Cebu United Enterprises v.

Gallofin, 106 Phil 491 (1959)

FACTS:

Cebu United Enterprises has import license to purchase over issue newspaper from the US. However,
this license expired on Dec. 16, or one day before the date of the importation of the items. Gallofin, the
collector of customs, refused to deliver the imported items on the ground that Cebu United Enterprises
was importing goods without a valid license.

The authority of the petitioners to import was contained in the Import Control Commission
License No. 17225, under Resolution 70 of the defunct commission. The license states, among
other conditions, that-¬‐-¬‐-¬‐ “Commodities covered by this license must be shipped from the
country of origin before the expiry date of the license, and are subject to sec. 13 of Republic
Act No. 650.”

ISSUE:

W/N duly executed acts of a governmental agency can have valid effects even beyond the life span of
said agency

HELD:

Although RA 650 creating the Import Control Commission (ICC) expired on July 31, it is to be conceded
that its duly executed acts can have valid effects even beyond the life span of said government agency.
The ICC who issued the license was abolished yet, the LICENSE was extended, the latter has still its
valid effects.

Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)

FACTS:

Crisostomo was appointed the President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the President
of the Philippines. During his incumbency, two administrative charges were filed against him for illegal
use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials, oppression and harassment,
grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty before the Office of the President. Likewise, he was also
charged with violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act with the Tanodbayan. As such, he was
preventively suspended and Dr. Mateo was designated as the officer-in-charge in his place. Meanwhile,
Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341 converting PCC into PUP with Mateo as President. Crisostomo was later
acquitted and his administrative charges were dismissed.

ISSUE:

Did PD 1314 abolish PCC?

HELD:
PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the PCC into what is now PUP. What took place was a change
in the academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence, the change in its
name, the expansion of its curriculum offerings and changes in its structure and organization.

As a general rule, when the purpose of the lawmaking authority is to abolish the office and create a new
one, he says so. In the instant case, PD 1314 merely states that PCC is converted into the PUP. In
addition, the law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being
“transferred” to the PUP but only that they “stand transferred” to it. “Stand transferred” simply means, for
example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new
name of the institution.

PubCorp:Violavs.AlunanIII

G.R. No. 115844. August 15, 1997

FACTS:

Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for prohibition challenging the validity of Art III, Sec.1-2 of
the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first, second, and third vice presidents and for auditors
for the National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.

He contended that the questioned positions are in excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493 which
mentions as elective positions only those of the president, vice president, and five members of the board
of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city, provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels and thus the implementing rules expand the numbers in the LGC in violation of the
principle that implementing rules and regulations cannot add or detract from the provisions of the law they
are designed to implement.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 1-2 of the Implementing Rules are valid.

RULING:

Yes. There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in this case. SC decisions have upheld the
validity of reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the Philippines to create, abolish, or merge
offices in the executive management.

While the board of directors of a local chapter can create additional positions to provide for the needs of
the chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must be deemed to have the power to create
additional positions not only for its management but also for that of all the chapters at the municipal, city,
provincial and metropolitan political subdivision levels. The fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to
create positions not only to the boards of the local chapters but to the board of the Liga at the national
level as well.

Larin vs. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997)

FACTS:

Larin, a Revenue Specific Tax Officer under the Assistant Commissioner of the BIR, is convicted of
crimes of violation of sec. 268 (4) NIRC and sec. 3 (e) RA 3019 (grave misconduct). Acting by authority of
the president, Sr. Deputy Executive Secretary Quisumbing issued a memorandum order, creating an
Executive Committee to investigate Larin’s administrative charge. While the investigation was going on,
the President issued E.O. 132, streamlining the BIR and abolishing the office of the Specific Tax Service.
Afterwards, Larin was found guilty and was subsequently dismissed. However, in the appealed case, SC
set aside the conviction of Larin

ISSUE:

W/N Larin was unlawfully removed from office

(1) Does the President have the power to dismiss him? Reorganize the BIR?
(2) Was reorganization valid, considering that there was no law enacted by Congress authorizing
reorganization by the Executive

HELD:

SC held that removal as a result of reorganization was done in bad faith.

Does the President have the power to dismiss him?

Larin is a presidential appointee. As such, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the
President for “the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint.” However, Larin is a career service
officer, therefore, he enjoys security of tenure. Under the Civil Service Decree, career service officers and
employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said
law. In other words, the fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing
authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is likewise a
career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed
for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.

Was the removal for a legal cause under a valid proceeding?

SC held that the removal complied with the requirements for procedural due process but that the
dismissal was not for a valid cause. The basis used in Larin’s removal is the criminal conviction against
him, but this conviction was later set aside by the Supreme Court upon appeal. Where the very basis of
the administrative case against petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set
aside by this court upon a categorical and clear findings that the acts for which he was administratively
held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the petitioner in the criminal case necessarily
entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in sch a case, there is no basis nor
justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.

Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR?

Yes, under sec. 48 and 62 of RA 7645, sec. 20, Bk. III of EO 292 (Residual Powers), and PD 1772 which
amended PD 1416. But while the President’s power to reorganize can not be denied, this does not mean
however that the reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that
reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.

When is there reorganization made in good faith?

The general rule is that a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the
position itself ceases to exist. And in that case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. Be that
as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or
purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid abolition takes place and
whatever abolition is done is void ab initio.

What are the marks of bad faith in removal as a result of reorganization?

Sec. 2, RA 6656 enumerates the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the removal of employees as a
result of reorganization:

(1) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
(2) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
(3) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance
and merit;
(4) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(5) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in sec. 3 hereof.

TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT OF APPEALS

527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324

Facts:

1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It provided for five
general areas of reform:
1. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
2. Secure funding for priority public health programs;
3. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its effective performance;
4. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
5. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program (NHIP)
6. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued Executive Order No.
102, entitled “Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,”
which provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of
the DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its mandate from being
the sole provider of health services to being a provider of specific health services and
technical assistance, as a result of the devolution of basic services to local government
units.
7. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) Philippines
1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH); and Executive Order No. 102,
“Redirecting the Functions and Operations of the Department of Health,”
8. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for violating Sections
5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article
 XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or
indirectly pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the people’s right to
health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution
are not self-executing; they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can
only provide guidelines for legislation.
9. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is detrimental to the health
of the people cannot be made a justiciable issue. The question of whether the HSRA will
bring about the development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm of
the political department.

Issue:

Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?

Held:

The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.

1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. For if they are not treated as self-executing, the
mandate of the fundamental law can be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However,
some provisions have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken from Article II of the
Constitution — specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15 and 18 — the provisions of which the
Court categorically ruled to be non self-executing in the aforecited case of Tañada v. Angara,
wherein the Court specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such
broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. Moreover, the
records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA supposedly violated the equal protection
and due process clauses that are embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There
were no allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with the HSRA.
Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional guarantees were breached, petitioners
are unsuccessful in establishing the relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently,
in annulling the HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the petitioners, they would still
not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any serious legal errors in laying down the compensation
of the DOH employees concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department
Circular No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers are
properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative Order No. 94, series of
2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The
validity of Executive Order No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule
that courts are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or
disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of application. The validity of a
statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish
the end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, clearly states: “[T]he president shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices.” Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No. 292, also known as
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the President’s constitutional power of
control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code,
recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.

Dario vs Mison Digested

Dario vs Mison

Facts: When President Cory Aquino came into power, she proceeded to reorganize the government,
upon which Mison, the Commissioner of Customs sent notices of termination to 394 Customs officials.
Some sought reinstatement from the CSC which the latter granted to 279 of them while the others went
directly to the Supreme Court. Mison also filed a petition questioning the decision of the CSC. Also, RA
6656 was passed, providing that all officers and employees who are found by the Civil Service
Commission to have been separated in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall be ordered reinstated
or reappointed. The validity of this law is also put into question.

Held: All the parties agree on the validity of reorganization per se, leaving the question only on its nature
and extent. Invariably, transition periods are characterized by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They
are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to th e new Constitution free from the
"fetters" of due process and security of tenure .At this point, we must distinguish removals from
separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization
carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of functions. In the latter case, the
Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to comply with clear and
explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not obliged to prove anything because the
Constitution allows it. Evidently, the question is whether or not Section 16 of Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution is a grant of a license upon the Government to remove career public officials it could have
validly done under an "automatic"-vacancy-authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason.

Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the
separation contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation
No. 3 dated March 25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of
career officers tendered in line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The
phrase "not for cause" is clearly and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service
employees separated "for cause." In other words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under
Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of 1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive ,
must concur, to wit:

1. The separation must not be for cause, and

2. The separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.

By its terms, the authority to remove public officials under the Provisional Constitution ended on February
25, 1987, advanced by jurisprudence to February 2, 1987. 70 It can only mean, then, that whatever
reorganization is taking place is upon the authority of the present Charter, and necessarily, upon the
mantle of its provisions and safeguards. Hence, it cannot be legitimately stated that we are merely
continuing what the revolutionary Constitution of the Revolutionary Government had started. We are
through with reorganization under the Freedom Constitution - the first stage. We are on the second stage
- that inferred from the provisions of Section 16 of Article XVIII of the permanent basic document. What
must be understood, however, is that notwithstanding her immense revolution ary powers, the President
was, nevertheless, magnanimous in her rule. This is apparent from Executive Order No. 17, which
established safeguards against the strong arm and ruthless propensity that accompanies reorganizations
- notwithstanding the fact that removals arising therefrom were "not for cause," and in spite of the fact that
such removals would have been valid and unquestionable. Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the
Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft, and
unfitness to render public service. Assuming, then, that this reorganization allows removals "not for
cause" in a manner that would have been permissible in a revolutionary setting as Commissioner Mison
so purports, it would seem that the Commissioner would have been powerless, in any event, to order
dismissals at the Customs Bureau left and right. Lastly, reorganizations must be carried out in good faith.
In this case, Mison failed to prove that the reorganization was indeed made in good faith because he
hired more people to replace those that he fired and no legitimate structural changes have been made.
To sum up, the President could have validly removed officials before the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution even without cause because it was a revolutionary government. However, from the effectivity
of the 1987 Constitution, the State did not lose its right to reorganize resulting to removals but such
reorganization must be made in good faith

BANDA VS ERMITA

(GR NO. 166620; APRIL 20, 2010)

FACTS: The petitioners filed this action as a class suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-
employees at the National Printing Office. They challenge the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 378
issued by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo which amended Sec. 6 of Executive Order No. 285,
removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO over the printing services requirements of government
agencies and instrumentalities. They perceive it as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the
NPO contending that it is beyong the executive powers of Pres. Arroyo to amend or repeal EO No. 285
issued by former Pres. Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers and that EO No. 378
violates petioners’ security of tenure because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is indeed qualified as a class suit.

Whether or not Pres. Arroyo can amend or repeal EO No. 285 by the mere issuance of another
executive order.
HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that an action does not become a class suit merely because it is
designated as such in the pleadings. Under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, When the subject
matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is
impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and
representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all.
Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest. From the foregoing
definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of
the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the
assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor General,
as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in the NPO. The 67
petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom they claimed to represent.
Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one signed a letter
denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the number of petitioners to 34. We note that
counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the desistance or withdrawal of some of the
petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due to pressure from people "close to the seat of
power." Still, even if we were to disregard the affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is
highly doubtful that a sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported
class suit. A perusal of the petition itself would show that of the 67 petitioners who signed the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, only 20 petitioners were in fact mentioned in the jurat as
having duly subscribed the petition before the notary public. In other words, only 20 petitioners effectively
instituted the present case.

As to the merits of the case, it is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has
the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s
constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the
legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary
(which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an
agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President.

Pertinent to the case at bar, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 authorizes the
President (a) to restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the
immediate Offices, the President Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support
System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to
another, and (b) to transfer functions or offices from the Office of the President to any other Department
or Agency in the Executive Branch, and vice versa.

In the case at bar, there was neither an abolition of the NPO nor a removal of any of its functions
to be transferred to another agency. Under the assailed Executive Order No. 378, the NPO remains the
main printing arm of the government for all kinds of government forms and publications but in the interest
of greater economy and encouraging efficiency and profitability, it must now compete with the private
sector for certain government printing jobs, with the exception of election paraphernalia which remains
the exclusive responsibility of the NPO, together with the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, as the Commission
on Elections may determine. At most, there was a mere alteration of the main function of the NPO by
limiting the exclusivity of its printing responsibility to election forms.
 Pursuant to Section 20, Chapter 7, Title I, Book III of the same Code, the power of the
President to reorganize the Executive Branch under Section 31 includes such powers and functions that
may be provided for under other laws. To be sure, an inclusive and broad interpretation of the President’s
power to reorganize executive offices has been consistently supported by specific provisions in general
appropriations laws.

Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of
offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of
creating and decentralizing is included in the subsequent provision of Section 62 which evidently shows
that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes including the creation of offices in the
department or agency concerned.

Notably, in the present case, the 2003 General Appropriations Act, which was reenacted in
2004 (the year of the issuance of Executive Order No. 378), likewise gave the President the authority to
effect a wide variety of organizational changes in any department or agency in the Executive Branch.
Sections 77 and 78 of said Act recognize the power of the President to reorganize even executive offices
already funded by the said appropriations act, including the power to implement structural, functional, and
operational adjustments in the executive bureaucracy and, in so doing, modify or realign appropriations of
funds as may be necessary under such reorganization. Thus, insofar as petitioners protest the limitation
of the NPO’s appropriations to its own income under Executive Order No. 378, the same is statutorily
authorized by the above provisions.

In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is
a mere reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA
in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of the President
motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual
assessment that this Court could only but accept.

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in
good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or
separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure
would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or
removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good
faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid
"abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.

In sum, the Court finds that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo’s issuance of Executive Order
No. 378.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby DENIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

PICHAY V. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (2012)

ODES no power to try and decide cases’ E.O. No. 13 empowering it is unconstitutional
FACTS

On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established Investigative and Adjudicatory Division
(IAD).

On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint-affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board
of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the
LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena,
Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.

On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order3 signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In
compliance therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a
case involving the same transaction and charge of grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v.
Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman.

ISSUE

Whether E.O. 13 is unconstitutional for abrogating unto an administrative office a quasi-judicial function
through and E.O. and not through legislative enactment by Congress.

HELD

NO.

The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize the Executive Department under E.O. 292. In the
case of Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora the Court affirmed that the President's authority to carry out
a reorganization in any branch or agency of the executive department is an express grant by the
legislature by virtue of Section 31, Book III, E.O. 292 (the Administrative Code of 1987), "the President,
subject to the policy of the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency,
shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President."

The law grants the President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to
reorganize his office "to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency." The Office of the President is the
nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must
be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his
directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President is the command post of the President.
(Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative
authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O. 292.

The President's power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section
31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under
Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President's power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the
President Proper but still within the Office of the

President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or gencies, and vice versa.

The distinction between the allowable organizational actions under Section 31(1) on the one hand and
Section 31 (2) and (3) on the other is crucial not only as it affects employees' tenurial security but also
insofar as it touches upon the validity of the reorganization, that is, whether the executive actions
undertaken fall within the limitations prescribed under E.O. 292. When the PAGC was created under E.O.
12, it was composed of a Chairman and two (2) Commissioners who held the ranks of Presidential
Assistant II and I, respectively,9 and was placed directly "under the Office of the President."10 On the
other hand, the ODESLA, to which the functions of the PAGC have now been transferred, is an office
within the Office of the President Proper.11 Since both of these offices belong to the Office of the
President Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the
ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.

What actions does reorganization include?

The Reorganization Did not Entail the Creation of a New, Separate and Distinct Office.

The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties
and functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which
is an existing office within the Office of the President Proper. The reorganization required no more than a
mere alteration of the administrative structure of the ODESLA through the establishment of a third division
– the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division – through which ODESLA could take on the additional
functions it has been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.

Reorganization takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or
units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. It involves a
reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy
of functions.

The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body not vested with quasi-judicial
powers.

while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve
cases, its authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-

ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties xxx, of PAGC."

Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or
complaints against

all presidential appointees in the government" and to "submit its report and recommendations to the
President." The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the
power to settlecontroversies and adjudicate cases. As the Court ruled in Cariño v. Commission on Human
Rights, and later reiterated in Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission:

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi- judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the
facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence
and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the
law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.

The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the Ombudsman.

Contrary to petitioner's contention, the IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit filed against him notwithstanding the earlier
filing of criminal and administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations before the Office of
the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being
conducted by another investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of
1989.

While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD- ODESLA is
limited to that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain so until
acted upon by the President.

Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the
President. The mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the actions of the IAD-ODESLA.
Mere allegation is not equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed. Petitioner must present
substantial proof to show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the
investigation. No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the
performance of the fact-finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant
consideration.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.39 Petitioner
has failed to discharge the burden of proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise
of the President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989

FACTS:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who is assigned with the Presidential Anti-Dollar
Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued
search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 against the private respondents. The application
for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of
Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the
affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin
M. Castro is likewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the
issuance of the 6 search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the
affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. Shortly thereafter, the private
respondent went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search
warrants in question. On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective
"for a period of five days notice"] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985. The lower court
declared Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest. Appellate Court held that
petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute
foreign exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. Further, the petitioner, in
exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar
had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void.

ISSUES:

(a) Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body and it is one co-
equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction;
and

(b) Whether or not such presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be
authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution.

HELD:

(a) No. It is the basic function of quasi-judicial bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and
unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality
and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force's organic act,
Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that
the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims and
execute its judgments. The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force has the following powers and
authority:

a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities,
including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports;

b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of
accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct of investigation;

c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators

and hearing officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities;
gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, oath oral and
documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit
reports containing findings and recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities;
 d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court; and To adopt such measures and take such actions as may be
necessary to implement this Decree.

xxx xxx xxx

"f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the
fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions
as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found committing or to have committed acts
constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said person
voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the
foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the country.

Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any
other judicial regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883.

The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of foreign exchange retained
abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits,
interest rates and such other relevant factors.

The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20%) thereof. The
informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20%) of the fine. Should there be no informer,
the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent (40%) of the fine and the balance shall
accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the fine to be retained by
the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the
Task Force."

The Court sees nothing in the provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search
warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to
offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. As the President's arm called upon to combat the
vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the
Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. It cannot be said to be co-equal or
coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate
its standing at par with the said court.

(b) No. It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are
exclusive upon judges. Since the 1973 Constitution took force and effect and until it was so
unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and search
warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been at best controversial. In a
case decided by the Court, the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one
capable of approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." The Court agree that the Presidential
Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that
ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable
cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the
success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the
conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To
permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in
his own right, when he is neither. That makes Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
BALANGUAN VS CA- PDF

Dacudaovs.DOJ-TOCHECKWITHFULLCASE

[Civil Law: Effectivity of laws; general rule: no retroactive effect; exception: when law is procedural in
nature]

Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R. Dacudao, Petitioners, vs. Secretary of Justice Raul M.
Gonzales of the Department of Justice, Respondent

G.R. No. 188056; January 8, 2013

Facts: The petitioners filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his associates
after the petitioners were defrauded in a business venture. Thereafter, the DOJ Secretary issued
Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in the country to forward all cases already filed
against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate
action. However, in a separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases
already filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan De Oro
City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila. Because of such DOJ orders, the
complaint of petitioners was forwarded to the secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila.
Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus assailing to the
respondent Secretary of justice grave abuse of discretion in issuing the department Order and the
Memorandum, which according to the violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the
law and right to speedy disposition of the cases. The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional
or exempting from coverage cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan De
Oro City. They contended that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that DO 182 was issued in
violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.

Issue: Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

Ruling: Yes. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist, and
one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a
statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create new rights or take away vested rights
but operates only in furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation already existing rights. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, no vested right
generally attaches to or arises from procedural law.
OLAGUER-PDF

padua-pdf

Joson v. Executive Secretary [G.R. No. 131255. May 20, 1998]

08Aug

FACTS

Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently
into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was
endorsed to the DILG. For failure to file an answer after three (3) extensions, petitioner was declared in
default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive suspension. Petitioner later “Motion to Conduct
Formal Investigation”. DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position papers
substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings.
Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the findings and recommendation of
the DILG Secretary. The former imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6)
months without pay.

ISSUES

Whether or not:

 (a) Preventive suspension is proper;

 (b) Procedural due process is violated;
 (c) The resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the
President who is the Disciplining Authority, not the Secretary of DILG;

RULING

“(a) Yes. Preventive suspension may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the
issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is
great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose
a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. The act of respondent in allegedly
barging violently into the session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in the company of armed men
constitutes grave misconduct. The allegations of complainants are bolstered by the joint-affidavit of two
(2) employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Respondent who is the chief executive of the province
is in a position to influence the witnesses. Further, the history of violent confrontational politics in the
province dictates that extreme precautionary measures be taken.

“(b) Yes. The rejection of petitioner’s right to a formal investigation denied him procedural due
process. Section 5 of A. O. No. 23 provides that at the preliminary conference, the Investigating
Authority shall summon the parties to consider whether they desire a formal investigation. This provision
does not give the Investigating Authority the discretion to determine whether a formal investigation would
be conducted. The records show that petitioner filed a motion for formal investigation. There is nothing in
the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations nor in A.O. No. 23 that provide
that administrative cases against elective local officials can be decided on the basis of position
papers. A.O. No. 23 states that the Investigating Authority may require the parties to submit their
respective memoranda but this is only after formal investigation and hearing.

“(c) No. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. What is delegated
is the power to investigate, not the power to discipline. The power to discipline evidently includes the
power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived from the
Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government officials. A. O. No. 23, however,
delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be
constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner Joson’s
claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency “…which recognizes the establishment of a single
executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of
the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.”

This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the Constitution. Control is said
to be the very heart of the power of the presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President,
however, may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the
Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally. The
members of Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the President
cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the time. Each head
of a department is, and must be, the President’s alter ego in the matters of that department where the
President is required by law to exercise authority.

EUGENIO VS. CSC

(Power of congress to abolish)
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. In 1993, Aida
Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES). She was given a CES eligibility and was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. But her
appointment to said rank was impeded when in the same year, the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
abolished the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).

CESB is the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the selection,
classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive Service.
Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the CSC does not have the
power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law (P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued
that it has the power to do so pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the
right to reorganize the CSC.

ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career Executive Service Board.

HELD:
NO. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that
as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken
stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the
petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.

On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside
funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB. But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission. As
read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is limited
to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16..
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government
with a broad and positive outlook.”

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-
related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly
etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: Attachment. — (a) This
refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and attached agency or
corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by
having the department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either
as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the
attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress
of programs and projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached
corporation or agency.

Blaquera vs. Alcala G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998

Facts: On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each official and employee of
the government the productivity incentive benefits in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the
employee’s one month basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO provided that
the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of
agencies, including government boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 and future
years pending the result of a comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.

The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies, were
paid incentive benefits for the year 1992. Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29
authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum amount of
P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO 268, enjoining the grant of productivity
incentive benefits without prior approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments,
offices and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for the year 1992 in
excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the excess. In compliance therewith, the heads
of the departments or agencies of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’
salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments.

Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential control over the
executive departments
Held: The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are exercised and
implemented through him. His power includes the control of executive departments as provided under
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution.

Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done
in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The
Pres. can, by virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or decision of his
subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices under him.

When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits, enjoining heads of government
agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the refund of the
excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments.

The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising
his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted incentive
benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting in
the uneven distribution of government resources.

The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive
departments.