Week 8 Lecture Material

Underwater Sensor Networks
Part IV
Dr. Sudip Misra

Associate Professor
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur
Email: smisra@sit.iitkgp.ernet.in
Website: http://www.sit.iitkgp.ernet.in/~smisra/
NPTEL Course-Wireless
Wireless Ad Hoc Ad
andHoc
Sensor
and Sensor
Networks
Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur
Why Localization?
 Tagging of sensor data with
location
 Low performance of GPS in

underwater
n
t aco
es Be
Requ
 Applications: Localized
Node
 Target tracking
Unlocalized
 Environmental monitoring Node
 Ocean mapping Acoustic

Communication
 Geographic routing
protocols
Fig. : Typical scenario of node localization in an UWSN
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Sensor Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur 2
Challenges
 Reference node deployment Underwater

 Node mobility
Environment
 Node density
 Time-synchronization
 Variable sound speed &

Underwater propagation delay
 Low bandwidth & bit rate
Acoustic Channel  Signal reflection, multi-path, fading
 High error probability
 Asymmetric power consumption
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Desirable Properties
 High accuracy
 Fast convergence
 Wide coverage
 Low communication cost
 Scalability
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Challenges & Desirable Properties
Fig. : Challenges and desirable properties of node localization in UWSNs
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Classification
Localization Techniques
Presence of Anchors Type of Control Ranging
Anchor-based Centralized Range-based
Anchor-free Distributed Range-free
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Range Based Schemes
 Range Measurement
 With the help of reference node
 RSSI
 TDoA [Che08]
 ToA
 Without reference node
 Euclidean distance
propagation technique
[Nic01]
 Location Estimation
 Lateration
 Calibration : refinement of measurement Fig.: TDoA between two stations
Reference: [Che08] X. Cheng , H. Shu, Q. Lia ng , D. Du, “Silent Positioning in Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks”, IEEE Trans. On Vehicular Technology, Vol. 57, No. 3, pp.
1756 – 1766, 2008.
[Nic01] D. Niculescu & B. Nath, “Ad hoc Positioning System”, Proc. of IEEE GLOBECOM, pp. 2926–2931, Nov. 2001.
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Range Free Schemes
 Problem in range based schemes:
 Cost of hardware required by range-based solutions may be inappropriate
for the underwater networks.
 Solution : Range free schemes
 Anchor nodes transmit messages containing location information & hop-
count to more than one hop neighbor. [Bul00] [Nil03]
 Anchor node sends beacon signals of different power levels and the
location area of the node is estimated from the reply of the nodes.
[Cha06]
 Limitation in the range free schemes:
 Provides a coarse estimation of the location of the node.
Reference: [Bul00] N. Bulusu, J. Heidemann and D. Estrin, “GPS-less Low Cost Outdoor Localization for Very Small Devices”, IEEE Personal Communications Magazine, Vol. 7,
No. 5, October 2000.
[Nil03] D. Niculescu and B. Nath, “DV Based Positioning in Ad hoc Networks”, Journal of Telecommunication Systems, 2003.
[Cha06] V. Chandrasekhar and W. K.G. Seah, “Area Localization Scheme for Underwater Sensor Networks”, IEEE OCEANS Asia Pacific Conference, May 16-19, 2006.
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Stationary Anchor-based Schemes
Stationary Anchor-
based
Single Stage Multi Stage
Fingerprinting- Fixed Range- Dynamic

Range-free Range-based
based based Range-based
PM PCA PF ALS USP 3DUL LSL OLTC
HYP UPS
E-UPS WPS LSLS SLMP
Reference: H.-P. Tan, R. Diamant, W. K. G. Seah, and M. Waldmeyer, “A survey of techniques and challenges in underwater localization,” Ocean Engineering, vol. 38,
no. 14, pp. 1663-1676, 2011
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Mobile Anchor-based Schemes
Mobile Anchor-
based
Single Stage Multi Stage
Range-free Range-based Range-based
AUV-
UDB LoMoB DNRL HASL PL MSAL
aided
3D- LSL-
MALS DET
LDB
Reference: H.-P. Tan, R. Diamant, W. K. G. Seah, and M. Waldmeyer, “A survey of techniques and challenges in underwater localization,” Ocean Engineering, vol. 38,
no. 14, pp. 1663-1676, 2011
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Mobility
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Meandering Current Mobility Model
 Meandering Current Mobility Model (MCM)
 The acoustic sensor nodes are free floating sensor nodes with networking
capability
 The nodes move by the effect of meandering sub-surface currents and
vortices
 The nodes are initially deployed in a small subarea where they are released
 Thereafter the nodes move according to the mobility model
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
MCM cont.
 Meandering Current Mobility Model (MCM) (contd.)
 In a mobile network connectivity and coverage vary when nodes move
 Under MCM model, dynamic coverage and connectivity are the functions of
time
 The oceans are stratified and rotating fluid
 Vertical movements are almost everywhere
 Vertical movements are negligible with respect to horizontal ones
 The sensor nodes move on horizontal surfaces and vertical displacements
are neglected just like the models in fluid dynamics
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
MCM cont.
 Any incompressible two dimensional flow is described by a stream function
ψ  
y − B (t ) sin( k ( x − ct ))
ψ ( x, y, t ) = − tanh  
 1 + 2 2 (t ) 2
− 
 k B cos ( k ( x ct )) 
 Where B (t ) = A + ε cos(ωt )
K: Number of meanders in unit length
c: Phase speed
B: Modulates the width of the meanders
A: Determines the meander width
ε: Amplitude of modulation
ω: Frequency
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
MCM cont.
 Two components of the velocity of meandering current (u, v) is given by:
∂ψ ∂ψ
u=− ;v =
∂y ∂x
 u is the zonal (eastward) component of the velocity field and v is the
meridional (northward) component of the velocity field
 These two velocity components provide the trajectory of the sensor nodes
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Oceanic Forces Mobility Model
 Oceanic Forces and Their Impact on the Performance of Mobile
Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks
 This scheme, oceanic forces mobility model (OFMM), incorporates
 Important realistic oceanic forces imparted on the sensor nodes
 3-D movement of the nodes
 Major oceanic forces
 Gravity
 Responsible for producing gravitational force
 The pressure gradient force (PGF) is the result of varying weight of water in different
region of the ocean
 Friction
 Arises when a body moves past another body in contact
 The force produced is called frictional force
 Rotation of earth
 Leads to centrifugal force and coriolis force (CF)
Reference: A. K. Mandal, S. Misra, T. Ojha, M. K. Dash, M. S. Obaidat, “Oceanic forces and their impact on the performance of mobile underwater acoustic sensor
networks,” Intl J. of Comm. Sys., Wiley, 2014 [DOI: 10.1002/dac.2882].
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
OFMM cont.
Underwater Acoustic Sensor Networks (contd.)
 PGF ( F ) p
 Arises because of nonuniform spatial distribution of pressure

 Directs from a higher pressure region to a lower one
→
1→
Fp=−ρ∇p
ρ : density of ocean water
→
∇ p : pressure gradient
 CF ( F c)
→ → →
F c
= −2(ω× V )
→
: : Velocity of body movement of a sensor node
V→
ω: Angular velocity of the Earth
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
OFMM cont.
 Gravitational
→
force ( F ) g
→
→
Fg = −g
g: Gravitational acceleration
 Frictional force ( F r )
→ →
=ν ∇ V
2
F
ν : coefficient of dynamic viscosity
r
→
V : Velocity of body movement of a sensor node
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
OFMM cont.
 Oceanic forces mobility model (OFMM)
 Using Navier–Stoke’s equation [Pond and Pickard, 1978], we get the x-
component, y-component, and z-component velocities
 Navier–Stoke’s equation
dV 1 → → → → →
= ∇ p − 2(ω× V ) − g +ν ∇ V
2
dt ρ
 x-component velocity 1
v =
x
νt
 y-component velocity 1
v =
y
νt
 Z-component velocity
v z
= 2.35 × exp(− gνz )
Reference: S. Pond and G. L. Pickard, Introductory Dynamical Oceanography (2nd edn), Butterworth-Heinemann: Oxford (UK), 1978.
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
End of Module IV
Thank You!
Wireless Ad HocAd
andHoc and Networks
Security of Wireless Sensor
Networks - Part I
Dr. Sudip Misra

Associate Professor
Wireless Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur

Overview
 Wireless Sensor network – Limited processing power, limited
resources, limited bandwidth, unguided transmission medium.
 Providing security to WSN – Main challenge is limited resources,
self-organizing network topology, communication channel
characteristics.
 Main security requirements are – Confidentiality, integrity and
availability.
Wireless Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur 2

Need of Security in WSN
 WSNs popular due to low cost solution and real world problem
solving features.
 Security is needed to protect the sensitive data during
transmission.
 Also, for protecting the network’s proper functioning

Different Keying Schemes
 Mainly three types of keying schemes are available.
 Network keying : Only a single key is used in the entire WSN. It does not
require more resources, key management is not needed, but this scheme
is not robust.
 Pair-wise keying : For every pair of sensor nodes, one key is used. If the
number of nodes in WSN is N, the number of required keys is N-1. It is
robust.
 Group keying : It combines both network keying and pair-wise keying
schemes. A single shared key is used in network communication.
Different keys are used between every pair of sensor nodes. This keying
scheme in robust.

Limitations in WSNs
 Sensor nodes are resource-constrained, small sized, limited
processing power, small memory, limited bandwidth . Therefore
traditional cryptographic algorithms can not be used directly
here.
 Memory constraints: Limited memory and limited storage space. Large
programs cannot be executed when operating system is loaded.
 Power constraints: Limited power. When sensor nodes perform
computations and for different inter process communication, power is
consumed. If traditional security algorithm is used here, lots of power
will be consumed

Limitations in WSNs (Cont.)
 Unpredictable communication: WSN uses connectionless service. It

suffers form reflection, scattering and fading. As a result, it produces high
bit errors and loss of data.
 Delay in communication: Due to the presence of intermediary nodes
between two nodes, packet transmission is delayed.
 Remote sites and unattended setup of WSNs: Sometimes, wireless
sensor nodes are employed in remote sites. Therefore, the probability of
attack is very high. And if any physical attack happens, it is hard to detect.

Security Requirements in WSNs
 The main security requirements of WSNs are:
 Data confidentiality
 Data integrity
 Self-organization
 Data newness
 Authentication
 Time synchronization
 Secure localization
 Availability

Data Confidentiality
 Data confidentiality protects data so that any unauthorized user
cannot read the data and analyze it. Attacker should not know
about the frequency of transmission and the content of the
data.
 Data should be received by only the intended receiver.
 The key distribution should be done in very secret way. The key
distribution algorithm should be strong and enough.
 Secure channel generation is very important.
 Without permission any nearby nodes should not read the content of the
nodes.

Data Integrity
 Data integrity ensures that the data is not modified by any
unauthorized third party means the data, during transmission
from source to destination should not be modified or changed
by attacker.
 Malicious nodes may modify the data. So this tampered data should be
transmitted to the actual source.
 From time to time, data should be verified.

Self-Organization
 Wireless sensor network is a type of ad-hoc network.
 Each sensor node is flexible and self organizing. Therefore,
applying traditional cryptographic algorithm is difficult.
 As the sensor nodes behave dynamically, sharing key between
nodes is difficult before deployment, if symmetric key is used.

Data Newness
 In case of symmetric key cryptography, sometimes old data is
sent repeatedly, which is termed as replay attack.
 To overcome this problem, a time specific counter should be
added to ensure the freshness of data.
 With the time specific counter, it is easily detected whether the
data is updated or old data is used.
 If shared key is used, it is mandatory to update data over time.

Data Authentication
 Authentication ensures that the data is coming from an authentic source.
 It should also ensure that no third party is acting like an authorized user.
 Receiver should have a scheme to ensure that the received data is coming
from the actual user.
 Data authentication can be done using message authentication code (MAC).
 MAC is calculated using the message and the shared key.

Data Availability
 Data availability ensures that the authorized user is not
prevented to access service. WSN should always be accessible to
legitimate users.
 To address this problem, one common technique is using extra
communication between nodes.
 Denial-of-Service attack results in loss of availability of data.

Time Synchronization
 The security schemes should be well time synchronized.
 Time synchronization is a major need in wireless sensor network
applications.
 It needs a critical timing.

Secure Localization
 Sensor nodes in WSNs should be localized in a secured manner in
any environment.
 If sensor nodes are not secured properly, attacker can deliver false
location information and replay messages.
 Different techniques are there to find the actual location. One of
them is id Verifiable Multi-lateration where the exact location is
known from different reference points.

Denial-of-Sleep Attacks
 It should ensure that the sensor nodes should not consume
energy on unwanted or bad packets.
 It is a kind of Denial of Service attack
 If there are large number of nodes, attacked in this way, lifetime
of the network is reduced.

Attacks Specific to WSN
 Different types of attack can be possible in WSN in the form of
denial-of-service attack, privacy attack, physical attack and many
more.
 WSN is vulnerable to different attacks – attack on network
availability, attack on authentication, attack on integrity.
 Attack on availability includes denial-of-service attack, attack on
authentication includes replay attack, eavesdrop attack and
spoofing attack. In stealthy attack- attacker’s main intension is to
insert a error value via an error node.
 Main attacks in WSN – routing attack, node replication, attacks
on information and denial of service attack.

Main Attacks on WSN
 Routing Attack
 Hello flood attack
 Spoofing
 Replay attack
 Sybil attack
 Wormhole attack
 Selective forwarding
 Acknowledgement spoofing
 Compromised nodes attack
 Node Replication attack
 Attacks on information in transit
 Denial of Service attack
.
Hello Flood Attack
 Attacker employs a high power
transmitter which sends ‘hello’
packets constantly.
 The nodes which receives these
‘hello’ packets, assume that the
received packets come from
neighboring node.
 The nodes start communicating
with the attacker.
 Attacker gains control over the
network
Hello flood attack

Spoofing Attack
 In spoofing attack, message is altered during transmission.
 Receiver receives inaccurate information.
 Routing action becomes different, data has to travel long distance.
 Consumes power of wireless sensor network.
 One common solution to tackle this spoofing attack is to apply
different integrity checking mechanisms like message
authentication code (MAC)

Replay Attack
 In Replay attack, same old
message is sent repeatedly over
the wireless sensor network.
 The bandwidth of the sensor
network degrades.
 To overcome this attack
timestamp or nonce is used with
Replay attack: Attacker intercepts the
encryption algorithm to identify message, and retransmits it in future
the old message.
 Timestamp is more preferred as it
requires lesser number of
messages compared to nonce.

Sybil Attack
 Single malicious node
behaves like multiple
nodes.
 This malicious node sends
several fake message.
 WSNs vulnerable to this
attack, as sensor nodes are Dimitrievski, Pejovska and Davcev, International
deployed in a very Journal of Peer to Peer Networks, 2011
unstructured manner
 One solution is key
registration system
Sybil attack. A single malicious node
behaves like multiple nodes.

References
 Mohammad S. Obaidat, Sudip Misra, Principles of Wireless Sensor Networks, Cambridge University
Press, 2014
 A Dimitrievski, V Pejovska and D Davcev, “Security Issues and Approaches in WSN,” International
Journal of Peer to Peer Networks (IJP2P), Vol.2, No.2, pp. 24--42, 2011.
 David R. Raymond, Randy C. Marchany and Michael I. Brownfield, “Effects of Denial-of-Sleep
Attacks on Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocols,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
Vol. 58, No. 1, 2009 .
 Sudip Misra, Ashim Ghosh, A. P. Sagar P. and Mohammad S. Obaidat, “Detection of Identity-Based
Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Signalprints ,”IEEE GlobCom 2010 Workshop on Web
and Pervasive Security (WPS), 2010.
 A. D. Wood and J.A. Stankovic, “Denial of service attacks in sensor networks, “ IEEE Computer
Magazine, pp. 54—62, 2002.
 D. R. Raymond and S. F. Midkiff, “Denial-of-service in wireless sensor networks: attacks and
defenses, “ IEEE Pervasive Computing, Vol. 7, pp.74—81, 2008.
 E. Shi, A. Perrig, “Designing secure sensor networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications , Vol: 11, No:6,
2004 .
 X. Du and H.-H. Chen, “Security in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications,
Vol.15, No.4, pp.66—66, 2008.
 J.C. Lee et al.,” Key management issues in wireless sensor networks: current proposals and future
developments,” IEEE Wireless Communications, Vol.14, No.5,pp.76—84, 2007.
 Wireless Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur 23
End of Module I
Thank You!
Wireless Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur

Security of Wireless Sensor
Networks - Part II
Dr. Sudip Misra

Associate Professor
Wireless Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur

Wormhole Attack
 One or more malicious nodes
are present who fake the route.
 There is a tunnel between
these malicious nodes.
 The malicious node captures
the packets and transmits them
to other location.
 Wormhole attack can be Wormhole attack
launched without any
knowledge of the network.
Source: Dimitrievski, Pejovska and Davcev, International Journal of Peer to

Peer Networks, 2011
Wireless Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur 2

Selective Forwarding Attack
 One malicious node denies to
forward packets.
 Malicious node can deny
packets which are coming from
a particular node or from
selective nodes.
 Sinkhole attack is one type of
selective forwarding attack.
 One compromised node attracts Shila and Anjali, Electro/Information Technology,
2008. IEEE
all the traffic going to the base

station Selective forwarding attack:
Node B drops the packets and
disrupt the network operation

Acknowledgement Spoofing
 Attacker intercepts between
sender and receiver.
 Spoof the acknowledgement
packets.
 The main goal is to make the
sender convince that a dead
node is alive.
 It makes the sender confuse and
mislead the routing process.
Acknowledgement Spoofing

Compromised Nodes Attack
 Attacker attacks some nodes of the network.
 Attacker wants to steal secret information like security keys from
these compromised nodes.
 One solution is to use trust protocol, which can differentiate
between compromised nodes and uncompromised nodes.

Node Replication Attack
 Attacker attacks a sensor node in the network.
 From the compromised node, attacker steals the secret
information.
 After getting the secret information, attacker duplicates the node
and the duplicate nodes (Cloned nodes) are employed in the
sensor network
 The duplicate nodes behave like the original node.
 The cloned node sends sensitive information to the attacker.
 Sometimes attacker can clone the base station which is serious
threat to WSN.

Attacks on Information in Transit
 The information in transit pass from one sensor node to other.
 The passing data may be modified, altered, spoofed or deleted.
 WSN in vulnerable to eavesdropping attacks.
 Attacker can monitor the traffic and alter the packets.
 Analysis of the traffic of the sensor network is a serious threat
to wireless sensor network.

Denial of Service(DoS) Attack
 DoS attack targets the resources of wireless sensor network
 Wireless sensor nodes are resource constrained devices.
 Attacker continuously sends unnecessary packets .
 Main intension of attacker is to consume the available resources of
the network, so that the legitimate users cannot access them.
 The target resources can be network bandwidth, power, memory
etc.

DoS Attack at Different Levels
 Physical layer DoS attack
 Jamming attack-
 Radio frequency is diverted to other nodes
 Can disrupt entire network or portion of network
 Tampering attack-
 Attacker physical tampers a sensor node
 Main aim is to collect the sensitive information
 Data link layer DoS attack
 Collision
 Two sensor nodes want to send data on same frequency channel
 If two packets from two different sensor nodes collide – it creates error.
 Exhaustion
 Attacker disrupt the channel by continuously sending requests
 Legitimate user cannot access the channel

DoS Attack at Different Levels
 Network layer DoS attack
 Greed
 Attacker compromise one node, which refuses to forward other node’s packets
 Only gives priority to its own traffic
 Misdirection
 Attacker sends traffic to other direction.
 The traffic cannot go to its intended direction
 Victim is any arbitrary node.
 Transport layer DoS attack
 Flooding
 Attacker repeatedly sends requests until its reaches maximum limit
 One solution is to use a limit on maximum number of connections per node.

Jamming Attack
 Major physical layer DoS attack
 Radio frequency is diverted to other nodes
 The data transmission is delayed.
 WSN nodes have limited resources – cannot employ spread
spectrum technology
 If jamming attack is detected, the sensor nodes go to sleep mode
and wake up cyclically to check the channel.
 This cannot avoid DoS attack. It enhances the lifespan of sensor nodes by
decreasing the power consumption.

Classification of Jammers
 Jammers are classified as follows:
 Constant jamming
 Transmission between two nodes are totally blocked.
 Data flow cannot pass from one side to another
 Intermittent jamming
 Sensor network is not jammed continuously.
 For a specific duration of time, message is transmitted and then blocked.
 Deceptive jamming
 Jammer continuously sends packets without any gap between two packets
 It makes normal communicator fool to believe that the packets are coming from
authenticated user

Classification of Jammers(Cont.)
 Random jammer
 Jammer switches between napping and jamming.
 At the time of jamming, attacker may act as constant jammer or deceptive
jammer.
 Reactive jammer
 When channel is not active, jammer remains silent.
 When the traffic becomes active, immediately it starts sending signal.

Physical Attacks on WSNs
 WSNs are vulnerable to all physical attacks, as it has limited
power, limited energy resources, unreliable transmission media.
Based on damage, three types of physical attack
 Active attacks
 Passive attacks
 Location based attacks

Active Attacks
 Active attacks includes – inserting error files into system, packet
alternation, modification, illegal access, overloading the sensor
network.
 Main targets of active attacks are -
 Interfering with the functionality of the system
 Reduction of some sensor nodes from the network
 Data modification
 Denial of Service
 Performance degradation of the whole system

Passive Attacks
 Attacker accesses the transmission illegally. Eavesdropping is the
most common passive attack.
 Passive attacks are classified into two categories
 Attacker access the file being transferred
 Attacker analyzes the traffic pattern and tries to find out the identity of the
sender and receiver and the frequency of transmission. These information
will be useful in future attack
 The main intensions of passive attack are
 Stealing sensitive information
 Compromised the privacy requirements
 Performance degradation

Location Based Attacks
 Classified as two types as follows:
 External attacks: Attackers reside outside the network. The consequences of
this attack are:
 Jamming the network
 Consumption of resources (e.g.: battery, power, memory)
 DoS attack
 Internal attacks: Attackers reside inside the network. The consequences of

this attack are:
 Compromising the secret keys
 Performance degradation

Security issues in WSNs
 Classified into different categories:
 Context and design implication
 Integrity
 Authenticity
 Confidentiality

Context and Design Implication
 Two main issues:
 Intention of hacker
 Vulnerabilities of the system
 WSN – low cost, energy efficiency, influence performance.
 Sometimes WSN protocols expose the location of base stations -
increase the possibility of attack

Integrity, Authenticity, Confidentiality
 The three main security requirements of WSNs.
 Confidentiality:
 Protection of data from passive attacks.
 The broadcast data should protect the single data or message fields.
 There should be some security measure to deny the attackers to access the
data.
 Integrity:
 It ensures that the transmitted data is not modified between the source and
destination
 It ensures that any insertion, deletion, substitution are only done by authorized
users.
 Authenticity:
 It ensures that messages come from authorized sources.
 It ensures that the sender and receiver are actual entity which they are claimed
to be.

Security protocols for WSNs
 Popular security protocols include:
 Security Protocol in WSN (SPINS)
 TinySec
 Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP)

SPINS
 Group of security protocols to handle data confidentiality and
integrity
 SPINS consists of :
 SNEP: Provides security attributes to WSN and offers confidentiality,
integrity, privacy and newness. It is employed in pairwise connection.
 µTESLA: It is applied in the broadcast method. It offers authentication. It
produces keys for message authentication code(MAC) scheme.

TinySec
 Data link layer security scheme.
 It is lightweight
 It offers:
 Privacy
 Authentication
 Newness.
 Two forms of approach:
 Authentication approach
 Authentication and encryption approach

LEAP
 Localized encryption and authentication protocol.
 Key management protocol.
 Instead of using only one key, it permits four key types
 A collection of keys: This is shared by all the nodes of WSN
 Arranged in clusters: It connects set of nodes in cluster
 Arranged in pairs: A key is shared between nodes of each pair
 Single key: One single key which is shared with base station

References
 Mohammad S. Obaidat, Sudip Misra, Principles of Wireless Sensor Networks, Cambridge University
Press, 2014
 A Dimitrievski, V Pejovska and D Davcev, “Security Issues and Approaches in WSN,” International
Journal of Peer to Peer Networks (IJP2P), Vol.2, No.2, pp. 24--42, 2011.
 David R. Raymond, Randy C. Marchany and Michael I. Brownfield, “Effects of Denial-of-Sleep
Attacks on Wireless Sensor Network MAC Protocols,” IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology,
Vol. 58, No. 1, 2009 .
 Sudip Misra, Ashim Ghosh, A. P. Sagar P. and Mohammad S. Obaidat, “Detection of Identity-Based
Attacks in Wireless Sensor Networks Using Signalprints ,”IEEE GlobCom 2010 Workshop on Web
and Pervasive Security (WPS), 2010.
 A. D. Wood and J.A. Stankovic, “Denial of service attacks in sensor networks, “ IEEE Computer
Magazine, pp. 54—62, 2002.
 D. R. Raymond and S. F. Midkiff, “Denial-of-service in wireless sensor networks: attacks and
defenses, “ IEEE Pervasive Computing, Vol. 7, pp.74—81, 2008.
 E. Shi, A. Perrig, “Designing secure sensor networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications , Vol: 11, No:6,
2004 .
 X. Du and H.-H. Chen, “Security in wireless sensor networks,” IEEE Wireless Communications,
Vol.15, No.4, pp.66—66, 2008.
 J.C. Lee et al.,” Key management issues in wireless sensor networks: current proposals and future
developments,” IEEE Wireless Communications, Vol.14, No.5,pp.76—84, 2007.
 Wireless Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur 25
End of Module II
Thank You!
Wireless Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur

Hardware Design of Sensor Node
Dr. Sudip Misra

Associate Professor
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur
What is Wireless Sensor Node ?
Fig. 1: Wireless sensor network

In a wireless sensor network, a sensor node senses physical
parameters from user-specific application area using different sensors
and sends the data to base station though single or multiple hops.
Source: T. Ojha, S. Misra, and N. S. Raghuwanshi, “Wireless sensor networks for agriculture: The state-of-the-art in practice and future challenges," Computers and
Electronics in Agriculture, vol. 118, pp. 66 - 84]
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Ad Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur 2
Characteristics and Requirements
Some characteristics and requirements of a sensor node
 Energy-efficiency
 Low-cost
 Distributed sensing
 Operate in high volumetric densities
 Be autonomous and operate unattended
 Be adaptive to the environment
 Wireless connectivity
 Multi-hop
 Distributed processing
M. A. M. Vieira, C. N. Coelho, D. C. da Silva, and J. M. da Mata, "Survey on wireless sensor network devices," Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation, 2003.
Proceedings. ETFA '03. 2003, pp. 537-544
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Design Challenges
There are several challenges in the design of wireless sensor node
 Flexibility and redundancy
 Scalable and adaptable structure design
 Reliability
 Energy-efficiency
 Low-cost
 Size
Source: M. S. Obaidat and S. Misra, “Inside a wireless sensor node: structure and operations,” in Principles of Wireless Sensor Networks, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Ppess, 2014, ch. 2, sec. 2.2, pp. 17–18.]
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Wireless Sensor Node: The Architecture
LCD Sensors
(optional) (1…N)
Wireless Controller & Memory Actuators

Module Unit (1…N)
GPS
Power Supply
(optional)
Fig. 2: Block diagram of wireless sensor node
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Functional components of Sensor Node
Power Operating Filtering

Managemen Network
System and and Data
t Protocols
Algorithm fusion
Power Supply Sensing

Communication Controller Unit
Battery
MCU
DC-DC
Radio Sensor
ADC
Memory
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Controller
Controller performs different tasks, process data, and control the
functionality of other parameters in the sensor node.
Different types of controllers used in wireless sensor node

 Microcontroller
 Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)
 Digital Signal Processor (DSP)
 Application-specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC)
Source: M. A. M. Vieira, C. N. Coelho, D. C. da Silva, and J. M. da Mata, "Survey on wireless sensor network devices," Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation,
2003. Proceedings. ETFA '03. IEEE Conference, 2003, pp. 537-544 vol.1.]
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Controller (Contd.)
Microcontroller
 General purpose processor for information processing and
control
 Optimized for embedded applications
 Uses clock cycles efficiently
 Low power consumption
Fig. 3 : Microcontroller ATMEGA 324
Examples : MSP430, ATMEGA 32, and PIC 16F877

[http://www.atmel.com/Images/Atmel-42743-ATmega324P_Datasheet.pdf]
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Controller (Contd.)
FPGA
 Reconfigurable
 High processing capability
 Does not have a fixed hardware structure
 Parallel processing is one of the most important features
 May be good for testing
Examples : CycloneIIEP2C5T144 and EP4CE6E22C8
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Controller (Contd.)
DSP
 Optimized for signal processing tasks
 Easy to reconfigure
 Easy to store data
 Consumes more energy compared to microcontroller
 Not suitable for wireless sensing application
Examples : TMS320C6748 and TMS320C6746
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Controller (Contd.)
ASIC
 High performance for specific applications
 Non-standard integrated circuits constructed for one specific
purpose application only
 Overall design can be made into one integrated circuit
 Reduced number of additional circuits
 Not flexible
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Memory Device
A wireless sensor node should have sufficient memory space to
perform the needed tasks.
Three types of memory are used in wireless sensor node

 Flash memory
 Fuse bit
 Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM)
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Communication Module
Communication module receives the transmitted data from
neighbor nodes and transmits to the sensed data to neighbor
nodes
Source Channel
Source Modulator
Coder Code
Channel
Source Channel
Destination Demodulator
Decoder Decoder
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Communication Module (Contd.)
Medium options
 Radio frequency
 Optical communication (laser)
 Infrared
 Ultrasound
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Radio frequency
 Based on electromagnetic waves
 Ease of use and integrality with other devices
 Communication range is long
 It has different penetration through the walls of the buildings or
houses based on the frequency.
 Used in various medical applications.
 Antenna size at least λ/4
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Optical communication (laser)
 Line of sight communication
 Spend less energy than radio
 Security since there is no broadcast and if a channel is
intercepted it would interrupt the signal
 No need for antenna
 Sensible to atmospheric conditions
Source: M. A. M. Vieira, C. N. Coelho, D. C. da Silva, and J. M. da Mata, "Survey on wireless sensor network devices," Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation,
2003. Proceedings. ETFA '03. IEEE Conference, 2003, pp. 537-544 vol.1.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Infrared
 Communication is usually directional
 It travels only in straight lines
 No need for antenna
 Communication range is very short less than 1 meter.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Ultrasound
 Communication is usually directional
 Pretty resilient to multi-path propagation
 Very good ranging capabilities
 Good wall penetration
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Transceiver Characteristics
Transceiver has different unique characteristics
 Service to upper layer: packet, byte, bit
 Power consumption
 Supported frequency, multiple channels
 Data rate
 Modulation
 Power control
 Communication range
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Transceiver States
Transceivers can be put into different operational states, typically:
 Transmit: Ready to transmit
data to neighbor nodes
 Receive: Ready to receive
Transmit Idle Receive
data from neighbor node
 Idle: Ready to receive, but
not doing so
Sleep
 Sleep: The transceiver is
switched off condition
Fig. 4 : Transceiver states
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Example: Communication Module
 ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4)
 Indoor/Urban: up to 100 (30 m)
 Outdoor line-of-sight: up to 300 (90 m)
 Low power and data rate
 Low Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11) Fig. 5: ZigBee
 High data rate upto 1 Mbps

 Infrastructure mode and Ad Hoc mode
 Communication range 10-100 m
 Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1) Fig. 6: Wi-Fi
 Low power
 Short Range upto 10 m
[https://www.sparkfun.com/datasheets/Wireless/Zigbee/XBee-Datasheet.pdf]
[https://www.sparkfun.com/products/10822]
[http://www.ebay.in/itm/172380401207?aff_source=Sok-Goog]
Fig. 7: Wi-Fi
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Sensors
 Main categories
 Passive, omnidirectional
Examples: light, thermometer, microphones, and hygrometer.
 Passive, narrow-beam
Example: Camera
 Active sensors
Example: Radar Fig. 8: Temperature Sensor
 Important parameter: Area of coverage
Fig. 9: Camera Sensor

[https://www.olimex.com/Products/Components/Sensors/SNS-DH11/]
[http://www.ebay.com/itm/FPV-1200TVL-CCTV-Security-Camera-CMOS-960H-IR-CUT-Filter-Mini-Board-Module-3-6mm-/172227993924]
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Wireless Sensor Operating Systems
Need for Embedded Operating System (EOS) in WSNs
 Managing the resources
 Providing an interface to user applications
 Protected operation modes of the CPU
 Process with separate address spaces
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Wireless Sensor Operating Systems (Contd.)
EOS challenges
 Small memory footprint
 Efficient in power and computation
 Lack hardware parallelism
 Real-time
 Robust
 Diversity in applications and design
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Existing embedded OSs are based on
 Event-Driven Model
 Very simple mechanism and more popular in networking field
 Consists of one or more event handlers
 The handlers wait for an event to occur
Example: TinyOS and SOS
 Thread-Driven Model
 Process based
 Processes run preemptively on the CPU in a seemingly parallel manner
 Each process is given amount of CPU time
Example: Mantis OS and RETOS
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Event-Driven Model
 Advantages
 Concurrency with low resources
 Complements the way networking protocols work
 Inexpensive scheduling technique
 Highly portable
 Disadvantages
 Event-loop is in control
 Program needs to be chopped to subprograms
 Bounded buffer producer-consumer problem
Source: M. Moubarak and M. K. Watfa,”Embedded Operating Systems in Wireless Sensor Networks,” in Guide to Wireless Sensor Networks, S. Misra, I. Woungang, and S. C. Misr
Eds.,Springer International press, 2009, pp. 324-327.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Thread-Driven Model
 Advantages
 Eliminates bounded buffer problem
 Programmer in control of program
 Automatic scheduling
 Simulates parallel execution
 Disadvantages
 Complex shared memory
 Expensive context switches
 Complex stack analyses
 High portable due to stack manipulation
Source: M. Moubarak and M. K. Watfa,”Embedded Operating Systems in Wireless Sensor Networks,” in Guide to Wireless Sensor Networks, S. Misra, I. Woungang, and S. C.
Misra, Eds.,Springer International press, 2009, pp. 324-327.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Energy Supply
 Recharging may or may not be an option
 Low-cost
 High-volume
 Light weight
 Less recharging-time
 Long lasting
 Two types of batteries
 Primary batteries – not rechargeable
 Secondary batteries – rechargeable, only makes sense in
combination with some form of energy harvesting
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Energy Supply (Contd.)
 Basic requirements of energy supply
 Low self-discharge
 Long shelf life
 Capacity under load
 Efficient recharging at low current
 Good relaxation properties (seeming self-recharging)
 Voltage stability (to avoid DC-DC conversion)
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Hardware Platforms
System-on-chip (SoC) sensor nodes
 Contains BWRC PicNode and Smart Dust, which are mainly
based on MEMS, CMOS, and RF technologies
Augmented general-purpose personal computers (PCs)
 There are a variety of low-power embedded PCs and personal
digital assistants (PDAs), which usually execute off-the-shelf
commercial operating systems such as Win CE, Linux, or real-
time operating systems, and employ standard wireless schemes
such as ZiggBee (IEEE 802.15.4), Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11), and
Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1)
Dedicated sensor nodes
 Contains the MIT uAMP and Berkeley moto family
Ppess, 2014, ch. 2, sec. 2.8, pp. 26–27.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Example of Sensor Node
System-on-chip (SoC) sensor nodes
 Contains BWRC PicNode and Smart Dust, which are mainly
based on MEMS, CMOS, and RF technologies
Augmented general-purpose personal computers (PCs)
 There are a variety of low-power embedded PCs and personal
digital assistants (PDAs), which usually execute off-the-shelf
commercial operating systems such as Win CE, Linux, or real-
time operating systems, and employ standard wireless schemes
such as ZiggBee, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth
Dedicated sensor nodes
 Contains the MIT uAMP and Berkeley moto family
Ppess, 2014, ch. 2, sec. 2.8, pp. 26–27.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
SWAN Sensor Node
Smart Wireless Applications & Networking (SWAN) designed in-
house a low-cost, energy-efficiency, and flexible wireless sensor
node
Fig. 10: Front view Fig. 11: Rear View
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Specifications of SWAN sensor node
Specifications of SWAN sensor node
 Processor : ATMEGA 324
 Clock frequency up to 20 MHz
 Power consumption:
 Active mode: 60mA@5 Volts (Maximum including wireless
module ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4))
 Sleep mode: 100uA@5 Volts
 10 bits 8 channels ADC
 Two USART
 USB connectivity
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Specifications of SWAN sensor node (Contd.)
Other specifications of SWAN sensor node
 Programming port
 I2C bus
 SPI bus
 32 pins for General purpose Input and Output
 Power On/Off switch
 Charging Switch
 On board Power backup (Rechargeable battery)
 16x2 alpha numerical display LCD
 Wireless Module Zigbee (IEEE 802.15.4)
 Extra output 5 volt, 3.3 volt, GND Pins
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Features of SWAN sensor node
Features of SWAN sensor node
More flexibility of each peripheral (such as LCD can be added or
removed easily, as per requirements)
User can change wireless module as per specific requirements
Any time, user can attach or detach any kind of sensor, actuator
with or from the node
As the node is programmable, user can use the node in different
applications changing the firmware of the node
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Energy Consumption
Fig. 12: State of Charge (SoC) of Battery
Wireless Ad-Hoc
References
 T. Ojha, S. Misra, and N. S. Raghuwanshi, “Wireless sensor networks for agriculture: The state-of-
the-art in practice and future challenges," Computers and Electronics in Agriculture, vol. 118, pp.
66-84.
 M. A. M. Vieira, C. N. Coelho, D. C. da Silva, and J. M. da Mata, "Survey on wireless sensor
network devices," Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation, 2003. Proceedings. ETFA '03.
IEEE Conference, 2003, pp. 537-544 vol.1.
 M. S. Obaidat and S. Misra, “Inside a wireless sensor node: structure and operations,” in
Principles of Wireless Sensor Networks, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Ppess, 2014, ch. 2,
sec. 2.2, pp. 17–18.
 http://www.atmel.com/Images/Atmel-42743-ATmega324P_Datasheet.pdf.
 https://www.olimex.com/Products/Components/Sensors/SNS-DH11.
 http://www.ebay.com/itm/FPV-1200TVL-CCTV-Security-Camera-CMOS-960H-IR-CUT-Filter-Mini-
Board-Module-3-6mm-/172227993924.
 M. Moubarak and M. K. Watfa,”Embedded Operating Systems in Wireless Sensor Networks,” in
Guide to Wireless Sensor Networks, S. Misra, I. Woungang, and S. C. Misra, Eds.,Springer
International press, 2009, pp. 324-327.
 M. S. Obaidat and S. Misra, “Inside a wireless sensor node: structure and operations,” in
Principles of Wireless Sensor Networks, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Ppess, 2014, ch. 2,
sec. 2.8, pp. 26–27.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
References (Cond.)
 https://www.sparkfun.com/datasheets/Wireless/Zigbee/XBee-Datasheet.pdf.
 https://www.sparkfun.com/products/10822/.
 http://www.ebay.in/itm/172380401207?aff_source=Sok-Goog/.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Thank You!
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Real-Life Deployment of WSN
Dr. Sudip Misra

Associate Professor
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Real-Life Deployment of WSN
 Development of a Sensor Based Networking System for Improved
Water Management for Irrigated Crops
 AID: A Prototype for Agricultural Intrusion Detection Using Wireless
Sensor Network
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Development of a Sensor Based Networking System
for Improved Water Management for Irrigated Crops
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Introduction
 Importance of water management
 Excess or lack of water in an agricultural field damages the crop
production
 Increased crop productivity
 Save limited water resource
 Need for WSNs

 Low-power and infrastructure-less network
 Uses remote monitoring and controlling applications
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Objective
 To develop and test low-cost wireless sensing network for
irrigation water management
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Scope of the Project
 Ensure food security of growing population
 Save limited water resource
 Available sensors and WSNs are mostly imported
 Not programmable
 Not flexible
 Not sending convenient information to farmers
 Costly
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Final Outcomes
 Understanding of WSN and database management
 Development of low-cost WSN for monitoring and controlling
water for irrigated crops
 Design of flexible and programmable wireless sensor node
 Development of Short Message Service (SMS) based system
 Development of sensors
 Development of a remote server
 System integration and its field testing
 Analysis of results
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Methodology
WSN System Development
Understanding of WSN & Database
Management
Development
Sensors Wireless Sensor Network

Development of Soil Development of Development of Low
Moisture Sensor Water Level Sensor cost system
Integrated System Testing
Field Application
Wireless Ad-Hoc
System Architecture
 The system architecture is divided into the following three
layers:
 Sensing and
actuating layer
 Remote processing
and service layer
 Application layer
Fig. 1: Overall architecture of the proposed system

Wireless Ad-Hoc
Design and Implementation
 Integrated design for sensor node
 Integrated design for sensors
 Integrated design for remote server
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Integrated Design for Sensor Node
LCD Sensors
(optional) (1…N)
Wireless Actuators
Processor & Memory Unit
Module (1…N)
GPS Power
(optional) Supply
Fig. 2: Block diagram of a wireless sensor node
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Integrated Design for Sensor Node (Contd.)
Fig. 3: Designed wireless sensor node
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Features of the sensor node

 Low-cost
 Very flexible
 Robust and efficient to manage water
 Consumes very low-energy
 Interface multiple heterogeneous sensors, actuators, and
wireless protocols
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Fig. 4(a): Sensor node deployed at IIT Kharagpur Fig. 4(b): Sensor node deployed at Benapur
Fig. 4: Field deployed sensor nodes

Wireless Ad-Hoc
Integrated Design for Sensors
Water-level sensor
 Gives discrete water levels
 Low-cost
 Robust, reliable, and easy-to-use
 Consumes very low-energy
Fig. 5: Designed driver circuit for water- Fig. 6: Designed water-level measurement
level sensor sensor
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Integrated Design for Remote Server
We developed three different types of servers to serve the
functionality of the system
 Repository data server
Communicates with the
deployed
cluster-head in the field by using
GPRS technology
 Web server
To access field data remotely
 Multi-users server
Provides field information to
farmer’s cell phone through a
SMS Fig. 7: Architecture of the remote server
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Integrated design for remote server (Contd.)
Fig. 8: Some Web pages of developed web-server
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Experimental Setup
We experimented our developed system in paddy field at IIT
Kharagpur during December 28, 2015 to April 18, 2016.
Table 1: Experimental setup
Parameter Value
Area of each field 3x3 m2
No of sensor nodes 4
No of sensors and actuators of each 2 (soil moisture and water
node level) and 1 (solenoid)
Data sensing duration 1 sec
Data sending duration 2 hours
Wireless protocols ZigBee(IEEE 802.15.4) & GPRS
Data rate ZigBee 250 kbps

GPRS 9.6 kbps
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Performance Evaluation
Fig. 9: Average soil moisture
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Performance Evaluation (Contd.)
Fig. 10: Average water level
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Fig. 11: Average packet delivery ratio
Wireless Ad-Hoc
AID: Agricultural Intrusion Detection Using Wireless
Sensor Network
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Introduction
 Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
 Collection of wireless sensor nodes
 Sense some physical phenomena
 Transmit the sensed data to a centralize unit or sink through
single-hop or multi-hop connectivity
 Intruder detection system in Agricultural field using WSN
 Generate alarms in the farmer’s house and transmits a
text message to the farmer’s cell phone
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Contribution
 A prototype of intruder detection system, that generates alarms in
the farmer’s house and triggers then generation and transmission
of a text message, when an intruder enters into the field.
 In order to perform experiments with the prototype, we develop
AVR micro-controller based wireless sensor boards.
 We provide empirical results of the implemented prototype in a
real agricultural field.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Problem Scenario
Source: S. K. Roy, A. Roy, S. Misra, N. S. Raghuwanshi and M. S. Obaidat, "AID: A prototype for Agricultural Intrusion Detection
using Wireless Sensor Network," 2015 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC), London, 2015, pp. 7059-7064.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Problem Scenario (contd.)
 A set of sensor nodes is deployed in an agricultural field
 Each of the boards is enabled with two type of sensors:
 Passive Infrared (PIR)
 Ultrasonic
 When an intruder enters into the field through the boundary
(perimeter) of the field, the PIR sensor detects the object.
 The ultrasonic sensor senses the distance at which the object is
located
Wireless Ad-Hoc
AID: Agricultural Intrusion Detection
AVR Micro-Controller-based Wireless Sensor Board
Fig. 12: Sensor node

Wireless Ad-Hoc
AID: Agricultural Intrusion Detection (contd.)
Components of a AVR Micro-Controller-based Wireless Sensor Board
 Micro-controller ATMEGA324PA-PU
 ZigBee (IEEE802.15.4)
 Liquid Crystal Display (LCD 16X2)
 Sensors
 Passive Infrared (PIR)
 Ultrasonic
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Different Layers of AID
Wireless Ad-Hoc
 Layer 1
 Consist of Passive Infrared (PIR) and ultrasonic sensor. The PIR
sensor senses the intruder, and the node is activated.
 The ultrasonic sensor measures the distance of the intruder
from field boundary
 Layer 2
 The sensed data from PIR and ultrasonic sensors are processed
by the micro-controller in this layer
 The intruder is detected after processing
Wireless Ad-Hoc
 Layer 3
 The detection information is transmitted to the sink through
single- or multi-hop connectivity, with the help of ZigBee (IEEE
802.15.4)
 End-to-end routing of the information from the node to the
sink, is the responsibility of this layer
 Layer 4
 The GSM technology is used to generate SMS to the farmer’s
cell phone
 Simultaneously, an alarm is generated in the farmer’s house
Wireless Ad-Hoc
 Detailed Procedure
 All the deployed sensor nodes initially remain in the sleep
mode
 After detecting an intruder, the node sends the information to
the sink.
 A sensor node forwards the information through intermediate
nodes between the originator node and the sink.
 A node that detects the intruder is known as MASTER node
 A MASTER chooses another node among its neighbor nodes, as
the next hop, for forwarding the information.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
 To choose the next hop, a MASTER node considers the following
parameters:
 Received Signal Strength (RSS) of the node at the next hop
 Residual Energy (RE) of the node at next hop
 Distance (D) between the MASTER node and the node at next
hop
Wireless Ad-Hoc
 After detecting an intruder, a MASTER node creates and
broadcasts a request message REQ
 On receiving the REQ packet, all the neighbor nodes reply back to
the MASTER node with a reply message REP
 Based on the REP message, a MASTER node calculates the
selection value S for each of its neighbor node i
 Depending upon the selection value, a neighbor node is selected
for forwarding the information of intrusion detection by the
MASTER node.
 The selection value Si is calculated as:
Wireless Ad-Hoc
Wireless Ad-Hoc
AID: Experimental Setup
Table 2: Specification of developed board
Components Value
Micro-controller ATMEGA 324PA-PU
SRAM 2KB
EEPROM 1KB
Flash Memory 32KB
Power Supply 4.8V
Clock Frequency 8MHz
Addressing Mode of ZigBee 16bits
Power Supply of ZigBee 3.3V
Compiler MikroC PRO for AVR
Language Embedded C
Rechargeable Battery Model No. GP1300 1.2V
Passive Infrared Sensor Model No. :HC-SR501
Ultrasonic Sensor Model No.:HC-SR04
Wireless Ad-Hoc
AID: Experimental Setup (Contd.)
Table 3: Experimental setup
Components Value
Number of Sensor Nodes 20
Field Size 36 m
Number of Gateway 1
Sink 1
GSM-based Alarm Device 1
Cell Phone 1
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AID: Experimental Field
Fig. 13: Experimental field
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Performance Evaluation
Simulation Metrics
 Accuracy (A): Accuracy is defined as the number of intruders

detected by AID, in percentage, over the total number of intruders
who actually enter into the field. Mathematically:
where
: Total number of detected intruders by AID
: Total number of intruders entered into the field.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
 Percentage of average activated nodes (P): Total percentage of
activated nodes require to detect an intruder. Mathematically:
where
N : Total number of nodes present in the network
n : Total number of activated nodes
: Total number of detected intruders by AID
 Voltage (V): Degradation of value of voltage in a certain time

duration t to detect total number of intruders in that duration t.
 Collected data for 3 hours
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Fig. 14: Detection Accuracy
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Fig. 15: Average Activated Nodes
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Fig. 16: Average Voltage Degradation
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References
 T. Ojha, S. Misra, and N. S. Raghuwanshi, “Wireless sensor networks for agriculture: The state-of-
the-art in practice and future challenges," Computers and Electronics in Agriculture, vol. 118, pp.
66 - 84, 2015.
 A. ur Rehman, A. Z. Abbasi, N. Islam, and Z. A. Shaikh, “A review of wireless sensors and
networks‘ applications in agriculture," Computer Standards & Interfaces, vol. 36, no. 2, pp. 263 -
270, 2014.
 S. Khriji, D. E. Houssaini, M. W. Jmal, C. Viehweger, M. Abid, and O. Kanoun, “Precision irrigation
based on wireless sensor network," IET Science, Measurement Technology, vol. 8, pp. 98 - 106,
2014.
 N. Sales, O. Remdios, and A. Arsenio, “Wireless sensor and actuator system for smart irrigation
on the cloud," in WF-IoT, 2015 IEEE, 2015.
 S. Misra, G. Mali, and A. Mondal, “Distributed topology management for wireless multimedia
sensor networks: exploiting connectivity and cooperation," International Journal of
Communication Systems, vol. 28, pp. 1367 - 1386, 2015.
 Z. Feng, “Research on water-saving irrigation automatic control system based on internet of
things," in ICEICE, 2011.
 Y. Kim, R. G. Evans, and W. M. Iversen, “Remote sensing and control of an irrigation system using
a distributed wireless sensor network," IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement,
vol. 57, pp. 1379-1387, 2008.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
References (Contd.)
 D. F. P. Grajales, F. Mejia, G. J. A. Mosquera, L. C. Piedrahita, and C. Basurto, “Crop-planning,
making smarter agriculture with climate data," in Fourth International Conference on Agro-
Geoinformatics, 2015.
 D. P. Rao, “A remote sensing-based integrated approach for sustainable development of land
water resources," IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, vol. 31, pp. 207 - 215,
2001.
 X. Hu and S. Qian, “IoT application system with crop growth models in facility agriculture," in 6th
ICCIT, 2011.
 L. L. Ptscher, D. P. Bernardon, L. M. Kopp, A. A. B. Ferreira, M. V. T. Heckler, B. A. Thom, P. D. B.
Montani, and D. R. Fagundes, “An automated irrigation system for rice cropping with remote
supervi-sion," in ICPOWERENG, 2011.
 Nakutis, V. Deksnys, I. Jaruevicius, E. Marcinkevicius, A. Ronkainen, P. Soumi, J. Nikander,T.
Blaszczyk, and B. Andersen, “Remote agriculture automation using wireless link and iot gateway
infrastructure," in 26th IWDEXA, 2015.
 M. Dursun and S. Ozden, “A wireless application of drip irrigation automation supported by soil
moisture sensors,“ in Scientic Research and Essays, vol. 6, no. 7, pp. 1573 - 1582, 2011.
 P. H. Tarange, R. G. Mevekari, and P. A. Shinde, “Web based automatic irrigation system using
wireless sensor network and embedded linux board," in ICCPCT, 2015.
 W. S. Lee, T. F. Burks, and J. K. Schueller, “Silage yield monitoring system," in ASAE Annual
Meeting, 2002.
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References (Contd.)
 S. Chatterjee and S. Misra, “Target Tracking Using Sensor-Cloud: Sensor-Target Mapping in
Presence of Overlapping Coverage,” IEEE Communications Letters, vol. 18, no. 8, pp. 1435 –
1438,, August 2014.
 S. Misra and S. Chatterjee, “Social choice considerations in cloud assisted WBAN architecture for
post-disaster healthcare: Data aggregation and channelization,” Information Sciences, vol. 284,
pp. 95–117, Nov 2014.
 A. Rodriguez de la Concepcion, R. Stefanelli, and D. Trinchero, “Awireless sensor network
platform optimized for assisted sustainable agriculture,” in IEEE Global Humanitarian Technology
Conference, Oct 2014, pp. 159–165.
 I. F. Akyildiz, S. Weilian, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “A survey on sensor networks,”
Communications Magazine, vol. 40, no. 8, pp. 102–114, November 2002.
 I. F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “Wireless sensor networks: A survey,”
Computer Networks, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 393–422, 2002.
 A. Munir, A. Gordon-Ross, and S. Ranka, “Multi-Core Embedded Wireless Sensor Networks:
Architecture and Applications,” IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, vol. 25, no.
6, pp. 1553–1562, June 2014.
 S. Misra and S. Singh, “Localized Policy-based Target Tracking Using Wireless Sensor Networks,”
ACM Transactions on Sensor Networks, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 1–30, Aug. 2012.
 “http://www.ediblesandiego.com/issues/summer-2014/crimes-in-thefield-crop-theft-sores-on-
area-farms.html.”
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References (Contd.)
 N. Wang, N. Zhang, and M. Wang, “Review: Wireless Sensors in Agriculture and Food industry-
Recent Development and Future Perspective,” Computers and Electronics in Agriculture, vol. 50,
no. 1, pp. 1–14, January 2006.
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Sensor Networks for Precision Agriculture Applications,” in International Conference on Sensor
Technologies and Applications, October 2007, pp. 526–530.
 F. J. Pierce and T. V. Elliott, “Regional and On-farm Wireless Sensor Networks for Agricultural
Systems in Eastern Washington,” Computers and Electronics in Agriculture, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 32–
43, April 2008.
 X. Shu-ming, W. Liang-Min, Q. Xiao-qian, and Z. Yong-Zhao, “Application Research of WSN in
Precise Agriculture Irrigation,” in Environmental Science and Information Application Technology,
2009. ESIAT 2009. International Conference on, vol. 2, July 2009, pp. 297–300.
 B. Lilly and K. Shenai, “Wireless sensor networks with embedded intelligence for agricultural
applications,” in 27th International Conference on Microelectronics Proceedings, May 2010, pp.
311–314.
 J. Gutierrez, J. Villa-Medina, A. Nieto-Garibay, and M. Porta-Gandara, “Automated Irrigation
System Using a Wireless Sensor Network and GPRS Module,” IEEE Transactions on
Instrumentation and Measurement, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 166–176, January 2014.
Wireless Ad-Hoc
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Underwater Sensor Networks

Dr. Sudip Misra

 Low performance of GPS in

 Ocean mapping Acoustic

 Reference node deployment Underwater

 Variable sound speed &

 Low communication cost

Fig. : Challenges and desirable properties of node localization in UWSNs

Presence of Anchors Type of Control Ranging

Anchor-based Centralized Range-based

Anchor-free Distributed Range-free

Single Stage Multi Stage

Fingerprinting- Fixed Range- Dynamic

PM PCA PF ALS USP 3DUL LSL OLTC

E-UPS WPS LSLS SLMP

Single Stage Multi Stage

Range-free Range-based Range-based

 Arises because of nonuniform spatial distribution of pressure

Dr. Sudip Misra

Wireless Ad-Hoc and Sensor Networks CSE, IIT Kharagpur

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 Unpredictable communication: WSN uses connectionless service. It

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deployed in a very Journal of Peer to Peer Networks, 2011

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Dr. Sudip Misra

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Source: Dimitrievski, Pejovska and Davcev, International Journal of Peer to

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all the traffic going to the base

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 Internal attacks: Attackers reside inside the network. The consequences of

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