G.R. No.

114829 March 1, 1995

MAXIMINO GAMIDO Y BUENAVENTURA, petitioner,

vs.
NEW BILIBID PRISONS (NBP) OFFICIALS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In the Resolution of 7 September 1994, we required Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea of No.
42 National Road corner Bruger Subdivision, Putatan, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, to
show cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for making it appear
in the jurat of the petition in this case that the petitioner subscribed the verification and
swore to before him, as notary public, on 19 April 1994, when in truth and in fact the
petitioner did not.

In his Explanation of 23 December 1994 which was received by this Court on 25

January 1995, Atty. Icasiano M. dela Rea admitted having executed the jurat without
the presence of petitioner Gamido. He alleges:

Firstly, I must honestly admit that I notarized it not in his presence. I did
it in the honest belief that since it is jurat and not an acknowledgement, it
would be alrights [sic] to do so considering that prior to April 19, 1994
and thereafter, I know Mr. Gamido since I have been in and out of New
Bilibid Prisons, not only because my office is here only across the
Municipal Building of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila but because I handled a
number of cases involving prisoners and guards of NBP as well as some of
its personnels [sic]. That in fact, I attempted to have the document
personally signed by him but considering that I have to strictly observe
rules and regulations of the NBP, particularly on visit, I did not pursue
anymore my intention to have it notarized before me.

Secondly, that in notarizing the document, I honestly feel and by heart

and in good faith, that as a notary public and as a practicing lawyer, I
could modestly contribute in the orderly administration of justice. The
Gamido family use to come in the office and in fact hiring the legal
services of the undersigned but I refused to handle since I am already
pre-occupied in other cases of similar importance. That on December 13,
 1994 I receive a letter from Mr. Gamido, last paragraph of which is read
as follows:

Sanay po Atty. ay maawa kayo sa akin na nagdudusa nang

walang kasalanan. Alang alang po sa kaawa awa kong
familiya, kailangan ang aking kalinga. Ang tulong ninyo ang
siyang daan upang ako ay makaalis sa pagpapahirap nang
mga taong walang puso at kaluluwa, walang awa sa kapwa,
at sa sambayanang Pilipino.

Then he apologizes to the Court and assures it that henceforth he would be more
careful and circumspect:

That I am praying for an apology to the Hon. Supreme Court if what I did
was wrong and the Hon. Supreme Court is assured that perhaps what
transpired was a wrong judgment or honest mistake. That the Hon.
Chairman and its Hon. Members are assured that when I signed the
petition not in Gamido's presence it is never intended to do a wrong, to
commit illegal or criminal acts but merely in the honest and sincere belief
that it is valid and legal. The Hon. Supreme Court is assured that it is
never intended for malice or for money.

This Hon. Chairman and its Hon. Members are further assured that from
hereon, I am more careful and circumspect in the exercise of this noble
and grand profession and that no amount or consideration will sway or
change this conviction. This is my life. This is the life of my family.

Atty. dela Rea's explanation is unsatisfactory; however, his spontaneous voluntary

admission may be considered in mitigation of his liability.

As a notary public for a long time, as evidenced by the fact that his questioned jurat is
indicated to have been entered in Book 45 of his notarial register, he should know the
similarities and differences between a jurat and an acknowledgement.

A jurat which is, normally in this form:

Subscribed and sworn to before me in _______________, this ____ day

of ____________, affiant having exhibited to me his Community (before,
Residence) Tax Certificate No. ____________ issued at ______________
on ____________.
"is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was sworn
to before him (Theobald vs. Chicago Ry. Co., 75 Ill. App. 208). It is not a part of a
pleading but merely evidences the fact that the affidavit was properly made (Young vs.
Wooden, 265 SW 24, 204 Ky. 694)." (LORENZO M. TAÑADA and FRANCISCO A.
RODRIGO, Modern Legal Forms, vol. I, sixth ed., 1985 printing, 31). The jurat in the
petition in the case also begins with the words "subscribed and sworn to me."

To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign at the end of a
document (Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1279). To swear means to put on oath; to
declare on oath the truth of a pleading, etc. (Id., 1298). Accordingly, in a jurat, the
affiant must sign the document in the presence of and take his oath before a notary
public or any other person authorized to administer oaths.

As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgement shall be made before a notary public or an

officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary
public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the
person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and
that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the
same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his
official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state. (See Lorenzo M. Tañada and Francisco A.
Rodrigo, Modern Philippine Legal Forms, vol. II, 1964 Fifth ed., 735).

It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise appear before the notary
public or any other person authorized to take acknowledgments of instruments or
documents.

The claim or belief of Atty. dela Rea that the presence of petitioner Gamido was not
necessary for the jurat because it is not an acknowledgment is patently baseless. If this
had been his belief since he was first commissioned as a notary public, then he has
been making a mockery of the legal solemnity of an oath in a jurat. Notaries public and
others authorized by law to administer oaths or to take acknowledgments should not
take for granted the solemn duties appertaining to their offices. Such duties are
dictated by public policy and are impressed with public interest.
His prior acquaintance and friendship with petitioner Gamido provides no excuse for
non-compliance with his duty. If Atty. dela Rea were faithful to his duty as a notary
public and if he wanted to accommodate a friend who was inside a prison, he could
have gone to the latter's cell since he openly admitted that he has "been in and out of
New Bilibid Prisons, not only because [his] office is here only across the Municipal
Building of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila but because [he] handled a number of cases
involving prisoners and guards of NBP as well as some of its personnels [ sic]."

Administratively, as a lawyer commissioned as a notary public, Atty. Icasiano M. dela

Rea committed grave misconduct when he agreed to prepare the jurat in the petition in
this case in the absence of petitioner Gamido, thereby making it appear that the latter
personally signed the certification of the petition and took his oath before him when in
truth and in fact the said petitioner did not.

WHEREFORE, for grave misconduct, ATTY. ICASIANO I. DELA REA is hereby FINED in
the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), without prejudice to criminal
prosecution as may be warranted under the circumstances. He is WARNED that the
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 [G.R. No. 129416. November 25, 2004]

ZENAIDA B. TIGNO, IMELDA B. TIGNO and ARMI B. TIGNO, petitioners,

vs. SPOUSES ESTAFINO AQUINO and FLORENTINA AQUINO and the
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

DECISION
TINGA, J.:

The controversy in the present petition hinges on the admissibility of a single

document, a deed of sale involving interest over real property, notarized by a person of
questionable capacity. The assailed ruling of the Court of Appeals, which overturned the
findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court, relied primarily on the presumption of
regularity attaching to notarized documents with respect to its due execution. We
conclude instead that the document has not been duly notarized and accordingly reverse
the Court of Appeals.

The facts are as follow:

On 11 January 1980, respondent spouses Estafino and Florentina Aquino (the
Aquinos) filed a complaint for enforcement of contract and damages against Isidro Bustria
(Bustria).[1] The complaint sought to enforce an alleged sale by Bustria to the Aquinos of
a one hundred twenty thousand (120,000) square meter fishpond located in Dasci,
Pangasinan. The property was not registered either under the Land Registration Act or
under the Spanish Mortgage Law, though registrable under Act No. 3344. [2] The
conveyance was covered by a Deed of Sale dated 2 September 1978.
Eventually, Bustria and the Aquinos entered into a compromise agreement, whereby
Bustria agreed to recognize the validity of the sale, and the Aquinos in turn agreed to
grant to Bustria the right to repurchase the same property after the lapse of seven (7)
years.
Upon submission, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch VII, approved
and incorporated the compromise agreement in a Decision which it rendered on 7
September 1981.
Bustria died in October of 1986.[3] On 1 December 1989, petitioner Zenaida B. Tigno
(Tigno), in substitution of her deceased father Isidro Bustria, [4] attempted to repurchase
the property by filing a Motion for Consignation. She deposited the amount of Two
Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) with the trial court, now Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55 at Alaminos, Pangasinan. On 18 December 1989, the Aquinos
filed an opposition, arguing that the right to repurchase was not yet demandable and that
Tigno had failed to make a tender of payment. In an Order dated 10 October 1999, the
RTC denied the Motion for Consignation.[5]
In June of 1991, Tigno filed a Motion for a Writ of Execution, which was likewise
opposed by the Aquinos, and denied by the RTC. Then, on 6 September 1991, Tigno filed
an action for Revival of Judgment,[6] seeking the revival of the decision in Civil Case No.
A-1257, so that it could be executed accordingly.[7] The Aquinos filed an answer, wherein
they alleged that Bustria had sold his right to repurchase the property to them in a deed
of sale dated 17 October 1985.[8]
Among the witnesses presented by the Aquinos during trial were Jesus De Francia
(De Francia), the instrumental witness to the deed of sale, and former Judge Franklin
Cario (Judge Cario), who notarized the same. These two witnesses testified as to the
occasion of the execution and signing of the deed of sale by Bustria. Thereafter, in
their Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, the Aquinos offered for admission as their
Exhibit No. 8, the deed of sale (Deed of Sale)[9] purportedly executed by Bustria. The
admission of the Deed of Sale was objected to by Tigno on the ground that it was a false
and fraudulent document which had not been acknowledged by Bustria as his own; and
that its existence was suspicious, considering that it had been previously unknown, and
not even presented by the Aquinos when they opposed Tignos previous Motion for
Consignation.[10]
In an Order dated 6 April 1994, the RTC refused to admit the Deed of Sale in
evidence.[11] A Motion for Reconsideration praying for the admission of said exhibit was
denied in an Order dated 27 April 1994.[12]
Then, on 18 August 1994, a Decision was rendered by the RTC in favor of Tigno. The
RTC therein expressed doubts as to the authenticity of the Deed of Sale, characterizing
the testimonies of De Francia and Cario as conflicting.[13] The RTC likewise observed that
nowhere in the alleged deed of sale was there any statement that it was acknowledged
by Bustria;[14]that it was suspicious that Bustria was not assisted or represented by his
counsel in connection with the preparation and execution of the deed of sale [15] or that
Aquino had raised the matter of the deed of sale in his previous Opposition to the Motion
for Consignation.[16] The RTC then stressed that the previous Motion for Execution lodged
by Tigno had to be denied since more than five (5) years had elapsed from the date the
judgment in Civil Case No. A-1257 had become final and executory; but the judgment
could be revived by action such as the instant complaint. Accordingly, the RTC ordered
the revival of the judgment dated 7 September 1981 in Civil Case No. A-1257.[17]
 The Aquinos interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. [18] In the meantime, the
RTC allowed the execution pending appeal of its Decision.[19] On 23 December 1996, the
Court of Appeals Tenth Division promulgated a Decision[20] reversing and setting aside
the RTC Decision. The appellate court ratiocinated that there were no material or
substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Cario and De Francia that would
taint the document with doubtful authenticity; that the absence of the acknowledgment
and substitution instead of a jurat did not render the instrument invalid; and that the
non-assistance or representation of Bustria by counsel did not render the document null
and ineffective.[21] It was noted that a notarized document carried in its favor the
presumption of regularity with respect to its due execution, and that there must be clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence to contradict the same.
Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the RTC erred in refusing to admit the Deed
of Sale, and that the document extinguished the right of Bustrias heirs to repurchase the
property.
After the Court of Appeals denied Tignos Motion for Reconsideration,[22] the present
petition was filed before this Court. Tigno imputes grave abuse of discretion and
misappreciation of facts to the Court of Appeals when it admitted the Deed of Sale. He
also argues that the appellate court should have declared the Deed of Sale as a false,
fraudulent and unreliable document not supported by any consideration at all.
The general thrusts of the arguments posed by Tigno are factually based. As such,
they could normally lead to the dismissal of this Petition for Review. However, while this
Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts,[23] factual review may be warranted in instances
when the findings of the trial court and the intermediate appellate court are contrary to
each other.[24] Moreover, petitioner raises a substantial argument regarding the capacity
of the notary public, Judge Cario, to notarize the document. The Court of Appeals was
unfortunately silent on that matter, but this Court will take it up with definitiveness.
The notarial certification of the Deed of Sale reads as follows:

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES)

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN ) S.S.
MUNICIPALITY OF ALAMINOS )

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17th day of October 1985 at Alaminos,
Pangasinan both parties known to me to be the same parties who executed the
foregoing instrument.
 FRANKLIN CARIO
Ex-Officio Notary Public
Judge, M.T.C.
Alaminos, Pangasinan

There are palpable errors in this certification. Most glaringly, the document is certified
by way of a jurat instead of an acknowledgment. A jurat is a distinct creature from an
acknowledgment. An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going
before some competent officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed; while
a jurat is that part of an affidavit where the officer certifies that the same was sworn
before him.[25] Under Section 127 of the Land Registration Act,[26] which has been
replicated in Section 112 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, [27] the Deed of Sale should
have been acknowledged before a notary public.[28]
But there is an even more substantial defect in the notarization, one which is
determinative of this petition. This pertains to the authority of Judge Franklin Cario to
notarize the Deed of Sale.
It is undisputed that Franklin Cario at the time of the notarization of the Deed of Sale,
was a sitting judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Alaminos. [29] Petitioners point out,
citing Tabao v. Asis,[30] that municipal judges may not undertake the preparation and
acknowledgment of private documents, contracts, and other acts of conveyance which
bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges. [31] In response,
respondents claim that the prohibition imposed on municipal court judges from notarizing
documents took effect only in December of 1989, or four years after the Deed of Sale was
notarized by Cario.[32]
Respondents contention is erroneous. Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) judges are empowered to perform the functions of notaries
public ex officiounder Section 76 of Republic Act No. 296, as amended (otherwise known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948) and Section 242 of the Revised Administrative
Code.[33] However, as far back as 1980 in Borre v. Moya,[34] the Court explicitly declared
that municipal court judges such as Cario may notarize only documents connected with
the exercise of their official duties.[35] The Deed of Sale was not connected with any
official duties of Judge Cario, and there was no reason for him to notarize it. Our
observations as to the errant judge in Borre are pertinent in this case, considering that
Judge Cario identified himself in the Deed of Sale as Ex-Officio Notary Public, Judge,
MTC:

[A notary ex officio] should not compete with private law practitioners or regular
notaries in transacting legal conveyancing business.
In the instant case, it was not proper that a city judge should notarize documents
involving private transactions and sign the document in this wise: "GUMERSINDO
ARCILLA, Notary Public Ex-Officio, City Judge" (p. 16, Rollo, Annex D of Complaint). In
doing so, he obliterated the distinction between a regular notary and a
notary ex officio.[36]

There are possible grounds for leniency in connection with this matter, as Supreme
Court Circular No. I-90 permits notaries public ex officio to perform any act within the
competency of a regular notary public provided that certification be made in the notarized
documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or
circuit. Indeed, it is only when there are no lawyers or notaries public that the exception
applies.[37] The facts of this case do not warrant a relaxed attitude towards Judge Carios
improper notarial activity. There was no such certification in the Deed of Sale. Even if one
was produced, we would be hard put to accept the veracity of its contents, considering
that Alaminos, Pangasinan, now a city,[38] was even then not an isolated backwater town
and had its fair share of practicing lawyers.
There may be sufficient ground to call to task Judge Cario, who ceased being a judge
in 1986, for his improper notarial activity. Perhaps though, formal sanction may no longer
be appropriate considering Judge Carios advanced age, assuming he is still
alive.[39] However, this Decision should again serve as an affirmation of the rule
prohibiting municipal judges from notarizing documents not connected with the exercise
of their official duties, subject to the exceptions laid down in Circular No. 1-90.
Most crucially for this case, we should deem the Deed of Sale as not having been
notarized at all. The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives from the
authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public does not have the capacity to notarize
a document, but does so anyway, then the document should be treated as unnotarized.
The rule may strike as rather harsh, and perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties
in good faith relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the person
pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would render merely officious the elaborate
process devised by this Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial commission.
Without such a rule, the notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary public
will have the same legal effect as one accomplished by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense.
The notarization of a document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a
private document converts such document into a public one, and renders it admissible in
court without further proof of its authenticity.[40] Thus, notarization is not an empty
routine; to the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree and the
protection of that interest requires preventing those who are not qualified or authorized
to act as notaries public from imposing upon the public and the courts and administrative
offices generally.[41]

On the other hand, what then is the effect on the Deed of Sale if it was not notarized?
True enough, from a civil law perspective, the absence of notarization of the Deed of
Sale would not necessarily invalidate the transaction evidenced therein. Article 1358 of
the Civil Code requires that the form of a contract that transmits or extinguishes real
rights over immovable property should be in a public document, yet it is also an accepted
rule that the failure to observe the proper form does not render the transaction invalid.
Thus, it has been uniformly held that the form required in Article 1358 is not essential to
the validity or enforceability of the transaction, but required merely for
convenience.[42] We have even affirmed that a sale of real property though not consigned
in a public instrument or formal writing, is nevertheless valid and binding among the
parties, for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale or real estate
produces legal effects between the parties.[43]
Still, the Court has to reckon with the implications of the lack of valid notarization of
the Deed of Sale from the perspective of the law on evidence. After all, the case rests on
the admissibility of the Deed of Sale.
Clearly, the presumption of regularity relied upon by the Court of Appeals no longer
holds true since the Deed of Sale is not a notarized document. Its proper probative value
is governed by the Rules of Court. Section 19, Rule 132 states:

Section 19. Classes of documents.For the purpose of their presentation in evidence,

documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills

and testaments; and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law
to be entered therein.

All other writings are private. (Emphasis supplied.)

 The Deed of Sale, invalidly notarized as it was, does not fall under the enumeration
of public documents; hence, it must be considered a private document. The nullity of the
alleged or attempted notarization performed by Judge Cario is sufficient to exclude the
document in question from the class of public documents. Even assuming that the Deed
of Sale was validly notarized, it would still be classified as a private document, since it
was not properly acknowledged, but merely subscribed and sworn to by way of jurat.

Being a private document, the Deed of Sale is now subject to the requirement of
proof under Section 20, Rule 132, which states:

Section 20. Proof of private document.Before any private document offered as authentic
is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the

maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which is claimed to be.

The Deed of Sale was offered in evidence as authentic by the Aquinos, who likewise
insist that its enforceability militates against Tignos claim. Correspondingly, the burden
falls upon the Aquinos to prove its authenticity and due execution. The Court of Appeals
clearly erred in not appreciating the Deed of Sale as a private document and in applying
the presumption of regularity that attaches only to duly notarized documents, as
distinguished from private documents.

Did the RTC err then in refusing to admit the Deed of Sale? We hold that it did not.
Section 20, Rule 132 provides ample discretion on the trier of fact before it may choose
to receive the private document in evidence. The RTC wisely refused to admit the Deed
of Sale, taking great lengths as it did to explain its doubts as to its veracity. The RTC was
not convinced of the proffered proof by the Aquinos, and the exercise of its sound
discretion as the primary trier of fact warrants due respect.
The most telling observation of the RTC relates to the fact that for the very first time
respondents alleged the existence of the Deed of Sale when they filed their answer to
petitioners current action to revive judgment. [44] Prior to the initiation of the present
action, Tigno had tried to operationalize and implement the Compromise Agreement
through two judicial means: consignation and execution of judgment. The Aquinos duly
opposed these prior attempts of the petitioner to exercise the right to repurchase, but
they did not raise then the claim that such right to repurchase was already extinguished
by the Deed of Sale. Tigno attempted to exercise the right to repurchase only a few years
after the execution of the Deed of Sale to which respondents themselves were
signatories. Thus, it is incredulous that the Aquinos did not invoke the Deed of Sale when
they opposed in court petitioners successive attempts at consignation and execution of
judgment. The Deed of Sale, if in existence and valid, would have already precluded
Tignos causes of action for either consignation or execution of judgment. The only
believable conclusion, as drawn by the RTC, was that the Deed of Sale had yet to be
created when petitioner moved in 1990 for consignation and execution of judgmentan
existential anomaly if we were to agree with the respondents that such document had
been signed and notarized back in 1985.
The dubiousness in origin of the Deed of Sale is not alleviated by the other
observations of the RTC. It also pointed to certain incredible aspects in the Aquinos tale
of events. It noted that no receipts were ever presented by the respondents to evidence
actual payment of consideration by them to Bustria, despite the allegation of the
respondents that the amount was covered by seven (7) receipts. [45] The Aquinos claimed
that Bustria kept all the receipts, an assertion which the RTC found as unbelievable, citing
ordinary human nature to ask for receipts for significant amounts given and to keep the
same.[46] In itself, the absence of receipts, or any proof of consideration, would not be
conclusive since consideration is always presumed. However, given the totality of the
circumstances surrounding this case, the absence of such proof further militates against
the claims of the Aquinos.
We can appreciate in a similar vein the observation of the Court of Appeals that
Bustria did not bother to seek his lawyers assistance as regards the execution of the Deed
of Sale, considering that the subject property had previously been fiercely litigated.
Although the Court of Appeals was correct in ruling that the document would not be
rendered null or ineffective due to the lack of assistance of counsel, the implausibility of
the scenario strikes as odd and therefore reinforces the version found by the RTC as
credible.
The Court likewise has its own observations on the record that affirm the doubts
raised by the Court of Appeals. Isidro Bustria, who would die in 1986, was already ninety-
three (93) years old when he allegedly signed the Deed of Sale in 1985. Still, the Aquinos
asserted before the RTC that Bustria traveled unaccompanied from his home in Dasol,
Pangasinan, passing through two towns to Alaminos, to execute the Deed of Sale.
Without discrediting the accomplishments of nonagenarians capable of great physical
feats, it should be acknowledged as a matter of general assumption that persons of
Bustrias age are typically sedentary and rarely so foolhardy as to insist on traveling
significant distances alone.
 Also of note is the fact that there are glaring differences as to the alleged signature
of Bustria on the Deed of Sale and as it otherwise appears on the judicial record. Bustrias
signature in the 1981 Compromise Agreement is noticeably shaky which is not surprising,
considering that it was subscribed when Bustria was eighty-nine (89) years old. However,
Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale, which if genuine was affixed when he was already
ninety-three (93) years old, is remarkably steady in its strokes. There are also other
evident differences between Bustrias signature on the Deed of Sale and on other
documents on the record.
Admittedly, these doubts cast above arise in chief from an appreciation of
circumstantial evidence. These have to be weighed against the findings of the Court of
Appeals that the fact that Bustria signed the Deed of Sale was established by the
respective testimonies of witnesses De Francia and Judge Cario. In its own appreciation
of these testimonies, the RTC alluded to notable inconsistencies in their testimonies. As
a final measure of analysis, the Court shall now examine whether the appellate court was
in error in reversing the conclusion of the RTC on these testimonies.
The inconsistencies cited by the RTC were that De Francia testified that Judge Cario
himself prepared and typed the Deed of Sale in his office, where the document was
signed,[47]while Judge Cario testified that he did not type the Deed of Sale since it was
already prepared when the parties arrived at his office for the signing. [48] On this point,
the Court of Appeals stated with utter nonchalance that a perusal of the record revealed
no material or substantial inconsistencies between the testimonies of Judge Cario and De
Francia.
Strangely, the appellate court made no comment as to the inconsistency pointed out
by the RTC as to who prepared the Deed of Sale. If the only point of consideration was
the due execution of the Deed of Sale, then the Court of Appeals should have properly
come out with its finding. Other variances aside, there are no contradictions in the
testimonies of Judge Cario and De Francia on the question of whether or not Bustria
signed the Deed of Sale.
However, as earlier established, the Deed of Sale is a private document. Thus, not
only the due execution of the document must be proven but also its authenticity. This
factor was not duly considered by the Court of Appeals. The testimonies of Judge Cario
and De Francia now become material not only to establish due execution, but also the
authenticity of the Deed of Sale. And on this point, the inconsistencies pointed out by the
RTC become crucial.

The matter of authenticity of the Deed of Sale being disputed, the identity of the
progenitor of this all-important document is a material evidentiary point. It is
disconcerting that the very two witnesses of the respondent offered to prove the Deed
of Sale, flatly contradict each other on the basis of their own personal and sensory
knowledge. Worse, the purported author of the Deed of Sale disavowed having drafted
the document, notwithstanding the contrary testimony grounded on personal knowledge
by the documentary witness.
Establishing the identity of the person who wrote the Deed of Sale would not
ordinarily be necessary to establish the validity of the transaction it covers. However,
since it is the authenticity of the document itself that is disputed, then the opposing
testimonies on that point by the material witnesses properly raises questions about the
due execution of the document itself. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of Judge
Cario and De Francia are irreconcilable. It is not possible to affirm the testimony of either
without denigrating the competence and credibility of the other as a witness. If Judge
Cario was truthful in testifying that he did not write the Deed of Sale, then doubt can be
cast as to the reliability of the notarial witness De Francia. It takes a leap of imagination,
a high level of gumption, and perverse deliberation for one to erroneously assert, under
oath and with particularities, that a person drafted a particular document in his presence.

However, if we were to instead believe De Francia, then the integrity of the notary
public, Judge Cario, would be obviously compromised. Assuming that Judge Cario had
indeed authored the Deed of Sale, it would indeed be odd that he would not remember
having written the document himself yet sufficiently recall notarizing the same. If his
testimony as to authorship of the document is deemed as dubious, then there is all the
reason to make a similar assumption as to his testimony on the notarization of the Deed
of Sale.
These inconsistencies are not of consequence because there is need to indubitably
establish the author of the Deed of Sale. They are important because they cast doubt on
the credibility of those witnesses of the Aquinos, presented as they were to attest to the
due execution and authenticity of the Deed of Sale. The Court of Appeals was clearly in
error in peremptorily disregarding this observation of the RTC.
As a result, we are less willing than the Court of Appeals to impute conclusive value
to the testimonies of de Francia and Judge Cario. The totality of the picture leads us to
agree with the trial court that the Deed of Sale is ineluctably dubious in origin and in
execution. The Court deems as correct the refusal of the RTC to admit the Deed of Sale,
since its due execution and authenticity have not been proven. The evidence pointing to
the non-existence of such a transaction is so clear and convincing that it is sufficient even
to rebut the typical presumption of regularity arising from the due execution of notarial
documents. However, for the reasons stated earlier, the Deed of Sale is ineluctably an
unnotarized document. And the lower court had more than sufficient basis to conclude
that it is a spurious document.

Since the validity of the Deed of Sale has been successfully assailed, Tignos right to
repurchase was not extinguished at the time of the filing of the Petition for revival of
judgment, as correctly concluded by the RTC. The Court of Appeals being in error when
it concluded otherwise, the reinstatement of the RTC Decision is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated 23 December

1996 and Resolution dated 9 June 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49879
is REVERSED, and the Decision dated 18 August 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of
Alaminos, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Civil Case No. A-1918 is REINSTATED. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
JUAN DELA RAMA and G.R. No. 142309
EUGENIA DELA RAMA,
Petitioners, Present:

QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CORONA,*
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
BRION, JJ.
OSCAR PAPA and AMEUERFINA Promulgated:
PAPA,
Respondents. January 30, 2009

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This petition allows us to reiterate some of the basic rules concerning the notarization of
deeds of conveyance involving real property. Such rules are important because an
improperly notarized document cannot be considered a public document and will not
enjoy the presumption of its due execution and authenticity.

I.

Petitioner spouses Juan and Eugenia dela Rama were the registered owners of a parcel
of land situated in Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
91166 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. The property was acquired
for P96,000.00 by way of sale from Canlubang Sugar Estate (CSE), as evidenced by a
notarized Absolute Deed of Sale dated 10 July 1980 executed by Juan dela Rama and
CSE, as represented by Jesus de Veyra. Eugenia dela Rama also affixed her signature as
proof of her marital consent.[1]

According to Juan dela Rama, he became a resident of the United States by 1984 and
would acquire American citizenship by 1989.[2] In 1992, petitioners through their
representative, were reminded to pay the realty tax on the property, only to be informed
by the assessors office that their title to the property had in fact been cancelled, and a
new title, TCT No. 102128, issued in favor of respondents Oscar and Ameorfina Papa. [3]

Until 31 July 1985, Oscar Papa had been the Assistant Vice- President and Head of
Marketing of the Laguna Estate Development Corporation (LEDC), a marketing arm of
CSE and the entity through which the property had earlier been marketed and sold to
petitioners. The property was transferred to and retitled in the name of the spouses Papa
pursuant to a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 March 1985, covering the subject
property, and identifying petitioners as the vendors and respondents as the vendees. The
1985 deed of sale bears the signatures of petitioners and respondents, at least two
witnesses (whose identities are not spelled out or otherwise ascertainable on the face of
the document), and the notarial signature and seal of Atty. William Gumtang. The new
title in the name of respondents was issued on 21 June 1985.

Articulating the primary claim that their signatures on the 1985 deed of sale were forged,
petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Branch 92, for
Cancellation of Title Obtained Under Forged Deed of Sale.[4] They prayed for the
declaration of nullity of the 1985 deed of sale, the corresponding cancellation of TCT No.
102128 in the name of respondents and the issuance of a new one in their names.
Respondents counterposed in their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim: [5] (1) that the
1985 deed of sale had been duly executed; (2) that laches had barred the complaint since
they had obtained title and physical possession as far back as 1985; (3) that they had
every reason to believe that the person from whom they purchased the property was
duly authorized to sell the same given that such person was in possession of the owners
duplicate TCT; and (4) that their purchase of the property was in good faith and for value,
thus even assuming that the forgery occurred, the action should be directed against those
who perpetrated the fraud.

During pre-trial, the following factual matters were stipulated upon: (1) that Juan dela
Rama was the registered owner of the property covered by TCT No. T-91166, which was
subsequently cancelled; (2) that TCT No. 102128 was issued in the name of respondents
after they acquired the same for P96,000.00; (3) that from 1974 to 1985 or thereabouts
Oscar Papa was employed or connected with LEDC, holding the position of Head of
Marketing; (4) that LEDC was a developer and marketing arm of CSE; and (5) that LEDC
had developed the residential subdivision where the subject property is located.

Petitioner Juan dela Rama and respondent Oscar Papa both testified in court. Dela Rama
claimed having religiously paid the property taxes since 1980. He denied that he or his
wife executed the 1985 deed of sale or any other document that conveyed their interests
or rights over the property. He even denied having met Papa before he testified in court
in 1995. Dela Rama also explained that he had purchased the property in 1980 while a
student at New York University, and that he had been a permanent resident
of California since 1984, and a United States citizen since 1989.

Oscar Papa testified that he was connected with LEDC from 1974 to 1985, where he
marketed residential, industrial and agricultural lots which belonged to the Canlubang
Sugar Estates. He claimed not to recall who had offered to him to buy the subject
property, and that he had never met Juan Dela Rama. He also admitted signing the deed
of sale, such document being witnessed by two staff members of LEDC, but he did not
see dela Rama sign the same document. Neither could he remember signing the deed of
sale in front of the notary public who notarized the document.

Papa claimed that in real estate transactions, it was standard practice that the
buyer first sign the document before the seller did so. He also claimed that it was likewise
standard practice in the real estate industry that the buyer and seller did not necessarily
have to meet face to face. Respondent further alleged that at the time of the transaction,
sales of real property was (sic) very bad with several owners trying to sell back their
property even at a price less than the purchase price, as this came shortly after the
assassination of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.

On 26 June 1986, the RTC promulgated a Decision[6] annulling the deed of sale,
cancelling respondents title and reinstating petitioners title to the subject property. The
RTC said that the facts and evidence presented indicated preponderating evidence that
the plaintiffs signatures in the deed of sale x x x are not their signatures, [7] such
conclusion being corroborated by the admission of Papa that he did not see petitioners
sign the deed of sale. The RTC also disbelieved respondents contention that it was
standard practice in real estate transactions for the buyer to first affix his signature before
the seller; noting that [i]t must be that before a buyer would part with his money, he will
first see to it that the sellers [sic] signatures were already affixed and if possible, affixed
in his presence.[8]

The RTC did not consider respondents as buyers in good faith, given their dubious
assertion that it was typical that the buyer signs the deed of sale before the seller, as
well as such circumstances like the failure of respondents to ever pay real estate taxes
on the property and to assert possession or occupancy over the property. Accordingly, it
held that the cancellation of respondents title was proper. In addition, the RTC discounted
the claim of defendants that laches and estoppel had set in to bar the action, pointing
out that under Section 47 of Pres. Decree No. 1529, no title to registered land in
derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession, and that under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, [t]he action of defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. [9]

Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 7 September 1999, the

appellate court rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and upholding the validity of the
deed of sale.[10]

The Court of Appeals considered the pivotal issue as whether the signatures of the
petitioners on the deed of sale were indeed forged, and ultimately concluded that there
was no such evidence to support the finding of forgery. It was observed that the burden
of proving the forgery fell upon the petitioners, yet they failed to present convincing
evidence to establish the forgery. The only evidence presented to establish the forgery
was the oral testimony of Juan dela Rama himself, which according to the Court of
Appeals, was self-serving. The RTC was chided for not applying Section 22 of Rule 132
of the Rules of Evidence, which provided in clear terms how handwriting must be proved.
It was pointed out that the Rule required that the handwriting of a person be proved by
any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen
the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has
acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person.[11]

Moreover, the Court of Appeals cited that neither one of the dela Ramas was
confronted with their signatures in the challenged deed of sale. Nor did they positively
and unequivocally declare that the signatures were not theirs or that these were forged.

II.

Hence, this petition for review. Petitioners devote considerable effort in

highlighting facts and admissions elicited from Oscar Papa himself to cast doubt on the
validity of the deed of sale. Yet it would be impertinent on our part to immediately dwell
on such evidentiary matters without first contending with the legal arguments cited by
the Court of Appeals in dismissing the complaint. While this Court is generally not a trier
of fact, there are recognized exceptions to that rule, such as when the findings of fact
are conflicting, or when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[12]
 The petition hinges on a factual questionwhether the signatures of the petitioners
as appearing on the deed of sale were forged. The Court of Appeals correctly observed
that petitioners had the onus probandi to establish such forgery. In concluding that
petitioners failed to discharge such burden, the appellate court cited the rule upholding
the presumption of regularity of a notarized document. Applying that rule, it is necessary
that the forgery must be established not merely by preponderance of evidence, but by
clear, positive and convincing evidence, and the Court of Appeals appears to have applied
that more exacting standard.

However, petitioners point out that respondent Papa had admitted before the
Court that he did not sign the deed of sale in front of the Notary Public. Based on the
transcript of Papas testimony before the RTC,[13] it is clear at least that the witness could
not attest to the fact that he had signed the document in front of the Notary Public.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you recall Mr. Witness if you sign[ed] this document in front of a

Notary Public?

[Papa]:

No[,] sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you know this Mr. William Gumtang?

Witness:

Yes
Atty. Lizares:

How do you know him Mr. Witness?

Witness:
 Atty. Gumtang is one of the Notary Public of CSE.

Atty. Lizares:

He is one of the Notary Public of CSE?

Witness:

Yes[,] sir.

Atty. Lizares:

So you do not recall if you signed this in front of Atty. Gumt[a]ng?

Witness:

I do not recall.

The deed was purportedly notarized by Atty. William Gumtang, who was personally
known to Papa as he was one of the notaries public of CSE. [14] Had Atty. Gumtang
testified that Papa had signed the deed of sale in his presence, Papas memory lapse
would have had less relevance. Yet Atty. Gumtang was never called on as a witness for
the defense, nor was any other step taken by the respondents to otherwise establish that
Papa had signed the deed of sale in front of the notary public.

A.

Papas admissions, refreshing in their self-incriminatory candor, bear legal

significance. With respect to deeds of sale or conveyance, what spells the difference
between a public document and a private document is the acknowledgment in the former
that the parties acknowledging the document appear before the notary public and
specifically manifest under oath that they are the persons who executed it, and
acknowledge that the same are their free act and deed. The Court, through Chief Justice
Davide, had previously explained:

A jurat which is normally in this form:

 Subscribed and sworn to before me in ____________, this
____ day of __________, affiant having exhibited to me his
Community (before, Residence) Tax Certificate No. __________
issued at __________ on ___________.

"is that part of an affidavit in which the officer certifies that the instrument was
sworn to before him. It is not a part of a pleading but merely evidences the
fact that the affidavit was properly made (Young vs. Wooden, 265 SW 24,
204 Ky. 694)." The jurat in the petition in the case also begins with the words
"subscribed and sworn to me."

To subscribe literally means to write underneath, as one's name; to sign

at the end of a document. To swear means to put on oath; to declare on oath
the truth of a pleading, etc. Accordingly, in a jurat, the affiant must sign the
document in the presence of and take his oath before a notary public or any
other person authorized to administer oaths.

As to acknowledgment, Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 provides:

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary

public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take
acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place
where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same
person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his
free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official
seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his
certificate shall so state.

It is obvious that the party acknowledging must likewise

appear before the notary public or any other person authorized to
take acknowledgments of instruments or documents.(Emphasis
supplied)[15]

The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long
as it is beyond dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot ascribe that
conclusion at bar to the deed of sale. Respondent failed to confirm before the RTC that
he had actually appeared before the notary public, a bare minimum requirement under
Public Act No. 2103. Such defect will not ipso facto void the deed of sale. However, it
eliminates the presumptions that are carried by notarized public documents and subject
the deed of sale to a different level of scrutiny than that relied on by the Court of Appeals.
This consequence is with precedent. In Tigno v. Sps. Aquino,[16] where the public
document in question had been notarized by a judge who had no authority to do so, the
Court dispensed with the clear and convincing evidentiary standard normally attached to
duly notarized documents, and instead applied preponderance of evidence as the
measure to test the validity of that document.

It appears that respondents had previously laid stress on the claim that it is a
common practice in real estate transactions that deeds of conveyance are signed on
separate occasions by the vendor and the vendee, and not necessarily in the presence
of the notary public who notarizes the document but they adduced nothing to support
their claim but their mere say-so. Assuming arguendo that is indeed the common practice
in the business, we quite frankly do not care. The clear requirements of law for a proper
acknowledgment may not be dispensed with simply because generations of transactions
have blithely ignored such requirements. If it is physically impossible for the vendor and
the vendee to meet and sign the deed in the presence of one notary public, there is no
impediment to having two or more different notaries ratifying the document for each
party that respectively appears before them. This is the prudent practice adopted by
professional law enterprises, and it is a correct measure in consonance with the law.

B.

There is another implication under our rules of evidence. Under Section 19, Rule
132 of the Rules of Court, documents acknowledged before a notary public except for
last wills and testaments are deemed as public documents, and as such, under Section
23 of the same Rule, they are evidence of the fact which gave rise to its execution and
as to its date.[17] Excepting the other public documents enumerated in Section 19, all
other writings are private, and before such private document is offered as authentic, its
due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.[18] Accordingly, in order that the challenged deed of sale may
be accepted by the Court as genuine, we must be satisfied by the evidence on record
establishing that its genuineness was proved by anyone who saw the document executed
or written, or by evidence of the genuineness or handwriting of the maker.

This shift in perspectives relieves petitioners of an extraordinary burden to prove

with clear and convincing evidence that the deed of sale was forged, as well as any
presumption that the said document is genuine as to its due execution. The question now
is thus whether they were able to establish the fact of forgery through a preponderance
of evidence.

III.

It is now upon this Court to ascertain whether the genuineness and due execution
of the deed of sale have been duly proven, there being no presumption that it was. In
doing so, we continue to recognize that it remains incumbent on the petitioners to prove
their allegation that the deed of sale was forged even though that document no longer
enjoys any significantly weighted presumption as to its validity since it cannot be
considered as a public document. The properly applicable standard of preponderance of
evidence necessitates that the court counterweigh the respective evidence submitted by
the litigants to test whether the plaintiffs claims are actionable. Accordingly, in this case
if the evidence presented by the petitioners that the deed of sale is a forgery is greater
or more convincing than that presented by the respondents, then favorable relief may be
granted to petitioners.

The evidence-in-chief presented by petitioners to prove that the deed of sale was
fraudulent consists of the testimony of two witnesses for the plaintiff petitioner Juan dela
Rama, and respondent Oscar Papa, who called as a hostile witness for the plaintiff.

A.

We begin with Juan dela Ramas testimony. Petitioners assert that Juan dela Rama
expressly denied in open court his signature on the deed of sale, and such denial is made
plain in the transcript of his testimony of 25 July 1995.

Atty. Lizares:

Mr. Witness I am showing to you the document mark[ed] as plaintiff[s]

exhibit which is the Deed of [A]bsolute Sale
which is also the Annex C of complaint purportedly executed
on March 29, 1985 by Juan Eugenio dela Rama and Eugenia dela Rama in
favor of Mr. Oscar Papa, did you
execut[e] the document?

[dela Rama]:
 I did not.

Court:

What exhibit is that.

Atty. Lizares:

Exhibit 1 your Honor is defendant marking the same document that is mark
as exhibit M and M-1 for the plaintiff this a common exhibit. This is a 2
pag[e] document. Did you execute the document?

Witness:

No [I] did not.

Atty. Fortun:

May I know the date?

Atty. Lizares:

March 29, 1985. Did you execute any document whatsoever M[r].
Witness disposing or transferring any interest or right over the
property which was earlier evidence[d] by your TCT No. T-91166?

Witness:

No such document was ever executed by me or my wife.

xxx

[On cross examination]

Atty. Fortun:

You declare that when you [were] shown that contract, it Appears
that between you and Mr. Papa you stated that was not your signature?
 Witness:

Yes Maam.[19]

[On redirect]

Atty. Lizares: So you never executed any Deed of Absolute Sale on

any document transferring your right or interest of the
property covered by TCT No. T-91166.

Witness:

No sir.[20]

The Court of Appeals noted that his testimony was not corroborated, thus, self-
serving, and further castigated the trial court for failing to apply Section 22 of Rule 132,
which establishes how the genuineness of handwriting must be proved. The provision
reads:

SEC. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved.The handwriting

of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been
charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.

Petitioners argue that our ruling in Emas v. De Zuzuarregui and Aguilar[21] is in

point. Emas involved a plaintiff who sought annulment of title on the ground that his
signature on the contract of mortgage on which the conveyance of the property was
based had been forged. In explaining that the plaintiffs testimony on the forgery of his
signature sufficed to debunk the genuineness of the contract, we held:
 The proof adduced before the trial court shows, we think, beyond
any doubt, that the deed, original of Exhibit A, which purports to show a
conveyance of the property in which purports to show a conveyance of the
property in question from the plaintiff, Lucio Emas, to the defendant De
Zuzuarregui, is a forgery, and that the fraud was consummated
substantially in the manner above described. The plaintiff in this action (the
real Lucio Emas) testified unequivocally that he had never taken any part
in the creation of the deed in question, and his testimony, in our opinion,
leaves no room to doubt that he was speaking the truth. As evidence of the
crime of forgery, the plaintiff's attorney submitted in the trial court certified
copies of the judgments entered in the Court of First Instance of Manila and
afterwards in the Supreme Court in the criminal case convicting Ortega of
the crime of estafa by falsification of a public document. These certified
copies were admitted by the trial court as competent proof and the attorney
for the defendants objected on the ground that said judgments are
inadmissible in this civil action, being res inter alios acta. As an abstract
point of law the assignment of error based on this exception is perhaps well
taken; but we are of the opinion that, apart from said certified judgments,
the record contains ample evidence to support the finding of the trial court
that the original of the Exhibit A is a forged document, and that the present
plaintiff, Lucio Emas, was not a party thereto.[22]

Does Section 22 of Rule 132 accommodate the testimony of the very person whose
signature is disputed as a means to establish the genuineness of handwriting? We believe
that it does, and Emas remains a good law notwithstanding the subsequent enactment
of the Rules of Court. After all, the owner of such disputed signature may fall within the
category of any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he
has seen the person write and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person. In Alo v. Rocamora,[23] plaintiff Alo presented in evidence a deed of sale
establishing that he, and not the defendant, was the prior purchaser of the land in
question. Alo himself testified as to the authenticity of the deed of sale. In discussing
whether the genuineness of such document was proved, we cited the then Section 324
of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides any writing may be proved, either by
anyone who saw the writing executed; or by evidence of the genuineness of the
handwriting of the maker; or by a subscribing witness. The Court then pronounced:
As to the authenticity of Exhibit A, introduced by the plaintiff, it may
be said that it was fully established by the testimony of the plaintiff himself
 and by that of the witness, Vicente Alquizola, who signed the same together
with the gobernadorcillo and who testified under oath that he was present
when the document was executed and signed by those whose names are
subscribed thereto. x x x
Telesforo Alo and Vicente Alquizola witnessed the execution of the
said instrument, the latter having been one of the accompanying witnesses
of the local authority before whom it was executed. Consequently there is
no doubt as to the authenticity of the said document, nor as to the truth of
the contents thereof, nor is there anything in the record, or any legal
reason, that would justify this court in holding that the said document was
false.[24]

Section 324 of the Code of Civil Procedure is substantially similar to Section 22 of

Rule 132, so our application of the former rule in Alo remains appropriate today. At the
very least, Section 22 of Rule 132 does not exclude such testimony from consideration.
It is in fact well-established in the law of evidence that the testimony of the very person
whose signature is disputed is more than competent proof on the genuineness of such
signature. According to Wigmore on Evidence, there even was once thought that for
proving the genuineness of a document the alleged writer was a preferred witness,
though it is now believed that no such rule of preference exists. [25] At the same time,
there really is no rule that automatically discounts the testimony of the alleged writer as
to the genuineness or spuriousness of his own signature. In enumerating the methods of
authentication of a handwriting, Professor Herrera actually designates as the first method,
the testimony of the purported writer:

I. Proof of the Genuineness of a handwriting

A. Methods of Authentication

1. The Testimony of the purported writer

Except to the extent that certain formalities of proof are required by the
rules relating to attesting witnesses or rules requiring formal
certification, and the like, various means are available for proving the
authenticity of a document as a prerequisite to its admission in
evidence. Under ordinary circumstances, it would seem that the
 testimony of the purported writer would be the most satisfactory
authentication, where it is available.

While this is generally true, it is not necessarily so in all cases. There is no

preferential rule requiring the testimony of the writer on the ground
that it is the best evidence; the fact that the best available evidence
is not used being significant only in so far as it affects the weight.
Thus evidence of handwriting may be admissible even though the
person whose writing it is claimed to be in available as a witness.

xxx

When the testimony of the writer is not available it may be

said that the next best evidence in quality would be in the testimony
of a witness who had seen the writer sign his name or actually make
the writing x x x (Citations omitted)[26]

We acknowledge the general premise that the testimony of the very person whose
signature is put in question has probative value, whether such testimony is offered to
affirm or dispute the genuineness of his signature. That testimony satisfies the
requirements under Section 22 of Rule 132 on how handwriting must be proved. At the
same time, the evidentiary weight of such testimony wholly depends on the strength of
the particular witnesss testimony viewed in conjunction with the totality of the evidence
at hand.

It may be possible, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, to discount the testimony of
a plaintiff disavowing the authenticity of his purported signature as self-serving, but such
posture can only be warranted if the self-serving assertion is negated by other evidence
or legal presumptions. If the challenged deed of sale were considered by us as a public
document, then dela Ramas mere testimonial disavowal of his signature would be
insufficient to rebut the presumptive due execution of that writing. However, since we
cannot consider the deed of sale as a public document owing to its improper
acknowledgment, Dela Ramas denial that the signature was his gains greater weight for
evidentiary purposes.

B.
Counter-intuitively perhaps, the petitioners as plaintiffs called on Oscar Papa to testify in
their behalf as a hostile witness. This he did on 25 July 1995. It was an impressive gambit
on the part of counsel for the petitioners that produced spectacular results.

Papa testified for the petitioners that he did not sign the document in the presence
of the dela Ramas.

Atty. Lizares:

But you do not (sic) meet the person. Who signed as Juan
Eugenio dela Rama?

[Papa]:

No I did not see him sign.

Atty. Lizares:

So you did not see him signing?

Witness:

Yes.

Atty. Lizares:

But you said you sign[ed] this document?

Witness:

Yes.

Atty. Lizares:

When you sign[ed] this document did Mr. dela Rama were [sic] the person
who purportedly signed in his behalf?

Atty. Fortun:
 Your Honor he had repeatedly answered that he signed it without
seeing him.[27]

A contrary admission on Oscar Papas part would have allowed the Court cause to believe
that the petitioners had consented to the sale.

As a witness for the petitioners, Oscar Papa admitted that he had not never met
Juan dela Rama before and during the sale, and until 1995 or ten years after the sale.

Atty. Lizares:

Have you ever met Juan Eugenio dela Rama?

[Papa]:

No sir.

Atty. Lizares:

He is not the one Juan Eugenio dela Rama who testified a while ago?

Atty. Fortun:

Already answered your Honor witness cannot recall.

Court:

Sustain[ed].

Atty. Lizares:

At the time you acquire[d] the property supposedly from Mr. dela
Rama you were the Head [of the] Marketing Department?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:
 Who introduce[d] you to Mr. Juan Eugenio dela Rama?

Atty. Fortun:

Misleading your Honor.

Court:

Sustain[ed].

Atty. Lizares:

So you mean you never met the person who execute[d] this
document?

Witness:

Yes sir.[28]

As a witness for the petitioners, Papa could not recall who exactly had offered the
subject property to him.

Atty. Lizares:

Who offer[ed] you this property which is the subject matter of this
case?

[Papa]:

I could not specifically recall who in particular offer[ed] the property,

it could have been one of my staff, or brokers at the time because
aside from my job I am handling several construction not only this
subdivision, not only Ceres I, there is Ceres II and Ceres III and all
the industrial lots.[29]
 xxx

Atty. Lizares:

You dont recall who offer[ed] this property?

Witness:

At this moment specifically I cannot recall.[30]

As a witness for the petitioners, Papa admitted he could not recall whether or not
any of the dela Ramas had already signed the deed of sale when he signed the same:

Atty. Lizares:

When you signed the document was it already signed by the

suppose[d] vendor?

[Papa]:

I could not really recall right now but the fact is at the time
for the buyer to sign it first and then give it [to] the seller
seller and then the seller signed it afterwards.[31]

xxx

Atty. Lizares:

And you also dont recall whether the signature Juan Eugenio dela
Rama was already in this document when you
sign this document?

Witness:
 I do not specifically recall now as I have said earlier the practice was
for the buyer to sign first and then the seller signed afterwards. [32]

As a witness for the petitioners, Papa admitted he could not remember where and
how he signed the deed of sale.

Atty. Lizares:

Now so who presented this document to you for your signature?

[Papa]:

My either (sic) my staff or agent who told me that such property is

for sale.

Atty. Lizares:

When the staff or agent told you that the property is for sale what
document did you ask from agent or staff?

Witness:

Deed of Absolute sale and I presume at the time whoever was selling
it inform me that the title is available.

Atty. Lizares:

Now when you sign[ed] this document where did you [sign] it?

Witness:

I could have signed it in the office or in our house.

Atty. Lizares:
 You dont recall where?

Witness:

Yes I cannot recall.

Atty. Lizares:

When you signed it were you alone?

Witness:

I could not even recall where I signed it.

Atty. Lizares:

Or perhaps with your wife?

Atty. Fortun:

Already answered your Honor he does not know.[33]

Had counsel for petitioners been content with relying singly on dela Ramas
testimony, there would have been a good chance that the complaint would not have
survived. His move to call in Papa as a hostile witness allowed the above-cited testimony
to form part of the evidence for the plaintiffs. The trial court correctly appreciated Papas
testimony on 25 July 1995 (as distinguished from his subsequent testimony as a witness
for the defense) as part of the evidence for the petitioners. [34]

In addition, another corroborative piece of evidence of the petitioners, as found

by the trial court, lay in the fact that the dela Ramas had paid real estate taxes on the
property until about 1993,[35] or eight (8) years after the purported sale. Any reasonable
person who had sold his property would not undertake the unnecessary burden of
continuing to pay real property taxes on the same.
 That piece in evidence should be taken into account together with petitioners
presentation of Papas clear-cut and unrebutted testimony of as well as the evasive and
ambivalent testimony of Papa. The totality of the evidence for the petitioners established
a prima facie case that the deed of sale was not genuine. Even as the burden of proof
may have initially lain with petitioners in establishing the forgery of what is a private
document, their evidence was sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to respondents
to establish the authenticity and due execution of said private document, especially as it
is they who rely on the same in their defense.

III.

There are a myriad of ways respondents could have swayed the case then in their
behalf after the burden of evidence had shifted to them. Most pertinently, they could
have presented the two persons whom Oscar Papa had identified as witnesses to the
deed of sale, Mrs. Galeos and Mrs. Reyes, as well as Atty. Gumtang, to whom the deed
was referred to for notarization. All three persons were personally known to Papa. Galeos
and Reyes were, according to Papa, staff of LEDCwho finalize[d] the document, [36] while
Atty. Gumtang was one of the notaries public of CSE.[37] Yet none of them testified in
respondents behalf.

Respondents had initially manifested to the trial court that they were to present
Gales and Reyes as witnesses in their behalf,[38] yet only Papa ultimately testified for the
defense. Assuming that the deed of sale was prepared, signed and notarized according
to Papas version of events, any of these three witnesses could have easily bolstered the
evidence in favor of the genuineness of the deed since Papa himself attested to their
personal knowledge of these events. That they were not presented by Papa in his behalf
speaks poorly of the veracity of his tale.

When Papa did testify in behalf of the defense on 26 March 1996, his counsel
adopted in full his earlier 25 July 1995 testimony as a hostile witness.[39] That earlier
testimony unfortunately was quite incriminatory. To make matters worse, his own
testimony in his defense poked even more holes to his version of events. On cross-
examination, he made it clear that he had no particular interest in meeting the petitioners
for the purposes of negotiating or consummating the sale.
Atty. Lizares:

In your previous testimony Mr. Witness you testified that you never
met Mr. Dela Rama do you confirm that?

[Papa]:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

And you never had a chance to speak with him?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

And neither his wife?

Witness:

Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Did you ever ha[ve] a chance to ask the broker or the person
facilitating this whoever he was that you want to meet Mr. dela
Rama?

Atty. Fortun:

Objection your Honor. Misleading.

Atty. Lizares:

No Im just asking whether he had a chance to ask.

 Court:

Reform your question.

Atty. Lizares:

Did you ever make a request in connection with this Transaction to

meet with Mr. dela Rama?

Witness:

I cannot answer because I cannot recall.[40]

Most incredibly, Papa revealed he could not even remember to whom he tendered
the purchase price of P96,000.00.

Atty. Lizares:

Mr. Witness, you or do you recall to whom did you made paid ( sic)
of the P96,000.00 that you said you paid to whoever who effected or
facilitate[d] the sale?

[Papa]:

Unfortunately I cannot recall at this time because it was on 1985 and

this is not the only transaction I am handling at that time being in
sales I am also handling the same of companys commercial lots, also
handling the industrial lots the golf shares, Ive been meeting a lot of
people, I could not really recall how this particular transaction
happen.

Atty. Lizares:

So you do not remember to whom you pay the money?

Witness:
 Yes sir.

Atty. Lizares:

Do you remember if there is only one or two or three person[s] who

arrange[d] with you for the sale of the property?

Witness:

I cannot recall but as I am trying to recall the numerous transaction

handled at that time, normally with this kind of transaction it will
involv[e] some person, or some broker or even some agent.

Atty. Lizares:

But for this particular transaction you can tell exactly how many?

Witness:

No sir.[41]

In the context of trying to establish the authenticity and due execution of the
deed of sale, Papas testimony proves woefully insufficient. It must be remembered that
the transaction was personal to Papa, and he was not conducting in behalf of his
employers. It was his own money, and not the companys, that he was tendering. Thus,
it is highly incredulous that Papa could not recall even the most basic details over his
own personal transaction, in fact the only one he had during his stint at the LEDC, that
involved a then princely sum of P96,000.00 of his own money.

Papa did testify in court that he had signed the deed of sale,[42] and that assertion
by itself has about as much weight as dela Ramas claim that he did not. At the same
time, that statement even if true does not conclusively prove the validity of the sale as it
does not establish mutual consent as to the putative vendors and vendees to the sale.
That point is especially salient since Papa admitted that he did not sign the document in
the presence of the petitioners.

IV.
 We are cognizant that the Court of Appeals approached its analysis of the case
from a wholly different, and ultimately erroneous perspective. We are unable to utilize
its appreciation of the facts. The Court of Appeals was unable to advert to anything on
record as to how the deed of sale was substantiated during trial by Papa. Respondents,
before this Court, are likewise unable to offer any convincing argument tending to verify
the deed of sale that is independent of the now-debunked legal presumption that the
document was duly executed.

The reversal of the Court of Appeals decision is clearly warranted. We do not

discount the fact that the petitioners could have further bolstered their case either by
presenting a handwriting expert, or Amuerfina dela Rama as a witness. Still, their failure
to do so is not fatal as the document in question is a private document, one which carries
no presumption as to its authenticity and due execution. All told, the findings and
conclusions of the trial court are correct and credible, compared to those of the Court of
Appeals hence, reinstatement of the lower courts decision is in order.

At the same time, we wish to impart a few more observations.

Given that the deed of sale has been proven as false, is there still any basis for
which the respondents can retain title to their property? We observe that at the respective
levels of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, respondents had argued that they
should be considered as purchasers in good faith, especially since the complaint had
adverted to certain unscrupulous persons illegally representing themselves to be the
plaintiffs and illicitly forging plaintiffs signatures sold to herein defendants. [43] We are
unable to agree. By the very version of facts submitted by the respondents, there are
enough circumstances to discount good faith on their part. Papa never bothered to
communicate directly with the petitioners to ascertain whether the persons claiming to
be their representatives persons Papa could not even identify were indeed authorized by
the petitioners. Papas inability to remember to whom he tendered payment for the
property likewise reveals utter apathy on his part as to the circumstances of the sale.

In Abad v. Guimba,[44] we ruled that a party was not an innocent mortgagee in

good faith because he neglected to check if the person he was dealing with had any
authority to mortgage the property. The rules on ascertaining mortgagee in good faith
are the same as those for purchasers in good faith. Without directly communicating with
the petitioners, how could have Papa been certain that the persons apparently unknown
to him were indeed duly authorized by the petitioners to sell the property.
 The following observation of the trial court is also pertinent in this regard:

The defendants said that it is the practice in real estate transaction

for the buyer to first affixed his signature and then the seller. This
asseverations cannot be accepted as ordinary. It must be that before a
buyer would part with his money, he will first see to it that the sellers
signatures were already affixed and if possible, affixed in his presence.
Intriguing also is the failure of the defendants to assert their right of
ownership over the land by actually entering and occupying the premises
and their failure at any moment the real estate taxes since 1985 when they
allegedly purchased the property. xxx[45]

Finally, the Court of Appeals had observed that upon close comparison of the
signatures on the questioned deed of sale and that earlier executed between the
petitioners and CSE and in petitioners passport, the challenged signatures appeared very
similar with each other. We have examined the signatures in the two deeds of sale, and
in fact noticed distinct differences, and varying writing styles. The signatures of the
petitioners on the 1980 deed of sale are smooth and smaller than their purported
signatures on the 1985 deed of sale. Moreover, the signature of Juan dela Rama in the
deed of sale appears hesitant and non-fluid. The signature Eugenia dela Rama on the
two deeds betray their very distinctive angles or slants.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of

Appeals dated 7 September 1999 and the Resolution dated 1 March 2000 in CA G.R. CV
No. 53914 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Calamba, Branch 92 dated 26 June 1996 is REINSTATED. Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 7184 September 17, 2014

FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe

(respondent) for malpractice as a notary public, among others.

The Facts

In a Complaint1 dated April 27, 2006, complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant)
charged respondent, previously of the Public Attorney's Office, 2 for malpractice and
gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer,
alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the
City of Marikina, notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled "Extra judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva" 3 dated "25th day of
1999" (subject document), stating that he is a "notary public for and in the City of
Marikina."4 Said document was one of the attachments to the Amended
Complaint5dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil Case No. 03-849-MK entitled "Esperanza
Nieva Dela Cruz[(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada[(as represented
by complainant)]." To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification 6 dated May
26, 2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Marikina City, certifying that per the court’s record, respondent is not a commissioned
notary public for the Cityof Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance. In a
Resolution7 dated July 5, 2006, the Court required respondent to file his
Comment8 which he eventually submitted on February 13, 2007 after proper service. In
said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of
the subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at
that time.9 To prove his defense, he attached a Certification10dated August 23, 2006
issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City, certifying the fact of
his appointment as notary public for the City of Pasigand in the Municipalities of Taguig,
Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999 under Appointment No.
98.11 Further, respondent, thru the comment, incorporated his own administrative
complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a fellow lawyer in
view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him. 12

In response, complainant filed a Reply13 dated April 26, 2007 asserting that he has the
legitimate rightto file the administrative complaint against respondent for his unlawful
act of notarization, which is not an act of harassment as respondent claims. He
alsodraws attention to the fact that the subject document was incompletely dated and
yet notarized by respondent.14 In a Resolution15 dated July 11, 2007, the Court,inter
alia, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report, and recommendation. Eventually, both parties appeared during the mandatory
conference held on April 30, 2008.16

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 22, 2008, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner foundrespondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyer’s
oath, reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of the subject
document inMarikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. To this
end, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that in the acknowledgment of the
subject document, it was categorically stated that respondent is a notary public for and
in the City of Marikina, Province ofRizal, of which he was not, hence, violating the
Notarial Law. Moreover,respondent likewise violated the lawyer’s oath, specifically its
mandate for lawyers, to obey the laws and do no falsehood.18

In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a
period of two (2) years from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that
he was still commissioned as a notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not
recommend that he be disqualified as such.19

In a Resolution20 dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with
modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1) year, with immediate
revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from
being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years.
On reconsideration,21 the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution22 dated March 8,
2014, modifiedthe penalty stated in its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the
penalty ofreprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as a
notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court concurs with the findings of the IBP except as to the penalty.

As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself

admitted that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the
Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999,
could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City ofMarikina, as
said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e.,the RTC of
Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from
Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: 23 Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and
Term– A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning courtfor a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is
made, unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and
the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V,
Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as amended,24 of which Section
240, Article II states:

Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall
be co-extensive with the province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of
Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to doany
notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)

For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in
the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not,
respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathemato
the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."

In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray,26 the Court
instructively expounded on infractions similar to that of respondent:

While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of notarizing

documents in a place outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial
commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While perhaps not on all
fours because of the slight dissimilarity inthe violation involved, what the Court said in
Nunga v. Virayis very much apropos: Where the notarization of a document is done by
a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission
todo so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a
notarial [act] without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the
laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in
deliberate false hood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall
squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."

It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization isnot an empty, meaningless, routinary

act. Far from it.1âwphi1 Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the
requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a
formality definitely more than casual.27 (Emphases supplied)

With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant
circumstances of this case, take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he
had already acknowledged his wrongdoings,28 the Court finds that suspension for a
period of six (6) months29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In
addition, he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of
one (1) year and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked. 30

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of malpractice

as a notary public,and violating the lawyer’s oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same orsimilar acts will be dealt with more
severely. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for
a period of one (1) year and his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby
REVOKED.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent's personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this
Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for
their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 5482, February 10, 2015

JIMMY ANUDON AND JUANITA ANUDON, Complainants, v. ATTY. ARTURO B.

CEFRA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

LEONEN, J.:

Whoever acts as Notary Public must ensure that the parties executing the document be
present. Otherwise, their participation with respect to the document cannot be
acknowledged. Notarization of a document in the absence of the parties is a breach of
duty.

Complainants Jimmy Anudon (Jimmy) and Juanita Anudon (Juanita) are brother- and
sister-in-law.1 Complainants and Jimmy’s brothers and sister co-own a 4,446-square-
meter parcel of land located in Sison, Pangasinan covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 69244.2cralawred

Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra (Atty. Cefra) is a distant relative of Jimmy and
Juanita. He was admitted to the bar in 1996. He practices law and provides services as
notary public in the Municipality of Sison, Pangasinan.3cralawred

On August 12, 1998, Atty. Cefra notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale 4 over a land covered
by TCT No. 69244. The names of Johnny Anudon (Johnny), Alfonso Anudon (Alfonso),
Benita Anudon-Esguerra (Benita), and complainants Jimmy and Juanita appeared as
vendors, while the name of Celino Paran, Jr. (Paran) appeared as the
vendee.5cralawred

Jimmy and Juanita claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified. They alleged
that they did not sign the Deed of Absolute Sale. Moreover, they did not sign it before
Atty. Cefra.6 The National Bureau of Investigation’s Questioned Documents Division
certified that Jimmy and Juanita’s signatures were forged.7 This is contrary to Atty.
Cefra’s acknowledgment over the document, which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the Munici[pa]lity of Sison, personally appeared
JOHNNY ANUDON, ALFONSO ANUDON, BENITA ESGUERRA, JIMMY ANUDON and
JUANITA ANUDON, who exhibited to me their respective Community Tax Certificates as
above-indicated, known to me and known to be the same persons who executed the
foregoing Deed of Absolute Sale and acknowledged to me that the same is their free
act and voluntary deed.

This instrument, which refers to a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of lot, consists of
two pages and have [sic] been signed by the parties and the respective witnesses on
each and every page thereof.

WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 12TH DAY OF AUGUST, 1998.

(Sgd.)
ARTURO B. CEFRA
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1999
PTR NO. 2461164; 1-7-98
SISON, PANGASINAN8cralawred
cralawlawlibrary

In addition to the forgery of their signatures, Jimmy and Juanita stated that it was
physically impossible for their brothers and sister, Johnny, Alfonso, and Benita, to sign
the Deed of Absolute Sale. Johnny and Benita were in the United States on the day the
Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, while Alfonso was in Cavite. 9cralawred

Due to the forgery of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor,
with Jimmy and Juanita as witnesses, filed a case of falsification of public document
against Atty. Cefra and Paran.10cralawred

Jimmy and Juanita also initiated a disciplinary action by filing a Complaint11 with this
court on August 6, 2001 questioning the propriety of Atty. Cefra’s conduct as lawyer
and notary public.

In the Resolution12 dated September 19, 2001, this court required Atty. Cefra to
comment on the administrative complaint. Atty. Cefra filed multiple Motions for
Extension of Time,13 which this court granted.14 Despite the allowance for extension of
time, Atty. Cefra did not comply with this court’s order to file a Comment. This court
fined Atty. Cefra in the Resolutions dated March 12, 200315 and November 17,
2003.16 In both Resolutions, this court directed Atty. Cefra to file his
Comment.17cralawred
Atty. Cefra’s continued refusal to file his Comment caused this court to order his arrest
and commitment.18 Thus, the National Bureau of Investigation’s agents arrested Atty.
Cefra at his residence on January 14, 2007.19cralawred

Atty. Cefra finally submitted his Comment20 on January 15, 2008.

In his defense, Atty. Cefra stated that Jimmy and Juanita were aware of the sale of the
property covered by TCT No. 69244. He narrated that on July 10, 1998, Juanita and
Jimmy’s wife Helen Anudon went to his residence to consult him on how they could sell
the land covered by TCT No. 69244 to Paran.21 Atty. Cefra claimed that he assisted in
the preparation of the documents for the sale, which included the deed of sale and the
acknowledgment receipts for payment.22cralawred

On August 13, 1998, Paran’s relatives, Viola Carantes and Lita Paran, brought the Deed
of Absolute Sale to the residences of Jimmy, Juanita, and Johnny’s son, Loejan Anudon
(Loejan) to have the document signed.23 Viola Carantes and Lita Paran informed Atty.
Cefra that they witnessed Jimmy, Juanita, and Loejan sign the document. 24 Loejan
affixed the signatures for his father, Johnny, and his uncle and aunt, Alfonso and
Benita.25cralawred

Atty. Cefra admitted knowing that Loejan affixed the signatures of Johnny, Alfonso, and
Benita “with the full knowledge and permission of the three[.]” 26 He allowed this on the
basis of his belief that this was justified since Loejan needed the proceeds of the sale
for the amputation of his mother’s leg.27 It clearly appeared that Loejan forged the
three (3) signatures. Loejan did not have formal authorization to sign on behalf of his
father, uncle, and aunt.

According to Atty. Cefra, he “notarized the questioned document in good faith, trusting
in [complainants’] words and pronouncements; with the only purpose of helping them
out legally and financially[.]”28cralawred

After receiving Atty. Cefra’s Comment, this court referred the case to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for investigation, report, and recommendation. 29cralawred

During the investigation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Juanita appeared
without any counsel and manifested her intention to solicit the services of the Public
Attorney’s Office.30 She also informed the Investigating Commissioner that her co-
complainant, Jimmy, had already passed away.31 The mandatory conference was held
on February 20, 2009.32 On the same day, the Investigating Commissioner issued an
Order33 terminating the mandatory conference and requiring the parties to submit their
respective Position Papers.

The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. Cefra’s conduct in notarizing the Deed
of Absolute Sale violated the Notarial Law.34 In addition, Atty. Cefra violated Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility,35 which requires that “[a] lawyer shall uphold
the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes.”

Hence, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Cefra’s

notarial commission and the disqualification of Atty. Cefra from reappointment as notary
public for two (2) years. The Investigating Commissioner also recommended the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months. 36cralawred

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-24937 dated May 14, 2011, the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines resolved to adopt the report and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.38 However, they recommended that the penalty
imposed on Atty. Cefra be modifed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year
and immediate Revocation of his Notarial Commission and Perpetual
Disqualification from re-appointment as Notary Public.39 (Emphasis in the
original)cralawlawlibrary

Atty. Cefra filed a Motion for Reconsideration,40 asking the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to temper the recommended penalty against him. 41 In Resolution No. XXI-
2014-9342 dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines proposed to lower its original penalty against Atty.
Cefra:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Atty. Arturo B. Cefra [is] SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year,
his notarial practice, if presently existing, immediately REVOKED and his
notarial practice SUSPENDED for two (2) years.43 (Emphasis in the
original)cralawlawlibrary

On September 9, 2014, the Office of the Bar Confidant reported that both parties no
longer filed a Petition for Review of Resolution No. XXI-2014-93.44cralawred
We agree and adopt the findings of fact of the Investigating
Commissioner. Respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra violated the Notarial Law and the
Code of Professional Responsibility in notarizing a document without requiring the
presence of the affiants.

The notarization of documents ensures the authenticity and reliability of a document. As

this court previously explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notarization of a private document converts such document into a public one, and
renders it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the
acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private
instrument. Notarization is not an empty routine; to the contrary, it engages public
interest in a substantial degree and the protection of that interest requires preventing
those who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public from imposing upon
the public and the courts and administrative offices generally. 45 (Citation
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

The earliest law on notarization is Act No. 2103.46 This law refers specifically to the
acknowledgment and authentication of instruments and documents. Section 1(a) of
this law states that an acknowledgment “shall be made before a notary public or an
officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments
or documents in the place where the act is done.”

The 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice reiterates that acknowledgments require the affiant
to appear in person before the notary public. Rule II, Section 1
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment.—“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which an

individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents and integrally
complete instrument or document;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and

(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or
document was voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument
or document, declares that he has executed the instrument or document as his free and
voluntary act and deed, and, if he acts in a particular representative capacity, that he
has the authority to sign in that capacity. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlawlibrary

Rule IV, Section 2(b) states further:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

SEC. 2. Prohibitions.— . . .

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document—

(1) is not in the notary’s presence personally at the time of the notarization; and

(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity as defined by these
Rules.cralawlawlibrary

The rules require the notary public to assess whether the person executing the
document voluntarily affixes his or her signature. Without physical presence, the notary
public will not be able to properly execute his or her duty under the law. In Gamido v.
New Bilibid Prisons Officials,47 we stated that “[i]t is obvious that the party
acknowledging must . . . appear before the notary public[.]”48 Furthermore, this court
pronounced that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

[a] document should not be notarized unless the persons who are executing it are the
very same ones who are personally appearing before the notary public. The affiants
should be present to attest to the truth of the contents of the document and to enable
the notary to verify the genuineness of their signature. Notaries public are enjoined
from notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. In fact, it is their duty to demand
that the document presented to them for notarization be signed in their
presence. Their function is, among others, to guard against illegal deeds. 49 (Citations
omitted)cralawlawlibrary

Notarization is the act that ensures the public that the provisions in the document
express the true agreement between the parties. Transgressing the rules on notarial
practice sacrifices the integrity of notarized documents. It is the notary public who
assures that the parties appearing in the document are the same parties who executed
it. This cannot be achieved if the parties are not physically present before the notary
public acknowledging the document.

Atty. Cefra claims that Jimmy and Juanita wanted to sell their land. Even if this is true,
Jimmy and Juanita, as vendors, were not able to review the document given for
notarization. The Deed of Absolute Sale was brought to Atty. Cefra by Paran’s
representatives, who merely informed Atty. Cefra that the vendors signed the
document. Atty. Cefra should have exercised vigilance and not just relied on the
representations of the vendee.

It is possible that the terms and conditions favorable to the vendors might not be in the
document submitted by the vendee for notarization. In addition, the possibility of
forgery became real.

In Isenhardt v. Atty. Real,50Linco v. Atty. Lacebal,51Lanuzo v. Atty.

Bongon,52 and Bautista v. Atty. Bernabe,53 the respondent notaries were all guilty of
notarizing documents without the presence of the parties. In Linco, Lanuzo, and
Bautista, the respondents notarized documents even if the persons executing those
documents were already dead at the time of notarization. In Bautista, the respondent,
like Atty. Cefra, also allowed another individual to sign on behalf of another despite lack
of authorization.54 In these cases, this court imposed the penalty of disqualification as
notaries for two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In the recent case of De Jesus v. Atty. Sanchez-Malit,55 the respondent-lawyer notarized

22 public documents even without the signatures of the parties on those
documents.56 This court suspended the respondent-lawyer from the practice of law for
one (1) year and perpetually disqualified her from being a notary public. 57cralawred

Aside from Atty. Cefra’s violation of his duty as a notary public, Atty. Cefra is also guilty
of violating Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. This canon requires “[a]
lawyer [to] uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.” He contumaciously delayed compliance with this court’s order
to file a Comment. As early as September 19, 2001, this court already required Atty.
Cefra to comment on the Complaint lodged against him. Atty. Cefra did not comply
with this order until he was arrested by the National Bureau of Investigation. Atty.
Cefra only filed his Comment on January 15, 2008, more than seven years after this
court’s order. Atty. Cefra’s actions show utter disrespect for legal processes.

The act of disobeying a court order constitutes violation of Canon 1158 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to “observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts[.]”

Under Rule 138, Section 27, paragraph 159 of the Rules of Court, “wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court” constitutes a ground for disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law. Atty. Cefra’s disobedience to this court’s directive issued in
2001 was not explained even as he eventually filed his Comment in 2008. Clearly, his
disobedience was willful and inexcusable. Atty. Cefra should be penalized for this
infraction.

In Sebastian v. Atty. Bajar,60 this court suspended a lawyer who refused to comply with
this court’s directives to submit a Rejoinder and to comment on complainant’s
Manifestation.61 The lawyer complied with the order to file a Rejoinder only after being
detained by the National Bureau of Investigation for five (5) days. 62 Likewise, she
complied with the order to comment through a Manifestation filed after four (4) months
without explaining her delay.63 This court found that the lawyer’s “conduct indicates a
high degree of irresponsibility. . . . [Her] obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s
orders ‘not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her
disrespect of the Court’s lawful orders which is only too deserving of
reproof.’”64cralawred

We thus find that the penalty recommended against Atty. Cefra should be modified to
take into account all his acts of misconduct.

WHEREFORE, this court finds respondent Atty. Arturo B. Cefra GUILTY of notarizing
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1998 in the absence of the affiants, as well
as failure to comply with an order from this court. Accordingly, this
court SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years, REVOKES his
incumbent notarial commission, if any, and PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIES him from
being commissioned as a notary public. Respondent is also STERNLY WARNED that
more severe penalties will be imposed for any further breach of the Canons in the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary