G.R. No.

204419, November 07, 2016

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HON. EDMAR P. CASTILLO, SR., AS

PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, APARRI, CAGAYAN AND
JEOFREY JIL RABINO Y TALOZA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA,** J.:

This is to resolve the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court dated November 12, 2012
of petitioner People of the Philippines as represented by Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B.
Sagucio, that seeks to reverse and set aside the Regional Trial Court's (RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan) Joint
Resolution1 dated May 14, 2012 quashing Search Warrant No. 45 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Gattaran, Cagayan and eventually dismissing Criminal Case No. 11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil
Rabino y Taloza.

The facts follow.

On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant
No. 45, which reads, in part, as follows:

SEARCH AND SEIZURE ORDER

TO ANY OFFICER OF THE LAW:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath SPO1 RONEL P.
SATURNO of the Regional Intelligence Division based at Regional Office 2, Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao
City, the applicant herein, and his witness that there is probable cause to believe that a Violation [of] R.A.
9165 Comprehensive Dangerous Drug, has been and is being committed and there are good and sufficient
reasons to believe that JOEFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO, a resident of Rizal Street, Maura, Aparri,
Cagayan has in his possession or control the following items, to wit:

SHABU (Methamphetamine and PARAPHERNALIAS you are hereby ordered to make an

immediate search at any time of the day or night but preferably at daytime at the afore-stated residential
place of JEOFREY JIL RABINO @ JEFF/JEO and its premises and forthwith seize and take possession of
the above-described items to immediately bring him, thereafter, to the undersigned to be dealt with in
accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the December 1, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

WITNESS MY HAND and SEAL this 13th day of January 2012, at Gattaran, Cagayan.2

Thereafter, to effect the above Search and Seizure Order, a search was conducted by elements of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) yielding one
(1) sachet containing residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride inside the house of private respondent
Rabino located in Aparri, Cagayan. When the confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory
Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, the test gave positive result for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.3

Thus, an Information4 dated January 15, 2012 was filed against private respondent Rabino for violation
of Section 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, which reads as follows:

That on or about January 14, 2012, in the Municipality of Aparri, [P]rovince of Cagayan, and within, the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any legal authority thereof, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control and custody
one (1) big zip-lock transparent plastic sachet containing two (2) pieces of transparent plastic sachets
containing white crystalline substance, one sachet with traces of said substance gave POSITIVE results to
the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, commonly known as Shabu, a dangerous
drag, while the other sachet gave negative results to said tests, the said accused knowing fully well and
aware that it is prohibited for any person to possess or use any dangerous drug regardless of the quality of
the purity thereof, unless authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881, the case was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan,
presided by respondent Judge Castillo.
 Before the case was set for arraignment, or on March 13, 2012, private respondent Rabino filed a Motion
to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence with the following grounds:

Search Warrant; Issuing Court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched; No compelling
reason for MTC Gattaran to issue warrant

xxxx

No probable cause to issue Search Warrant

xxxx

No searching question elicited from deponent

x xx x

No particularity in the places to be searched

xxxx

Irregularity in the implementation of the search

x x xx

Suppression of Evidence Just and Proper

The RTC, through respondent Judge Castillo, granted the above motion in its Joint Resolution dated May
14, 2012, which partly reads as follows:

It is indubitable from the foregoing that the minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, which
penalty is way beyond imprisonment of six (6) years. A fortiori, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to
entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45. As such, Search Warrant No. 45 is null
and void. [Corollary] thereto, all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

With the foregoing conclusion, any further discussion on the grounds relied upon by the accused to buttress
his motion and the opposition interposed by the public prosecutor are deemed mere surplusage.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the motion is GRANTED. Search Warrant No. 45 is hereby
ordered QUASHED. Consequently, all evidence obtained in the execution of Search Warrant No. 45 are
likewise ordered SUPPRESSED. There being no more evidence to support them, the Informations in the
above-captioned cases are hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.6

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the same court in its Joint Order7dated
September 24, 2012.

Hence, the present petition.

The issue and arguments raised by petitioner are as follows:

With all due respect, the assailed Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by respondent Judge Castillo with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or is patently erroneous. It is respectfully submitted that
the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue Search Warrant No. 45 earlier mentioned
to search and seize the shabu stated therein in Aparri, Cagayan a place which is within the same second judicial
region in violation of R.A. 9165, notwithstanding the fact that the power to hear and try the offense is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

Private respondent, on the other hand, in his Comment8 dated January 25, 2016, claims that the petition
was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He also argues that the petition should have been filed
by the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, and not petitioner Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Carlos B, Sagucio. Lastly, private respondent insists that the petition does not show that the assailed Joint
Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

This Court finds merit to the petition.

 Before proceeding with the discussion on the substantial issue raised in the petition, certain procedural
issues have been pointed out by private respondent that need to be tackled. According to the private respondent,
the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed by petitioner before this Court must be struck down as it violates
the doctrine on hierarchy of courts. Private respondent further argues that petitioner did not provide any
compelling reason that would merit the direct filing with this Court of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It
is also averred that the petition should have been filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and not the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor because the petition is in the nature of an appeal and the former is vested with the power of
representing the people before any court.

Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is proper when (1) any tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and (2) there is no appeal, nor plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding.9 Grave
abuse of discretion exists when there is an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or
personal hostility; or a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal
to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down
as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. 10 On the
other hand, a remedy is considered "plain, speedy and adequate" if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the
injurious effects of the judgment the acts of the lower court or agency.11 Its principal office is only to the inferior
court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.12

The special civil action for certiorari is the proper recourse availed of by petitioner in questioning the
quashal of the search warrant as the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge that ordered
the said quashal. In his allegation that the judge misapplied the rules on jurisdiction or on the proper courts
authorized to issue a search warrant, petitioner has shown that the quashal of the search warrant was patently and
grossly done. In any case, the Court had allowed even direct recourse to this Court 13 or to the Court of
Appeals14 via a special civil action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search warrant.15 The general
rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. Howevever, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed
directly before it.16 In this case, since the pivotal issue raised by petitioner involves an application of a rule
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution17 regarding the
jurisdiction of courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant, this Court deems it proper to resolve the present
petition.

As such, even if the petitioner in this case, representing the People, is only the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor and not the Office of the Solicitor General, such technicality can be relaxed in the interest of justice.
The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is
in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice
and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must always be avoided.18 It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than
dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy
disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice. 19 In certain cases, this
Court even allowed private complainants to file petitions for certiorari and considered the said petitions as if filed
by the Office of the Solicitor General. In United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip,20 this Court ruled that an exception
exists to the general rule that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court assailing any adverse
order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, thus:

The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of
the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia
Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the
RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG. The Court in the said case
even held that the petitioners therein could argue its case in lieu of the OSG:
 From the records, it is clear that, as complainants, petitioners were involved in the proceedings which led
to the issuance of Search Warrant No. 23. In People v. Nano, the Court declared that while the general rule
is that it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People
or the Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals, if
there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed
filed by the private complainants therein as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. In line with this ruling,
the Court gives this petition due course and will allow petitioners to argue their case against the questioned
order in lieu of the Solicitor General.

The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the
Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions
filed directly before it. In this case, the Court has opted to take cognizance of the petition, considering the nature of
the issues raised by the parties.

Therefore, if this Court had previously considered the petitions filed by private complainants and deemed
them as if filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, there is no reason to disallow the petition herein filed by
the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.

Anent the main issue as to whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search warrant
involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction, this Court answers in the affirmative.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:

SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest
shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable
cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn or
affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify
on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the
things to be seized.22 Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the
search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the
search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. 23chanrobleslaw

The respondent RTC judge, in this case, quashed the search wan-ant and eventually dismissed the case based
merely on the fact that the seerch warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan proceeding from a
suspected violation of R.A. 9165 or The Dangerous Drugs Act, an offense which is beyond the jurisdiction of the
latter court. It is therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his motion to
quash are devoid of any merit. By that alone, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the
search warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must be remembered that a search warrant is valid
for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its
elements are found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within
the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.

Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region
where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran,
Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the
application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region. The fact that the search
warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter
was found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court was duly complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant
must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the
offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in
the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its
original jurisdiction.24 Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a
search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the
requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dated November 12,
2012, of petitioner People of the Philippines is GRANTED. Consequently, the Joint Resolution dated May 14,
2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, insofar as it quashed Search Warrant No. 45 issued
by the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Criminal Case No.
11-10881 against private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126379. June 26, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by Provincial Prosecutor FAUSTINO T.

CHIONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE CAESAR CASANOVA, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 80, Malolos, Bulacan, AZFAR HUSSAIN, MOHAMMAD SAGED,
MUJAHID KHAN, MOHAMMAD ASLAM, and MEHMOOD ALI, respondents.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

In behalf of the People, the Solicitor General has perfected the appeal at bar under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court from the Decision promulgated on September 11, 1996 of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals.[1] Said judgment dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari to invalidate (i) the order of Judge Caesar
A Casanova of Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court dated February 9 1996,[2] as well as (ii) that dated May 28,
1996 denying the Peoples motion for reconsideration.[3] Those orders were handed down in Criminal Case No.
43-M-96, a case of illegal possession of explosives after the accused had been arraigned and entered a plea of not
guilty to the charge. More particularly, the Order of February 9, 1996:

1) quashed a search warrant (No. 1068 [95]) issued by Judge Marciano I. Bacalla of Branch 216 of the
Regional Trial Court at Quezon City on December 15, 1995,[4]

2) declared inadmissible for any purpose the items seized under the warrant, and

3) directed the turnover of the amount of U.S. $5,750.00 to the Court within five (5) days to be released
thereafter in favor of the lawful owner considering that said amount was not mentioned in the Search
Warrant."

The antecedents, culled from the records by the Appellate Court, are hereunder set out.

1. On December 14, 1995, S/Insp PNP James Brillantes applied for search warrant before Branch 261,
RTC of Quezon City against Mr. Azfar Hussain, who had allegedly in his possession firearms and
explosives at Abigail Variety Store, Apt. 1207 Area F, Bagong Buhay Ave. Sapang Palay, San Jose del
Monte Bulacan.

2. The following day, December 15, 1995, Search Warrant No. 1068 (95) against Mr. Hussain was issued
not at Abigail Variety Store but at Apt. No. 1, immediately adjacent 9to0 Abigail Variety Store resulting
in the arrest of four (4) Pakistani nationals and in the seizure of their personal belongings, papers and
effects such as wallet, wrist watches, pair of shoes, jackets, t-shirts, belts, sunglasses and travelling bags
including cash amounting to $3,550.00 and P1,500.00 aside from US $5,175.00 (receipted) which were
never mentioned in the warrant. The sum of $5,175.00 was however returned to the respondents upon
order of the court on respondents motion or request. Included allegedly are one piece of dynamite stick;
two pieces of plastic explosives C-4 type and one (1) fragmentation grenade. But without the items
described in the search warrant are: (a) three (3) Ingram machine pistols; (b) four (4) gmm pistol; (c)
blasting caps; (d) fuse; (e) assorted chemical ingredients for explosives; and (f) assorted magazine assg
and ammunitions.

3. On December 19, 1995, three days after the warrant was served, a return was made without mentioning
the personal belongings, papers and effects including cash belonging to the private respondents. There
was no showing that lawful occupants were made to witness the search.

4. On January 22,1996, private respondents upon arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged;
** and on the same date, submitted their Extremely Urgent Motion (To Quash Search Warrant and to
Declare Evidence Obtained Inadmissible), dated January 15, 1996;

5. ** According to the private respondents in their pleading (consolidated comment on petition

for certiorari **): On January 29, 1996, an ocular inspection of the premises searched was conducted by
respondent Judge and the following facts had been established as contained in the order dated January 30,
1996** to wit:

1) That the residence of all the accused is at Apartment No. 1 which is adjacent to the Abigails
Variety Store;

2) That there is no such number as 1207 found in the building as it is correspondingly called only
Apartment No. 1, 2, 3, and 4;

3) That Apartment No. 1 is separate from the Abigails Variety Store;

4) That there are no connecting doors that can pass from Abigails Variety Store to Apartment No.
1;

5) That Abigails Variety Store and Apartment No. 1 have its own respective doors used for ingress
and egress.

That there being no objection on the said observation of the Court, let the same be reduced on the
records.

SO ORDERED.

6. On February 9, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order duly granting the motion to quash search
warrant **;[5]

7. On February 12, 1996, private respondents filed the concomitant motion to dismiss **;

8. On February 19, 1996, Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Rolando Bulan filed a motion for reconsideration
and supplemental motion on the order quashing the search warrant**;

9. On February 27, 1996 and March 12, 1996, private respondent filed opposition/comment and
supplemental opposition/comment on the motion for reconsideration **:

10. On May 28, 1996, respondent Judge ** issued its order denying the motion for reconsideration **;
(and on) June 11, 1996, private respondents filed extremely urgent reiterated motion to dismiss**.

Chiefly to nullify Judge Casanovas quashal Order of February 9, 1996 above referred to, the Solicitor
General forthwith commenced a special civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The action did
not prosper, however. As earlier mentioned, the Fourteenth Division of the Appellate Tribunal
promulgated judgment on September 11, 1996, dismissing the case for lack of merit.

The judgment was grounded on the following propositions, to wit:[6]

1. The place actually searched was different and distinct from the place described in the search
warrant. This fact was ascertained by the Trial Judge through an ocular inspection, the findings wherein,
not objected to by the People, were embodied in an order dated January 30, 1996. The place searched, in
which the accused (herein petitioners) were then residing, was Apartment No. 1. It is a place other than
and separate from, and in no way connected with, albeit and adjacent to, Abigails Variety Store, the place
stated in the search warrant.
2. The public prosecutors claim -- that the sketch submitted to Judge Bacalla relative to the application for
a search warrant, actually depicted the particular place to be searched -- was effectively confuted by Judge
Casanova who pointed out that said SKETCH was not dated, not signed by the person who made it and
not even mentioned in the Search Warrant by the Honorable Judge (Bacalla, who) instead ** directed
them to search Abigail Variety Store Apartment 1207 ** in the Order ** dated December 15, 1995 -- this,
too, being the address given in the Application for Search Warrant dated December 14, 1995 requested by
P/SR INSP. Roger James Brillantes, the Team Leader. The untenability of the claim is made more patent
by the Peoples admission, during the hearing of its petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, that said
sketch was in truth not attached to the application for search warrant ** (but) merely attached to the
motion for reconsideration.[7]

Quoted with approval by the Appellate Court were the following observations of Judge Casanova
contained in his Order of May 28, 1996, viz.:[8]

(d)** ** it is very clear that the place searched is different from the place mentioned in the Search
Warrant, that is the reason why even P/SR. INSP Roger James Brillantes, SPO1 Prisco Bella and SPO4
Cesar D. Santiago, who were all EDUCATED, CULTURED and ADEPT to their tasks of being
RAIDERS and who were all STATIONED IN BULACAN were not even able to OPEN THEIR MOUTH
to say in TAGALOG with Honorable Judge who issued the Search Warrant the words KATABI, or
KADIKIT or KASUNOD NG ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE ang papasukin namin or if they happen to
be an ENGLISH speaking POLICEMEN, they were not able to open their mouth even to WHISPER the
ENGLISH WORDS RESIDE or ADJACENT or BEHIND or NEXT to ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE,
the place they are going to raid.**.

3. The search was not accomplished in the presence of the lawful occupants of the place (herein private
respondents) or any member of the family, said occupants being handcuffed and immobilized in the living
room at the time. The search was thus done in violation of the law.[9]

4. The articles seized were not brought to the court within 48 hours as required by the warrant itself; (i)n
fact the return was done after 3 days or 77 hours from service, in violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court.[10]

5. Judge Casanova correctly took cognizance of the motion to quash search warrant, pursuant to the
doctrinal tenets laid down in Nolasco vs. Pao (139 SCRA 152) which overhauled the previous ruling of
the Supreme Court in Templo vs. dela Cruz (60 SCRA 295). It is now the prevailing rule that whenever a
search warrant has been issued by one court or branch thereof and a criminal case is initiated in another
court or branch thereof as a result of the search of the warrant, that search warrant is deemed
consolidated with the criminal case for orderly procedure. The criminal case is more substantial than the
search warrant proceedings, and the presiding Judge in the criminal case has the right to rule on the
search warrant and to exclude evidence unlawfully obtained (Nolasco & Sans cases).

6. Grave abuseof discretion cannot be imputed to the respondent Judge, in light of Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution and Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

7. The proper remedy against the challenged Order is an appeal, not the special civil aciton of certiorari.

The Solicitor General now seeks reversal of the foregoing verdict ascribing to the Court of Appeals the
following errors, to wit:

1) sanctioning the lower Courts precipitate act of disregarding the proceedings before the issuing Court
and overturning the latters determination of probable cause and particularity of the place to be searched;

2) sanctioning the lower Courts conclusion that the sketch was not attached to the application for warrant
despite the clear evidence ** to the contrary;

3) ignoring the very issues raised in the petition before it:

4) holding that the validity of an otherwise valid warrant could be diminished by the tardiness by which
the return is made;

5) hastly applying the general rule that certiorari cannot be made a substitute for appeal although the
circumstances attending the case at bar clearly fall within the exceptions to that rule; and
 6) depriving petitioner of the opportunity to present evidence to prove the validity of the warrant when
the petition before it was abruptly resolved without informing petitioner thereof.

The whole case actually hinges on the question of whether or not a search warrant was validly issued as
regards the apartment in which private respondents were then actually residing, or more explicitly, whether or not
that particular apartment had been specifically described in the warrant.

The Government insists that the police officers who applied to the Quezon City RTC for the search warrant
had direct, personal knowledge of the place to be searched and the things to be seized. It claims tha tone of said
officers, infact, had been able to surreptitiously enter the place to be searched prior to the search: this being the
first of four (4) separate apartments behind the Abigail Variety Store; and they were also the same police officers
who eventually effected the search and seizure. They thus had personal knowledge of the place to be searched
and had the competence to make a sketch thereof; they knew exactly what objects should be taken therefrom; and
they had presented evidence sufficient to establish probable cause. That may be so; but unfortunately, the place
they had in mind -- the first of four (4) separate apartment units (No. 1) at the rear of Abigail Variety Store --
was not what the Judge who issued the warrant himself had in mind, and was not what was ultimately described
in the search warrant.

The discrepancy appears to have resulted from the officers own faulty depiction of the premises to be
searched. For in their application and in the affidavit thereto appended, they wrote down a description of the place
to be searched, which is exactly what the Judge reproduced in the search warrant: premises located at Abigail
Variety Store Apt 1207, Area-F, Bagong Buhay Avenue, Sapang Palay, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. And the
scope of the search was made more particular -- and more restrictive -- by the Judges admonition in the warrant
that the search be limited only to the premises herein described.

Now, at the time of the application for a search warrant, there were at least five (5) distinct places in the
area involved: the store known as Abigails Variety Store, and four (4) separate and independent residential
apartment units. These are housed in a single structure and are contiguous to each other although there are no
connecting doors through which a person could pass from the interior of one to any of the others. Each of the five
(5) places is independent of the others, and may be entered only through its individual front door. Admittedly, the
police officers did not intend a search of all five (5) places, but only one of the residential units at the rear of
Abigails Variety Store: that immediately next to the store (Number 1).

However, despite having personal and direct knowledge of the physical configuration of the store and the
apartments behind the store, the police officers failed to make Judge Bacalla understand the need to pinpoint
Apartment No. 1 in the warrant. Even after having received the warrant -- which directs that the search be limited
only to the premises herein described, Abigail Variety Store Apt 1207 -- thus literally excluding the apartment
units at the rear of the store -- they did not ask the Judge to correct said description. They seem to have simply
assumed that their own definite idea of the place to be searched -- clearly indicated, according to them, in the
sketch they claim to have submitted to Judge Bacalla in support of their application -- was sufficient
particularization of the general identification of the place in the search warrant.

The Solicitor General argues that this assumption is sanctioned by Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff,
[11]
AFP, allegedly to the effect that the executing officers prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant
is relevant, and he may, in case of any ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched, look to the affidavit
in the official court file.

Burgos is inapplicable. That case concerned two (2) search warrants which, upon perusal, immediately
disclosed an obvious typographical error. The application in said case was for seizure of subversive material
allegedly concealed in two places: one at No. 19. Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City; and the other, at "784 Units C
& D. RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City;" Two (2) warrants issued -- No. 20-82 [a] and No. 20-82
[b]). Objection was made to the execution of Warrant No. 20-82 (b) at 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon
Avenue, Quezon City because both search warrants apparently indicated the same address (No. 19, Road 3,
Project 6, Quezon City) as the place where the supposedly subversive material was hidden. This was error, of
course but, as this Court there ruled, the error was obviously typographical, for it was absurd to suppose that the
Judge had issued two warrants for the search of only one place. Adverting to the fact that the application for the
search warrants specified two (2) distinct addresses, and that in fact the address, 784 Units C&D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City appeared in the opening paragraph of Warrant 20-82 (b), this Court concluded that
evidently, this was the address the judge intended to be searched when he issued the second warrant (No. 20-82
[b]); and to clear up the ambiguity caused by the obviously typographical error, the officer executing the warrant
could consult the records in the official court file.[12]
 The case at bar, however, does not deal with the correction of an obvious typographical erro involving
ambiguous descriptions of the place to be searched, as in Burgos, but the search of a place different from that
clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant. In Burgos, the inconsistency calling for
clarification was immediately perceptible on the face of the warrants in question. In the instant case, there is no
ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting
of minds as to the place to be searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and
what was done was to substitute for the place that the judge had written down in the warrant, the premises that
the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It is neither fair nor licit to allow police
officers to search a place different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched --
although not that specified in the warrant -- is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant
and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a search is the
place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs
they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following the officers theory, in the context of the facts
of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear of Abigails Variety Store would have been fair game for a
search.

The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers own
personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the
warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires inter alia the search warrant to
particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the persons or things to be seized. It would concede to
police officers the power of choosing the place to be searched, even if not be that delineated in the warrant. It
would open wide the door to abuse of search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the description of
the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the warrant itself; it cannot be left
to the discretion of the police officers conducting the search.

The Government faults Judge Casanova for having undertaken a review of Judge Bacallas finding of
probable cause, as if he were an appellate court. A perusal of the record however shows that all that Judge
Casanova did was merely to point out inconsistencies between Judge Bacalla' Order of December 15, 1995 and
the warrant itself, as regards the identities of the police officers examined by Judge Bacalla.[13] In Judge
Casanovas view, said inconsistencies, being quite apparent in the record, put in doubt the sufficiency of the
determination of the facts on which the search warrant was founded.

The Government alleges that the officers had satisfactorily established probable cause before Judge
Bacalla for the issuance of a search warrant. While this may be conceded, the trouble is, to repeat, that the place
described in the search warrant -- which, of course, is the only place that may be legitimately searched in virtue
thereof -- was not that which the police officers who applied for the warrant had in mind, with the result that what
they actually subjected to search-and-seizure operations was a place other than that stated in the warrant. In fine,
while there was a search warrant more or less properly issued as regards Abigails Variety Store, there was none
for Apartment No. 1 -- the first of the four (4) apartment units at the rear of said store, and precisely the place in
which the private respondents were then residing.

It bears stressing that under Section 2, Article III of the Constitution, providing that:[14]

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be serched, and the things to be seized.,

it does not suffice, for a search warrant to be deemed valid, that it be based on probable cause, personally
determined by the judge after examination under oath, or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce; it is essential, too, that it particularly describe the place to be searched,[15] the manifest intention
being that the search be confined strictly to the place so described.

There was therefore in this case an infringement of the constitutional requirement that a search warrant
particularly describe the place to be searched; and that infringement necessarily brought into operation the
concomitant provision that (a)ny evidence obtained in violation ** (inter alia of the search-and-seizure provision)
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[16]

In light of what has just been discussed, it is needless to discuss such other points sought to be made by
the Office of the Solicitor General as whether or not (1) the sketch of the building housing the store and the
residential apartment units -- the place to be searched being plainly marked -- was in fact attached to the
application for the search warrant; or (2) the search had been conducted in the presence of the occupants of the
place (herein petitioners), among others; or (3) the validity of the search warrant was diminished by the tardiness
by which the return was made, or (4) the Court of Appeals had improperly refused to receive evidence which **
(the People) had earlier been denied opportunity to present before the trial court; or (5) the remedy of the special
civil action of certiorari in the Court of Appeals had been erroneously availed of. The resolution of these issues
would not affect the correctness of the conclusion that the search and seizure proceedings are void because the
place set forth in the search warrant is different from that which the officers actually searched, or the speciousness
of their argument that anyway, the premises searched were precisely what they had described to the Judge, and
originally and at all times had in mind.

Only one other matter merits treatment. The Solicitor Generals Office opines that where a search warrant
has been issued by the court other than the one trying the main criminal case, the proper recourse of persons
wishing to quash the warrant is to assail it before the issuing court and not before that in which the criminal case
involving the subject of the warrant is afterwards filed.[17] In support, it cites the second of five (5) policy
guidelines laid down by this Court in Malaloan v. Court of Appeals[18] concerning possible conflicts of
jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in one court
and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as
evidence in said criminal case. Said second guideline reads:[19]

2. When the latter court (referring to the court which does not try the main criminal case) issues the search
warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice to any
proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All
grounds and objections then available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings
for the quashal of the warrant, other they shall be deemed waived.

The guidelines have been misconstrued. Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal
action based on the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the rule that a motion
to quash the warrant (or to retrieve things thereunder seized) may be filed only with the issuing Court. Such a
motion may be filed for the first time for the first time in either the issuing Court or that in which the criminal
action is pending. However, the remedy is alternative, not cumulative. The Court first taking cognizance of the
motion does so to the exclusion of the other, and the proceedings thereon are subject to the Omnibus Motion Rule
and the rule against forum-shopping. This is clearly stated in the third policy guidelines which indeed is what
properly applies to the case at bar, to wit:

3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested
party may move in the court where the criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal
property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said purpose. Since two separate courts with
different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to supress
evidence are alternative and not cummulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash
shall consequently be governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided however, that objections not available,
existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion
to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to any proper remedy
in the appopriate higher court.

In this case, the search warrant was applied for in, and issued by, Branch 216 of the Regional Trial Court
at Quezon City, and the return was made to said court. On the other hand, the criminal action in connection with
the explosives subject of the warrant was filed in Branch 80 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan. In this
situation, a motion to quash the search warrant, or for the return of the personal property seized (not otherwise
contraband) could have properly been presented in the QC RTC. No such motion was ever filed. It was only after
the criminal action had been commenced in the Bulacan RTC that the motion to quash and to suppress evidence
was submitted to the latter. The case thus falls within guideline No. 3 above quoted in accordance with which the
latter court must be deemed to have acted within its competence.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Fourteenth Division of the Court of Appeals of September 11, 1996
-- which dismissed the Peoples petition for certiorari seeking nullification of the Orders of Branch 80 of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 9, 1996 and May 28, 1996 in the Criminal Case No. 43-M-96 -- is, for the
reasons set out in the foregoing opinion, hereby AFFIRMED without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 120915. April 3, 1998]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSA ARUTA y

MENGUIN, accused-appellant.

DECISION

ROMERO, J.:

With the pervasive proliferation of illegal drugs and its pernicious effects on our society, our law enforcers
tend at times to overreach themselves in apprehending drug offenders to the extent of failing to observe well-
entrenched constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and arrests. Consequently, drug offenders manage
to evade the clutches of the law on mere technicalities.

Accused-appellant Rosa Aruta y Menguin was arrested and charged with violating Section 4, Article II of
Republic Act No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. The information reads:

That on or about the fourteenth (14th) day of December, 1988, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in transporting approximately eight (8) kilos and five
hundred (500) grams of dried marijuana packed in plastic bag marked Cash Katutak placed in a travelling bag,
which are prohibited drugs.

Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City convicted and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos.[1]

The prosecution substantially relied on the testimonies of P/Lt. Ernesto Abello, Officer-in-Charge of the
Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of Olongapo City and P/Lt. Jose Domingo.Based on their testimonies, the
court a quo found the following:

On December 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant, known only as Benjie, that a certain
Aling Rosa would be arriving from Baguio City the following day, December 14, 1988, with a large volume of
marijuana. Acting on said tip, P/Lt. Abello assembled a team composed of P/Lt. Jose Domingo, Sgt. Angel
Sudiacal, Sgt. Oscar Imperial, Sgt. Danilo Santiago and Sgt. Efren Quirubin.

Said team proceeded to West Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City at around 4:00 in the afternoon of December
14, 1988 and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) building along Rizal Avenue and the
Caltex gasoline station. Dividing themselves into two groups, one group, made up of P/Lt. Abello, P/Lt. Domingo
and the informant posted themselves near the PNB building while the other group waited near the Caltex gasoline
station.

While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus with body number 474 and the letters BGO printed on its front
and back bumpers stopped in front of the PNB building at around 6:30 in the evening of the same day from where
two females and a male got off. It was at this stage that the informant pointed out to the team Aling Rosa who
was then carrying a travelling bag.

Having ascertained that accused-appellant was Aling Rosa, the team approached her and introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. When P/Lt. Abello asked Aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter
handed it to the former.

Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked Cash
Katutak. The team confiscated the bag together with the Victory Liner bus ticket to which Lt. Domingo affixed
his signature. Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM office for investigation where a Receipt of
Property Seized was prepared for the confiscated marijuana leaves.

Upon examination of the seized marijuana specimen at the PC/INP Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas,
Pampanga, P/Maj. Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist, prepared a Technical Report stating that said specimen
yielded positive results for marijuana, a prohibited drug.

After the presentation of the testimonies of the arresting officers and of the above technical report, the
prosecution rested its case.
 Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging the illegality of the
search and seizure of the items thereby violating accused-appellants constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure as well as their inadmissibility in evidence.

The said Demurrer to Evidence was, however, denied without the trial court ruling on the alleged illegality
of the search and seizure and the inadmissibility in evidence of the items seized to avoid pre-judgment. Instead,
the trial court continued to hear the case.

In view of said denial, accused-appellant testified on her behalf. As expected, her version of the incident
differed from that of the prosecution. She claimed that immediately prior to her arrest, she had just come from
Choice Theater where she watched the movie Balweg. While about to cross the road, an old woman asked her
help in carrying a shoulder bag. In the middle of the road, Lt. Abello and Lt. Domingo arrested her and asked
her to go with them to the NARCOM Office.

During investigation at said office, she disclaimed any knowledge as to the identity of the woman and
averred that the old woman was nowhere to be found after she was arrested.Moreover, she added that no search
warrant was shown to her by the arresting officers.

After the prosecution made a formal offer of evidence, the defense filed a Comment and/or Objection to
Prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence contesting the admissibility of the items seized as they were allegedly a
product of an unreasonable search and seizure.

Not convinced with her version of the incident, the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted
accused-appellant of transporting eight (8) kilos and five hundred (500) grams of marijuana from Baguio City to
Olongapo City in violation of Section 4, Article 11 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 and sentenced her to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of twenty thousand
(P20,000.00) pesos without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.[2]

In this appeal, accused-appellant submits the following:

1. The trial court erred in holding that the NARCOM agents could not apply for a warrant for the search
of a bus or a passenger who boarded a bus because one of the requirements for applying a search warrant is that
the place to be searched must be specifically designated and described.

2. The trial court erred in holding or assuming that if a search warrant was applied for by the NARCOM
agents, still no court would issue a search warrant for the reason that the same would be considered a general
search warrant which may be quashed.

3. The trial court erred in not finding that the warrantless search resulting to the arrest of accused-appellant
violated the latters constitutional rights.

4. The trial court erred in not holding that although the defense of denial is weak yet the evidence of the
prosecution is even weaker.

These submissions are impressed with merit.

In People v. Ramos,[3] this Court held that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength
of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution which
provides:

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates
only against unreasonable searches and seizures. The plain import of the language of the Constitution, which in
one sentence prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and at the same time prescribes the requisites for a
valid warrant, is that searches and seizures are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search
warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that
between person and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or
refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.[4]
 Further, articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence
pursuant to the doctrine pronounced in Stonehill v. Diokno.[5] This exclusionary rule was later enshrined in Article
III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution, thus:

Section 3(2). Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.

From the foregoing, it can be said that the State cannot simply intrude indiscriminately into the houses,
papers, effects, and most importantly, on the person of an individual. The constitutional provision guaranteed an
impenetrable shield against unreasonable searches and seizures. As such, it protects the privacy and sanctity of
the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint.[6]

Therewithal, the right of a person to be secured against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions
to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must perforce be strictly construed and their application
limited only to cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do otherwise is an infringement upon personal
liberty and would set back a right so basic and deserving of full protection and vindication yet often violated.[7]

The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court[8] and by prevailing jurisprudence;

2. Seizure of evidence in plain view, the elements of which are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in
the pursuit of their official duties;

(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are;

(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and

(d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search;

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;[9]

6. Stop and Frisk;[10] and

7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.[11]

The above exceptions, however, should not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to
trample upon the constitutionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable search
and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and
seizure can be lawfully conducted.

Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it generally signifies a reasonable ground
of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged. It likewise refers to the existence
of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject
to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.[12]

It ought to be emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our rules of evidence of which his knowledge is technically
nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense which all reasonable men have in abundance. The same
quantum of evidence is required in determining probable cause relative to search. Before a search warrant can be
issued, it must be shown by substantial evidence that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being
connected with criminal activity, and that the items will be found in the place to be searched.[13]
 In searches and seizures effected without a warrant, it is necessary for probable cause to be present. Absent
any probable cause, the article(s) seized could not be admitted and used as evidence against the person
arrested. Probable cause, in these cases, must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a
crime has been committed or is about to be committed.

In our jurisprudence, there are instances where information has become a sufficient probable cause to
effect a warrantless search and seizure.

In People v. Tangliben,[14] acting on information supplied by informers, police officers conducted a

surveillance at the Victory Liner Terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may
commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs. At 9:30 in the
evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. They
confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen
identified themselves.Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only
knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest.

In instant case, the apprehending officers already had prior knowledge from their informant regarding
Arutas alleged activities. In Tangliben policemen were confronted with an on-the-spot tip. Moreover, the
policemen knew that the Victory Liner compound is being used by drug traffickers as their business address. More
significantly, Tangliben was acting suspiciously.His actuations and surrounding circumstances led the policemen
to reasonably suspect that Tangliben is committing a crime. In instant case, there is no single indication that Aruta
was acting suspiciously.

In People v. Malmstedt,[15] the Narcom agents received reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs on his person. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the
suspect could not be readily ascertained. His actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the
operation. The Court held that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to
act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.

Note, however, the glaring differences of Malmstedt to the instant case. In present case, the police officers
had reasonable time within which to secure a search warrant. Second, Arutas identity was priorly
ascertained. Third, Aruta was not acting suspiciously. Fourth, Malmstedt was searched aboard a moving vehicle,
a legally accepted exception to the warrant requirement.Aruta, on the other hand, was searched while about to
cross a street.

In People v. Bagista,[16] the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming
from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular
informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana
from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since she fitted the
description given by the NARCOM informant. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the NARCOM
agents, any evidence obtained in the course of said search is admissible against accused-appellant. Again, this
case differs from Aruta as this involves a search of a moving vehicle plus the fact that the police officers erected
a checkpoint. Both are exceptions to the requirements of a search warrant.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals and People,[17] the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the
Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they
chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was observed to have reddish
eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When
approached and asked what he was holding in his hands, he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained
marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he
was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this
area was a haven for drug addicts.

In all the abovecited cases, there was information received which became the bases for conducting the
warrantless search. Furthermore, additional factors and circumstances were present which, when taken together
with the information, constituted probable causes which justified the warrantless searches and seizures in each of
the cases.

In the instant case, the determination of the absence or existence of probable cause necessitates a
reexamination of the facts. The following have been established: (1) In the morning of December 13, 1988, the
law enforcement officers received information from an informant named Benjie that a certain Aling Rosa would
be leaving for Baguio City on December 14, 1988 and would be back in the afternoon of the same day carrying
with her a large volume of marijuana; (2) At 6:30 in the evening of December 14, 1988, accused-appellant alighted
from a Victory Liner Bus carrying a travelling bag even as the informant pointed her out to the law enforcement
officers; (3) The law enforcement officers approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents;
(4) When asked by Lt. Abello about the contents of her travelling bag, she gave the same to him; (5) When they
opened the same, they found dried marijuana leaves; (6) Accused-appellant was then brought to the NARCOM
office for investigation.

This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin where the police received information two days before the
arrival of Aminnudin that the latter would be arriving from Iloilo on board the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was
known, the vehicle was identified and the date of arrival was certain. From the information they had received, the
police could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a
warrant. Instead of securing a warrant first, they proceeded to apprehend Aminnudin. When the case was brought
before this Court, the arrest was held to be illegal; hence any item seized from Aminnudin could not be used
against him.

Another recent case is People v. Encinada where the police likewise received confidential information the
day before at 4:00 in the afternoon from their informant that Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu
City on board M/V Sweet Pearl at 7:00 in the morning of the following day. This intelligence information
regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts could have
been a basis of probable cause for the lawmen to secure a warrant. This Court held that in accordance with
Administrative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, series of 1987, the lawmen could have applied for a warrant
even after court hours. The failure or neglect to secure one cannot serve as an excuse for violating Encinadas
constitutional right.

In the instant case, the NARCOM agents were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. To legitimize
the warrantless search and seizure of accused-appellants bag, accused-appellant must have been validly arrested
under Section 5 of Rule 113 which provides inter alia:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

xxx xxx xxx.

Accused-appellant Aruta cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one
nor had she just committed a crime. Accused-appellant was merely crossing the street and was not acting in any
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the NARCOM agents to suspect and conclude that she was
committing a crime. It was only when the informant pointed to accused-appellant and identified her to the agents
as the carrier of the marijuana that she was singled out as the suspect. The NARCOM agents would not have
apprehended accused-appellant were it not for the furtive finger of the informant because, as clearly illustrated
by the evidence on record, there was no reason whatsoever for them to suspect that accused-appellant was
committing a crime, except for the pointing finger of the informant. This the Court could neither sanction nor
tolerate as it is a clear violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Neither
was there any semblance of any compliance with the rigid requirements of probable cause and warrantless arrests.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the NARCOM agents to effect a warrantless search of accused-
appellants bag, there being no probable cause and the accused-appellant not having been lawfully arrested. Stated
otherwise, the arrest being incipiently illegal, it logically follows that the subsequent search was similarly illegal,
it being not incidental to a lawful arrest.The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure must
perforce operate in favor of accused-appellant. As such, the articles seized could not be used as evidence against
accused-appellant for these are fruits of a poisoned tree and, therefore, must be rejected, pursuant to Article III,
Sec. 3(2) of the Constitution.

Emphasis is to be laid on the fact that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest, in
order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings. Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based
on evidence produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.[18]

As previously discussed, the case in point is People v. Aminnudin[19] where, this Court observed that:
 x x x accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the
other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger
that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid and legal warrantless arrest, the search and seizure of
accused-appellants bag would also not be justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the second
exception. The marijuana was obviously not immediately apparent as shown by the fact that the NARCOM agents
still had to request accused-appellant to open the bag to ascertain its contents.

Neither would the search and seizure of accused-appellants bag be justified as a search of a moving
vehicle. There was no moving vehicle to speak of in the instant case as accused-appellant was apprehended
several minutes after alighting from the Victory Liner bus. In fact, she was accosted in the middle of the street
and not while inside the vehicle.

People v. Solayao,[20] applied the stop and frisk principle which has been adopted in Posadas v. Court of
Appeals.[21] In said case, Solayao attempted to flee when he and his companions were accosted by government
agents. In the instant case, there was no observable manifestation that could have aroused the suspicion of the
NARCOM agents as to cause them to stop and frisk accused-appellant. To reiterate, accused-appellant was merely
crossing the street when apprehended. Unlike in the abovementioned cases, accused-appellant never attempted to
flee from the NARCOM agents when the latter identified themselves as such. Clearly, this is another indication
of the paucity of probable cause that would sufficiently provoke a suspicion that accused-appellant was
committing a crime.

The warrantless search and seizure could not likewise be categorized under exigent and emergency
circumstances, as applied in People v. De Gracia.[22] In said case, there were intelligence reports that the building
was being used as headquarters by the RAM during a coup detat. A surveillance team was fired at by a group of
armed men coming out of the building and the occupants of said building refused to open the door despite repeated
requests. There were large quantities of explosives and ammunitions inside the building. Nearby courts were
closed and general chaos and disorder prevailed. The existing circumstances sufficiently showed that a crime was
being committed. In short, there was probable cause to effect a warrantless search of the building. The same could
not be said in the instant case.

The only other exception that could possibly legitimize the warrantless search and seizure would be
consent given by the accused-appellant to the warrantless search as to amount to a waiver of her constitutional
right. The Solicitor General argues that accused-appellant voluntarily submitted herself to search and inspection
citing People v. Malasugui[23] where this Court ruled:

When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on his person or premises, he is
precluded from complaining later thereof. (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., [V]ol. I, p. 631.)The right
to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may be made either
expressly or impliedly.

In support of said argument, the Solicitor General cited the testimony of Lt. Abello, thus:

Q When this informant by the name of alias Benjie pointed to Aling Rosa, what happened after that?

A We followed her and introduced ourselves as NARCOM agents and confronted her with our informant
and asked her what she was carrying and if we can see the bag she was carrying.

Q What was her reaction?

A She gave her bag to me.

Q So what happened after she gave the bag to you?

A I opened it and found out plastic bags of marijuana inside.[24]

This Court cannot agree with the Solicitor Generals contention for the Malasugui case is inapplicable to
the instant case. In said case, there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest thereby making the warrantless
search effected immediately thereafter equally lawful.[25] On the contrary, the most essential element of probable
cause, as expounded above in detail, is wanting in the instant case making the warrantless arrest unjustified and
illegal. Accordingly, the search which accompanied the warrantless arrest was likewise unjustified and
illegal.Thus, all the articles seized from the accused-appellant could not be used as evidence against her.

Aside from the inapplicability of the abovecited case, the act of herein accused-appellant in handing over
her bag to the NARCOM agents could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to
the unreasonable search. The instant case is similar to People v. Encinada,[26] where this Court held:

[T]he Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search. This he
gleaned from Bolonias testimony.

Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?

A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.

Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two chairs that he carried, what
did you do next?

A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal
search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to
Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
search. The implied acquiscence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted
irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity
of the performance of duty.(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, accused-appellants lack of objection to the search is not tantamount to a waiver of her constitutional
rights or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search. As this Court held in People v. Barros:[27]

x x x [T]he accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted on the occasion
of his warrantless arrest simply because he failed to object-

x x x. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and lastly, that said person had an actual
intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 698). The fact that the accused failed
to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v.
Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):

xxx xxx xxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional
rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation
thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (Citation omitted).

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.[28](Emphasis
supplied)

To repeat, to constitute a waiver, there should be an actual intention to relinquish the right. As clearly
illustrated in People v. Omaweng,[29] where prosecution witness Joseph Layong testified thus:

PROSECUTOR AYOCHOK:

Q - When you and David Fomocod saw the travelling bag, what did you do?

A - When we saw that travelling bag, we asked the driver if we could see the contents.
 Q - And what did or what was the reply of the driver, if there was any?

A - He said you can see the contents but those are only clothings (sic).

Q - When he said that, what did you do?

A - We asked him if we could open and see it.

Q - When you said that, what did he tell you?

A - He said you can see it.

Q - And when he said you can see and open it, what did you do?

A - When I went inside and opened the bag, I saw that it was not clothings (sic) that was contained in the
bag.

Q - And when you saw that it was not clothings (sic), what did you do?

A - When I saw that the contents were not clothes, I took some of the contents and showed it to my
companion Fomocod and when Fomocod smelled it, he said it was marijuana.(Emphasis supplied)

In the above-mentioned case, accused was not subjected to any search which may be stigmatized as a
violation of his Constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.If one had been made, this Court
would be the first to condemn it as the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional rights is
one of the highest duties and privileges of the Court. He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily
agreed to have it conducted on his vehicle and traveling bag, which is not the case with Aruta.

In an attempt to further justify the warrantless search, the Solicitor General next argues that the police
officers would have encountered difficulty in securing a search warrant as it couldbe secured only if accused-
appellants name was known, the vehicle identified and the date of its arrival certain, as in the Aminnudin case
where the arresting officers had forty-eight hours within which to act.

This argument is untenable.

Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:

x x x [N]o search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by
the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Italics supplied)

Search warrants to be valid must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things
to be seized. The purpose of this rule is to limit the things to be seized to those and only those, particularly
described in the warrant so as to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made.[30]

Had the NARCOM agents only applied for a search warrant, they could have secured one without too
much difficulty, contrary to the assertions of the Solicitor General. The person intended to be searched has been
particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be in the afternoon
of December 14, 1988. Aling Rosa turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana.
The vehicle was identified to be a Victory Liner bus. In fact, the NARCOM agents purposely positioned
themselves near the spot where Victory Liner buses normally unload their passengers. Assuming that the
NARCOM agents failed to particularize the vehicle, this would not in any way hinder them from securing a search
warrant. The above particulars would have already sufficed. In any case, this Court has held that the police should
particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it
is feasible.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

While it may be argued that by entering a plea during arraignment and by actively participating in the
trial, accused-appellant may be deemed to have waived objections to the illegality of the warrantless search and
to the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained thereby, the same may not apply in the instant case for the following
reasons:
 1. The waiver would only apply to objections pertaining to the illegality of the arrest as her plea of not
guilty and participation in the trial are indications of her voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction.[32] The
plea and active participation in the trial would not cure the illegality of the search and transform the inadmissible
evidence into objects of proof. The waiver simply does not extend this far.

2. Granting that evidence obtained through a warrantless search becomes admissible upon failure to object
thereto during the trial of the case, records show that accused-appellant filed a Demurrer to Evidence and objected
and opposed the prosecutions Formal Offer of Evidence.

It is apropos to quote the case of People v. Barros,[33] which stated:

It might be supposed that the non-admissibility of evidence secured through an invalid warrantless arrest
or a warrantless search and seizure may be waived by an accused person. The a priori argument is that the
invalidity of an unjustified warrantless arrest, or an arrest effected with a defective warrant of arrest may be
waived by applying for and posting of bail for provisional liberty, so as to estop an accused from questioning the
legality or constitutionality of his detention or the failure to accord him a preliminary investigation. We do not
believe, however, that waiver of the latter necessarily constitutes, or carries with it, waiver of the former--an
argument that the Solicitor General appears to be making impliedly. Waiver of the non-admissibility of the
fruits of an invalid warrantless arrest and of a warrantless search and seizure is not casually to be
presumed, if the constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizures is to retain its vitality for the
protection of our people. In the case at bar, defense counsel had expressly objected on constitutional grounds to
the admission of the carton box and the four (4) kilos of marijuana when these were formally offered in evidence
by the prosecution. We consider that appellants objection to the admission of such evidence was made
clearly and seasonably and that, under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights under the premises
can be reasonably inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.(Emphasis supplied)

In fine, there was really no excuse for the NARCOM agents not to procure a search warrant considering
that they had more than twenty-four hours to do so. Obviously, this is again an instance of seizure of the fruit of
the poisonous tree, hence illegal and inadmissible subsequently in evidence.

The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction
against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.[34]

While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and
civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based on the
justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed.[35]

Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full
protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be
exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement
of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government.[36]

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is
less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed
in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.[37]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Olongapo
City, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellant ROSA ARUTA Y MENGUIN is hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
confinement unless she is being held for some other legal grounds. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 123872. January 30, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN MONTILLA y

GATDULA, accused-appellant.

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August 22, 1994 for violating
Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in an information which alleges:

That on or about the 20th day of June 1994, at Barangay Salitran, Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of
Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being
authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport, and deliver
twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried marijuana leaves, which are considered prohibited drugs, in violation of the
provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing damage and prejudice to the public interest.[1]

The consequent arraignment conducted on September 14, 1994 elicited a plea of not guilty from appellant
who was assisted therein by his counsel de parte.[2] Trial was held on scheduled dates thereafter, which
culminated in a verdict of guilty in a decision of the trial court dated June 8, 1995 and which imposed the extreme
penalty of death on appellant. He was further ordered to pay a fine in the amount of P500,000.00 and to pay the
costs of the proceedings.[3]

It appears from the evidence of the prosecution that appellant was apprehended at around 4:00 A.M. of
June 20, 1994 near a waiting shed located at Barangay Salitran, Dasmarias, Cavite by SPO1 Concordio Talingting
and SPO1 Armando Clarin, both members of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command based in
Dasmarias. Appellant, according to the two officers, was caught transporting 28 marijuana bricks contained in a
traveling bag and a carton box, which marijuana bricks had a total weight of 28 kilos.

These two officers later asserted in court that they were aided by an informer in the arrest of appellant. That
informer, according to Talingting and Clarin, had informed them the day before, or on June 19, 1994 at about
2:00 P.M., that a drug courier, whom said informer could recognize, would be arriving somewhere in Barangay
Salitran, Dasmarias from Baguio City with an undetermined amount of marijuana. It was the same informer who
pinpointed to the arresting officers the appellant when the latter alighted from a passenger jeepney on the
aforestated day, hour, and place.[4]

Upon the other hand, appellant disavowed ownership of the prohibited drugs. He claimed during the trial
that while he indeed came all the way from Baguio City, he traveled to Dasmarias, Cavite with only some pocket
money and without any luggage. His sole purpose in going there was to look up his cousin who had earlier offered
a prospective job at a garment factory in said locality, after which he would return to Baguio City. He never got
around to doing so as he was accosted by SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin at Barangay Salitran.

He further averred that when he was interrogated at a house in Dasmarias, Cavite, he was never informed
of his constitutional rights and was in fact even robbed of the P500.00 which he had with him. Melita Adaci, the
cousin, corroborated appellant's testimony about the job offer in the garment factory where she reportedly worked
as a supervisor,[5] although, as the trial court observed, she never presented any document to prove her alleged
employment.

In the present appellate review, appellant disputes the trial court's finding that he was legally caught in
flagrante transporting the prohibited drugs. This Court, after an objective and exhaustive review of the evidence
on record, discerns no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court. It finds unassailable the reliance
of the lower court on the positive testimonies of the police officers to whom no ill motives can be attributed, and
its rejection of appellant's fragile defense of denial which is evidently self-serving in nature.

1. Firstly, appellant asserts that the court a quo grossly erred in convicting him on the basis of insufficient
evidence as no proof was proffered showing that he wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously administered,
transported, and delivered 28 kilos of dried marijuana leaves, since the police officers "testified only on the alleged
transporting of Marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite."

Further, the failure of the prosecution to present in court the civilian informant is supposedly corrosive of
the People's cause since, aside from impinging upon appellant's fundamental right to confront the witnesses
against him, that informant was a vital personality in the operation who would have contradicted the hearsay and
conflicting testimonies of the arresting officers on how appellant was collared by them.

The pertinent provision of the penal law here involved, in Section 4 of Article II thereof, as amended, is
as follows:

SEC. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such
transactions.

Notwithstanding the provision of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a
minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death
of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

Now, the offense ascribed to appellant is a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, some of the various
modes of commission[6] being the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited
drugs as set forth in the epigraph of Section 4, Article II of said law. The text of Section 4 expands and extends
its punitive scope to other acts besides those mentioned in its headnote by including these who shall sell,
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions." Section 4 could thus be violated by the commission of any of the acts
specified therein, or a combination thereof, such as selling, administering, delivering, giving away, distributing,
dispatching in transit or transporting, and the like.

As already stated, appellant was charged with a violation of Section 4, the transgressive acts alleged
therein and attributed to appellant being that he administered, delivered, and transported marijuana. The
governing rule with respect to an offense which may be committed in any of the different modes provided by law
is that an indictment would suffice if the offense is alleged to have been committed in one, two or more modes
specified therein. This is so as allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should
be considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the ground of
multifariousness.[7] In appellant's case, the prosecution adduced evidence clearly establishing that he transported
marijuana from Baguio City to Cavite. By that act alone of transporting the illicit drugs, appellant had already run
afoul of that particular section of the statute, hence, appellant's asseverations must fail.

The Court also disagrees with the contention of appellant that the civilian informer should have been
produced in court considering that his testimony was "vital" and his presence in court was essential in order to
give effect to or recognition of appellant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses arrayed by the State
against him. These assertions are, however, much too strained. Far from compromising the primacy of appellant's
right to confrontation, the non-presentation of the informer in this instance was justified and cannot be faulted as
error.

For one, the testimony of said informer would have been, at best, merely corroborative of the declarations
of SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before the trial court, which testimonies are not hearsay as both testified
upon matters in which they had personally taken part. As such, the testimony of the informer could be dispensed
with by the prosecution,[8] more so where what he would have corroborated are the narrations of law enforcers on
whose performance of duties regularity is the prevailing legal presumption. Besides, informants are generally not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the
police.[9] Moreover, it is up to the prosecution whom to present in court as its witnesses, and not for the defense
to dictate that course.[10] Finally, appellant could very well have resorted to the coercive process of subpoena to
compel that eyewitness to appear before the court below,[11] but which remedy was not availed of by him.

2. Appellant contends that the marijuana bricks were confiscated in the course of an unlawful warrantless
search and seizure. He calls the attention of the Court to the fact that as early as 2:00 P.M. of the preceding day,
June 19, 1994, the police authorities had already been apprised by their so-called informer of appellant's
impending arrival from Baguio City, hence those law enforcers had the opportunity to procure the requisite
warrant. Their misfeasance should therefore invalidate the search for and seizure of the marijuana, as well as the
arrest of appellant on the following dawn. Once again, the Court is not persuaded.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant, absent which such search and seizure becomes
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision.[12] Evidence secured on the occasion of such
an unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous
tree. In the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding. This exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1) customs
searches;[13] (2) searches of moving vehicles,[14] (3) seizure of evidence in plain view;[15] (4) consented
searches;[16] (5) searches incidental to a lawful arrest;[17] and (6) "stop and frisk" measures[18] have been invariably
recognized as the traditional exceptions.

In appellant's case, it should be noted that the information relayed by the civilian informant to the law
enforcers was that there would be delivery of marijuana at Barangay Salitran by a courier coming from Baguio
City in the "early morning" of June 20, 1994. Even assuming that the policemen were not pressed for time, this
would be beside the point for, under these circumstances, the information relayed was too sketchy and not detailed
enough for the obtention of the corresponding arrest or search warrant. While there is an indication that the
informant knew the courier, the records do not reveal that he knew him by name.

While it is not required that the authorities should know the exact name of the subject of the warrant
applied for, there is the additional problem that the informant did not know to whom the drugs would be delivered
and at which particular part of the barangay there would be such delivery. Neither did this asset know the precise
time of the suspect's arrival, or his means of transportation, the container or contrivance wherein the drugs were
concealed and whether the same were arriving together with, or were being brought by someone separately from,
the courier.

On such bare information, the police authorities could not have properly applied for a warrant, assuming
that they could readily have access to a judge or a court that was still open by the time they could make
preparations for applying therefor, and on which there is no evidence presented by the defense. In determining
the opportunity for obtaining warrants, not only the intervening time is controlling but all the coincident and
ambient circumstances should be considered, especially in rural areas. In fact, the police had to form a surveillance
team and to lay down a dragnet at the possible entry points to Barangay Salitran at midnight of that day
notwithstanding the tip regarding the "early morning" arrival of the courier. Their leader, SPO2 Cali, had to
reconnoiter inside and around the barangay as backup, unsure as they were of the time when and the place in
Barangay Salitran, where their suspect would show up, and how he would do so.

On the other hand, that they nonetheless believed the informant is not surprising for, as both SPO1 Clarin
and SPO1 Talingting recalled, he had proved to be a reliable source in past operations. Moreover, experience
shows that although information gathered and passed on by these assets to law enforcers are vague and piecemeal,
and not as neatly and completely packaged as one would expect from a professional spymaster, such tip-offs are
sometimes successful as it proved to be in the apprehension of appellant. If the courts of justice are to be of
understanding assistance to our law enforcement agencies, it is necessary to adopt a realistic appreciation of the
physical and tactical problems of the latter, instead of critically viewing them from the placid and clinical
environment of judicial chambers.

3. On the defense argument that the warrantless search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence
obtained from him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of the illegal drugs as a
result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court. Under that provision, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.

A legitimate warrantless arrest, as above contemplated, necessarily cloaks the arresting police officer with
authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1) dangerous weapons, and (2) those that may be used as
proof of the commission of an offense.[19] On the other hand, the apprehending officer must have been spurred by
probable cause in effecting an arrest which could be classified as one in cadence with the instances of permissible
arrests set out in Section 5(a).[20] These instances have been applied to arrests carried out on persons caught
in flagrante delicto. The conventional view is that probable cause, while largely a relative term the determination
of which must be resolved according to the facts of each case, is understood as having reference to such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to believe and conclude as to the
commission of an offense, and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.[21]

Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time to observe that the evidentiary measure for the propriety of
filing criminal charges and, correlatively, for effecting a warrantless arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In
the past, our statutory rules and jurisprudence required prima facie evidence, which was of a higher degree or
quantum,[22] and was even used with dubiety as equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in the American
jurisdiction from which we derived the term and its concept, probable cause is understood to merely mean a
reasonable ground for belief in the existence of facts warranting the proceedings complained of,[23] or an apparent
state of facts found to exist upon reasonable inquiry which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man
to believe that the accused person had committed the crime.[24]

Felicitously, those problems and confusing concepts were clarified and set aright, at least on the issue
under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the
quantum of evidence required in preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender a well
founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent's probable guilt thereof. [25] It has
the same meaning as the related phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating
fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause exists."[26] It should, therefore, be
in that sense, wherein the right to effect a warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized.

In the case at bar, as soon as appellant had alighted from the passenger jeepney the informer at once
indicated to the officers that their suspect was at hand by pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1 Clarin
recounted that the informer told them that the marijuana was likely hidden inside the traveling bag and carton box
which appellant was carrying at the time. The officers thus realized that he was their man even if he was simply
carrying a seemingly innocent looking pair of luggage for personal effects. Accordingly, they approached
appellant, introduced themselves as policemen, and requested him to open and show them the contents of the
traveling bag, which appellant voluntarily and readily did. Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin, the bag
yielded the prohibited drugs, so, without bothering to further search the box, they brought appellant and his
luggage to their headquarters for questioning.

Appellant insists that the mere fact of seeing a person carrying a traveling bag and a carton box should not
elicit the slightest suspicion of the commission of any crime since that is normal. But, precisely, it is in the
ordinary nature of things that drugs being illegally transported are necessarily hidden in containers and concealed
from view. Thus, the officers could reasonably assume, and not merely on a hollow suspicion since the informant
was by their side and had so informed them, that the drugs were in appellant's luggage. It would obviously have
been irresponsible, if not downright absurd under the circumstances, to require the constable to adopt a "wait and
see" attitude at the risk of eventually losing the quarry.

Here, there were sufficient facts antecedent to the search and seizure that, at the point prior to the search,
were already constitutive of probable cause, and which by themselves could properly create in the minds of the
officers a well-grounded and reasonable belief that appellant was in the act of violating the law. The search
yielded affirmance both of that probable cause and the actuality that appellant was then actually committing a
crime by illegally transporting prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts, it is ineluctable that appellant was
caught in flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the search of his belongings without the requisite warrant were
both justified.

Furthermore, that appellant also consented to the search is borne out by the evidence. To repeat, when the
officers approached appellant and introduced themselves as policemen, they asked him about the contents of his
luggage, and after he replied that they contained personal effects, the officers asked him to open the traveling
bag. Appellant readily acceded, presumably or in all likelihood resigned to the fact that the law had caught up
with his criminal activities. When an individual voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have the same
conducted upon his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof.

After all, the right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like other rights, be waived either expressly
or impliedly.[27] Thus, while it has been held that the silence of the accused during a warrantless search should
not be taken to mean consent to the search but as a demonstration of that person's regard for the supremacy of the
law,[28] the case of herein appellant is evidently different for, here, he spontaneously performed affirmative acts
of volition by himself opening the bag without being forced or intimidated to do so, which acts should properly
be construed as a clear waiver of his right.[29]

4. Appellant likewise harps on the alleged failure of the prosecution to "legally, properly and adequately
establish that the 28 bricks of marijuana allegedly confiscated from (him) were the same marijuana examined by
the forensic chemist and presented in court." Indeed, the arresting officers did not identify in court the marijuana
bricks seized from appellant since, in fact they did not have to do so. It should be noted that the prosecution
presented in the court below and formally offered in evidence those 28 bricks of marijuana together with the
traveling bag and the carton box in which the same were contained. The articles were properly marked as
confiscated evidence and proper safeguards were taken to ensure that the marijuana turned over to the chemist
for examination, and which subsequently proved positive as such, were the same drugs taken from appellant. The
trial court, therefore, correctly admitted them in evidence, satisfied that the articles were indubitably no other than
those taken from appellant.
 Complementarily, the corpus delicti was firmly established by SPO1 Clarin and SPO1 Talingting who
categorically related that when they had ascertained that the contents of the traveling bag of appellant appeared
to be marijuana, they forthwith asked him where he had come from, and the latter readily answered "Baguio City,"
thus confirming the veracity of the report of the informer. No other conclusion can therefore be derived than that
appellant had transported the illicit drugs all the way to Cavite from Baguio City. Coupled with the presentation
in court of the subject matter of the crime, the marijuana bricks which had tested positive as being indian hemp,
the guilt of appellant for transporting the prohibited drugs in violation of the law is beyond doubt.

Appellant questions the interrogation conducted by the police authorities, claiming that he was not allowed
to communicate with anybody, and that he was not duly informed of his right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The police
authorities here could possibly have violated the provision of Republic Act No. 7438[30] which defines certain
rights of persons arrested, detained, or under custodial investigation, as well as the duties of the arresting,
detaining, and investigating officers, and providing corresponding penalties for violations thereof.

Assuming the existence of such irregularities, however, the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down. Firstly, appellant never admitted or confessed anything during his custodial
investigation. Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the nature of a compelled or involuntary confession or
admission was elicited from him which would otherwise have been inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and more
importantly, the guilt of appellant was clearly established by other evidence adduced by the prosecution,
particularly the testimonies of the arresting officers together with the documentary and object evidence which
were formally offered and admitted in evidence in the court below.

5. The reversible error of the trial court lies in its imposition of the penalty of death on appellant. As
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 20, Article IV of the Dangerous Drugs Act now provides inter
alia that the penalty in Section 4 of Article II shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is, in the case of
indian hemp or marijuana, 750 grams or more. In said Section 4, the transporting of prohibited drugs carries with
it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million
pesos. Thus, the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua and death. In
the present case, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code consequently provides the rules to be observed in the
application of said penalties.

As found by the trial court, there were neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending
appellant's violation of the law, hence the second paragraph of Article 63 must necessarily apply, in which case
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is the proper imposable penalty. Contrary to the pronouncement of the
court a quo, it was never intended by the legislature that where the quantity of the dangerous drugs involved
exceeds those stated in Section 20, the maximum penalty of death shall be imposed. Nowhere in the amendatory
law is there a provision from which such a conclusion may be gleaned or deduced. On the contrary, this Court
has already concluded that Republic Act No. 7659 did not amend Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, [31] the
rules wherein were observed although the cocaine subject of that case was also in excess of the quantity provided
in Section 20.

It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the law itself provides a specific penalty where the violation
thereof is in its aggravated form as laid down in the second paragraph of Section 4 whereby, regardless of Section
20 of Article IV, if the victim is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense in said section be
the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.[32] While the minority
or the death of the victim will increase the liability of the offender, these two facts do not constitute generic
aggravating circumstances, as the law simply provides for the imposition of the single indivisible penalty of death
if the offense is attended by either of such factual features. In that situation, obviously the rules on the graduation
of penalties in Article 63 cannot apply. In herein appellant's case, there was neither a minor victim nor a
consequent death of any victim. Hence, the basic rules in Article 63 of the Code govern.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 90, of Dasmarias, Cavite in Criminal
Case No. 3401-94 is hereby MODIFIED in the sense that accused-appellant Ruben Montilla y Gatdula shall suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 186529 August 3, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. JACK RACHO y RAQUERO, Appellant.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425
affirming the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Joint Decision[3] dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack
Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for
the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed
a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the
Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant.[4] The agent gave the police appellants
name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora
the following day.

On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a
Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The
team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the
same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to
him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and
waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the
team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately
denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom
which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.[5]

The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was
turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name.
The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.[6]

Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for
transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the
accusatory portions of which read:

That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession
five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as Shabu, a
regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]

That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and
there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of
shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]

During the arraignment, appellant pleaded Not Guilty to both charges.

At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to
inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was
taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van,
blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes
and underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation.[9]

On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment[10] convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5,
Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the
CA affirmed the RTC decision.[11]

Hence, the present appeal.

In his brief,[12] appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that
the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the
specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of
his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated
sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.

The appeal is meritorious.

We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast
rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the
case.[13]

Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet
of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of
his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the
evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and
appellate courts.

It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review. This Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at
a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping
with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond
reasonable doubt.[14]

After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find
that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the
warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.

The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In
fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in
the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted
to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus
curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal. [15]

As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the
search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.[16]

The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.[17] Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in plain view;

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.[18]

 What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.[19]

The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act
of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as
he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.[20] Consequently, the warrantless search was
considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.

Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search;
generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest
can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.[21] Thus,
given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest
appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to
believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[22]

The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the
established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with
appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the
information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a
red and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora,
and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus,
the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a
tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu.
When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened,
yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.[23] The team then brought appellant to the police station for
investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory
examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.

Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by
the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another
question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.

The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that reliable information alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that
he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.[24] We find no cogent reason to
depart from this well-established doctrine.

The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,[25] People v. Tudtud,[26] and People v. Nuevas.[27]

In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa would be
arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police
assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While
thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off.
The informant then pointed to the team members the woman, Aling Rosa, who was then carrying a traveling bag.
Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she
handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.[28]

The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City,
received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that
the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence
Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved
in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato
and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of
police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and
helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the
contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.[29]
 In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 54
in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong
pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of
illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted
the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the
accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges,
the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the
two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them,
introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents
of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.[30]

In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate
probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.

As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers.
Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted
from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would
engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending
to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been
apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been
confiscated.

We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems reliable information sufficient to justify a
search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.

Maspil, Jr.,[31] People v. Bagista,[32] People v. Balingan,[33] People v. Lising,[34] People v.

Montilla,[35] People v. Valdez,[36] and People v. Gonzales.[37] In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the
warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate
that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed
by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against
warrantless searches.[38]

Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the
requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office
received the tipped information on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the
appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the
same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police
had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.[39]

Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous tree, hence, the confiscated item is
inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any evidence obtained
in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining
evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of
his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal,
warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.[40]

One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,[41]

x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be
law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still
tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime
regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name
of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.[42]
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for
insufficiency of evidence.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless
the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons
for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.

No costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANITA CLAUDIO Y

BAGTANG, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the
accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The information filed against the accused alleged:

That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs for
the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)

The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence
as follows:

To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and testimonial evidence
as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing
approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic
container; "B-1-a"—another plastic container; "C"—Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings: Positive
for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with Pat. Daniel Obiña and
Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"—Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"—Sworn Statement of Pat.
Daniel Obiña, "H" Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V. Galindo;"H-
1"—date of of the request; "L"—Certificate of Field Test dated July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a" additional
Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong; Pat. Daniel Obiño,
Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.

Theresa Ann Bugayong—22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro
Manila testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July 25,
1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of suspected dried
marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a marking "MB Store" (Exh. "B").

The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her examination, she
prepared Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three
eliminations; microscopic examination, the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of thin
layer chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo Santiago, a representative
of the CANU, Olongapo City.

The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obiña, 37 years old, married, policeman and residing
at 34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obiña testified that he has been a member of the INP, since 1970
up to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job then was
among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and apprehend suspects. On July
21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that date, he came from
Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having left Baguio at about 8:30
o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City. His family lives in Baguio
City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second seat at the back. While he was thus seated, suspect
Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after putting a bag which she was carrying
at the back of the seat of Obiña. The bag placed by suspect behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic
containing some vegetables. The act of the accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obiña's seat aroused his suspicion
and made him felt (sic) nervous. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the
woven plastic bag. But it was only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted
one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven
bag appearing to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could
recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did
not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the accused until
they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex Gasoline Station in Sta.
Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted her and showed her his Id
Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was
carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home."
However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle
right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl.
Tiongco; Pat. Obiña, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of
plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even before
the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the CANU. After the marijuana was
taken from the bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the accused and the marijuana confiscated from her
possession with Pat. Obiña and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and himself Identified photographs shown
to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana
contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a") and Identified it as the one confiscated from the
accused and pointed to his initials on the newspaper wrapping which also shows the date and time, although the
wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be soiled already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when
confiscated.

To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo
City, witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated from the accused and for
Identification purposes, the witness presented the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket which
is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because as a
policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.

On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981 and underwent
treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for medical treatment. He stayed in Baguio
City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981, witness never
knew the accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same Victory Liner he took.
When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag placed the bag right behind his seat instead of
placing it in front of her or beside her seat. Witness Obiña became suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed
when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at said town to load
some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He
confirmed his testimony on direct that when witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to
settle the matter to which he refused. Accused further testified that from the time the accused placed her bag
behind his seat from Baguio City, he felt so nervous and had to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was
only after having taken his medicine that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right
hand inside the buri bag in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the bag. He Identified
his sworn statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise
Identified accused Anita Claudio in open court.

Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City,
testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was inside the Investigation Division of the
Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day, Pat. Daniel Obiña arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the courtroom as Anita
Claudio. Pat. Obiña reported to him that he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the Victory Liner bus for possession
of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana leaves were contained in a buri bag with some vegetables such as camote
tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was placed in a plastic wrapper with the name National
Book Store colored black and white. Witness Identified the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings
of Pat. Obiña which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2-a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date which was placed
by Pat. Obiña after Cpl. Tiongco examined the suspected marijuana.
 After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he interviewed apprehending
officer Obiña and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obiña (Exh.
"G"). He also interviewed accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room seated on
a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused whether she was willing to give her
written statements to which the accused refused. Hence, no statements were taken of her. However, pictures were
taken inside the investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were already previously Identified by Pat.
Obiña, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that of Pat. Obiña and the accused and also of
himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the plastic bag were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio
was detained.

Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City,
testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City,
Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On
July 22, 1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a kilo of suspected
marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted a field test on this marijuana which he received
from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh. "H").

In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a Certificate of Fleld Test
dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol
(THC), an active substance that can be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified a
plastic bag of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the Evidence
Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory.

The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married, residing at No. 27 Jones
St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has been
a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division and his duty
was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.

He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at
the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty patrol
using a motorcycle. While he was at the said place, he saw Pat. Obiña alighted from the Victory Liner bus ordering
somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obiña he approached him and asked him what was
happening. Pat. Obiña told him he apprehended a certain woman possessing dried marijuana. The woman was
still then inside the bus. Pat. Obiña then brought the woman to the police department who was bringing with her
a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the tricycle while Pat. Obiña sat behind the driver.
He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle to police station. He went inside the Investigation Section of
the Police Station and he was there when Pat. Obiña reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman
possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for the first time inside the Investigation Section placed in a buri bag
covered with newspaper. He witnessed the taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obiña in the
presence of Cpl. Tiongco and the woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang Identified
the accused in open Court. When asked about the nature of the marijuana when it was brought out from the bag,
he said that the marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were
vegetables and bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the
accused. His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obiña, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a
newspaper wrapping which was already torn.

While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to Cpl. Tiongco's
questions that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger long at the
investigation Division. After he saw the marijuana and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question
the place of delivery of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-21-07-
81 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature, stands for Daniel Obiña. After
the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)

Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:

I CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF

THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.

II CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF THE ALLEGED
BUYMAN WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
 III APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS WRONG
BECAUSE SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF
APPELLANT. (Rollo, p. 91)

The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep. Act
No. 6425 and not for violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.

The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:

Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.—The penalty
of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. If the
victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the
proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs. Therefore,
she may not be convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.

The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only delivery
which is penalized but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of probihited drugs. Claudio
was caught transporting 1.1 kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating
Sec. 4.

The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is unknown.

This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of
marijuana. This is a considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the
possession of such considerable quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact
that he is not a user of prohibited drugs cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell,
distribute and deliver said marijuana.

The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.

The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:

.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:

Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.— A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
(12a)

Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to
arrest Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful
arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the
1.1 kilos of marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having had
with her marijuana at the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of possession. In a
complete turnabout, in the latter portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere
fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in her possession was only planted.

We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's findings
and appreciation of the evidence presented.
 Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of
policemen. Law enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the
contrary (People v. De Jesus, 145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the prosecution
witnesses should fabricate their testimonies and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v.
Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).

The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in
Olongapo City all that time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obiña for no reason at all.

In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself
(People v. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).

Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La
Cruz, supra).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-

appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and
found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him
away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at
about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation.
The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act was filed against him. 2Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also
been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement
of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was granted, and trial
proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that
the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified
by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he
descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag
he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI
forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them.
On the basis of this finding, the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was
manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of
wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not
even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He
also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properly Identified and could have
been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC headquarters. 14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose
and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two
watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched
by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a
friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment,
observing that he had not sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by him. 19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand.
Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the
truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering
for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.

The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was
not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That
is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention
by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No
bail has been allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in
evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the
Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it
came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid
as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was
the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was
arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it
was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we
may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin on June
25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana leaves on
that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular informer,
prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by
Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the coming
of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For instance,
report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you also
receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security reason and
we cannot Identify the person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with drugs?

A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received by you
many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984 that was
the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we
have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already gathered
information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in your
intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search warrant
anymore?
 A Search warrant is not necessary. 23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC.
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed
to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be
invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was
held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of the customs law
because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was
made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the
head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called
"buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of
arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was
it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank
of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was
like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed
to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined
by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we
will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain
of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is
innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to
convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple
fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous
phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless
arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also
illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the
compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the
basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike
against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not
allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution
itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant,
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption
that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is
ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MIKAEL

MALMSTEDT, *defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for defendant-appellant.

PADILLA, J.:

In an information dated 15 June 1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt (hereinafter referred to as the
accused) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10, in Criminal
Case No. 89-CR-0663, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended. The factual background of the case is as follows:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December
1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.

At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon
trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989.
From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.1

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men
to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking
all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted
by persistent reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.2

The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up
a checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from
the Cordillera Region.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and CIC
Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct
an inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the
bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's
waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to
comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object
turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4)
suspicious-looking objects wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped
objects. The wrapped objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each
bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like
foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet
for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were found to
also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found among the personal effects of
accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which
is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act.

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in
his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely entrusted to him by
an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the
same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride
and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck containing,
among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn handed it to his
companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he charged the accused that there
was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was taken with the pouch bag placed around
his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's defense.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure
to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office,
he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers in his bag. It
was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about said claim, denying ownership of
the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his pouch bag.

In a decision dated 12 October 1989, the trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, specifically Section 4, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended. 3 The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt, this Court
finds him GUILTY of violation of Section 4, Article 11 of Republic Act 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

Let the hashish subject of this case be turned over to the First Narcotics Regional Unit at Camp Bado; Dangwa, La
Trinidad Benguet for proper disposition under Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act 6425, as amended.

SO ORDERED.4

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search warrant and,
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not admissible as evidence
against him.

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there
is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a
private person under the following circumstances.6

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
 (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7. (6a 17a).

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest.7

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.8 The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure is not determined by any fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.9

Warrantless search of the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because
of existence of probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused,10or where the accused was acting suspiciously,11 and attempted to flee.12

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said information
was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that accused came down by bus
from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no time to
obtain a search warrant. In the Tangliben case,13 the police authorities conducted a surveillance at the Victory
Liner Terminal located at Bgy. San Nicolas, San Fernando Pampanga, against persons engaged in the traffic of
dangerous drugs, based on information supplied by some informers. Accused Tangliben who was acting
suspiciously and pointed out by an informer was apprehended and searched by the police authorities. It was held
that when faced with on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly and there was no time to
secure a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It was only
when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the inspection, that accused
was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his identification papers, when ordered to
do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it
not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his
identification papers when required to do so?

The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited drugs in
his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport, taken together as a whole, led
the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused was trying to hide something illegal from the
authorities. From these circumstances arose a probable cause which justified the warrantless search that was
made on the personal effects of the accused. In other words, the acts of the NARCOM officers in requiring the
accused to open his pouch bag and in opening one of the wrapped objects found inside said bag (which was
discovered to contain hashish) as well as the two (2) travelling bags containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by accused's own attempt to hide his identity by refusing to present his
passport, and by the information received by the NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession. To deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability and facility to act accordingly, including,
to search even without warrant, in the light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and
ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his
capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D.
CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL MANASES G.
REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal
Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City
Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.

Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant
Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued, on
different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they
were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).

as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or
intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to
above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised
Penal Code."

Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and
the Rules of Court — because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and
things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were
issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were
not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law — on March 20,
1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and
injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course,
thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and
commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with
Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated
under the search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and
have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners'
consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners,
regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
 On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers,
documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the
injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations
have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of
the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to
the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the
corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:

. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not
relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the
constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights
of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by
one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had
not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its
violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501,
511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United
States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)

With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the
aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this
Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using them in evidence against
petitioners herein.

In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely:
(1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are
valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers
and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1äwphï1.ñët

Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that
accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the
Constitution 13 provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and
(2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were
issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of
Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words,
no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have
found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,"
— as alleged in the aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws
or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy
of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is
precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted — to outlaw the so-called
general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party
in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court 14 by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was
compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.

Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants
sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature,
thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized
be particularly described — as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if
the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized
are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of
the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the
American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is
protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully obtained, 17 such as the common-law action
for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and
against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability
to an unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.

However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the
exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:

As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been
unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege.
In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have been protection enough; but
that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches
and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
 praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal
20
Court. After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):

. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free
from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic
right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.

Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion
as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the
assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the
freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual
nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf
that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court
as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the
exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that
proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible
of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive
protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches — state or federal — it was
logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine — an essential part of the right to
privacy — be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case.
In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been
forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to
withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule to "is to deter — to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively
available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional
restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy
embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against
rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit
that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as
other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the
whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment.
Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is
entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice.
(emphasis ours.)

Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search
warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party
against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the
requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not
possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of
the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish
a probable cause.

Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or
make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration,
overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly,
those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap
under which the minority usually — but, understandably — finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of securing their
conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit the illegality had been
committed.

In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962,
petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House
No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises
considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J.
Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects
under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a standing under the latest
rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the
aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, not in
their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution
of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions,
to suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now advanced by
petitioners herein.

Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said
motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the cases relied upon by the
petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not
deem it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in
appropriate cases in the future.

We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned;
that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June
29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary
injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the
petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects
seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without
special pronouncement as to costs.

It is so ordered.

[G.R. No. L-32409. February 27, 1971.]

BACHE & CO. (PHIL.), INC. and FREDERICK E. SEGGERMAN, Petitioners, v. HON. JUDGE
VIVENCIO M. RUIZ, MISAEL P. VERA, in his capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
ARTURO LOGRONIO, RODOLFO DE LEON, GAVINO VELASQUEZ, MIMIR DELLOSA,
NICANOR ALCORDO, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, JOHN DOE, and JOHN DOE, Respondents.

San Juan, Africa, Gonzales & San Agustin, for Petitioners.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V . Bautista, Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez
and Special Attorney Jaime M. Maza for Respondents.

DECISION

VILLAMOR, J.:

This is an original action of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction. In their petition Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the Philippines, and its President, Frederick E. Seggerman, pray this Court to
declare null and void Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge on February 25, 1970; to order
respondents to desist from enforcing the same and/or keeping the documents, papers and effects seized by virtue
thereof, as well as from enforcing the tax assessments on petitioner corporation alleged by petitioners to have
been made on the basis of the said documents, papers and effects, and to order the return of the latter to petitioners.
We gave due course to the petition but did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for therein.

The pertinent facts of this case, as gathered from record, are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On February 24, 1970, respondent Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter
addressed to respondent Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners
for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code, in relation to all other pertinent provisions
thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon, one
of herein respondents, to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter.

In the afternoon of the following day, February 25, 1970, respondent De Leon and his witness, respondent
Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers:
respondent Vera’s aforesaid letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned
by respondent De Leon; an affidavit of respondent Logronio subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition
in printed form of respondent Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a
search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by respondent Judge.

At that time respondent Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy
Clerk of Court to take the depositions of respondents De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned,
respondent Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer, upon request of
respondent Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, respondent Judge asked respondent
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he
could be charged for perjury. Respondent Judge signed respondent de Leon’s application for search warrant and
respondent Logronio’s deposition, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was then sign by respondent Judge and
accordingly issued.

Three days later, or on February 28, 1970, which was a Saturday, the BIR agents served the search warrant
petitioners at the offices of petitioner corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. Petitioners’ lawyers protested
the search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant. The
agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded six boxes of documents.

On March 3, 1970, petitioners filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that the
search warrant be quashed, dissolved or recalled, that preliminary prohibitory and mandatory writs of injunction
be issued, that the search warrant be declared null and void, and that the respondents be ordered to pay petitioners,
jointly and severally, damages and attorney’s fees. On March 18, 1970, the respondents, thru the Solicitor General,
filed an answer to the petition. After hearing, the court, presided over by respondent Judge, issued on July 29,
1970, an order dismissing the petition for dissolution of the search warrant. In the meantime, or on April 16, 1970,
the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments on petitioner corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97,
partly, if not entirely, based on the documents thus seized. Petitioners came to this Court.

The petition should be granted for the following reasons:

1. Respondent Judge failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

The pertinent provisions of the Constitution of the Philippines and of the Revised Rules of Court are:

"(3) The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Art. III, Sec. 1,
Constitution.)

"SEC. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

"No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

"SEC. 4. Examination of the applicant. — The judge or justice of the peace must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their
 depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." (Rule 126,
Revised Rules of Court.)

The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, required by Art. III, Sec. 1, par.
3, of the Constitution, and by Secs. 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, should be conducted by the
judge himself and not by others. The phrase "which shall be determined by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce," appearing in the said constitutional
provision, was introduced by Delegate Francisco as an amendment to the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee
of Seven. The following discussion in the Constitutional Convention (Laurel, Proceedings of the Philippine
Constitutional Convention, Vol. III, pp. 755-757) is enlightening:

"SR. ORENSE. Vamos a dejar compañero los piropos y vamos al grano. En los casos de una necesidad de actuar
inmediatamente para que no se frusten los fines de la justicia mediante el registro inmediato y la incautacion del
cuerpo del delito, no cree Su Señoria que causaria cierta demora el procedimiento apuntado en su enmienda en tal
forma que podria frustrar los fines de la justicia o si Su Señoria encuentra un remedio para esto casos con el fin de
compaginar los fines de la justicia con los derechos del individuo en su persona, bienes etcetera, etcetera.

"SR. FRANCISCO. No puedo ver en la practica el caso hipottico que Su Señoria pregunta por la siguiente razon:
el que solicita un mandamiento de registro tiene que hacerlo por escrito y ese escrito no aparecer en la Mesa del
Juez sin que alguien vaya el juez a presentar ese escrito o peticion de sucuestro. Esa persona que presenta el registro
puede ser el mismo denunciante o alguna persona que solicita dicho mandamiento de registro. Ahora toda la
enmienda en esos casos consiste en que haya peticion de registro y el juez no se atendra solamente a sea peticion
sino que el juez examiner a ese denunciante y si tiene testigos tambin examiner a los testigos.

"SR. ORENSE. No cree Su Señoria que el tomar le declaracion de ese denunciante por escrito siempre requeriria
algun tiempo?.

"SR. FRANCISCO. Seria cuestio de un par de horas, pero por otro lado minimizamos en todo lo posible las
vejaciones injustas con la expedicion arbitraria de los mandamientos de registro. Creo que entre dos males debemos
escoger. el menor.

x x x

"MR. LAUREL. . . . The reason why we are in favor of this amendment is because we are incorporating
in our constitution something of a fundamental character. Now, before a judge could issue a search warrant, he
must be under the obligation to examine personally under oath the complainant and if he has any witness, the
witnesses that he may produce . . ."

The implementing rule in the Revised Rules of Court, Sec. 4, Rule 126, is more emphatic and candid, for
it requires the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce . . ."

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to
determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3, of the
Constitution, and Sec. 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, both of which prohibit the issuance of warrants
except "upon probable cause." The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the exercise
of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule
to the contrary.

In the case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the complainant
(respondent De Leon) and his witness (respondent Logronio). While it is true that the complainant’s application
for search warrant and the witness’ printed-form deposition were subscribed and sworn to before respondent
Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for
determining whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the participants seem to
have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of the proceedings before respondent Judge were not
even taken. At this juncture it may be well to recall the salient facts. The transcript of stenographic notes (pp. 61-
76, April 1, 1970, Annex J-2 of the Petition) taken at the hearing of this case in the court below shows that per
instruction of respondent Judge, Mr. Eleodoro V. Gonzales, Special Deputy Clerk of Court, took the depositions
of the complainant and his witness, and that stenographic notes thereof were taken by Mrs. Gaspar. At that time
respondent Judge was at the sala hearing a case. After respondent Judge was through with the hearing, Deputy
Clerk Gonzales, stenographer Gaspar, complainant De Leon and witness Logronio went to respondent Judge’s
chamber and informed the Judge that they had finished the depositions. Respondent Judge then requested the
stenographer to read to him her stenographic notes. Special Deputy Clerk Gonzales testified as follows:
"A And after finishing reading the stenographic notes, the Honorable Judge requested or instructed them,
requested Mr. Logronio to raise his hand and warned him if his deposition will be found to be false and without
legal basis, he can be charged criminally for perjury. The Honorable Court told Mr. Logronio whether he affirms
the facts contained in his deposition and the affidavit executed before Mr. Rodolfo de Leon.

"Q And thereafter?

"A And thereafter, he signed the deposition of Mr. Logronio.

"Q Who is this he?

"A The Honorable Judge.

"Q The deposition or the affidavit?

"A The affidavit, Your Honor."

Thereafter, respondent Judge signed the search warrant.

The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of Search Warrant No.
2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against
the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be
consider a personal examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was the
one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution and the rules require a personal
examination by the judge. It was precisely on account of the intention of the delegates to the Constitutional
Convention to make it a duty of the issuing judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses that
the question of how much time would be consumed by the judge in examining them came up before the
Convention, as can be seen from the record of the proceedings quoted above. The reading of the stenographic
notes to respondent Judge did not constitute sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule;
for by that manner respondent Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the complainant
and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which the judicial mind, on account of its
training, was in the best position to conceive. These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-
important question of whether or not there was probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was issued for" [v]iolation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue
Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs. 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209." The question
is: Was the said search warrant issued "in connection with one specific offense," as required by Sec. 3, Rule 126?

To arrive at the correct answer it is essential to examine closely the provisions of the Tax Code referred
to above. Thus we find the following:

Sec. 46(a) requires the filing of income tax returns by corporations.

Sec. 53 requires the withholding of income taxes at source.

Sec. 72 imposes surcharges for failure to render income tax returns and for rendering false and fraudulent
returns.

Sec. 73 provides the penalty for failure to pay the income tax, to make a return or to supply the information
required under the Tax Code.

Sec. 208 penalizes" [a]ny person who distills, rectifies, repacks, compounds, or manufactures any article
subject to a specific tax, without having paid the privilege tax therefore, or who aids or abets in the conduct
of illicit distilling, rectifying, compounding, or illicit manufacture of any article subject to specific tax . .
.," and provides that in the case of a corporation, partnership, or association, the official and/or employee
who caused the violation shall be responsible.

Sec. 209 penalizes the failure to make a return of receipts, sales, business, or gross value of output
removed, or to pay the tax due thereon.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. The first
is the violation of Sec. 46(a), Sec. 72 and Sec. 73 (the filing of income tax returns), which are interrelated. The
second is the violation of Sec. 53 (withholding of income taxes at source). The third is the violation of Sec. 208
(unlawful pursuit of business or occupation); and the fourth is the violation of Sec. 209 (failure to make a return
of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output actually removed or to pay the tax due thereon). Even in their
classification the six above-mentioned provisions are embraced in two different titles: Secs. 46(a), 53, 72 and 73
are under Title II (Income Tax); while Secs. 208 and 209 are under Title V (Privilege Tax on Business and
Occupation).

Respondents argue that Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., L-19550, June 19, 1967 (20 SCRA 383), is not
applicable, because there the search warrants were issued for "violation of Central Bank Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code;" whereas, here Search Warrant No 2-M-70 was issued for violation of only one
code, i.e., the National Internal Revenue Code. The distinction more apparent than real, because it was precisely
on account of the Stonehill incident, which occurred sometime before the present Rules of Court took effect on
January 1, 1964, that this Court amended the former rule by inserting therein the phrase "in connection with one
specific offense," and adding the sentence "No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense," in
what is now Sec. 3, Rule 126. Thus we said in Stonehill:jgc:

"Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that ‘a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense.’ Not satisfied
with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that ‘no search warrant shall issue
for more than one specific offense.’"

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 in this
manner:

"Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements
books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts,
promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications, accounting and
business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign
remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970."

The description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be seized.

In Stonehill, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, said: "The grave violation
of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description
therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:

‘Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or paper showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.’

"Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions
of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the
seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — that the things to be seized be particularly described
— as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants."

While the term "all business transactions" does not appear in Search Warrant No. 2-M-70, the said warrant
nevertheless tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the elimination of general warrants, for
the language used therein is so all-embracing as to include all conceivable records of petitioner corporation,
which, if seized, could possibly render its business inoperative.

In Uy Kheytin, Et. Al. v. Villareal, etc., Et Al., 42 Phil. 886, 896, this Court had occasion to explain the
purpose of the requirement that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things
to be seized, to wit:

". . . Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ may not be made, —
 that abuses may not be committed. That this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is
borne out by American authorities.

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued
in this case.

A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description therein
is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow (People v. Rubio; 57 Phil. 384); or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search
and seizure (idem., dissent of Abad Santos, J.,); or when the things described are limited to those which bear
direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued (Sec. 2, Rule 126, Revised Rules of Court).
The herein search warrant does not conform to any of the foregoing tests. If the articles desired to be seized have
any direct relation to an offense committed, the applicant must necessarily have some evidence, other than those
articles, to prove the said offense; and the articles subject of search and seizure should come in handy merely to
strengthen such evidence. In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should have
mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data regarding the receipts of payments,
certificates of stocks and securities, contracts, promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications,
checks, bank deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated in the warrant.

Respondents contend that certiorari does not lie because petitioners failed to file a motion for
reconsideration of respondent Judge’s order of July 29, 1970. The contention is without merit. In the first place,
when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which were squarely raised in and passed upon
by the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in
this Court is no longer a prerequisite. (Pajo, etc., Et. Al. v. Ago, Et Al., 108 Phil., 905). In the second place, the
rule requiring the filing of a motion for reconsideration before an application for a writ of certiorari can be
entertained was never intended to be applied without considering the circumstances. (Matutina v. Buslon, Et Al.,
109 Phil., 140.) In the case at bar time is of the essence in view of the tax assessments sought to be enforced by
respondent officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue against petitioner corporation, On account of which
immediate and more direct action becomes necessary. (Matute v. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 26 SCRA 768.) Lastly,
the rule does not apply where, as in this case, the deprivation of petitioners’ fundamental right to due process
taints the proceeding against them in the court below not only with irregularity but also with nullity. (Matute v.
Court of Appeals, Et Al., supra.)

It is next contended by respondents that a corporation is not entitled to protection against unreasonable
search and seizures. Again, we find no merit in the contention.

"Although, for the reasons above stated, we are of the opinion that an officer of a corporation which is
charged with a violation of a statute of the state of its creation, or of an act of Congress passed in the exercise of
its constitutional powers, cannot refuse to produce the books and papers of such corporation, we do not wish to
be understood as holding that a corporation is not entitled to immunity, under the 4th Amendment, against
unreasonable searches and seizures. A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed
name and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no constitutional
immunities appropriate to such body. Its property cannot be taken without compensation. It can only be proceeded
against by due process of law, and is protected, under the 14th Amendment, against unlawful discrimination . . ."
(Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. ed. 652.)

"In Linn v. United States, 163 C.C.A. 470, 251 Fed. 476, 480, it was thought that a different rule applied
to a corporation, the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a
corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been
achieved in a lawful way." (Silverthorne Lumber Company, Et. Al. v. United States of America, 251 U.S. 385,
64 L. ed. 319.)

In Stonehill, Et. Al. v. Diokno, Et Al., supra, this Court impliedly recognized the right of a corporation to
object against unreasonable searches and seizures, thus:

"As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of
the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said
corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein
petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or the interest of each of them in said corporations,
whatever, the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can
be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an
unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently,
petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and
 things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object
to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized
effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity . . ."

In the Stonehill case only the officers of the various corporations in whose offices documents, papers and
effects were searched and seized were the petitioners. In the case at bar, the corporation to whom the seized
documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself a petitioner. On that score, petitioner
corporation here stands on a different footing from the corporations in Stonehill.

The tax assessments referred to earlier in this opinion were, if not entirely — as claimed by petitioners —
at least partly — as in effect admitted by respondents — based on the documents seized by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 2-M-70. Furthermore, the fact that the assessments were made some one and one-half months after
the search and seizure on February 25, 1970, is a strong indication that the documents thus seized served as basis
for the assessments. Those assessments should therefore not be enforced.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is granted. Accordingly, Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by
respondent Judge is declared null and void; respondents are permanently enjoined from enforcing the said search
warrant; the documents, papers and effects seized thereunder are ordered to be returned to petitioners; and
respondent officials the Bureau of Internal Revenue and their representatives are permanently enjoined from
enforcing the assessments mentioned in Annex "G" of the present petition, as well as other assessments based on
the documents, papers and effects seized under the search warrant herein nullified, and from using the same
against petitioners in any criminal or other proceeding. No pronouncement as to costs.

A.M. No. L-207-J April 22, 1977

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, complainant, vs. HONORABLE PIO MARCOS District Judge, Second
Judicial District, CFI of Benguet and Baguio City, Branch I, stationed at the City of Baguio respondent.
DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

The administrative complaint for gross inefficiency filed by Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos
against the then respondent Judge Pio Marcos of the Court of First Instance of Benguet and Baguio City, now
retired after having reached the age of seventy, 1 arose from the issuance of a search warrant past 12:00 midnight
of April 4, 1971, and thereafter served and executed approximately two hours later, long before dawn. The
grounds alleged were that the search warrant was not limited to one offense covering both illegal possession of
firearms and violation of Central Bank rules and regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to
be seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his witnesses; that articles not mentioned
were taken; and that thereafter the return and the inventory although appearing to have been prepared on said date
were not actually submitted to respondent Judge until April 13, 1971 and the objects seized delivered only about
a week later on April 19.

There was a lengthy and detailed answer submitted by respondent Judge, the essence of which was
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, the procedure followed
by him conforming to the practice he found quite conducive to fruitful results in the campaign against smuggling,
resulting in intensified tax collection. He asserted that he is legally and morally convinced of his innocence of the
charge of gross inefficiency, his actuations being guided by the prescriptions of the Constitution and the rules or
the spirit thereof as well as the best interest of the State. He then alleged that the application for the search warrant
was filed by the Chief of Police of Baguio City, Colonel Victorino S. Calano duly supported by the affidavit of
one Romeo Amansec, who was subjected to intensive examination and interrogation, the other witness, one
Sergeant Victorino de Vera of the Philippine Constabulary, also being thus examined and interrogated, all three
of them describing with particularity and in detail the place to be searched and the things to be seized; that the
applicant and his witnesses arrived at his place at about 10:30 p.m. and the warrant issued at 11:45, the promptness
with which he acted being due to the urgency of the matter; that there was only one specific offense therein
covered, namely robbery in band with the use of a firearm then in the possession of the alleged leader Rogelio
Roxas, who had allegedly taken by force a treasure in the form of a golden Buddha; that after the interrogation,
he was convinced that the offense of robbery in band was committed and that the Buddha had to be seized before
dawn as it would be taken out of Baguio and smuggled out of the country; that the delay in the delivery to the
court could be explained by the conclusion reached by him that from the angle of security and safety, the articles
seized should be kept and guarded by the CIS agents at Camp Holmes, only a few kilometers from Baguio, under
tight security and personal responsibility of Colonel Calano and that as to those things taken or seized not covered
by the warrant, the persons aggrieved could file a motion for their return, his duty to act on the matter starting to
commence only when it is submitted judicially Respondent Judge prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack
of merit.

The Complaint and the answer were then referred for investigation, report and recommendation to the
then Associate, now Acting Presiding, Justice Magno S. Gatmaitan of the Court of Appeals, He conducted a
thorough investigation arid thereafter submitted an exhaustive and comprehensive report on May 31, 1974. The
grounds alleged in the complaint to show inefficiency he classified in the following: The first, the failure to follow
the legal Procedure by respondent Judge when he issued tile warrant,; the second, the defects manifest on the face
thereof as two offenses were included and the description of the premises to be searched and the object to be
seized being too general; the third, the absence of the probable cause; and the fourth, the article seized having
included objects not mentioned in the warrant and the delay in the delivery thereof to respond judge.

As to the first ground, the failure to follow the legal Procedure by respondent Judge when he issued the
warrant, Justice Gatamaitan stated the following in his Report: “There can be no question that from a reading of
the application for search warrant by Col. Calano and the affidavit by witness Romeo Amansec is well as the
search warrant itself, it can be decuded that — the deposition in writing of Sgt. De Vera had not been taken to
contrary to 4 of Rule 126; but Investigator must agree with defense that Respondent did examine under oath, Col.
Calano and witnesses, Romeo Amansec and Sgt. De Vera for Investigator notes that complainant Secretary of
Justice himself presented as his sole witness, Clerk of Court. Fernando R. Romero, and this witness declared that,

‘Q.’ Would you be able to tell us more or less what sorts of questions were propounded by Judge Marcos
by way of interrogating these witnesses

A I cannot repeat the words because it was a long time ago, but if I may be permitted to make a gist I may
be able to relate.

Q. Please do so.

A.After administering the oath individually to Col. Calano Amansec and de Vera after giving their names
and other personal circumstances, he dealt on the questions “What were those articles that were the subject of the
application? And they described the articles, what I heard are a golden Buddha, a rifle with some ammunitions ‘
This being the case, Investigator is bound to accept this testimony and must hold that outside of the literal defect
in that Respondent had not taken the written disposition of Sgt. de Vera, the proceedings he had adopted were not
fatally wrong, in fact, it might as well be added that there is something very probable and thereof credible, in the
testimony of this witness that time was of the extreme essence, the urgency of the situation could no longer permit
further going back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for renewed typing of application and affidavits and warrant,
at any rate, since it was complainant Secretary of Justice himself who presented Clerk of Court Romero, he should
be bound by latter’s testimony. … ” 2As to the second ground consisting of the warrant Being defective because
it was issued for two offenses and tile description of the premises to be searched and the objects to be seized being
too general, Justice Gatmaitan discussed the matter thus: “Since the warrant really stated that it as issued for,
‘Illegal Possession of firearms and Violation of Central Bank Rules and Regulations,’ and the body recited that,
‘Accused Rogelio Roxas illegally possess[es] firearms and ammunition without license or permit to possess the
same and a golden Buddha which he is keeping and concealing at his premises at No. 47 Ledesma St., Baguio
City in violation of Central Bank Rules and Regulations; Investigator must concur with complainant that this
warrant violated See. 3 of Rule 126 which provides that, ‘No Search warrant shall issue for more than one specific
offense.’ Investigation must even add that the particular Central Bank circular or regulation is not determined: as
to the attack on the description of the premises to be searched and the objects to he seized, what Investigator
understands is that the test of a good description for purposes of sufficiency of the warrant ‘is that it be one that
would not permit seizure of the wrong property, indeed the very cited by Complainant where the search warrant
described the objects as, ‘books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with
his activities as money lender charging a usurious rate of interest in violation of the law,’ this description was
held to be good enough the Supreme Court reasoning, ‘Taking into consideration to nature of “he articles so
described, it is clear that no other more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it
is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof, The description so made substantially complies
with the legal provisions because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position
enabling him to Identify the articles in question, which he did,’ … so that here, since certainly, no one would be
mistaken in Identifying the Buddha, whose image is well known, and even the firearms and ammunition because
these were those without permit to possess, and all located at No. 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as
description was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal defects. 3 As to the
third charge that the search warrant was issued without probable cause, Justice Gatmaitan started with the affidavit
of Amansec showing that ” ‘on or about 6:30 a. m. of March 31, 1971, I went to Baguio City and while I passed
by a house at No. 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio City I was attracted by several persons inside the house; That I
peeped from outside the house and when the curtain was moved I saw a Buddha that was inside the house; That
I observed what was going on inside the house and I heard someone say that the golden Buddha was actually for
sale and when I observed them closer I overheard that it was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos; That I
peeped again and I actually saw for myself again the Buddha and I heard one of the persons inside whom I later
found out to be Mr. Rogelio Roxas that it was a golden Buddha but that a down payment was needed; That I am
executing this affidavit because I actually saw the Buddha and that I also saw a firearms and some bullets inside
the house.’ which can easily sustain, contrary to complainant’s position, that Amansecs knowledge was not
hearsay at all; as to Sgt. De Vera, it will be seen that according to his testimony,

‘Q. Upon arrival in Baguio, did you seek the coordination of the Police Force in Baguio?

A. Not upon our arrival, but late in the evening, sir.

Q. What else did you do between 10:00 a.m. and 4:00 p.m. that same day, April 4, 1971, when you went
to see Col. Calano

A. We conducted a survey and tried to find out and I found out that the Buddha is really existing in the
house of Rogelio Roxas, at No. 47 Ledesma Street.

Q. Were you able to pinpoint where the Buddha is?

A. Yes, sir. We went to the place at No. 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio City to determine that.

Q. What did you find out?

A. That it was really existing.’

… from which investigator concludes that Sgt. de Vera’s knowledge neither was hearsay either; now
complainant point[ed] out certain alleged discrepancies between the affidavit of Amansec and his interrogation,
… but perhaps, neither should it be overlooked that all these if they existed at all were directed to the conscience
of examining Judge, who was the one called upon to grade their credibility, to act with precision; the point is that
while at this beginning the knowledge of witnesses had come thru their information from their undercover men,
the fact also was that they were able to confirm the same with their own eyes, the existence of the suspected
articles within the premises, and that was what they certified under interrogation, — from respondent, — as
declared no less by complainant’s own witness, the Clerk of Court, Fernando R. Romero who was present
threat. 4As to the fourth accusation of gross inefficiency, based on the delay in the return as well as the delivery
of the objects seized, Justice Gatmaitan did concur “with complainant that the return was quite delayed; for in the
words of See. 11, Rule 126, the searching officer should forthwith deliver the seized articles, yet, while search
had been made on the night of 5 April, or better stated, early morning of 6 April, 1971, the return was made only
on 13 April, 1971. As to the Buddha, it was stated in the return that it was, ‘under the control and custody of
Government Security Agents for safekeeping and will be turned over to this Honorable Court when directed to
do so.’ … Now if it be remembered that Police chief Calano kept the Buddha in his residence in Camp Holmes,
… for several days, that provided the most fertile ground for suspicion of possible substitution; however,
Investigator will concede that the duty to make immediate return devolved upon the searching party, perhaps a
Judge cannot, considering that he has other duties, be expected to immediately act and require immediate return;
perhaps, if there might and probably could be, danger of substitution, the attention of the Judge should be
immediately called to that, here it was not ever, at least, there is nothing in the evidence to that effect; … However,
the searching officer’s duty is to immediately return to the Court with the seized articles; here the raiding party
returned 7 days later, but without the Buddha, although Investigator sees that on that date, 13 April, 1971, when
the return was made without the Buddha, respondent issued the order reading, “In the 1st Indorsement dated April
5, 1971 signed by the Acting Chief of Police of Baguio, the following articles were seized by virtue of Search
Warrant No. 296 issued by the undersigned, to wit: One (1) Buddha allegedly golden about 28 inches in height
more or less; … . All these articles were delivered to this Court, except the first item which is , one (1) Buddha
allegedly golden about 28 inches in height more or less.’ To complete the record of search warrant No. 296, the
Acting Chief of Police is hereby ordered to deliver to this Office the ‘one (1) Buddha allegedly golden about 28
inches in height more or less. It is so ordered]. City of Baguio, Philippines, this 13th day of April, 1971. …
Although not mentioned in the memorandum but mentioned in the complaint, is the fact that article not mentioned
in the warrant, i.e., ‘1 old saber with scabbard, and 14 pieces of brassbars, appearance similar to gold bars were
seized … — as to this, respondent’s answer that Fiscal had the right to take action, as well as aggrieved person to
file corresponding pleading in court, … — this is correct. Therefore, as to the delay in the return and the seizure
of other articles not mentioned in the search warrant, Investigator must conclude that he can find no way to blame
respondent’s. 5
 The conclusions reached by Justice Gatmaitan follow: “From foregoing, Investigator come to the
conclusions that Respondent: 1st — Issued subject search warranty after examining the witnesses as well as
complainant thereof under oath, that the examination sufficiently complied with the requirement as to the
description of the place to be searched and the object to be seized and that the knowledge of the witnesses was
not hearsay but on their own knowledge; however, insofar as the fact that the written deposition of witness Sgt.
De Vera was not taken down and the same attached to the record, Respondent violated Sec. 4 of Rule 126; 2nd
— There was probable cause to issue the warrant; but the warrant itself suffered of the defect that it was for two
(2) offenses and one of these was not even specified by stating with precision what Central Bank circular or
regulation had been infringed contrary to Rule 126, See. 3; 3rd — As to the delay in the return, and as to the
seizure of brass bars and a saber not mentioned in the warrant, Therein Investigator has not seen that Respondent
should be made liable. 6

Then came his recommendation: “In view whereof, while Investigator believes that aforecited defects in
the search warrant might perhaps have justified setting it aside on certiorari, this being however an administrative
case, maybe something more should have been shown to justify punishment, for otherwise, all Judges whose
orders are assailed and annulled under the extraordinary legal remedies must be visited with definite sanctions,
— something more should have been shown, some partiality, bias, prejudice, wrongful motive, but which
Complainant has not shown nor even attempted to show, and Investigator after some reflection having come to
believe that in the extreme urgency in which Respondendt had found himself, even other judges, even investigator
himself, would have fallen into the same mistake, — therefore, he respectfully desist from recommending a
specific severe or even less than severe punishments, — this subject of course to his Highest Court’s other wiser
criterion. 7

What immediately attracts attention in the above sentence of Justice Gatmaitans recommendation is the
extreme care he took to indicate that he is not to be understood as intruding in and way with the full discretion
that appropriately belongs to his court. It reflects his high sense of delicadeza. Nonetheless, it would appear
obvious, considering the exhaustive report and the ‘language employed after his painstaking appraisal of the
evidence of record, that there is not sufficient warrant for any disciplinary action against respondent, As he
correctly pointed out, a certiorari proceeding could have been availed of for correctly purposes. Moreover, it must
have been Justice Gatmaitans sense of realism fortified by long years of service as a trial judge and possibly
excessive modesty that did lead him to say that he could have fallen into the same mistake. As “.’as categorically
affirmed by retired Chief Justice Makalintal Dizon v. De Borja: 8 “To hold a judge administratively accountable
for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable. 9 Nonetheless, it is not inappropriate to place on record that
a trial judge in the position of respondent ought to have abided with the settled juristic norm that a warrant should
not be issued for more than one offense and that the deposition of the witness should be made in writing and
thereafter attuned to the record.

One last word. It is to be recalled that, as noted at the outset, respondent judge retired on July 11, 1975.
The writer of this opinion is of the view, following Diamalon v. Quintilla, 10that as an administrative proceeding
is predicated on the holding of an office or position in the government, the resignation or retirement calls for its
dismissal. Nonetheless, in Perez v. Abiera, 11this Court, in an opinion by Justice Muñoz Palma, ruled: “In short,
the cessation from office of a respondent Judge either because of resignation, retirement or some other similar
cause does not per se warrant the dismissal of an administrative complaint which was filed against him while still
in the service. Each case is to be resolved in the context of the circumstances present thereat.” 12

WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint for gross inefficiency against Judge Pio Marcos is dismissed.
Let a copy of this resolution be placed on his record.

G.R. No. L-28642 April 30, 1976

MARIA CASTRO and CO LING petitioners, vs. HONORABLE JAVIER PABALAN, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of La Union, and SGT. ERNESTO LUMANG, respondents.

Marcelino B. Florentino for petitioners.

Jose L Yumang for respondent Sgt. Ernesto Lumang. Hon. Javier Pabalan for and in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:

This Court is confronted anew in this certiorari proceeding with the claim that a search warrant issued
without complying with the requisites of the Constitution 1 and the Rules of Court 2 should have been nullified,
but was not in the challenged order of respondent Judge Javier Pabalan. 3 More specifically, it was the failure of
the application for the search warrant as well as the search warrant itself to specify the specific offense, to examine
the applicant as well as his witnesses on the part of respondent Judge, and to describe with particularity the place
to be searched and the things to be seized, that were singled out to justify the assertion of illegality. When required
to answer, respondent Judge did not bother to refute specifically the allegations of the petition for certiorari, but
merely contented himself with inviting attention to the challenged order as well as the resolutions denying the
motion for reconsideration and with the statement that he "has no particular prayer to ask the Supreme Court," an
assertion thereafter repeated in the second paragraph of his two-paragraph answer that he "has no request to make
in this particular case leaving the issues entirely to the discretion of the Supreme Court." 4 The tone of diffidence,
almost of apology, is easy to understand. It is difficult to resist the thought that respondent Judge failed to pay
heed to authoritative decisions of this Court. The most cursory perusal of the application for search warrant 5 by
respondent Lumang and the search warrant itself, 6 yields no other conclusion. Respondent Judge ignored what
the Constitution requires on two points, the existence of a probable cause and the particular description of the
things to be seized. The limitation as to the specific offense as mandated by the Rules of Court was not observed
either. Even on the assumption then that he could not

relevant According to the former: "A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection
with one specific offense to be determined by the municipal or city judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
Section 4 provides: "The municipal or city judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach
them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him." be held chargeable with knowledge of the
leading Stonehill decision, 7 announced barely twenty days before the search warrant in question was issued, still
from Alverez v. Court of First Instance 8 the first to be decided under the 1935 Constitution, promulgated in 1937,
to Oca v. Marquez, 9 that came out in 1965, this Court had adhered firmly to the view that for a search warrant to
escape the imputation of being unreasonable, there should be strict conformity with the requirements of the
Constitution and the applicable procedural rules. The finding then should have been against the validity of the
search warrant. Nonetheless, insofar as such order limited itself to requiring the return solely of the liquor, the
pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin, all of which may be considered
as personal effects of petitioners, with the rest of the goods taken falling under the category of things forbidden
by law and therefore need not be restored, 10 it can be sustained. So we rule.

In the opening paragraph of the application for search warrant, respondent Ernesto I. Lumang admitted
that "he has been informed" and therefore was of the belief that petitioners Maria Castro and Co Ling, whose
place of residence was not even indicated, although subsequently mention was made of their being at Barrio
Padasil, Bangar, La Union, "have in possession narcotics and other contraband." 11 There is a claim that he had
verified the report and that therefore he had "reasons to believe that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable
the undersigned to take possession" of such narcotics and other contraband. 12 The application was accompanied
by the joint affidavit of a Sergeant Francisco C. Molina and a Corporal Lorenzo G. Apilado of the Philippine
Constabulary. 13 Again, mention was merely made of their information about narcotics and other contraband
being kept by petitioners. They did allege therein that they conducted rigid surveillance, but all they could come
out with is that petitioner Co Ling is an overstaying alien for almost ten years conducting such traffic and that
after verification, he was not registered in the Immigration Office. 14 Then, on the very same day, July 10, 1967,
the search warrant was issued for illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. 15 Again, there was reference to the
possession by petitioners of such forbidden goods. As to the complete and detailed description of the properties
to be seized, the search warrant merely mentioned illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband inside the warehouse
and premises of petitioners. 16 In the resolution upholding the validity of the search warrant, respondent Judge did
state the following: "On July 10, 1967, Ernesto Lumang, Sgt. of the PC, with a long service behind, appeared in
chamber before the Presiding Judge of Branch I of this Court. With him were Sgt. Molina and Cpl. Apilado both
of the PC Command of La Union. The three submitted to the Presiding Judge in chamber an application for search
warrant which is Exhibit I in this case and a joint affidavit supporting the search warrant asked. As Sgt. Lumang
said, testifying regarding this incident, those appearing were asked, although not in writing and not recorded,
some questions by the Presiding Judge regarding their request of the search warrant on the knowledge of Molina
and Apilado on the facts stated on the application and on the joint affidavit. The inquiry was brief. The barrio to
be searched was handwritten in ink, Maria Cristina cancelling the typewritten name Padasil. But this correction
was not done in the duplicates. Anyhow Padasil and Maria Cristina are adjoining barrios. After the routine taking
of their oath and examination questions and answers, the Presiding Judge of this Branch signed the application
for search warrant, the joint affidavits, and forthwith issued the search warrant which is Exhibit C." 17

As set forth at the outset, failure to abide by both the Constitution and the procedural law in terms of the
existence of a probable cause, a particular description of the property to be seized and the requirement that there
be only one specific offense, is quite manifest.
 1. This excerpt from the epochal opinion of former Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno 18 is
highly relevant: "Two points must be stressed in connection with — this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. None of these requirements
has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a 'violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.' In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in
said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence,
it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the
same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As
a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a 'violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,' — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes."19 That
same approach is reflected in the two subsequent cases of Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. v. Ruiz 20 and Asian Surety &
Insurance Co., Inc. v. Herrera. 21 It bears repeating, as was emphasized in Stonehill v. Diokno, that the averments
as to the alleged commission of the offenses imputed to petitioner were abstract. As admitted in the challenged
order, the inquiry was brief. Subsequently, reference was made to "the routine taking of [their oath] and
examination questions and answers ..." 22 Nor can such perfunctory manner in which respondent Judge conducted
the required "examination under oath" be justified merely because respondent Lumang was "a Sergeant of the
PC, with a long service behind [him]." 23 Moreover, contrary to the Rules of Court, he did not even bother to take
the depositions of the witnesses in writing, attaching them to the record. 24 There was thus a manifest and palpable
violation of the constitutional standard as to the quantum of proof to show the existence of probable cause, as so
clearly enunciated in Stonehill.

2. Then again, the Constitution requires, for the validity of a search warrant, that there be a particular
description of "the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 25 As was admitted by the judge
in the challenged resolution, there was a mistake concerning the residence of petitioners, which was set forth in
the search warrant as being in Barrio Padasil when in fact it is in Barrio Maria Cristina. He would gloss over such
inaccuracy by saying that they were, anyway, adjoining barrios. As to the premises to be searched, it may be
admitted that the deficiency in the writ is not of sufficient gravity to call for its invalidation. Nonetheless, and
again in line with Stonehill v. Diokno, the Constitution is quite explicit that there be a particular description of
the things to be seized. That requisite was not complied with in this case. That would explain why the searching
party felt it had a free hand and did take possession of various kinds of goods, including personal effects, which
respondent Judge himself would have them return. What was aptly characterized as a "major objective" of this
constitutional provision, the elimination of general warrants, was thus frustrated. It need not be stressed anew that
this Court is resolutely committed to the doctrine that this constitutional provision is of a mandatory character
and therefore must be strictly complied with. 26 To quote from the landmark American decision of Boyd v. United
States: 27 "It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy
encroachments thereon. Their motto should be obsta principis." 28

3. Another infirmity was the failure to comply with the basic procedural requisite that a search warrant
"shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." 29 Here reference was made to
"an illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband." The latter is a generic term covering all goods exported from or
imported into the country contrary to applicable statutes. Necessarily then, more than one offense could arise from
the activity designated as illegal traffic of narcotics and contraband. As a matter of fact, in the challenged order,
reference was made to at least three charges having been filed, the violation of Section 203 of the Internal Revenue
Code, its Section 1039 on tax evasion, as well as illegal possession of opium. It would seem that once again what
was correctly pointed out by Chief Justice Concepcion in Stonehill v. Diokno as unjustified and unwarranted finds
application. Nor can there be any plausibility to the possible excuse, to repeat what was said before, that the
Stonehill opinion having been rendered only twenty days previous to the issuance of the search warrant,
respondent Judge could not be held chargeable with a knowledge thereof, considering that as far back as July 30,
1965, two years earlier, in Oca v. Marquez, 30 this Court, through the then Justice J. P. Bengzon, enunciated: "The
decision herein has applied the provisions of th Old Rules of Court since this case arose under said Rules.
Attention of the Bench and Bar is however called to the fact that effective January 1, 1964 the issuance of search
warrants is governed by Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which among other things requires
that a search warrant must be in connection with one specific offense." 31

4. As was made clear at the outset, though, the illegality of the search warrant does not call for the return
of the things seized, the possession of which is prohibited by law. This is the established doctrine in this
jurisdiction. As far back as Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 32 a 1920 decision, it was held: "That although in the issuance
of the search warrant in question the judge did not comply with the requirements of section 98 of General Orders
No. 58, the petitioners are not entitled to the return of the opium. and its paraphernalia which were found and
seized under said warrant, and much less are they entitled to be exonerated because of such omission of the
judge." 33 Among the authorities cited is Cooley: "'Search-warrants have heretofore been allowed to search for
stolen goods, for goods supposed to have been smuggled into the country in violation of the revenue laws, for
implements of gaming or counterfeiting, for lottery tickets or Prohibited liquors kept for sale contrary to law, for
obscene books and papers kept for sale or circulation, and for powder or other explosive and dangerous material
so kept as to endanger the public safety.'" 34 So, also, in Yee Sue Koy v. Almeda, 35 handed down in 1940, Justice
Laurel, speaking for this Court, stated: "If it be true, furthermore, without, however, deciding the point, that as
alleged by the respondents the articles in question constitute the corpus delicti of the Usury Law, their return to
the petitioners cannot be ordered." 36 Magoncia v. Palacios, 37 promulgated in 1948, reiterated such a doctrine.
Thus: "En el asunto de Uy Kheytin contra Villareal (42 Jur. Fil. 935), los recurrentes pidieron la devolucion del
opio de que se incautaron los constabularies al registrar su casa armados con un mandamiento de registro expedido
sin cumplir las disposiciones de los articulos 96 y 98 de la Orden General No. 58; sostenian que los requisites
exigidos por dichos articulos no se habian cumplido, y por tanto, el mandamiento de registro era ilegal, como si
no existiera; que al registro se ha hecho sin mandamiento de registro debidamente expedido. Este Tribunal denego
la peticion, declarando que la irregularidad de la expedicion del mandamiento de registro ne era suficiente causa
para ordenar la devolucion del opio. El Hon. Juez recurrido no abuso de su discrecion al denegar la devolucion al
acusado del paltik, 42 municiones y una granada de mano, tampoco abuso de su sana discrecion al denegar la
peticion del acusado de que se prohiba al Fiscal Provincial y al Jefe de Policia de Asingan, Pangasinan a presentar
tales efectos como prueba en la vista." 38

5. This decision leaves open the question of the legality of any possible use that may be made by the
prosecuting authorities of the articles seized under an invalid search warrant. Here, again, the Yee Sue Koy
opinion of Justice Laurel is illuminating, especially in view of the inadmissibility of evidence illegally seized
under the present Constitution 39 At this stage, the question does not have to be faced. The words of Justice Laurel
follow: "While we reiterate the rule that the seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant ' for
the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found
is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the
constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself ..., the said rule has
no applicable force in the present case. ... In the application for the issuance of the search warrant in question, it
was alleged that the articles seized were 'being used by it (Sam Sing & Co.) in connection with its activities of
lending money at usurious rate of interest in violation of the Usury Law,' and it is now suggested (memoranda of
respondents) that the only object of the agents of the Anti-Usury Board in keeping the articles is to prevent the
petitioners from employing them as a means of further violations of the Usury Law. In this state of the record,
without deciding the question whether the petitioners will in fact use the articles in question, if returned, for illegal
purposes, we are not prepared to order the return prayed for by the petitioners. (Cf. People v. Rubio, 57 Phil. 384,
394-395.)" 40

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of September 12, 1967 denying the motion
of petitioners to annul the search warrant as well as the resolutions of October 26, 1967 and January 29, 1968
denying the motions for reconsiderations are reversed, the decision of this Court being that the search warrant in
question is tainted by illegality for being violative both of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. It is likewise
the decision of this Court that notwithstanding the illegality of such search warrant, the challenged order of
respondent Judge can be sustained only insofar as it would limit the return of the articles seized to the liquor, the
pack of playing cards, the bottle of distilled water and five bottles of Streptomycin taken under such search
warrant. No costs.

G.R. No. L-25232 December 20, 1973

ASIAN SURETY and INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE HERRERA, as
Judge, City Court of Manila, NBI Agent CELSO J. ZOLETA, JR. and MANUEL
CUARESMA, respondents.

Astraquillo, Laquio, Brillantes and Associates, Tañada, Carmon and Tañada and Alidio, Elegir, Anchete and
Catipon petitioner.

Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for respondent Celso J. Zoleta,
Jr.

Antonio Barredo for respondent Manuel Cuaresma.

ESGUERRA, J.:
 Petition to quash and annul a search warrant issued by respondent Judge Jose Herrera of the City Court of
Manila, and to command respondents to return immediately the documents, papers, receipts and records alleged
to have been illegally seized thereunder by agents of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) led by respondent
Celso Zoleta, Jr.

On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta,
Jr. supported by the deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an
undocketed criminal case for estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and
Insurance Co., a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office
at Room 200 Republic Supermarket Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila. The search warrant is couched in the following
language:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath NBI Agent Celso J. Zoleta,
Jr. and his witness Manuel Cuaresma that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe that Mr.
William Li Yao or his employees has/have in his/their control in premises No. 2nd Floor Republic
Supermarket Building, in Rizal Avenue district of Sta. Cruz, Manila, property (Subject of the offense;
stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense) should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the ----- of the premises above-
described and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: Fire Registers, Loss
Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts,
including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns, and other
papers connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964 to be dealt with as the law directs.

Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI
entered the premises of the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of
the insurance company, in the presence of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors
of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and
receipts.

Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the
explicit provisions of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 1, of Art. III of the 1935
Constitution, now Section 3, of Art. IV of the new Constitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, hereunder quoted for convenience of reference, viz:

Sec. 3 — The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrant shall issue but upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnessed he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons, or
things to be seized." (Art. IV, Section 3, New Constitution)

Sec. 3 — Requisites for issuing search warrant — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined by the judge or justice of the peace after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

No search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. (Sec. 3, Rule 126, Rules of Court)

Sec. 5 — Issuance and form of search warrant — If the judge or justice of the peace is thereupon satisfied
of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that
they exist, he must issue the warrant in the form prescribed by these rules. (Sec. 5, Rule 126)

Sec. 8 — Time of making search — The warrant must direct that it be served in the day time, unless the
affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which case a
direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the night or day. (Sec. 8, Rule 126)

Sec. 10 Receipt for property seized. — The officer seizing property under the warrant must give a detailed
receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any
person, must, in the presence of at least one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the
seized property. (Sec. 10, Rule 126) .

"Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness
than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from
the inspection and scrutiny of others.1 While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still
it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government
(People v. Elias, 147 N.E. 472)."

I. In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa,
(2) falsification, (3) tax evasion and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3,
Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense." The
aforequoted provision, which is found in the last paragraph of the same section, is something new. "There is no
precedent on this amendment — prohibition against the issuance of a search warrant for more than one specific
offense — either in the American books on Criminal procedure or in American decisions."2 It was applied in the
celebrated case of Harry S. Stonehill v. Secretary of Justice3 where this Court said:

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the
privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or passion of peace
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision abovequoted —
to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen in times of keen
political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal
means.

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants,
that this Court deemed it fit to amend section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in its
counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court, that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in
connection with one specific offense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.

II. Petitioner likewise contests the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it authorized the search
and seizures of personal properties so vaguely described and not particularized, thereby infringing the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. It also assails the noncompliance with the above-requirement as likewise openly violative of Section 2 of
Rule 126 which provides:

SEC. 2. A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of the following personal property:

(a) Property subject of the offense;

(b) Property stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of the offense; and

(c) Property used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.

The search warrant herein involved reads in part: "... property (Subject of the offense, stolen or embezzled
and proceeds or fruits of the offense used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense) should
be seized and brought to the undersigned." The claim of respondents that by not cancelling the description of one
or two of the classes of property contained in the form when not applicable to the properties sought to be seized,
the respondent judge intended the search to apply to all the three classes of property. This is a patent impossibility
because the description of the property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters
Report, including subrogation receipts and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash
receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. and the offenses alleged to have been committed by the
corporation to wit: estafa, falsification, tax evasion and insurance fraud, render it impossible for Us to see how
the above-described property can simultaneously be contraband goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds
or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that the respondent Judge made no attempt
to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to any one of the
three classes of personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2
of the Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the
personal properties to be seized. Because of this all embracing description which includes all conceivable records
of petitioner corporation, which if seized (as it was really seized in the case at bar), could possibly paralyze its
business,4 petitioner in several motions, filed for early resolution of this case, manifested that the seizure of TWO
carloads of their papers has paralyzed their business to the grave prejudice of not only the company, its workers,
agents, employees but also of its numerous insured and beneficiaries of bonds issued by it, including the
government itself, and of the general public.5 And correlating the same to the charges for which the warrant was
issued, We have before Us the infamous general warrants of old. In the case of Uy Kheytin, et al., v. Villareal, 42
Phil. 896, cited with approval in the Bache case, supra, We had occasion to explain the purpose of the requirement
that the warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized, to wit:

"... Both the Jones Law (sec. 3) and General Orders No. 58 (sec. 97) specifically require that a search
warrant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The evident
purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding
what articles they shall seize, to the end that "unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made. That
this is the correct interpretation of this constitutional provision is borne out by American authorities."

The purpose as thus explained could, surely and effectively, be defeated under the search warrant issued
in this case.

III. Moreover, as contended by petitioner, respondents in like manner transgressed Section 10 of Rule 126
of the Rules for failure to give a detailed receipt of the things seized. Going over the receipts (Annexes "B", "B-
1", B-2", "B-3" and "B-4" of the Petition) issued, We found the following: one bordereau of reinsurance, 8 fire
registers, 1 marine register, four annual statements, folders described only as Bundle gm-1 red folders; bundle
17-22 big carton folders; folders of various sizes, etc., without stating therein the nature and kind of documents
contained in the folders of which there were about a thousand of them that were seized. In the seizure of two
carloads of documents and other papers, the possibility that the respondents took away private papers of the
petitioner, in violation of his constitutional rights, is not remote, for the NBI agents virtually had a field day with
the broad and unlimited search warrant issued by respondent Judge as their passport.

IV. The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126.6 Annex "A" of the
Petition which is the search warrant in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual search was
conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m., until the wee hours of the morning of October 28,
1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities7 are of the view that where a search
is to be made during the night time, the authority for executing the same at that time should appear in the directive
on the face of the warrant.

In their Memorandum8 respondents, relying on the case of Moncado v. Peoples Court (80 Phil. 1), argued:

Even assuming that the search warrant in question is null and void, the illegality thereof would not render
the incriminating documents inadmissible in evidence.

This Court has reverted to the old rule and abandoned the Moncado ruling (Stonehill case, supra). Most
common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule,
realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Thus the Supreme Court of the United States declared:9

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused
of an offense the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secured against such searches
and seizures is of no value, and so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praise-
worthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of
endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.

Moreover, the criminal charges filed by the NBI have all been dismissed and/or dropped by the Court or
by the office of the City Fiscal of Manila in 1968, as manifested in the petition filed by petitioner dated October
24, 1972, for early resolution of this case.

V. It has likewise been observed that the offenses alleged took place from 1961 to 1964, and the
application for search warrant was made on October 27, 1965. The time of the application is so far remote in time
as to make the probable cause of doubtful veracity and the warrant vitally defective. Thus Mr. Joseph Varon, an
eminent authority on Searches, Seizures and Immunities, has this to say on this point:

From the examination of the several cases touching upon this subject, the following general rules are said
to apply to affidavits for search warrants:

(1) xxx xxx xxx

(2) Such statement as to the time of the alleged offense must be clear and definite and must not be too
remote from the time of the making of the affidavit and issuance of the search warrant.
 (3) There is no rigid rule for determining whether the stated time of observation of the offense is too
remote from the time when the affidavit is made or the search warrant issued, but, generally speaking, a
lapse of time of more than three weeks will be held not to invalidate the search warrant while a lapse of
four weeks will be held to be so.

A good and practical rule of thumb to measure the nearness of time given in the affidavit as to the date of
the alleged offense, and the time of making the affidavit is thus expressed: The nearer the time at which the
observation of the offense is alleged to have been made, the more reasonable the conclusion of establishment of
probable cause. [Emphasis Ours]

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is hereby granted; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is
nullified and set aside, and the respondents are hereby ordered to return immediately all documents, papers and
other objects seized or taken thereunder. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-34038 June 18, 1976

Customhouse, Pasay City, petitioner,

vs.
District, stationed at Pasig, Rizal, and CESAR T. MAKAPUGAY, respondents.

G.R. No. L-34243 June 18, 1976

NICANOR MARCELO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District stationed
at Pasig, Rizal, and SALVADOR T. MASCARDO, as Collector of Customs stationed at the MIA Airport
Customhouse, respondents.

G.R. No. L-36376 June 18, 1976

CALIXTO D. ENRIQUEZ, REYNALDO REYES AND LUCILA ENRIQUEZ, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, GREGORIO CONDE AND ANASTACIA TORILLO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-38688 June 18, 1976

FRANCISCO P. FELIX, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. JUDGE ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ and FELIX C. HALMAO, respondents.

G.R. No. L-39525 June 18, 1976

PEDRO E. NIEVA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial
District, JOSE ARELLANO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

G.R. No. L-40031 June 18, 1976

PEDRO E. NIEVA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial
District, JOSE ARELLANO and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:p

G.R. No. L-34038

On July 1, 1971, petitioner Collector of Customs, Salvador T. Mascardo filed against Cesar T. Makapugay,
a letter complaint with respondent Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court for violation of: (a) Section 174 of the
National Internal Revenue Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4713, (b) Central Bank Circular No. 265, in
relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, otherwise known as The Central Bank Act, and (c) Section 3601
and 3602 of Republic Act No. 1937, in relation to Sections 2505 and 2530 (m) 1 of the same Act, claiming that
Cesar T. Makapugay "with malicious intention to defraud the government criminally, willfully and feloniously
brought into the country FORTY (40) cartons of "untaxed blue seal" Salem cigarettes and FIVE (5) bottles of
Johny Walker Scotch Whiskey, also "untaxed", without the necessary permit from the proper authorities. The
respondent submitted a Baggage Declaration Entry which did not declare the said articles. The Customs Examiner
assigned further asked him if he has something more to declare but the answer was in the negative. And in utter
disregard of existing Central Bank Circulars particularly C.B. Circular 265, as amended, the respondent brought
into the country various Philippine Money in the amount of Two Thousand Two Hundred Eighty (P2,280.00)
Pesos cleverly hidden in one of the pieces of baggage examined by the assigned customs examiner, without any
prior permit from the Central Bank authorities. ... " (p. 11, rec.).

Respondent Judge assumed jurisdiction to conduct and did conduct the preliminary investigation, and on
July 6, 1971, issued the challenged order, dismissing "the case with prejudice and ordering the return to private
respondent the amount of P2,280.00, his passport No. Ag-2456 FA - No. B103813, and one (1) box of air-
conditioning evaporator only, as well as the forfeiture of forty (40) cartons of untaxed blue seal Salem cigarettes
and five (5) bottles of Johnny Walker Scotch Whiskey" (p. 13, rec.).

Armed with said order, private respondent Makapugay demanded that petitioner release the articles so
stated. Petitioner Collector of Customs refused to obey the order due to the "prior institution of seizure
proceedings thereon." The refusal prompted respondent Makapugay to file a complaint for "Open Disobedience"
under Article 231 of the Revised Penal Code, before the City Fiscal of Pasay City.

Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, seeking to annul and set aside the order
dated July 6, 1971 on the ground that respondent Judge has no power to conduct a preliminary investigation of
criminal complaints directly filed with him, cannot legally order the dismissal "with prejudice" of a criminal case
after conducting a preliminary investigation thereon, and is without authority to order the return of articles subject
of seizure proceedings before Customs authorities.

In due time, respondents filed their respective answers to the petition and subsequently both parties
submitted their respective memoranda in lieu of oral argument.

G. R. No. L-34243

On June 22, 1971, respondent Collector of Customs filed a letter- complaint with respondent Judge against
petitioner Nicanor Marcelo for an alleged violation of Section 3602 in relation to Section 2505 of Republic Act
1937, otherwise known as the Tariff and Customs Code, supposed to have been committed in the following
manner:

... Mr. Marcelo who is an arriving passenger from Hongkong on board a Philippine Air Lines plane, Flight
307, on June 22, 1971, criminally, feloniously, and with intention to defraud the government did not declare the
contents of his pieces of baggage in the Baggage declaration Entry nor with the assigned Customs Examiner. ...
When his pieces of baggage were examined, instead of personal effects as declared in the Baggage Declaration
Entry, what were found were various assorted Watches, Bags, Montagut shirts and Dress materials which are
highly taxable.

The act of passenger Marcelo in intentionally refusing to declare the said articles in the Baggage
Declaration Entry, and before the Customs Examiner despite inquiries made, constitute a criminal offense within
the meaning of Section 3602 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. ... (p. 19, rec.).

The criminal complaint having been docketed as Case No. CCC-VII-854-P.C., the respondent Judge
assumed jurisdiction over the objection of petitioners counsel, conducted the preliminary examination and
investigation, simultaneously in the manner provided for by Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, and
thereafter on October 6, 1971 issued the following order:

WHEREFORE, there being a preliminary investigation and examination conducted by the Court and
considering that the respondent was given a chance to defend himself let a Warrant of Arrest be issued for his
apprehension. The respondent is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P5,000.00 for his provisional
release.

Pursuant to Section 6, Rule 135 of the New Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 113 thereto, the
City Fiscal of Pasay is hereby ordered to file the corresponding information against the respondent before this
court of competent jurisdiction within FORTY EIGHT (48) HOURS from receipt hereof (p. 23, rec.)
 Petitioner Nicanor Marcelo filed this action for certiorari with preliminary injunction, impugning the
validity of the order of respondent Judge dated October 6, 1971, on the same ground as the petition in G.R. No.
L-34038.

On October 20, 1971, the Supreme Court adopted resolution requiring respondents to rile an answer and
likewise issued a writ of preliminary injunction, "restraining respondent Judge, his representatives, assigns or
persons acting upon his orders, place or stead, from executing, enforcing and implementing his order of October
6, 1971 ... "(p. 32, rec.)

In compliance therewith, respondent Judge filed a petition for admission of answer on November 29, 1971
(pp. 43-44, rec.), which was granted by this Court in its December 13, 1971 resolution (p. 62, rec.).

On the other hand, respondent Collector of Customs, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation
on February 1, 1972, adopting as his answer to the petition, the legal grounds averred in the original petition in
G.R. No. , Collector of Customs, etc. versus Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, etc., et al (p. 72, rec.).

On June 13, 1972, the Supreme Court by resolution resolved to consider the case submitted for decision
after noting the failure of petitioner to file his memorandum (p. 94, rec.).

G. R. No. L-36376

On February 22, 1973, private respondents Gregorio Conde and Anastacia Torillo, filed a complaint
directly with the Circuit Criminal Court, indicting petitioners with violations of the Anti-Graft Law.

The complaint was ultimately docketed and on the same day (February 22, 1973), respondent Judge
forthwith issued an order of the following tenor:

Considering that the complaint filed ... sufficient in form and substance, the same having been filed in
accordance with Section 13, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court, and pursuant to the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court in the case of "Mateo vs. Villaluz," let the preliminary investigation of this case be set on February
24, 1973 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning (p. 22, rec.).

On the day set, petitioners appeared at the sala of respondent Judge who proceeded to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the case. The same was reset on February 26, 1973.

Immediately before the hearing of February 26, 1973, petitioners, through counsel, filed an "Urgent
Motion to Suspend Preliminary Investigation" contesting the power of the respondent Judge to conduct the
preliminary examination and investigation (p. 23, rec.), which was denied by respondent Judge in his order dated
February 27, 1973 (p. 31, rec.). Counsel for petitioners then asked for time to raise the issue before this Court,
which respondent Judge granted by giving petitioners a period of just one (1) day to seek relief from this Tribunal.

Accordingly, herein petitioners filed this petition.

On March 2, 1973, this Court required respondents to answer the petition and issued a temporary
restraining order "enjoining respondent Judge from ... causing and effecting the arrest of petitioners herein" (p.
39, rec.).

In his answer filed on March 14, 1973, respondent Judge, invoking the same arguments in G.R. No. L-
34243, held on to the view that the Circuit Criminal Courts are vested with the power and authority to conduct
preliminary investigations.

G. R. No. L-38688

On May 23, 1974, private respondent Felix Halimao filed a criminal complaint directly with the Circuit
Criminal Court presided over by respondent Judge charging herein petitioner with alleged violations of Republic
Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which complaint was docketed as
Criminal Case No. Prel. Inv. 116-Rizal.

At the hearing of May 27, 1974, petitioner, through counsel, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend
Preliminary Investigation" (p. 9, rec.) based on the ground that respondent Judge has no authority to conduct the
same.

After arguments by counsels for both parties, the respondent Judge denied petitioner's motion. An oral
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied (pp. 14-15, rec.).
 Hence, this petition.

On May 31, 1974, this Court by resolution gave due course to the petition and issued a restraining order,
"enjoining respondent Judge, his agents, representatives, and/or any person or persons acting upon his orders or
in his place or stead from proceeding further with the preliminary investigation ... " (p. 24, rec.)

On June 17, 1974, it appearing that the case involved in the petition is criminal in nature, the Court required
herein petitioner to IMPLEAD the People of the Philippines as party-respondent (p. 26, rec.). In conformity
thereto, petitioner through counsel, filed on June 28, 1974 an amended petition impleading The People (pp. 49-
50, rec.).

Except for the Solicitor General who appeared for The People of the Philippines, respondents in answer,
frontally met the averments of petitioner.

G. R. No. L-39625

On October 24, 1974, petitioner filed this instant petition seeking to annul "any preliminary investigation
conducted by respondent Judge in Preliminary Inv. No. 72-Rizal, Circuit Criminal Court, 7th Judicial District, as
well as the warrant, if any, that may be issued for the arrest and imprisonment of petitioner" and to enjoin
permanently respondent Judge from conducting preliminary investigations and from ordering petitioner's arrest.

On October 30, 1974, the Court required the respondents to file their answer within ten (10) days from
notice thereof and issued, effective immediately, a temporary restraining order against respondent Judge (p. 64,
rec.).

On November 13, 1974, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation requesting to be excused from filing
an answer considering that in three other cases (The Collector of Customs v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No.
L-34038; Nicanor Marcelo v. Hon. Onofre A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-34243; and Francisco Felix v. Hon. Onofre
A. Villaluz, G.R. No. L-38688) which involve the same legal issue, his office maintains that respondent Judge
has no authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under
Republic Act No. 5179 (p. 81, rec.).

On November 20, 1974, private respondent filed his answer (pp. 87-104, rec.).

Petitioner, on January 22, 1975, filed a motion praying that the instant case be consolidated and decided
jointly with G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376 and L-38688 as they involve the same issue; and that the
memoranda filed for petitioners in said four cases be reproduced and adopted as the memorandum for petitioner
in this case, which should be deemed submitted for decision together with the aforementioned cases (pp. 122-
124, rec.). Said motion was granted in the resolution of February 10, 1975 (p. 129, rec.).

In his pleading dated February 5, 1975, private respondent (pp. 130-132, rec.) stated that he joins the
petitioner in his plea for the consolidation of the instant case with cases Nos. L-34038, L-36376 and L-38688 and
prayed that the memorandum filed by respondent in L-38688 be considered reproduced and adopted as the
memorandum for private respondent in this case, in addition to the affirmative defenses and arguments contained
in private respondent's answer to the petition, and that this case be submitted for decision together with the
aforementioned cases (p. 137, rec.).

The records disclosed the following antecedent facts.

On January 11, 1974, herein private respondent Jose Arellano filed a complaint against Pedro E. Nieva,
Jr., herein petitioner, together with his wife Pacita and daughter Patricia N. with the Circuit Criminal Court,
Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No. 3019)
in connection with the P230,000.00 industrial loan obtained by the Areson Woodtech Manufacturing Company
headed by the complainant, Jose Arellano, from the Development Bank of the Philippines, where herein petitioner
holds the Position of Auditor. The cm was docketed therein as Criminal Case Prel. Inv. CCC-VII-72 Rizal (pp.
1-2, 90-91, pp. 14-16 [Annex "A"] rec.).

On the same day the aforesaid complaint was filed in court, respondent Judge issued an order that reads:

Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 112 of the New Rules of Court in relation to the doctrine laid down by the
Supreme Court in the mu of "Mateo versus Villaluz", Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos is hereby ordered
to conduct the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case within five (5) days from receipt hereof and to
file the necessary information in a court of competent jurisdiction if the evidence so warrants.
 ... (pp. 2, 91 [Annex "B"], pp. 21-22, rec.).

On May 22, 1974, investigating Fiscal Teodoro B. Santos endorsed the records of the case back to
respondent Judge, because

... (T)he facts and circumstances which has (sic) been the basis of this instant suit is the same set of first
and circumstances and involving the same parties in a case of ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION now pending
preliminary investigation and also before this Honorable Court. Hence, this endorsement in order to avoid
duplication of effort and time in' the resolution and disposition of the same incident.

In an urgent ex-parte motion dated May 24, 1974 filed with the Circuit Criminal Court pursuant to
paragraph 1 of the Joint Circular of the Department of Justice and the Department of National Defense dated April
29, 1974, herein private respondent prayed that the endorsement of Fiscal Santos be given due course and that the
preliminary investigation be conducted by the respondent Judge (pp. 3, 92, 104 [Annex "I"], rec.).

Herein petitioner opposed the same in a pleading dated June 1, 1974 (p. 3, pp. 40-49 [Annex "F"], rec.),
which was amplified in another pleading dated September 24, 1974 (pp. 3, 50-59 [Annex "G"], rec.).

Under date of June 18, 1974, private respondent filed a motion to strike out herein petitioner's opposition
to complainant's ex parte urgent motion for preliminary investigation in view of the failure of herein petitioner's
counsel to comply with the order of the Court to furnish a copy of his opposition to complainant Jose Arellano
(pp. 93, 105-106 [Annex "2"], rec.).

On September 24, 1974, herein petitioner filed his opposition to the motion to strike out herein
respondent's opposition (pp. 7, 55-59 [Annex "G"], rec.). On the same day, a hearing was conducted by the
respondent Judge on the urgent motion for preliminary investigation and immediately thereafter, he denied said
opposition of herein petitioner (Annex "H", p. 62, pp. 3, 93, rec.).

Hence, this petition.

G. R. No. L-40031

On November 2, 1973, Jose Arellano, private respondent herein, filed with the Circuit Criminal Court at
Pasig, Rizal, a complaint charging herein petitioner with estafa, allegedly committed under the circumstances
provided for in paragraph 4 1(b) Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (p. 12, rec.). Said complaint was
subsequently docketed as CCC Case No. Prel. Inv. -65-Rizal. Thereupon, respondent Judge proceeded to conduct
the preliminary investigation in question. After the termination of the proceedings, respondent Judge issued on
May 31, 1974 the challenged resolution which reads:

Wherefore, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, Assistant City Fiscal Teodoro B.
Santos is hereby ordered to file the necessary information for the crime of Estafa against respondent Pacita Nieva,
in a court of competent jurisdiction, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt hereof.

Let a warrant of arrest be issued for the immediate apprehension of respondent Mrs. Pacita Nieva, and for
her provisional liberty, she is hereby ordered to post a bond in the amount of P20,000.00. (p. 24, rec.).

On July 26, 1974, petitioner's counsel filed an urgent motion to declare the preliminary investigation
proceedings null and void ab initio due to lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court. to conduct the same, re-
echoing the arguments invoked by petitioners in G. R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243, L-36376 and L-38688 (p. 14,
rec.).

In an order dated August 8, 1974, respondent Judge denied the same (p. 22, rec.).

On January 28, 1975, this Court by resolution required respondents to file an answer to the petition and
not to move for the dismissal of the same. The Court further' resolved to consolidate the case with Cases Nos. L-
38688, L-34038, L-34243, and L-36376 (p. 26, rec.).

In a manifestation filed on February 10, 1975, the Solicitor General requested that he be excused from
filing an answer on the ground that in three cases (G.R. Nos. L-34038, L-34243 and L-38688), which involve the
same legal issue, the counsel for the People has taken the position that respondent Judge has no authority or
jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation of criminal cases which he may try and decide under Republic
Act No. 5179.
 Private respondent, on the other hand, through the Citizens Legal Assistance Office of the Department of
Justice, filed his answer on February 20, 1975, maintaining that respondent Judge has jurisdiction to conduct
preliminary investigation invoking particularly Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court in relation to
Sections 1, 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. 5179.

The one common legal issue posed by these six cases is whether a Circuit Criminal Court possesses the
power to conduct preliminary investigations. Neither the explanatory note to House Bill No. 9801 (now R.A. No.
5179,) nor the available Congressional debates intimate that Circuit Criminal Courts are clothed with the authority
to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations (Congressional Records of House, March 28, 1967, pp.
41-45; May 15, 1967).

WE therefore examine the law.

Petitioners, in maintaining that respondent Judge has no such power, rest their claim on Section I of
Republic Act No. 5179, which provides:

In each of the sixteen judicial districts for the Court of First Instance as presently constituted, there is
hereby created a Circuit Criminal Court with limited jurisdiction, concurrent with the regular Court of First
Instance, to try and decide the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
latter:

a. Crimes committed by public officers, crimes against persons and crimes. against property as defined
and penalized under the Revised Penal Code, whether simple or complex with other crimes;

b. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, ...
;

c. Violations of Sections 3601, 3602 and 3604 of the Tariff and Customs Code and Sections 174, 175 and
345 of the National Internal Revenue Code. (emphasis supplied).

Petitioners argue that said courts, having been conferred limited jurisdiction, cannot exercise such power
of preliminary investigation, the same not being embraced and contemplated within its given function to "try and
decide" specific criminal cases.

What is limited by Republic Act No. 5179 is the scope of the cases that may be tried by Circuit Criminal
Courts.

Circuit Criminal Courts are of limited jurisdiction, only because they cannot try and decide all criminal
cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance as courts of general jurisdiction. They can only
take cognizance of cages expressly specified in Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179, as amended by Presidential
Decree No. 126. Nevertheless, they have the same powers and functions as those conferred upon regular Courts
of First Instance necessary to effectively exercise such special and limited jurisdiction. This is plain and evident
from Sections 3 and 6 of their organic law, Republic Act No. 5179:

Section 3. The provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the Courts of First
Instance and the trial, and disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit judge
and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. ... Unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, the Circuit Criminal Courts shall have
the same powers as those conferred by the Judiciary Act and the Rules of Court upon regular Courts of First
Instance, insofar as may be necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect.

Judges of the regular Courts of First Instance are expressly conferred the authority to conduct preliminary
examination and investigation by Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Section 13. Preliminary examination and investigation by the judge of the Court of First Instance. — Upon
complaint filed directly with the Court of First Instance, without previous preliminary examination and
investigation conducted by the fiscal, the judge thereof shall either refer the complaint to the justice of the peace
referred to in the second paragraph of Section 2, hereof - for preliminary examination and investigation, or himself
conduct both preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously in the manner provided in the preceding
sections, and should he find reasonable ground to believe that the defendant has committed the offense charged,
he shall issue a warrant for his arrest, and thereafter refer the case to the fiscal for the filing of the corresponding
information. (emphasis supplied).

Section 14. Preliminary examination and investigation by provincial or city fiscal or by state attorney in
cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance. — Except where an investigation has been conducted by a judge
of first instance, justice of the peace or other officer in accordance with the provisions of the preceding sections
no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be filed by the provincial or city
fiscal, or state attorney, without first giving the accused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation
conducted by him or by his assistant by issuing a corresponding subpoena. ...

The power of preliminary examination and investigation, which may be exercised by judges of the Circuit
Criminal Courts, is without doubt, "not inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 5179," and likewise,
"necessary to carry their jurisdiction into effect."

Moreover, Congress further confirmed that the Court of First Instance has the power to conduct
preliminary investigation by approving on September 8, 1967 Republic Act No. 5180, prescribing a uniform
system of preliminary investigation by all government prosecutors, which provides:

Sec. 1. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary and except when an investigation has been
conducted by a Judge of First Instance, city or municipal judge or other officer in accordance with law and the
Rules of Court of the Philippines, no information for an offense cognizable by the Court of First Instance shall be
filed by the provincial or city fiscal or any of his assistants, or by a state attorney or his assistants, without first
giving the amused a chance to be heard in a preliminary investigation conducted by him by issuing a
corresponding subpoena. ...

Sec. 2. The provisions of Section fifteen, Rule 112, of the New Rules of Court Of the Philippines, shall
be observed in the investigations of persons in custody.

From the abovequoted Provisions, Republic Act No. 5180 likewise continues the procedure prescribed in
the Revised Rules of court of 1964, Particularly Rule 112 thereof.

The aforequoted portion of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5180 was not modified by the amendatory
Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 issued respectively on December 6, 1972 and March 23, 1976.

More decisively, the 1935 as well as 1973 Constitution vests this essential power in all courts to first
determine probable cause before ordering the arrest of those charged with a criminal offense (Section 1[3], Art.
III, 1935 Constitution; See. 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution). The determination of "Probable cause" is the sole
object of preliminary examinations. Surely, congress could not have possibly intended to deny the Circuit
Criminal Courts such constitutional prerogative, which is part of the basic constitutional right of an individual
whose person cannot be legally seized without prior preliminary examination by a judge.

WE enunciated that the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts is for the purpose of alleviating the burden
of the regular Courts of first Instance and to accelarate the disposition of criminal cases pending to be filed
therein (People vs. Gutierrez, etc., et al., 36 SCRA 172; Osmeña vs. Sec. of Justice, G.R. No. L-32033, Sept 30,
1971, 199) or to contribute to the speedy resolution of criminal cases and help curb the progress of criminality
in the country (Paraguya vs. Tiro, 41 SCRA 13s). As opined by Mr. Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion in
the Gutierrez case, supra, "... Circuit Criminal Courts are nothing but additional branches of the regular Courts
of First Instance in their respective districts ..." , which he reiterated in his concurring opinion in the Osmeña case,
thus:

My principal reason for my vote in favor of the judgment in this case is that I cannot find any justification
for allowing the Secretary of Justice to have any part at all in the distribution or assignment of cases among the
different branches of any Court of First Instance, of which the corresponding Circuit Criminal Court is one. I
took this view in my concurring opinion in the case of People v. Gutierrez, cited in the main opinion of Justice
Villamor, and I cannot see why I must opine differently now. ... (41 SCRA 211).

If the main purposes then in creating Circuit Criminal Courts are to alleviate the burden of the regular
Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of the cases therein as well as stem the tide of criminality,
it is only logical that such authority vested in the judges of the Courts of First Instance is likewise conferred on
Circuit Criminal Courts. Otherwise, the Courts of First Instance would still be carrying the burden of conducting
preliminary. investigations in those cases where Circuit Criminal Courts have jurisdiction and consequently
delaying the trial and disposition of criminal cases pending before such Courts of First Instance.
 That Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 5179 clearly intended, by Sections 3 and 6 thereof, to clothe
the Circuit Criminal Court with all the powers vested in regular Courts of First Instance including the authority
to conduct preliminary examinations and investigations, is confirmed by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6425, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 44, Section 39 of which
confers on Circuit Criminal Courts, Courts of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts
concurrent original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable thereunder and expressly directs that the "preliminary
investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date-of
their filing." Before the amendment, the law required only seven (7) days from the date of the commencement of
the preliminary investigation. Section 39, as amended, reads:

Sec. 39. Jurisdiction. — The Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court and Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court shall have concurrent original jurisdiction over all cases involving offenses punishable under this
Act: Provided, that in cities or provinces where there are Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the said courts
shall take exclusive cognizance of cases where the offenders are under sixteen years of age.

The preliminary investigation of cases filed under this Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty
(30) days from the date of their filing.

Where the preliminary investigation is conducted by a prosecuting officer and a prima facie case is
established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the
termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case
is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecuting officer within forty-eight
(48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case.

Trial of the cases under this section shall be finished by the court not later than ninety (90) days from the
date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days
from the date of submission of the case.

It is patent that the aforequoted provision of Section 39 of Republic Act No. 6425 affirms the power of
the Circuit Criminal Courts to conduct preliminary examination and investigation in all the cases falling under
their jurisdiction and additionally fixes the period for preliminary investigation, the filing of the information and
the rendition of decisions in all offenses penalized by the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Under the amendment, the Circuit Criminal Court no longer has exclusive, but still retains concurrent,
jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance and Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts under the Dangerous
Drugs Act. Its authority to conduct preliminary examination and investigation granted under Section 6 of Republic
Act No. 5179, remains intact and undiminished; because the amendatory decree expressly directs that "If the
preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a prima facie case is found to exist, the corresponding
information should be filed by the proper prosecuting officer ... " There is nothing in the amendatory decree from
which it can be reasonably inferred that since the jurisdiction of the Circuit Criminal Court over violations of the
Dangerous Drugs Act is no longer exclusive, Circuit Criminal Court Judges no longer possess the authority to
conduct preliminary examination and investigation.

Recognizing the constitutional power of the courts, including the Courts of First Instance, to conduct
preliminary examination, other special laws specifically vest such authority exclusively in the Court of First
Instance in case of violation of the Revised Election Code (Sec. 187, 1947 Revised Election Code, as amended;
Sec. 234, 1971 Rev. Election Code) and of the Anti-subversion Act when the penalty imposable for the offense
is prision mayor to death (Sec. 16, Rep. Act No. 1700).

It is urged that the word "judge" in the above-quoted section of Presidential Decree No. 44 (and also in
the. 1935 and 1973 Constitutions) contemplates not the Court of First Instance Judge nor the Circuit Criminal
Court Judge but the municipal judge. As heretofore stated, it is an elementary precept in statutory construction
that where the law does not distinguish, WE should not distinguish (Colgate Palmolive Philippines, Inc. vs.
Gimenez, L-14787, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 267). The Statute cannot give a restricted meaning to the generic term
"judge", used in the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Furthermore, in People versus Manantan (L-14129, July 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 684), a justice of the peace,
accuse of violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, moved to dismiss the information on the ground that
the law refers merely to a justice, judge, or fiscal and that being a justice of the peace, he is beyond the coverage
of the said Code. The Supreme Court in denying such contention, held that there was no need of including justices
of the peace in the enumeration in said section because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic term
"judge". The term "judge", not modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of judges,
including justices of the peace.
 The cases of People versus Paderna (22 SCRA 273) and Paraguya versus Tiro (41 SCRA 137) involved
not the power of the Circuit Criminal Court to conduct preliminary investigation, but its jurisdiction to try and
decide certain They do not at all reveal an iota of any further restriction on the limited jurisdiction of the Circuit
Criminal Court other than those delineated in existing laws.

Thus, in the Paderna case, supra, involving a violation of Section 174 of the Tax Code, Mr. Chief Justice
Castro, then Associate Justice, speaking for the Supreme Court in ruling that the Circuit Criminal Court was
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, stated:

... [T]he charge is for unlawful possession of untaxed "blue seal cigarettes" of an appraised value of less
than P500.00 ... and the penalty provided under Republic Act 4713 is a fine of not less than P50.00 nor more than
P200.00 and imprisonment of not less than 5 nor more than 30 days because the value of the cigarettes does not
exceed P500.00, this case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the city court. ...

... Section 1 of Republic Act 5179, which took effect on September 8, 1967, provides in part that circuit
criminal courts shall have limited jurisdiction concurrent with the regular court of first instance, to try and decide
the following criminal cases falling under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the latter.

xxx xxx xxx

The jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts is thus dependent not only on the type of cases but also on
the penalties provided for those cases. Inasmuch as the case at bar falls within the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the City Court, it cannot, even if it involves a violation of section 174 of the Tax Code, be taken
cognizance of by circuit criminal courts, the jurisdiction of which is concurrent with that of courts of first instance
where the latter's jurisdiction is original and exclusive.

The same ruling was substantially reiterated in the more recent Tiro case, supra, involving indirect bribery
committed by a public officer. In passing upon the issue of the Circuit Criminal Court's limited jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court, through Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes, held:

... The law (R.A. 5179) confined the jurisdiction of the circuit criminal courts (which is even made
concurrent with the courts of first instance) to crimes committed by public officers; ... only where they are falling
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the court of first instance. In short, circuit criminal courts'
jurisdiction was limited merely to cases involving crimes specifically enumerated in Section 1 of Republic Act
5179, for which the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than 3 year (or 6 years in proper cases),
or fine of more than 3 years (or 6 years in proper cases), or fine of more than P3,00.00 (or P6,000.00 as the case
may be), or both such fine and imprisonment (sec. 44[f] in relation to Sec. 87[c], Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25922, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596; Mangila vs. Lantin, L-24735, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 81; People vs. Tapayan , L-36885, November 28, 1969, 30 SCRA 529; Andico vs. Roan, L-
26563, April 16, 1968, 23 SCRA 93).

Since indirect bribery is penalized under the Revised Penal Code with imprisonment for a period not
exceeding six months, suspension and public censure (Art. 211, RPC), the case is clearly removed from the
competence of the circuit criminal court to pass upon. It is not denied that the crime of indirect bribery is
essentially one committed by public officers. Jurisdiction of the court, however, is determined not only by nature
of the offense charged in the information, but also by the penalty imposable thereto. ... (emphasis supplied).

In these two cases, it was made clear that for the Circuit Criminal Court to acquire jurisdiction, the offense
must not only be one of those enumerated under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 5179; it should also be within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the regular Courts of First Instance. In the aforesaid cases, the Circuit
Criminal Court was clearly without jurisdiction to hear and decide the offenses involved, by command of the
specific provisions of its charter, the Judiciary Act and the Revised Penal code; and not by a directive of the
Supreme Court, which merely applied in said cited cases the statutory prescriptions. The Supreme Court cannot
legally define additional restrictions, which is the sole prerogative of the law-making authority.

The contrary view appears to entertain the mistaken notion that Section 13, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court, being a rule of procedure, the same should be rendered inoperative by reason of the fact that the Supreme
Court cannot, by promulgating a rule of procedure, arrogate jurisdiction unto itself or grant any to the lower
courts.

It is of course basic that only the Constitution and the law can confer jurisdiction to hear and decide certain
cases. But equally true is the fact that both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions expressly delegated to the Supreme
Court the rule-making authority — the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure and to
amend the existing laws thereon. The law or rule of preliminary investigation is undoubtedly a rule of procedure.
 The 1935 Constitution states:

The Supreme court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be inform for all courts of the same grade
and shall not diminish, increase or modify, substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are
declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme court to alter and modify the same. The Congress
shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the
admission to the practice of law in the Philippines (Sec. 13, Art. VIII, 1935 Constitution).

The 1973 Constitution similarly authorizes the Supreme Court to

Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repeated, altered, or supplemented by the National
Assembly. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade. and shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
(Sec. 5[5], Art, X, 1973 Constitution).

Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court merely implement Section 3 of Article Ill
of the 1935 Constitution (now Section 3 of Article IV of the 1973 Constitution). Section 13 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules of Court was not an innovation as it merely restated Section 13 of General Order No. 58, Section
37 of Act No. 1627, and Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court, in obedience to its rule-making
authority under Section 13, Article VIII of the 1935 Constitution. Rule 112 does not modify substantive rights
but continues the procedure already operative prior to the 1935 Constitution.

WE have ruled that Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court, which is the predecessor of Rule 112 of the 1964
Revised Rules of Court, is an adjective or procedural rule (Bustos vs. Lucero, 81 Phil. 640).

While admitting that Court of First Instance were previously clothed with the power of preliminary
investigation by virtue of Section 37 of Act 1627, nevertheless, it is argued that this same section was amended
when the Judiciary Act of 1948 was enacted since under Section 99 of said Judiciary Act, "All laws and rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act' were repealed. the inconsistency, it is claimed, lies in the fact that
while the authority of municipal courts and city courts to conduct preliminary investigation was reiterated in said
Judiciary Act, there was no mention therein whether Courts of First Instance Judges are still possessed of such
authority.

If such repeal was intended, it is unconstitutional; because the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973 vest in the
Judge the power to issue a warrant of arrest or search warrant after conducting a preliminary investigation or
examination. Congress could not divest the court of such authority as the Constitution does not permit it, for the
constitutional guarantee on arrest or search warrant is not qualified by some such phrase as "unless otherwise
provided by law." For a clearer appreciation, the Constitutional guarantee on arrest and search warrant reads:

(3) The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause,
to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized (Art.
III, 1935 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

Sec. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and
the witness he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized (Art. IV, 1973 Constitution, emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the aforequoted provisions of the 1973 Constitution that until now only the judge can
determine the existence of probable cause and can issue the warrant of arrest. No law or presidential decree has
been enacted or promulgated vesting the same authority in a particular "responsible officer." Hence, the 1973
Constitution, which was ratified and took effect on January 17, 1973, should govern the last four cases, namely,
Nos. L-36376, L-38688, L-39525 and L-40031, which arose after January 17, 1973.

But even under the 1935 Constitution, the term seizures or seized comprehends arrest. Thus, in Vivo
versus Montesa (July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 155), reiterating the doctrines in the cases of Qua Chee Gan, et al. vs.
Deportation Board (L-20280, Sept. 30, 1963) and Morano vs. Vivo (L-22196, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 162),
WE ruled unanimously through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

Nevertheless, we are of the opinion that the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioners of
Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with
paragraph 3, Section 1, of Article III (Bill of Rights) of our Constitution, providing:

3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Art. III, 1773
Constitution, emphasis supplied).

It will be noted that the power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited by the
Philippine Constitution to judges exclusively, unlike in previous organic laws and the Federal Constitution of the
United States that left undetermined which public officials could determine the existence of probable cause. And
in Qua Chee Gan, et al. vs. Deportation Board, L-20280, promulgated on September 30, 1963, this Court pointed
out that Executive Order No. 69, of July 29, 1947, issued by President Roxas, in prescribing the procedure for
deportation of aliens, only required the filing of a bond by an alien under investigation, but did not authorize his
arrest.

Discussing the implications of the provision of our Bill of Rights on the issuance of administrative
warrants of arrest, this Court said in the same case:

xxx xxx xxx

Under the express terms of our Constitution it is, therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an
individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence
of probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between
warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of
having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should
one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the
order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or
agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is
issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of
deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt.

The(n) contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the
power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out
the order of deportation, the president obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee. But, certainly,
during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It is enough, as was true before the
executive order of President Quirino, that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in the executive order of President Roxas.

Following the same trend of thought, this Court, in Morano vs. Vivo (L-22196, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA,
562; Phil. 1967-B, page 741), distinguished between administrative arrest in the execution of a final deportation
order and arrest as preliminary to further administrative proceedings. The Court remarked in said case:

Section 1 (3), Article Ill of the Constitution, we perceive, does not require judicial intervention in the
execution of a final order of deportation issued in accordance with law. The constitutional limitation contemplates
an order of arrest in the exercise of judicial power as a step preliminary or incidental to prosecution or proceedings
for a given offense or administrative action, not as a measure indispensable to carry out a valid decision by a
competent official, such as a legal order of deportation issued Commissioner of Immigration, in circumstance of
legislation (L-24576, pp. 161-1621).

The foregoing doctrine was last reiterate in Ang, et al. versus Galang, etc. (L-21426, Oct. 22, 1975).

Under the American Constitution, the aforesaid terms include not only arrest but also invitations for police
interview or interrogation as well as stop-and-frisk measures. In the 1968 case of Terry versus Ohio, the United
States Supreme Court enunciated:

... It is quite plain that the Fourth Amendment governs "seizures" of the person which do not eventuate in
a trip to the station house and prosecution for crime — "arrests" in traditional terminology. It must be recognized
that whenever a police officer accounts an individual and restrain his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that
person (392 U.S. 1, 16 88 S.C.T. 1868, 20 L.E.D. 2d 889; 903 [1968].)

That the aforesaid terms seizures and seized signify arrest was deliberately intended by the founding
fathers of the 1935 Constitution, which words are likewise employed in the 1973 Constitution, Delegate Miguel
Cuaderno categorically recounted:

An amendment affecting the issuance of an order of arrest and search warrant, to the effect that in each
case the order must be supported by the testimony of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, made
before the judge, and also an amendment providing that prisoners charged with capital offenses shall be bailable
before conviction unless the evidence of guilt is strong, were approved upon the initiative of Delegates Francisco.
It was the prevailing opinion among many delegate that one courts had been rather easy in the issuance of order
of arrest or search warrants, and charged with capital offenses (Cuaderno, the Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p. 65, Emphasis supplied).

Delegate Jose Aruego added:

During the debates on the draft, Delegate Francisco proposed an amendment being the insertion of the
words, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce. The Idea in the Francisco amendment was not new in the Philippines; for it was
provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Philippines. The signification of the Idea into a
constitutional provision was zealously insisted upon, in order to make the principle more sacred to the judges and
to prosecuting pointed out in the debates, causes by the issuance of search warrants, which were generally found
afterwards to be false (Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. I, p.160).

The term "judge" employed in both Constitutions cannot be so limited to "municipal judge" as to exclude
the judge of the Court of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Court (People vs. Manantan, 5 SCRA 684, 690-695).
WE are not justified to create a distinction where the Constitution does not make any.

In general, "judge" is a term employed to designate a public officer selected to preside and to administer
the law in a court of justice (Ark. — School Dist. No. 18 vs. Grubbs Special School Dist., 43 S.W. 2d 765, 766,
184 Ark. 863, 48 CJS 946).

According to intent or context, the term "judge" may include an assistant judge (N.H. — City Bank v.
Young, 43 N.H. 457); a country or court justice (Mo. State v. O'Gorman, 75 Mo. 370); a justice of the peace (N.Y.
People v. Mann 97 N.Y. 530, 49 Am. R.556).

The term "a judge", in Gen. St. C. 47, Art. 1 & 22, providing that "a judge" may cause any house or
building to be searched for the protection of gambling tables, etc., is equivalent to "any judge" and comprehends
an entire class, and cannot, without disturbing its meaning, be restricted in its applications to judges of county,
city and police courts and therefore the judge of the Louisville Law and equity court has authority to issue a
warrant for such a research (Com. v. Watzel, 2 S.W. 123, 125, 84 KY 537).

Admittedly, Section 99 of the Judiciary Act contains a repealing clause which provides: "All laws and
rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed." The question may now be asked: What is
the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to Identify or
designate the Act or Acts that are intended to be repealed (Sutherland, Statutory Construction, [1934], Vol. 1, p.
467). Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial and an
irreconcilable conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts. Such being the case, the presumption against
implied repeals and the rule against strict construction regarding implied repeals apply ex propio vigore, for
repeals and amendments by implication are not favored (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, L-23894, Jan. 24, 1974, 55 SCRA
261, 265-6; Villegas vs. Subido, L-31711, Sept. 30, 1971, 41 SCRA 190; Quimseng vs. Lachica, 2 SCRA 182).
Indeed, the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws; so that, if a repeal is intended, the proper step is to
so express it with specificity (Continental Insurance Co. vs. Simpson, 8 F[2d] 439; Webb vs. Bailey, 151 Ore.
2188, 51 P[2d] 832; State vs. Jackson, 120 W. Va. 521, 199 S.E. 876). The failure to add a specific repealing
clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law (Crawford, Construction of Statute, 1940 ed., p.
631), unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist between the terms of the new and of the old
statutes (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377). Here, there is no such
inconsistency.

To begin with, the two laws, although with a common objective, refer to different persons and different
methods applicable under different circumstances. Thus, while Section 87 of the Judiciary Act provides that
municipal judges and judges of city courts may also conduct preliminary investigation for arty offense alleged to
have been committed within their respective municipalities and cities ... ; Section 37 of Act 1627 reads in part
that such power of "every justice of the peace including the justice of Manila, ... shall not exclude the proper judge
of the Court of First Instance ... from exercising such jurisdiction."

WE should not, and cannot, adopt the theory of implied repeal except upon a clear and unequivocal
expression of the will of Congress, which is not manifest from the language of Section 99 of the Judiciary Act,
apart from the fact that Congress by itself alone had no power to amend the Constitution.

The opposite view likewise denies that the jurisdiction of our courts to conduct preliminary investigation
could be traced to the Constitution, adding that the Charter of Manila and other cities confer upon the respective
fiscals of said cities the power to conduct preliminary investigations.

The organic acts prior to the 1935 Constitution did not prohibit the conferment of such a power to conduct
preliminary examination or investigation on quasi-judicial officers like the city fiscals of chartered cities (see the
instructions of President McKinley to First Philippine Commission, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Jones Law of
1916, and the Revised Administrative Code of 1917).

But the power thus granted to the Manila City Fiscals (and later to City Fiscals and City Attorneys of other
chartered cities) to conduct preliminary investigations did not and does not include the authority to issue warrants
of arrest and search warrants, which warrants the courts alone can issue then as now. The constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures under the 1935 Constitution provides that only a judge can issue a
search warrant or warrant of arrest after he has by himself personally determined the existence of probable cause
upon his examination under oath of the complainant and his witnesses; although as ruled in one case, he may rely
on the investigation conducted by the fiscal or prosecutor (Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 Phil. 739, 741-42).

It is patent that under the 1935 Constitution, only the "judge" is directed to conduct a preliminary
examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest by express constitutional conferment.

But the 1973 Constitution empowers the National Assembly to grant the power to issue search warrants
or warrants of arrest after conducting the necessary preliminary examination to "other responsible officer." Until
such a law is enacted by the National Assembly, only the judge can validly conduct a preliminary examination
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest or search warrant.

Even when the fiscal or prosecutor conducts the preliminary investigation, only the judge can validly issue
the warrant of arrest. This is confirmed by Section 6 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which
directs the judge to issue the warrant of arrest when he is "satisfied from the preliminary. examination conducted
by him or by the investigating officer (referring to the fiscal or the municipal mayor under Sec. 5) that the offense
complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed
it, ... ."

Thus, the power of the city prosecutors to conduct preliminary examination and investigation (minus the
authority to issue warrants of arrest or search warrant) is purely statutory. On the other hand, the judge derives
his authority not only from the Rules of Court, but also — and originally — from the fundamental law to which
all other laws are subordinate. If an objection must be raised, it should be against the authority of the fiscal to
exercise such power of preliminary investigation, which, as has been stated, is merely statutory. No less than the
Constitution confers upon the judge the power to conduct such examination and investigation.

The case of Albano versus Alvarez (December 22, 1965, 15 SCRA 518) is authority for the proposition
that Sec. 13 of Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court contains an innovation, which requires that, when
the Court of First Instance itself conducts the preliminary investigation, it must not only conduct the preliminary
examination proper but the preliminary investigation as well since Section 13 commands the Court of First
Instance to conduct both the preliminary examination and investigation simultaneously (523-524). Said Albano
case does not negate but recognizes the authority of the judge of the Court of First Instance to conduct such
preliminary investigation.

It is true that this COURT held expressly and impliedly that under the charters of the cities of Manila,
Bacolod and Cebu, the power to conduct preliminary investigation is exclusively lodged in the city prosecutor
(Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859, 868-869, May 12, 1948; Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, 45 OG 196; Montelibano
vs. Ferrer, 97 Phil. 228, June 23, 1955; and Balite vs. People, 18 SCRA 280, 285-286, Sept. 30, 1966). But the
charters of the cities of Manila, Bacolod and Cebu do not contain any provision making such grant of power to
city prosecutors exclusive of the courts (Kapunan, Criminal Procedure, 3rd Edition, 1960), which cannot be
deprived of such authority to conduct preliminary examination because said prerogative of the courts emanates
from the Constitution itself. Unless the Constitution is amended, the judge cannot be divested of such a power,
which is an essential element of the cardinal right of an individual against unreasonable searches and seizures. If
the present city charters conferred on city fiscals or city prosecutors the power to issue warrants of arrest it would
be an unconstitutional grant of power under the 1935 Constitution. As heretofore intimated, the present practice
or rule of court authorizing the judge to issue warrants of arrest based on the preliminary investigation conducted
by the city fiscal, seems to violate the 1935 Constitution, which requires the judge himself to conduct the
preliminary examination. Neither the judge nor the law can delegate such an authority to another public officer
without trenching upon this constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The theory that Courts of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts Judges cannot exercise the power of
preliminary examination and investigation, and that as a necessary consequence, they cannot also issue warrants
of arrest, obviously collides with the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Moreover, the theory tolerates an unthinkable — because anomalous — situation wherein the Court of
First Instance and the Circuit Criminal Court must wait for prosecutors and courts inferior to them to conduct the
preliminary examination and/or to issue the needed warrants of arrest before they could effectively exercise their
power to try and decide the cases falling under their respective jurisdiction. This situation would make the Courts
of First Instance and Circuit Criminal Courts totally dependent upon state prosecutors and municipal courts, which
are inferior to them, for their proper functioning. The possibility that the administration of criminal justice might
stand still will not be very remote.

The two-fold purpose for which the Circuit Criminal Courts were created was to alleviate the burden of
the regular Courts of First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases filed therein (Osmeña vs.
Secretary of Justice, supra; People vs. Gutierrez, supra). Such being the admitted purpose, the power to conduct
preliminary examination must necessarily attach to the duties of a Circuit Criminal Court Judge; for aside from
being one of the instruments by which a case may be accelerated and disposed of, it is a duty which trully lies
within the scope of the office, essential to the accomplishment of the main purpose for which the office was
created (Sec. 3, Art III, 1935 Constitution; Sec 3, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution), even if regarded as incidental and
collateral, is germane to and serves to promote the accomplishment of the principal purpose (Lo Cham vs.
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 635).

WE RULE that both Section 1(3), Article III of the 1935 Constitution provide the source of the power of
all Judges, including Judges of the Court of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, and other courts of
equivalent rank, to conduct the examination to determine probable cause before the issuance of the warrant of
arrest and therefore sustain the proceedings conducted by respondent Judge leading to the issuance of the warrants
of arrest and his referral of the cases to the fiscal or other government prosecutor for the filing of the corresponding
information.

II

It may be well to trace briefly the historical background of our law on criminal procedure.

During the Spanish regime, the rules of criminal procedure were found in the Provisional Law on Criminal
Procedure which accompanied the Spanish Penal Code. The two laws were published in the Official Gazette in
Manila on March 13 and 14, 1887 and became effective four (4) months thereafter(U.S. vs. Tamparong, 31 Phil.
32-33; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1969, ed., p. 8).

While the Provisional Law on Criminal Procedure provided or governadorcillo, it did not require any
preliminary examination or investigation before trial. The sumario was abolished by General Order No. 58 (U.S.
vs. Tamparong, supra; Navarro, Criminal Procedure, 1960 ed., pp. 171, 174; Revilla, Vol. 2. Philippine Penal
Code and Procedure, 1930 ed., pp. 1134-35).

When the Philippine came under American sovereignty General Order No. 58 was promulgated by the
U.S. Military Governor in the exercise of his legislative powers as commander-in-chief of the occupation army
and took effect on April 13, 1900. General Order No. 58 was amended by Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901, the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903, Act No. 1627 of July 1, 1907, the Jones Law of 1916,
Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, and Act No. 4178
of December 5, 1934.

General Order No. 58 amended (Sec.1) the Criminal Code of Procedure enforced during the Spanish
regime and vested in the magistrate "the authority to conduct preliminary investigation (Sec. 13) for the issuance
of the warrant of arrest" and authorized "a judge or a justice of the peace" to issue a search warrant upon his
determination of the existence of probable cause therefor "particularly describing the place to be searched and the
person or thing to be seized" (Secs. 95 and 97). The term "magistrate" comprehended the court of First Instance
(Temporosa vs. Yatco, 79 Phil. 225, 226 [1947]; Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96, 104-107 [1939]; People vs. Red,
55 Phil. 706, 710 [1931]; People vs. Solon, 47 Phil. 443 441 [1925]; Navarro Criminal Procedure, 960 ed., 1973;
Padilla, Criminal Procedure, 1965 ed., p. 270).

A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with a public
offense. People vs. Swain, 90 P. 720, 722 5 Cal. App. 421 citing Pen. Code, S807.

A "magistrate" is an officer having power to issue a warrant for the arrest of a person charged with the
commission of a crime. The arrest of a person charge with the commission of a crime. The following persons are
magistrates:

(1) the justices of the Supreme Court;

(2) the judges of the Circuit Court;

(3) the county judges and justices of the peace;

(4) all municipal officers authorized to exercise the power and perform the duties of a justice of the
peace. Wallowa County v. Oakes, 78 P. 892, 46 Or. 33 (26 Words and Phrases, pp. 44, 45).

Act No. 194 of August 10, 1901 amended General Order No. 58 by empowering "every justice of the
peace ... to make preliminary investigation of any crime allege to have been committed within his
municipality, jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First
Instance" (emphasis supplied).

The obvious inference from the aforequoted provision of Act No. 194 is that before its passage, the justice
of the peace had no power to conduct preliminary investigation of any offense triable by the Court of First
Instance, which alone can conduct such preliminary investigation of a crime under its original jurisdiction
pursuant to General Order No. 58. But its enactment did not divest the Court of First Instance of such authority.

In the 1939 case of Marcos, et al. versus Cruz, the Supreme Court, through Justice Imperial, sustained the
power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigations under Sections 13 and 14 of General
Order No. 58 (68 Phil. 96, 106-107), which was impliedly followed in the 1947 case of Temporosa versus Yatco,
et al., supra.

While General Order No. 58 vested the authority in a magistrate, a generic term which includes judges of
the Courts of First Instance and justices of the peace; Section 1 of Act No. 194 is less categorical by employing
the clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the judges of the Courts of First
Instance."

The Philippine Bill of 1902 in a similar ambiguous vein contained such authority when it merely provided
that the "Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise
jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by the
Government of said Islands, subject to the power of said Government to change the practice and method of
procedure. The municipal courts of said Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided by
the Philippine Commission, subject in all matters to such alteration and amendment as maybe hereafter enacted
by law; ... " (Sec. 9, emphasis supplied).

Act No. 590 of January 9, 1903 further amended Act No. 194 by extending the power to conduct
preliminary investigation to the justice of the peace of the provincial capital or of the town wherein the provincial
jail is situated of crimes committed anywhere within the province but again utilized the equivocal
clause "jurisdiction to hear and determine which is by law now vested in the Court's of First Instance; ... (Sec. 7,
Act 590, emphasis supplied).

Act No. 1627 of July 1 1907 had the virtue of greater clarity when if authorized expressly every justice of
the peace, including the justice of the peace of Manila, to "conduct preliminary investigation of all crimes and
offenses alleged to have been comitted within his municipality and cognizable by Court of First Instance, but this
shall not exclude the proper judge of the Court of First Instance of a municipal court from or of a municipality in
which the provincial jail is located, when directed by an order from the judge of First Instance, shall have
jurisdiction to conduct investigation at the expense of the municipality wherein the crime or offense was
committed although alleged to have been committed anywhere within the province, to issue orders of arrest, ...
(Sec. 37, Act No. 1627, emphasis supplied).
 The Jones Law of 1916, like the Philippine Bill of 1902, merely provides "that the Supreme Court and the
Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands shall possess and exercise jurisidiction as heretofore provided
and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law" (Sec. 26, Jones Law).

Section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 re-affirms the power of the Court of First
Instance of Manila to conduct preliminary examination —

Sec. 2474. Persons arrested to be promptly brought before a court. — Preliminary examination in
municipal court and Court of First Instance. — Every person arrested shall, without unnecessary delay, be
brought before the municipal court, or the Court of First Instance for preliminary hearing, release on bail, or
trial. In cases triable in the municipal court the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary
examination, except a summary one to enable the court to fix the bail, in any case where the prosecution announces
itself and is ready for trial within three days, not including Sundays, after the request for an examination is
presented. In cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a
preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city, after a due investigating of the facts, shall have
presented an information against him in proper form. But the Court of Firs Instance may make such summary
investigation into the case as it may necessary to enable it to fix the bail or to determine whether the offense is
bailable. (emphasis supplied).

It is clear that both the Manila Court of First Instance and municipal court can conduct a preliminary
hearing or examination. Section 2474 aforequoted, adds, however, that the City Fiscal impliedly may conduct
such preliminary examination; because it provides that in "cases triable only in the Court of First Instance the
defendant shall not be entitled as of right to a preliminary examination in any case where the fiscal of the city,
after a due investigation of the facts, shall have presented an information against him in proper form. It will be
noted, however, that it is only after the City Fiscal has conducted a preliminary examination that the accused
ceases to "be entitled as of right" to a preliminary examination by the Judge of the Court of Firs Instance who,
however, retains inferentially the discretion to conduct another preliminary investigation because the Court of
First Instance Judge is not foreclosed by the preliminary examination conducted by the City Fiscal. But, when the
City Fiscal has not conducted any preliminary examination, the Court of First Instance Judge himself certainly
can proceed with such preliminary examination, which the defendant can demand as a matter of right.

Act No. 3042 of March 10, 1922, while amending Section 13 of General Order No. 58, re-states the power
of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination for the issuance of the warrant of arrest.

Act No. 4178 of December 5, 1934 further amended Section 13 of General Order No. 58 but still retained
the authority of the magistrate to conduct the preliminary examination. As herefofore stated, Sections 13 and 14
of General Order No. 58, as amended, were applied by the Supreme Court in Marcos, et al. versus Cruz (68 Phil.
96, 106-107).

Under the jurisprudence then or prior to the 1935 Constitution, the preliminary investigation before the
justice of the peace or muncipal court consisted of two stages, namely, preliminary examination for the issuance
of the warrant of arrest where only the complainant and his witnesses are heard by the justice of the peace; and
the second stage where the accused and his witnesses are heard. The Judge of the Court of First Instance conducts
only the first stage, that is, preliminary examination for purposes of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, to be
followed by the actual trial (Marcos, vs. Cruz, supra; People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548, 555 [1946]).

The basic source of the power of the Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary examination or
investigation from May 14, 1935 to January 17, 1973, is paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article III of the 1935
Constitution, which guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ...
seizures ... and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after an examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing ... the
persons ... to be seized." Construing the foregoing constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
the Supreme Court, through then Chief Justice Ricardo Paras, pronounced that the determination of the existence
of "probable cause must depend upon the judgment and discretion of the judge ... issuing the warrant. ... His
conclusion as to whether "probable cause" existed or not is final and conclusive. If he is satisfied that "probable
cause" exists from the facts stated in the complaint, made upon the investigation by the prosecuting attorney, then
his conclusion is sufficient upon which to issue a warrant of arrest. He may, however, if he is not satisfied, call
such witnesses as he may deem necessary before issuing the warrant. ... There is no law which prohibits him from
reaching the conclusion that "probable cause" exists from the statement of the prosecuting attorney alone, or any
other person whose statement or affidavit is entitled to credit in the opinion of the judge ... The preliminary
investigation conducted by the petitioner (Provincial Fiscal) under Republic Act No. 732 ... does not, as correctly
contended by the respondent Judge, dispense with the latter's duty to exercise his judicial power of determining,
before issuing the corresponding warrant of arrest, whether or not probable cause exists therefor. The Constitution
vests such power in the respondent judge who, however, may rely on the facts stated in the prosecuting attorney"
(Amarga vs. Abbas, March 28, 195l, 98 Phil. 739, 741-742).

While the power to conduct preliminary examination may be delegated by law to government prosecutors,
only the judge can issue the warrant of arrest under the 1935 Constitution and prior thereto (Sayo, et al. vs. Chief
of Police, et al. 80 Phil. 859; Lino vs. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933; Hashim vs. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216).

The valid seizure of a person can only be executed through a lawful warrant of arrest. Arrest without a
warrant can only be legally effected by a police officer or private individual a) when the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; b) when an offense has in
fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another (Sec. 6, Rule 113, 1964 Revised Rules of Court).

In all other cases, there must be a valid warrant of arrest. When the seizure of a person is made without a
warrant of arrest or with a warrant of arrest which is not based on a determination by the judge of the existence
of probable cause, the arrest becomes unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional.

Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940 Rules of Court expressly confer on the municipal or city judge,
the City Final and the Judge of the Court of First Instance the power to conduct preliminary examination or
investigation.

On June 20, 1957, Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law, was approved.
The proviso of Section 5 thereof expressly provides that the preliminary investigation of offenses defined and
penalized therein by prision mayor to death shall be conducted by the proper Court of First Instance. This grant
obviously is exclusive of the provincial or city fiscal or other government prosecutors whose power to conduct
preliminary investigation in all other cases is affirmed in the first clause of Section 5 thereof.

Sections 13 and 14 of the 196.4 Revised Rules of Court re-state Sections 2 and 4 of Rule 108 of the 1940
Rules of Court.

As aforestated, aside from the challenged Sections 3 and 6 of Republic Act No. 5179 creating the Circuit
Criminal Courts, Republic Act 5180 was approved on September 8, 1967, which affirms the prerogative of the
Courts of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation of offenses punishable by said courts.

Presidential Decrees Nos. 77 and 911 promulgated respectively on December 6, 1972 and March 23, 1976.
amending Republic Act No. 5180, did not modify the opening clause of Section 1 of said Republic Act 5180
affirming the power of the Court of First Instance to conduct preliminary investigation in accordance with law
and the Rules of Court.

Section 234 of the 1971 Revised Election Code, otherwise known as Republic Act No. 6388, vests in the
Court of First Instance "exclusive original jurisdiction to make preliminary investigations, issue warrants of arrest
and try and decide any criminal case or proceeding for violation of" the Election Law. This provision was a
reiteration of the previous election laws (Act No. 1582 of 1907; Com. Act No. 357 of 1938; and Republic Act
No. 180 of 1947, as amended).

After the ratification of the 1973 Constitution on January 17, 1973, the source of the authority of the judge
to conduct preliminary examination for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest, is still the Constitution, this time
the 1973 Constitution, which likewise guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against
unreasonable ... seizures for whatever nature and for any purpose ... and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing ... the persons ... to be seized" (Sec. 3 of Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
The 1973 Constitution, instead of employing the generic term warrants to comprehend both search warrants and
warrants of arrest, as did the 1935 Constitution, expressly specifies "search warrants or warrants of arrest." The
purpose of such specification was apparently to clarify the doubt raised by the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Montemayor in the Amarrga case, supra, that the 1935 Constitution merely guarantees against unreasonable
searches but not against unreasonable arrests, despite the fact that the constitutional guarantee expressly affirms
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures ... and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the persons ... to be seized" (Par. 3, See. 1, Art. III, 1935
Constitution).
 In passing, the dissent of Justice Montemayor in the Amarga case seems to deny equal, if not greater,
importance to individual freedom from illegal arrest or arbitrary detention vis-a-vis property rights and right
against self-incrimination. It will also likewise be noted that the 1973 Constitution also authorizes the law-making
authority to empower other responsible officers to conduct such preliminary examination for purposes of the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. As enunciated in the Amarga case and in U.S. versus Ocampo (18 Phil. 1, 41-42),
the government prosecutors may be authorized to conduct such preliminary examination and their determination
of the existence of probable cause may be relied upon by the , 23 SCRA judge, who may, as a consequence, issue
the warrant of arrest; although the judge himself is not precluded from conducting his own preliminary
examination despite the conclusion of the prosecuting attorney as to the existence or non-existence of probable
cause.

III

1. The challenged order of July 6, 1971 issued by the respondent Judge in G.R. No. L-34038 (Collector
of Customs, etc. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.) dismissed the criminal complaint filed by petitioners therein
against private respondent with prejudice, obviously meaning that the case may not be refiled without exposing
the accused to double jeopardy. The respondent Judge seriously erred in so issuing said order, contravening as it
does a basic legal principle on double jeopardy, and committing thereby a grave abuse of discretion. The
constitutional right against double jeopardy exists, not after the first preliminary examination or investigation, but
only after the first trial which results either in conviction or acquittal or in the dismissal or termination of the case
without the express consent of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid complaint or
information and after the accused had pleaded to the charge (Sec. 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court; Taladua
vs. Ochotorena, et al. L-25595, February 15, 1974; Republic vs. Agoncillo, L-27257, August 31, 1971, 40 SCRA
579; People vs. Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249; People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851).

As correctly stated by the Solicitor General, petitioner's counsel, "dismissal at preliminary investigation
is never with prejudice. Re-filing of the same is allowed if evidence has become sufficient to warrant conviction
of private respondent." There has been no deviation from such established jurisprudence exemplified in People
vs. Bagsican (6 SCRA 400), Wherein the Court held that "the finding in the preliminary investigation that no
prima facie case existed against the accused does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction. — Such finding
is not final acquittal as would preclude further proceedings" (Emphasis supplied).

2. Aggravating his grave mistake and misapprehension of the law, respondent Judge also directed through
the same order the return of the articles allegedly seized from the person of respondent Makapugay. This portion
of the question order is fraught with undesirable consequences.

As stated heretofore, the dismissal of a case, even with prejudice, during the stage of preliminary
investigation does not bar subsequent prosecution and conviction if the evidence warrants the re-filing of the same
becomes next to impossible. For the enforcement of such order would virtually deprive herein petitioner Collector
of Customs of the evidence indispensable to a successful prosecution of the case against the private respondent.
Worse, the order nullified the power of seizure of the customs official.

Respondent Judge ignored the established principle that from the moment imported goods are actually in
the possession or control of the Customs authorities, even if no warrant of seizure had previously been issued by
the Collector of Customs in connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the Bureau of Customs acquires
exclusive jurisdiction over such imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the Customs laws, subject to an
appeal only to the Court of Tax Appeals and to final review by the Supreme Court (Section 2205 and 2303, Tariff
and Customs Code; Papa, et al. vs. Mago, et al., Feb. 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 857; Virata, et al. vs. Aquino, et al. Sept
30, 1973, 53 SCRA, 24; see also Vierneza vs. Commissioner, July 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 394; Farm Implement &
Machinery vs. Commissioner, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 905; Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969,
SCRA 1016; Asaali, et al. vs. Commissioner, December 16, 1968, 26 SCRA 382; Sare Enterprises vs.
Commissioner, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 112; Geotina, etc. vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., August 30, 1971, 40
SCRA 362; Commissioner vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., January 31, 1972; Lopez vs. Commissioner, et al.,
January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 327; Geotina vs. Broadway, etc., et al., January 30, 1971, 37, SCRA 410; Auyong
Hian vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 110; and Pacis, et al., vs. Pamaran, etc., et
al., March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 16). Such exclusive jurisdiction precludes the Court of First Instance as well as
the Circuit Criminal Court from assuming cognizance of the subject matter (Enrile, et al. vs. Venuya, et al.,
January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 381) and divests such courts of the prerogative to replevin properties subject to
seizure and forfeiture proceedings for violation of the Tariff and Customs Code (Diosamito, et al. vs. Balanque,
et al., July 28, 1969, 28 SCRA 836; Señares vs. Frias, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 533); because proceedings for the
forfeiture of goods illegally imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of
wrongdoer nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty (Lazatin vs. Commissioner, et al., July 30, 1969, 28 SCRA
1016).
 Respondent Judge claims that the pendency of a seizure proceeding was never brought to his attention (p.
038, rec.) and that he could not have foreseen the possibility that petitioner would be instituting seizure
proceedings ... and besides, it is understood that the order of the court commanding the release of the subject
articles was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some other lawful
reason (p.39, rec.).

The questioned order of respondent Judge is unqualified and contains no intimation that the "release ...
was on a premise that herein petitioner was not holding or withholding the same for some other lawful reason."
On the contrary, the tenor of the order is so absolute and so emphatic that it really leaves no alternative for
petitioner Collector of Customs except to return the articles.

The records of the case, moreover, reveal that a report of seizure (p. 14, rec.) and warrant of seizure and
detention (p. 15, rec.) were made by petitioner Collector of Customs on June 30, 1971 and on July 9, 1971
respectively. It is patent that respondent Judge knew actually of the existence at least of the report of seizure of
June 30, 1971, which is six days prior to his order of dismissal dated July 6, 1971. He should have anticipated
that a warrant of seizure and detention will logically be issued as in fact it was issued on July 9, 1971, because it
was the petitioner Collector of Customs who filed the criminal complaint directly with him on July 1, 1971.
Respondent Judge chose to ignore the presence of the report of seizure dated June 30, 1971, six days before his
order of dismissal and the filing of the criminal complaint on July 1, 1971. Prudence should have counselled him,
so as not to frustrate the petitioner Collector of Customs in enforcing the tariff and customs laws, against ordering
the release of the seized articles without first ascertaining from the petitioner Collector of Customs whether the
latter intended to institute or had instituted seizure proceedings.

As aptly expressed by Mr. Justice Barredo in his Concurring Opinion in People vs. Gutierrez, supra, "It
is not enough that a judge trusts himself or can be trusted as capable of acting in good faith, it is equally important
that no circumstance attendant to the proceedings should mar that quality of trust worthiness." We have enjoined
judges to apply the law as interpreted by the Supreme Court and not to dispose of a case according to their personal
views (Albert vs. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948).

IV

In G.R. No. L-36376 (Enriquez, et al. vs. Hon. Onofre Villaluz, et al.), the arbitrary denials displayed by
respondent Judge of motions presented before him likewise invite some cautionary reminders from this Court.

In this case, petitioners were given an unreasonable period of one (1) day within which to elevate the
matter before this Tribunal. But considering the novelty of the issue, a grant of twenty-four hours to prepare a
petition for certiorari is a virtual denial of the motion. And petitioners' motion for an extension of at least one (1)
day was peremptorily brushed aside by respondent Judge with one single word DENIED.

The fact that petitioners succeeded in bringing the matter before the Supreme Court within the constricted
period of time granted them is beside the point. More important is the consideration by this Court of the dangers
posed by respondent Judge's peremptory denial of a reasonable time.

Indeed, it is commendable to see judges hasten the disposition of cases pending before them. But more
commendable would be for judges to contribute their share in maintaining the unswerving faith of litigants in the
courts of justice. WE once again stress that "One important judicial norm is that a judge's official conduct should
be free from appearance of impropriety" (Luque vs. Kayanan, 29 SCRA 165).

But while w sustain the power of the Circuit Criminal to conduct preliminary examination (p. 36), pursuant
to OUR constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1973 Constitution) as
a matter of policy, WE enjoin the respondent Judge and other Circuit Criminal Court Judges to concentrate on
hearing and deciding criminal cases filed before their courts (see Mateo vs. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18, 28-29, March
31, 1973). The primary purpose of the creation of the Circuit Criminal Courts in addition to the existing Courts
of First Instance, as above intimated, is to mitigate the case load of the Courts of First Instance as well as to
expedite the disposition of criminal cases involving serious offenses specified in Section I of Republic Act 5179,
as amended. Circuit Criminal Judges therefore, should not encumber themselves with the preliminary examination
and investigation of criminal complaints, which they should refer to the municipal judge or provincial or city
fiscal, who in turn can utilize the assistance of the state prosecutor to conduct such preliminary examination and
investigation. Or the Judge of the Circuit Criminal Court can directly request the Secretary of Justice to assign a
state prosecutor for the same purpose (See. 3, Republic Act No. 5184).
 Moreover, it seems that respondent Judge does not have adequate time to hear and dispose of the 34
criminal cases with detention prisoners pending in his sala, aside from the 479 pending cases of voluntary
submission by drug addicts, as of January 31, 1975 (A.M. No. 230-CCC, Item 42, Agenda of March 13, 1975),
as revealed by his letter dated February 26, 1975, wherein he requested the Supreme Court to renew the detail in
his sala of Municipal Judge Hermenegildo C. Cruz of Mandaluyong, Rizal, to assist him. This significant fact
should further dissuade him from actively conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal cases directly filed
with him.

Furthermore, Judges of the Circuit Criminal Courts whose dockets permit, may be assigned by the
Supreme Court for a period not exceeding 6 months, unless with their consent, to assist Judges of regular Courts
of First Instance with clogged dockets (Sec. 5[3], Art. X, 1973 Constitution).

WHEREFORE, IN G.R. NOS. L-34243, 36376, 38688 AND 39525, THE PETITIONS ARE HEREBY
DISMISSED AND THE WRITS OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR RESTRAINING ORDERS
ISSUED THEREIN ARE HEREBY LIFTED; IN G.R. No. L-40031, THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED;
AND IN G.R. NO. L-34038, THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE DATED JULY 6, 1971 IS HEREBY
SET ASIDE AS NULL AND VOID INSOFAR AS THE SAME DISMISSED THE CRIMINAL CASE WITH
PREJUDICE AND INSOFAR AS THE SAME DIRECTED THE RETURN TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT
THEREIN OF THE ARTICLES SEIZED FROM HIM WHICH ARE NOW SUBJECT OF SEIZURE
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CUSTOMS AUTHORITIES, AND THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION ISSUED THEREIN IS HEREBY MADE PERMANENT. NO COSTS.

G.R. No. L-29218 October 29, 1976

JOSE T. VIDUYA, as collector of Customs of the Port of Manila, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO
BERDIAGO alias EDUARDO BERTIAGO; and HON. ANDRES REYES, as Presiding Judge of Branch
VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, respondents.

Solicitor, General Antonio P. Barredo and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for petitioner.

Amelito R. Mutuc for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:p

An order of the lower court quashing a search warrant issued at the instance of petitioner Jose T. Viduya,
then Collector of Customs of Manila, to gain custody of a seized vehicle pursuant to a warrant of seizure and
detention against private respondent Eduardo Berdiago 1 was assailed in this certiorari and mandamus proceeding
with a prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction. 2 The invocation by the then Solicitor General, now
Associate Justice of this Court, Antonio P. Barredo, of the controlling force of Papa v. Mago 3 and the persuasive
character attached to the ruling of an American leading decision, Carroll v. United States, 4 clearly indicative of
the tenuous nature of the claim of private respondent that there was a violation of his constitutional right to be
free from unreasonable search and seizure, 5 led to a resolution by the Court of July 12, 1968, requiring that
respondents answer the petition and issuing the preliminary mandatory injunction sought requiring respondent
Berdiago "to deliver the custody and possession of said car to respondent court; and furthermore requiring
respondent court to take possession and custody of the said Rolls Royce car from respondent Berdiago or from
whomsoever has possession and custody thereof and let petitioner to take delivery and custody thereof; ... ." 6 The
stress, and quite understandably, in the extensively-researched answer filed on behalf of respondents by their able
counsel, former Ambassador Amelito R. Mutuc, was on the primacy of the immunity the Constitution guarantees
against an unreasonable search and seizure. More specifically, it was contended with vigor and plausibility that
respondent Judge quashed the search warrant on showing of lack of probable cause, a requirement not only of the
Constitution but of the Rules of Court 7 and the Tariff and Customs Code. 8 While no objection could validly be
raised against such a proposition, it cannot apply to this controversy. It is undoubted that prior to the issuance of
a search warrant, there was a previous discovery of the failure to pay the correct amount of customs duties. That
was probable cause enough. It let to the institution of a seizure and forefeiture proceeding. Moreover, the law has
always looked with disfavor on attempts at nonpayment or underpayment of customs duties. It is essential that no
undue obstacle be placed on intensive efforts to assure the collection of what is properly due the government. The
Mago decision was thus merely a reflection of what has long been the settled doctrine on the matter in the
Philippines. It is futile to assert then, considering the circumstances to be more specifically referred to, that the
requirement of lack of probable cause was not met. We find for petitioner.

The petition includes as one of its Annexes the warrant of seizure and detention. 9 It was issued on the
basis of reliable intelligence that fraudulent documents were used by respondent Berdiago in securing the release
from the Bureau of Customs of a Rolls Royce car, Model 1966, 2 door, Hardtop with Motor No. CRX 1379,
which arrived in the Port of Manila on January 8, 1968 on board the vessel, Jose Abad Santos, it being made to
appear that such car was a 1961 model instead of a 1966 one, thus enabling respondent to pay a much lower
customs duty in the amount of P3,255.00, when the correct amount due was P219,783.00. 10 There was,
accordingly, a formal demand for the payment of the sum to cover the deficiency, respondent manifesting his
willingness to do so but failing to live up to his promise contained in a letter of April 24, 1968, leading to Seizure
Identification Case No. 10941 against the car. 11 As it was kept in a dwelling house at the Yabut Compound,
Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, two officials of the Customs Police Service as duly authorized
agents of petitioner, applied to respondent Judge for a warrant to search said dwelling house and to seize the Rolls
Royce car found therein, pursuant to Section 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code; he issued the search warrant
on May 30, 1968. 12 Thereafter, on June 3, 1968, there was an urgent motion to quash the same by respondent
Berdiago. 13 Then, on June 6, 1968, an opposition to said motion to quash was filed by petitioner, based on the
allegation of a violation of Section 2209 of the Tariff and Customs Code. 14 It was moreover pointed out that
respondent Berdiago could not rely on the constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure because it
was not shown that he owned the dwelling house which was searched. 15 Nonetheless, respondent Judge in the
challenged order quashed such search warrant. 16 Hence this petition.

To repeat, the plea of petitioner must be heeded. A case of a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Judge when he quashed the search warrant had been shown. What lessens the gravity of such lapse
from controlling doctrines was the commendable attitude displayed in stressing the worth of a constitutional right.
Where attempts at evasion of payment of customs duties are concerned, however, this Court has not been
indisposed to he as receptive to claims of its violation, especially where they rest on no substantial basis.

1. In the leading case of Papa v. Mago, 17 with Justice Zaldivar as ponente, there is this pronouncement,
which he aptly noted by the then Solicitor-General Barredo, calls for application: "The Bureau of Customs has
the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, (1) to assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported
articles, and all other dues, fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws; (2) to
prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and (3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.
The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties
Collected on Informal Entry." As long as the importation has not been terminated the imported goods remain
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the port of entry and the legal permit
for withdrawal shall have been granted. The payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.
The record shows, ... that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full. Furthermore, a comparison
of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on
Informal Entry" and the "compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory,
shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid the payment of duties thereon. ...
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to forfeiture .... And this Court has
held that merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to forfeiture, and that goods
released contrary to law are subject to seizure and forfeiture." 18

2. Nor did Mago announce a novel doctrine. It is merely a recognition of the state power to assure that
fraudulent schemes resorted to by importers would be doomed to failure. That same year in 1968, in Asaali v.
Commissioner of Customs, 19 the opinion stressed in rather emphatic language why it must be thus: "The policy
relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not to do away entirely, with the evil and
corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would be frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by respondent
Commissioner of Customs in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside and this
appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling principles of law do not call
for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the legitimate authority vested in the government were not to
be reduced to futility and impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has assumed
epidemic proportions." 20 Moreover, as far back as 1920, in Uy Kheytin v. Villareal, 21 there was the explicit
affirmation of the principle that "dutiable articles on which the duties have not been paid" belong to a different
category from the search and seizure "of a man's private papers" as they "rightfully belong to the custody of the
law." 22

3. There is this clarification of the matter in the opinion of Justice Zaldivar in Mago "Petitioner Martin
Alagao and his companion policemen had authority to effect the seizure without any search warrant issued by a
competent court. The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The Code
authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs Code to enter, pass
through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to
inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on
board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable
or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search
warrant in said cases. But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said 'dwelling house may be
entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of the peace ... .' It is our considered view,
therefore, that except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under the
customs law may effect search and seizure without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
" 23 There is justification then for the insistence on the part of private respondent that probable cause be
shown. 24 So respondent Judge found in issuing the search warrant. Apparently he was persuaded to quash it
when he noted that the warrant for seizure and detention came later than its issuance. In thus acting, respondent
Judge apparently overlooked that long before the search warrant was applied for, to be specific on April 15, 1968,
the misdeclaration and underpayment was already noted and that thereafter on April 24, 1968, private respondent
himself agreed to make good the further amount due but not in the sum demanded. 25 As the car was kept in a
dwelling house in Wakas, Barrio San Dionisio, Parañaque, Rizal, petitioner through two of his officers in the
Customs Police Service 26 applied for and was able to obtain the search warrant. Had there been no such move
on the part of petitioner, the duties expressly enjoined on him by law noted in the Mago opinion namely to assess
and collect all lawful revenues, to prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds, and to enforce tariff and
customs law would not have been performed. While therefore, it is to be admitted that his warrant of seizure and
detention came later, on July 5, 1968 to be exact, than the search warrant, which was issued on May 30, 1968,
there were indubitable facts in existence at that time to call for its issuance. Certainly there was probable cause as
defined in United States v. Addison, 27 Identifying it with "such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances,
as will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action, and the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just
and proper." 28 There was evidently need for the issuance of a search warrant. It ought not to have been thereafter
quashed.

4. That is about all, except for a reference in the petition to an excerpt from Carroll v. United
States, 29 tracing such an approach to the landmark Boyd decision cited in Uy Kheytin. It was emphasized therein
in the opinion of Chief Justice Taft that what was said by Justice Bradley in Boyd stated the doctrine that had
gained approval and acceptance. It was summarized thus: "The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the
common law; and the seizure of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws or concealed to avoid the duties
payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least two centuries past; and the like seizures have
been authorized by our own revenue acts from the commencement of the government." 30 It is not for this Court
to do less than it can to implement and enforce the mandates of the customs and revenues laws. The evils
associated with tax evasion must be stamped out — without any disregard, it is to be affirmed, of any
constitutional right. The facts, appreciated in their true light, fail to show that the issuance of the search warrant
contravened the immunity against unreasonable search and seizure. Its being quashed then amounted to a grave
abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted and the order of June 20, 1968 of respondent Judge
denying the petition for custody of the car by petitioner and quashing the search warrant nullified and set aside.
The writ of preliminary mandatory injuction issued by this Court is maintained in full force and effect, the custody
and possession of the Rolls Royce car, model 1966, 2 door Hardtop with Motor No. CRX 1379 to remain in the
custody of the Customs authorities until the termination according to law of the seizure and forfeiture proceeding.
Costs against private respondent.

G.R. No. L-23051 October 20, 1925

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JOSE MA.

VELOSO, defendant-appellant.

Claro M. Recto for appellant.

Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the accused, Jose Ma.
Veloso, guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the authority, in violation of article 252 of the Penal
Code, and sentencing him to four months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties,
to pay a fine of P200, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The errors assigned by counsel for the accused as appellant, go to the proposition that the resistance of the police
was justifiable on account of the illegality of the John Doe search warrant.

In May, 1923, the building located at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, was used by an
organization known as the Parliamentary Club. Jose Ma. Veloso was at that time a member of the House of
Representative of the Philippine Legislature. He was also the manager of the club.
 The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary Club was nothing more
than a gambling house. Indeed, on May 19, 1923, J. F. Townsend, the chief of the gambling squad, had been to
the club and verified this fact. As a result, on May 25, 1923, Detective Andres Geronimo of the secret service of
the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. Thus
provided, the police attempted to raid the Parliamentary Club a little after three in the afternoon of the date above-
mentioned. They found the doors to the premises closed and barred. Accordingly, one band of police including
policeman Rosacker, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a window of the house. Other policemen, headed
by Townsend, broke in the outer door.

Once inside the Parliamentary Club, nearly fifty persons were apprehended by the police. One of them
was the defendant Veloso. Veloso asked Townsend what he wanted, and the latter showed him the search warrant.
Veloso read it and told Townsend that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe, and that the police had
no right to search the house. Townsend answered that Veloso was considered as John Doe. As Veloso's pocket
was bulging, as if it contained gambling utensils, Townsend required Veloso to show him the evidence of the
game. About five minutes was consumed in conversation between the policemen and the accused the policemen
insisting on searching Veloso, and Veloso insisting in his refusal to submit to the search.

At last the patience of the officers was exhausted. So policeman Rosacker took hold of Veloso only to
meet with his resistance. Veloso bit Rosacker in the right forearm, and gave him a blow in another part of the
body, which injured the policeman quite severely. Through the combined efforts of Townsend and Rosacker,
Veloso was finally laid down on the floor, and long sheets of paper, of reglas de monte, cards, cardboards, and
chips were taken from his pockets.

All of the persons arrested were searched and then conducted to the patrol wagons. Veloso again refused
to obey and shouted offensive epithets against the police department. It was necessary for the policemen to
conduct him downstairs. At the door, Veloso resisted so tenaciously that three policemen were needed to place
him in the patrol wagon. 1awph!l.net

In the municipal court of the City of Manila, the persons arrest in the raid were accused of gambling. All
of them were eventually acquitted in the Court of First Instance for lack of proof, with the sole exception of
Veloso, who was found guilty of maintaining a gambling house. This case reached the appellate court where the
accused was finally sentenced to pay a fine of P500. (No. 22163. 1 )

The foregoing are the principal facts taken mainly from the findings of the trial judge, the Honorable
Vicente Nepomuceno. Counsel for the appellant makes no effort to impugn these findings, except that he stresses
certain points as more favorable to the case of his client. The defense, as previously indicated, is planted squarely
on the contention that since the name of Veloso did not appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym
John Doe was used, Veloso had a legal right to resist the police by force. The nature of this defense makes it
advisable to set forth further facts, relating particularly to the search warrant, before passing to the law.

There are found in the record the application for search warrant, the affidavit for search warrant, and the
search warrant. The application reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, vs. JOHN DOE, Defendant.

APPLICATION FOR (G)

SEARCH WARRANT

Testimony taken before Hon. L. Garduño, Judge, Municipal Court, Manila.

Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, testifies as follows:

Q. What is your name, residence and occupation? — A. Andres Geronimo, No. 47 Revellin, detective.

Q. Are you the applicant of this search warrant? — A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know the premises situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, District of W. C., City of Manila? — A. Yes.
sir.
 Q. Do you know who occupies said premises? — A. I do not know. According to the best of my information the
house is occupied by John Doe.

Q . What are your reasons for applying for this search warrant? — A. It has been reported to me by a person whom
I consider to be reliable that in said premises there are instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as
cards, dice, chips, lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games kept. It has been reported to me
by a person whom I consider to be reliable that there are or there will be gambling conducted in said premises. The
aforesaid premises are known as gambling house. I have watched the foregoing premises and believed it to be a
gambling house and a place where instruments and devices used in gambling games, such as cards, dice, chips,
lottery tickets, lists of drawing and lists used in prohibited games are kept.

I, Andres Geronimo, being duly sworn, depose and say that I have read the foregoing questions and answers and
that I find the same to correct and true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Sgd.) ANDRES GERONIMO

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO Judge, Municipal Court

The affidavit and the search warrant are so nearly alike that it will suffice to copy the search warrant alone.
This document reads:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF THE CITY OF MANILA

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff,

vs.

JOHN DOE, Defendant.

SEARCH WARRANT (G)

The People of the Philippine Islands, to any member of the

Police Force of the City of Manila.

GREETING:

Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me by Andres Geronimo that he has good reason to believe
and does believe that John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him and which is under
his control, namely in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippines Islands, certain
devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law, to wit: money, cards, chips, reglas, pintas, tables and
chairs and other utensils used in connection with the game commonly known as monte and that the said John Doe
keeps and conceals said devices and effects with the illegal and criminal intention of using them in violation of the
Gambling Law.

Now therefore, you are hereby commanded that at any time in the day or night within ten (10) days on or after this
date to make a search on the person of said John Doe and in the house situated at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, in quest of the above described devices and effects and if you find the same or any part
thereof, you are commanded to bring it forthwith before me as provided for by law.

Given under my hand, this 25th day of May, 1923.

(Sgd.) L. GARDUÑO
Judge, Municipal Court

Coming now to the legal aspects of the case it is first worthy of mention that by reason of the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the eleventh and eighteenth paragraphs of the Philippine Bill
of Rights, as found in the present Organic Act, the security of the dwelling and the person is guaranteed. The
organic act provides "that the right to be secured against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated."
It further provides "that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."

In the Philippine Code of Criminal Procedure are found provisions of the same import although naturally
entering more into detail. It is therein provided, among other things, that "a search warrant shall not issue except
for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and
the person of thing to be seized." (Section 97.) After the judge or justice shall have examined on oath the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce, and shall have taken their depositions in writing (section 98),
and after the judge or justice is satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based, or that there
is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the warrant which must be substantially in the following
form:

. . . You are, therefore, commanded, . . . to make immediate search on the person of ............................, or in the
house situated ...................................... (describing it or any other place to be searched with reasonable particularity,
as the case may be) for the following property: . . . ." (Section 99.) It is finally provided that "a person charged with
a crime may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the
crime. (Section 105).

A search warrant must conform strictly to the requirements of the constitutional and statutory provisions
under which it is issued. Otherwise it has rightly been held, must be absolutely legal, "for there is not a description
of process known to the law, the execution of which is more distressing to the citizen. Perhaps there is none which
excites such intense feeling in consequence of its humiliating and degrading effect." The warrant will always be
construed strictly without, however, going the full length of requiring technical accuracy. No presumptions of
regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify under it. (24 R. C. L., pp.
711, et seq.; Reed vs. Rice [1829], 2 J. J. Marshall [Ky.] 44; 19 Am. Dec., 122; Smith vs. McDuffee [1914], 72
Ore., 276; Ann. Cas. 1916 D, 947.)

The search warrant has been likened to a warrant of arrest. Although apprehending that there are material
differences between the two, in view of the paucity of authority pertaining to John Doe search warrants we propose
to take into consideration the authorities relied upon by the appellant, thus following the precedent of Uy Kheytin
vs. Villareal ([1920], 42 Phil., 886), where the regularity of the issuance of the search warrant was also questioned.

In the lower court, and again in this court, the attorneys for the defense quoted from Wharton's Criminal
Procedure. In that text at pages 51, 52, 54, 55, and 56 of volume 1 of the Tenth Edition, is found the following:

Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant and where the name is
unknown there must be such a description of the person accused as will enable the officer to identify him
when found.

xxx xxx xxx

Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the party to be apprehended
is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio personae such as will enable the officer to
identify the accused.

xxx xxx xxx

John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said regarding the essential
requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant
for the apprehension of a person whose true name is unknown, by the name of "John Doe" or "Richard
Roe," "whose other or true name in unknown," is void, without other and further descriptions of the person
to be apprehended, and such warrant will not justify the officer in acting under it. Such a warrant must, in
addition, contain the best descriptio personae possible to be obtained of the person or persons to be
apprehended, and this description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person or persons upon
whom the warrant is to be served; and should state his personal appearance and peculiarities, give his
occupation and place of residence, and any other circumstances by means of which he can be identified.
 Person apprehended in act of committing a crime, under a "John Doe" warrant, on the other hand, the
apprehension will not be illegal, or the officer liable, because under such circumstances it is not necessary
that a warrant should have been issued.

The authority most often cited to sustain the text, and quoted with approval by the United States Supreme
Court, is the case of Commonwealth vs. Crotty ([1865], 10 Allen [Mass.], 403). It there appeared that one Peaslee
had made a complaint to the police court Lee, charging that "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name
is to your complainant unknown," had committed an assault and battery upon him; upon which complaint a
warrant was issued against "John Doe or Richard Roe, whose other or true name is to your complainant unknown,
named in the foregoing complaint." Neither the complaint nor the warrant contained any further description or
means of identification of the person to be arrested. Crotty resisted the arrest upon the ground that the warrant
was invalid. Mr. Chief Justice Bigelow, as the organ of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, said:

We cannot entertain a doubt that the warrant on which the officer attempted to arrest one of the defendant
at the time of the alleged riot was insufficient, illegal and void. It did not contain the name of the defendant,
nor any description or designation by which he could be known and identified as the person against whom
it was issued. It was in effect a general warrant, upon which any other individual might as well have been
arrested, as being included in the description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was contrary to
elementary principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of the citizen, as set forth in the
Declaration of Rights, article 14, which declares that every subject has a right to be secure from all
unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, and that all warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right,
if the order in the warrant to a civil officer to arrest one or more suspected persons or to seize their property
be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest or seizure. This
is in fact only a declaration of an ancient common law right. It was always necessary to express the name
or give some description of a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in
blank, and without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void. (1 Hale P. C. 577. 2 Ib. 119.
Foster, 312. 7 Dane Ab. 248. 1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39. Mead vs. Haws, 7 Cow., 332, and cases cited.)

This rule or principle does not prevent the issue and service of a warrant against a party whose name is
unknown. In such case the best description possible of the person to be arrested is to be given in the
warrant; but it must be sufficient to indicate clearly on whom it is to be served, by stating his occupation,
his personal appearance and peculiarities, the place of his residence, or other circumstances by which he
can be identified. (1 Chit. Crim. Law, 39, 40.)

The warrant being defective and void on its face, the officer had no right to arrest the person on whom he
attempted to serve it. He acted without warrant and was a trespasser. The defendant whom he sought to
arrest had a right to resist by force, using no more than was necessary to resist the unlawful acts of the
officer . . .

The defendants, therefore, in resisting the officer in making an arrest under the warrant in question, if they
were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence, did not do an unlawful act by lawful means, or
a lawful act by unlawful means, and so could not be convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot, with which
they are charged in the indictment.

Appellant's argument, as based on these authorities, runs something like this. The law, constitutional and
statutory, requires that the search warrant shall not issue unless the application "particularly" describe the person
to be seized. A failure thus to name the person is fatal to the validity of the search warrant. To justify search and
arrest, the process must be legal. Illegal official action may be forcibly resisted.

For the prosecution, however, as the arguments are advanced by the Attorney-General, and as the law was
summarized by the trial judge, there is much to be said. Careful and logical reflection brings forth certain points
of paramount force and exercising a decisive influence. We will now make mention of them by correlating the
facts and the law.

In the first place, the affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the building
to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands." This, without doubt,
was a sufficient designation of the premises to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place
to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended. (Steele vs. U. S. [1925], U. S. Supreme Court Advance Opinions 1924-1925; 69 Law. ed., 757).
The police officers were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the premises of the building
occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside, they then had the right to arrest the persons
presumably engaged in a prohibited game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has
been held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money or property found upon
his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime, or which may furnish
the person arrested with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence on
the trial of the cause, but not otherwise. (Moreno vs. Ago Chi [1909], 12 Phil., 439.)

Proceeding along a different line of approach, it is undeniable that the application for the search warrant,
the affidavit, and the search warrant failed to name Jose Ma. Veloso as the person to be seized. But the affidavit
and the search warrant did state that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building occupied by him,
and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine
Islands, certain devices and effects used in violation of the Gambling Law." Now, in this connection, it must not
be forgotten that the Organic Act requires a particular description of the place to be searched, and the person or
things to be seized, and that the warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus,
and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the authorities cited by the appellant,
it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those
cases where it contains a description personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused." The
description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served. As the
search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling apparatus in his possession in the building occupied by him at
No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the manager of the club,
the police could identify John Doe as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty.

Again, it must be remembered that No. 124 Calle Arzobispo was supposed to be used for club purposes.
It was not the home of Veloso; not the place of abode of the family, which the law carefully protects in all of its
sanctity. It was a club partially public in nature. It was, moreover, a camouflaged club with a high sounding name
calculated to mislead the police, but intended for nefarious practices. In a club of such a character, unlike in the
home, there would commonly be varying occupancy, a number of John Does and Richard Roes whose names
would be unknown to the police.

It is also borne out by the authorities that, in defense of himself, any member of his family or his dwelling,
a man has a right to employ all necessary violence. But even in the home, and much less so in a club or public
place, the person sought to be arrested or to be searched should use no more force than is necessary to repel the
unlawful act of the officers. To authorize resistance to the agents of the authority, the illegality of the invasion
must be clearly manifest. Here, there was possibly a proper case for protest. There was no case for excessive
violence to enforce the defendant's idea of a debatable legal question. (Commonwealth vs. Crotty, supra; People
vs. Chan Fook [1921], 42 Phil., 230; 3 Groizard, Codigo Penal, pp. 456, 457.)

The trial judge deduced from the searched warrant that the accused Veloso was sufficiently identified
therein. Mention was made by his Honor of the code provision relating to a complaint or information, permitting
a fictitious name to be inserted in the complaint or information, in lieu of the true name. The Attorney-General
adds to this the argument that the police were authorized to arrest without a warrant since a crime was being
committed. We find it unnecessary to comment on this contention.

John Doe search warrants should be the exception and not the rule. The police should particularly describe
the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. The police
should not be hindered in the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the
best of conditions, by superficial adherence to technicality or far fetched judicial interference.

We agree with the trial judge and with the Attorney-General in their conclusions to the effect that the
search warrant was valid, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime
of resistance of the agents of the authority.

The information alleges that at the time of the commission of the crime, the accused was a member of the
House of Representatives. The trial court was led to consider this allegation in relation with the facts as an
aggravating circumstance, and to sentence the accused accordingly. We doubt, however, that advantage was taken
by the offender of his public position when he resisted the officers of the law. The offender did not necessarily
make use of the prestige of his office as a means to commit a crime. Undoubtedly, Jose Ma. Veloso, as Juan de
la Cruz, would have resisted the police just as stoutly, as the Honorable Jose Ma. Veloso did. The penalty,
accordingly, falls within the medium of that provided by the Penal Code.

Finding present no reversible error, agreeing in all respects with the findings of facts as made by the trial
judge, and concurring with the trial judge in his legal conclusion, with one exception, it results that the judgment
appealed from must be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the sole modification that the defendant and appellant shall
be sentenced to two months and one day imprisonment, arresto mayor, with the costs of this instance against him.
Let the corresponding order to carry this judgment into effect issue.

[G.R. No. 141176. May 27, 2004]

ELI LUI and LEO ROJAS, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES EULOGIO and PAULINA
MATILLANO, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44768 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, Branch
21.[2]

The Antecedents

Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, his fathers older
sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur. On May 2, 1988, Lariosa
was employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a monthly salary of P800.00. The
store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and was located at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw
Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to close the store during lunchtime and after store hours in the
afternoon.Ben himself opened the store in the mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another
store owned by Kiaos son, Eli Lui, who also happened to be Bens nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao
employed Maximo Pagsa and Rene Malang.

Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer every morning before
going to work and in the afternoon, in exchange for free meals and lodging. There were occasions when Lariosa
stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang and left some of his things with them. Lariosa deposited his savings with
the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan.

On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the house
of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he rested until the
next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October 19, 1988, but Kiao told him
that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for the month of October. Kiao warned
Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of Labor. Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without
retrieving his things from Kiaos house.

On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his backwages from Ben in
the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan City and on
November 1, 1988, applied for a job at his cousins place, at Quimpo Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio
cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses for P900.00.

On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at New Matina, Davao City, but
returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4, 1988, he returned to Nancys house and stayed there until
the next day, November 5, 1988.

That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben reported
the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein he alleged that after
Lariosas employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He
suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a former employee, had a duplicate key to the side
door of the United Products Enterprise Store.

At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to retrieve
his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and when Lariosa agreed, they borrowed Luis
Ford Fierra for their transportation. The vehicle stopped at the Almendras Hall where Pagsa alighted on the pretext
that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene, and his wife remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui and
informed the latter that Lariosa was with him.

After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa and two others, Alan Mendoza
and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he wanted to talk, and asked the latter to go with him. Pagsa urged Lariosa
to go along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and boarded Luis vehicle. The car stopped in front of Luis house, where the
latter alighted and went inside, while his companions and Lariosa remained in the car. When Lui returned, he was
armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked Lariosa with the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he
would be killed. The group went to Bens house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as they drove towards
the store.

Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Bens money. Lariosa refused
to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face into the toilet bowl, in an
attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to anything. Lui then made a
telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.

Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88 dated November
6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City from 12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Rojas was directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or stations. He was authorized to carry
his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on board a police car and proceeded to the corner of
Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets.

In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them handcuffed
Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of the keys. As Lariosa opened the lock as
ordered, one of Luis companions took his picture. Another picture was taken as Lariosa held the door knob to
open the door. Lariosa was then boarded in the police car and brought to the corner of Magsaysay and Gemphesaw
Streets where he was transferred to the police car driven by Rojas. He was brought to the Metrodiscom
headquarters.Lui once more mauled Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he stole P45,000.00 from
his uncle and to reveal what he did with the money. When a policeman asked him where he slept the night before,
Lariosa replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriends parents at New Matina, Davao City. The
policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if Lariosa had left anything while he slept
thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen took these
and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and his two companions were waiting.

Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied that he used to stay in
the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan. Rojas and Lui then
brought Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed, to a car. Luis companions, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan
boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.

Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and
Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed Lariosa in
tow. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the house. They then
proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosas aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the adjacent room were Julieta,
Lariosas sister, Paulinas daughter-in-law, Virginia, the latters sister, Erlinda, and a seven-month-old baby. Paulina
was shocked. Rojas told Paulina, Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something. Paulina remonstrated,
Why are you meddling (manghilabot)?

Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because something might happen. He
then said, All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something. Paulina told Lui to wait for her
husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a hurry. Paulina was then impelled to
bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and Tan, to the second floor where her aparador was located. Rojas
and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui and his two companions then took two mats and two pairs
of ladies shoes belonging to Paulina and Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts
which belonged to the latters children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his
companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins. Lui and his two companions then went
down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of the room, one of Luis companions recognized her as Lariosas
sister. Lui and his companions brought her along with them as they left the house.

Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach ached and she was on the verge
of losing consciousness. Concerned, Erlinda massaged Paulinas stomach.However, Erlinda had to leave because
she was worried about her mother. Paulina then went to the kitchen, prepared hot water and put a soothing
ointment on her stomach to relieve the pain.

In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police Station and caused an entry
in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had recovered the following items from the Matillano residence -- one
pair of colored blue pants valued at P89.00; one floor mat costing P290.00; a pair of black ladies shoes
worth P126.00; and another pair of ladies shoes worth P69.00.
 At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying themselves as policemen
had gained entry into their house and took the following: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; two pairs of pants; two
floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one necklace; one ring; and old coins.[3]

At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police blotter that earlier that day, at 4:00
p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two floor mats; two
pairs of ladies shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1 necklace; one ring; and, old coins, without his and his wifes consent
and without a search warrant.[4] In the meantime, Doroteo Barawan, officer-in-charge of the Office of the
Barangay Captain, filed a complaint against Kim Kiao, et al., based on the complaint of Paulina, docketed as
Barangay Case No. 168.[5]

On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that he

stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United Products, and that he used part of the money to buy
appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies shoes, a Seiko wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants,
Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.[6]

On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging
Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.[7] The trial
court rendered judgment on June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. The trial
court held that Lui procured Lariosas confession through force and intimidation, in connivance with police
authorities.[8] The trial court, likewise, found that Lui had an ulterior motive for charging Lariosa of robbery:

What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the burden of this charged against
the accused despite want of any appreciable evidence, can be gathered in the record, as indicating the fear of
complainant, that the accused will file a complaint against him in the Department of Labor for illegally dismissing
him in his employment, without any sufficient legal grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint was intended
to support complainants ground against any possible complaint, the accused might file against him with the
Department of Labor by way of anticipation.[9]

On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following exhibits:

Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June 14, 1989, one Eulogio Matillano,
accuseds uncle, is hereby allowed to get or to retrieve exhibits H, I, J, K, L, and M, consisting of Sony Cassette
with serial no. W3658; Rayban sunglasses; two (2) bundles of floor mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of
ladies shoes; and Seiko Actus wristwatch.[10]

Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter Doe, John Doe
and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed against them in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 880-B. On December 13, 1988, the
court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused therein. Upon reinvestigation, however, the Provincial
Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated March 31, 1989, recommending that the case be dismissed for insufficiency
of evidence, but that the charges be forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office for possible administrative
sanctions against Rojas.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against the
respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas is a member of
the Integrated National Police, this office is without jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against him pursuant
to Presidential Decree No. 1850. Therefore, let the complaint against Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its annexes,
including a copy of the resolution of the undersigned, be forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office
at Camp Catitipan, Davao City, for whatever action it may take.[11]

The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The National Police Commission,
thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating Rojas of administrative liability for the complainants failure to
substantiate the charges.[12] The Commission held that Rojas was merely complying with the mission order issued
to him when he accompanied Lui and the latters two companions to the Matillano residence.

In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III dismissed the
petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutors resolution filed by Paulina Matillano.The Secretary of Justice,
likewise, denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.

In a parallel development, Lariosas parents, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for robbery,
violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et al., with the
Commission of Human Rights docketed as CHR Case No. RFO No. 88-0207-DS. In a Resolution dated December
4, 1989, the Regional Office of the Commission recommended, thus:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we are recommending that there is sufficient prima facie evidence:

1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended;
and

2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile, as defined under Art. 128 of
the same code.[13]

The Proceedings in the Trial Court

On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil complaint for damages in
the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against Eli Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and Henry Tan. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. G-XXI-47(90). The plaintiffs therein alleged the following:

3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in Bansalan, Davao del Sur, for
several years now. They are law-abiding and peaceful citizens in the community;

4. That at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while plaintiff husband was away from
his residential house at Lily St., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife was there tending the house,
defendants, without any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru intimidation succeeded in searching the house
owned by the plaintiff after which they brought with them two floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of
pants, two polo shirts, two T-shirts, one Relova wrist watch, one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and
several old coins, without the consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the items taken;

5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one Elinito Lariosa but defendants
thru the use of naked power and brute force, illegally searched the house of the herein plaintiffs in gross violation
of plaintiffs constitutional rights;

6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally search the house of plaintiffs and
then taking with them the items mentioned above without even the benefit of any receipt is not only violative of
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code but also of Article 32 of the Civil Code;

7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental anguishes, wounded feelings,
deprivation of the properties taken, besmirched reputation, and fright for which reason defendants should be made
to jointly and severally pay moral damages in the amount of P500,000.00;

8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of example or correction for the
public good, defendants should be made to pay jointly and severally exemplary damages in the amount
of P300,000.00;

9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of counsel for an agreed attorneys
fees equivalent to 25% of the total award plus per diem of P1,000.00 per court appearance;

10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not less than P10,000.00;[14]

They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, viz:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment issue ordering the defendants to
jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:

1. P500,000.00 as moral damages;

2. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;

3. Litigation expenses of P10,000.00;

4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total award;

5. Per diems to be proved during the trial of this case.

Plaintiffs pray for other reliefs consistent with equity.[15]

In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia, that they did not conduct a
search in the house of the plaintiffs and that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter the house and even
brought out pairs of pants. They added that the other items were brought out by Lariosas sister and that they took
only one (1) floor mat, two (2) pairs of ladies shoes, and one (1) pair of blue pants.[16]

The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter their house, and
with Lariosas sister, voluntarily turned over the items declared in the complaint.They testified that no violence,
threats or intimidation were even committed by them against Paulina Matillano. Defendant Rojas further testified
that he was merely complying with the Mission Order issued to him when he entered the house of the plaintiffs
in the company of the other defendants, and that he remained in the ground floor while the other defendants
retrieved the goods from plaintiff Matillano in the second floor of the house.

On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of the complaint for plaintiffs
failure to prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed the defendants counterclaims. The trial court gave
credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina Matillano voluntarily allowed them
to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the subject items to them. The trial court took into
account the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor, the Secretary of Justice, the National Police Commission, as
well as the order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Case No. 880-B.

The Case on Appeal

The decision of the trial court was elevated to the Court of Appeals where the appellants contended, thus:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT PAULINA MATILLANO

VOLUNTARILY ALLOWED APPELLEES TO ENTER THE HOUSE BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF
HER NEPHEW ELINITO LARIOSA WHO WAS HANDCUFFED;

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA MATILLANO WAS THE
ONE WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE BANSALAN POLICE STATION.

3. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT DESPITE CLEAR

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE AGAINST THE DEFENDANTS APPELLEES.[17]

On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally:

1. To pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and
Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

2. Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), as attorneys fees; and

3. To pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[18]

The appellate court denied the appellees motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The appellees
Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the decision.

Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE TIME-HONORED DOCTRINE

LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT THAT FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT ARE BINDING AND
CONCLUSIVE AND DESERVE A HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT, WHEN IT SET ASIDE THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS AND ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT THAT TRIED THE CASE;

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT AN ILLEGAL

SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED IN MRS. MATILLANOS RESIDENCE, IN DISREGARD OF THE
EXCULPATORY FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT MRS. MATILLANO HAD VOLUNTARILY
ALLOWED PETITIONERS ENTRY INTO HER HOUSE.[19]

The Issues

The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano
consented to the petitioners entry into her house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and pieces of jewelry
owned by her and her family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages to the respondents; and, (c)
if so, the extent of the petitioners liability to the respondents.

Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court shall delve into and resolve them
simultaneously.

The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions
of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule admits of some
exceptions, such as a case where the findings of facts of the trial court are substantially different from those of
the appellate court, and the resolution of such issues are determinative of the outcome of the petition.[20]

The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in discarding the factual
findings of the trial court. Contrary to the disquisitions of the appellate court, the petitioners assert that the
inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rojas and Lui are peripheral. Lui did not conduct any search in the
second floor of the respondents house and even if he did so, respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against
unreasonable search when she allowed the petitioners to enter. According to the petitioners, the respondents failed
to prove that they forced their way into the house of the respondents, and that the facts and circumstances which
the appellate court found the trial court to have overlooked are not, in fact, substantial enough to warrant a reversal
of the factual findings of the court a quo. According to the petitioners, the appellate court failed to discern that
the action filed by the respondents with the trial court was merely a leverage to the charge of robbery against
Lariosa, the respondents nephew.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative weight to the evidence of the
respondents. It stated in its decision that the trial court erred in giving credence and probative weight to the
testimonies of the petitioners (the appellants therein). Moreover, the appellate court found that the trial court had
overlooked facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, would have altered the courts
decision. The appellate court gave weight to the findings of the trial court in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.[21]

We agree with the Court of Appeals.

The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and with the
handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the respondents. They proceeded
to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her vehement protests, and because of petitioner Luis
warning that she might be harmed, respondent Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his
cohorts to the second floor of their house. The foregoing was testified to by respondent Paulina Matillano, thus:

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q Mrs. Matillano, do you know the person of Eli Lui?

A I know him.

Q Why do you know Eli Lui?

A Because he is from Bansalan.

Q On November 6, 1988, where were you, Mrs. Matillano?

A I was in our house.

Q At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you notice any unusual incident that
took place in your house?

A There was.

Q What incident was that, Mrs. Matillano?

A There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.

Q Where did they enter?

 A They entered through the kitchen.

Q Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?

A I was in our sala.

Q Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered (sic) your house?

A I was afraid.

Q Aside from fear, what did you do?

A One of them suddenly said, Mrs., we are authorities.

ATTY. TAN:

Not responsive to the question, Your Honor.

ATTY. SUARIO:

She is responding the question because my question is, Aside from fear, what did you do? and according
to this witness, she was not able to do anything because one of those who entered(not continued)

COURT:

I think the answer is not responsive. Just reform the question.

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q What did these persons do when they entered your house?

A One of them said, Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something from your house."

Q Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that they were persons in authority?

A That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but I know (sic) him later to be
Leo Rojas.

Q Why do you know him later to be Leo Rojas?

A When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo Rojas.

Q What was Leo Rojas wearing at that time?

A He was in civilian clothes.

Q Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your house?

A Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was also with them in the name of
Elinito Lariosa.

Q Who else, Mrs. Matillano?

A Eli Lui.

ATTY. SUARIO:

At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word manghilabot be incorporated.

COURT:

So, the word is interfering or meddling. You record the word manghilabot.

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q When you said manghilabot, what do you mean, Mrs. Matillano?

 A Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I said why are they doing that
(manghilabot)?

Q When you said those remarks, what else happened?

A It was Eli Lui who answered, Mrs., do not answer anymore because something might happen. (Basig
madisgrasya).

ATTY. SUARIO:

Madisgrasya, Your Honor, is more than something.

ATTY. SUARIO:

Q When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?

A He said, All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something. And I even told him that
we should wait for my husband but they did not agree because they said they are in a hurry.

Q And after that, what else happened?

A I accompanied him upstairs.

Q You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you accompanied upstairs.

A Eli Lui and his other two (2) companions.

Q These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their names?

A Yes, sir.[22]

ATTY. TAN:

Q Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered your house. When you said
suddenly, will you please describe how did they enter the house?

A They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the house.

Q You mean to say that they did not knock at the door?

A They did not.

Q Who first entered the house among the five (5)?

A What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and whom I recognized was Eli Lui
and my nephew who was in handcuffs.

Q Was your door opened at that time?

A It was closed but it was not locked. It can be kicked open.

Q But you can open it without kicking the door?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?

A Why would you not be afraid when they were armed?

Q Who were armed among the five (5)?

A All of them except the one who was in handcuffs.

Q You are very sure of that?

A I am very sure.[23]
 Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his cohorts took her personal
things, and those of her familys, from the second floor of the house:

Q Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were upstairs, what happened upstairs?

A Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats, the pair of leather shoes, 2 pairs
of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also let me open the chest and when it was already open they rummaged
through it and they got my old Bulova watch, my necklace, my ring and a coinsita, old gold coins.

Q When you said coinsita, what is coinsita?

A Old coins.

Q After taking all of these things, what else happened?

A They went downstairs.[24]

Q Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken from your house, do you confirm
that there were two (2) polo-shirts that were taken?

A Yes.

Q And there were also two (2) floor mats?

A Yes, that is true.

Q One (1) Bulova wristwatch?

A Yes.

Q One (1) necklace?

A Yes.

Q Two (2) pairs of lady (sic) shoes?

A Yes.

Q Two (2) pairs of pants?

A Yes.

Q One (1) ring?

A Yes.

Q Who owns these two (2) pairs of ladys (sic) shoes?

A That was mine.

Q What were the color of the shoes?

A Black and dirty white (referring to the color of the rostrum).

Q Where did you buy that shoes?

A In Davao City.

Q What store in Davao City?

A NCCC.

Q What particular date when you bought that shoes?

A I think it was in the month of November.

Q 1988?

A 1988.

Q And who owns these two (2) polo-shirts?

A My children.

Q What are the names of your children?

A Allan and Danilo.

Q Where is Allan residing?

A During the incident, Allan was still schooling in Tacloban.

Q So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing in Bansalan?

A No more.

Q How about Danilo, where was he residing in November 6, 1988?

A He was living in Sta. Cruz.

Q He has a family of his own at Sta. Cruz?

A He was still single then.

Q But he was residing in Sta. Cruz?

A Yes.

Q How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?

A My children also.

Q You are referring to Allan and Danilo?

A No, because I still have so many children.

Q So, who owns these two (2) pants?

A Also my children, Eulogio, Jr. and Allan.

Q Now, Eulogio, Jr. where is (sic) he residing on November 6, 1988?

A In our house.

Q How about these two (2) t-shirts?

A Also owned by my children.

Q Are you referring to Allan and Danilo?

A They used to wear that.

Q How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he was then residing in Tacloban?

ATTY. SUARIO:

May we manifest, Your Honor, that he was schooling in Tacloban.

COURT:

All right.
 A They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually they left some of their clothes
inside our aparador.

Q These polo shirts were still new?

A Already used.

Q How about the pants?

A The other one is already used and the other one is new.

Q How about the floor mats?

A That is mine.

Q Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or aparador, is that correct?

A Yes, that is true.

Q Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein?

A Many.

Q Could you say one (1) dozen?

A It cannot be counted.

Q Could you say three (3) dozens?

A It is really full of dress.

Q Would you say it is more than three (3) dozens?

A More.

Q And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts and pants?

A Yes.

Q And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of clothes, pants, polo shirts and t-
shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2) polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts w ere taken?

A Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still usable the good ones.

Q Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched your trunk?

A I was ordered to open the trunk.

Q Who particularly ordered you to open the trunk?

A Eli Lui.[25]

The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain [26] and filed a
complaint against petitioner Lui and his cohorts.[27]

The petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their cohorts inside the house
and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied by the unshaken testimony of respondent Paulina
Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.

The petitioners attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility and courtesy to respondent Paulina
Matillano is implausible, taking into account petitioner Luis state of mind before he and petitioner Rojas and their
cohorts left the Metrodiscom Headquarters in Davao City, and proceeded to the house of the respondents in
Bansalan. Before they left Davao City, Lui sadistically mauled Lariosa with the acquiescence of the police
authorities, and forced him to give an uncounselled extrajudicial confession. This was the finding of the RTC in
Criminal Case No. 17,136,88:
 Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused denied having anything to do with
the lost money of the complainant. Later, he was turned over to the police for investigation and there without
affording accused with his right to counsel, he was interrogated orally and was forced to admit that out of the
money he stole, he bought items which the police later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the accused to
the complainants establishment and forced to do re-enactment of the act of robbery, without accused again
afforded the right to counsel. Pictures were taken during the re-enactment while accused was handcuffed, as
shown in the pictures taken by the police.

Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit A), no longer able
to bear the pain of the mauling to him by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of maltreating the accused even in the
presence of the guards in the jail and seriously threatening accused to admit ownership of the recovered items at
Bansalan and at New Matina, SIR, Davao City, otherwise he will be salvaged, along with the serious threatening
words of accuseds companion in the jail, that if he will refuse to sign his alleged confession, he will be salvaged
as directed by Eli Lui with the police.

Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui seems to have an open hand in
the prosecution of the accused. He was the one who called the police to arrest him, even without a warrant of
arrest. Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied on him in the investigation and the filing of proper
charges against accused. They rode in a car of Eli Lui, in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the
establishment of complainant during the re-enactment in going to Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought
by accused out of the money allegedly stolen; all of these incidents shows the police despite justification, that
they do not have enough facilities, gone astray in conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to any
possible indiscretion of Eli Lui of making the scale of justice bend in his favor, by manifesting control over the
police power of investigation highly and seriously pre-judicial to the rights, and interests of the accused.[28]

If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence of police authorities, he would
not have cared a whit in barging into the respondents house with petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City,
and his cohorts, and divesting the respondents of their belongings. The petitioners and their cohorts wanted to
insure that their caper would succeed.Hence, they did not coordinate with the Bansalan Police Station when they
went to the respondents house with their intention to divest them of their belongings.

Petitioner Rojas reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by Sergeant Alberto Genise
is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to follow up a theft case
within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City. The petitioner was not authorized, under the
said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime, such as violation of domicile as defined in Article
128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:

ART. 128. Violation of domicile The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial order, shall enter any dwelling
against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of
such owner, or, having surreptitiously entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse
to do so.

If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a
crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the second floor of the
respondents house and himself conduct a search therein, he allowed them to search the premises without a
warrant. The petitioners and their cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in the house of the respondents,
much less divest the latter of their personal belongings. As a police officer, it was petitioner Rojas duty to prevent
the commission of crimes in his presence, and to arrest the persons committing such crimes.

The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on the following grounds: (a) she
had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a businessman doing business in Bansalan; (b) the occupants of the
respondents house when the petitioners and their cohorts arrived were all women; (c) the respondents failed to
report the incident to the Bansalan police authorities; and, (d) the provincial prosecutors resolution recommending
the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 880-B for robbery against the petitioners, which was sustained by the Secretary
of Justice, and the ruling of the National Police Commission exonerating petitioner Rojas from any liability.

We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial court.
 First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not stay permanently in Bansalan. He
went there only to collect money from a certain Matura and other businessmen.[29] She also testified that there
were many cases against the petitioner, one of which was for arson. The case was dismissed, but one of her
neighbors was rendered missing.[30] If the petitioner, a businessman for ten years or so, had no qualms in torturing
Lariosa under the very noses of police officers, he would, likewise, have no qualms about intimidating respondent
Paulina Matillano and divesting her of her personal belongings. It must be stressed that petitioner Lui was in the
company of petitioner Rojas, a police officer from Davao City.

Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the occupants of the respondents
house were all women. They must have believed that there were male occupants; hence, barged into the house
with drawn guns.

Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillanos sworn statement before the Bansalan Police
Station, she declared that the petitioners were armed with guns. They threatened her life and, without any search
warrant therefor, divested her and her family of their personal belongings against their will.[31]

Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain, respondent Paulina Matillano declared
that the petitioners entered their house, that petitioner Lui pointed a gun at her, and that the petitioners and their
cohorts searched the house and carted away their personal belongings.[32] That the report made before the
Barangay Captain and petitioner Paulina Matillanos sworn statement are not as complete as her testimony before
the trial court is understandable. Affidavits are usually taken ex parte and are almost always incomplete and
inaccurate, but they do not detract from the credibility of the witness.[33] An entry in the police blotter is usually
incomplete and inaccurate for want of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the victim may be unable
to recall the connected collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory,
and for his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject.[34] The same principle applies to entries in the
barangay blotter.

Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and quasi-administrative agencies
are not binding on the courts. In the present case, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as affirmed by the
Secretary of Justice,[35] found no probable cause for robbery against the petitioners because they had no intent to
rob, but merely to recover the properties from the house of the respondents which petitioner Lui perceived to have
been acquired by Lariosa with money stolen from his uncle, Ben.[36] The decision of the National Police
Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of grave misconduct was anchored on its finding that the petitioner was
merely performing his duty as ordered by his superior officer.[37] It was inevitable for the City Prosecutor to
dismiss the complaint for violation of domicile filed against petitioner Rojas in I.S. No. 91-1488 because the
crime of violation of domicile was committed in Bansalan and not in Davao City.[38] In contrast, the Commission
on Human Rights recommended the indictment of petitioner Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner Rojas for
violation of domicile.[39]

Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, the dismissal of the
complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial Court and the
National Police Commission are of no relevance to the civil complaint for damages filed by the respondents
against the petitioners. The action of the respondents against the petitioners may still proceed despite the dismissal
of the criminal and administrative actions against them.

The petitioners contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search
and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, the right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable. This provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent
but also those who appear to be guilty, who must nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved.[40] The general rule is that a search and seizure must be carried through or with judicial warrant; otherwise,
such a search and seizure becomes unconstitutional within the context of the constitutional provision [41] because
a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right. Peace officers who effect a warrantless search cannot
invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.[42]

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived expressly
or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed.[43] There must be clear and convincing evidence
of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a constitutional right. There must be proof
of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. [44] The
waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every reasonable presumption
against any waiver of fundamental constitutional rights.[45] The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to
the entry into her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search therein. [46] A
peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration
of regard for the supremacy of the law.[47]

In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent Paulina
Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto, either expressly or
impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening of her wooden closet and the
taking of their personal properties.However, such failure to object or resist did not amount to an implied waiver
of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui
threatened and intimidated her. Respondent Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the
petitioner and his cohorts conducted the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional
right.

Furthermore, the petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed over the articles
to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that there was foreknowledge on the part of the petitioners of
the articles they wanted to retrieve from the respondents house. Even if respondent Paulina Matillano did hand
over the articles to the petitioner, it was only because the petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened and
intimidated her into doing so.

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to the respondents for moral
and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively awarded by it. Petitioner Rojas, a policeman of Davao City,
conspired with petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns, gained entry into the respondents house, and threatened and
intimidated respondent Paulina Matillano. Although petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he
assented thereto by allowing petitioner Lui and his cohorts to go up to the second floor and divest the respondents
of their belongings. The petitioners even left together after the incident.

In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,[48] we had the occasion to state:

In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of constitutional
rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages.

xxx

(9) the rights to be secure in ones persons, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

xxx

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged.

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

xxx

(6) Illegal search;

(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired
is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor. In addition,
exemplary damages may also be awarded.

xxx

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that
there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which
is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext
of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put
an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort.
(emphasis supplied)
 In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons indirectly
responsible, viz:

[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer
or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties
of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under
Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved
party.

xxx

While it would certainly be too nave to expect that violators of human rights would easily be deterred by
the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no uncertain terms that Article 32 of
the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint
tortfeasors.

xxx

[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated directly should be held liable. Article
32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly,
responsible for its violations. (emphasis supplied)

Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted damages to
private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of private respondents against
unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum
Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of all illegal sources of scouting supplies. As correctly observed
by respondent court:

Indeed, the acts committed by the PC soldiers of unlawfully seizing appellees (respondents) merchandise
and of filing the criminal complaint for unfair competition against appellees (respondents) were for the protection
and benefit of appellant (petitioner) corporation. Such being the case, it is, thus, reasonably fair to infer from
those acts that it was upon appellant (petitioner) corporations instance that the PC soldiers conducted the raid
and effected the illegal seizure. These circumstances should answer the trial courts query posed in its decision
now under consideration as to why the PC soldiers immediately turned over the seized merchandise to appellant
(petitioner) corporation.

The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting thereto, he was
liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner corporation which even received for
safekeeping the goods unreasonable seized by the PC raiding team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them
for quite a time despite the dismissal of its complaint for unfair competition.[49]

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 205800 September 10, 2014

MICROSOFT CORPORATION and ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED, Petitioners, vs.

SAMIR FARAJALLAH, VIRGILIO D.C. HERCE, RACHEL P. FOLLOSCO, JESUSITO G.
MORALLOS, and MA. GERALDINE S. GARCIA (directors and officers of NEW FIELDS (ASIA
PACIFIC), INC.), Respondents.

DECISION

CARPIO, Acting C.J.:

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 June 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 116771
and the Resolution2 of the CA dated 30 January 2013. The Decision and Resolution sustained the orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) quashing Search Warrant Nos. 10-15912 and 10-15913.
 The Facts

Microsoft Corporation and Adobe Systems Incorporated (petitioners) are corporations organized and
existing under the laws of the United States. Microsoft Corporation is the owner of all rights including copyright
relating to all versions and editions of Microsoft software3 and the corresponding user’s manuals, and the
registeredowner of the "Microsoft" "MS DOS" trademarks in the Philippines. Adobe Systems Incorporatedis the
owner of all rights including copyright relating to all versions and editions of Adobe Software.4

Samir Farajallah, Virgilio D.C. Herce, Rachel P. Follosco, Jesusito G. Morallos and Ma. Geraldine S.
Garcia (respondents) are the directors and officers of New Fields (Asia Pacific), Inc., a domestic corporation with
principal office at Unit 1603, East Tower, PhilippineStock Exchange Center, Exchange Road, Ortigas Center,
Pasig City.

Petitioners claim that in September 2009, they were informed that New Fields was unlawfully reproducing
and using unlicensed versions of their software. Orion Support, Inc.(OSI) was engaged by petitioners to assist in
the verification of this information. Two OSI Market Researchers, Norma L. Serrano (Serrano) and Michael A.
Moradoz (Moradoz) were assigned to confirm the informant's tip. Serrano and Moradoz were trained to detect
unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software.5

On 17 March 2010, counsel for petitioners filed a letter-complaint with the Chief of the Philippine
National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group. The case was assigned to Police Senior Inspector
Ernesto V. Padilla (Padilla).6

On 26 March 2010, Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz went to the office of respondents. Using a legitimate
business pretext, they were able to use two computers owned by New Fields and obtained the following
information regarding the installed Microsoft and Adobe software:

First computer

Installed Software Product I.D./Serial Number

Microsoft Windows XP Pro V2002 S₱2 55274-640-1582543-23775

Microsoft Office Word 2007 Enterprise 89388-707-0358973-65509

Edition 2007

Adobe Acrobat 8 Pro (1) 1118-1061-0904-4874-2027

Second computer

Installed Software Product I.D./Serial Number

Microsoft Windows XP Pro V2002 S₱2 55274-640-1582543-23442

Microsoft Office Word 2007 Enterprise 89388-707-0358973-65709

Edition 2007

Adobe Acrobat 8 Pro (1) 1118-1061-0904-4874-2027

Padilla was trained to distinguish original from counterfeit software,7 and he saw the screens of the
computers used by the OSI staff, including the product I.D. Nos. of the installed software.

In their Joint Affidavit, Serrano and Moradoz stated that:

 There are at least two (2) computers using common product identification and/or serial numbers of
MICROSOFT and ADOBE software. This is one indication that the software being used is unlicensed or was
illegally reproduced or copied. Based on the training we attended, all ADOBE and MICROSOFTsoftware should
only be installed in one computer, unless they avail of an Open Licese Agreement from the software developer,
which is not the case in NEW FIELDS. In this case, the first three sets of numbers of the Product I.D. Nos. of the
MICROSOFT Windows XP Pro operating System software program installed in the two (2) computerunits we
used, i.e., "55274-640-1582543-xxxxx", were the same. We also observed that the first three sets of numbers of
the Product I.D Nos. of the MICROSOFT Office 2007 (Word) software in the two (2) computers we used, i.e.,
"89388-707-0358973-xxxxx", were also the same. Ostensibly, this means that NEW FIELDS only used one (1)
installer of the MICROSOFT Windows XP operating system software and one (1) installer of the MICROSOFT
Office software program on two (2) computers. Based on our training, if the first three sets of numbers of the
Product I.D. Nos. of the MICROSOFT software installed are the same, it signifies that it came from one installer.
It does not matter [if] the last 5 digits of the Product I.D. Nos. are different because this is computer-generated
and therefore varies with every installation. Apart from the MICROSOFT software, the serial numbers of the
ADOBE software installed in the computer units we used were also the same, signifying that NEW FIELDS only
used one (1) installer of the ADOBE software program on two (2) computers.8 (Emphasis supplied)

They also observed that New Fields had 90 computers in their office with Microsoft software, none of
which had the Certificate of Authenticity issued by Microsoft.

After being informed of the resultsof the investigation, petitioners then issued certifications that they have
not authorized New Fields to "copy, print, reproduce and/or publish unauthorized copies of Microsoft and Adobe
software products."9

An application for search warrants was filed by Padilla on 20 May 2010, before Judge Amor Reyes in her
capacity as Executive Judge of the RTC. Search Warrant Nos. 10-15912 and 10-15913 were issued on the same
date.10

The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields employees witnessed the search
conducted by the authorities. Several items were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing
unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software.

On 6 June 2010, New Fields filed a motion seeking to quash one of the two warrants served (Search
Warrant No. 10-15912).11 The motion was received by petitioners on 10 June 2010 and was set for hearing on 11
June 2010. During the hearing on the motion, petitioners were allowed by the RTC to file their
Comment/Opposition on or before 21 June 2010.12

In their Comment/Opposition dated 21 June 2010,13 petitioners alleged that:

The Motion [to Quash] failed to comply with the mandatory 3-day notice rule under the Rules of Court.
Hence it is nothing but a worthless piece of paper.

xxxx

In this case, the Motion of Respondents was scheduled for hearing on 11 June 2010. However,
Respondents only furnished [petitioners] a copy of the Motion on 10 June 2010, or just1 day before the scheduled
hearing, which was in clear violation of the 3-day notice rule.14

On 29 June 2010, the RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that "allthe items seized
from the respondents be returned x x x."15 According to the RTC, petitionersshould have identified which specific
computer had the pirated software.16 The RTC added that no criminal charge has been filed yet, despite the fact
that the seized items have been in petitioners’ possession for several weeks since the warrants were issued. Lastly,
the RTC dismissed the petitioners’ contention that the threeday notice rule was not complied withbecause
petitioners were already notified of the motion personally.17

On 8 July 2010, petitioners receiveda copy of the Order, and Deputy Sheriff Edgardo Reyes of the RTC
alsoeffected the return of the seized items, in compliance with the RTC’s Order.18 Petitioners filed an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order on 8 July 2010 wherein they alleged that: (1)
they intend to file a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order; and (2) the Order was not immediately
executory.19Respondents received a copy of the motion the day it was filed.

On 9 July 2010, respondents moved to expunge petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, saying that
petitioners failed to comply with the threeday notice rule.20 The hearing on the motion was set on 13 July 2010.
A copy of the motion was received by petitioners on 20 July 2010.21
 On 15 July 2010, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order.22 Respondents filed their
Comment/Opposition23 to the motion, which was received by petitioners on 12 August 2010.24

The RTC denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration in its Order dated 27 August 2010. 25 Petitioners
filed a petition for certiorari26 under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010 before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners alleged
that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Quash despite: (1) respondents’
failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement; and (2) the existence of probable cause, and personal
knowledge of the warrant applicant.

The Ruling of the CA

The CA denied the petition for certiorari. The appellate court held that:

In the instant case, when the court a quoordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion
toquash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not
strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion
giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.27

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The instant petition raisedonly one issue, to wit:

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Judge Amor Reyes of Branch 21, Regional Trial
Court of Manila did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
its Orders dated 29 June2010 and 27 August 2010, quashing Search Warrant Nos. 10-[1]5912 and 10-[1]5913
and directing the immediate release of the items seized pursuant to the said warrants, despite the pendency of
appellate proceedings.28

The Ruling of the Court

We rule that strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be relaxed in this case. However, we
sustain petitioners’ contention that there was probable cause for issuance of a warrant, and the RTC and CA
should have upheld the validity of both warrants.

Compliance with the three-day notice rule

In Anama v. Court of Appeals,29 we ruled that the three-day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of
the ruleis to safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable
opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three-day notice rule may be
dispensed with.

As correctly pointed out by the CA:

In the instant case, when the court a quoordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion
toquash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was not
strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion
giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion.30

Existence of probable cause

Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitions for review by certiorari "shall raise only
questions of law." A question of fact exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it can only
be resolved through a reexamination of the body of evidence.31

In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc.,32 we ruled that the existence of probable cause is a question
33
of fact. In the same case, we also stated that:

Probable cause is dependent largely on the opinion and findings of the judge who conducted the
examination and who had the opportunity to question the applicant and his witnesses. For this reason, the findings
of the judge deserve great weight. The reviewing court should overturn such findings only upon proof that the
judge disregarded the facts before him or ignored the clear dictates of reason.34
 This Court is not a trier of facts. As a general rule, we defer to the lower courts’ appreciation and evaluation
of evidence.35 This general rule, however, is not absolute. We will review the factual findings of the CA in any
of the following instances:

(1) when the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;

(2) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (3) when
the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;

(4) when there is a grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;

(5) when the Appellate Court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and such findings
are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

(6) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a misapprehension of facts;

(7) when the Court of Appeals failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion;

(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;

(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are
based; and

(10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence but such
findings are contradicted by the evidence on record.36

In this case, we find reason to overturn the rulings of the RTC and CA, since there was grave abuse of
discretion in the appreciation of facts. The CA sustained the quashal of the warrant because the witnesses had "no
personal knowledge of the facts upon which the issuance of the warrants may be justified,"37 and the applicants
and the witnesses merely relied on the screen shots acquired from the confidential informant.38

We disagree with the conclusions of the CA. The assailed CA Decision itself stated:

Initial hearsay information or tips from confidential informants could very well serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant, if followed up personally by the recipient and validated.39 Looking at the records, it
is clear that Padilla and his companions were able to personally verify the tipof their informant. In his Affidavit
submitted to Judge Amor Reyes prior to the issuance of the warrant, Padilla stated that:

At the time that I was inside the office premises of the NEW FIELDS, I saw the Product Keys or Product
Identification Numbers of the ADOBE and MICROSOFT computer software programs installed in some of the
computer units. Ms. Serrano and Mr. Moradoz were able to pull up these data since they were allowed to use
some of the computers of the target companies in line with the pretext that we used to gain entry into NEW
FIELDS. I actively read and attentively observed the information reflected from the monitor display unit of the
computers that Ms. Serrano and Mr. Moradoz were able to use. x x x.40

As mentioned earlier, Padilla has been trained to distinguish illegally reproduced Adobe and Microsoft
software. Thus, in his Affidavit, he stated that:

xxxx

6. I suspect that the ADOBE and MICROSOFT computer software programs that are being used in the
premises of NEW FIELDS are unauthorized, illegal or unlicensed copies because of the following reasons:

6.1. At least two (2) computer units are using a common Product Identification Number of MICROSOFT
and ADOBE software.1âwphi1 This is one indication that the software being used is unlicensed or was illegally
reproduced or copied. All ADOBE and MICROSOFT computer software programs should only be used in one
computer unit, unless they avail of an Open License Agreement from the computer software developer, which
[was not obtained by] NEW FIELDS. x x x.41

The evidence on record clearly shows that the applicant and witnesses were able to verify the information
obtained from their confidential source. The evidence likewise shows that there was probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant. Thus, the requirement of personal knowledge of the applicant and witnesses was
clearly satisfied in this case.
 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 June 2012 and the Resolution dated 30
January 2013 of the Court of Appeals, uph0lding the 29 June 2010 and 27 August 2010 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Search Warrant Nos. 10-15912 and 10-15913 are declared
valid.

SO ORDERED.