and Merkel:
different time horizons very different from messed-up
2. Less risky: Messed-up
the consolidation of the new party system reforms are more reformable constitutional revisions involving
takes much longer than changing the constitution system or form of government
If there are errors in the reforms,
“old, fragmented, clientelistic, and irresponsible parties” easier to return to the old setup
“would not be able to create strong and stable governments” or to push it further to the new setup especially for shift to federalism
through new legislation/amendment
 10 Nov 2017

because of constitutional is to reform because of constitutional is to reform

entrenchment protecting rather than entrenchment protecting rather than
its status, no federal overhaul their its status, no federal overhaul their
country negotiated under systems or forms of country negotiated under systems or forms of
democratic conditions has government democratic conditions has government
ever returned to unitary ever returned to unitary

2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup
through new legislation/amendment
very different from messed-up
constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
especially for shift to federalism
2. Less risky: Messed-up very different from messed-up
reforms are more reformable constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup especially for shift to federalism
through new legislation/amendment

because of constitutional only “forced- is to reform

entrenchment protecting together rather than
its status, no federal federalism” overhaul their
country negotiated under has returned systems or forms of
democratic conditions has government
ever returned to unitary
III.3. Third cautionary insight:
very different from messed-up Institutional design is political design
2. Less risky: Messed-up
reforms are more reformable constitutional revisions involving
system or form of government
If there are errors in the reforms,
easier to return to the old setup
or to push it further to the new setup especially for shift to federalism
through new legislation/amendment
 10 Nov 2017

According to Adam Przeworski:

According to Adam Przeworski: According to Adam Przeworski:

There are no optimal democratic institutions There are no optimal democratic institutions
the distributive impact of institutional design
means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them
and even if and even if
B there were, B there were,

According to Adam Przeworski: According to Adam Przeworski:

There are no optimal democratic institutions There are no optimal democratic institutions
the distributive impact of institutional design the distributive impact of institutional design
means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them means opposing political forces will most likely not choose them

A and even if (most A and even if

B there were, important B there were,
political
economy of actors are
B1 institutional those who B1
design/ will write the
constitution) each
constitutional B2 institutional
engineering opposing design outcome
political forces B3 reflects the
balance of power
 10 Nov 2017

political
economy of
the
federalism only president to
project in support was Arroyo
the (in her campaign
Philippines different from the
platform in 2004)
under federalism project
but haphazard support
Duterte before Duterte
(1986-early 2016)

very strong
political
support of the
economy of
president
the
federalism (prominent in his
only president to
project in campaign platform)
support was Arroyo
the (in her campaign
Philippines different from the
platform in 2004)
under federalism project
but haphazard support
Duterte before Duterte
(1986-early 2016)
only played second
fiddle to the
parliamentary project
 10 Nov 2017

How do we
very strong
clear primacy over the U F reach here?
political parliamentary/semi- political Constituent (P/SP)
support of the presidency project
economy of economy of Assembly Current preferred
president
the the mode:
federalism (prominent in his federalism
only president to - Philippine President
project in campaign platform) project in
support was Arroyo - House Speaker
the (in her campaign the - Senate President
Philippines different from the Philippines - House Committee
platform in 2004)
under federalism project under on Constitutional
but haphazard support
Duterte before Duterte Duterte Amendment
(1986-early 2016)
only played second
fiddle to the
parliamentary project

How do we
U F reach here?
political Constituent (P/SP)
economy of Assembly Current preferred
the mode:
federalism - Philippine President
project in - House Speaker
the - Senate President
Philippines - House Committee
under on Constitutional
Duterte Amendment

ARTICLE XVII ARTICLE XVII

AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this
Constitution may be proposed by: Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all (1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all
its Members; or its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention. (2) A constitutional convention.

“Constituent assembly” mode

(Note: term never appears in the Constitution)
?
 10 Nov 2017

October 10, 1986

How do we How do we
U F reach here? U F reach here?
political Constituent (P/SP) political Constituent (P/SP)
economy of Assembly economy of Assembly
the the
federalism federalism assuming that the Duterte administration could get
project in project in the 3/4ths vote (18/24) in the Senate = big question mark
the the
Philippines Philippines and (223/297) in the Lower House = sure ball, as of now
under under
Duterte Duterte
 10 Nov 2017

How do we How do we
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here?
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here?
Constituent (P/SP) Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments Just two comments
Assembly Assembly
1. very low level of one of the most crucial indicators: 1. very low level of one of the most crucial indicators:
institutionalization of political parties party switching institutionalization of political parties party switching
current 17th Congress (the one that will become the ConAss):  higher level of payoffs to  More incoherent
move legislative agenda lawmaking as more  More unstable
election result for HoR = PDP-Laban only had 3 out of 297 representatives political support
of the executive policy side payments
LP had 116 members for the president,
pork barrel by any are made with more
post-election = PDP-Laban membership and allies swelled especially when
other name players representing
party-switching to a supermajority of 260-plus (CDF, PDAF, DAP, particularistic interests his popularity
and re-alignment = official minority: 20-plus but also the majority's minority Duterte’s pork) goes down
= real minority; down to 7 members

How do we
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty

Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016)
and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)
But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th
Congress (2010-2013) by Mendoza et al., 2012

How do we
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
th
HoR of the 15 Congress (2010-2013)
70 percent of members belong to a political dynasty

“with kinship links to at least one legislator in the 12th, 13th,

14th, or 15th Congress, or at least one local government
official elected in 2001, 2004, 2007, or 2010” (Dynasty3 Type)
 10 Nov 2017

How do we
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty

Not aware of any scholarly study yet on the 16th Congress (2013-2016)
and the current 17th Congress (2016-2019)
But there are at least two on the House of Representatives of the 15th
Congress (2010-2013) by Mendoza et al., 2012
by Rivera, 2011

How do we
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
th
HoR of the 15 Congress (2010-2013)

“34 out of 77 provinces or 44 percent had the

same political family winning the governorship
and at least one congressional district”

How do we
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here?
Constituent (P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly
2. High level of barrier to entry one of the most crucial indicators:
political dynasty
 Self-perpetuating
in politics by nature
of clan replication
 10 Nov 2017

How do we How do we
Philippine Congress
(especially its HoR) U F reach here? U F reach here?
Constituent (P/SP) ConAss
(P/SP)
Just two comments
Assembly members
2. High level of barrier to entry one of the most crucial indicators: who are
political dynasty winners of
 Self-perpetuating the old
 Highly clientelistic unitary/
in politics by nature
(patronage-based)  Prevents party presidential
of clan replication
because familial/clan institutionalization setup
interests take as dynasties act
precedence over any as surrogates of
national interests political parties

How do we
U F reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
members
who are
winners of
the old
unitary/ compromises “with F1
presidential groups that have (P/SP1)
each
setup benefited from existing institutional
institutional design outcome
overwhelmingly for arrangements” reflects the
non-institutionalized balance of power
and dynastic interests

How do we How do we
U F reach here? U F reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP) because of (P/SP)
members the sheer
who are multiplicity
winners of of features
involved
the old
unitary/
F1 (think F1
presidential (P/SP1) institutional (P/SP1)
each bundle and each
setup
distributive
swing could be
F institutional
2 design outcome
configuration)
F institutional
2 design outcome
overwhelmingly for
more dramatic (P/SP2) reflects the overwhelmingly for (P/SP2) reflects the
non-institutionalized balance of power non-institutionalized balance of power
and dynastic interests and dynastic interests
 10 Nov 2017

How do we How do we
U F reach here?
“hybrid
U F reach here?
because of (P/SP) because of (P/SP)
the sheer outcomes the sheer
multiplicity that leave multiplicity
of features lines of of features
involved accountability involved
(think F1 unclear and
combine the
(think F1
institutional (P/SP1) institutional (P/SP1)
bundle and each worst bundle and each
of both
configuration)
F institutional
2 design outcome worlds”
configuration)
F institutional
2 design outcome
overwhelmingly for
non-institutionalized F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
institutional F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
and dynastic interests (P/SP3) Frankenstein outcomes (P/SP3)

among the most important factors: among the most important factors:
How do we How do we
(existing vested interests)
U F reach here?
(existing vested interests)
U F reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP) assumption of ConAss
(P/SP)
members some kind of members
who are displacement who are
institutional winners of of the vested winners of
endogeneity the old
unitary/
F1 interests of
the old order
the old
unitary/
F1
presidential (P/SP1) presidential (P/SP1)
what explains each each
setup setup
institutional
choices?
F institutional
2 design outcome premium on F institutional
2 design outcome
and performance? F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
democratic regime
transitions F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
(P/SP3) (P/SP3)

among the most important factors:

How do we
(existing vested interests)
U F reach here?
ConAss
(P/SP)
Worst-case members
scenario of who are
constitution- winners of
making for
Przeworski
the old
unitary/
F1
presidential (P/SP1)
each
setup
F institutional
2 design outcome

F3 (P/SP2) reflects the

balance of power
(P/SP3)
 10 Nov 2017

among the most important factors: among the most important factors:
How do we How do we
(existing vested interests)
Worst-case
U F reach here? Elster: U
(existing vested interests)
F reach here?
scenario of ConAss
(P/SP) ConAss
(P/SP)
constitution- members members
making for who are who are
Przeworski winners of winners of
“When the the old
unitary/
F1 the old
unitary/
F1
relation of (P/SP1) (P/SP1)
forces is known presidential each presidential each
setup setup
and uneven,
the institutions are
F institutional
2 design outcome F institutional
2 design outcome

custom-made for a particular F3 (P/SP2) reflects the

balance of power
F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
person, party or alliance” (P/SP3) (P/SP3)

among the most important factors:

How do we
Elster: U
(existing vested interests)
F reach here?
Constitutions ConAss
(P/SP)
“ought to members
be written by who are
specially winners of
convened
assemblies”
the old
unitary/
F1
 “not by presidential (P/SP1)
each
bodies setup
that also
serve as
F institutional
2 design outcome

ordinary F 3
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
legislatures” (P/SP3)

among the most important factors: among the most important factors:
How do we How do we
Elster:
(existing vested interests)
U F reach here?
(existing vested interests)
U F reach here?
Constitutions ConAss
(P/SP) political ConAss
(P/SP)
“ought to members economy of members
be written by who are the who are
specially winners of federalism winners of
convened
assemblies”
the old
unitary/
F1 project in
the
the old
unitary/
F1
 “not by presidential (P/SP1) Philippines presidential (P/SP1)
each each
bodies setup under setup
that also
serve as
F institutional
2 design outcome Duterte F institutional
2 design outcome

ordinary “to reduce the scope for

institutional interest”
(P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
analogy: same inept driver
with brand new vehicle F3 (P/SP2) reflects the
balance of power
legislatures” from Manila to Sagada (P/SP3)
 10 Nov 2017

IV.1. Institutional design as “mis-design”

IV. Three other cautionary insights (strategic miscalculations of actors)
a.k.a. “law of unintended consequences”

IV.2. Institutional design as “design-less” IV.3. Postscript: The democracy cautionary insight
(upstream and downstream quality of new constitutional choices)
 10 Nov 2017

Thank you very much Federalism and the Institutional Design Literature:
The Crucial Role of Political Science in Assessing
the Duterte Administration's Constitutional Overhaul Project

Gene Lacza Pilapil