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University of California, Merced
KEN MCRAE
University of J17estern Ontario
MARC F. JOANISSE
University of J17estern Ontario
. .,.~.,... CAMBRIDGE
::: UNIVERSITY PRESS
CHAPTER 12
Lawrence W. Barsalou
and so forth. Similarly, nouns can be com- cognitive processes such as perception and
binatorially rotated through the thematic attention. As we will see, however, concep-
1- roles associated a particular verb, such as tual knowledge permeates every aspect of
11
:o rotating" cake," pizza/1 and "tamale" through cognition from high to low. vVithout knowl-
le the patient role of" eat" (other nouns could edge, any cognitive process would stum-
e, similarly be rotated through other roles for ble into ineffectiveness. There is no such
11
e 11 eat," such as ufork" and fingers," for the thing as a knowledge-free cognitive process.
's instrument): To understand cognition, it is essential to
). In recursion, complex conceptual and understand the conceptual system and its
::I linguistic structures are nested within exist- ubiquitous presence across the spectrum of
1 ing linguistic and conceptual structures. cognitive activities.
When conceptualizing a face, for example,
s people could first conceptualize a head.
3.1 High-level perception
Nested within the conceptualization of the
head, people could then conceptualize the As people interact with the environment
eyes, then the eyeballs, then the irises, and and attempt to achieve goals, the conceptual
so forth. Analogously, people can describe system supports the construction of percep-
this embedded conceptual structure lin- tions. For example, conceptual knowledge
guistically, as in "the head contains the eyes, contributes to the mechanisms that sepa-
which contain eyeballs, which contain irises, rate figure from ground (e.g., Peterson and
and so forth." Embedding conceptual and Gibson, 1994), and also to processes that fill
linguistic structures within other structures in missing regions of incomplete percep-
allows people to construct novel conceptu- tual experiences (e.g., Palmer, 1999; Samuel,
alizations and verbalizations not encoun- 1997). Conceptual knowledge produces
tered previously. anticipation inferences about what is likely
In summary, using combinatoric and to happen next (e.g., Reed and Vinson,
recursive mechanisms, people construct an 1996), and also the specific forms that these
unlimited number of complex represen- anticipations take (e.g., Shiffrar and Freyd,
tations from finite numbers of words and 1993; Stevens et al., 2000). Finally, concep-
concepts. This ability appears to result from tual knowledge helps to predict entities and
a productive system for language that is events likely to be present in the current
closely coupled to a productive system for scene, thereby speeding their categorization
conceptualization. It is generally assumed (e.g., Biederman, 1981; Palmer, 1975; Yeh and
that these two systems have parallel struc- Barsalou, 2006).
ture (e.g., Langacker, 1986). As a result,
constructing linguistic expressions produc-
3.2 Selective attention
tively produces corresponding conceptual
structures. Conversely, constructing con- Once a concept becomes active to construe
ceptualizations productively produces cor- a situation, it controls the distribution of
responding linguistic descriptions. attention across it; For example, when the
concept for a spatial preposition becomes
active (e.g., above), it directs attention to a
3 The conceptual system supports likely region where a focal figure will appear
the spectrum of complex cognitive relative to the ground below. Specifically, the
activities ideal position is for the figure to be aligned
geometrically above the center of the ground,
Researchers often assume that the concep- not too far away. On hearing "the square is
tual system resides in the province of higher above the circle," for example, people gen-
cognition along with language and thought. erally infer that the square is center aligned
Conversely, researchers often assume that above the circle, not too far away. Much
the conceptual system is irrelevant to lower work demonstrates that spatial concepts
TI
!
BARSALOU
direct attention to prototypical locations in Carmichael, Hogan, and vValter, i932; Craik
this manner (e.g., Carlson-Radvansky and and Lockhart, i972; Huttenlocher, Hedges,
Logan, i997; Hayward and Tarr, i995; Logan and Duncan, i991). Rather than solely cap-
and Compton, i996). After reading the word turing perceptual images as does a camera
for a spatial location, the activated spatial or video recorder, the brain encodes images
concept directs attention to the most likely together with concepts that interpret them.
position in the display. As a result, the memory of a stimulus con-
Additional research shows that infer- tains both perceptual and conceptual infor-
ences about function modify these atten- mation. Once a stimulus is encoded, it
tional inferences (e.g., Carlson-Radvansky, becomes stored together with other mem-
Covey, and Lattanzi, i999; Conventry, ories encoded previously with similar con-
i998). Consider the statement "the tooth- ceptual structures. Much work shows that
paste tube is above the toothbrush." If spa- as the number of memories stored with a
tial geometry were the only factor affecting concept increases (i.e., fan), interference
attentional inferences, then a picture of between the memories becomes more
a toothpaste tube centered geometrically severe (e.g., Anderson, i976; Postman and
over a toothbrush should be verified faster Underwood, i973). Finally, concepts further
than when the two objects are not centered become active during memory retrieval to
geometrically. Verification is fastest, how- produce classic reconstruction effects (e.g.,
ever, when the toothpaste tube is positioned Bartlett, i932; Brewer and Treyens, i981).
functionally (not geometrically) over the Thus, concepts enter ubiquitously into all
end of the toothbrush having the bristles. phases of memory processing.
Thus, the concept above does not trigger a
single attentional inference based on ideal-
3.4 Language
ized geometry. Instead, the noun concepts
combined with above during the construc- The semantics of natural language are
tion of propositions jointly determine the closely related to the human conceptual
inference. system. Although lexical meanings are not
identical to concepts, the two have much in
common and influence each other exten-
3. 3 Episodic memory
sively (e.g., Barsalou et al., i993; Marslen-
Besides being central to online process- Wilson, i992; Schwanenflugel, i991). The
ing of the environment, the conceptual access of word meaning can be viewed as
system is central to offline processing in an inferential process. On perceiving a word
memory, language, and thought. In each of such as "bird," retrieving semantic informa-
these complex cognitive activities, process- tion constitutes inferences about the word's
ing a nonpresent situation is often of pri- meaning. American readers are more likely,
mary importance, with perception of the for example, to infer that "bird" means
current environment being suppressed to something having the properties of small,
facilitate processing the imagined situation flies, and sings, rather than something having
(Glenberg, Schroeder, and Robertson, i998). the properties of large, runs, and squawks.
Humans are much more adept at represent- Typically, these meanings are highly context
ing non present situations than other species; dependent, reflecting both the surrounding
with the control of conceptual representa- text and the pragmatics of the communica-
tions via language appearing central to this tive sii:uation (e.g., Barsalou, i999a; Yeh and
ability (e.g., Donald, i993). Barsalou, 2006).
The conceptual system enters into all As the meanings of words become com-
three classic phases of memory activity: bined during the construction of proposi-
encoding, storage, and retrieval. During tions, background conceptual knowledge is
encoding, the conceptual system pro- used extensively. In particular, knowledge
vides diverse forms of elaboration (e.g., of conceptual relations is often central to
THE HUMAN CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM 2 45
integrating word meanings (e.g., Gagne and of background knowledge are retrieved
Shoben, 1997; 'Wisniewski, 1997). For exam- and incorporated into the decision making
ple, integrating the mea_nings of lake and process. Loken, Barsalou, and Joiner (2008)
trout to understand "lake trout" requires document a wide variety of roles that con-
activating knowledge about the relation ceptual processes play in consumer decision
LOCATION (X, Y), whereas integrating making.
the meanings of swinging and vine to under- The conceptual system is also central to
stand "swinging vine" requires activating reasoning. vVhile performing deductive rea-
knowledge about the relation MOTION soning, people do not simply manipulate
(X, Y). abstract logical expressions. Instead, they
Inference production beyond individual appear to manipulate conceptual represen-
words is a well-established aspect of lan- tations about the reasoning domain, thereby
guage comprehension (e.g., Bransford and exhibiting widespread content effects (e.g.,
Johnson, 1973; Schank and Abelson, 1977). Cheng and Holyoak, 1985; Johnson-Laird,
As people comprehend a text, they infer 1983). Conceptual representations are also
considerable amounts of background knowl- central to inductive reasoning, especially
edge not stated explicitly. For example, when it concerns categories (e.g., Medin
comprehenders infer a variety of thematic et al., 2003). Finally, conceptual representa-
roles, such as hearing "Mary pounded a nail tions are central to causal reasoning across
into the wall" and inferring that a hammer a wide variety of domains, including clini-
was used (e.g., McRae, Spivey-Knowlton, cal diagnosis (e.g., Kim and Ahn, 2002) and
and Tanenhaus, 1998). Similarly, when peo- artifact function (e.g., Barsalou, Sloman, and
ple hear the sentence "The surgeon put Chaigneau, 2005).
on gloves before beginning the operation," Problem solving also relies extensively
they are surprised when the next sentence on conceptual processes. Similar to reason-
begins "She was tired from the previous ing, widespread effects of domain-specific
operation," because they make default gen- knowledge occur (e.g., Newell and Simon,
der inferences (e.g., Carreiras et al., 1996). 1972). The same abstract problem can be
In general, the more deeply people compre- difficult to solve when grounded in one
hend a text, the richer the inferences they domain but easy when grounded in another,
produce, not only about thematic roles but depending on the availability of relevant
about explanations and a wide variety of knowledge. Ross (1996) argues further that
other conceptual structures (e.g., Graesser, knowing how to use artifacts for solving
Singer, and Trabasso, 1994). Researchers typ- problems constitutes a significant aspect
ically assume that these rich comprehension of category knowledge. Rather than simply
inferences arise via the conceptual system containing physical features that identify
as relevant conceptual knowledge becomes category members, a category representa-
active. tion contains extensive knowledge about
how to use its exemplars for achieving goals
(also see Barsalou, 1991).
3. 5 Thought
Thought requires extensive use of concep-
3.6 Social and cultural cognition
tual representations. As people perform
decision making, reasoning, and problem The conceptual system plays extensive roles
solving, conceptual representations become in sociai cognition (e.g., Fiske and Taylor,
activated as the objects of thought. During 1991; Kunda, 1999). During social interac-
decision making, the choice objects under tion, people use socia.l knowledge to catego-
consideration are represented conceptu- rize perceived individuals into social groups.
ally (e.g., Markman and Medin, 2002). As Stereotypes for these groups can be viewed
possible choice objects are evaluated, fea- as conceptual representations that have been
tures, relations, values, and diverse forms distorted by various sources of background
BARSALOU
knowledge. Once a perceived individual has wider variety is possible. A relatively generic
been assigned to a social category, rich infer- description of each approach will serve to
ences (attributions) result about the causes illustrate it.
of the person's behavior, their mental state,
and likely actions. Self-concepts constitute
4.1 GOFAI theories
another central form of conceptual knowl-
edge in the social domain. GO FAI theories of the conceptual system
Although the basis of a culture can be originated in artificial intelligence during
localized in its artifacts, activities, organi- the cognitive revolution (e.g., Haugeland,
zations, and institutions to a considerable i985). To represent knowledge in comput-
extent, it can also be localized in concep- ers, artificial intelligence researchers devel-
tual knowledge of these external entities oped new representation languages based
(e.g., Shore, i996). Cultural transmission on predicate calculus (e.g., Charniak and
can be viewed, in part, as the propagation McDermott, i985; Newell and Simon, i972).
of conceptual knowledge from generation Typically, these representation languages
to generation, along with the transmission included predicates to represent conceptual
of other things, such as skills. Much recent relations, arguments that become bound to
work illustrates that different conceptual values, and recursive nesting that embeds
knowledge produces major cognitive and predicates within predicates (e.g., Barsalou,
behavioral differences among cultures (e.g., i992). Reflecting the goals of knowledge
Atran, Medin, and Ross, 2005). engineering, the GO FAI representation of
a concept typically contains an extensive
amount of information, such that a given
4 Theories of the conceptual system concept contains many propositions, If a
computer is to have sufficient knowledge
Three approaches to theorizing about the for understanding language, answering ques-
conceptual system enjoy varying degrees of tions, and solving problems, its knowledge
acceptance in psychology, cognitive science, must be extensive.
and cognitive neuroscience. The most tra- In contrast, psychological versions of
ditional theories, and perhaps still the most GO FAI theories are typically much sparser,
dominant, originated in what Haugeland reflecting the goal of testing psychological
(1985) dubbed "GOFAI" for Good Old models in a controlled and rigorous man-
fashioned Artificial Intelligence. In partic- ner. Thus, psychological versions likely con-
ular, the theory of semantic memory con- siderably underestimate the complexity of
stitutes perhaps the best known and most naturally occurring conceptual representa-
widely accepted view of the conceptual sys- tions (e.g., Barsalou and Hale, i993). Two
tem. Connectionist theories constitute a sec- general subclasses of the GOFAI approach
ond major class of theories. This approach have dominated theories of the concep-
reflects an increasing appreciation of neu- tual system and continue to do so: semantic
ral mechanisms and statistical processing, memory and exemplar models. The seman-
both relatively absent in GOFAI theories. tic memory view, in particular, continues to
Simulation, embodied, and situated theo- constitute the primary way that research-
ries constitute the most recent class. ·while ers in many communities think about the
incorporating neural and statistical mecha- conceptual system. Researchers across psy-
nisms, they further emphasize the brain's chology, ,cognitive science, and cognitive
modality-specific systems, the body, and the neuroscience implicitly adopt the semantic
environment. memory framework when they must address
Each of these three approaches is knowledge in their respective research areas.
described next. Within each approach, a Semantic memory and exemplar models are
wide variety of models exists, and an even each addressed in turn.
THE HUl;lAN CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM 2 47
1 SEMANTIC MEMORY
in the modalities and for the environmental
f~~ construct of semantic memory arose entities they represent.
from a proposed distinction between seman- Representations in semantic memory
tic and episodic memory (Tulving, 1972). are also generally assumed to be relatively
Specific examples in~l~de the network mod- abstract and decontextualized. In the typi-
els of Collins and Quillian (1969), Collms and cal theory, the representation of a category
Loftus (1975), and Glass and Holyoak (1975). is a prototype or rule that distills relatively
As Hollan (1975) notes, prototype and other invariant properties from exemplars. Lost in
feature set models (e.g., Reed, 1972; Rosch the distillation are idiosyncratic properties of
and Mervis, 1975) are roughly equivalent to exemplars and background situations. Thus
their network counterparts, together form- the representation of chair might be a decon-
>ed ing a more general class of semantic mem- textualized prototype that includes seat, back,
nd ory models. Thus, semantic network, feature and legs, with idiosyncratic properties and
'2). list, and prototype models will be subsumed background situations filtered out. Although
~es here under the larger rubric of semantic functional properties may be extracted and
ial memory. For further review of these models, stored, they typically tend to be decontex-
to see Smith (i978). tualized invariants, not detailed informa-
els Following Tulving's classic proposal, tion about specific situations. The resulting
semantic memory is widely viewed as mod- representations have the flavor ofdetached
. · ular, that is, as an autonomous system sepa- encyclopedia descriptions in a database of
rate from the episodic memory system. Less categorical knowledge about the world.
explicitly, but equally true, semantic mem- Similar to being decontextualized,
n ory is also viewed widely as separate from semantic memory representations are typ-
a the brain's modality-specific systems. It is ically viewed as relatively stable. For a given
e generally assumed that semantic memory · category, these theories assume that differ-
does not share representation and process- ent people share roughly the same repre-
ing mechanisms with perception, action, sentation, and that the same person uses the
and interoception,' but is instead a relatively same representation on different occasions.
f independent system with its own principles Finally, semantic memory models excel
of representation and processing. in implementing the basic operations of
One of these distinguishing principles propositions and productivity described
is representational format, namely, repre- earlier. Because the representations in these
sentations in semantic memory are widely models typically include predicates whose
viewed as amodal. Rather than being rep- arguments become bound to values, with
resentations in modality-specific systems, the potential for predicates to embed recur-
semantic memory representations are typ- sively, they naturally implement proposi-
ically viewed as redescriptions of modality- tions and productivity. Although semantic
specific states in an amodal representation memory models can implement categori-
language, namely, one that lacks modality- zation and inference using prototypes· and
specific qualities. For example, the concep- definitions, they have been widely criticized
I
tual representation of the visual property as being too abstract and rigid in how they
red is an amodal symbol that stands for perform these basic operations. Typically,
perceptual states of red in the visual sys- . semantic memory models are not sensitive
tem and their physical counterparts in the to the details of exemplars and situations
world. In general, amodal representations in and do not contain adaptive mechanisms
semantic memory stand for representations that implement learning.
'
BARSALOU
a strong competitor to semantic memory to assume that all exemplar memories for
models. Many important variants of the a category are accessed every time the cate-
basic exemplar model have been developed, gory is processed. Although an exemplar set
including Nosofsky (1984), Heit (1998), and can be very large, its constant application
Lamberts (1998). Exemplar models are across different occasions is relatively stable,
included within the broader class of GOFAI with all exemplars being applied. Exemplar
models because they tend to use standard models that sample small subsets of exem-
symbolic notation for expressing the prop- plars, on the other hand, are dynamic (e.g.,
erties of exemplars, unlike connectionist Barsalou, Huttenlocher, and Lamberts, 1999;
theories and simulation/embodied/situated Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997).
theories, which use statistical and neural ·where exemplar models excel is in cat-
representation languages. egorization. Because extensive detail about
Architecturally, exemplar models tend to a category is stored - both in terms of idi-
be modular in that exemplar knowledge is osyncratic exemplar properties and back-
again assumed implicitly to reside in mem- ground situations - these models are highly
ory stores outside the brain's modality-spe- accurate during categorization and can
cific systems. Similar to semantic memory adapt quickly to changing category infor-
models, redescriptions in an amodal rep- mation. Although exemplar models have
resentation language typically capture the not been developed to explain inference,
content of exemplar memories, standing in they can in principle produce highly accu-
for the modality-specific states experienced rate inferences following categorization,
originally. again because of the large amounts of infor-
Notably, however, some exemplar mation stored and the context-specificity
models view exemplar representations as of retrieval processes that operate. on it.
implicit memories in modality-specific sys- ·where exemplar models are weakest is on
tems (e.g., Brooks, 1978; Jacoby and Brooks, symbolic operations. Thus far, this approach
1984; cf. Roediger and McDermott, 1993). has not attempted to implement predicates,
According to this approach, for example, arguments, and recursion, and therefore
an exemplar for a visual category is stored does not implement the basic operations of
as a visual memory in the visual system, propositions and productivity.
not as an amodal description outside it.
Exemplar models that store exemplars in
modality-specific systems can be construed
+2 Connectionist theories
as nonmodular, given that common repre- Feedforward connectionist networks con-
sentations underlie both conceptual and stitute a relatively recent but increasingly
modality-specific processing. influential theory of the conceptual system.
·where exemplar models differ most from For general accounts of feedforward nets, see
semantic memory models is on abstraction Rumelhart, Hinton, and vVilliams (1986) and
and decontextualization. ·whereas seman- Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2002). For specific
tic memory models distill properties across applications of the foedforward architecture
exemplars and store them as abstractions to representing conceptual knowledge, see
(e.g., prototypes and rules), exemplar mod- Hinton (1989), Kruschke (1992), Rumelhart
els simply store exemplar memories, thereby and Todd (1993), Tyler et al., (2000), and
capturing idiosyncratic information about Rogers and McClelland (2004). A variety of
category instances along with details about other c6nnectionist architectures have also
the situations in which they occur. been used to model the conceptual system,
Perhaps counterintuitively, exemplar which are not addressed here (e.g., Cree,
models tend to assume that category rep- McRae, and McNorgan, 1999; Farah and
resentations are relatively stable, much like McClelland, 1991; Humphreys and Forde,
semantic memory models. Stability exists in 2001; McClelland and Rumelhart, 1985;
most exemplar models because they tend Rumelhart et al., 1986).
THE HU~IAN CONCEPTUAL SYSTE~I 2 49
Because extensive detail about a category cognitive linguistics adopts similar views
is stored - both in terms of idiosyncratic (e.g., Fauconnier, 1985; Lakoff and Johnson,
exemplar properties and background situ- 1980, 1999; Langacker, 1986; Talmy, 1983), but
ations - feedforward nets are highly accu- have not yet typically drawn strong connec-
rate during categorization, and can adapt tions to cognitive and neural mechanisms
quickly to changing category information. (although see Gallese and Lakoff, 2005).
For the same reason, feedforward nets pro- All of these approaches assume that the
duce highly accurate inferences following conceptual system is nonmodular. Rather
categorization. ·where connectionist models than having separate systems for modality-
are weakest (like exemplar models) is on specific and conceptual processing, a com-
symbolic operations (Fodor and Pylyshyn, mon representational system is assumed
1988). Although some attempts have been to underlie both. According to this view,
made to implement predicates, arguments, conceptual processing relies heavily on
and recursion (e.g., Pollack, 1990; Smolensky, modality-specific simulations to represent
1990), these approaches have not been categories (for more detail on the simula-
widely accepted as plausible psychological tion process, see Barsalou, 1999b; 2003a).
or neural accounts of the conceptual system. A consequence of this nonmodular archi-
So far, connectionism has not succeeded in tecture is that conceptual representations
convincing the cognitive psychology, cog- are modal, not amodal. The same types of
nitive science, and cognitive neuroscience representations underlie perception and
communities that this approach explains conception. When the conceptual system
the basic conceptual operations of proposi- represents an object's visual properties, it
tions and productivity. uses representations in the visual system;
when it represents the actions performed
on an object, it uses motor representations.
4. 3 Simulation, embodiment, and situated
Depending on the distribution of modalities
theories·
on which people experience a category, a
Recent theories have focused on the roles particular distribution of modality-specific
of modality-specific simulation, embodi- information becomes established for it (e.g.,
ment, and situations in conceptual process- vision and taste for fruit versus vision and
ing. Damasio (1989) 1 Martin (2001), Barsalou action for tools; Cree and McRae, 2003).
(1999b; 2003a), and Simmons and Barsalou Although perception and conception
(2003) focus on modality-specific simulation. are similar in this framework, they are not
Glenberg (1997) and Barsalou et al. (2003) identical. Whereas bottom-up mechanisms
focus on embodiment. Barsalou (1999a; dominate the activation of modality-spe-
2003b; 2005) and Barsalou, Niedenthal et al. cific systems during perception, top-down
(2003) focus on situations. Although these mechanisms dominate during conception.
approaches differ somewhat in emphasis, Furthermore, the representations acti-
they all assume that the conceptual sys- vated in conception are partial .reenact-
tem specifically and cognition in general are ments of modality-specific states, and may
grounded in the brain's modality-specific often exhibit bias and reconstructive error.
systems, in the body, and in the environ- Nevertheless, perception and conception
ment. According to these approaches, the are far from being modular autonomous
cognitive system is not self-sufficient but systems.
depends in important ways on its ground- The claim is not that modal reenactments
ings. Indeed, these approaches assume that constitute the sole form of conceptual rep-
grounding mechanisms are central parts of resentation. As Simmons and Barsalou
the cognitive system, not merely a periph- (2003) suggest, representations in the brain's
eral interface. For a recent collection of association areas also play a role, perhaps
papers on this approach, see Pecher and somewhat analogous to the hidden unit
Zwaan (2005). Much additional work in representations in connectionist nets. This is
THE HUMAN CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM
iews consistent with the widespread finding that (1991; 2003b), ad hoc and goal-derived cat-
ison, other factors influence conceptual process- egories develop to bind roles in action
, but ing besides the modalities (e.g., statistical schemata with their instantiations in the
nec- strength, correlation, and uniqueness; Cree environment. As systems of these mappings
isms and McRae, 2003; Tyler et al., 2000). Thus, develop, the conceptual system becomes
the claim is simply that modal simula- organized around the action-environment
the tions are one important and widely utilized interface.
th er form of -representation during conceptual
lity- processing. 4· 3.1 COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS
om- Regarding abstraction and stability, this Three common misconceptions arise fre-
ned approach assumes that conceptual repre- quentlyaboutsimulation/embodied/situated
levv, sentations are dynamic and situated. Rather views. One is that they are purely empiricist
on than being a single abstracted representation with no nativist contributions. Although
;ent for a category, a concept is a skill for con- extreme empiricist views are possible and
1la- structing idiosyncratic representations tai- sometimes taken, there is no a priori reason
lored to the current needs of situated action why strong genetic constraints could not
:hi- (Barsalou, 2003b). Actually, Barsalou, et al. underlie a system that relies heavily on sim-
ons (2003) advocate discarding the use of concept ulation, embodiment, and situatedness. For
: of altogether and replacing it with accounts of example, specific simulations could in prin-
ind the specific mechanisms that represent cat- ciple be determined genetically. More plau-
em egories. In this spirit, Barsalou (1999b; 2003a) sibly, however, strong genetic constraints
' it proposes the construct of a simulator as a may exist on the mechanisms that capture
:m; distributed neural mechanism that con- and implement simulations. In this spirit,
1ed structs an infinite set of specific simulations Simmons and Barsalou (2003) propose that
ns. to represent a category, property, or relation the association and feature areas underlying
ies dynamically. Thus, the simulator for chair simulations reflect constraints on categories
,a can construct many simulations of differ- that developed over the course of evolution
fie ent chairs, from different perspectives, used (also see Caramazza and Shelton, 1998).
g., for different purposes, reflecting the agent's A second common misconception about
nd current goal and situation. simulation/embodied/situated approaches
A given simulation is assumed to repre- is that they necessarily implement·record-
)fl sent more than the focal category of ing systems and cannot implement concep-
ot interest. Additional information about tual systems for interpreting the world. As
ns background settings, goal-directed actions, Barsalou (1999b; 2003a) proposes, however,
e- and introspective states is also assumed to modality-specific systems can implement
rn be included, making simulations situated basic conceptual operations, such as cate-
n. (e.g., Barsalou, 1999a, 2003b, 2005; Barsalou, gorization, inference, propositions, and pro-
i- Niedenthal, et al., 2003). On a given occa- ductivity. The essential idea is that selective
t- sion, a specific simulation is tailored to the attention extracts information about the
1y computational and pragmatic demands of components of experience to establish sim-
•f. the current situation. Thus, the conceptual ulators for these components. Once these
n system is dynamic and situated, similar to simulators exist for object, events, mental
IS feedforward nets, but with modal represen- · states, relations, properties, and so forth, the
tations instead of amodal ones. argument is that they naturally implement
:s A related theme is that the conceptual basic conceptual operations.
system is organized around situated action A third common misconception is that
l (cf Glenberg, 1997). A fundamental prob- abstract concepts cannot be represented in
s lem in situated action is mapping action simulation/embodied/situated approaches.
s effectively into the world, and one possibil- Various researchers, however, have argued
t ity is that the conceptual system develops to that mechanisms within this approach are
facilitate this process. According to Barsalou capable of representing these concepts.
BARSALOU
For example, Lakoff and Johnson (1980; approach to cognitive linguistics rests on
1999) propose that abstract concepts are this assumption, namely, the linguistic sys-
grounded metaphorically in concrete con- tem serves as an instrument for controlling
cepts (but see Murphy, 1996 for a critique). the conceptual system.
Alternatively, Barsalou (1999b) and Barsalou Increasing empirical research suggests
and vVieiner-Hastings (2005) propose that that both the linguistic and conceptual sys-
abstract concepts are grounded in situated tems are active as people perform concep-
simulations, just like concrete concepts, but tual tasks (see Glaser, 1992 for a provocative
focus on different situational content, espe- review). Depending on task materials (e.g.,
cially on interoceptions and events. words versus pictures) and task conditions
(e.g., superficial versus deep processing),
4-3·2COMPUTATIONAL conceptual processing relies on varying mix-
IMPLEMENTATION tures of the linguistic and conceptual sys-
One major limitation of the simulation/ tems. Further evidence for this view comes
embodied/situated approach to date is the from Solomon and Barsalou (2004) and Kan
relative lack of computational frameworks et al., (2003). In these experiments, subjects
for implementing it. Increasingly, however, used different mbctures of linguistic pro-
implementations are being developed. For cessing and simulation while verifying the
example, Cangelosi and his colleagues have conceptual properties of objects under dif-
recently begun implementing the ground- ferent task conditions. Barsalou et al., (2005)
ing mechanisms in simulation/embodied/ offer further behavioral and neural evidence
situated theories (e.g., Cangelosi, Greco, and that conceptual processing utilizes vary-
Hamad, 2000; Cangelosi et al., 2005; Cangelosi ing mixtures of linguistic processing and
i; and Riga, 2005; Joyce et al., 2003). Also, the simulation.
top-down mechanisms in O'Reilly's neural
net architectures have significant poten-
tial for implementing simulations (e.g., 5 Conclusion
O'Reilly, 1998, 2006). Other recent attempts
to ground computational accounts of cogni- · As reviewed here, three basic accounts of
tion in modality-specific processing include the conceptual system exist in modern cog-
Roy (2005) and Clark and Mendez (2005). nitive psychology, cognitive science, and
Acceptance of the simulation/embodied/sit- cognitive neuroscience: (1) classic GO FAI
uated approach clearly depends on increas- approaches, such as semantic memory and
ing formalization, but there appears to be exemplar models, that utilize amodal sym-
no a priori reason why formalization is not bols in a modular conceptual system; (2) sta-
possible. Given the relative recency of this tistical approaches, such as connectionism
! '
approach, together with the complexity of and neural nets, that implement dynamic
the mechanisms that must be implemented, and situated conceptual representations; (3)
it is not surprising that mature formal simulation/embodied/situated approaches
accounts do not yet exist (for discussion of that ground conceptual knowledge in
these complexities, see Barsalou, 1999b, pp. modality-specific systems, in the body, and
651-2). Of interest will be whether viable in the environment.
computational accounts can be constructed Claiming that significant value exists in
i
in the coming years. all three approaches might seem unduly
'!
l i - diplomatic. To the contrary, however, each
4.3.3RELATIONS BETWEEN LANGUAGE of these approaches has discovered some-
AND SIMULATION thing fundamentally important about the
Finally, several lines of research propose human conceptual system. Classic GOFAI
that the linguistic system is. closely coupled approaches have established the impor-
with the simulation system. As mentioned tance of propositional representations and
earlier, a central tenet of Langacker's (1986) productivity in conceptual processing.
THE HUMAN CONCEPTUAL SYSTEM 2 53
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