The Developmental State Experiment in Africa The Experiences of Ghana and South Africa

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The Developmental State Experiment in Africa: the

Experiences of Ghana and South Africa
Joseph R. A. Ayee
To cite this article: Joseph R. A. Ayee (2013) The Developmental State Experiment in
Africa: the Experiences of Ghana and South Africa, The Round Table, 102:3, 259-280, DOI:
10.1080/00358533.2013.794577
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The Round Table, 2013
Vol. 102, No. 3, 259–280, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2013.794577
The Developmental State Experiment in

Africa: the Experiences of Ghana and
South Africa
Downloaded by [WOLKITE UNIVERSITY] at 06:00 30 November 2017
JOSEPH R. A. AYEE
Rector, MountCrest University College, Accra, Ghana
ABSTRACT Several strategies have been designed and implemented in African countries to promote
development. Even though they may have contributed to increased gross domestic product growth
over the years, they have largely failed because of a number of factors, namely: ineffective leader-
ship; poor policy implementation; policy discontinuity; slow industrialisation; and an environment
not conducive for private sector growth. The failure of these strategies or paradigms has led to the
continued search for an appropriate strategy to address Africa’s development predicament. This
search has also been exacerbated by the rise of China, East Asia and some Latin American countries
as newly industrialising countries, the 2008 global economic crisis stemming from market failure
and the renewed interest in the role and nature of the state in the development process, especially its
role in reviving the economies of many Western countries with bail-out packages by the state. These
developments no doubt point not only to the role of the state in development but also to the kind of
state that will promote and facilitate socio-economic development. The kind of state to shoulder the
burden of socio-economic development is the developmental state, which according to (Evans, 2008,
p. 13), ‘If … it was important to 20th century economic success … will be much more important to
21st century success’. Using Ghana (considered as a non-developmental state) and South Africa
(considered to be an emerging developmental state) as case studies, the paper examines the extent
or the degree to which the two countries have met or achieved the key seven features of the develop-
mental state. Some recommendations are also made with the aim of consolidating progress thus far
and deepening or accelerating the process. In doing so, it is hoped that the lecture will make a con-
tribution to the literature on the concept of the developmental state.
KEY WORDS: development strategies, developmental state, Ghana, South Africa, good governance,
economic transformation, Millennium Development Goals, South African National Development
Plan, globalisation, Kwame Nkrumah, Nelson Mandela, transactional leadership, financial reforms
Introduction
Much ink has been poured on the development project in Africa because of the persis-
tence of poverty and lack of economic transformation in the midst of resources that have
The author is also Emeka Anyaoku, Visiting Professor of Commonwealth Studies, Institute of
Commonwealth Studies (ICS), University of London, January–July 2013. This article is based on
an inaugural lecture delivered in that capacity at the ICS, London, on 25 March 2013.
Correspondence Address: Joseph R. A. Ayee, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of
London, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU, UK. Email: joseph.ayee@sas.ac.uk
Ó 2013 The Round Table Ltd
260 J. R. A. Ayee
either been tapped or are yet to be tapped (Leys, 1996; Sen, 1999; Evans, 2010). While
some scholars blame structural factors (the absence of meaningful diversification and
transformation and lack of facilitative environment for private sector growth) and political
economy vulnerabilities (such as ineffective leadership, weak institutions and corruption)
for the lack of economic and political progress in Africa, others point accusing fingers at
colonialism, neo-colonialism and an unjust world economic order. In the rush to promote
and enhance development in Africa, nine development strategies, some of them overlap-
ping chronologically, have been designed and implemented, often under the direction and
support of the development partners (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
(UNECA), 2011). This point has been reiterated by Delgadao (1995, p. 4):
… the basic design and mode of implementation of all these paradigms come from outside
Africa, even though each paradigm undoubtedly has had genuine African adherents. It is
hard to think of other significant regions of the world in modern times where outside influ-
ences on basic development strategy issues have been so pervasive.
The nine strategies or paradigms that have emerged in Africa are as follows:
(1) Commercialisation through cash cropping, which happened between the pre-
independence era and up to 1979.
(2) Community development, integrated rural development and participatory devel-
opment (1955–1973).
(3) Regional integration for industry and national self-sufficiency for food
(1970–1979).
(4) Basic human needs (1970–1979).
(5) Regional integration, food first (1973–1989).
(6) Supply shifters in agriculture (1979–1989).
(7) First-generation structural adjustment on demand management (1980–1984).
(8) Second-generation structural adjustment on equity and growth (1985–1999).
(9) Sustainable development (1990 to the present) (UNECA, 2011).
Even though these strategies may have contributed to increased gross domestic product
(GDP) growth over the years in African countries, they have largely failed because of a
number of factors, namely: ineffective leadership; poor policy implementation; policy
discontinuity; slow industrialisation; and an environment not conducive for private sec-
tor growth (UNECA, 2011).
The failure of these strategies or paradigms has led to the continued search for an
appropriate strategy to address Africa’s development predicament. This search has also
been exacerbated by the rise of China, East Asia and Latin American countries as
newly industrialising countries, the 2008 global economic crisis stemming from market
failure and the renewed interest in the role and nature of the state in the development
process, especially its role in ‘reviving the economies of many Western countries with
bailout packages for banks, the automobile industry and other parts of manufacturing,
massive investment in the social sector and expansion of social security for the unem-
ployed’ (UNECA, 2011, p. 95). For instance, in 2008, the United States government
under former President George Bush announced a bail out for the US financial market
and in 2009 President Obama introduced a fiscal stimulus package of US$787 billion.
The Developmental State Experiment in Africa 261
Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the state injected £37 billion to bail out its financial
institutions (UNECA, 2011). These developments no doubt point not only to the role of
the state in development but also to the kind of state that will promote and facilitate
socio-economic development. The kind of state to shoulder the burden of socio-eco-
nomic development is the developmental state, which according to Evans (2008, p. 13),
‘If … it was important to 20th century economic success … will be much more impor-
tant to 21st century success’.
It is against this backdrop that this article examines the extent or the degree to which
Ghana and South Africa have met or achieved the seven key features of the develop-
mental state. These features are: transformational or development-oriented leadership;
state autonomy; developmental public administration or public service; production-
oriented private sector; effective national development planning; expansion of human

capacity; and good governance. In doing so, the article will make a contribution to the
literature on the paradigm of the developmental state.
Rationale for the Choice of Topic

I have selected the topic because of the renewed interest in and debate over what kind
of state should be set up to promote socio-economic and political development in Africa
and the developmental state and its relevance in the development discourse on Africa
today (UNECA, 2011; Mkandawire, 2012). I have selected Ghana and South Africa for
three reasons.
First, I have lived and worked in both countries and therefore I have the advantage
of being an ‘insider’, which should not cloud my judgement.
Second, Ghana's position in Africa is unique. It was the first country south of the
Sahara to gain independence from colonial rule. Its political struggles shaped the strug-
gle for the independence of most African countries. Many of its policy initiatives have,
therefore, been tested and evaluated to the extent that numerous scholars recognise
Ghana in the 20th and the 21st centuries as a ‘microcosm of social, political and eco-
nomic processes in Africa. The Ghanaian proclivity for experimentation has made
Ghana into a veritable laboratory for the investigation of different approaches to ende-
mic African problems’ (Pellow and Chazan, 1986, pp. 209–210). It also experienced
one of the fastest economic deteriorations on the continent, in spite of its natural and
human resource endowments. In the early 1980s it embarked on an extensive World
Bank/International Monetary Fund-backed structural adjustment reform, which saw the
reversal of negative economic growth and a significant improvement in the economy
under an authoritarian regime. It consequently became the ‘star pupil’ of structural
adjustment on the continent, and one that other countries were tasked to emulate
(Porter, 2003). In the early 1990s it became one of the pioneers of good governance,
moving from an authoritarian dictatorship to a liberal democracy, with a vibrant civil
society and a proliferation of both electronic and print media. In 2001 it became the
first African country to have a peaceful change of government (from an incumbent
government to that of the opposition), indicating the maturity of democracy on the
continent. In 2009, it again provided hope for the consolidation of democracy when the
incumbent government handed power to the opposition after very close elections. It is
not surprising that Ghana continues to be a symbol for Africa, evident most in visits by
262 J. R. A. Ayee
the last three American presidents (Ohemeng and Ayee, 2012). Ghana is not usually
considered to be a developmental state, yet it has made some good progress against
some development indicators, notably some of the Millennium Development Goals.
Third, South Africa has been selected because of the claim to it being the ‘giant of
Africa’ and ‘Africa’s big brother’. Since its celebrated entry into the African democratic
space with the dismantling of apartheid in 1994, there has been a change in the power
and leadership equations in Africa. In addition, South Africa has a strong private sector
(a domestic capitalist class), a strong and well-organised labour movement, the
Congress of South Africa Trade Unions (COSATU), which is allied to the ruling party,
and is arguably the only country in Africa where official documents of the ruling party,
the African National Congress (ANC), and the national development plan are devoted
to the construction of a developmental state to restructure the South African economy.

For instance, the ANC aspires to ‘build a developmental state that is shaped by the
history and socio-economic dynamics of South African society’ within the ‘National
Democratic Revolution’ paradigm (ANC, 2007, p. 5). The ANC’s manifesto for the
2009 general elections also approvingly referred to the building of a developmental
state in South Africa that will work with the private sector and address problems of
unemployment, poverty and inequality (ANC, 2009). Similarly, chapter 13 of the South
African National Development Plan 2030 on Our Future: Make it Work is devoted to
‘Building a Capable and Developmental State’ that recognises the need for South Africa
to build a ‘state that is capable of playing a developmental and transformative role and
a public service that needs to be immersed in the developmental agenda but insulated
from undue political interference (Republic of South Africa, 2012, p. 407). South Africa
therefore may be regarded as a ‘developmental state in the making’, or an ‘emerging
developmental state’, or a ‘developmental state in waiting’.
The Developmental State

A wealth of scholarship has been built up over the last decade or two on the paradigm
of the developmental state. This literature has different orientations. Some look at the
definitions, features, schools of thought and institutional framework, whereas others
examine the feasibility or otherwise of the developmental state in Africa.
There is no universal definition of a developmental state. Mkandawire (2001, p. 291)
defines it as ‘a state whose ideological underpinnings are developmental and one that
seriously attempts to deploy its administrative and political resources to the task of eco-
nomic development’. The UNECA (2011, p. 95) sees a developmental state as ‘a state
that puts economic development as top priority of government policy, and is able to
design effective instruments to promote such a goal’. In the view of Edigheji (2010, p.
4), a developmental state is one that ‘authoritatively, credibly, legitimately and in a
binding manner is able to formulate and implement its policies and programmes. This
entails possessing a developmentalist ideology that privileges industrialisation, economic
growth and expansion of human capabilities. Such a state also has to be able to con-
struct and deploy the institutional architecture within the state and mobilise society
towards the realisation of its developmentalist project’. Perhaps, the most widely cited
definition of the developmental state has been offered by Castells (1992, pp. 56–57).
According to him:
A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to

promote and sustain development, understanding by development the combination of
steady high rates of growth and structural change in the productive system, both domesti-
cally and in its relationship to the international economy … Thus ultimately for the
developmental state, economic development is not a goal but a means.
From these definitions, we may define a developmental state as a state that possesses
sufficient developmental structures (that is, effective and efficient state capacity—regu-
latory, administrative, extractive and technical) and uses them to perform developmental
roles grounded on the interaction between local and international stakeholders
(Brautigam, 1996; Routley, 2012). It therefore has political, ideological and institutional
connotations (Chang et al., 1998; Routley, 2012).

The major contributions to the developmental state have been made by Chalmers
Johnson (1982, 1995, 1999): ‘Market‐conforming Intervention’; Peter Evans (1995,
2010): ‘Embedded Autonomy’; Adrian Leftwich (1995, 2000, 2008, 2010): ‘The Pri-
macy of Politics’; Ha‐Joon Chang (1999, 2000, 2002a, b): ‘Institutional Political
Economy (IPE)—An Alternative to Economic Neo‐liberalism’; and Linda Weiss
(1998, 1999, 2000, 2003): ‘Thinking About Globalisation’. Other contributions have
come from Castells (1992), White (1998), Fine (1999, 2010), Mkandawire (2001),
Edigheji (2005, 2010), Fakir (2007), Gyimah-Boadi (2009), UNECA (2011), Meyns
and Musamba (2010) and Routley (2012).
The debate over the developmental state has led to two schools of thought, namely,
the political school and the economic school (Fine, 2010). The political school, on one
hand, focuses on state capacity for developmental purposes, that is, the ability of the
state to formulate and implement appropriate policies and programmes to promote
development. In other words, ‘the developmental state seeks political legitimacy by
being developmental, with success in the economy allowing it to sustain itself’ (Fine,
2010, p. 171). The economic school, on the other hand, is ‘exclusively preoccupied
with appropriate economic policies, or the rationale for them, as opposed to the political
(and ideological) conditions that make them possible’ (Fine, 2010, p. 171). Accordingly,
the focus of attention is on market imperfections and how to correct them either
through the state or through creating other institutions in order to promote development.
There are also five views to the debate. The first view argues that the paradigm of the
developmental state is ‘not totally alien’ to Africa. In the words of Mkandawire (2001,
pp. 295, 291), ‘In Africa, we have many examples of states whose performance until the
mid‐1970s would have qualified them as “developmental states” … but which now
seem anti-developmental because the hard times brought the economic expansion of their
countries to a halt’. This is because development was a major preoccupation of some of
the immediate post-independence leaders who espoused development ideologies. They
include Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana (Pan-Africanism—political and economic liberation
for economic development), Julius Nyerere of Tanzania (ujamaa aimed at promoting
rural transformation), Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia (humanism) and Leopold Senghor of
Senegal (negritude) (UNECA, 2011). Even though this argument may sound plausible,
the outcome of this preoccupation for development did not produce developmental states
in Africa because the development project was not supported by sustainable visions of
development, while it involved overbearing statist intervention in the economy in which
the state became an economic entrepreneur and assumed ‘multiple roles as investor,
264 J. R. A. Ayee
banker, trader, and primary employer, rather than carefully nurturing a local entrepre-
neurial class (UNECA, 2011, p. 102). There was also little or no industrialisation and
diversification of the economies, while excessive statism encouraged rent‐seeking
behaviour which detracted economic actors from productive activities (Bates, 1981,
p. 11–14).
The second view is that what Africa needs is a democratic developmental state. This
is an issue because the developmental state in East Asia’s experience is generally seen
as having been autocratic rather than democratic. Although not described as a necessary
condition, autocratic rule was deemed to have facilitated the strong political leadership
and the autonomy of state bureaucracy, both seen as essential features of developmental
states in East Asia. What counted was the developmental performance of a state, while
the nature of its political regime was regarded as secondary; therefore it is an argument
for democratic developmental states (White, 1998; Edigheji, 2005, Edegheji, 2010).
Evans’s recent work builds on Amartya Sen’s (1999) capability approach, focusing on
the development of capabilities of individuals rather than economic gains as the focus
of the developmental state (Evans, 2010). The work of Richard Sandbrook et al. (2007)
identifies states as a key player in development, but sees the developmental outcomes
of these state-led projects as centring on building a society without poverty and social
exclusion (Sandbrook et al., 2007).
A third view is that the developmental state is no longer relevant because the so-
called Asian tigers did not survive the Asian economic crises in 2000 and the global
crisis of 2008 (Weiss, 2003; Low, 2004; Block, 2008). The literature is extant on the
origins and evaluation of East Asian developmental states and some Southeast Asian
ones, drawing differentiations and variations between the first- and second-generation
developmental states. The common issue is that what had worked has become less
effective as domestic and external conditions have changed, the latter much influenced
by globalisation, information communication technology, knowledge-based new
economy and deregulation in the global economy. The relevancy and resilience of
developmental states, especially in Asia, is therefore questioned. The Asian crisis seems
to have turned the economic miracle economies into a fast meltdown, with Japan still
in a profound stagnation, which puts the faith and credibility of the developmental state
at stake, both its rise and fall. Some have described the developmental state as a
mantra, a buzzword, highly prescriptive, complex and problematic (O’Riain, 2000;
O’Hearn, 2000; Low, 2004; Block, 2008).
A fourth view points at some of the gaps in the developmental state literature. They
include:
• ‘The tendency to address the capacity of the state but not its motivations’ (Haggard,
2004, p. 70). This separation is untenable because it is in part motivations and
commitments that produce a professionalised bureaucracy and a professionalised
bureaucracy that motivates and induces commitment.
• The treatment of ‘the national bureaucracy as a totally depoliticised, socially disem-
bodied, and in rational pursuit of a self evident national interest …’ (Pempel, 1999,
p. 144). There is evidence to show that national interest is not necessarily self-
evident, it cannot be assumed to be developmental, it is contested and constructed
through many negotiations. Bureaucrats and politicians cannot be assumed to be or
taken for granted to be acting within the national interest; some are whereas others
are not.
• The sustainability of developmental states and their developmental role has been
questioned, especially when there is an acknowledgement that developmental states
come and go, and can be seen to be structures that are in some senses grown out of
by design (Fritz and Menocal, 2007).
A fifth view points out that Africa could not have a developmental state because of
rent-seeking activities, lack of commitment to development, neo-patrimonialism and
inadequate human resources, and state intervention in the economy is redundant
because of globalisation (Mkandawire, 2012).
In spite of these criticisms, the UNECA’s (2011, p. 106) Economic Report on Africa
has noted that there is a consensus that a developmental state is ‘crucial to the process
of accelerated economic growth and social transformation’ and concluded that ‘African
countries clearly need developmental states to promote economic and social transforma-
tion’.
Trajectory
There is no agreement on the features that constitute the developmental state. However,
there is some agreement among scholars on four of them. They are:
(1) A political leadership oriented towards development (Fritz and Menocal, 2007;
Musamba, 2010).
(2) A capable, autonomous (but embedded) bureaucracy (Evans, 1995).
(3) A close, often mutually beneficial symbiotic relationship between some state
agencies (often discussed as pilot agencies) and key industrial capitalists (John-
son, 1982, 1987).
(4) Successful policy interventions that promote growth (Wade, 1990; Beeson,
2004).
I therefore build on these four features of the developmental state and expand them to
seven in the light of the debate to make the features more comprehensive and relevant
to the Ghanaian and South African contexts. It is to these seven features that I now
turn, in the following subsections, in measuring the progress of Ghana and South Africa
in the journey to becoming a developmental state.
Transformational or Development-oriented Leadership

This involves leadership with a vision and a developmentalist ideology and the
commitment for development. In other words, the leaders must be bound together by a
powerful economic and political vision. Ghana and South Africa have produced
transformational or development-oriented leaders in Kwame Nkrumah and Nelson
Mandela, respectively. These leaders had the vision and a developmentalist ideology
and the commitment for the development of their countries. These leaders, however,
had their weaknesses. For instance, Nkrumah did not give the bureaucracy sufficient
266 J. R. A. Ayee
scope to take initiatives and act authoritatively in pursuit of the desired development
goals of the country. He was also dictatorial. Similarly, Nelson Mandela was not able to
redress adequately the sharp inequalities of South African society and improve service
delivery to the poor black communities in the townships within the four years that he
was in office.
After these two leaders, there seems to be a transformational leadership deficit in the
two countries. The two countries have failed to produce leaders of comparable stature
and pedigree. Admittedly, leaders in the two countries have at various times claimed
that they should be judged on their ability to bring about national development. There-
fore, national development has become a legitimating norm for the leaders; but this has
been largely seen as a public relations hoax as poverty, inequalities and service delivery
on all fronts remain daunting challenges.

Leadership in the two countries has been bedevilled by the following weaknesses:
• Hard choices and pragmatic choices have often been sacrificed at the altar of politi-
cal expediency. It is true that not all deficits need to be tackled at once as this
allows for prioritisation and consultation. However, this approach by the leaders in
both countries has led to the perception of abdication of responsibility, evasiveness
and obfuscation. In South Africa, the policy of transformation has sometimes been
misinterpreted to mean the wholesale replacement of white staff with unqualified
black staff, even though its original intent was gradually to replace white staff with
emerging qualified black staff. Transformation does not mean putting square pegs in
round holes, but rather building the capacity of black staff with quality to take over
from white staff. However, when it comes to the implementation of this laudable
policy, political and administrative leaders have developed cold feet and played to
the gallery to score political and bureaucratic points. Similarly, in Ghana, successive
leaders have developed a penchant for discontinuing policies and programmes of
their predecessors, contrary to constitutional provision that ‘as far as practicable, a
government shall continue and execute projects and programmes commenced by
previous Government’ (Republic of Ghana, 1992, p. 35(7)). Even some procedures
cease to exist when governments leave office. In her evidence before the Justice
Yaw Appau’s Commission on Judgment Debts in January this year (2013), the
Solicitor General noted that an open lease file system was instituted a few years ago
during the Kufuor administration, which enabled the Attorney General’s Office to
track the transfer of funds to beneficiaries of judgment debts. However, the ‘open
file system fizzled out’ when the Kufuor administration left office in 2009 (Daily
Graphic, 2013, p. 4).
• Systemic corruption: in spite of the proliferation of laws and institutions to deal with
corruption in both countries, political leaders are seen as not doing enough to tackle
corruption—which has been described as a major threat facing humanity as it has
destroyed lives and communities, and undermined countries and institutions. It has
generated popular anger that has threatened to destabilise further societies and exac-
erbate violent conflicts. In the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index, for instance,
Ghana and South Africa were ranked 64 and 69, respectively, among a list of 174
countries, and scoring 45 and 43, respectively. What is disturbing in both countries
is the call by presidents urging the public and whistleblowers to report cases of
corruption involving themselves and other politicians to anti-corruption agencies for

investigation (Cameron, 2009; Ayee, 2011a, b).
• Patronage: the building of patronage by the leaders in both countries has not abated.
The Office of the President in both countries has become a conduit for patronage,
with appointments being made that have increased the size of the presidency. This
is not to ignore the fact that the Office of President in both countries has been
staffed by some great minds and policy analysts, which ensure sector strategies and
cross-sectoral synthesis reporting (Cameron, 2010; Ayee, 2013).
• Mismanagement of the economy: the management of the economy has been a major
preoccupation of successive governments in both countries. No doubt, successive
leaders in government and leaders of some political parties have established
Economic Management Teams (EMTs). The State of the Nation Addresses by the
Presidents, budget statements of Ministers of Finance and, of course, the manifestos
of the political parties have sought to show some commitment on the part of leaders
both in government and outside it to develop strategies for the management of the
economy. In a nutshell, the leaders of parties and government and outside it have
embraced economic policies and programmes that have sought to contribute to
broad developmental outcomes, as opposed to those that might be considered more
irresponsible or predatory in character. Given that the two countries have pursued
neo-liberal economic policies, the achievement of macroeconomic indicators
weighed far above microeconomic indicators. However, gains on the macroeco-
nomic front were eroded by fiscal indiscipline largely through profligate spending,
especially during election year, which has resulted in huge public debt with which
the two countries are struggling to grapple. For instance, South Africa’s debt-to-
GDP ratio for the year 2012–2013 is currently 38%. This excludes the debt of
state-owned enterprises (Republic of South Africa, 2013). The International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) warns that the build-up of public debt levels in South Africa since
the global crisis is now a constraint on the government’s fiscal space as significant
additional debt accumulation will probably raise funding costs (International Mone-
tary Fund, 2012). The 2012 South African budget acknowledged that the country’s
weak growth, persistently high unemployment, inequality and poverty are persistent
and chronic problems (Republic of South Africa 2012, p. 3). Similarly, Ghana’s
debt-to-GDP ratio in December 2012 was 49.4% (Republic of Ghana, 2013).
• Furthermore, the reports of the Auditor General of both countries have identified
persistent waste of state resources through financial misconduct and other malfea-
sance with little or no sanctions applied to the culprits. This waste of resources is
exacerbated by poor record keeping on the part of state institutions.
From these weaknesses, it is clear that leadership in the two countries has largely exhib-
ited features of transactional leadership, that is, leadership based on individual gain and
the exchange of rewards for effort. On this count, therefore, one cannot with confidence
say that there is transformational leadership in the two countries.
This notwithstanding, it is instructive to note that the two countries have a national
developmental vision. South Africa is one of the few countries in the world that has
openly proclaimed commitment to the construction of a developmental state. As already
indicated, this proclamation can be seen in ANC documents and government policy
documents such as the 2012 National Development Plan 2030 and the 2009 Medium
268 J. R. A. Ayee
Term Strategic Framework. Ghana, however, unlike South Africa, has been quiet and
modest in its developmental state journey. The only document that mentioned the devel-
opmental state is ‘The Concept Note for the Implementation of the New Approach to
Public Sector Reform Programme’ of the current National Democratic Congress (NDC)
government in which one of the three expected results of the public sector reform pro-
gramme is to build an ‘effective Ghanaian public administration that addresses chal-
lenges of a developmental state, which will be achieved through rigorous
implementation of the six pillars or strategic objectives’ (Republic of Ghana, n.d., p. 2).
In addition, the 1992 Constitution has set the long-term national development vision for
Ghana, which is ‘the establishment of a just and free society’ (Republic of Ghana,
1992, Article 34(1)) and which is in consonance with the motto of the country, ‘Free-
dom and Justice’. Accordingly, all governments are required to design and implement
policies and programmes that will ultimately lead to the realisation of this agenda. One
needs to sound a cautionary note here that it is one thing either expressing interest in a
developmental state or it being contained in policy documents and constitutions; how-
ever, actually constructing such as state is a Herculean task as the real challenge is to
design the requisite institutions and formulate and implement policies for the realisation
of developmental goals. Even though these conditions are beginning to take shape in
the two countries, they are slow.
State Autonomy
This involves the capacity of the state to formulate and implement policies to promote
the public or national interest as well as create an enabling environment for civil society
organisations and other stakeholders to participate in the policy process to garner sup-
port for the national development agenda. This is what Evans (1995) calls ‘embedded
state autonomy’.
What institutional arrangements and governance system are in place to determine the
capacity of the state? In other words, do the two countries have strong internal institu-
tional arrangements (measured by the levels of autonomy) and strong relationships with
non-state actors (measured by the degree of embeddedness) to ensure a high degree of
state capacity? (Edigheji, 2010).
The autonomy of the state in the two countries has been questioned by the ownership
of policies and programmes designed and implemented. There is no doubt that some
development plans, the budget, strategies, frameworks and programmes, have been
formulated and implemented in the two countries aimed at promoting development.
However, most of them were largely influenced by the Bretton Woods institutions and
other donors. The budget, for instance, is seen to be influenced by the Bretton Woods
institutions. Given that the two countries operated a neo-liberal economic policy regime
with emphasis on a sound macroeconomic environment, a functioning legal system,
prudential regulation of the financial sector and protection of property rights, the
influence of the Bretton Woods institutions on policies and programmes cannot be
underestimated (Mohammed, 2010). Consequently, the level of autonomy of state
institutions over policies and programmes that they have designed seems to have been
compromised. In addition to this, the implementation of public policies and programmes
has been problematic in the two countries, largely because of the lack of capacity of
the state institutions and the divorce of policy implementation from formulation.
In terms of the relationship between state and non-state institutions, the opening up
of political space in Ghana and South Africa made possible by their constitutions,
namely, the 1992 Constitution and 1996 Constitution, respectively, has led to the prolif-
eration of several civil society organisations (CSOs), such as centres and institutes often
referred to as think tanks, which are actively engaged with policy-makers.
A number of policy consultation processes have emerged in both countries. First is
the legislative sub-committees, which invite memorandums from the public and CSOs
on bills to be discussed. There is, however, little evidence in the literature to suggest
that the inputs from CSOs and some members of the public have actually improved the
quality of some bills. Second is that some CSOs, especially the think tanks, through
their own initiatives, have undertaken policy developments that they believe are relevant
to the state’s development. They undertake such processes through organising work-
shops to brainstorm on policies. For instance, the Institute of Economic Affairs in
Ghana helped to initiate a discussion on a bill for Freedom of Information. In recent
times, IMANI Ghana and other organisations have collaborated in organising various
workshops on managing Ghana’s oil resource so as to avoid the so-called resource
curse that seems to afflict so much of Africa.
Third is the consultation between government and CSOs directly to help shape public
policies and programmes. For instance, the National Economic Development and
Labour Council (Nedlac), established in 2005, is one body through which government
comes together with organised business, labour and community groupings at a national
level to discuss and try to reach consensus on issues of social and economic policy.
Nedlac works very closely with departments of labour, trade and industry, finance
(National Treasury), public works and others with the aim of making socio-economic
decision-making more inclusive, to promote the goals of economic growth, equity and
social inclusion. Since its inception, Nedlac has served as a critical interface between
government and its social partners (business, labour and civil society) to improve policy
planning, coordination and integration. It played a key role in the formulation of a
South African response to the global economic crisis as well as its policy propositions
in shaping the national response to the challenges of labour brokering in the country
(Gumede, 2009).
Fourth are the meetings of political leaders such as the President, ministers and local
government leadership with the public, called in Ghana the people’s assembly, while in
South Africa it is called the Izimbizo, meaning public gatherings. One of the important
advantages of the public meetings is that the government gets to understand better the
realities of each locality. Although the monitoring and follow-up mechanisms of these
public meetings have been contested, they have opened a window for people of all
walks of life to interact with government officials and have input into policies and pro-
grammes (Cameron, 2003, 2009; Ayee, 2011a, b).
Fifth are the meet-the-press or media briefings at which ministers take turns to
engage with the media on what is happening in their sectors. Sixth is the setting up of
a committee or commission to go round the country and invite public views on some
burning and critical issues. For instance, the Constitution Review Commission (CRC), a
presidential Commission of Inquiry, was set up in January 2010 by the NDC
government of the late President John Mills to consult with the people of Ghana on the
operation of the 1992 Constitution and on any changes that need to be made to the
Constitution. The Commission was also tasked to present a draft bill for the amendment
270 J. R. A. Ayee
of the Constitution in the event that any changes are warranted. The CRC used a highly
participatory qualitative inquiry methodology, which directly and indirectly reached
millions of Ghanaians (individuals, groups, institutions), including Ghanaians living
abroad. The total number of formal submissions received, processed, coded and stored
in a database by the CRC is 83,161. Millions of Ghanaians participated in the consulta-
tive processes of the CRC, directly or through traditional and new media, without
formally making submissions. The White Paper on the Constitution Review Commis-
sion of Inquiry was gazetted on 15 June 2012. It accepted almost 90% of the CRC’s
recommendations (Republic of Ghana, 2012).
Having said this, the relationship between the state and non-state institutions has
largely remained tenuous and sometimes uneasy because either most of the state
institutions are keen to adopt a co-optation strategy, which has often been resisted by
the non-state actors, or the non-actors are labelled ‘anti-government’ and therefore not
worth engaging with. Accordingly, state autonomy in the true sense of the developmen-
tal state has still a long way to go in the two countries.
Developmental Public Administration or Public Service

This involves strengthening state institutional capacity through the stabilising of the
political and bureaucratic interface. It involves managing the balance between building
a professional public service that serves the government of the day, but is at the same
time sufficiently autonomous and insulated from political patronage and unproductive
interference. In other words, politicisation of public administration must be a thing of
the past.
The two countries introduced a host of New Public Management (NPM) reforms,
which included civil service reforms, decentralisation, agencification, privatisation,
financial reforms, corporatisation and performance management. In addition, South
Africa introduced contract appointments and Senior Management Service (SMS) (direc-
tor general, deputy director general, chief director and director) aimed at promoting
managerialism and efficiency. The origin of the SMS in South Africa was the concern
of government that the public service was unable to implement key reformist policies
of government (Cameron, 2009). However, given the ANC’s need to transform funda-
mentally the apartheid basis of the South African state, it is perhaps not surprising that
the South African public service is highly politicised. In 1997, the ANC introduced its
Cadre Policy and Deployment Strategy, which advocated political appointments to
senior positions in the public service. It emphasised recruitment from within parties,
and potential ‘deployees’ were made to understand and accept the basic policies and
programmes of the ANC (Cameron, 2010). Gwede Mantashe, the Secretary General of
the ANC, robustly defended the policy of cadre deployment in an interview, stating that
it ensured that there was maximum trust between the political head of a department and
its senior appointees. He went on to ask whether the ANC, if it garnered 70% of votes,
should look for appointments to state institutions from the 30% of the electorate that
did not support the ANC (Sunday Times, 29 April 2009).
The system of contract appointments—at least in its pure NPM form—has not been a
major success. There is a view that contract appointments are not suitable in developing
countries. Given the general skills shortage, a contract system is a luxury that leads to
the haemorrhaging of scarce skills. The three-year contract in particular has resulted in
greater political control over senior officials (Cameron, 2010).
Even though contract appointments are made in Ghana, there is no SMS as in South
Africa. There is evidence that recruitment, promotion and placement for some public
offices in some instances have not followed the merit principle in the way that Max
Weber envisaged (Glover-Quartey, 2007; Asante, 2008). Departures from the legal-
rational criteria have been legion inasmuch as education, experience and potential have
often been set aside, or given little attention; other factors, such as family, ethnic origin
and political affiliation, have been given greater weight (Ayee, 2013). In other words,
there has been growing politicisation of the public service.
The growing politicisation of the public service has also led to high-profile public
administrators, namely, some Chief Directors and Chief Executive Officers, either to
campaign actively for political parties or to stand for primaries without resigning their
positions, thus compromising their positions as public administrators and giving the
public service a negative image and reputation. Sometimes, depending on who was in
power, they were either asked or forced to resign before they contested the elections.
This growing politicisation of the public service is not new because the trend has been
there since independence in 1957 (Ayee, 2011a, 2013).
The politicisation has led to a further vulnerability of public administrators and the
influence of politicians exercising the power to punish and reward. The intimidating
influence of politicians and the power imbalance between them and public administra-
tors have made most public administrators cowed or petrified into submission. The
mentality that the ‘politician is always right while the public administrator is always
wrong’ has created an atmosphere of fear and frustration among some public adminis-
trators. Even though Article 191 of the 1992 Ghanaian Constitution protects public
administrators against victimisation or discrimination for having discharged their duties
faithfully in accordance with the Constitution or dismissal or removal from office or
reduced in rank or otherwise punished without just cause, in practice there is no guaran-
tee against this insulation as some public administrators suffer in one way or another
from these injustices when there is a change of government, or they have fallen out of
favour, or when they have been perceived to have displeased the appointing authority.
In other words, in spite of the constitutional protection, when there is a conflict between
a politician and public administrator, it is the public administrator who bears the brunt,
not the politician. This shows the highly intense political environment within which the
public administrator works (Ayee, 2013).
The NPM reforms introduced in Ghana and South Africa were meant to lessen the
role of political leaders but have resulted in greater political intervention in the day-
to-day management of government, and a weakening of depoliticised, professional
managers within the public service. The politicisation of the public service and the
concomitant lack of capacity have undermined a developmental public administration in
the two countries. The bureaucracy therefore lacks the attributes of flexibility and
competence and has not been able to forge business alliances and direct state interven-
tions in the economy, or protect itself from particularistic private sector interests, but it
is also strong enough to cooperate with the same in a productive manner. Furthermore,
it lacks the ability to build strong government–business–civil society relationships and
is unable to increase engagement with citizens through the provision and delivery of
value for money services. The political–bureaucratic interface can be managed if
272 J. R. A. Ayee
bureaucrats ‘rule’, politicians ‘reign’. Their function is not to make policy but to create
space for the bureaucracy to manoeuvre in while also acting as a ‘safety valve’ by
forcing the bureaucracies to respond to the needs of the groups upon which the stability
of the system rests, that is, to maintain the relative autonomy of the state while preserv-
ing political stability (Wade, 1990).
It is instructive to note that in the recent policy documents of both countries, there is
an acknowledgement that the political and administrative interface needs to be drasti-
cally improved before there can be progress with the developmental state paradigm. For
instance, the National Development Plan of South Africa of 2011 has conceded that the
political–administrative interface needs clarification to ensure a clearer separation
between the roles of the political principal and the administrative head. The current
emphasis on ‘political deployment needs to be replaced by a focus on building a profes-

sional public service that serves government, but is also sufficiently autonomous to be
insulated from political patronage’ (Republic of South Africa, 2011, p. 365). Similarly,
in Ghana, ‘The Concept Note for the Implementation of the New Approach to Public
Sector Reform Programme’ of the current NDC government refers to ‘a transformed
public service that will serve as a potent instrument for bringing about great, dynamic
and capable developmental orientation in Ghana, in order to better respond to the needs
of society and share its values, challenges and aspirations, as well as equip her for glo-
bal competitiveness’ (Republic of Ghana, n.d., p. 2).
Appointment on merit can contribute greatly to eradicating patronage in the public
service. Olowu (2002, p. 10) argues that those countries that put a meritocracy in
place are better equipped to advance on management reforms. Similarly, Adam-
olekun (2004, pp. 7–8) states that a merit-based public service helps enhance the
efficiency and productivity of an administrative system. This suggestion does not
imply the introduction of a classical notion of political neutrality as it has been
argued that governments should have the right to appoint senior managers who share
their ideological beliefs, provided that they have managerial competence (Cameron,
2003).
Production-oriented Private Sector

Both countries have shown commitment to building the private sector as an engine of
growth in their policies and programmes. South Africa’s economy is dominated by what
Ben Fine (2010, p. 174) refers to as a ‘minerals-energy complex … which is an integral
partnership between the state and private capital and an equally integral connection
between a core set of activities around mining and energy, straddling the public/private
divide’. Private sector interests are promoted given the number of conglomerates, espe-
cially in the mining sector. To build a black entrepreneurial class and reverse the legacy
of racialised economic opportunity, the project of Black Economic Empowerment
(BEE) has been initiated. This project is to ensure that a quarter of the private economy
is owned by black South Africans. However, the project has been criticised for its con-
sumption of resources, the non-strategic pattern of decision-making, patronage and con-
flict of interest (Butler, 2010). In Ghana, governments have designed programmes to
energise the private sector. They include Golden Age of Business, the declaration of
2005 as a ‘Business Friendly Year’ and presidential special initiatives in areas such as
garments and textiles and cassava.
In spite of the interventions to promote private sector growth, they have not been
able to direct the behaviour of private investment—one of the trademarks of the devel-
opmental state. There has not been a very concerted programme of industrial expansion
and diversification even though South Africa’s progress is far better than that of Ghana.
The primary purpose of state intervention is to create state–private sector partnerships
and promote the interests of the business sector, and create conditions for capital accu-
mulation and productivity improvement. This has not happened as expected, even
though one is quick to concede that the private sector in South Africa is doing better
than the Ghanaian one in terms of the creation of an enabling environment. The private
sector in Ghana faces the following challenges: ineffective national strategic agenda;
capable but non-responsive public sector; unpredictable macroeconomic conditions;
unreliable and expensive infrastructural services; unpredictable legal and regulatory

regimes; inadequate managerial skills; inadequate capital base; poor entrepreneurial ori-
entation; obsolete technology; generally low productivity; pervasive corruption; and
poor market access (Republic of Ghana, 2010).
A common problem that faces South Africa and Ghana, however, is in the area of
the provision of infrastructure such as electricity and water. Even though South Africa
has problems with electricity and water, especially in the rural townships, those of
Ghana are worse. Electricity load-shedding and erratic water supply have bedevilled the
country, thereby affecting the private sector. It is instructive to note that even though
Ghana has six institutions (namely, Volta River Authority (VRA), Electricity Company
of Ghana (ECG), Ghana Grid Company (GridCo), Northern Electricity Development
Company (NEDCO), Abu Dhabi National Energy Company PJSC (TAQA) and Asogli)
producing electricity, they cannot be compared favourably with ESCOM, the only insti-
tution producing electricity in South Africa. It has been pointed out that electricity and
water do not go off in a developmental state, or at least they are developmental out-
comes that are to be avoided (Fine, 2010).
Effective National Development Planning

This refers to the design of comprehensive, strategic and long-term plans and indicators
of monitoring and evaluating them. It also entails the creation of an effective and viable
central planning agency to be the ‘brain and engine’ of development planning. Both
Ghana and South Africa have a history of development planning behind them. How-
ever, Ghana today does not have a comprehensive and long-term national development
plan. In the words of the Report of the Constitution Review Commission:
… besides Vision 2020, all the development plans Ghana has had since independence have
been short to medium-term plans lasting no more than a couple of years. These plans have
on occasion been further shortened by unexpected regime changes or truncated due to
resource scarcity, the diversion of funds, the misappropriation of funds or cash flow prob-
lems. (Republic of Ghana, 2011, p. 38)
South Africa, however, has a comprehensive and long-term national development plan
that was launched in 2012 and which has a vision of taking the country to achieve
developmental state status in 2030.
274 J. R. A. Ayee
Even though the two countries have had plans, their implementation has been
problematic, mainly due to a lack of political and bureaucratic commitment and support,
inadequate capacity of agencies and adverse international economic order (Cameron,
2010; Ayee, 2011a).
Both countries have a planning agency, which in Ghana is called the National Devel-
opment Planning Commission (NDPC), while the South African one is called the
National Planning Commission (NPC). The NPC is not a government department. It
consists of 26 people appointed by the President to advise on issues affecting long-term
development and chaired by a Minister at the Presidency. This is seen as giving the
NPC the ‘license to be honest, bold, cut through the silos of government and take on
board the views of all South Africans’ (Republic of South Africa, 2011, p. 2). The
NDPC, on the other hand, was created by Articles 86 and 87 of the 1992 Constitution
and set up by the National Development Planning Commission Act, 1994 (Act 479)
and the National Development Planning (Systems) Act, 1994 (Act 480). It has 37 nomi-
nated and ex officio members. Unlike the South African NPC, the NDPC functions as a
unit of the Office of the President tasked with the onerous responsibility of making pro-
posals for development plans, and monitoring, evaluating and coordinating the nation‘s
development agenda. The neutrality and sometimes effectiveness of the two commis-
sions have been the subject of debate as some scholars feel that the power of the Presi-
dent to appoint makes the commission members not politically insulated enough and
that in some cases they have been under pressure to satisfy the whims and caprices of
the government in power. In addition, capacity challenges have also been identified as
hampering the work of the two bodies (Cameron, 2010; Ayee, 2011a).
Expansion of Human Capacity

This involves investment in social policy programmes such as quality education, health
care, economic and social infrastructure and land reform. I have already made the point
that the provision of infrastructure, especially uninterrupted water and electricity supply,
has been a big challenge for the two countries, especially Ghana. Basic service delivery
in both countries is relatively poor, sporadic and irritating. Both countries have formu-
lated strategies aimed at meeting the Millennium Development Goals. Ghana’s progress
towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals is described as mixed
(Ayee, 2011b), while South Africa’s is behind schedule, especially dealing with the
scourge of HIV/AIDS and school enrolment targets (von Holdt, 2010). Job creation and
the diversification of the economy are big challenges for both countries in spite of strat-
egies designed and initiated. Agrarian and housing issues have dominated discussion in
both countries and have been the rallying point for the opposition and civil society
organisations (Cameron, 2009; Ayee, 2011a).
The management of natural resources in both countries has come under the micro-
scope, with arguments being made that revenues from the sector are not welfare
enhancing (Ayee et al., 2011). Expectations of returns from the natural resources sector
have been particularly high at the community level in the two countries and have
caused frustration among the youth in the communities and tension or rivalries among
the various mining communities. In South Africa, for instance, a mine workers’ strike
in the town of Marikana over wages led to the death of 45 people, including two
policemen. Social ills apart from the wage demand fuelled the unrest:
Marikana township constructed by Lonmin did not have electricity for more than one
month, and at a nearby RDP township broken drains were spilling into [the] river … In
Marikana there are broken sewage systems, bilharzia in the water, children are getting sick
… lack of educational facilities and training, environmental pollution … Many mine work-
ers rented shacks in informal settlements and live in appalling conditions. All these led to
tension in the communities and high youth discontent. (Macleod, 2012, pp. 2–3)
The lesson from the tragedy for the two countries is that mining companies should live
up to their corporate social responsibility and governments must enforce the mining
laws and regulations.
A requirement of human capacity building is investment in research, science and
technology by the government. On this requirement, South Africa is streets ahead of

Ghana. This is because South Africa has a National Research Foundation that rates
researchers and supports them with grants annually for research.
Good Governance
The 1992 Constitution of Ghana and 1996 Constitution of South Africa and Acts of
the legislature have provided a legal and institutional framework for good gover-
nance. There are constitutional and legal provisions to promote the rule of law,
political and civil liberties and rights, peace, stability, transparency, accountability,
genuine decentralisation and local governance, combat corruption, increase state–
citizen interaction, vibrant civil society organisations, gender balance, and improved
systems, processes and coordination among state institutions at all levels (Republic
of Ghana, 1992; Republic of South Africa, 1996). These are meant to create confi-
dence in leadership, structures and institutions within and outside the two countries.
The two countries have subjected themselves to the African peer review mechanism,
while generally peaceful elections have been held in both countries. Ghana has wit-
nessed an alternation of governments in power in 2001 and 2009. There has been a pro-
liferation of civil society organisations in both countries, which are active and have in
one way or another contributed to policy outcomes. While South Africa has enacted the
Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000, Ghana is yet to do so. There is no death
penalty in South Africa, whereas there is one in Ghana even though significant
advancement has been made in the quest for abolition of the death penalty with the
government’s acceptance of the recommendations of the Constitution Review Commis-
sion that the ‘death penalty in article 13 of the Constitution be completely abolished
and that the penalty be replaced with imprisonment for life. The sanctity of life is a
value so much engrained in the Ghanaian social psyche that it cannot be gambled with
judicial uncertainties’ (Republic of Ghana, 2012, p. 44).
Notwithstanding the progress in good governance, there are still good governance
deficits in both countries. They include the following:
(1) Crime and polarisation of society especially in South African in spite of relative
peace and stability.
(2) Lack of coordination among state agencies and institutions, leading to duplica-
tion, non-performance or buck passing.
(3) Inadequate provision of basic services, such as sanitation, water and electricity.
276 J. R. A. Ayee
(4) Use of excessive force by police, resulting in deaths and injuries, especially in
South Africa.
(5) Lack of transparency and accountability with leaders lacking the commitment
and support to promote them.
(6) Dismissal of people or announcing their replacements before incumbents are
officially informed of changes in their employment status.
(7) Gender-based violence, especially rape, which is rife in South Africa, more so
than in Ghana.
(8) Corruption, which has been acknowledged by anti-corruption agencies in the
two countries, namely, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative
Justice in Ghana and the Public Protector in South African, in spite of the exis-
tence of laws and anti-corruption agencies and other bodies.

(9) Political parties’ violence sometimes leading to politically motivated killings in
South Africa.
(10) Ethnic violence as a result of disputes over chieftaincy and land, which is a
common occurrence in Ghana, and less so in South Africa.
(11) Stories of stigma and discrimination against most-at-risk populations, particu-
larly those who are living with HIV/AIDS (PLHIVs).
(12) Societal discrimination against women and persons with disabilities; ill-treat-
ment of the mentally ill and the horrendous and degrading conditions in prayer
camps—which are the most common option for treatment of the mentally ill—
and psychiatric hospitals, which remain under-resourced, under-staffed and
over-crowded (Cameron, 2003, 2009, 2010; Ayee, 2011a, b).
Even though in some cases governmental leaders in both countries took steps to prose-
cute and punish officials who committed abuses and designed programmes to deal with
the infractions, they have not been enough to deal effectively with most of the deficits
in the promotion and enforcement of the requirements of good governance.
Conclusion
From what has been said so far, there has been modest progress by Ghana and South
Africa towards the achievement of a developmental state status. The road to develop-
mental state status has been slow and bumpy, even though South Africa’s progress,
from available evidence, seems better than that of Ghana. Even though I have painted a
somewhat bleak picture of the progress of the developmental state in both Ghana and
South Africa, there is room for optimism. Achieving the status of a developmental state
is not an end in itself but a means to an end. A note of optimism is that there is recog-
nition in Ghana and South Africa that more work needs to be done if the dream of a
developmental state is to be achieved. There is also a favourable international interest
in the capacity of the state to facilitate development.
What the two countries need to do is to consolidate the gains made and deepen the
process of achieving the developmental state. How can this be done? It can be done
through a number of recommendations.
First, there needs to be a realisation on the part of the key players that building a
developmental state is an expensive venture and depends on the robustness of the fiscal
foundation of the state. The fiscal foundation of the two states, especially Ghana, is
weak, as reflected in the high level of debt-to-GDP ratio, and as a result the resources
are not available for a significant state-led development initiative.
Second, political leadership in both countries should be reminded that they enjoy the
support of their constituencies because they are associated with promoting rapid eco-
nomic growth and providing economic benefits to both the ruling elites and the general
citizenry. Consequently, they must demonstrate high levels of commitment to poverty
reduction and begin to address equity concerns from the early stages of the transforma-
tion process. This is because successful economic performance is the primary source of
their legitimacy. Legitimation occurs from the achievements of the state, not necessarily
the way politicians came to power.
Third, capacity building (including providing the required resources) for the public
service at all levels and the internalisation of strategic ethos must be taken more
seriously in both countries, especially South Africa. It must be well planned, coordi-
nated and sustained, rather than the ad hoc and piecemeal approach that has been
adopted in both countries. In this way, the capacity of technocrats to engage with the
private sector and that of the public service in general will be improved for increased
service provision and delivery.
Fourth, development is a political process. Even though this may seem a truism, it is
often forgotten. The paradigm of a developmental state does not call for centralisation
of power, but decentralisation of power and responsibilities. It requires a diffusion of
power in both the international and national environments. This diffusion of power
enhances the accountability of political elites to their citizens, thereby creating the
motivation for their pursuance of a developmental agenda. Moreover, it increases their
leverage vis-à-vis other domestic and international actors, thereby creating the capacity
and space for them to pursue such human-oriented development.
Finally, consolidating and deepening the good governance agenda in both countries
needs to be re-echoed. Without promoting good governance, it will be difficult to
address inequities in political and socio-economic indicators such as participation,
appointment for public office, recruitment for public service, income and employment.
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The Developmental State Experiment in

oriented private sector; effective national development planning; expansion of human

Rationale for the Choice of Topic

to the construction of a developmental state to restructure the South African economy.

The Developmental State

A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy its ability to

connotations (Chang et al., 1998; Routley, 2012).

Transformational or Development-oriented Leadership

on all fronts remain daunting challenges.

corruption involving themselves and other politicians to anti-corruption agencies for

Developmental Public Administration or Public Service

emphasis on ‘political deployment needs to be replaced by a focus on building a profes-

Production-oriented Private Sector

unreliable and expensive infrastructural services; unpredictable legal and regulatory

Effective National Development Planning

Expansion of Human Capacity

technology by the government. On this requirement, South Africa is streets ahead of

tence of laws and anti-corruption agencies and other bodies.

Challenges (Cape Town: HRSC Press), chapter 9.

tion (Chapter 4). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Economic Planning Mr Seth Terkper on 5 March 2013. Accra: Government Printer.

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