2 Cases Second Batch

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS
SY 2016-2017
ATTY. JOSEPH RANDI TORREGOSA
LIST OF CASES
(SECOND BATCH)
1. US vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, 19 March 1910

2. Salvador Yapyuco vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan and People, 25 June 2012, G.R. Nos.
120744-46
3. Yao Kee, et. al. vs. Aida Sy-Gonzales, et.al. G.R. No. L-55960, 24 November 1988
4. Karen Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, 21 August
1997
5. In the matter of the adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No.
148311, 31 March 2005
6. People vs. Roger Tulin, et. al., G.R. No. 111709, 30 August 2001
7. US vs. Bull, G.R. No. L-5270, 15 January 1910
8. Claro Recto vs. Esperanza Harden, G.R. No. L-6897, 29 November 1956
9. Van Dorn vs. Romillo, G.R. No. L-68470, 08 October 1985
10. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, 30 June 1989
11. Laurel vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013 25 July 1990
12. Bank of America vs American Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 133876, 29 December
1999
13. Republic of the Philippines vs Sandiganbayan et al, GR 108292, 10 September
1993
14. Cadalin vs. POEA, G.R. L-104776, 05 December 1994
15. Edward Christensen vs. Aznar-Garcia, G.R. L-16749, 31 January 1963
16. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. Roberto Reyes @ “Amay Bisaya”, GR No.154259, 28
February 2005
17. Baksh vs. CA and Gonzales, GR No.97336, 19 February 1993
18. Manila Doctors Hospital vs. Chu, G.R. No. 150355, 31 July 2006
19. Continental Steel Manufacturing vs. Honorable Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator,
G.R. No. 182836, 13 October 2009
20. Geluz vs. CA, G.R. L-16439, 20 July 1961
21. Eastern Shipping Lines vs. Lucero, 124 SCRA 1983
22. Victory Shipping Lines vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission. G.R. L-9268, 28
November 1959
UNITED STATES vs . AH CHONG
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5272. March 19, 1910.]
THE UNITED STATES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . AH CHONG , defendant-

appellant.
Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. JUSTIFICATION HOMICIDE; SELF-DEFENSE; MISTAKE OF FACTS. —

Defendant was a cook and the deceased was a house boy, and both were employed in
the same place and usually slept in the same room. One night, after the defendant had
gone to bed, he was awakened by some one trying to open the door, and called out
twice, "who is there?" He received no answer, and fearing that the intruder was a robber,
leaped from the bed and again called out: "If you enter the room I will kill you." At that
moment he was struck by a chair which had been placed against the door. Believing
that he was being attacked, he seized a kitchen knife and struck and fatally wounded
the intruder, who turned out to be his roommate. Thereupon he called to his employers
and rushed back into the room to secure bandages to bind up the wound. Defendant
was charged with murder. While there can be no doubt of defendant's exemption from
liability if the intruder had really been a robber, the question presented is whether, in this
jurisdiction, a person can be held criminally responsible when, by reason of a mistake of
facts, he does an act for which he would be exempt if the facts were as he supposed
them to be, but would constitute murder if he had known the true state of facts at the
time.
Held, That, under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability, provided that
the ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. In other words,
if such ignorance or mistake of facts is suf cient to negative a particular intent which,
under the law, is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged it destroys the
presumption of intent and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions governing negligence,
and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, a person
voluntarily committing an act incurs criminal liability even though the act be different
from that which he intended to commit.
DECISION
CARSON , J : p
The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to
the testimony of the accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com
from the circumstances surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest,
no other evidence as to these facts was available either to the prosecution or to the
defense. We think however, that, giving the accused the bene t of the doubt as to the
weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to which there can be
said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclosed by the
record may be taken to be substantially correct:
The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Of cers' quarters, No. 27,"
Fort McKinley, Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was
employed as a house boy or muchacho. "Of cers' quarters No. 27" is a detached house
situated some 40 meters from the nearest building, and in August, 1908, was occupied
solely as an of cers' mess or club. No one slept in the house except the two servants,
who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the building, the door of which
opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by which
communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a
heavy growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not
furnished with a permanent bolt or lock, and the occupants, as a measure of security,
had attached a small hook or catch on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of
reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of fastening the door by placing against it a
chair. In the room there was but one shall window, which, like the door, opened on the
porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings of any kind in the
room.
On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had
retired for the night, was suddenly awakened by someone trying to force open the door
of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer
and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone
bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the heavy growth of vines along the
front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant, fearing that the intruder
was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill
you." At the moment he was struck just above the knew by the edge of the chair which
had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought
that the blow had been in icted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he
supposed to be a burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair
was merely thrown back into the room by the sudden opening of the door against
which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his
roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps in a
desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately
recognized him in the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his
employers who slept in the next house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of
the incident just described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant
was employed as cook; and as defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated
robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal protection.
The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have
been or friendly and amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding
that when either returned at night, he should knock at the door and acquaint his
companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house early in the evening and gone
for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez, servants employed
at of cers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three returned from
their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.
28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated,
Celestino and Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found
Pascual sitting on the back steps fatally wounded in the stomach whereupon one of
them ran back to No. 28 and called Lieutenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately
went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but
said that he did it under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced
open the door of their sleeping room, despite defendant's warnings.
No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascual
suggests itself, unless it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his
Chinese roommate, and sought to frighten him by forcing his way into the room,
refusing to give his name or say who he was, in order to make Ah Chong believe that he
was being attacked by a robber.
Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the
military hospital, where he died from the effect of the wound of the following day.
The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found
guilty by the trial court of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and
sentenced to six years and one day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by
law.
At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate,
Pascual Gualberto, but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a
wrongful act, in the exercise of his lawful right of self defense.
Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —
"The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal
liability:
"4. He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are
the following attendant circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) Illegal aggression.
"(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
it.
"(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself."
Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would
be entitled to complete exemption from criminal liability for the death of the victim of
his fatal blow, if the intruder who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a
dangerous thief or "ladron," as the defendant believed him to be. No one, under such
circumstances, would doubt the right of the defendant to resist and repel such an
intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door notwithstanding defendant's thrice-
repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the intruder if he persisted
in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small
questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a small room, with no means of escape,
with the thief advancing upon him despite his warning, defendant would have been
wholly justi ed in using any available weapon to defend himself from such an assault,
and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts and
deliver the first blow.
But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron."
That neither the defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge
was in real danger at the time when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such
"unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or "ladron" as defendant believed he was
repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity" for the use of knife to
defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for
which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them
to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act. To this
question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under such
circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance
or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.
In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of
fact is suf cient to negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary
ingredient of the offense charged (e. g., in larceny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in
crimes and misdemeanors generally some degree of criminal intent) "cancels the
presumption of intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the
circumstances demand a conviction under the penal provisions touching criminal
negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code one
voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor incurs criminal liability for any wrongful
act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec.
133 and cases cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap.; 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met.,
596; Yates vs. People, 32 N. Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs.
Rogers, 7 Met., 500)
The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only
question worthy of consideration is whether malice of criminal intent is an essential
element or ingredient of the crimes of homicide and assassination as de ned and
penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that since the de nitions there given of
these as well as most other crimes and offenses therein de ned, do not speci cally
and expressly declare the acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed
with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable,
the commission of the acts set out in the various de nitions subjects the actor to the
penalties described therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under
one or other of the express provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of
exemptions. But while it is true that contrary to the general rule of legislative enactment
in the United States, the de nitions of crimes and offenses as set out in the Penal Code
rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent is an
essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the
code clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential
requisite of all crimes and offenses therein de ned, in the absence of express
provisions modifying the general rule, such as are those touching liability resulting from
acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by one voluntarily
committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are
more apparent than real, for "There is a little distinction, except in degree, between a will
to do a wrongful thing and indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore
carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies the place of the af rmative criminal
intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again, "There is so little
deference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm that
one of them may very well be looked upon as the measures of the other. Since,
therefore, the guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal
shows by committing it, and since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the
harm which is done by the crime the consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows
the same proportion; it is greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has
been otherwise stated the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mind, is to be
viewed the same whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.
Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:
"Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and omissions punished by
law.
"Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntary
unless the contrary shall appear.
"Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur
criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that
which he had intended to commit."
The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word
"voluntary" as used in this article, says that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and
intentional act, and roundly asserts that without intention (intention to do wrong or
criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the word "voluntary" implies and
includes the words "con malicia." which were expressly set out in the de nition of the
word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included
in the word "voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)
Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only
be said exempt from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended
to be done was in itself a lawful one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence,
nevertheless admits and recognizes in his discussion of the provisions of this article of
the code that in general without intention there can be no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.)
And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by Viada are more
apparent than real.
Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:
"In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declares that
where there is no intention there is no crime . . . . in order to affirm, without fear of
mistake, that under our code there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which
must fall within the sphere of ethics if there is no moral injury." (Vol. 2, The
Criminal Law, folio 169.)
And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as,
for example in its sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following
language:
"It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the
malice which is supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause
the injury which may be the object of the crime."
"And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that
"considering that, whatever may be the civil effects of the inscription of his three
sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in the parochial church, there
can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary elements or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or omission punished by law; nor is he
guilty of criminal negligence."
And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the
following language:
". . . Considering that the moral element of the crime that is intent or malice
or their absence in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as
criminal, is not a necessary question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment
and decision of the trial court."
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an
essential element of the various crimes and misdemeanors therein de ned becomes
clear also from an examination of the provisions of article 568, which are as follows:
"He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with
malice, would constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum degree, to prison correccional in its minimum
degree, and with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium degrees if it shall
constitute a less grave crime.
"He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through
simple imprudence or negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.
"In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to
their discretion, without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.
"The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty
prescribed for the crime is equal to or less than those contained in the first
paragraph thereof, in which case the courts shall apply the next one thereto in the
degree which they may consider proper."
The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the
words "criminal intent," and the direct inference from its provisions is that the
commission of the acts contemplated therein, in the absence of malice (criminal
intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal liability on the actor.
The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to
approximate in meaning the word "willful" as used in English and American statutes to
designate a form of criminal intent. It has been said that while the word "willful"
sometimes means little more than intentionally or designedly, yet it is more frequently
understood to extend a little further and approximate the idea of the milder kind of legal
malice; that is, it signi es an evil intent without justi able excuse. In one case it was
said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once
said that ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely 'voluntarily' but with a bad purpose;
in other words, corruptly." In English and the American statutes de ning crimes
"malice," "maliciously," and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more
purely technical than "willful" or "willfully," but "the difference between them is not great;"
the word "malice" not often being understood to require general malevolence toward a
particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from which ows any unlawful and
injurious act committed without legal justi cation. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1,
secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in
the de nition of a crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously," "with
malice aforethought," or in one of the various modes generally construed to imply a
criminal intent, we think that reasoning from general principles it will always be found
that, with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to constitute a crime evil intent
must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with numerous
citations from the decided cases, thus forcefully presents this doctrine:
"In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil that in
the rule as to intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with
which a thing was done is sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds
only from a criminal mind. So that —
"There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words,
punishment is the sequence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And
neither in philosophical speculation nor in religious or moral sentiment would any
people in any age allow that a man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was
so. It is therefore a principle of our legal system, as probably it is of every other,
that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent, without which it can not
exist. We find this doctrine confirmed by —
"Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern,
is distinct on this subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, 'the act itself does not make a man guilty
unless his intention were so;' Actus me invito factus non est meus actus, 'an act
done by me against my will is not my act;' and others of the like sort. In this, as
just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —
"Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. 'By reference to
the intention, we inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to
the happiness or misery actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it
may, we hold a man guilty simply on the ground of intention; or, on the same
ground, we hold him innocent.' The calm judgment of mankind keeps this
doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance takes the
place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason the public voice that were the mind is pure, he who differs in act from
his neighbors does not offend. And —
"In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God
to man, no one deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an
upright mind, destitute of every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to
suffer a punishment which the community deems not his due, so far from its
placing an evil mark upon him it elevates him to the seat of the martyr. Even
infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in justification of what
has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if its truth
is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then the doctrine of the law, superior to
all other doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that
no man is to be punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong." (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 286 to 290.)
Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure
from this doctrine of abstract justice results from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that
Ignorantia juris non excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which
justice could not be administered in our tribunals; and compelled also by the same
doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid,
in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make their commission
criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these exceptional
cases at length, it is suf cient here to say that the courts have always held that the
intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without
regard to the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so
construed (cases cited in Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that
ignorance of the law excuses no man has been said not to be a real departure from the
law's fundamental principle that crime exists only where the mind is at fault, because
"the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and it suf ces if it is simply to do thing
which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and cases cited.)
But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity
therefor, requiring mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise than in strict accord with
the principles of abstract justice. On the contrary the maxim here is Ignorantia facti
excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a
sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in
the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided always there is
no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the
accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn,
1 Den. C. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb., 342; Yates vs P., 32
N.Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41; P. vs. Miles, 55
Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to whether
he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the
mistake was made, and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might
reasonably be expected to have on his mind, in forming the intent, criminal or otherwise
upon which he acted.
"If in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to
believe the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely
in accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does believe them — he is legally guiltless of the homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In order words, and with reference to the right of self-
defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions
apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in
acting on the facts as they appear to him. If without fault or carelessness, he is
misled concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus
supposes the facts to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth
otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure." (Bishop's New
Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there cited.)
The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the
application of this rule is the case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at
night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled
pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by his friend under the mistaken belief
that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is loaded, and that his life
and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one will doubt
that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew
the real state of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be
guilty of the crime of homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of
his innocent mistake or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or
assassination) overcomes at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of
the code, that the "act punished by law" was committed "voluntarily."
Parsons, C. J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:
"If the party killing had a felonious design against him, and under that
supposition killed him, although it should afterwards appear that there was no
such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter or excusable
homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief." (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart. Hom., 417, 418,
Lloyd's report of the case, p. 7.)
In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit, jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
"A in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward
him, with an outstretched arm and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces
against his life as he advances. Having approached near enough in the same
attitude, A, who has a club in his hand, strikes B over the head before or at the
instant the pistol is discharged; and of the wound B dies. It turns out the pistol
was loaded with powder only , and that the real design of B was only to terrify A.
Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal than he would have been if
there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must require
that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain
how the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential
right of self-defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause,
and not the party killing, are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his
apprehension, no danger can be supposed to flow from this principle." (Lloyd's
Rep., p. 160.)
To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by
Viada, a few of which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous
to those in the case at bar.
"QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his
hearth, at night, in company only of his wife, without other light than that reflected
from the fire, and that the man with his back to the door was attending to the fire,
there suddenly entered a person whom he did not see or know, who struck him
one or two blows, producing a contusion on the shoulder, because of which he
turned, seized the person and took from him the stick with which he had
undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him to
the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the
unknown lying on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person
was his father-in-law, to whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his
identity, and who died in about six days in consequence of cerebral congestion
resulting from the blow. The accused, who confessed the facts, had always
sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he visited during his
sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be considered
free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal
branch of the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor,
without sufficient provocation, and that there did not exist rational necessity for
the employment of the force used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of
forced used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code
condemned him to twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and
costs. Upon appeal by the accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under
the following sentence: 'Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to
have been proven, that the accused was surprised from behind, at night, in his
house beside his wife, who was nursing her child, was attacked, struck, and eaten,
without being able to distinguish the person or persons attacking, nor the
instruments with which they might have executed their criminal intent, because of
the fact that the attack was made from behind and because there was no other
than fire light in the room, and considering that in such a situation and when the
acts executed demonstrated that they might endanger his existence, and possibly
that of his wife and child, more especially because his assailant was unknown, he
should have defended himself, and in doing so with the same stick with which he
was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-defense, nor did he use means
which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the instrument with
which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was capable of
producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consternation which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to know or
distinguish whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they
might bear, nor that which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower
court did not find from the accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for
the means employed, and that it did not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the
Penal Code, it erred, etc.' (Sentence of supreme court of Spain, February 28,
1876.)" (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.)
"QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was
situated in a retired part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no
light, heard the voice of a man, at a distance of some 8 paces, saying: 'Face
down, hand over your money!' because of which , and almost at the same
moment , he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately the voice
of one of his friends (who had before stimulated a different voice) saying, 'Oh!
they have killed me,' and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon
the ground, he cried, 'Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined,'
realizing that he had been the victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and
observing that his friend was a corpse, he retired from the place. Shall he be
declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author of this homicide, as
having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in paragraph 4,
article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not so
find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article,
but not that of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and
therefore, condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prision mayor,
etc. The supreme court acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence,
holding that the accused was acting under a justifiable and excusable mistake of
fact as to the identity of the person calling to him, and that under the
circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means employed were
rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17, 1885.)"
(Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)
"Question VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is
awakened, at night, by a large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts
his head out of the window and inquires what is wanted, and is answered 'the
delivery of all his money, otherwise his house would be burned' — because of
which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill four individuals, one of
whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one of the men, who,
on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense
with all of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of
Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable
necessity for the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve
months of prision correccional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the
supreme court acquitted the condemned, finding that the accused, in finding at
the malefactors, who attacked his mill at night in a remote spot by threatening
robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of his person, property,
and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877)." (I Viada, p. 128.)
A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at the bar convinces
us that the defendant Chinaman struck the fatal below alleged in the information in the
rm belief that the intruder who forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief,
from whose assault he was an imminent peril, both of his life and of his property and of
the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the circumstances, as they
must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in good faith,
without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than
exercising hid legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed
them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or
even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by
him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believed threatened his
person and his property and the property under his charge.
The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should
be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and he
is bail bond exonerated, with the costs of both instances de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson, Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.
Separate Opinions
TORRES , J., dissenting :
The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes
that, according to the merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence,
is de ned and punished in article 568 of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as
the victim was willfully (voluntariamente) killed, and while the act was done without
malice or criminal intent it was, executed with real negligence, for the acts committed
by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the defendant under the
erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him was a
malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the
person who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.
By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned
the accused should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision
correccional, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an
indemnity of P1,000 to the heirs of the deceased, with the costs of both instances,
thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 120744-46. June 25, 2012.]
SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ , petitioner, vs . HONORABLE

SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 122677. June 25, 2012.]
MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA ,

petitioners, vs . HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.
[G.R. No. 122776. June 25, 2012.]
GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO , petitioners, vs .

HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ,
respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA , * J : p
Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton
violence is never justi ed when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot rst,
think later" disposition occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide
or murder been a function of law enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the
cost of human life.
These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the June 30, 1995 Decision 1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613
and 16614 — cases for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted
murder, respectively. The cases are predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in
Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince
Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva (Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador
Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr. (Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno)
who were members of the Integrated National Police (INP) 2 stationed at the Sindalan
Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan (Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes,
who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen, respectively; Ernesto Puno,
Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David, Ruben Lugtu, Moises
Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David (David), who were
either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer of cers in
Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with murder,
multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the inculpatory
portions of which read: cSICHD

Criminal Case No. 16612 :
That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San
Fernando, Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, all public of cers, being then policemen, Brgy.
Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF),
respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and while
responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay
and conducting surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to
their of ce, did then and there, with treachery and evident premeditation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to take the life of
Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by ring directly at
the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and in icting
multiple gunshot wounds which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of
the body, thereby causing the direct and immediate death of the latter.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack Eduardo S. Flores,
Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with automatic
weapons by ring directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said
Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican,
having commenced the commission of murder directly by overt acts of execution
which should produce the murder by reason of some cause or accident other than
their own spontaneous desistance. CAScIH
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking the life of Noel C. Villanueva,
attack the latter with automatic weapons by ring directly at the green Toyota
Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and in icting multiple gunshot
wounds which are necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which
would have produced the crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes
independent of the defendants' will, namely, the able and timely medical
assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5
Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, 6
the accused — except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990, 7 and Yapyuco who was
then allegedly indisposed 8 — entered individual pleas of not guilty. 9 A month later,
Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered
a negative plea. 10 In the meantime, Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu
and Manguerra jointly led a Motion for Bail relative to Criminal Case No. 16612. 11 Said
motion was heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon by both the prosecution and
the defense, that these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence adduced at said
hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits. 12 On May 10,
1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612. 13 Yapyuco likewise
applied for bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991. 14
Pamintuan died on November 21, 1992, 15 and accordingly, the charges against him were
dismissed.
At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial inquest.
16 Hence, joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of
evidence left off at the hearing on the bail applications.
SEHTIc
The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma,
De Vera, Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio
esta celebrations between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around
7:30 p.m., shortly after the religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated,
Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out
for potholes and open canals on the road. With Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of
his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney, Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-
10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were approaching a curve on the road,
they met a burst of gun re and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both wounded and
bleeding profusely. 1 7
Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not see
any one on the road ag them down. 18 In open court, Flores executed a sketch 19
depicting the relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of
Salangsang where they had come from and the house situated on the right side of the road
right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a left turn; he identi ed said house to be
that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly took post and opened re at
him and his companions. He could not tell how many rearms were used. He recounted
that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded, jumped out of
the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of Naron's
house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to
be employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not
stopping when agged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told
him to summon Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He
dashed back to Salangsang's house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed
that petitioner Yu was also there, and Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao
jeepney to be taken to the hospital. 20 This was corroborated by Villanueva who stated
that as soon as the ring had ceased, two armed men, together with Pamintuan,
approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and taken to the
nearby St. Francis Hospital. 21
Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gun re which very rapidly
succeeded each other, and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the
defense would say. 22 He professed that he, together with his co-passengers, were also
aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way to the hospital and inside it he observed two men,
each holding long rearms, seated beside the driver. He continued that as soon as he and
his companions had been dropped off at the hospital, the driver of the Sarao jeepney
immediately drove off together with his two armed companions. 23 He further narrated
that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where the
latter expired on April 7, 1988. 24 He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been
known to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identi ed to be his
wife's uncle and with whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for
that matter, which would have otherwise inspired ill motives. 25 He claimed the bullet holes
on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the passenger side and that there were no other bullet
holes at the back or in any other portion of the vehicle. 26
DAaIHT
Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, af rmed the presence
of his companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated
Villanueva's and Flores' narration of the events immediately preceding the shooting. He
recounted that after seeing off his guests shortly after the procession had passed his
house and reminding them to proceed carefully on the pothole-studded roads, he was
alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley of gun re from a distance which was
shortly followed by Flores' frantic call for help. He immediately proceeded to the scene on
his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the gate of Naron's house
where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he could not
recognize. 2 7 At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another
jeepney occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys
of the Tamaraw jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mother's house,
but before driving off, he allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an
owner-type jeepney idling in front of the ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which
he remembered to be that frequently used by Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He
claimed he spent the night at his mother's house and in the morning, a policeman came
looking for him with whom, however, he was not able to talk. 28
Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in
front of Naron's house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the
neighboring houses was illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was
Yapyuco's group or the group of Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the
hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it was the Sarao jeepney previously identi ed
by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured companions to the hospital. 29
Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp
Olivas, af rmed that she had previously examined the rearms suspected to have been
used by petitioners in the shooting and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She
could not, however, determine exactly when the rearms were discharged; neither could
she tell how many rearms were discharged that night nor the relative positions of the
gunmen. She admitted having declined to administer paraf n test on petitioners and on
the other accused because the opportunity therefor came only 72 hours after the incident.
She af rmed having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and found eleven (11) bullet
holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the passenger side of the vehicle at
oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the bullets
that hit at an angle might have been red while the jeepney was either at a standstill or
moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road. 30
Additionally, Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply of cer of the INP-Pampanga
Provincial Command tasked with the issuance of rearms and ammunitions to members
of the local police force and CHDF and CVO members, identi ed in court the memorandum
receipts for the rearms he had issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan
and Yapyuco. 31 ICTcDA
Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the
injuries of Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel
from the occipital region of Villanueva's head as well as from the posterior aspect of his
chest; he noted nothing serious in these wounds in that the incapacity would last between
10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet wound on the front lateral portion of the right
thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be caused by a firearm discharged in front of
the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were both standing upright on the ground
and the rearm was red from the level of the assailant's waist; but if the victim was
seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming from his
front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would
come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a
lower level. 3 2
With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient,
he noted a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head — one consistent with
being hit by a hard and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds
the locations of which suggested that Licup was upright when red upon from the front:
one is a through-and-through wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of
the right leg; another, through-and-through wound at the middle portion of the right
forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen which critically and fatally involved the
stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was seated in the passenger
seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant must have been in
front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the leg. He
found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to
and exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at
Licup's left side. He explained that if this wound had been in icted ahead of that in the
forearm, then the former must have been red after Licup had changed his position as a
reaction to the rst bullet that hit him. He said that the wound on the leg must have been
caused by a bullet red at the victim's back and hit the jeepney at a downward angle
without hitting any hard surface prior. 33
Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup's right forearm must have been caused by a
bullet red from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he
held the improbability of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that he might have
changed position following the in iction of the other wounds, unless there was more than
one assailant who red multiple shots from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however,
he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup having changed position especially if the
gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which of Licup's three wounds was first
in icted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was delivered ahead of the others
because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down with his head lying
low and steady. 34
Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing of cer at the National Police Commission
(NAPOLCOM) af rmed that the accused police of cers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had
been administratively charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of
the subject shooting incident and that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon
sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in their dismissal from service. 35 Dolly
Porqueriño, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testi ed that at the hearing of the
administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated April
5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his of ce. This, according to her, together
with the sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the
Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM
Central Of ce for consideration. 36 The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these
documents together with the joint counter-af davits which had been submitted in that
case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno. HSaIET
Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identi ed himself as
the commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the
superior of cer of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction
included Barangays Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of
April 5, 1988, he and his men were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly
received a summon for police assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by
Pamintuan, concerning a reported presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan.
Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in San Fernando for reinforcement but at the
time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he decided to respond and instructed
his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with them. 37
Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who
told him that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their
collective strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario
Reyes of nearby Del Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there
were likewise Cafgu members convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later,
Pamintuan announced the approach of his suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno
took post in the middle of the road at the curve where the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the
victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came much closer, Pamintuan
announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno behind him,
allegedly agged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping,
the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow
police of cers Cunanan and Puno, 38 to re warning shots but the jeepney continued
pacing forward, hence they were impelled to re at the tires thereof and instantaneously,
gunshots allegedly came bursting from the direction of Naron's house directly at the
subject jeepney. 3 9
Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their re, Yapyuco
and his men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no rearms but instead, two
injured passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis
Hospital. From there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and
look for the people who red directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw
jeepney was likewise gone. 40
Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time
was in bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement of cers in the area who
had been ambushed supposedly by rebel elements, 41 and that he frequently patrolled the
barangay on account of reported sightings of unidenti ed armed men therein. 42 That
night, he said, his group which responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised
of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan Police Substation, 43 the team composed of
Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted
that all of them, including himself, were armed. 44 He denied that they had committed an
ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney would have
been killed. 45 He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney
did not come from him or from his fellow police of cers but rather from Cafgu members
assembled in the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were red only when the
jeepney had gone past the spot on the road where they were assembled. 46 HTCSDE
Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the
accused after the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that
his co-accused had already been investigated by the main police station in San Fernando,
but the inquiries did not include himself, Cunanan and Puno. 47 He admitted an
administrative case against him, Cunanan and Puno at the close of which they had been
ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the decision was reversed and they were
exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation independently conducted by their
station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco. 48
S/Supt. Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga
acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where
members of the police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He
said that he himself has actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that
rebel elements had been trying to in ltrate the employment force of San Miguel
Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly conducted "clearing operations" in
sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated that days prior to the incident,
Yapyuco's team had already been alerted of the presence of NPA members in the area.
Corroborating Yapyuco's declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting
incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached
Pamintuan's statement referring to Flores as being "married to a resident of Barangay
Quebiawan" and found after surveillance to be "frequently visited by NPA members." He
af rmed having found that guns were indeed red that night and that the chief investigator
was able to gather bullet shells from the scene. 49
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco
as well as the latter's documentary evidence. 5 0 Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson,
Yu and Manguera, waived their right to present evidence and submitted their memorandum
as told. 51
The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the
regular and lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order
either as barangay of cials and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could
take shelter in the justifying circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal
Code; or whether they had deliberately ambushed the victims with the intent of killing
them. 52 With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco, Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario
and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate offense of homicide for the
eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16612) and of
attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated murder as
charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted all
of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores,
Panlican, De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision
reads: ScaEIT
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso
Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres
Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense of
Homicide, as de ned and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or
proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the
amounts of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate shares of the
costs of said action.
II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insuf ciency of evidence, all the accused
charged in the information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez,
Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y
David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson, Moises Lacson y
Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple
Attempted Murder charged therein, with costs de oficio.
III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso
Cunanan, Jr. y Basco, Ernesto Punoy Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres
Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals in the offense
Attempted Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, in relation
to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting
them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any
aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum, to SIX
(6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the
amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus
P120,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate
share of the costs of said action.
ECISAD
SO ORDERED. 53
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and
which brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein
willfully under the guise of maintaining peace and order; 54 that the acts performed by
them preparatory to the shooting, which ensured the execution of their evil plan without
risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle;
that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and consciously intended to in ict
harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their defense of lawful
performance of of cial duty; 55 that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise
bene t petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had suf cient
basis or probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan's report that the victims were armed
NPA members, and they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or
gross inexcusable negligence when they acted as they did; 56 that there was insuf cient or
total absence of factual basis to assume that the occupants of the jeepney were members
of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the shooting incident could not have been
the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police operation but was the result of
either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario Reyes and Pamintuan, or a
hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation. 57
These ndings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution
witnesses Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the
subject incident. The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have
indeed stopped if it had truly been agged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since —
as it turned out after the search of the vehicle — they had no rearms with them, and hence,
they had nothing to be scared of. 58 It observed that while Salangsang and Flores had been
bona de residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it would be impossible for Pamintuan,
barangay captain no less, not to have known them and the location of their houses which
were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the presence of the victims
and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang's house that evening could not have possibly
escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuan's Sworn Statement dated April
11, 1988 did not suf ciently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as
well as his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw
jeepney. 59 It surmised how the defense, especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have
failed to explain why a large group of armed men — which allegedly included Cafgu
members from neighboring barangays — were assembled at the house of Naron that night,
and how petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw jeepney to be the target vehicle.
From this, it inferred that petitioners had already known that their suspect vehicle would be
coming from the direction of Salangsang's house — such knowledge is supposedly evident
rst, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at the scene to
afford a direct line of re at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the house of
Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses
were deliberately not lit that night. 60
SDTcAH
The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores' sketch depicting the position of the
Tamaraw jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet
holes on the right side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the
trajectory of the bullets that hit Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of
Naron's residence and the shots were red at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past
them. It also gave weight to the testimony and the report of Dabor telling that the service
rearms of petitioners had been tested and found to be positive of gunpowder residue,
therefore indicating that they had indeed been discharged. 61
The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence
pointing to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the
jeepney and the gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that
caused such damage and injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the
bullets that hit the front passenger side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the
accused on the right side of the street and inside the front yard of Naron's house; the
deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the lamp post; and the
positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. 62
This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only forti ed petitioners'
admission that they did discharge their rearms, but also provided a predicate to its
conclusion that petitioners conspired with one another to achieve a common purpose,
design and objective to harm the unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no
conclusive proof of who among the several accused had actually red the gunshots that
injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the Sandiganbayan imposed collective
responsibility on all those who were shown to have discharged their rearms that night —
petitioners herein. 63 Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by which the accused
collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously with the
shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge
against the employees of San Miguel Corporation; 64 and that on the basis of the self-
serving evidence adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-
up of the incident by Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as
by the NAPOLCOM. 65 It likewise found very consequential the fact that the other accused
had chosen not to take the witness stand; this, supposedly because it was incumbent
upon them to individually explain their participation in the shooting in view of the weight of
the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying circumstance of lawful
performance of of cial duty and the declaration of some of them in their af davits to the
effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Naron's residence from
which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself. 66 EICDSA
As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because rst, it was supposedly not
shown how the aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and
fatally injuring Licup began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be
supported by proof of a deliberate and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and
cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from circumstances immediately preceding
the aggression. The same nding holds true for evident premeditation because between
the time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance from Pamintuan through David
and the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to be no suf cient
time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance. 67
Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testi ed that his injury required leave from work for
60 days which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits; 68 that he was
earning P8,350.00 monthly; 69 and that he had spent P35,000.00 for the repair of his
Tamaraw jeepney. 70 Also, Teodoro Licup had stated that his family had spent P18,000.00
for the funeral of his son, P28,000.00 during the wake, P11,000.00 for the funeral plot and
P20,000.00 in attorney's fees for the prosecution of these cases. 71 He also submitted a
certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of his deceased son. 72 On
these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify (a)
Villanueva P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and P120,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of
deceased Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P600,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.
In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan's nding of conspiracy and
labels the same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly
established that he had by positive acts intended to participate in any criminal object in
common with the other accused, and that his participation in a supposed common
criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. He believes the nding is
belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only after the shooting incident
when the wounded passengers were taken to the hospital on his jeepney. 73 He also points
out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayan's declaration that the incident could not have
been the product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of either a
hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay of cials involved or an
amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the
latter alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide
but rather of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. 74 He
laments that, assuming arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused by
his warning shots, he must nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the
scene of the incident as a bona fide member of the police force and, hence, his presence at
the scene of the incident was in line with the ful llment of his duty as he was in fact in the
lawful performance thereof — a fact which has been af rmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc
when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross misconduct against him, Cunanan
and Puno. 75 He also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and attributes to Pamintuan
the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had entertained the
belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements. 76 IcDESA
In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the
Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed
decision was based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial
but erroneously attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in
the case: one, the police of cers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the
barangay of cials and CHDFs comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who
had waived the presentation of evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-
a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay of cials
and had waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this
regard that all accused barangay of cials and CHDFs did not participate in the
presentation of the evidence by the accused police of cers and, hence, the nding that
they too had red upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an established fact. 77
Also, they believe that the ndings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on
inadmissible evidence, speci cally on evidence rejected by the court itself and those
presented in a separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural
and suspicious and, hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal
prosecution. 78 Finally, they lament that the nding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence
and that the prosecution has not even shown that they were with the other accused at the
scene of the incident or that they were among those who red at the victims, and neither
were they identified as among the perpetrators of the crime. 79
In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the nding of conspiracy. They
claim that judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether
the incident was the result of a legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by
the accused to obtain commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. This, because they believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are
concerned, shown that they had ever been part of such malicious design to commit an
ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed decision. They advance that as police
of cers, they merely followed orders from their commander, Yapyuco, but were not privy
to the conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments before the shooting.
They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal design with
the rest of the accused. 80 They af rm Yapyuco's statement that they red warning shots
at the subject jeepney, 81 but only after it had passed the place where they were posted
and only after it failed to stop when agged down as it then became apparent that it was
going to speed away — as supposedly shown by bullet holes on the chassis and not on the
rear portion of the jeepney. They also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that
would have otherwise urged them to commit the crimes charged, especially since none of
the victims had been personally or even remotely known to either of them. That they were
not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact that they did not directly
aim their ri es at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they immediately held
their re when Flores identi ed themselves as employees of San Miguel Corporation. They
conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily red at the victims
directly. 82 CIcTAE
Commenting on these petitions, the Of ce of the Special Prosecutor stands by the nding
of conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had
assembled themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously
known that it would be coming from Salangsang's residence. It posits that the manner by
which the jeepney was red upon demonstrates a community of purpose and design to
commit the crimes charged. 83 It believes that criminal intent is discernible from the posts
the accused had chosen to take on the road that would give them a direct line of re at the
target — as shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the Tamaraw jeepney. 84 This
intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of gun re, both Flores and Licup were
wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence. 85 It refutes the invocation of
lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the
belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have
not shown that they had previously veri ed the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But
while it recognizes that the accused had merely responded to the call of duty when
summoned by Pamintuan through David, it is convinced that they had exceeded the
performance thereof when they red upon the Tamaraw jeepney occupied, as it turned out,
by innocent individuals instead. 86
As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence
adduced before the Sandiganbayan as well the ndings based thereon should not be
binding on them, the OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David,
Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as
directed later on submitted the case for decision as to them with the ling of their
memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due process to said petitioners in view of
their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the motion for bail at the trial
proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation of their own
evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly tried
and testi es in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter
has failed to register his objection thereto. 87
The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to
rest on loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that
evidence nonetheless exists to support the penultimate nding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. EcAISC
I.
It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of
the incident on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony —
which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno — as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes in their af davits which had been offered in evidence by the prosecution, 88
explained that their presence at the scene was in response to the information relayed by
Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on board a vehicle described to be
that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay Quebiawan. It is on the
basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justi cation under Article 11 (5) of
the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit that it
was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it
became apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to ee, yet contention arises as
to whether or not there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who
among them had discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and
injured Villanueva.
The rst duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal. 89
To this end, the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit 90
of Andres Reyes and Manguerra; the counter-af davit 91 of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-
affidavit 92 of Cunanan and Puno; the counter-affidavit 93 of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-
af davit 94 of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno executed immediately after the incident in
question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that "[their] team was forced to re at
the said vehicle" when it accelerated after warning shots were red in air and when it
ignored Yapyuco's signal for it to stop; 95 in their earlier af davit they, together with
Yapyuco, declared that they were "constrained . . . to re directly to (sic) the said eeing
vehicle." 96 Yapyuco's open court declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is
that he twice discharged his rearm: rst, to give warning to the subject jeepney after it
allegedly failed to stop when agged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came
clear that it was trying to escape. 97 He suggested — substantiating the implication in his
affidavit that it was "the whole team [which fired] at the fleeing vehicle" 98 — that the bullets
which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs
posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes
admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect vehicle. 99 IcHTCS
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their af davits, declared that it was only
Manguerra from their group who discharged a rearm but only into the air to give warning
shots, 100 and that it was the "policemen [who] directly red upon" the jeepney. 101
Manguerra himself shared this statement. 1 0 2 Yet these accounts do not sit well with the
physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger door of the jeepney which
Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from bullets sprayed
from perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyuco's claim
that he, Cunanan and Puno did re directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and
had already moved past them such that the line of re to the passengers thereof would be
at an oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously,
gunshots came bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and
Puno had taken post, and when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Naron's
house sitting on the right side of the road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario
Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such that the line of re would be direct and
perpendicular to it. 103
While Dabor's ballistics ndings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who
among the accused actually discharged their rearms that night, her report pertaining to
the examination of the ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney af rms the irreducible fact that the
CHDFs posted within the yard of Naron's house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said
vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing
that such nding cannot be applied to them as it is evidence adduced in a separate trial.
But as the OSP noted, they may not evade the effect of their having withdrawn their motion
for separate trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the binding effect on
them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco. 104
Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or
admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during
the trial and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter,
the admission is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a
judicial admission. 105 It is thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of
Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter's testimony implicating them in the
incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when, in fact, they
could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses
charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this
regard, as they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the
truthfulness in their af davits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of
their co-accused. DIETcH
II.
The availability of the justifying circumstance of ful llment of duty or lawful exercise of a
right or of ce under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the
accused acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or of ce,
and (b) the injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the
due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or of ce. 1 0 6 The
justi cation is based on the complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the
accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent
or with fault or negligence. 107 Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an
acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense
charged for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or
offense is a necessary consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful
exercise of his right or of ce. Thus, it must be shown that the acts of the accused relative
to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts
on him to prove such hypothesis.
We nd that the requisites for justi cation under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code
do not obtain in this case.
The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them
— who were either police and barangay of cers or CHDF members tasked with the
maintenance of peace and order — were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a
suspected rebel in ltration in the locality. Theirs, therefore, is the speci c duty to identify
the occupants of their suspect vehicle and search for rearms inside it to validate the
information they had received; they may even effect a bloodless arrest should they nd
cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were committing or were bound
to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a continuing offense, it
is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were acting under an
of cial order to open re at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances. Even
more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as
would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such de ance of
authority that would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a
violent attack with their rearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was
presented at the trial to show that the accused were placed in real mortal danger in the
presence of the victims, except maybe their bare suspicion that the suspects were armed
and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.
But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether
or not they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they
do not stand as accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they
were as the accused believed them to be, the actuations of these responding law
enforcers must inevitably be ranged against reasonable expectations that arise in the
legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The rules of engagement, of which
every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which he must always
exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or re his
weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should
be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police
work requires nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the
completion of the process pertains to other government officers or agencies. 108 ACcaET
A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justi ed in using such force as is reasonably
necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape,
recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. 109 United States v.
Campo 110 has laid down the rule that in the performance of his duty, an agent of the
authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked or
is the subject of resistance, and nds no other means to comply with his duty or cause
himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or death results from
the exercise of such force, the same could be justi ed in in icting the injury or causing the
death of the offender if the of cer had used necessary force. 1 1 1 He is, however, never
justi ed in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in
resorting to dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. 112 People v.
Ulep 113 teaches that —
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort,
and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken
without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police of cers with authority to
arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true that police of cers sometimes
nd themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an immediate
and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the
judgment and discretion of police of cers in the performance of their duties must
be exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In
the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they must act in
conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within the spirit and
purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement
of cers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they
are apprehending. They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing
with criminal elements against whom society must be protected, these criminals
are also human beings with human rights. 114
Thus, in People v. Tabag , 115 where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four members
of a family in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the
accused sought exoneration by invoking among others the justifying circumstance in
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding
them liable for murder said, thus:
In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11
of the Revised Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means
be considered as done in the ful llment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an
of ce or in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.
Other than "suspicion," there is no evidence that Welbino Magdasal, Sr.,
his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And
even if they were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process
of law . On that fateful night, they were peacefully resting in their humble home
expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly, therefore, nothing
justi ed the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The
massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution. 116
Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their re directly at the jeepney by claiming that
it failed to heed the rst round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and
instead tried to ee. While it is possible that the jeepney had been agged down but
because it was pacing the dark road with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners' signal
to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact that the passengers thereof were drunk
from the party they had just been to, 117 still, we nd incomprehensible petitioners' quick
resolve to use their rearms when in fact there was at least one other vehicle at the scene
— the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco — which they could actually have used to pursue
their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.
Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justi es the
use of force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We nd,
however, that petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful
rearms does not necessarily connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not
seem to have been confronted with the rational necessity to open re at the moving
jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is offered why they, in that instant, were
inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps their over-anxiety or
impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they exceeded
the ful llment of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby in icting
Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the
passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb — all of which could not have
been the necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties. aSEDHC
III.
At this juncture, we nd that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain
failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact
which, if true, would have justi ed the act or omission which is the subject of the
prosecution. 118 Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime
where it negates the intent component of the crime. 119 It may be a defense even if the
offense charged requires proof of only general intent. 120 The inquiry is into the mistaken
belief of the defendant, 1 2 1 and it does not look at all to the belief or state of mind of any
other person. 122 A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be
honest and reasonable; 123 (b) that it be a matter of fact; 124 and (c) that it negate the
culpability required to commit the crime 125 or the existence of the mental state which the
statute prescribes with respect to an element of the offense. 126
The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States
v. Ah Chong , 127 but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense
where the physical circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an
aggression which it was his instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements,
was woken by the sound of his bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no
response from the intruder after having demanded identi cation, believed that a robber
had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but at that moment he was struck by a
chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that he was under attack,
seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his roommate.
Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding
that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:
. . . The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of
fact is, in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").
SAcaDE
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such
mistake of fact as shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of
evil in the mind necessarily relieves the actor from criminal liability, provided
always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid down by Baron
Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they
appear to him." . . .
If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe
the existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in
accord with the principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or
carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally guiltless of homicide;
though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is
unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of
self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of
reason, and suf ciently sustained in adjudication , that notwithstanding
some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-
defense, he is justi ed in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If,
without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts
to be, the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise,
and he has really no occasion for the extreme measure . . . . 128
Besides, as held in People v. Oanis 129 and Baxinela v. People, 130 the justification of an act,
which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or
bad faith on the part of the accused. 131 Thus, Ah Chong further explained that —
The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be
held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an
act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or
assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and
we hold that under such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided
always that the alleged ignorance or mistake of fact was not due to negligence or
bad faith. 132 ECSHID
IV.
This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has
been established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the
prosecution is bound by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the evidence of the accused. The weakness of the defense of the accused does
not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
1 3 3 By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an investigation of the whole
proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy upon the certainty
of guilt. 134 The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of
the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 135
The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by
direct evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. 136 Corpus delicti consists
of two things: rst, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of
the act. 1 3 7 In homicide (by dolo) as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove:
(a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the
criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural
cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way
criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words, proof of
homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may
consist in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the
time or immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate
act of the malefactors, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. 138 In such case, even if
there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because with respect to crimes of personal
violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act
and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. 139 Evidence of
intent to kill is crucial only to a nding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as the same
is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree
of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses. 140 aCTADI
The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is

interesting that, in negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the
occupants of the jeepney, petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture
depicted in the defense evidence is certainly an ugly one: petitioners' af davits as well as
Yapyuco's testimony are replete with suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who
harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was he who their (petitioners') minds
that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the identity of the
suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that
Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that
the San Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated
by NPA members. He also af rmed Yapyuco's claim that there had been a number of
ambuscades launched against members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the
neighboring areas supposedly by NPA members at around the time of the incident. But as
the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate that Pamintuan had died during the
pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in court emerged. 141
Yet whether such claims suf ce to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and
materiality. Motive is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a
crime. It gains signi cance when the commission of a crime is established by evidence
purely circumstantial or otherwise inconclusive. 142 The question of motive is important in
cases where there is doubt as to whether the defendant is or is not the person who
committed the act, but when there is no doubt that the defendant was the one who caused
the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the reason for the deed. 143
In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to
kill anyone of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service rearms; and the
manner by which the bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no
other conclusion than that the shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of
re. We do not doubt that instances abound where the discharge of a rearm at another is
not in itself suf cient to sustain a nding of intention to kill, and that there are instances
where the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that the discharge was not in
fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in ascertaining the intention with which a
speci c act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act
itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the evidence. 1 4 4 TcAECH

The rearms used by petitioners were either M16 ri e, .30 caliber garand ri e and .30
caliber carbine. 145 While the use of these weapons does not always amount to
unnecessary force, they are nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets
were red and hit the jeepney, it is not dif cult to imagine the possibility of the passengers
thereof being hit and even killed. It must be stressed that the subject jeepney was red
upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it is not as much too dif cult to aim
and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its passengers would be
exposed even assuming that the gun re was aimed at the tires — especially considering
that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in
encounters with lawless elements in the streets.
Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the rearms
employed, the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver — and in fact even the driver
himself — of being hit and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be
precise. This, we nd to be consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the
impulse to re directly at the jeepney came when it occurred to them that it was
proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this, their natural and logical
impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by ring upon the tires thereof, or to debilitate the
driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney suggests
that petitioners' actuations leaned towards the latter.
This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was
seated on the passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together
with all the consequences arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting
breed no other inference than that the ring was deliberate and not attributable to sheer
accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v. State 146 tells that:
This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural
consequences of his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men
generally act deliberately and by the determination of their own will,
and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that every
man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one
man is found to have killed another, if the circumstances of the
homicide do not of themselves show that it was not intended, but was
accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed
by the slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was
otherwise .
V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate
intent of killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyuco's alternative claim in G.R.
No. 120744 that he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide. Here is why: IADaSE
First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing
being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another
should be unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice. 147
People v. Guillen 148 and People v. Nanquil 149 declare that a deliberate intent to do an
unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People
v. Castillo , 150 we held that that there can be no frustrated homicide through reckless
negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of intent to kill, and without intent
to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.
Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan, likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more
persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven
by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and
after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose
and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so
that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other were, in fact,
connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a
concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found, continues until the object of it has been
accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold an accused guilty as a co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in the
transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 151 DEIHAa
Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence. From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission
of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. 1 5 2 The
instant case requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners that they
were really bent on a violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude
that conspiracy arose from the moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter,
had converged and strategically posted themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan,
we nevertheless nd that petitioners had been ignited by the common impulse not to let
their suspect jeepney ee and evade their authority when it suddenly occurred to them that
the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated despite the signal for it
to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were confronted with
the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the jeepney's
supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that such was their
common purpose. And by their concerted action of almost simultaneously opening re at
the jeepney from the posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment
of the suspects, conveniently affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve
their object as shown by the concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the
jeepney at angular and perpendicular trajectories. Indeed, there is no de nitive proof that
tells which of all the accused had discharged their weapons that night and which directly
caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, yet we adopt the
Sandiganbayan's conclusion that since only herein petitioners were shown to have been in
possession of their service rearms that night and had red the same, they should be held
collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement operation
which had gone terribly wrong. 153
VI.
The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes
of homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with
the other accused, of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed
victims. 154 The allegation of evident premeditation has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent with the fact that the urge to kill had
materialized in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as they perceived their
suspects to be attempting ight and evading arrest. The same is true with treachery,
inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was
consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners. caSDCA
Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal
whereas an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty
lower by two degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide.
Petitioners in these cases are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance proved and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan has properly xed in Criminal Case No.
16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one (1) day, but should have
denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal.
However, upon the nding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed
attempted homicide, a modi cation of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted
homicide is two (2) degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide, which is prision
correccional. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence to be meted out on petitioners is within the
minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6) months and one (1) day to two (2)
years and four (4) months of prision correccional, whereas the minimum of the sentence,
which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months of arresto mayor.
We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 in
moral damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay,
jointly and severally, the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and
P20,000.00 as moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there
being no aggravating circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.
WHEREFORE , the instant petitions are DENIED . The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 30, 1995, are hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS :
(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614,
the indeterminate sentence is hereby modi ed to Two (2) years and four (4) months of
prision correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the
minimum. cCAaHD
(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of P77,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 in moral
damages, as well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of P51,700.00 as actual and
compensatory damages, and P20,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED .
Bersamin, ** Abad, Villarama, Jr. *** and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
*Per Special Order No. 1228 dated June 6, 2012.
**Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per Special
Order No. 1241 dated June 14, 2012.
***Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., per Special
Order No. 1229 dated June 6, 2012.
1.Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal (Chairman), with Associate Justices Minita
V. Chico-Nazario and Roberto M. Lagman, concurring; rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), pp. 7-
80.
2.Now known as the Philippine National Police.
3.Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-2.

5.Records, Vol. 6, pp. 1-2
6.Records, Vol. 1, p. 46.

7.Accordingly, the charges against him were dismissed. See April 30, 1991 Order, id. at 108.
TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 3-5.
8.April 30, 1991 Order, records, vol. 1, pp. 107-108; TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 12-14. See also
records, vol. 1, pp. 191-197.
10.Id. at 307.
12.Resolution dated May 10, 1991, records, vol. 1, pp. 198-205.
13.Id. at 205.
14.Id. at 300-308.
15.See certificate of Death, records, Vol. II, p. 707; see also Manifestation dated December 11,
1992, id. at 703-704.
16.Records, Vol. 1, p. 388.
17.TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 27-30, 32-34, 37-40, 42-50, 52-53; TSN, July 5, 1991, pp. 20-22.
18.Id.; Id.; TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 25-26.
19.Exhibits "L," "L-1" to "L-5."
20.TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 6-13, 15-17-19, 22-25, 26-29, 45-46, 52-53; TSN, July 5, 1991, pp. 38-
46; 48-49.
21.TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 27-30, 32-34, 37-40, 42-50, 52-53; TSN, July 5, 1991, pp. 20-22.
22.TSN, May 2, 1991, pp. 25-26.
23.Id. at 31-32, 44-45, 51.

24.Id. at 37 and 55.
25.Id. at 16.
26.Id. at 57-59.
27.TSN, July 23, 1991, pp. 38-41; TSN, May 3, 1991, pp. 4-10, 18, 27, 29.
28.Id. at 17-20, 24-26, 41-47; id. at 10-14, 18-23.

29.TSN, May 3, 1991, pp. 14-15.
30.TSN, July 24, 1991, pp. 38-40, 47-55; TSN, November 26, 1991, pp. 4-8, 10-14, 19-20. See
Technical Report No. PI-032-88, Exhibit "J."
31.TSN, April 30, 1991, pp. 17-19. See Memorandum Receipts, Exhibits D, E, F, G, H.
32.TSN, October 22, 1991, pp. 7, 10-11, 13-20, 42-43, 49-50. Dr. Pedro Solis appears to have
authored a book on Legal Medicine in 1964. See Medico-legal Report dated April 6, 1988,
Exhibit I.
33.TSN, October 22, 1991, pp. 21-23, 26-28, 30-34, 37-42, 50-53.
34.Id. at 44-48.
35.TSN, October 7, 1991, pp. 12, 14-15.
36.TSN, October 25, 1991, pp. 17-44.

37.TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 5-12; TSN, November 8, 1993, p. 10.
38.Memorandum of Cunanan and Puno filed with the Sandiganbayan, rollo (G.R. No. 122776),
p. 126.
39.TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 13-15, 18-21; TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 3, 5, 12, 23-25, 31.
See also Joint Counter Affidavit of Cunanan and Puno, dated July 20, 1988, in which
they stated that their "team was forced to fire at the said vehicle" when it did not heed
the supposed warning shots, Exhibit "A." In their earlier Joint Affidavit dated April 5,
1988, Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno stated that after firing warning shots in the air, the
subject jeepney accelerated its speed which "constrained (them) to fire directly to (sic)
the said fleeing vehicle, Exhibit "O."
40.TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 22-23; TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 6-7, 10-11, 21-23.
41.Id. at 23-25; Id. at 4.

42.TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 12, 15-16.
43.Id. at 6-7.
44.TSN, September 15, 1993, p. 23; TSN, November 8, 1993, pp. 7-8, 10-11, 20.
45.TSN, November 8, 1993, p. 5.
46.Id. at 8-9.
47.Id. at 21-23.
48.TSN, September 15, 1993, pp. 26-29.
49.TSN, November 22, 1993, pp. 26-36, 40-43, 46-47.
50.See Order dated April 6, 1994, records, Vol. II, p. 955.
51.See Manifestation and Motion dated May 6, 1993, id. at 759-761, and Resolution dated June
1, 1993, id. at 763-764.
52.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), p. 55.
53.Id. at 77-79.
54.Id. at 56-57.
55.Id. at 64-66.
56.Id. at 69-70.
57.Id. at 64-65.
58.Id. at 61.
59.Id. at 58.
60.Id. at 60-61.
61.Id. at 60-63.
62.Id. at 73-74.
63.Id. at 74-75.
64.Id. at 64-65.
65.Id. at 69.
66.Id. at 68-69.
67.Id. at 71-73.
68.Exhibit "X."
69.TSN, July 5, 1991, pp. 7-9, 27.
70.Id. at 11-12, 17.
71.TSN, January 9, 1991, pp. 4-12.

72.Exhibit "FF."
73.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), p. 96.
74.Id. at 93-95.
75.Id. at 108.
76.Id. at 103.
77.Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 57-65.

78.Id. at 75-81.
79.Id. at 82-89.
80.Rollo (G.R. No. 122776), pp. 101-103.

81.Id.
82.Id. at 104-106.
83.Id. at 223-225.
84.Id. at 226-227.
85.Id. at 227-228.
86.Id. at 228-230.
87.Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 230-232.

88.See note 50 and Exhibits "A," "B," "C," "N" and "O."
89.People v. Esmale, G.R. Nos. 102981-82, April 21, 1995, 243 SCRA 578, 592.
90.Co-executed by deceased Pabalan, dated September 28, 1988, Exhibit "N."
91.Dated September 28, 1988, Exhibit "C."

92.Dated July 20, 1988, Exhibit "A."
93.Dated July 20, 1988, Exhibit "B."
94.Dated April 5, 1988, Exhibit "O."

95.Exhibits "A-1," "O," "B" and "B-1."
96.Exhibit "O."
97.See notes 38 and 39.

98.Exhibit "B-1."
99.See notes 38 and 39. See also Exhibits "B" and "C."
100.Exhibit "C."
101.Exhibit "N."
102.Id.
103.See notes 30, 38 and 39. Refer also to the sketch of Yapyuco and Flores depicting the
relative location of the Tamaraw jeepney at the scene of the incident.
104.Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 230-232.

105.People v. Panida, G.R. Nos. 127125 and 138952, July 6, 1999, 310 SCRA 66; People v.
Buntag, 471 Phil. 82, 95 (2004).
106.See People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257, 262-263 (1943); People v. Pajenado, G.R. No. L-26458,
January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 172, 177; Baxinela v. People, 520 Phil. 202, 214-215; People
v. Belbes, 389 Phil. 500, 508-509 (2000); People v. Ulep, G.R. No. 132547, September 20,
2000, 340 SCRA 688, 699; Cabanlig v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148431, July 28, 2005,
464 SCRA 324, 333.
107.People v. Fallorina, G.R. No. 137347, March 4, 2004, 424 SCRA 655, 665, applying Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code.
108.People v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 116200-02, June 21, 2001, 359 SCRA 283, 297-298.
109.People v. Oanis, supra note 106, at 262.
110.10 Phil. 97, 99-100 (1908).
111.United States v. Mojica, 42 Phil. 784, 787 (1922).

113.Supra note 106.
114.People v. Ulep, supra note 106, at 700.
115.335 Phil. 579 (1997).

116.Id. at 597. (Emphasis has been supplied.)
117.See note 17.
118.21 Am Jur 2d, $152, p. 232, citing Turner v. State, 210 Ga. App. 303, 436 S.E.2d 229.
119.Id., citing U.S. v. Vasarajs, 908 F.2d 443 and People v. Nash, 282 Ill. App. 3d 982, 218 Ill.
Dec. 410, 669 N.E.2d 353.
120.Id., citing Com. v. Simcock, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 184, 575 N.E.2d 1137.
121.Id., citing Johnson v. State, 734 S.W.2d 199.
122.Id.
123.Id. at 233, citing U.S. v. Buchannan, 115 F.3d 445; People v. Reed, 53 Cal. App. 4th 389.
Generally, ignorance or mistake of fact constitutes a defense to a criminal charge only if
it is not superinduced by fault or negligence of party doing the charged act. (Crawford v.
State, 267 Ga. 543, 480 S.E.2d 573). For a mistake of fact to negate a mental state
required to establish a criminal offense, the mistake must be reasonable, and the act, to
be justified, must be taken under a bona fide mistaken belief (Cheser v. Com., 904
S.W.2d 239).
124.Id. at 233, citing Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127. If a mistake arises not from ignorance of
law, but from ignorance of an independently determined legal status or condition that is
one of the operative facts of a crime, such a mistake is one of fact (U.S. v. Lopez-Lima,
738 F.Supp. 1404).
125.Id. at 233, citing Potter v. State, 684 N.E.2d 1127; Miller v. State, 815S.W.2d 582.
126.Id. at 233, citing Jones v. State, 263 Ga. 835, 439 S.E.2d 645.
127.15 Phil. 488 (1910).

128.Id. at 500-501. (Emphasis supplied.)
129.Supra note 106.
130.Supra note 106.

131.People v. Oanis, supra note 106, at 264; Baxinela v. People, supra note 106, at 215.
132.United States v. Ah Chong, supra note 127, at 493.
133.People v. Crispin, G.R. No. 128360, March 2, 2000, 327 SCRA 167, 179; People v. Calica,
G.R. No. 139178, April 14, 2004, 427 SCRA 336, 362.

134.People v. Dramayo, G.R. No. L-21325, October 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 59, 64; People v. Calica,
supra, at 347.
135.People v. Gamer, G.R. No. 115984, February 29, 2000, 326 SCRA 660, 674.
136.People v. Delim, G.R. No. 142773, January 28, 2003, 396 SCRA 386, 400, citing People v.
Fulinara, G.R. No. 88326, August 3, 1995, 247 SCRA 28.
137.Gay v. State, 60 Southwestern Reporter, 771 (1901).
138.People v. Delim, supra note 136, at 400.
139.United States v. Gloria, 3 Phil. 333 (1903-1904).
140.Mondragon v. People, G.R. No. L-17666, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 476, 480-481; See also
Reyes, Luis B., Revised Penal Code, Book II, 15th ed (2001), p. 470.
141.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), pp. 67-68.
142.See Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan, 495 Phil. 718, 745 (2005), citing People v. Flores, 389
Phil. 532 (2000).
143.People v. Ramirez, 104 Phil. 720, 726 (1958).

144.United States v. Montenegro, 15 Phil. 1, 6 (1910).
145.Exhibits "U," "U-0," "U-1," "U-2," "W," "W-1" and "W-2."
146.97 Northwestern Reporter, 210 (1903). (Emphasis supplied.)

148.47 O.G. 3433, 3440.
149.43 Phil. 232 (1922).
150.42 O.G. 1914, 1921.

151.People v. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 454, 473.
152.U.S. v. Ancheta, 1 Phil. 165 (1901-1903); U.S. v. Santos, 2 Phil. 453, 456 (1903); People v.
Mandagay and Taquiawan, 46 Phil. 838, 840 (1923); People v. Agbuya, 57 Phil. 238, 242
(1932); People v. Ibañez, 77 Phil. 664; People v. Macabuhay , 46 O.G. 5469; People v. San
Luis, 86 Phil. 485, 497 (1950); People v. Dima Binasing, 98 Phil. 902, 908 (1956).
153.Rollo (G.R. Nos. 120744-46), p. 75, citing People v. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17,
1975, 62 SCRA 17 and People v. Tamani, G.R. Nos. L-22160 and L-22161, January 21,
1974, 55 SCRA 153.
154.Namely, Eduardo Flores, Raul Panlican, Alejandro De Vera and Restituto Calma.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988.]
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN ,
petitioners, vs. AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-
BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ,
respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioner.

De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1.CIVIL LAW; CUSTOM, DEFINED. — Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name
"Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 3, 12].
2.ID.; ID.; MUST BE PROVED ACCORDING TO THE RULES ON EVIDENCE. — The law
requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence"
[Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom
as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil.
390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a
foreign custom.
3.ID.; FOREIGN MARRIAGE; HOW PROVED. — To establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact;
and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,
43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922)].
4.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF WRITTEN FOREIGN LAW; TESTIMONY OF
COMPETENT WITNESS, INCLUDED. — In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in
the Rules of Court. Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under
Rule 132 Section 25. The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence
like the testimony of a witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel
Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE CONTRACTED PURSUANT TO A FOREIGN LAW MUST BE PROVED
TO BE RECOGNIZED; CASE AT BAR. — Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese
law on marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours . . . [Wong Woo Yiu v.
Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her
testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See
Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated it therefore
follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction
[Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
6.ID.; PHILIPPINE COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS. —
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
7.ID.; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF WRITTEN FOREIGN LAW; RULING IN MEMORACION CASE,
NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The Memoracion case however is not applicable to
the case at bar as said case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was
whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of
marriage in a complaint for adultery.
8.CIVIL LAW; PERSONS; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH
CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF CHINA; EFFECT ON STATUS
OF CHILDREN. — Failure to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the
laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of
acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the
time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOGNITION OF NATURAL CHILDREN; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE
NATURAL CHILD BENEFITS HER SISTERS AND BROTHERS OF THE FULL BLOOD. — The
acknowledgment of Sze Sook Wah extends to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her
sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code].
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR NATURAL CHILDREN
AND PROVIDING FOR THEIR SUPPORT CONSTITUTES A STATEMENT BEFORE A COURT
OF RECORD. — Compromise agreement entered into by their parents acknowledging their
five (5) natural children and providing for their support approved by the Court of First
Instance constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be
voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code].
11.REMEDIAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129; FUNCTIONS AND JURISDICTION OF
THE JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, VESTED NOW WITH THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT. — With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were
abolished. Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts
[See Section 19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Bellosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August
12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360]
12.ID.; ACTIONS; ISSUE ON PATERNITY AND FILIATION MAY BE PASSED UPON IN A
TESTATE OR INTESTATE PROCEEDING; REASON. — A case involving paternity and
acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding
(See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision
presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not
been terminated. The reason for this rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting
rulings on the same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52,
63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits.
DECISION

CORTES , J : p
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth
P300,000.00 more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case
No. C-699 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said
petition they alleged among others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with
Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy
Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate
Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who
alleged that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931
in China; (b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee;
and, (c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to
become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p.
107.]
After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:
(1)Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-
64;]
(2)Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chum Yen are the legitimate children of
Yao Kee with Sy Kiat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3)Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI
decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64-65.]
held in favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo,
pp. 106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED
and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:
(1)Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and

Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion
Gillego, an unmarried woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without
benefit of marriage for many years:
(2)Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao
Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to
Yao Kee in China had not been proven to be valid to the laws of the Chinese
People's Republic of China (sic);
(3)Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of

Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor
and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and accordingly, said property should be
excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy Kiat; and
(4)Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36-
37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however
denied by respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled
"Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao
Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of
the dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court however
resolved to deny the petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982
entry of judgment was made in G.R. No. 56045. *
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the
Supreme Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution
dated September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this
petition.
Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:
I.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE
MARRIAGE OF SY KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-

GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS
NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo,
p. 6.]
I.Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law
and custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following
testimonial and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during
that time was for elders to agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her
case, her elder brother was the one who contracted or entered into [an] agreement
with the parents of her husband; that the agreement was that she and Sy Kiat
would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent out; that
the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but
two of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and
Sze Chun Yen, the eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that
Sze Sook Wah was born on November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Kiat,
have been living in Fookien, China before he went to the Philippines on several
occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage was a written
document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of
the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a
go-between, a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would
talk to the parents of the bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to
have the groom-to-be their son-in-law, then they agree on a date as an
engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of the groom would bring
some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one month after
that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to
Sy Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom
brings with him a couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day,
the parents of the bride would give the dowry for her daughter and then the
document would be signed by the parties but there is no solemnizing officer as is
known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document is signed
only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that
the parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be
placed in a carriage where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom
and before departure the bride would be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon
reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom takes away the veil; that
during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom), there were
many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old
ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy
Kiat; that during her wedding, Sy Chiok, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the
document with her mother; that as to the whereabouts of that document, she and
Sy Kiat were married for 46 years already and the document was left in China and
she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it was left in the
possession of Sy Kiat's family; that right now, she does not know the
whereabouts of that document because of the lapse of many years and because
they left it in a certain place and it was already eaten by the termites; that after her
wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived immediately together as husband and wife, and
from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat went to the Philippines sometime in
March or April in the same year they were married; that she went to the Philippines
in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the Philippines
and lived with Sy Kiat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy
Kiat during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-
15; Rollo, pp. 50-52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was
among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the
parents or elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to
the effect that (a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b)
Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to
Chinese custom [CFI decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3,
1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital status — Married"; "If married give
name of spouse — Yao Kee"; "Address — China"; "Date of marriage — 1931"; and "Place of
marriage — China" [Exhibit "SS-1".]
Fifth, Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where
the following entries are likewise found: "Civil status — Married"; and, "If married, state
name and address of spouse — Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4".]

And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the
People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at the
Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were
married on January 19, 1931 in Fukien, the People's Republic of China" [Exhibit "5".]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance
with Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [ In the Matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes", July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law,
Fourth Ed. Vol. 1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had
occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a
court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like
any other fact" [ Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one
of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states that:
Art. 71.All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied.) **
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign
marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a
question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [ Adong v.
Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an
unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45.Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is
admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also
printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign
country, if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25,
thus:
SEC. 25.Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein,
when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with
a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is
kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [ Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher, 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61
Phil. 471 (1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law
and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be
considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-
serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to
testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and
consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the
marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals' ruling they are not duty bound to
prove the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court
in the case of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that
Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and
proved as any other fact [ Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915);
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually
exchanged by the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to
be considered duly solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the
Court is uniformly corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was
left to be decided was the issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with
Chinese law was duly proven [ Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial
notice of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not
shown any proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng
marriage was celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to
Yao Kee took place in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the
Memoracion case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent
evidence to show the fact of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not
concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a
spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours *** [ Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March
31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no
solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her
alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore
follows that her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction
[ Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
II.The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners' filiation:
(1)Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered:
"Children if any: give number of children — Four"; and, "Name — All living in China"
[Exhibit "SS-1";]
(2)the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children
with Sy Kiat, only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah Sze Lai Chu and
Sze Chin Yan [TSN, December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3)an affidavit executed on March 22, 1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah's application for a
marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit
"3".]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has
three daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom — Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho — she
knows, and one adopted son [TSN, December 6, 1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according
to the laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only
that of acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at
the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the
deceased because of Sy Kiat's recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3"] and its extension
to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil
Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural
children with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years
without the benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment,
evidenced by a compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and
approved by the Court of First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only
acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for
their support and future inheritance, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
2.The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and
that out of such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and
finally terminate effective immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy,
born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on
January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on December 14, 1956; and
Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3.With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY . . ., the
parties mutually agree and covenant that —
(a)The stocks and merchandise and the furniture and equipments . .
., shall be divided into two equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat
who shall own one-half of the total and the other half to Asuncion Gillego
who shall transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b)the business name and premises . . . shall be retained by Sy Kiat.
However, it shall be his obligation to give to the aforenamed children an
amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000;00) monthly out of the rental of
the two doors of the same building now occupied by Everett Construction.
xxx xxx xxx
(5)With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the common-law
husband-and-wife relationship between the parties, of the real estates and
properties registered and/or appearing in the name of Asuncion Gillego . . ., the
parties mutually agree and covenant that the said real estates and properties
shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy, Manuel Sy,
Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during
her lifetime. . . . [Exhibit "D".] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a

child may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee
and the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled
"An Act Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of
Caloocan"; with regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
SEC. 91-A.Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court. —
xxx xxx xxx

The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases;
xxx xxx xxx
(2)Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption,
paternity and acknowledgment;
(3)Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations legal separation of
spouses, and actions for support;
(4)Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters
one to three of the civil code;
xxx xxx xxx
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished.
Their functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section
19 (7), B.P. Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Bellosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143
SCRA 356, 360] hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction
raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No.
5502 sec. 91-A last paragraph that:
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in
any case pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the
main case.
xxx xxx xxx
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA
307]:
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 **** a
case involving paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in
the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July
13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration
proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated. [at pp. 313-314.]
(Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for this rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of con icting rulings on the
same issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court" [ Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano , G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but
more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits.
Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C .J ., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ ., concur.
Footnotes
*The petition for review in G.R. No. 56045 was denied for lack of merit on March 9, 1981.
Counsel for the petitioners then filed a Motion for Consolidation and for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration which was granted on July 8, 1981. On February
17, 1982, however, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the resolution of March 9,
1981 was denied.
**Other than the exceptions contained in this article, this provision of law is derived from
Section 19, Act No. 3613 and Section IV, General Order No. 68.
***The presumption that, in the absence of proof, the foreign law is the same as the law of the
forum, is known as processual presumption which has been applied by this Court in the
cases of Lim v. The Insular Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472 (1917); International
Harvester Co. in Russia v. Hamburg-American Line, 42 Phil. 845 (1918); Miciano v.
Brimo, 50 Phil. 867 (1924); and Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L-18176, October 26,
1966, 18 SCRA 450.
****Rep. Act 4834 created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. Section 1 of said
Act is the exact copy of section 19-A of Rep. Act 5502.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997.]
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father

and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR.,
and EVELINA E. SALVACION , petitioners, vs . CENTRAL BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI
y NORTHCOTT , respondents.
Erlinda S. Carolino for petitioners.

Del Rosario Lim Devera Vigilia & Panganiban for China Banking Corporation.
SYNOPSIS
Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12
years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg detained Karen for four days and
raped her several times. After policemen and people living nearby rescued Karen, Greg was
arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. A case for Serious Illegal Detention and
four counts of rape charges were filed against Greg Bartelli. A Civil Case for damages with
preliminary attachment was also filed against him. On the scheduled day of hearing for
Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail, thereby causing all criminal cases
filed against him to be archived pending his arrest. Meanwhile, the issuance of the writ of
preliminary attachment was granted for the petitioners and the writ was issued. However,
China Banking Corporation failed to honor Notice of Garnishment served by the Deputy
Sheriff of Makati. China Banking Corporation invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank
Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are
exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Meanwhile,
the trial court granted petitioner's motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the
civil case. Summons was published. Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and
was declared in default. After hearing ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of
petitioner. Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice
was published in the Manila Bulletin. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of
the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had
become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking
Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioner seek relief from the Supreme Court.
According to the Supreme Court, petitioner deserved the damages awarded to her by the
court. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory
relief; however, exceptions to the rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has
far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated
as one for mandamus. The application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if the Court rule that the questioned Section 113 of the Central Bank Circular
No. 960 which exempt from attachment, garnishment, or an order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable
to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed
that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. The provisions of Section
113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No.
6426 were held to be inapplicable to the case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents were required to comply with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No.
89-3214 and to release to the petitioners the dollar deposits of Greg Bartelli in such
amount as would satisfy the judgment. caDTSE
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; INSTANT PETITION FOR DECLARATORY

RELIEF TREATED AS A PETITION FOR MANDAMUS; THE SUPREME COURT HAS NO
ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER A PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF.
— Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this
petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for
mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil
Case No. 89-3214. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may
be treated as one for mandamus.
2. COMMERCIAL LAW; SECTION 113 OF CENTRAL BANK CIRCULAR NO. 960,
PROVIDING THAT FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM
ATTACHMENT, GARNISHMENT OR ANY OTHER ORDER OF ANY COURT OR ANY
GOVERNMENT AGENCY OR BODY; HELD INAPPLICABLE TO THIS CASE BECAUSE OF ITS
PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES. — The application of the law depends on the extent of its
justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result specially to a citizen aggrieved by a
foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil
Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non
deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is
silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the
vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377). It would be unthinkable,
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by
accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense
of the innocent. Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar
against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the
Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar
deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime?
This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny. We definitely cannot have both ways
and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the
provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends
Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of
execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y
Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit
of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. DCHaTc

DECISION
TORRES , JR. , J : p
In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the
unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Little do we realize that statutes or even constitutions
are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise
vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day.
The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs:
a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining
the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960; prcd
b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:
1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents;
2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the
provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other
order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever"
i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of
defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment
rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process
guaranteed by the Constitution;
ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class

privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution;
iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent
Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their
wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and
depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized
bank.
The antecedent facts:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured
petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein,
Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was
able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6,
and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued
Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The
policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368,
Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No.
104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door
Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.
On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg
Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802,
803, 804 and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary
attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled
hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail.
On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused
Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28,
1989.
Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989
granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary
attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in
the amount of 100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court
on February 28, 1989.
On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China
Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati,
China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of
garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando De
Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not
violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a
garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the
subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati,
China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits of defendant Greg
Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever,
This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a
letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any
exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has
rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claim sought to be
enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as
granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank
responded as follows:
"May 26, 1989
"Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino
12 Pres. Osmeña Avenue

South Admiral Village
Parañaque, Metro Manila

Dear Ms. Carolino:
"This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on
Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
"The cited provision is absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception,
nor has the same been repealed nor amended.
"The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's
banking system which would help in the development of the economy. There is
no intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your
subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law.
Compliance is, therefore, enjoined.
"Very truly yours,

(SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO
Director" 1
Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioner's motion for leave to serve
summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs.
Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons with the complaint was published in the Manila Times
once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the
complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte,
the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendant, ordering the latter:
"1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral
damages;
"2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and
Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00
for both of them;
"3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and

"4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount
of damages herein awarded; llcd
"5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus

"6. Costs of the Suit.
"SO ORDERED."
The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in
graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows:
"The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati
but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail
Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four
counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805).
Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served
upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general
circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc.,
the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer
to the complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last
publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was
declared in default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex
parte.
"In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E.
Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a
certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following testimony:
"Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City but has
recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year.
"In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema,
Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30
p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair,
an American approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had
already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5)
"The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat
beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that
he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has a daughter
who is about Karen's age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan
Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5)
"The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's
Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach
Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his
niece. (Id., pp. 5-6)
"They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the
defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6)
"When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged
niece was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was
inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told
her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7)
"Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became
nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord
and tied Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but
defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it
and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7)
"Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the
door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of
her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to
shout but no sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth.
When defendant withdraw his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain
after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8)
"He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sex organ as well as to
her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do
so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a
lot while feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to inset his
sex organ a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the
defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9)
"After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to
take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the
water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex
organ. When she took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime,
defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower,
Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired
crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen has no way of
determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did
not care to giver her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00
o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10)
"The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and
coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still
bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second
time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which
defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it
looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night.
During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she
could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly.
"Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie
her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for
help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were
closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so
afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call the police, it was
still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her.
Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for
help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14)
"On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning
for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again
in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because
everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for
around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window
was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window
with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-
15)
"That Monday evening, Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant
left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroom and saw a small window
covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl
and she cried for help through the hole. She cried: 'Maawa na po kayo sa akin.
Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako! Somebody heard her. It was
a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was 'istorbo'.
Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the
police. She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-
16)
"She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in
bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he
again got some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was
merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again
raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 -
9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the
second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her
shouting for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After
she was raped the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17)
She again went to the bathroom and shouted for help. After shouting for about
five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and
she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a
woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change
her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the room but she did not change her
clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call for the police and the
defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was
wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16)
cdll
"Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had
asked for help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He
told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on
Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then
he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but
she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19)
"When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she
knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going
upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policemen
asked her name and the reason why she was there. She told him she was
kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the
defendant was talking to them. 'Nakikipag-areglo po sa mga pulis,' Karen added.
"The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20)
They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the
house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with
defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whom she called Kuya Bong
Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to sub-Station I and there she was
investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by
her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the
second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21)
"At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The
written statement she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they
proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator
and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private
parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they
reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal
officer has been marked as Exhibit B.
"She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time of the
incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano
University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the
subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad
Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station
but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her
transfer. The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case.
(TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46)
xxx xxx xxx
"After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother
and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-
minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10)
She appears to be restless or sad. (Id., p. 11)The father prays for P500,000.00
moral damages for Karen for this shocking experience which probably, she would
always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever
recover from this experience." (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11)
Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was
published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse
of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the
decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar
deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960.
Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court.
The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two:
May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in
petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise
known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960
providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds
that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant
Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in
violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given
foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the
herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for
their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing
it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank and 4.) The Monetary
Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated
quasi-legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiff's substantive right to have the
claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary
attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiff's
substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out
of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39
of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so.
On the other hand, respondent Central bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary
Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority
because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as
amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from
attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as
amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the
Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is
enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a
class.
Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency
deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to
assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and
the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the
inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such
institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in
the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that
the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and
that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not
violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote
the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a
considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to
take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons
and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the
general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and
Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from
execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a
law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be
exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. cdta
For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to
that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful
of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the breastly
hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli
which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioners has undergone; but it is
restrained from doing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular
NO. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other
alternative but to follow the same.
This Court finds the petition to be partly meritorious.
Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petitioner
for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to
require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-
3214.
This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. 2
However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far-
reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as
one for mandamus. 3
Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good, and in her
gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language requested by the
American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and that she was raped by
said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for
four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid
punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil
Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could
alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may
continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her
has the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this
unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and
award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its
decision.
"Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was
undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which
could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make
her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she
was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University,
where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school
authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her and
allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case.
xxx xxx xxx
The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton
and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of
serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose
only fault was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that
defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor
capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that
unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that
in every forest there is a snake, . . ." 4
If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to
fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important that his
child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from
this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere
visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.
It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the
country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and
presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the
present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the
questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law
failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such
as the case before us.
It has thus been said that —
"But I also know, 5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the
progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened,
as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions
change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and
keep pace with the times . . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat
which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen
of their barbarous ancestors."
In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus:

"The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to
obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law
and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the
application thereof envisaged by the alien. More specifically, the petition raises
the question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other
court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB
Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor
but from a mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in
the bank for long.
"The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who
are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.
xxx xxx xxx

". . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines
refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the
strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960:
'Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits

shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.'
"Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of

Republic Act No. 6426:
'Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations. — The Monetary Board of the Central
Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the
publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette and in a
newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three
consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank promulgates new rules and
regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at
the time the deposit was made shall govern.'
"The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic

Act No. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus:
'Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency

deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential
Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the
depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office
whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether
public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits
shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order a
process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever,' prll
"The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment,

garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its
whereases, viz:
'WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are
authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency;
'WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the
establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking
units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases;
'WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines,
certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as
confidentiality of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on
the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in
trade or business in the Philippines;
'WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of confidentiality over such

foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing
the vested rights of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign
currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits
in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly
channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly
contributing to the economic development of the country;'
"Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign

currency deposits is 'to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign
Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines' (3rd
Whereas).
"The Offshore Banking System was established by PD. No. 1034. In turn, the
purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
'WHEREAS, conditions conductive to the establishment of an offshore banking

system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate
communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines;
'WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as
possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development;
'WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be

advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign
lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating
employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing
to the national development effort.
'WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other
positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as
another financial center in Asia;'
"On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD No.
1035. Its purposes are as follows:
'WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines

has been authorized under a separate decree;
'WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial
competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and
participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and
firms;
'WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said
depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes
as would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking units;'
"It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System
and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from
foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third
Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws
and given protection and incentives by them.
"Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the
kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and
protection by said laws because such depositors stays only for a few days in the
country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
"Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited

his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping
during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
"For the reasons stated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar
deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113
of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and P.D. No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes." 6
In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result specially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides
that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous,
this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of
conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be
used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the
guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank
Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation
calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of
justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246,
insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to
this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to
COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al.
vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners
the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy
the judgment. cdll

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco and Panganiban, JJ ., concur.
Padilla, J ., took no part.
Mendoza and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1. Annex "R", Petition.

2. Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA
1.
3. Nationalista Party vs. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101; Aquino vs. Comelec, 62 SCRA 275;
and Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, supra.
4. Decision, Regional Trial Court, Civil Case No. 89-3214, pp. 9 & 12; Rollo, pp. 66-69.
5. Thomas Jefferson, Democracy, ed. Saul K. Padover. (New York, Penguin, 1946) p. 171.
6. Comment of the Solicitor General, Rollo, pp. 128-129; 135-136.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY

ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG , petitioner,
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ , J : p
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig , herein petitioner, filed a petition 1 to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others,
that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia;
that Stephanie has been using her mother's middle name and surname; and that he is now
a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle
name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother's surname, and that her surname
“Garcia” be changed to "Catindig ," his surname.
On March 23, 2001, 3 the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption,
thus:
"After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the petitioner, and in
the absence of any opposition to the petition, this Court finds that the petitioner
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualification provided for by
law as an adoptive parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for
and educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition would redound
to the best interest and welfare of the minor Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The
Court further holds that the petitioner's care and custody of the child since her
birth up to the present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED.

Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations
of obedience and maintenance with respect to her natural mother, and for civil
purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioner's legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be
known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG. TacESD
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local Civil Registrar
concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office for record
purposes.
SO ORDERED." 4
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration 5
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001, 6 the trial court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an illegitimate child may use the
surname of her mother as her middle name when she is subsequently adopted by her
natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a
consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary for
every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or
initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of
the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be violated; (5)
permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother's surname) avoids the
stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as her middle name is not
opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner that
Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural
mother for the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie's filiation with her natural mother
because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the
latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her relationship
or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her natural
mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any, will
be before the surname of the mother." 7
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law —
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is known
and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word
or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other individuals and,
also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of the world at large
addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. 8 It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name. DCATHS
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2) the surname
or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or
at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or family name is that
which identifies the family to which he belongs and is continued from parent to child. The
given name may be freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to which
the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the substantive rules which regulate
the use of surname 1 0 of an individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he
may be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or a previously
married woman, or a widow, thus:
"Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx xxx xxx

Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage
shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his
wife, such as 'Mrs.'
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party,
she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse,
she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to
continue employing her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or

(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he
were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall
be obliged to use such additional name or surname as will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, the word ‘Junior' can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other
direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or

(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx xxx xxx"
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of

Middle Name —
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 176 1 1 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of Their
Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use. EAHDac
The middle name or the mother's surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother's surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365
of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of adoption, is
likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use
the surname of the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx"
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees that drafted the Family Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding
the surname of the child's mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the Joint Meeting
of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the members approved the suggestion that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father,
thus:
"Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the use by the
wife of the surname and that of the child because the father's surname indicates
the family to which he belongs, for which reason he would insist on the use of the
father's surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may also use the
surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the surname of the
mother, how will his name be written? Justice Caguioa replied that it is up to him
but that his point is that it should be mandatory that the child uses the surname
of the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioa's point is covered by the present
Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no choice of the
person himself precisely because of this misunderstanding. He then cited the
following example: Alfonso Ponce Enrile's correct surname is Ponce since the
mother's surname is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose
Gutierrez David's family name is Gutierrez and his mother's surname is David but
they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be modified to the
effect that it shall be mandatory on the child to use the surname of the father but
he may use the surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle name.
Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion in the Chapter on Use
of Surnames since in the proposed Article (10) they are just enumerating the
rights of legitimate children so that the details can be covered in the appropriate
chapter.
xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification suggested by
Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should always be last because
there are so many traditions like the American tradition where they like to use their
second given name and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese
wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in the Chapter on the Use
of Surnames, they should say that initial or surname of the mother should
immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name, if any,
will be before the surname of the mother. Prof. Balane added that this is really the
Filipino way. The Committee approved the suggestion." 1 2 (Emphasis supplied)
ETDSAc
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that "the adopted shall bear the surname
of the adopters." 1 3 Again, it is silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only
expressly allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to bear the
surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of adoption. 1 4
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child —
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. 1 5 It is a juridical act,
a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. 1 6 The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also
as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. 1 7 This was, indeed, confirmed in
1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child
initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption is impressed with
social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is geared to favor the
adopted child. 1 8 Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the "Domestic Adoption Act
of 1998," 1 9 secures these rights and privileges for the adopted. 2 0
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 2 1 of the Family Code and
Section 17 2 2 Article V of RA 8552. 2 3
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all
the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including
the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed above. This is
consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees
as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother
should immediately precede the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie's continued use of her mother's
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted
that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 2 4 , Article V of RA 8552 (law on
adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent.
Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in
the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides
for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father. She calls
them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence, to allow
Stephanie to use her mother's surname as her middle name will not only sustain her
continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of her
illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of Adoption
Statutes In Favor Of Adoption —
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. 2 5 The interests and welfare
of the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, 2 6 hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. 2 7
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
"In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail."
This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be authorized
by some way of interpreting the law." 2 8
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother's surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mother's surname "GARCIA" as her
middle name. cTSHaE
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo at 34-36.
2. Annex "C", id. at 33.
3. Annex "F", id. at 41-43.
4. Rollo at 42-43.
5. Annex "G", id. at 44-48.
6. Annex "H", id. at 49.

7. Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, August 10,
1985, p. 8.
8. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, G.R. No. 97906, May 21, 1992, 209
SCRA 189, citing 38 Am Jur, Name 594-595.
9. Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996, 253 SCRA 509,
citing Tolentino, A.M., Civil Code of the Philippines, Commentaries and Jurisprudence,
Vol. I, 1993 ed., 672.
10. Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo Wong, supra.
11. "Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the
regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."
12. Minutes of the Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family law Committees, August 10,
1985, pp. 16-18.
13. Article 365 of the New Civil Code.
14. Republic vs. Hon. Hernandez, et al., supra; Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Maximo
Wong, supra.
15. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, Vol. I, Fifteenth Edition, 2002, p. 685.
16. Pineda, The Family Code of the Philippines Annotated, 1989 Edition, p. 272-273, citing 4
Valverde, 473.
17. Paras, supra, citing Prasnick vs. Republic, 98 Phil. 665.
18. Lahom vs. Sibulo, G.R. No. 143989, July 14, 2003, 406 SCRA 135, citing United Nation
General Assembly/44/49 (1989).
19. "Sec. 17. Legitimacy . — The adoptee shall be considered the legitimate son/daughter of
the adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such is entitled to all the rights and
obligations provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them without
discrimination of any kind. To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love, guidance and
support in keeping with the means of the family."
20. Id.
21. "Art. 189. (1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;"
22. Supra.
23. Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
24. "Sec. 18. Succession. — In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the
adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of succession without distinction from legitimate
filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a will, the law
on testamentary succession shall govern."
25. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92326, January 24,
1992, 205 SCRA 356, citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption, 865.
26. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing 2 Am Jur 2d, Adoption,
910.
27. Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et al., id., citing Bobanovic, et al. vs.
Montes, etc., et al., 142 SCRA 485 (1986).
28. Paras, supra, p. 91.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111709. August 30, 2001.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . ROGER P. TULIN,

VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE,
CHEONG SAN HIONG, and JOHN DOES , accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Britanico Consunji & Sarmiento Law Offices for Cheong San Hiong.
Rodrigo Berenguer & Guno for R. Tulin, V.I. Loyola, C.O. Changco and A.C. Infante.
SYNOPSIS
Appellants were charged with qualified piracy in connection with the seizure of M/T
Tabangao in Batangas where the officers and crew were forced to sail to Singapore and
transfer its loaded petroleum products to another Vessel Navi Pride off the coast of
Singapore. Appellants pleaded not guilty with appellant Hiong claiming that he merely
followed the orders of his superiors to buy bunker fuel. However, it was disclosed that he
connived, through falsification of documents, to prevent the Singapore ports authority to
detect the sale, the amount of the sale was less than one-half of the amount of the cargo
transferred, that there was no evidence of the sale, with receipts not issued and the sale
was made 66 nautical miles away in the dead of the night. The officers and crew of M/T
Tabangao with whom the appellants were with for more than a month, positively identified
appellants as the seajackers. Appellants, except Hiong, were represented by Tomas
Posadas who was later found to be a non-lawyer. They were, however, assisted by Atty.
Abdul Basar who manifested that they were adopting the evidence adduced by Posadas.
Their extrajudicial statements obtained without assistance of counsel were introduced as
evidence for the prosecution. The trial court found all appellants except Hiong to have
acted in conspiracy. According to the trial court, Hiong's act was not indispensable in the
attack and seizure of the vessel. He was found guilty as a mere accomplice. Hence, this
appeal.
An accused is entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at
every stage of the proceedings since an ordinary layman is not versed on the technicalities
of trial. In this case, appellants' representative, Mr. Posadas, knew the technical rules of
procedure, coupled with their manifestation that they adopted the evidence adduced by
him constitute waiver, and with the full assistance of a bonafide lawyer, Atty. Basar and
cannot serve as a basis for a claim of denial of due process.
The extrajudicial confessions made without assistance of counsel are inadmissible in
evidence.
Piracy is an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law.
If there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice
and not as principal.
An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior,
if such order is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by the subordinate to
carry out said order is lawful.
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHT TO COUNSEL AT EVERY STAGE OF PROCEEDING;

RIGHT WAIVED IN CASE AT BAR. — On the first issue, the record reveals that a
manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the
evidence adduced when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to
sufficient representation during the trial as covered by the due process clause shall only be
valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-
appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that
said accused-appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the
subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and intelligently executed the same. They
also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court. It is true that an
accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by
counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment
(Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a
layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided by law that "
[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law.
(Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of Rule 115 adds that "
[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently
appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of
counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal
practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-appellants were sufficiently
and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of the
record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there
was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that
it was unequivocally, and intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide
lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553
[1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).
2. ID.; RIGHT TO COUNSEL DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION; MIRANDA
DOCTRINE; CONSTRUED. — [T]he right to counsel during custodial investigation may not
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. Such rights originated from
Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda
doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation,
the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he gives
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an
attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these
rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The
Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver must be in writing
and made in the presence of counsel.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; UNCOUNSELLED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
WITHOUT VALID WAIVER OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL, INADMISSIBLE; CASE AT BAR. — [T]he
absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-
appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not
even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets forth the
so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]).
According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293
[1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-
appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence
against them.
4. ID.; ID.; DENIAL; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED.
— We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is
not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the
accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay,
284 SCRA 296 [1998]).
5. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; REQUISITE FOR DEFENSE TO PROSPER; CASE AT BAR. — Anent
accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he
was at his place of work and that on April 10, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite,
sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak defense, much
more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441 [1997])
considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-
appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10,
1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan, Batangas. Changco
not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work
on the dates aforestated.
6. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; TRIAL COURT'S EVALUATION OF CREDIBILITY
OF TESTIMONY, ACCORDED HIGHEST RESPECT. — It is doctrinal that the trial court's
evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts
have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus,
to determine whether a certain witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79
[1998]).
7. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; WHEN PRESENT. — We likewise uphold the trial
court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8,
Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to
be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court,
there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may
appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to
achieve a common criminal design.
8. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco,
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to
attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio
Changco was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of
Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the
crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food provisions on their
way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco
need not be present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he
performed his task in view of an objective common to all other accused-appellants.
9. ID.; PIRACY; COVERAGE WIDENED BY R.A. NO. 7659. — Article 122 of the Revised
Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on the high
seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its
amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was
widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters." On the other hand, under
Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces
any person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in
Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member of the complement or not, any
person is covered by the law. Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the
provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between
the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or
interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in
keeping with the intent to protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes
against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential
Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the
penal statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended,
and piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
10. ID.; ID.; AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE ON TERRITORIALITY IN CRIMINAL LAW. —
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is
an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force
here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lollo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
11. ID.; CRIMINAL LIABILITY; WHEN THERE IS LACK OF COMPLETE EVIDENCE OF
CONSPIRACY, LIABILITY IS THAT OF AN ACCOMPLICE. — Nevertheless, the trial court
found that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or
abetted Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo
under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532. The ruling of the trial court is within well-
settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is
that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any
doubt as to the participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always
resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People
vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
12. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER ISSUED BY
SUPERIOR; ORDER AND MEANS TO CARRY OUT ORDER MUST BE LAWFUL; CASE AT BAR.
— [I]t cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of
his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order
issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by
the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981
ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a
patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was
committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in
carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities,
falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial,
Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and
articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature
and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have
refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the
"Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of
his actions.
DECISION
MELO , J : p
This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for
sometime. It was reassigned, together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in
pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.
In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC
Shipping and Transport Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels
of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with a total value of P40,426,793,87,
was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.
The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second
Mate Christian Torralba, and Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of
an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by Emilio Changco, older brother of
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and
bolos. They detained the crew and took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter,
accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over, using black paint, the
name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC
logo on the chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee,"
with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the
while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was undergoing repairs.
PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel
to the Philippine Coast Guard and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and
the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations yielded negative results. On
March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area
presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus
forced to return to the Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on
March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.
On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18
nautical miles from Singapore's shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride"
anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T Tabangao" to transfer the
vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised
the crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both
vessels leaving the area, was completed on March 30, 1991. TEDHaA
On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer
of cargo to "Navi Pride."
On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained
at sea. On April 10, 1991, the members of the crew were released in three batches with the
stern warning not to report the incident to government authorities for a period of two days
or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from the
shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco,
brother of Emilio Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to
Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to their respective homes. The second
batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and were
brought to different places in Metro Manila. SCcHIE
On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the
PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew
members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for investigation. The incident was also
reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of the
crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.
A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:
a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present
at U.K. Beach, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-
appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-
way by NBI agents as the latter were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade
arrest.
c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby
of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.
On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Piracy in Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as
follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA,

CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine
(9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation of P.D. No. 532), committed as
follows:
That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991,
both dates inclusive, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, then
manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire upon, board and seize while
in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum
products, together with the complement and crew members, employing
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, then direct
the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were unloaded and
thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the
aforesaid law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)
This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment,
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereupon ensued.
Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in
their testimony as to where they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial,
and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the
"Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood. Their
story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red
speedboat with Captain Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board,
approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from the three if they wanted to work in
a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid
P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They
agreed even though they had no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the
vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers. They denied having gone to
Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the
morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of
work, and were told that the balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was
neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the parties.
Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home
sleeping on April 10, 1991. He testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco,
Jr.
Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that
he studied in Sydney, Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later
completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as such for two years on board a
vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company
was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and
petroleum to domestic and international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was
"Navi Pride."
On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his
cohorts, Hiong's name was listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the
Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the radio telephone operator on
board the vessel "Ching Ma."
The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who
offered to sell to the former bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars.
After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount to Paul Gan, the latter,
together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high
seas on board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his
return on board the vessel "Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of
diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong
was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount of
300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the
surveyor William Yao, on board "Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee".
Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer. Although no inspection of
"Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte.,
Ltd. was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and
crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not
pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely reflected that the vessel
carried 11,900 tons.
On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then
told the Captain of the vessel to ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil
transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of "M/T Galilee," called
"Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not
ask for the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.
Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride"
and took samples of the cargo. The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain
Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then handed the payment to Paul
Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong
reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.
Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the
firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was
observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and drinks, including beer,
purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and
was completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer. IaHCAD
On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and
wanted to offer its cargo to cargo operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship
agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the Philippines to discuss the
matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with
"M/T Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at
the port of Batangas that weekend. After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City,
where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by the name of "KEVIN
OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha
Hotel. From accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not
arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by NBI agents.
After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime
charged. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby
rendered by this Court finding the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres
Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals, of
the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential
Decree No. 532 and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime.
Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty for the principals of said crime is
mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the law. The accused
Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA,
pursuant to Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD
532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio
Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same,
the said accused are hereby ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said
corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00, Philippine
Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991
until the said amount is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong
are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines, Inc. the cargo of the "M/T
Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said
corporation, all the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to
the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87,
Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After the
accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to
Singapore.
All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the
National Bureau of Investigation and the City Jail of Manila during the pendency
of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly
with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau
of Investigation. With costs against all the accused.
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)
The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be
summarized as follows:
Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco
Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial
court erred in allowing them to adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were
being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby depriving them of their
constitutional right to procedural due process. cDTACE
In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance
as counsel for all of them. However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11,
1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a member of the Philippine Bar.
This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.
Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that
during the custodial investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to
sign statements without being given the opportunity to read the contents of the same;
were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of
their constitutional rights.
Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution
proved beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They
allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who totaled 22 and who were not
guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have
overpowered the alleged pirates. EAHcCT
Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime
committed by him; (2) the trial court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no knowledge that Emilio Changco and
his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the vessel
was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding
him guilty as an accomplice to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of 1974); (4) the trial court erred in
convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine
courts of jurisdiction to hold him for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred
in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to prove the same and which in
fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting
him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was
charged as a principal by direct participation under said decree, thus violating his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove
any participation on his part in the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further
argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking of "M/T Tabangao" and in
committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its
cargo were pirated.
As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with
qualified piracy as principal under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to
Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he was convicted for acts done outside
Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must have
been committed within its territory.
We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.
The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal
effects and implications of the fact that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants
during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the absence of counsel
during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime
of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No. 7659 obliterate the crime committed by
accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted as
accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by
him were done or executed outside Philippine waters and territory?
On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was
executed by accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11,
1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced when they were represented
by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as
covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a
bona fide lawyer. During the trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar,
made a categorical manifestation that said accused-appellants were apprised of the
nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and
intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when
asked in open court (tsn, February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59). cHCIEA
It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in
person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to
promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure). This
is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is
also provided by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with
right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the same section of
Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in
person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights
without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but without prejudice to the sanctions
imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of accused-
appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas
Posadas. An examination of the record will show that he knew the technical rules of
procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the right to sufficient
representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and
intelligently made and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar.
Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a valid waiver of
rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs. People, 166
SCRA 680 [1988]).
However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may
not be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17
hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this
section as well as compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or
similar practices, and their families.
Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to
the so-called Miranda doctrine which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during
custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that
any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to
the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that the waiver
must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.
Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the
accused-appellants make them invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights
was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the aforestated Section 12 sets
forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice
Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]).
According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293
[1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial confessions of accused-
appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence
against them.
However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient
evidence to convict accused-appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound
deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits "U" and "UU") and
accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit
the crime charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the
Court of Appeals —
. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and

members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed
to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the "M/T
Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang
Island, Mindoro, with its cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the
officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of Horsebough Lighthouse, about
sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the
Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T
Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride" for the price of about $500,000.00 (American
Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .
xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on
board the vessel with the Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to
April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be no scintilla of doubt
in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see
and identify the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused
were taken into custody by the operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas executed
their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused
as some of the pirates.
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3)
Accused admitted to the Court that they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the
evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel sailed to its
destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.
(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)
We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is
not supported by any hard evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the
categorical identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses than to the
accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v. Baccay,
284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated
a patently desperate tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly
Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and their companion) while said
accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at Aplaya,
Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then
anchored off-shore. And readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and
handymen for an indefinite period of time without even saying goodbye to their families,
without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal
effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in
accord with human experience. As pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain
Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock
in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks
or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)." aSATHE
Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17,
he was at his place of work and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor,
Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally and inherently a weak
defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275
SCRA 441 [1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to
disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear and convincing evidence that, at about
midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in Calatagan,
Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was
in his place of work on the dates aforestated.
It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded
the highest respect, for trial courts have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly
the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain witness is telling the
truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a conspirator, one need not participate
in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know
the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted
by the trial court, there are times when conspirators are assigned separate and different
tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in fact, constitute a whole and
collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.
We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola,
and Infante, Jr. and others, were the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao"
off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco was to fetch the master and
the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and
bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with
money for their fare and food provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-
coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be present at the time of the
attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective
common to all other accused-appellants.
Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-
appellant Cecilio Changco is the younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain
Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia Shipping Lines. Cecilio
worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven
kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the
other hand, has known Cecilio since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a relative of the Changco brothers
by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking
case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol
in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at
that time remained at large.
As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of
piracy in Philippine waters as defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively
of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No. 7659 (effective January 1, 1994),
which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded
Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been
rendered "superfluous or duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish piracy committed in Philippine
waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person"
mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that
Presidential Decree No. 532 shall only apply to offenders who are members of the
complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No. 7659 shall apply to
offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel,
hence, excluding him from the coverage of the law.
Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty
of reclusion temporal shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas,
shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a
passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment,
or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.
(Italics supplied.)
Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:
ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine
waters. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person
who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not
being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part
of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers. EacHCD
(Italics ours)
On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be
understood, as follows:
d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of
the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person,
including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine
waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall be considered as
pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (italics supplied).
To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that
piracy must be committed on the high seas by any person not a member of its
complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic Act No. 7659, the
coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in
Philippine waters." On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974),
the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any person including "a passenger or member
of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or not, a member
of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.
Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532. There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is
likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or interpret the law. All the
presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to
protect the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations.
As expressed in one of the "whereas" clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under
Presidential Decree No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.
As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
accused-appellant Hiong since the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice
it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" (renamed
"M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although
the captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-
loaded, transferred, and sold. And such transfer was done under accused-appellant
Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532 requires that the attack
and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition
by the pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the
same need not be committed in Philippine waters.
Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is
an exception to the rule on territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if
Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a violation of qualified piracy under the
penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes piracy in
Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force
here since its purpose is precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters
(People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise, well-settled that regardless of
the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).
However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him on the ground that he was
convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 even though
he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?
The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:
(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T
Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack
and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act was indispensable in the
attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found
that accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted
Emilio Changco and his band of pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section
4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:
SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or
highway robbery brigandage. — Any person who knowingly and in any manner
aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving them
information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the
government, or acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or
in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who directly or
indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall
be considered as an accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in
accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code. ITDSAE
It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this
Section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of
complete evidence of conspiracy, the liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal
(People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the participation of an
individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser
responsibility (People v. Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA
792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).
Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree
No. 532 which presumes that any person who does any of the acts provided in said
section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is proven. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly
abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and
derived benefit therefrom.
The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the
stolen cargo by personally directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He
profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn,
June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the
petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General
Declarations and Crew List to ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by
Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied the pirates with food, beer, and other provisions
for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).
We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and
Crew List was accomplished and utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine
Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert detection by Singapore Port
Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore
Port Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this
would have resulted in his arrest and prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of
the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have been effected.
We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-
appellant Hiong's role in the disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that
on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the
vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm submitted
the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the
name of Hiong; that the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its
voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A CSH", Record) falsely stated that the
vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were no
passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that
the vessel was to unload and transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the
fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo
at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record)
stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that
although Hiong was not the Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the
"Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record); that he then paid
$150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did
not issue one; and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore
on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening, (Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it
was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo on the high
seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons
of diesel oil. The second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed
above. It was likewise supervised by accused-appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio
Changco supervised the transfer from his end. EcHIAC
Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his
superiors and that he has no knowledge of the illegality of the source of the cargo.
First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and
nature of the cargo since he himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second,
considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should have avoided any participation
in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired.
He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any
contract of sale for the purchase by the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize
the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not even verify the
identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the
source of the cargo; he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in
the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the
first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money without any
receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and
thus safe to deal with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was
P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00 (computed at P30.00 to $1, the
exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its
value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his
right mind would go to far away Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation
— only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale involved. This, in addition to
the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware
that the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders
of his superiors." An individual is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order
issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and that the means used by
the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981
ed., p. 212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a
patent violation not only of Philippine, but of international law. Such violation was
committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used by Hiong in
carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities,
falsified records, using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial,
Hiong presented himself, and the trial court was convinced, that he was an intelligent and
articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have realized the nature
and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have
refused to follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the
"Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which reason, he must now suffer the consequences of
his actions.
WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on
record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban, Gonzaga-Reyes and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

UNITED STATES vs . H. N. BULL
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 5270. January 15, 1910.]
THE UNITED STATES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . H. N. BULL , defendant-

appellant.
Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant.

Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO MAKE WAR, TREATIES, AND TO

ACQUIRE TERRITORY; STATUS OF ACQUIRED TERRITORY. — The Constitution confers
upon the United States the power to make war and treaties, and to acquire territory by
conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, but does not
become a part of the United States until formally incorporated therein by Congress.
Until this is done, it is the duty of Congress to provide all needful rules and regulations
for its government, and in legislating with reference thereto, Congress is limited only by
those provisions of the Constitution which go to the very root if its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place.
2. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; NATURE AND
CHARACTERISTICS. — The Government of the Philippine Islands is not that of a State or
a Territory, although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It
stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into
the Union. The authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the
Constitution of the United States, which, however, operates on the President and
Congress, and not on the inhabitants of the Philippines and the Philippine Government.
3. ID.; POWERS AND LIMITATIONS; SOURCE OF ITS ORGANIC LAWS. — For
its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looks to the
orders of the President before Congress acted, and the Acts of Congress after it
assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed
will of the President and Congress, instead of the sovereign constituency which lies
back of American constitutions.
4. ID.; A COMPLETE GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISM WITH THE USUAL
DEPARTMENTS. — Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is
a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments
exercising the functions commonly assigned to such departments.
5. ID.; LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE GOVERNMENT. — The legislative power
delegated to the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms, subject to
specific limitations. The grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but
to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated.
6. ID.; VALIDITY OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS. — An act of the legislative authority
of the Philippine Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is
valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by Congressional legislation, or its
enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic law.
7. ID.; ID.; RESERVATION BY CONGRESS OF POWER TO SUSPEND ACTS
UNTIL APPROVED. — The reservation by Congress of the power to suspend valid Acts
of the Philippine Commission and Legislature, does not operate to suspend such Acts
until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid Acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled.
8. ID.; ID.; POWER TO REGULATE FOREIGN COMMERCE. — The power to
regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
the territory belonging to the United States it may regulate foreign commerce with such
territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through the legislative body created by it,
to which its power in that respect is delegated. Congress has not, except in certain
specific instances, legislated directly upon the subject, but, by the grant of general
legislative power, it has authorized the Government of the Philippines to enact laws
with reference to matters not covered by the Acts of Congress, and report its action to
Congress for approval or disapproval. The limitations upon the power of the
Commission or Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the
regulation of commerce with foreign countries.
9. ID.; ID.; ACT NO. 55. — Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over
the control of the Islands and was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
Amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The Military Government and the Civil
Government instituted by the President had the power, whether it be called legislative
or administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the
territory. The Act passed in furtherance of this power has remained in force since its
enactment, without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be presumed to
have met with its approval.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFICERS AND CREWS OF SHIPS IN TERRITORIAL WATERS. —
When a foreign merchant ship enters territorial waters, the ship's officers and crew are
subject to the jurisdiction of the territorial courts, subject to such limitations only as
have been conceded by the territorial sovereign through the proper political agencies.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; TRANSPORTATION OF ANIMALS ON SHIPS. — The offense of
failing to provide suitable means for securing animals while transporting them on a ship
from a foreign port to a port of the Philippine Islands is within the jurisdiction of the
courts of the Philippines when the forbidden conditions existed during the time the ship
was within territorial, regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the
ship sailed from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION UNDER ACT NO. 55. — In a prosecution
under Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, the information need not allege that the
court was sitting at a port where the cattle were actually disembarked. The allegation in
the information that an act was done willfully includes the allegation that it was done
knowingly.
DECISION
ELLIOTT , J : p
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of

section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the
judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of
error he contends: (1) that the complaint does not state facts suf cient to confer
jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as amended is in
violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United States, and void as
applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insuf cient to support the
conviction.
The information alleges:
"That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the
said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the
steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and
transporting cattle, carabaos, and other animals from a foreign port, to wit, the
port of Ampieng, Formosa, to the port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that
the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about
the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
wrongfully carry, transport, and bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said
vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677)
head of cattle and carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said
animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as aforesaid, did then
and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit and suitable means
for tying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then and there
cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their
noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the
deck of said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding;
that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide
suitable means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of
said animals were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon
the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed.
"All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Commission."
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine
Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels carrying such animals, sufficient
forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable sustenance of such animals
during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of
shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided
with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours
from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final
debarkation."
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding
to section 1 thereof the following:
"The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine
Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within the Philippine
Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit so
as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals, and suitable and
proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from
vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary
suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon of from
vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to
the horns."
Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —

"Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who
knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall,
for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, United States money, for each offense.
Prosecutions under this Act may be instituted in any Court of First Instance or any
provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are
disembarked."
1. It is contended that the information is insuf cient because it does not
state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the
offense was committed on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of
the Philippine Islands.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such
animals are disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136,
which provides generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act
No. 400 merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses
committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of
the waters of the Philippine Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.
S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First
Instance in any province into which such ship or water craft upon which the offense or
crime was committed shall come after the commission thereof. Had this offense been
committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of
the jurisdiction of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
accordance with well recognized and established public law. But the Standard was a
Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not registered or licensed in the
Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the question whether the court
had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by
the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes the offense
continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of the United States.
No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed
on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlands which embrace the entrance to Manila
Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable.
(Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bon ls, Le Droit Int., sec. 490 et seq.;
Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of
the territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that
sovereignty through the proper political agency. This offense was committed within
territorial waters. From the line which determines these waters the Standard must have
traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the
violation of the statute continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the court is
concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have existed while the vessel
was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at the port of departure
in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed
during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was done
within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the subject-matter
of the offense and the person of the offender.
The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the
court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that
jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every state has
complete control and jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal
right, even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without
permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition such ports are
considered as open to the public ships of all friendly powers. The exemption of such
vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was not established until within
comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 Attorney-
General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations invest the
commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the
country into which he comes." (1, Op. U. S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also
supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late
as 1820. In the leading case of The Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U. S.),
116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels
enter a friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from
jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality."
The principle was accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that
"the privilege of exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law
of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle
of courtesy and mutual deference between nations." (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252
and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, 2. C. X.)
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go
freely. Local of cials exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses
committed by their crews are justiciable by their own of cers acting under the laws to
which they primarily owe allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of
territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and nds its
justi cation in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are generally careful to
respect local laws and regulations which are essential to the health, order, and well-
being of the port. But comity and convenience does not require the extension of the
same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-de ned theories as
to the extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them. According to the French
theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not concern
the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the
courts of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim
exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in
foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bon ls, Le Droit Int.
(quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de
la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been
admitted or claimed by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it
by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act,
1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to
restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says
that —
"It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of
merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they
become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the
country are touched." (Hall, Int. Law, p. 263.)
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant
vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities,
unless the local sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements
consented to waive a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2
Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.)
Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of The Exchange, said that —
"When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to
continual infraction and the government to degradation if such individual
merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable to
the jurisdiction of the country."
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant
vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject
themselves to the laws which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and
this as well in war as in peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman,
c92 U. S., 520-525.)
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article
13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the
United States, of July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consuls, vice-consuls, or consular
agents of each country "the right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as
may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation
whose interests are committed to their charge, without the interference of the local
authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order
or tranquillity of the country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception
applies to controversies between the members of the ship's company, and particularly
to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee,
168 Mass., 188.) The order and tranquillity of the country are affected by many events
which do not amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one
member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which the public may
have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the
local authorities.
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a
"quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of Galvestion, Texas. They were prosecuted
before a justice of the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by
the Government to take necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the
aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of
similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian
charge, May 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of
such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879
the mate of the Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of
Philadelphia Country for an assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying
in the port of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.),
363.) Representations were made through diplomatic channels to the State
Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count
Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
"I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration
in connection with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of
the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden
and Norway. The stipulations contained in the last clause of that article . . . are
those under which it is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the
consular officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature growing
out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to disposing of
controversies resulting from personal violence involving offenses for which the
party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.
"This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of
such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls in
conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or abitrators in such
differences as may arise between captains and crews of the vessels, where such
differences do not involve on the part of the captain or crew a disturbance of the
order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local
magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel,
involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent
for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local
laws, and under such circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty
which the judge or magistrate is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such
cases it must necessarily be left to the local judicial authorities whether the
procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact
there has been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the
complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party
accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against
the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p.
315.)
The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over
offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against
another which amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a
fair and reasonable construction of the language requires us to hold that any violation
of criminal laws disturbs the order or tranquillity of the country. The offense with which
the appellant is charged had nothing to do with any difference between the captain and
the crew. It was a violation by the master of the criminal law of the country into who
port he came. We thus nd that neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the
place of the commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general
principle of public law, are the courts of the Philippine Islands deprived of jurisdiction
over the offense charged in the information in this case.
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege
that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is
claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the
appellant upon this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very
strictly against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in
order to constitute the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the
language of the statute confers jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which
the animals are brought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and
the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned.
This might be different if the disembarkation of the animals constituted a constitutional
element in the offense, but it does not.
It is also contended that the information is insuf cient because it fails to allege
that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing
said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The
allegation of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation
that it was committed knowingly. As said in Wood house vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company
(67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an
act forbidden by law, that the act must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with
knowledge, the will consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of
Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The rst one is that the complaint did not show,
in the words of the ordinance, that the appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of.
This point, I think, was fully answered by the respondents counsel-that the words
'willfully' and 'knowingly ' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies
that it was done by design-don for a set purpose; and I think that it would necessarily
follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94
III., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case.
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but
his defense rests upon the assertion that "according" to his experience, the system of
carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to
the life and comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was
done knowingly and intentionally.
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it
is only necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or
public offense in ordinary and concise language, without repetition. It need not
necessarily be in the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a
person of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce
judgment according to right. A complaint which compile with this requirement is good.
(U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 566.)
The Act, which is in the English language, imposes upon the master of a vessel
the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to
avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the
complaint as it reads in English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully
carried the cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals while in
transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . .
that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable
means for securing said animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals
were cruelly torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold
of said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed."
The appellant contends that he language of the Spanish text of the information
does not charge him with failure to provide "suf cient" and "adequate" means. The
words used are "medios su cientes " and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that
the original complaint was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is
translatable by the words "adecuado," " suficiente," and " conveniente," according to the
context and circumstances, we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in
view of the fact that the objection was not made in the court below, and that the
evidence clearly shows a failure to provide "suitable means for the protection of the
animals."
2. The appellant's argument against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and
the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of
the constitutional law of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and omissions
incidental to the transportation of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the
Philippine Islands, and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been
enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would doubtless have
been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs
vs. People (Colo.), 11 L.R.A., N.S., 1071.)
But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is
controlled by constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the
Union. The importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the
principles which govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of
the legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the
Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of opinion certain
applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war
and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by
conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard
against the possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being
questioned, the framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress
should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting territory and other property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV. sec. 3,
par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of territory by the United States, and until it is formally
incorporated into the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon
Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create a local
government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required for local government.
(Binns vs. U.S., 194 U.S., 486.) This has been the usual procedure. Congress has
provided such governments for territories which were within the Union and for newly
acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to organize a
government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative, and
judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with
which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of
the government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the
Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by
its conformity with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton,
11 Otto (U.S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress has
delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary
for the government of the territory, reserving, however, the right to annual the action of
the local legislature and itself legislate directly for the territory. This power has been
exercised during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of
Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously questioned.
(Dorr vs. U.S., 195 U.S., 138; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370, 385.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within
such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into
contiguous territory tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people
that it went there by its own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 289.) In legislating
with reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by those
prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its power to act at all,
irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182
U.S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U.S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U.S., 197; Dorr vs.
U.S., 195 U.S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 516.)
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the
United States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the
acquisition of the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of
1878 provides that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not
locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the organized
territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United
States." When Congress organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly
that this section of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands, (Sec.
1, Act of 1902.)
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United
States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have
consistently proceeded in conformity with the principles above stated. The city of
Manila was surrendered to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military
commander was directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a
peace which should determine the control, disposition, and government of the Islands.
The duty then devolved upon the American authorities to preserve peace and protect
persons and property within the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by
proper orders, and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military
governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the 22d of
December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of the Spanish eet and
the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands
and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace
the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been ceded to the
United States. During the period of strict military occupation, before the treaty of peace
was rati ed, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Nogueras,
214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the President
as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President organized
a civil government, which, however, had its legal justi cation, like the purely military
government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of the
President embraced legislative, executive, and judicial functions, all of which he might
exercise personally, or through such military or civil agents as he chose to select. As
stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901—
"The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation
includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens
that in a single order of a military commander can be found the exercise of all
three of these different powers-the exercise of the legislative powers by provisions
prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power by determinations of right; and of
executive power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights
determined."
President Mckinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly
as conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government
was initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be
gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the
approval of the President, "that part of the military power of the President in the
Philippine Islands which is legislative in its character" was transferred from the military
government to the Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as
should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as complete civil
government should be established, or Congress otherwise provided. The legislative
power thus conferred upon the Commission was declared to include "the making of
rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs
duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds of the Islands;
the establishment of an educational system throughout the Islands; the establishment
of a system to secure an ef cient civil service; the organization and establishment of
courts; the organization and establishment of municipal and department governments,
and all other matters of a civil nature which the military governor is now competent to
provide by rules or orders of a legislative character." This grant of legislative power to
the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared general
principles, and subject to certain speci c restrictions for the protection of individual
rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to be instituted was
"not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the
happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the
measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even
their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The speci c restrictions
upon legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excursive nes
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment in icted; that no person shall be put twice
in jeopardy for the same offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself; that the right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a
punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or expost facto law shall be passed; that
no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights
of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship without discrimination or preference shall forever be
allowed."
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the
Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided
that "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . .
shall until otherwise provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and
shall be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for
the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining and protecting the
inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion,"
Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the of ce of Civil Governor was created, and the executive
authority, which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred
to that of cial. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President
as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the
Islands under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress
assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with
the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substantial changes in the form of government
which the President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation,
and approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all
the limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's
instructions were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by
legislative act not the Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights
and privileges of individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of
the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of government, in
creating the of ce of the Governor-General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the
Commission establishing certain executive departments, was expressly approved and
rati ed. Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before and after
the rati cation of the treaty of peace was also rati ed and approved by Congress. (Act
of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S.,
197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be
governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting clause of all
statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of "By the authority of
the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the Commission in all
parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be
transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses-the Philippine Commission and
the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by
Congress under its power to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the
United States.
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although
its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the
constitutional relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The
authority for its creation and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United
States, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the
Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United States, acting through the
President and Congress, both deriving power from the same source, but from different
parts thereof. For its powers and the limitations thereon the Government of the
Philippines looked to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts
of Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from the formally
and legally expressed will of the President and Congress, instead of the popular
sovereign constituency which lies back of American constitutions. The power to
legislate upon any subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when
it exercises such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal
equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United States.
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete
governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising
the functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in
the Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to
some extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the governor is not
a member of the legislative body, but the veto power enables him to exercise much
control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive department in
the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive
he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the
advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and
privileges.
In instituting this form of government the intention must have been to adopt the
general constitutional doctrines which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the
Legislature must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress
must act under the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state
constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted.
The judiciary, as in all governments operating under written constitutions, must
determine the validity of legislature enactments, as well as the legality of all private and
of cial acts. In performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the
Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other constitutional theory
could there be that government of laws and not of men which is essential for the
protection of rights under a free and orderly government.
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands,
it is apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act
of the State legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the
States exercise all powers which have not been granted to the central governments.
The former operates under grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an
Act of Congress depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains
a grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid
unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its inaction. An
act of the legislative authority of the Philippine Government which has not been
expressly disapproved by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered
by congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some provision of the
organic laws.
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general
terms subject to speci c limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to
legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the
restrictions stated. It is true that speci c authority is conferred upon the Philippine
Government relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself
legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be viewed simply as
enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully informed and ready to act, and not
as implying any restriction upon the local legislative authority in other matters. (See
Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U.S., April 16, 1908.)
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by
the Government of the Philippines tends strongly to con rm the view that for purposes
of construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of
general instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress
from the necessity of legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant
general legislative power to the new government, subject to broad and easily
understood prohibitions, and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they
met with disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress, which hereby
reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of Congress, July 1, 1902,
sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines
until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make
them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the Philippine
Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U.S.), 1.)
In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether
the Legislature has been expressly or by implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3,
Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States operates only upon the States of the
Union. It has no application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to
regulate foreign commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with
such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by
it, to which its power in this respect is delegated. Congress has by direct legislation
determined the duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines,
and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to provide for the
needs of commerce by improving harbors and navigable waters. A few other speci c
provisions relating to foreign commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its
general regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the reserved
power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet with its approval. The
express limitations upon the power of the Commission and Legislature to legislate do
not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign
countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the
Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of
March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government
instituted by the President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or
administrative, to regulate commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the
territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.),
73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its enactment without annulment or other
action by Congress, and must be presumed to have met with its approval. We are
therefore satis ed that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full
constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce between foreign
countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act No. 55, as amended by
Act No. 275, is valid.
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning

of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question
which must be determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the
defendant Bull brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain
cattle, which came from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable
means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of
which are fully sustained by the evidence: amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence:
amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial court found the following facts, all of
which are fully sustained by the evidence:
"That the defendant, H.N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian
steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to
the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and
carabaos from Chinese and Japanese ports to and into the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands.
"That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and
captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large
number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the directions of the said
defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay,
and within the jurisdiction of this court; an that fifteen of said cattle then and
there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were dead, having broken
legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as
aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid
danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so
transported aboard said ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and
into the city of Manila, without any provision being made whatever upon said
decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to maintain said cattle in a suitable
condition and position for such transportation.
"That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle aboard
steamships coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by was
of individual stalls for such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and
supports at the front, sides, and rear thereof, and cross cleats upon the floor on
which they stand and are transported, so that in case of storms, which are
common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without
slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account of transportation in
the manner in which said animals or cattle were transported in this case. Captain
Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman,
has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that
since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system
for the transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever
during the last year. The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf,
that according to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the
decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the
animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by the proofs or
common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance, three hundred
cattle without supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for
them individually can be safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the
decks and in the holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One
animal falling or pitching, if he is united or unprotected, might produce a serious
panic and the wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the
manner found in this case."
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a ne of two hundred and
fty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The sentence and judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-6897. November 29, 1956.]
In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney's Fees. CLARO M. RECTO ,

claimant-appellee, vs . ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and FRED M.
HARDEN , defendants-appellants.
J. W. Ferrier, Sr. and M. R. Sotelo for appellants.

Claro M. Recto for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; WIFE'S CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES

WITHOUT HUSBAND'S CONSENT; CONTINGENT FEES ON HER SHARE IN CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT BIND THE LATTER. — Where the wife executed a contract of
professional services whereby she binds herself among other things that she agrees to
pay her attorney twenty (20%) per cent of the value of the share and participation which
she may receive in the funds and properties of the conjugal partnership of herself and
her husband, such contract does not seek to bind the conjugal partnership. The wife
merely bound herself — and assumed the personal obligation — to pay by way of
contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor
purports to give to her lawyer any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her
aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
2. ID.; CONTINGENT FEES NOT PROHIBITED IN THE PHILIPPINES. —
Appellants contention "that article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippine in effect
prohibit contingent fees in untenable. Contingent fees are not prohibited in the
Philippines and are impliedly sanctioned by our Canons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics.
(See also Ulanday vs. Manila Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554).
3. ID.; WIFE'S CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES; INTERPRETED AND
CONSTRUED. — Appellant's contention that the contract in question has for it purpose
to secure of divorce allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines is not borne out either by the language of the contract between
them or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce or
facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the
interest of the wife in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit
she intended to file in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as the husband and
wife are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the dissolution
thereof are governed — pursuant to Art. 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force
in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in question) and Article 15
of the Civil Code of the Philippines — by the laws of the United States, which sanction
divorce. In short, the contract of services, between the wife and her lawyer, is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
4. ID.; CONTRACT OF SERVICES WHEN NOT OPPRESSIVE OR INEQUITABLE.
— Considering the character of the services rendered by the attorney in the case at bar,
the nature and importance of the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time
(1944 to 1952) and the trouble involved therein, the skill displayed in connection with
said cases, the value of the property affected by the controversy the professional
character and standing of the lawyer, the risks assumed and the results obtained, Held:
that the character and standing of the lawyer, the risks assumed and the results
obtained, Held: that the contract of services in question is neither harsh nor oppressive
or inequitable.
5. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; WIFE'S
CONTRACT OF SERVICES; 20% CONTINGENT FEES ON HER SHARE IN CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP; INTENTION TO FILE SUIT FOR DIVORCE AS CONDITION; RENDERED
IMPOSSIBLE BY WIFE. — The contract of services was made principally, in
contemplation of a suit for divorce which the wife intended to file before a competent
court in California, "and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between' her and
her husband. Had she filed said action for divorce and secure a decree of divorce, said
conjugal partnership would have been dissolved and then liquidated and the share of
the wife therein would have been fixed. However this cannot take place, either now or in
the forseeable future owing to the agreements between the wife and her husband
which were made for the evident purpose of defeating the attorney's claim for his fees.
In other words the occurrences within the time contemplated by the parties — bearing
in mind the nature of and circumstances under which they entered into, said contract of
services — of the event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was rendered
impossible by the wife. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a
period, she may not insist upon its occurrence prior to the enforcement of the rights of
the lawyer, for "the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its fulfillment," (Art. 1186 Civil Code) and "the debtor shall lose every right to
make use of the period" when he "violates any undertaking in consideration of which the
creditor agreed to the period." (Art. 1198, Civil Code).
DECISION
CONCEPCION , J : p
This is an appeal taken by Esperanza P. de Harden and Fred M. Harden from a

decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the pertinent part of which is of the
following tenor:.
"The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitled under paragraph 3 of
the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is 20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of
P384,110.97.
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves the recommendation of the
Commissioner with the above-stated modification, and finds that Attorney Claro
M. Recto is entitled to the sum of THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR THOUSAND
ONE HUNDRED AND TEN PESOS AND NINETY-SEVEN CENTAVOS (P384,110.97),
representing 20% of Esperanza P. de Harden's share in the conjugal properties
owned by her and her husband, Fred M. Harden, as contingent fee stipulated in
paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional Services, Exhibit JJJ or 20, and the
said Esperanza P. de Harden is hereby ordered to pay the said amount above-
stated." It appears that sometime in July, 1941, appellant, Mrs. Harden, and
appellee, Claro M. Recto, executed the following:
"CONTRACT OF PROFESSIONAL SERVICES
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
"That I, ESPERANZA PEREZ DE HARDEN, of age, married to Fred M.
Harden, and temporarily residing in the Philippines, with address at 534 Sales
Street, Manila, have engaged the services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to appear
and act as my counsel in the action which I will file against my husband, Fred M.
Harden, for the purpose of securing an increase in the amount of support being
received by me from the conjugal partnership of myself and said Fred M. Harden,
and for the purpose likewise of protecting and preserving my rights in the
properties of the said conjugal partnership, in contemplation of the divorce suit
which I intent to file against him in the competent Court of California and of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between us, this contract of services to be
under the following conditions:
"1. That in lieu of retainer fee, which under the circumstances I am not
in a position to pay, I hereby agree to pay Attorney Claro M. Recto, such payment
to be made monthly, during the pendency of the litigation and until the
termination of the same, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in
allowance or pension which may be awarded to me by the court over and above
the amount of P1,500.00 which I now receive monthly from defendant Fred M.
Harden out of the funds of the conjugal partnership; Provided, that should the
case be terminated or an amicable settlement thereof be arrived at by the parties
before the expiration of two years from the date of the filing of the complaint, I
shall continue to pay the said twenty-five (25%) per cent up to the end of said
period.
"2. That the aforesaid monthly payments shall be in addition to
whatever amount may be adjudged by the court against the defendant Fred M.
Harden or against the conjugal partnership by way of litis expense, that is,
attorney's fees chargeable as expenses of litigation.
"3. That as full and complete satisfaction of the fees of Attorney Claro
M. Recto in connection with the case above referred to, and said case being for
the purposes aforestated, that is, to secure an increase in the amount of support I
now receive as well as to protect and preserve my rights and interest in the
properties of the conjugal partnership, in contemplation of divorce and of the
liquidation of said partnership, I hereby agree to pay said Attorney Claro M. Recto
twenty (20%) per cent of the value of the share and participation which I may
receive in the funds and properties of the said conjugal partnership of myself and
defendant Fred M. Harden, as a result of the liquidation thereof either by death,
divorce, judicial separation, compromise or by any means or method by virtue of
which said partnership is or may be liquidated.
"4. All expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for my
account, but the same may be advanced by Attorney Claro M. Recto, to be
reimbursed to him either from the money which I receive by way of support or
from the funds of the conjugal partnership.
"5. It is hereby understood that this contract includes the services of
Attorney Claro M. Recto in connection with the securing of the liquidation of the
properties and assets of the conjugal partnership of myself and Fred M. Harden,
upon dissolution of said partnership or for any other cause mentioned in
Paragraph (3) hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have signed these presents in the City _____ of
Manila, Philippines this _______ day of July, 1941.
s/ Esperanza P. de Harden
t/ ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN
ACCEPTED:
s/ Claro M. Recto
t/ CLARO M. RECTO"
In compliance therewith, on July 12, 1941, the appellee, as counsel for Mrs.
Harden, commenced Civil Case No. 59634 of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled "Esperanza P. de Harden vs. Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides." In the
complaint therein filed, it was prayed, among other things: (a) that Mrs. Harden be given
the exclusive administration of the business and all properties of the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden; ( b ) that, in the event of denial of this prayer, the
defendants be ordered to inform her "of everything pertaining to the administration of
said business and properties", as well as to render accounts thereof and to permit her
to examine the books and records pertinent thereto; (c) that Mr. Harden be ordered to
account to Mrs. Harden, and to return to this jurisdiction, the sum of P449,015.44
allegedly withdrawn by him from the Philippines or sent by him to Hongkong on April 1,
1941; (d) that defendant Salumbides be ordered to account for all moneys, amounting
to P285,000.00, belonging to the business and assets of said conjugal partnership and
deposited by him in a safety box, either in his name, or in that of Antonio Wilson, from
January 23 to December 23, 1940; (e) that the transfer, in the name of Salumbides, of
certain shares of stock, allegedly belonging to the conjugal partnership, be rescinded
and said defendant ordered to transfer said shares of stock in the name of Mrs. Harden
or in that of Mr. and Mrs. Harden, should Mr. Harden be allowed to continue as
administrator of said partnership; ( f ) that the transfer, made by Mr. Harden and/or by
defendant Salumbides, as his attorney-in-fact, of 36,000 shares of stock of the Angelo
Mining Company, to some residents of Hongkong, be rescinded and said shares
returned to the assets of the conjugal partnership and placed in the name of Mr. and
Mrs. Harden; (g ) that the monthly allowance of Mrs. Harden be increased from P1,500
to P15,000; (h) that, pending nal decision, Mr. Harden be ordered to increase the
allowance or pension of Mrs. Harden and their daughter Sarah Elizabeth to P10,000 a
month; and (i) that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the defendants
from disposing of the assets of the conjugal partnership in fraud of Mrs. Harden.
By an order dated July 12, 1941, the court authorized the issuance of said writ,
upon the ling of the corresponding bond. It appears that, pursuant to an agreement
submitted by both parties, and with a view to avoiding unnecessary embarrassment,
restraint or inconvenience in the nancial operations of the business enterprises
affected by said writ of preliminary injunction, the same was amended by an order
dated July 19, 1941, in the sense that.
". . . without prejudicing in any way the rights of the parties in this case, a
separate bank account be established in the Chartered Bank of India, Australia
and China, of Manila, and all transactions in connection with the aforesaid
businesses passed through that account by Mr. Harden or his duly authorized
representative, who at present is Mr. Salumbides, without the necessity of
securing a particular order from this Court on each occasion; that the present
funds in the Philippine National Bank in the name of Plaza Lunch and Fred M.
Harden be utilized for the purpose of starting said special bank account in the
Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China; that all income from the aforesaid
businesses be deposited in this special bank account and no checks be drawn
upon the same, except to pay the necessary overhead and running expenses
including purchases of tobacco, merchandise, etc., required for the proper
operation of said businesses; that a new set of books be opened by Mr. Harden or
his duly authorized representative covering all business transactions passed
through said special bank account and the same be opened for inspection by the
plaintiff's duly authorized representative.
"The order of injunction of July 12, 1941, is modified only to the above
extent, and in all other respects is maintained."
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under
military occupation. Then came the liberation, in the course of which the records of this
case were destroyed. On October 23, 1946, said records were reconstituted at the
instance of appellee herein. Thereafter, the proceedings were resumed and, in due
course, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered, on or about October 31, 1949, a
decision the dispositive part of which we quote:
"In view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds and so holds that
—
"(a) Fred M. Harden abandoned his domicile of origin in New Jersey
and established a domicile of choice in Manila, Philippines, since 1901;
"(b) The matrimonial domicile of Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de
Harden was established in Manila, Philippines, from the date of their marriage on
December 14, 1917;
"(c) Since they did not execute any antenuptial contract before their
marriage, all the properties, real or personal, acquired by either or both of them on
and after December 14, 1917, up to the present, over and above the sum of
P20,000.00 representing Fred M. Harden's capital, are hereby declared conjugal
properties;
"(d) The total amount of P1,944,794.37 representing deposits in safety
deposit boxes in the name of Jose Salumbides, the selling price of the house in
Los Angeles, California, and the pre-war and post-war remittances abroad of Fred
M. Harden, from which has already been deducted the sum of P160,000.00
covering payments for deficiency Federal income taxes and attorney's fees, both
in the tax case and the present one, is hereby declared chargeable to the share of
defendant Harden and deductible from whatever participation he may still have in
the said conjugal partnership upon the liquidation thereof, upon his failure to
return and deposit them in the name of the Plaza Lunch with the Manila branch
of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China up to the time this decision
shall become final;
"(e) A conjugal lien be annotated in the original and owner's duplicate
of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 24393, 52436 and 54911 of the Register of
Deeds of Manila and in Original Certificate of Title No. 2292 of Quezon Province,
and on all the certificates of shares belonging to said conjugal partnership, as
well as in the corresponding books of the companies or corporations issuing
them, whereby it will be made to appear that any subsequent alienation or
encumbrance of said properties by Fred M. Harden alone or his representative
without the consent of his wife will be deemed fraudulent and subject to
revocation or cancellation for being in fraud and prejudicial to the right of
Esperanza P. de Harden;
"( f ) Within a period of fifteen (15) days after this decision shall have
become final, Fred M. Harden and Esperanza P. de Harden are hereby ordered to
execute a document to be approved by this court creating and express active trust
upon the remaining cash assets and income of the conjugal partnership in the
Philippines, whereby the Philippine Trust Company, with offices in Manila, will act
as trustee, subject to the right of Fred M. Harden to receive therefrom the sum of
P2,500,00 a month by way of allowance and an equal amount for the plaintiff as
separate support and maintenance;
"(g) Within thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final,
Fred M. Harden shall inform the plaintiff of all the properties and businesses of
the conjugal partnership, be they in the Philippines or abroad, and render a true
and complete accounting of the earnings and profits thereof;
"(h) The plaintiff is entitled to litis expensae in the amount of
P175,000.00 for services rendered by her counsel up to the rendition of this
judgment, which Fred M. Harden or the herein receiver is ordered to pay within a
period of fifteen (15) days after this decision has become final; and
"(i) The writ of preliminary injunction of July 12, 1941, is hereby
declared permanent and the order of receivership of November 20, 1946, is hereby
maintained, but said auxiliary remedies will be automatically lifted upon the
conclusion of the annotation of the conjugal lien and the execution of the deed of
trust above mentioned. Without costs.
"IT IS SO ORDERED."
The defendants appealed from said decision to this Court, where the case was
docketed as case No. L-3687. While the appeal was thus pending before us, herein
appellee led a manifestation and a motion, both dated February 20, 1952. In said
"manifestation", appellee stated that Mrs. Harden had instructed him, by letter, to
"discontinue all proceedings relative to" said case, "vacate all orders and judgments
rendered therein, and abandon and nullify all her claims to the conjugal partnership
existing between her and Mr. Harden", in accordance with several instruments dated
January 29, 1952, and executed without the knowledge, advise and consent of said
appellee, as counsel for Mrs. Harden, whereby: (1) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had purportedly
agreed to settle their differences in consideration of the sum of $5,000 paid by Mr.
Harden to Mrs. Harden, and a monthly pension of P500 to be paid by him to her; (2) Mr.
Harden had created a trust fund of $20,000 from which said monthly pension of $500
would be taken; and (3) Mr. and Mrs. Harden had mutually released and forever
discharged each other from all actions, debts, duties, accounts, demands and claims to
the conjugal partnership, in consideration of the sum of $1. It was further asserted, in
appellee's "manifestation", that the purpose of the said instruments, executed by Mr.
and Mrs. Harden, was to defeat the claim of the former for attorney's fees, for which
reason, he prayed, in his aforementioned motion, that
"a) Pending the resolution of this motion, the receiver appointed herein
be authorized to continue holding the properties above mentioned in his custody
in order not to defeat the undersigned's inchoate lien on them;
"b) A day set aside to receive the evidence of the undersigned and
those of the plaintiff and the defendant Fred M. Harden, in order to determine the
amount of fees due to the undersigned, by the appointment of a referee or
commissioner for the reception of such
"c) After due hearing, the undersigned be declared entitled to the sum
of P400,000.00 as his fees for services rendered in behalf of the plaintiff in this
case, under paragraph 3 of the contract, Annex 'A', and to that end a charging lien
therefore be established upon the properties above-mentioned;
"d) And the receiver be ordered to pay to the undersigned the full
amount of the fees to which the latter is found to be entitled."
Counsel for the defendants-appellants, in turn, moved for the dismissal of the
case, to which appellee objected. Acting upon the issues raised in such motion for
dismissal and in appellee's motion to establish and enforce his charging lien, as
counsel for Mrs. Harden, this Court issued on July 22, 1952, a resolution the pertinent
part of which reads:
"It will be seen from the above that the defendants-appellants pray for the
complete dismissal of the above entitled case without prejudice to the annotation
of the contingent claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto on the property under
receivership, other than the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company which
belong to Fred M. Harden. On the other hand, Attorney Claro M. Recto agrees to
the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and
commitment, and all other interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of
this case, with the exception of the receivership, but objects to the dismissal of
the case on the ground that, since receivership is merely an auxiliary remedy, the
present case should be allowed to remain pending for the purpose of maintaining
the receivership to safeguard his right to collect the fees that may be due him.
"Attorney Claro M. Recto prays that a commissioner or referee be
immediately appointed by this Court to receive evidence in support of his
allegations as to his attorney's lien and its enforcement. Counsel for the
defendants-appellants does not object to this proceeding provided that the
restrictions set forth by him be observed. However, this Court does not have the
proper facilities for receiving evidence in order to determine the amount of the
fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, and it is deemed advisable that this
matter be determined by the Court of First Instance. This is specially so
considering the opposition to the claim of Attorney Claro M. Recto filed by
Attorney J. W. Ferrier, Sr. in behalf of Esperanza P. de Harden.
"In view of the foregoing, the above entitled case is hereby remanded to the
court of origin in order to determine the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro
M. Recto in his motion dated February 20, 1952.
"It is understood that, after said fees had been finally determined and paid,
this case will be completely dismissed as prayed for by the defendants-
appellants, without prejudice to considering the claim of the receiver for
compensation as stated in his urgent motion dated July 2, 1952. "Pending the
determination of the amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Recto, the writ
of preliminary injunction, the orders of contempt and commitment, and all
interlocutory orders which were issued in the course of this case, are hereby lifted
and vacated, and with regard to the receivership, the same is hereby dissolved,
only with respect to the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Company. As to the
rest of the properties, the receivership shall be maintained."
In compliance with said resolution, the records of this case were remanded to
the lower court, which, on September 2, 1952, designated a commissioner to receive
evidence on the amount of the fees collectible by herein appellee and to report thereon.
After due hearing, said commissioner submitted, on February 6, 1953, a report of about
one hundred (100) pages of the printed record on appeal, setting forth, in detail, the
evidence introduced by both parties, and his ndings of fact, with the following
conclusion and recommendation:
"Taking into consideration the value of the properties involved in this
litigation, the length of time in which claimant had handled the same for
Esperanza Harden, the volume and quality of the work performed, the
complicated legal questions involved, the responsibility assumed by the claimant
as counsel, his reputation in the bar, the difficulties encountered by him while
handling the same in which he had to work hard every inch of the way because of
the stiff oppositions filed by adverse counsel, the diligence he employed not only
in the preservation of the records in his possession during the days of enemy
occupation but also in the protection of the interests of Esperanza Harden, his
successful handling of said case and those cases growing out of it which
reached the Supreme Court, and the extra services he rendered in her behalf in the
tax and other court cases, the undersigned Commissioner concludes that
claimant is entitled to the full amount of 20% of Esperanza Harden's share of the
conjugal properties, as provided in paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional
Services, Exhibit JJJ.
"WHEREFORE, the undersigned Commissioner respectfully recommends
that Atty. Claro M. Recto be paid the equivalent amount of 20% of Esperanza P.
de Harden's share of the conjugal properties or the sum of P369,410.04 as his
contingent fee for services rendered in her behalf."
After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendered a decision dated April
30, 1953, adopting substantially said report of the commissioner, but increasing the
contingent fee of appellee herein from P369,410.04, the sum recommended in the
report, to P384,110.97. Hence, this appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
The rst question for determination therein is the validity of the above-quoted
contract of services, which the appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground: (1)
that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband's consent;
(2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits contingent
fees; (3) that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of divorce,
allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines; and (4) that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and
oppressive.
The rst objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not
seek to bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely
bound herself — or assumed the personal obligation — to pay, by way of contingent
fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to
give, to the appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid
share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
For the same reason, the second objection is, likewise, untenable. Moreover, it
has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines and are
impliedly sanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (see, also,
Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the
United States (Legal Ethics by Henry S. Drinker, p. 176).
". . . in the United States, the great weight of authority recognizes the
validity of contracts for contingent fees, provided such contracts are not in
contravention of public policy, and it is only when the attorney has taken an
unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client that such a claim is condemned."
(See 5 Am. Jur. 359 et seq.; Ballentine, Law Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 276.)
Needless to say, there is absolutely nothing in the records before us to show that
appellee herein had, in any manner, taken an unfair or unreasonable advantage of his
client Mrs. Harden.
The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract
between them, or by the intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a
divorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to
protect the interest of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a
divorce suit she intended to le in the United States. What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and
Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United States, their status and the
dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain
(which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution of the contract in
question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — by the laws of the United
States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services, between Mrs. Harden
and herein appellee, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.
The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one
who seeks equity must come with clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. Dy Buncio & Co., 93
Phil., 195; 30 C. J. S. 475), and appellants have not done so, for the circumstances
surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned agreements,
ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife, were made
for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of herein appellee, under his
above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a
judgment in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal
partnership, which turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis
expensae in the sum of P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have
waived such rights, as well as the bene ts of all orders and judgments in her favor, in
consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000 allegedly paid to her by Mr. Harden and the
additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in installments, at the rate of $500 a
month. In fact, no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement
between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. One can not even consider the possibility of a
reconciliation between the spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary
consideration for said alleged settlement. What is more, the records show that the
relations between said spouses — which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when
Mrs. Harden engaged the services of the appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs.
Harden were separated since 1938 — had worsened considerably thereafter, as
evidence by an action for divorce led by Mr. Harden in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon
the ground of repeated acts of in delity allegedly committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940
and 1941.
Again, it appears that appellee had rendered, under the contract in question, the
following services, for the benefit of Mrs. Harden:
1. He succeeded in defeating defendants' motion for the dissolution of the
writ of preliminary injunction, issued by the Court on July 12, 1941, and amended on
July 19, 1941.
2. On November 12, 1946, appellee moved for the appointment of a receiver,
upon the ground that, despite said writ of preliminary injunction, the defendants had
been disposing of the properties of the conjugal partnership for the purpose of
defrauding Mrs. Harden. After due hearing, the court, by an order dated November 20,
1946, directed the appointment of Abelardo Perez as receiver of said properties, upon
the ling of a P10,000 bond. Defendants asked, on February 13, 1947, that the
receivership be suspended, or else, that they be allowed to le a bond for the discharge
of the receivership. Appellee replied objecting thereto, unless the defendants posted a
P4,000,000 bond. Subsequently or on March 5, 1947, the defendants sought a
reconsideration of the order of November 20, 1946, and the discharge of the receiver.
By an order dated March 21, 1947, the Court authorized said discharged upon the ling,
by the defendants, of a bond in the sum of P500,000, provided that Mr. Harden "should
bring back all the 368,553 shares of the Balatoc Mining Co., in his name to the
Philippines for deposit with the Clerk of Court, or with the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China, at Manila . . .
"3. On motion of the appellee dated March 4, 1947, the Court, by an order
dated April 5, 1947, directed Mr. Harden to remit to Mrs. Harden the sum of $2,500, to
be charged against her litis expensae. Upon similar motion, led by appellee on or
about April 26, 1947, the Court ordered Mr. Harden, on May 13, 1947, to furnish Mrs.
Harden the sum of $5,000, under the same conditions.
4. On June 21, 1947, the defendants instituted Civil Case No. G. R. No. L-1499
of this Court, entitled "Fred M. Harden and Jose Salumbides vs. Emilio Peña, Abelardo
Perez and Esperanza P. Harden" for the purpose of annulling and setting aside, by writ
of certiorari, the aforementioned orders of the lower court dated July 12, 1941,
November 20, 1946, and April 5 and May 13, 1947, and to restrain, in the meantime, the
enforcement thereof. After appropriate proceedings, in the course of which appellee
appeared as counsel for Mrs. Harden, and like counsel for the petitioners therein, led
several lengthy, detailed pleadings and memoranda, decision was rendered on
November 21, 1950, denying the writ of certiorari prayed for.
5. On or about September 9, 1947, appellee led a motion alleging that

despite the writ of preliminary injunction above mentioned, the defendants had,
fraudulently and without judicial consent, remitted abroad several sums of money
aggregating P1,000,608.66, and praying that Mr. Harden be ordered to return this sum
to the Philippines, within a stated period, said sum to be deposited with the account of
the Plaza Lunch at the Manila Branch of the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and
China. Mr. Harden objected to said motion. Appellee led a rejoinder, to which Mr.
Harden replied. Appellee led a rejoinder to the rejoinder. On October 7, 1947, the Court
granted appellee's motion. Mr. Harden sought a reconsideration, which was opposed
by the appellee on October 27, 1947, and denied by an order dated November 13, 1947.
Mr. Harden moved, on November 18, 1947, for the suspension of this order, which was
immediately objected to by the appellee and then denied by the Court.
6. Inasmuch as said order of November 13, 1947 had not been complied
with, appellee led on November 27, 1947, a motion praying that Mr. Harden be
declared in contempt of court and punished accordingly. Meanwhile, or on November
24, 1947, Mr. Harden had instituted case G. R. No. L-1816 of this Court against Hon.
Emilio Peña, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Mrs. Harden. In the
petition therein led, Mr. Harden applied for a writ of certiorari annulling said orders of
Judge Peña of October 7 and November 13, 1947, and prayed that, pending disposition
of the case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents
therein from enforcing said orders, particularly through contempt proceedings. Hence,
the lower court deferred action on the aforementioned motion of November 27, 1947.
After due hearing, this Court, in a resolution dated February 12, 1948, refused to issue
the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for. Subsequently, or on November 21, 1950,
decision was rendered denying the petition for a writ of certiorari.
7. Soon after the issuance of our resolution in said case G. R. No. 1816, dated
February 12, 1948, or to be exact on March 27, 1948, the lower court issued an order
directing Mr. Harden to comply, within ve (5) days from notice, with the order of
October 7, 1947. On April 6, 1948, appellee led with the lower court the corresponding
formal charges against Mr. Harden for contempt of court. After due hearing, Mr. Harden
was, by an order of April 28, 1948, found guilty as charged and ordered con ned "until
he complies with the aforementioned orders" of October 7, 1947 and March 27, 1948.
On motion of Mr. Harden, said order of April 28, 1948 was suspended until May 4, 1948,
on which date he was arrested and placed in con nement at the New Bilibid Prison, in
Muntinglupa, Rizal. On July 10, 1948, he led with this Court a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus against the Director of Prisons, (G. R. No. L-2349, entitled "Fred M.
Harden vs. The Director of Prisons"), which, in due course was denied in a decision
promulgated on October 22, 1948.
8. During the military occupation of the Philippines by the Japanese, the
appellee made representations with the Japanese Government to prevent the
commandeering of a business establishment belonging to Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
Moreover, he succeeded in persuading the Japanese to refrain from interning Mrs.
Harden and her daughter and to allow her to withdraw, from the former's deposit in a
local bank, from P200 to P250 a month, for their subsistence. He, likewise, lent her
money to meet her needs and spent the sum of P55,000 in the preservation of the
records and papers pertaining to the business and other properties of the conjugal
partnership of Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
9. Appellee assisted, also, the receiver, as his counsel and, in such capacity,
took all steps essential for the proper discharge of the duties of the former. Among
other things, appellee sought and obtained judicial authority for some important acts of
administration of, and disposition by, the receiver. He (appellee) secured judicial
intervention for the protection and preservation of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, including orders for the delivery of certi cates of stock, the return thereof
and/or its deposit with the clerk of court. He, likewise, represented the receiver in
seeking war damage payments.
10. In civil case No. 6222 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
"Francisco Dalupan vs. Fred M. Harden" for the recovery of P113,837.17, it was decided,
through appellee's intervention, that the conjugal assets would bear the payment of
P22,767.43 only, the balance to be chargeable exclusively against Mr. Harden's share of
the conjugal partnership.
11. Appellee instituted civil case No. 6940 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, entitled "Abelardo Perez vs. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China and
Fred M. Harden", for the recovery of P1,000,608.66 and the return of stock certi cates
of the Balatoc Mining Co., which had been sent abroad.
12. He (appellee) represented Mrs. Harden in connection with a million-peso
federal tax case against Mr. and Mrs. Harden.
13. Appellee successfully blocked Mr. Harden's attempts to withdraw: (1)
$53,000 and forward the same to the Collector of Internal Revenue of Los Angeles,
California; (2) $50,000.00, allegedly to defray expenses in resisting a new tax
assessment against him in the United States; and (3) P65,000 for his expenses.
Then too, the conjugal partnership had varried and extensive business interests
and its assets were worth almost P4,000,000. The pleadings, motions, oppositions,
rejoinders, and memoranda led, and the evidence introduced, in the aforementioned
cases — in which appellee was pitted against one of the most experienced and able
members of the Philippine Bar — were numerous, extensive and exhaustive. For
instance, the record on appeal in one of those cases, namely, G. R. No. L-3687,
consisted of 966 pages.
In short, considering the character of the services rendered by the appellee, the
nature and importance of the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time (1941
to 1952) and trouble involved therein, the skill displayed in connection with said cases,
the value of the property affected by the controversy, the professional character and
standing of the appellee, the risks assumed and the results obtained, we are of the
opinion, and so hold, that the contract of services in question is neither harsh nor
oppressive or inequitable.
Under their second assignment of error, appellants maintain that:
"The lower court erred in failing to find as a fact borne out by the evidence
that the legal services of Attorney Claro M. Recto to Mrs. Esperanza P. de Harden,
payment, for which is sought by him in this case, have already been paid by his
immediate execution pending appeal of the decision in Civil Case No. CFI-R-59634
(SC-G.R. No. L- 3687), wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for all such
legal services."
Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000
represents litis expensae, and the contract between the appellee and Mrs. Harden
explicitly declares that said litis expensae shall be "in addition to" appellee's share of
25% of the increase in the allowance of Mrs. Harden and his attorney's fees of 20% of
her share in the conjugal partnership. The second assignment of error is, therefore,
devoid of merit.
Appellants, further contend, that:
3. The lower court erred in holding that the inchoate share of the wife,
Esperanza P. de Harden, in the undissolved and unliquidated conjugal partnership
properties of the Harden spouses, is capable of certain valuation before such
dissolution and liquidation, and summarily assessing the value of Mrs. Harden's
share in such conjugal properties without proper evidence.
4. "The lower court erred in awarding 20% of such inchoate share to
Attorney Claro M. Recto from Mrs. Harden's interests in the Harden conjugal
properties, summarily assessing such 20% inchoate share as of a value of
P384,110.97, and ordering the payment of said sum to Attorney Recto in
pursuance of the provisions of paragraph 3 of the Contract of Professional
Services."
Appellants' arguments in support thereof may be summarized as follows: The
contract of services in question provides that appellee's contingent fees shall be 20%
of the share of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of
Mrs. Harden shall be determined upon the liquidation of said partnership, which has not
taken place, as yet. What is more, it cannot be effected until the dissolution of the
marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs. Harden. Inasmuch as this relation subsists, it
follows that the amount of attorney's fees due to appellee herein should not have been
determined in the decision appealed from.
This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made,
principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she
intended to le before a competent court in California, "and of the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership between" her and Mr. Harden. Had she led said action for divorce
and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have been dissolved
and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would have been xed.
However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the foreseeable future, owing to the
aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the
evident purpose of defeating appellee's claim for attorney's fees. In other words, the
occurrence, within the time contemplated by the parties — bearing in mind the nature of,
and the circumstances under which they entered into, said contract of services — of the
event upon which the amount of said fees depended, was rendered impossible by Mrs.
Harden. Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a period, she may
not insist upon its occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the herein
appellee, for "the condition shall be deemed ful lled when the obligor voluntarily
prevents its ful llment" (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and "the debtor shall lose every right to
make use of the period" when he "violates any undertaking, in consideration of which
the creditor agreed to the period." (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)
It should be noted, also, that the compensation agreed upon for appellee's
services, consists of three (3) parts, namely: (a) 25% of the increase in the allowance of
Mrs. Harden; (b ) litis expensae; and (c) 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership.
The rst part was dealt with in the rst paragraph of their contract of services. The
second and third parts were the object of the second and third paragraphs,
respectively. The rst paragraph limited the rights of appellee thereunder to two (2)
years, in the event of termination of the case or amicable settlement thereof within two
(2) years from the ling of the complaint. No such limitation appears in the second and
third paragraphs of said contract. Hence, the same were intended by the parties to be
fully operative under any and all conditions.
It may not be amiss to add that the value of the properties involved has been
assessed, not summarily, but after due notice and full dress hearing, in the course of
which both parties introduced testimonial and documentary evidence. Appellants
presented Exhibits 1 to 58, whereas those of the appellee were so numerous that,
having begun with Exhibit A, his last piece of documentary evidence was marked Exhibit
26 Y's. The transcript of the hearing, which lasted ten (10) days, covers over 220 pages.
The other assignments of error made by appellants herein are mere corollaries of
those already disposed of, and, hence, no further discussion thereof is necessary.
In conclusion, it appears that the assets of the conjugal partnership between Mr.
and Mrs. Harden are reasonably valued at P3,841,109.70. One-half (1/2) thereof,
representing the share of Mrs. Harden, is therefore, worth P1,920,554.85. Twenty
percentum (20%) of this sum is P384,110.97, which is the contingent fee due to the
appellee, apart from the litis expensae already paid to him. Inasmuch as the appellee
has collected, also, the sum of P80,000.00, on account of said contingent fees, there
results in his favor a balance of P304,110.97.
Subject to this quali cation, the decision appealed from is hereby af rmed,
therefore, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B.
L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.]
ALICE REYES VAN DORN , petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO,

JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the
National Capital Region Pasay City, and RICHARD UPTON ,
respondents.
DECISION
MELENCIO-HERRERA , J : p
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P,
issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent led suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-
P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in
Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking
that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.
The denial is now the subject of this Certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject
to appeal. Certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of
an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was
patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves
upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1
Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with
the proceedings. 2 We consider the petition led in this case within the exception, and we
have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds; and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt,
Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that
there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in
the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law rm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W.
Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
"You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to le an Answer,

appear on my behalf and do all things necessary and proper to represent me,
without further contesting, subject to the following:
"1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
"2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

"3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx" 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For
instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in
Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
court of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic
relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage
tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a
wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property. cdll
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged
to live together with, observe respect and delity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2. U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).

3. Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4. p. 98, Rollo.
5. "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad."
6. cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga,
Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.]
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL , petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-

SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity
as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING ,
respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; ADULTERY

AND CONCUBINAGE; SWORN WRITTEN COMPLAINT OF OFFENDED SPOUSE,
JURISDICTIONAL. — Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as
well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a
formal, requirement. While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the
offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint
is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIVE AND SUCCESSIVE RULE IN THE PROSECUTION OF
SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION, RAPE AND ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, NOT APPLICABLE TO
CONCUBINAGE AND ADULTERY. — Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions
for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery
and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-
called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above
mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State,
as parens partriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with
the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the
aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of
her parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of
adultery and concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE IN CIVIL CASES, DETERMINED AS OF THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT, APPLIED TO PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES. —
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and
express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion
to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition. The
absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have
been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced
by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the
complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes", or those which
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre,
the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the
action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and option.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — This policy was adopted out of consideration for the
aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through
the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the
time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence
since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed
offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing
of the criminal case.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADULTERY AND CONCUBINAGE; AFTER A DIVORCE HAS BEEN
DECREED, THE INNOCENT SPOUSE NO LONGER HAS THE RIGHT TO INSTITUTE
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE OFFENDERS. — American jurisprudence, on cases involving
statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia with ours, yields the rule that after a
divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse
shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no
legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; U.S. RULE APPLIED IN THIS JURISDICTION. — We see no reason why
the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction, considering our
statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of such nature,
the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time the
complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended
spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of
the filing of the complaint.
7. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE IN THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY BETWEEN A FILIPINA AND A GERMAN, RECOGNIZED IN THE
PHILIPPINES. — In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid
divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; SEVERANCE OF MATERIAL BOND HAD THE EFFECT OF DISSOCIATING
THE FORMER SPOUSES FROM EACH OTHER. — The allegation of private respondent that
he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge,
even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent
initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family
nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would
there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of
the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had
the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
9. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; RULE IN
MATA CASE (18 PHIL. 4 90), NOT APPLICABLE TO CASE AT BAR. — The aforecited case of
United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private respondent. In
applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous
the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to
appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and
unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot
be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of
nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating
that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for
adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decision in
said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the
termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule
and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected,
as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
DECISION
REGALADO , J : p
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute

divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be
an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar
of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The
marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983
where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5
However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated January 8,
1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 The
complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda
Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434
went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department
of Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to
defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 1 0 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz
suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent
judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6,
1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435
until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 1 1 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 1 2 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 1 3 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from
further proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988
Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and,
upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city
fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue. LexLib
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 1 7 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 1 8
While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 1 9 and without
which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else.
Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision
is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive
rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery
and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens partriae, was added and
vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal
action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or
guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In
other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the
action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and
express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion
to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not
have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes", or those
which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such
genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 2 0 Hence,
as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse
of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the
action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the
time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a
party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific
issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist
where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter. cdphil
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
" 'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the
husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant
when the offense is said to have been committed, he had ceased to be such when
the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as
to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense is
against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for
this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending
spouse must be such when the prosecution is commenced." (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to
the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country,
the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 2 3 in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 2 4 after a divorce was granted by
a United States court between Alice Van Dorn, a Filipina, and her American husband, the
latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal
property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be
granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
"There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her
husband, in any State of the Union . . .
"It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law . . .
"Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband
of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets . . ." 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 2 6 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same
as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage
be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null
and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect".
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after
the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning, any
complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg to
stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before
the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same
rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was
effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, herein before cited, 2 7
must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the
offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although
an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue
determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is
hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J ., concurring :
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute

divorce as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by
the very act of his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered
as the offended party in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another,
because in divorcing her, he already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual
relations with others. A contrary ruling would be less than fair for a man, who is free to
have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman of the same privilege.
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and
binding in the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their
National law, namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court
regarding the validity of such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to
a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalities would be involved.
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and
precisely because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid
insofar as the American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is
involved. This results in what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino
woman is still married to a man who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of
the undersigned that very likely the opposite expresses the correct view. While under the
national law of the husband the absolute divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to
the application of the proper foreign law (one of the exceptions to comity) is when the
foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people or residents of the forum.
Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the part of the husband
would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would be still valid
under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new Family
Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both
with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.(139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact
that the husband was an American with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of
the divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, 5, 29.
2. Ibid., 6, 29.
3. Ibid., 7.
4. Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.
5. Ibid., 7, 178.
6. Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.
7. Ibid., 8-9, 178.
8. Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.
9. Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.
10. Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.
11. Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.
12. Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.
13. Ibid., 10; Annex H, id.
14. Ibid., 105.
15. Ibid., 11.
16. Ibid., 311-313.
17. Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.
18. People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569
(1971); People vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.
19. Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672 (1980).
20. Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves, et
al. vs. Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984).
21. Rollo, 289.
22. 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153, 37
p. 1099; State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.
23. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).
24. 139 SCRA 139, 140 (1985).
25. The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, effective
on August 3, 1988), Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law."

26. U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).
27. Footnote 20, ante.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990.]
SALVADOR H. LAUREL , petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the

Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary , respondents.
[G.R. No. 92047. July 25, 1990.]
DIONISIO S. OJEDA , petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG,

JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA,
AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as members of the
PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE
UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
IN JAPAN , respondents.
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR. , J : p
These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their
representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the 3,179
square meters of land at 306 Ropponggi, 5-Chome Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan scheduled on
February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a temporary restraining order effective
February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047) likewise prayer for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose to the public the basis of their
decision to push through with the sale of the Roppongi property inspite of strong public
opposition and to explain the proceedings which effectively prevent the participation of
Filipino citizens and entities in the bidding process.
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the Court on
March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al. was filed, the
respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's resolution dated February 22,
1990. The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990 when the memoranda of
the parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon.
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a
motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047, followed by
a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we granted on May 8,
1990, a third motion for extension of time granted on May 24, 1990 and a fourth motion
for extension of time which we granted on June 5, 1990 but calling the attention of the
respondents to the length of time the petitions have been pending. After the comment was
filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his
motion and resolved to decide the two (2) cases. LexLib

I
The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired by the
Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan on May 9,
1956, the other lots being:
(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku,
Tokyo which has an area of approximately 2,489.96 square meters,
and is at present the site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;
(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area
of around 764.72 square meters and categorized as a commercial lot
now being used as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate
staff; and
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyamacho, Shinohara,
Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is now vacant.
The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the
Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World War II.
The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would be
payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of procurements to be
fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2, Reparations Agreement). Rep.
Act. No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the national policy on procurement and
utilization of reparations and development loans. The procurements are divided into those
for use by the government sector and those for private parties in projects as the then
National Economic Council shall determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be
made available by sale to Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned
entities in national development projects.
The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the Second
Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through Reparations
Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roponggi property consists of the land and
building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Memorandum for
Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter
was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 when the Roppongi building needed major
repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi
property has remained undeveloped since that time.
A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine
Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease
agreement with a Japanese firm — Kajima Corporation — which shall construct two (2)
buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the present
Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction would be the
lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be constructed in Roppongi
and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building in Roppongi shall then be used
as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of the lease period, all the three leased
buildings shall be occupied and used by the Philippine government. No change of
ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" to Reply to Comment) The Philippine
government retains the title all throughout the lease period and thereafter. However, the
government has not acted favorably on this proposal which is pending approval and
ratification between the parties. Indeed, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a
committee to study the disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in
Tokyo and Kobe, Japan through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative
Orders Numbered 3-A, B, C and D.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-Filipino
citizens or entities to avail of reparations' capital goods and services in the event of sale,
lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the Roppongi were specifically
mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has been
pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties starting with the
Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a minimum floor price at
$225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one bidder qualified. The second
one, after postponements, has not yet materialized. The last scheduled bidding on
February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later, the rules on bidding were changed
such that the $225 million floor price became merely a suggested floor price. cdrep
The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner in
G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone while the
petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged unjustified bias of the
Philippine government in favor of selling the property to non-Filipino citizens and entities.
These petitions have been consolidated and are resolved at the same time for the
objective is the same — to stop the sale of the Roppongi property.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:
(1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
Philippine Government?; and
(2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. NO. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of the
government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of Executive
Order No. 296 in making the property available for the sale to non-Filipino citizens and
entities. He also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on the Utilization or
Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for being discriminatory against
Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them the right to be informed about
the bidding requirements.
II
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the related lots
were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government for diplomatic
and consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel states that the
Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of private ownership
under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra).
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended for
public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of public
dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State. The Roppongi
and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery, diplomatic, and consular
quarters, buildings and other improvements" (Second Year Reparations Schedule). The
petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a necessary service. They are held
by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. (Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot
be appropriated, is outside the commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it
cannot be alienated nor be the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v.
Rojas, 30 Phil. 20 [1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the moment, the
petitioner avers that the same remains property of public dominion so long as the
government has not used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a
removal of its original purpose or use.
The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the subject
property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where the property is
located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in determining the applicable law
regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of the title to a property. They also
invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice
which used the lex situs in explaining the inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a
property situated in Japan.
The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil Code is
applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public dominion. It
has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for public service or for
diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing Article 422, Civil Code) and
because the intention by the Executive Department and the Congress to convert it to
private use has been manifested by overt acts, such as, among others; (1) the transfer of
the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai; (2) the issuance of administrative orders for the
possibility of alienating the four government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of
Executive Order No. 296; (4) the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating
that funds may be taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the
holding of the public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the deferment
by the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an acknowledgment
by the Senate of the government's intention to remove the Roppongi property from the
public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda
v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478 which sought to enjoin the second bidding of
the Roppongi property scheduled on March 30, 1989.
III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R. No.
87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the executive
order contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop the national
patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also allegedly violates:
(1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands
of the public domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII,
Constitution; Section 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).
(2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges
and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony
(Section 10, Article VI, Constitution);

(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair
competition and trade practices;
(4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters
of public concern (Section 7, Article III, Constitution);
(5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not
wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the
Philippines under the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act
No. 1789); and
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest (Sections 28, Article II,
Constitution).
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an unconstitutional
executive order is a misapplication of public funds. He states that since the details of the
bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly disclosed until February 15, 1990
(or a few days before the scheduled bidding), the bidding guidelines are available only in
Tokyo, and the accomplishment of requirements and the selection of qualified bidders
should be done in Tokyo, interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have
the chance to comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the
Roppongi shall be sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains
tax under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted. cdll
IV
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the Roppongi
site and the three related properties were acquired through reparations agreements, that
these were assigned to the government sector and that the Roppongi property itself was
specifically designated under the Reparations Agreement to house the Philippine
Embassy.
The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled out. It is
dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding contract of
procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the Japanese government.
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
(Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:
"ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
"ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
"(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents,
ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
"ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property."
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been changed
because the lot has been idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co.
v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public domain, not
available for private appropriation or ownership "until there is a formal declaration on the
part of the government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108
Phil. 335 [1960]).
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair
and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazarao, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]).
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises. LexLib
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of

the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the
building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a
shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the
status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for
investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not have a
provision in this text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties procured from
Japan for the government sector. The executive order does not declare that the properties
lost their public character. It merely intends to make the properties available to foreigners
and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease or other disposition. It merely eliminates
the restriction under Rep. Act. 1789 that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino
citizens and one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive
Order No. 296 provides:
"Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of
other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the abovementioned properties can be
made available for sale, lease or any other manner of disposition to non-Filipino
citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino citizens."
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the Roppongi
and the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real properties. As
earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for the government
sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No. 1789). Only the private
sector properties can be sold to end-users who must be Filipinos or entities owned by
Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was amended by Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources
of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being
classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad.
Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public
use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive Department
to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future funding to
augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order
No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a
source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi property
by insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be the
ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property, Japanese law
and not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law — its coverage and effects, when
enacted, and exceptions to its provisions — is not presented to the Court. It is simply
asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply without stating what that
law provides. It is assumed on faith that Japanese law would allow the sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation
exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or
ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the
formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the
interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private
International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its
conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the
need to determine which law should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that
the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent
officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the
procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex
situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of
the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real
properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to
sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely
explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties
so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino
citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in
belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire
the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?
The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the recommendation
by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was premature or, at the very
least, conditioned on a valid change in the public character of the Roppongi property.
Moreover, the approval does not have the force and effect of law since the President
already lost her legislative powers. The Congress had already convened for more than a
year.
Assuming for the sale of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no longer of
public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides:
"Section 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a
party. — In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a
party to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any
other property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the
respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which,
together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of
the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall
be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless
the authority therefor be expressly vested by law in another officer." (Emphasis
supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
"SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. — Whenever real
property of the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of
conveyance shall be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
"(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another officer.
"(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality,
by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied).
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her
own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by
the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale of
the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less
authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the
public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious policy
considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the circumstances behind the
decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan. LexLib
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not pass upon
the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents' assertion, we
did not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi property. The Court
stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not the real issue and that
resolving the constitutional question was "neither necessary nor finally determinative of
the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner ultimately questions is the use of the
proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi property." In emphasizing that "the decision
of the Executive to dispose of the Roppongi property to finance the CARP . . . cannot be
questioned" in view of Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act. No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge
the fact that the property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was
authorized to dispose of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean
that in case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by
authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic development
projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the
proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in these
petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi property
from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority to allow the
sale of the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the constitutional issue raised
by petitioner Ojeda.
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these questions
are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary for the
determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will not pass upon
a constitutional question although property presented by the record if the case can be
disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a statute or general law
(Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, [1909], Railroad Commission v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not be sold:
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the
Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and
suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows and
orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties
lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a monument
to the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the
monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect
economic or financial benefits from them. But who would think of selling these
monuments? Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our
properties in Japan as memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and
suffered. Even if we should become paupers we should not think of selling them.
For it would be as if we sold the lives and blood and tears of our countrymen."
(Rollo-G.R. No. 92013, p. 147).
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:

"Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in
atonement for its past belligerence, for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and
for deaths, physical dislocation and economic devastation the whole Filipino
people endured in World War II.

"It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its
significance today remains undimmed, inspite of the lapse of 45 years since the
war ended, inspite of the passage of 32 years since the property passed on to the
Philippine government.
"Roppongi is a reminder that cannot — should not — be dissipated. . . ." (Rollo-
92047, p. 9)
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all
Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi and related properties
will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both the President and congress
must concur. Considering the properties' importance and value, the laws on conversion
and disposition of property of public dominion must be faithfully followed.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of

prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the
Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is
made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., concurring:
I concur completely with the excellent ponencia of Mr. Justice Gutierrez and will add the
following observations only for emphasis.
It is clear that the respondents have failed to show the President's legal authority to sell
the Roppongi property. When asked to do so at the hearing on these petitions, the Solicitor
General was at best ambiguous, although I must add in fairness that this was not his fault.
The fact is that there is no such authority. Legal expertise alone cannot conjure that
statutory permission out of thin air. Cdpr
Exec. Order No. 296, which reads like so much legislative double talk, does not contain
such authority. Neither does Rep. Act No. 6657, which simply allows the proceeds of the
sale of our properties abroad to be used for the comprehensive agrarian reform program.
Senate Res. No. 55 was a mere request for the deferment of the scheduled sale of the
Roppongi property, possibly to stop the transaction altogether; and in any case it is not a
law. The sale of the said property may be authorized only by Congress through a duly
enacted statute, and there is no such law.
Once again, we have affirmed the principle that ours is a government of laws and not of
men, where every public official, from the lowest to the highest, can act only by virtue of a
valid authorization. I am happy to note that in the several cases where this Court has ruled
against her, the President of the Philippines has submitted to this principle with becoming
grace.

PADILLA, J., concurring:
I concur in the decision penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, Jr., I only wish to make a few
observations which could help in further clarifying the issues.
Under our tri-partite system of government ordained by the Constitution, it is Congress
that lays down or determines policies. The President executes such policies. The policies
determined by Congress are embodied in legislative enactments that have to be approved
by the President to become law. The President, of course, recommends to Congress the
approval of policies but, in the final analysis, it is Congress that is the policy-determining
branch of government.
The judiciary interprets the laws and, in appropriate cases, determines whether the laws
enacted by Congress and approved by the President, and presidential acts implementing
such laws, are in accordance with the Constitution.
The Roppongi property was acquired by the Philippine government pursuant to the
reparations agreement between the Philippine and Japanese governments. Under such
agreement, this property was acquired by the Philippine government for a specific
purpose, namely, to serve as the site of the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan.
Consequently, Roppongi is a property of public dominion and intended for public service,
squarely falling within that class of property under Art. 420 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
"Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) ...
(2) "Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
(339a)"
Public dominion property intended for public service cannot be alienated unless the
property is first transformed into private property of the state otherwise known as
patrimonial property of the state. 1 The transformation of public dominion property to
state patrimonial property involves, to my mind, a policy decision. It is a policy decision
because the treatment of the property varies according to its classification. Consequently,
it is Congress which can decide and declare the conversion of Roppongi from a public
dominion property to a state patrimonial property. Congress has made no such decision
or declaration.
Moreover, the sale of public property (once converted from public dominion to state
patrimonial property) must be approved by Congress, for this again is a matter of policy
(i.e. to keep or dispose of the property). Sec. 48, Book 1 of the Administrative Code of
1987 provides:
'(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor
is expressly vested by law in another officer.
'(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but
titled in the name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or
instrumentality, by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality.' "
(Emphasis supplied)
But the record is bare of any congressional decision or approval to sell Roppongi. The
record is likewise bare of any congressional authority extended to the President to sell
Roppongi thru public bidding or otherwise. LexLib
It is therefore, clear that the President cannot sell or order the sale of Roppongi thru public
bidding or otherwise without a prior congressional approval, first, converting Roppongi
from a public dominion property to a state patrimonial property, and, second, authorizing
the President to sell the same.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to make PERMANENT the temporary
restraining order earlier issued by this Court.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
The central question, as I see it, is whether or not the so-called "Roppongi property" has
lost its nature as property of public dominion, and hence, has become patrimonial property
of the State. I understand that the parties are agreed that it was property intended for
"public service" within the contemplation of paragraph (2), of Article 430, of the Civil Code,
and accordingly, land of State dominion, and beyond human commerce. The lone issue is,
in the light of supervening developments, that is, — non-user thereof by the National
Government (for diplomatic purposes) for the last thirteen years; the issuance of Executive
Order No. 296 making it available for sale to any interested buyer; the promulgation of
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, making available for the
program's financing, State assets sold; the approval by the President of the
recommendation of the investigating committee formed to study the property's utilization;
and the issuance of Resolution No. 55 of the Philippine Senate requesting for the
deferment of its disposition — it, "Roppongi", is still property of the public dominion, and if
it is not, how it lost that character.
When land of the public dominion ceases to be one, or when the change takes place, is a
question our courts have debated early. In a 1906 decision, 1 it was held that property of
the public dominion, a public plaza in this instance, becomes patrimonial upon use thereof
for purposes other than a plaza. In a later case, 2 this ruling was reiterated. Likewise, it has
been held that land, originally private property, has become of public dominion upon its
donation to the town and its conversion and use as a public plaza. 3 It is notable that under
these three cases, the character of the property, and any change occurring therein,
depends on the actual use to which it is dedicated. 4
Much later, however, the Court held that "until a formal declaration on the part of the
Government, through the executive department or the Legislative, to the effect that the
land .. is no longer needed for [public] service, for public use or for special industries, [it]
continue[s] to be part of the public [dominion], not available for private expropriation or
ownership." 5 So also, it was ruled that a political subdivision (the City of Cebu in this case)
alone may declare (under its charter) a city road abandoned and thereafter, to dispose of
it. 6
In holding that there is "a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to
allow the sale of the property," 7 the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative
act — executive or legislative - is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion,
and (2) a legislative decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties
brought about by earlier interpretations that the nature of property — whether public or
patrimonial — is predicated on the manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same
breath, repudiates the Government's position that the continuous non-use of "Roppongi",
among other arguments, for "diplomatic purposes", has turned it into State patrimonial
property.
I feel that this view corresponds to existing pronouncements of this Court, among other
things, that: (1) Property is presumed to be State property in the absence of any showing
to the contrary; 8 (2) With respect to forest lands, the same continue to be lands of the
public dominion unless and until reclassified by the Executive Branch of the Government; 9
and (3) All natural resources, under the Constitution, and subject to exceptional cases,
belong to the State. 1 0
I am elated that the Court has banished previous uncertainties.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
With regret, I find myself unable to share the conclusions reached by Mr. Justice Hugo E.
Gutierrez, Jr.
For purposes of this separate opinion, I assume that the piece of land located in 306
Roppongi, 5-Chome, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan (hereinafter referred to as the "Roppongi
property") may be characterized as property of public dominion, within the meaning of
Article 420 (2) of the Civil Code:
"[Property] which belong[s] to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service —."
It might not be amiss, however, to note that the appropriateness of trying to bring
within the con nes of the simple threefold classi cation found in Article 420 of the Civil
Code ("property for public use", property "intended for some public service" and
property intended "for the development of the national wealth") all property owned by
the Republic of the Philippines whether found within the territorial boundaries of the
Republic or located within the territory of another sovereign State, is not self-evident.
The rst item of the classi cation — property intended for public use — can scarcely be
properly applied to property belonging to the Republic but found within the territory of
another State. The third item of the classi cation — property intended for the
development of the national wealth — is illustrated, in Article 339 of the Spanish Civil
Code of 1889, by mines or mineral properties. Again, mineral lands owned by a
sovereign State are rarely, if ever, found within the territorial base of another sovereign
State. The task of examining in detail the applicability of the classi cation set out in
Article 420 of our Civil Code to property that the Philippines happens to own outside its
own boundaries must, however, be left to academicians. LLphil
For present purposes, too, I agree that there is no question of conflict of laws that is, at the
present time, before this Court. The issues before us relate essentially to authority to sell
the Roppongi property so far as Philippine law is concerned.
The majority opinion raises two (2) issues: (a) whether or not the Roppongi property has
been converted into patrimonial property or property of the private domain of the State;
and (b) assuming an affirmative answer to (a), whether or not there is legal authority to
dispose of the Roppongi property.
I
Addressing the first issue of conversion of property of public dominion intended for some
public service, into property of the private domain of the Republic, it should be noted that
the Civil Code does not address the question of who has authority to effect such
conversion. Neither does the Civil Code set out or refer to any procedure for such
conversion.
Our case law, however, contains some fairly explicit pronouncements on this point, as
Justice Sarmiento has pointed out in his concurring opinion. In Ignacio v. Director of Lands
(108 Phils. 335 [1960]), petitioner Ignacio argued that if the land in question formed part
of the public domain, the trial court should have declared the same no longer necessary for
public use or public purposes and which would, therefore, have become disposable and
available for private ownership. Mr. Justice Montemayor, speaking for the Court, said:
"Article 4 of the Law of Waters of 1866 provides that when a portion of the shore
is no longer washed by the waters of the sea and is not necessary for purposes of
public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coast-guard
service, the government shall declare it to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as an increment thereof. We believe that only the
executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and the
power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea, is not
necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for coast-guard service. lf no such declaration has been made by
said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain." (Natividad
v. Director of Lands, supra.)
The reason for this pronouncement, according to this Tribunal in the case of
Vicente Joven y Monteverde v. Director of Lands, 93 Phil., 134 (cited in Velayo's
Digest, Vol. 1, p. 52).
'. . . is undoubtedly that the courts are neither primarily called upon, nor indeed in
a position to determine whether any public land are to be used for the purposes
specified in Article 4 of the Law of Waters.' Consequently, until a formal
declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or
the Legislature, to the effect that the land in question is no longer needed for
coast-guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership."
(108 Phil. at 338-339; emphasis supplied)
Thus, under Ignacio, either the Executive Department or the Legislative Department may
convert property of the State of public dominion into patrimonial property of the State.
No particular formula or procedure of conversion is speci ed either in statute law or in
case law. Article 422 of the Civil Code simply states that: "Property of public dominion,
when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the
patrimonial property of the State". I respectfully submit, therefore, that the only
requirement which is legitimately imposable is that the intent to convert must be
reasonably clear from a consideration of the acts or acts of the Executive Department
or of the Legislative Department which are said to have effected such conversion.
The same legal situation exists in respect of conversion of property of public dominion
belonging to municipal corporations, i.e., local governmental units, into patrimonial
property of such entities. In Cebu Oxygen Acetylene v. Bercilles (66 SCRA. 481 [1975]), the
City Council of Cebu by resolution declared a certain portion of an existing street as an
abandoned road, "the same not being included in the city development plan". Subsequently,
by another resolution, the City Council of Cebu authorized the acting City Mayor to sell the
land through public bidding. Although there was no formal and explicit declaration of
conversion of property for public use into patrimonial property, the Supreme Court said:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's
application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, It follows
that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that 'Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State.'
Besides the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in
very clear and unequivocal terms, states that 'Property thus withdrawn from
public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other
real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed.'
Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in question from public
use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner
has a registrable title over the lot in question." (66 SCRA at 484; emphasis
supplied)
Thus, again as pointed out by Sarmiento, J., in his separate opinion, in the case of
property owned by municipal corporations simple non-use or the actual dedication of
public property to some use other than "public use" or some "public service", was
sufficient legally to convert such property into patrimonial property (Municipality of Oas
v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 [1906]; Municipality of Hinunganan v. Director of Lands, 24 Phil. 124
[1913]; Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, 22 SCRA 1334 [1968]).
I would also add that such was the case not only in respect of property of municipal
corporations but also in respect of property of the State itself Manresa in commenting on
Article 341 of the 1889 Spanish Civil Code which has been carried over verbatim into our
Civil Code by Article 422 thereof, wrote: LLpr
"La dificultad mayor en todo esto estriba, naturalmente, en fijar el momento en

que los bienes de dominio publico dejan de serlo. Si la Administracion o la
autoridad competente legislativa realizan un acto en virtud del cual cesa el
destino o uso publico de los bienes de que se trata, naturalmente la dificultad
queda desde el primer momento resuelta. Hay un punto de partida cierto para
iniciar las relaciones juridicas a que pudiera haber lugar. Pero puede ocurrir que
no haya tal declaracion expresa, legislativa or administrativa, y, sin embargo,
cesar de hecho el destino publico de los bienes; ahora bien, en este caso, y para
los efectos juridicos que resultan de entrar la cosa en el comercio de los hombres,
(se entendera que se ha verificado la conversion de los bienes de dominio publico
en bienes patrimoniales?
El citado tratadista Ricci opina, respecto del antiguo Codigo italiano,
por la afirmativa, y por nuestra parte creemos que tal debe ser la solucion.
El destino de las cosas no depende tanto de una declaracion expresa
como del uso publico de las mismas, y cuando el uso publico cese con
respecto de determinados bienes, cesa tambien su situacion en el dominio
publico. Si una fortaleza en ruina se abandona y no se repara, si un trozo
de la via publica se abandona tambien por constituir otro nuevo en
mejores condiciones . . . ambos bienes cesan de estar adscritos al uso
comun o a la defensa nacional, y ambos bienes pasan el patrimonio del
Estado, y su regimen juridico es el del presente Codigo, y las leyes
especiales mas o memos administrativas." (3 Manresa, Comentarios al
Codigo Civil Español, p. 128 [7a ed.; 1952) (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion says that none of the executive acts pointed to by the Government
purported, expressly or definitely, to convert the Roppongi property into patrimonial
property of the Republic. Assuming that to be the case, it is respectfully submitted that the
cumulative effect of the executive acts here involved was to convert property originally
intended for and devoted to public service into patrimonial property of the State, that is,
property susceptible of disposition to and appropriation by private persons. These
executive acts, in their totality if not each individual act, make crystal clear the intent of the
Executive Department to effect such conversion. These executive acts include:
(a) Administrative Order No. 3 dated 11 August 1985, which created a

Committee to study the disposition/utilization of the Government's property in
Japan. The Committee was composed of officials of the Executive Department:
the Executive Secretary; the Philippine Ambassador to Japan; and representatives
of the Department of Foreign Affairs and the Asset Privatization Trust. On 19
September 1988, the Committee recommended to the President the sale of one of
the lots (the lot specifically in Roppongi) through public bidding. On 4 October
1988, the President approved the recommendation of the Committee.
On 14 December 1988, the Philippine Government by diplomatic note informed

the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic's intention to dispose of
the property in Roppongi. The Japanese Government through its Ministry of
Foreign Affairs replied that it interposed no objection to such disposition by the
Republic. Subsequently, the President and the Committee informed the leaders of
the House of Representatives and of the Senate of the Philippines of the
proposed disposition of the Roppongi property.
(b) Executive Order No. 296, which was issued by the President on 25 July
1987. Assuming that the majority opinion is right in saying that Executive Order
No. 296 is insufficient to authorize the sale of the Roppongi property, it is here
submitted with respect that Executive Order No. 296 is more than sufficient to
indicate an intention to convert the property previously devoted to public service
into patrimonial property that is capable of being sold or otherwise disposed of.
(c) Non-use of the Roppongi lot for fourteen (14) years for diplomatic or for
any other public purposes. Assuming (but only arguendo) that non-use does not,
by itself, automatically convert the property into patrimonial property. I
respectfully urge that prolonged non-use, conjoined with the other factors here
listed, was legally effective to convert the lot in Roppongi into patrimonial
property of the State. Actually, as already pointed out, case law involving property
of municipal corporations is to the effect that simple non-use or the actual
dedication of public property to some use other than public use or public service,
was sufficient to convert such property into patrimonial property of the local
governmental entity concerned. Also as pointed out above, Manresa reached the
same conclusion in respect of conversion of property of the public domain of the
State into property of the private domain of the State.
The majority opinion states that "abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-
use alone especially if the non-use was attributable not to the Government's own
deliberate and indubitable will but to lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property" (Majority Opinion, p. 13). With respect, it may be stressed
that there is no abandonment involved here, certainly no abandonment of
property or of property rights. What is involved is the change of the classification
of the property from property of the public domain into property of the private
domain of the State. Moreover, if for fourteen (14) years, the Government did not
see fit to appropriate whatever funds were necessary to maintain the property in
Roppongi in a condition suitable for diplomatic representation purposes, such
circumstance may, with equal logic, be construed as a manifestation of the
crystalizing intent to change the character of the property.
(d) On 30 March 1989, a public bidding was in fact held by the Executive
Department for the sale of the lot in Roppongi. The circumstance that this bidding
was not successful certainly does not argue against an intent to convert the
property involved into property that is disposable by bidding.
The above set of events and circumstances makes no sense at all if it does not, as a
whole, show at least the intent on the part of the Executive Department (with the
knowledge of the Legislative Department) to convert the property involved into
patrimonial property that is susceptible of being sold.
II
Having reached an affirmative answer in respect of the first issue, it is necessary to
address the second issue of whether or not there exists legal authority for the sale or
disposition of the Roppongi property.
The majority opinion refers to Section 79(f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917
which reads as follows: LLpr
"SEC. 79 (f). Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party.

— In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party
to any deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other
property the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the
respective Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which,
together with the proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of
the Philippines for approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall
be executed and signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the
Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be expressly vested
by law in another officer." (Emphasis supplied)
The majority opinion then goes on to state that: "[T]he requirement has been retained in
Section 4, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292)" which
reads:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality,
by the executive head of the agency or instrumentality." (Emphasis supplied).
Two points need to be made in this connection. Firstly, the requirement of obtaining
specific approval of Congress when the price of the real property being disposed of is in
excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) under the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, has been deleted from Section 48 of the 1987 Administrative Code. What
Section 48 of the present Administrative Code refers to is authorization by law for the
conveyance. Section 48 does not purport to be itself a source of legal authority for
conveyance of real property of the Government. For Section 48 merely specifies the
official authorized to execute and sign on behalf of the Government the deed of
conveyance in case of such a conveyance.
Secondly, examination of our statute books shows that authorization by law for
disposition of real property of the private domain of the Government, has been granted by
Congress both in the form of (a) a general, standing authorization for disposition of
patrimonial property of the Government; and (b) specific legislation authorizing the
disposition of particular pieces of the Government's patrimonial property.
Standing legislative authority for the disposition of land of the private domain of the
Philippines is provided by Act No. 3038, entitled "An Act Authorizing the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to Sell or Lease Land of the Private Domain of the
Government of the Philippine Islands (now Republic of the Philippines)", enacted on 9
March 1922. The full text of this statute is as follows:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in
Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now

Secretary of the Environment and Natural Resources) is hereby authorized to sell
or lease land of the private domain of the Government of the Philippine Islands, or
any part thereof, to such persons, corporations or associations as are, under the
provisions of Act Numbered Twenty-eight hundred and seventy-four, (now
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended) known as the Public Land Act, entitled
to apply for the purchase or lease of agricultural public land.
SECTION 2. The sale of the land referred to in the preceding section shall, if
such land is agricultural, be made in the manner and subject to the limitations
prescribed in chapters five and six, respectively, of said Public Land Act, and if it
be classified differently, in conformity with the provisions of chapter nine of said
Act: Provided, however, That the land necessary for the public service shall be
exempt from the provisions of this Act.
SECTION 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, March 9, 1922." (Emphasis supplied).
Lest it be assumed that Act No. 3038 refers only to agricultural lands of the private
domain of the State, it must be noted that Chapter 9 of the old Public Land Act (Act No.
2874) is now Chapter 9 of the present Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended) and that both statutes refer to: "any tract of land of the public domain which
being neither timber nor mineral land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or
for commercial or industrial purposes other than agricultural" (Emphasis supplied). In
other words, the statute covers the sale or lease or residential, commercial or industrial
land of the private domain of the State. llcd

Implementing regulations have been issued for the carrying out of the provisions of Act
No. 3038. On 21 December 1954, the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
promulgated Lands Administrative Orders Nos. 7-6 and 7-7 which were entitled,
respectively: "Supplementary Regulations Governing the Sale of the Lands of the Private
Domain of the Republic of the Philippines"; and "Supplementary Regulations Governing the
Lease of Lands of Private Domain of the Republic of the Philippines" (text in 51 O.G. 28-29
[1955]).
It is perhaps well to add that Act No. 3038, although now sixty-eight (68) years old, is still
in effect and has not been repealed. 1
Specific legislative authorization for disposition of particular patrimonial properties of the

State is illustrated by certain earlier statutes. The first of these was Act No. 1120, enacted
on 26 April 1904, which provided for the disposition of the friar lands, purchased by the
Government from the Roman Catholic Church, to bona fide settlers and occupants thereof
or to other persons. In Jacinto v. Director of Lands (49 Phil. 853 [1926]), these friar lands
were held to be private and patrimonial properties of the State. Act No. 2360, enacted on
28 February 1914, authorized the sale of the San Lazaro Estate located in the City of
Manila, which had also been purchased by the Government from the Roman Catholic
Church. In January 1916, Act No. 2555 amended Act No. 2360 by including therein all lands
and buildings owned by the Hospital and the Foundation of San Lazaro theretofor leased
by private persons, and which were also acquired by the Philippine Government.
After the enactment in 1922 of Act No. 3038, there appears, to my knowledge, to be only
one statute authorizing the President to dispose of a specific piece of property. This
statute is Republic Act No. 905, enacted on 20 June 1953, which authorized the President
to sell an identified parcel of land of the private domain of the National Government to the
National Press Club of the Philippines, and to other recognized national associations of
professionals with academic standing, for the nominal price of P1.00. It appears relevant
to note that Republic Act No. 905 was not an outright disposition in perpetuity of the
property involved; it provided for reversion of the property to the National Government in
case the National Press Club stopped using it for its headquarters. What Republic Act No.
905 authorized was really a donation, and not a sale.
The basic submission here made is that Act No. 3038 provides standing legislative
authorization for disposition of the Roppongi property which, in my view, has been
converted into patrimonial property of the Republic. 2
To some, the submission that Act No. 3038 applies not only to lands of the private domain
of the State located in the Philippines but also to patrimonial property found outside the
Philippines, may appear strange or unusual. I respectfully submit that such position is not
any more unusual or strange than the assumption that Article 420 of the Civil Code applies
not only to property of the Republic located within Philippine territory but also to property
found outside the boundaries of the Republic. llcd
It remains to note that under the well-settled doctrine that heads of Executive
Departments are alter egos of the President (Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil.
451 [1939]), and in view of the constitutional power of control exercised by the President
over department heads (Article VII, Section 17, 1987 Constitution), the President herself
may carry out the function or duty that is specifically lodged in the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328
[1957]). At the very least, the President retains the power to approve or disapprove the
exercise of that function or duty when done by the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources.
It is hardly necessary to add that the foregoing analyses and submissions relate only to
the austere question of existence of legal power or authority. They have nothing to do with
much-debated questions of wisdom or propriety or relative desirability either of the
proposed disposition itself or of the proposed utilization of the anticipated proceeds of
the property involved. These latter types of considerations lie within the sphere of
responsibility of the political departments of government - the Executive and the
Legislative authorities. Cdpr
For all the foregoing, I vote to dismiss the Petitions for Prohibition in both G.R. Nos. 92013
and 92047.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Gancayco, Cortes and Medialdea, JJ., dissent.
Footnotes
PADILLA, J., concurring:

1. Art. 422 of the Civil Code provides:
"Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or public service,
shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. (341a).
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

1. Municipality of Oas v. Roa, 7 Phil. 20 (1906).
2. Municipality of Hinunangan v. Director of Lands, 24 Phil. 124 (1913). The property

involved here was a fortress.
3. Harty v. Municipality of Victoria, 13 Phil. 152 (1909).
4. See also II TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES 39 (1972 ed.), citing 3
Manresa III. See also Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of Zamboanga, No. L-
24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA 1334.
5. Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 339 (1960).
6. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. vs. Bercilles, No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA
481.
7. G.R. Nos. 92013 & 92047, 21.
8. Salas v. Jarencio, No. L-29788, August 30, 1972, 46 SCRA 734; Rabuco v. Villegas, No. L-
24916, February 28, 1974, 55 SCRA 658.
9. See Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. v. Lopez Enage, No. L-30637, July 16, 1987, 152 SCRA
80.
10. CONST., art. XII, sec. 2.

FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
1. We are orally advised by the Office of the Director of Lands that Act No. 3038 is very
much in effect and that the Bureau of Lands continues to date to act under it. See also,
in this connection, Sections 2 and 4 of Republic Act No. 477, enacted 9 June 1950 and
as last amended by B.P. Blg. 233. This statute governs the disposition of lands of the
public domain and of the private domain of the State, including lands previously vested
in the United States Alien Property Custodian and transferred to the Republic of the
Philippines.
2. Since Act No. 3033 established certain qualifications for applicants for purchase or
lease of land of private domain of the government, it is relevant to note that Executive
Order No. 296, promulgated at a time when the President was still exercising legislative
authority, provides as follows:
"Sec. 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of other laws,
to the contrary notwithstanding, the above mentioned properties can be made available
for sale, lease or any other manner of disposition to non-Filipino citizens." (Emphasis
supplied)

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133876. December 29, 1999.]
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA , petitioner, vs . AMERICAN REALTY

CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS , respondents.
Agcaoili & Associates for petitioner.

William R. Veto for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
As security for restructured loans, private respondent, a third party mortgagor, executed
two (2) real estate mortgages in favor of petitioner. Eventually, the corporate borrowers
defaulted in the payment of the restructured loans. Consequently, petitioner filed collection
suits before foreign courts. Later petitioner likewise filed an application for extra-judicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage. This prompted private respondent to file an action for
damages against petitioner. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents. According to the trial court, the filing by petitioner of collections suits
operated as a waiver of the security of the mortgages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
assailed decision of the lower court. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner resorted to this action. aSDCIE
A mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action
for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. The remedies available to the
mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. An election of one remedy
operates as a waiver of the other.
A suit brought before a foreign court having competence and jurisdiction to entertain the
action is deemed to be within the contemplation of the remedy available to the mortgagee-
creditor. This would best serve the interest of justice and fair play and further discourage
the noxious practice of splitting up a lone cause of action.
Despite the fact that the award of actual and compensatory damages by the lower court
exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the same was nonetheless valid. Inasmuch as
the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to refute the evidence formally offered by
private respondent, the rudiments of fair play were deemed satisfied.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; SPECIAL CONTRACTS; MORTGAGE; REMEDIES OF MORTGAGE

CREDITOR; ELUCIDATED. — The jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach and similar cases
adjudicated thereafter provides: "In the absence of express statutory provisions, a
mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for
debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the
two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be
impaired, for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a
personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for attachment and
execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he waives such personal
action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the
properties of the defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for
the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of
action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other
remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule
that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and
simultaneously or successively another action against the mortgaged property, would
result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil.
584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil. 404), but also in
subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of
the residence of the plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies." In Danao
vs. Court of Appeals, this Court, reiterating jurisprudence enunciated in Manila Trading and
Supply Co. vs. Co Kim and Movido vs. RFC, invariably held: ". . . The rule is now settled that a
mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to
recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties
of the debtor, including the subject matter of the mortgage . . ., subject to the qualification
that if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has
waived. Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN REMEDY IS CHOSEN. — The remedies available to the
mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one
remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for
foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. As to extra-judicial foreclosure, such remedy is deemed elected by the
mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but with the
Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the
provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. In Cerna vs. Court of Appeals,
we agreed with the petitioner in said case, that the filing of a collection suit barred the
foreclosure of the mortgage. Hence, by the mere filing of the ordinary action for collection
against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the present case is deemed to have elected
a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise. Corollarily, no
final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRD PARTY MORTGAGOR; LIABILITY. — Private respondent ARC
constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the debt of the
principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a
third party mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may
secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging their own property. Notwithstanding, there is
no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who
secures the fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be
solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contract — loan —
remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the latter that the creditor may
have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties in lieu of an
action for the recovery of the amount of the loan.
4. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; APPRECIATION OF THE FOREIGN LAW. — The well-
imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A
foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of
processual presumption. In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on
the matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said
foreign law would still not find applicability. Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or
contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign
law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning
persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The
public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. Moreover, foreign law
should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens
or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws. TSIDaH
5. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; ACTUAL DAMAGES; AWARD GIVEN EXCEEDING THAT

PRAYED FOR; UPHELD. — Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable
because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and
the same must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages
will be given. Indeed, the question of the value of property is always a difficult one to settle
as valuation of real property is an imprecise process since real estate has no inherent
value readily ascertainable by an appraiser or by the court. The opinions of men vary so
much concerning the real value of property that the best the courts can do is hear all of the
witnesses which the respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully weighing
that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable. In the case at bar, we see
no reason that would justify this Court to disturb the factual findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard to the award of actual damages. And
notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory damages by the
lower court exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the same is nonetheless valid,
subject to certain qualifications. In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was
afforded the opportunity to refute and object to the evidence, both documentary and
testimonial, formally offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed
satisfied.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT,

RESPECTED. — In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar
and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected.
The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that trial courts have the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.
7. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; EXEMPLARY DAMAGES. — Exemplary or corrective damages
are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. Considering its purpose, it must be fair
and reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly enrich a prevailing
party. In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in the present case
qualifies the test of reasonableness. cEASTa

DECISION
BUENA , J : p
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage
constituted over a third party mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an
action for the collection of the principal loan before foreign courts? cdrep
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997 and its resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing
institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the State of California, United States of America while private
respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC) is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited liability
company organized and existing under the laws of England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major
multi-million United States (US) Dollar loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1)
Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera
S.A. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "borrowers"), all of which are existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private
respondent. 3
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and the corporate
borrowers signed and entered into restructuring agreements. As additional security for the
restructured loans, private respondent ARC as third party mortgagor executed two real
estate mortgages, 4 dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its parcels of land
including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte,
Bulacan, and which are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-
78761, T-78762 and T-78763. Cdpr
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the restructured loans
prompting petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions 5 before foreign courts for the collection
of the principal loan, to wit:
"a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,
Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2098) against Liberian Transport
Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo
Katipunan Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June 17, 1992.
b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division,

Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245) against El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio
Katipunan Litonjua on July 2, 1992;cdrep
c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No.

4039 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators Corporation, Eddie
Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio
Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on November 19,
1992; and
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No.
4040 of 1992) against Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A.,
Espriona Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific Navigators Corporation, Eddie
Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Jr. and
Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on November 21, 1992."
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private respondent ARC, being a third
party mortgagor, was not impleaded as party-defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff
of Bulacan, Philippines, an application for extrajudicial foreclosure 6 of real estate
mortgage. cdasia
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real properties were
sold at public auction in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with Integrated Credit and
Corporation Services Co. (ICCS) as the highest bidder for the sum of Twenty Four Million
Pesos (P24,000,000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional Trial Court,
Branch 159, an action for damages 8 against the petitioner, for the latter's act of
foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite the pendency of civil suits
before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from foreclosing
the mortgage after an ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is not applicable in the
present case, claiming that:
"a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a party to the
principal restructuring agreements, was never made a party defendant in the civil
cases filed in Hongkong and England;
"b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the Philippines
since the civil actions were filed in Hongkong and England. As such, any
decisions (sic) which may be rendered in the abovementioned courts are not (sic)
enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action to enforce the foreign
judgments is first filed in the Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Revised Rules of Court. prLL
"c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal
agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by filing civil actions
for sums of money."
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for suspension 1 0 of the

redemption period on the ground that "it cannot exercise said right of redemption without
at the same time waiving or contradicting its contentions in the case that the foreclosure
of the mortgage on its properties is legally improper and therefore invalid."
In an order 1 1 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the private respondent's
motion for suspension after which a copy of said order was duly received by the Register
of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged properties at the foreclosure
sale, consolidated its ownership over the real properties, resulting to the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-186272, T-186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in
its name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor, ICCS sold the real
properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for the amount of Thirty Nine Million
Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 1 2 Accordingly, Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-
187782(m), T-187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-16652P(m) were issued in the latter's
name. prLL
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 1 3 in favor of private respondent ARC dated
12 May 1993, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the filing in foreign
courts by the defendant of collection suits against the principal debtors operated
as a waiver of the security of the mortgages. Consequently, the plaintiff's rights
as owner and possessor of the properties then covered by Transfer Certificates of
Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-78760 and T-78761, all of the Register of
Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines, were violated when the defendant
caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages constituted thereon.
"Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following
sums, all with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint up
to the date of actual payment:
"1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Ninety Nine Million

Pesos (P99,000,000.00); cdtai
"2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00);

and
"3) Costs of suit.
"SO ORDERED."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court
prompting petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review 1 4 on certiorari where herein petitioner BANTSA
ascribes to the Court of Appeals the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the doctrines laid down by
this Hon. Supreme Court in the cases of Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court docketed as G.R. No. 74730 promulgated on
August 25, 1989 and Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. IAC, 196
SCRA 29 (1991 case), although said cases were duly cited, extensively
discussed and specifically mentioned, as one of the issues in the
assignment of errors found on page 5 of the decision dated September 30,
1997. Cdpr
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it
awarded the private respondent actual and exemplary damages totalling
P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998 although such huge amount was not
asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint, is contrary to law
and is totally unsupported by evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit against the
principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign courts
constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary
damages in favor of private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is
proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.

First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a waiver of the
remedy of foreclosure requires the concurrence of two requisites: an ordinary civil action
for collection should be filed and subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly
rendered therein. cdrep
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the principal loan
does not suffice; a final judgment must be secured and obtained in the personal action so
that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure may be appreciated. To put it differently, absent
any of the two requisites, the mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have waived the
remedy of foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and upholds the jurisprudence
laid down in Bachrach 1 5 and similar cases adjudicated thereafter, thus:
"In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute
against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to
foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may pursue either of the two remedies,
but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired,
for each of the two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a
personal action will leave open to him all the properties of the debtor for
attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he
waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged
property, an unsatisfied judgment thereon would still give him the right to sue for
a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the defendant, other
than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the
deficiency. In either case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action
undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one or the other
remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other
hand, a rule that would authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against
the debtor and simultaneously or successively another action against the
mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to
justice (Soriano vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity
(Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in subjecting the defendant to the
vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies." LexLib
In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 1 6 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence enunciated in Manila
Trading and Supply Co. vs. Co Kim 1 7 and Movido vs. RFC, 1 8 invariably held:
". . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his
security and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with
the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor,
including the subject matter of the mortgage . . ., subject to the qualification that
if he fails in the remedy by him elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he
has waived. (Underscoring Ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a mortgage
creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a
real action to foreclose the mortgage. 1 9
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative
and not cumulative. Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other.
For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen upon the filing of the suit for collection or
upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage, pursuant to the
provision of Rule 68 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure,
such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not
with any court of justice but with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is
to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118. cdphil
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its
properties as security for the debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private
respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party mortgagor. Under the law, third
persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or mortgaging
their own property. 2 0
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which
makes a third person who secures the fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his
own property, to be solidarily bound with the principal obligor. The signatory to the
principal contract — loan — remains to be primarily bound. It is only upon default of the
latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the
mortgaged properties in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. 2 1
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the action for
collection and rendition of final judgment therein should concur, is untenable. cda
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 2 2 we agreed with the petitioner in said case, that the
filing of a collection suit barred the foreclosure of the mortgage:
"A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy of foreclosure
of the chattel mortgage constituted over the personal property as security for the
debt or value of the promissory note when he seeks to recover in the said
collection suit."
". . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure, thereby
abandoning the chattel mortgage as basis for relief, he clearly manifests his lack
of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property as security for the
promissory note . . . ."
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for clarity and emphasis,
that the mere act of filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the
mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary
action for collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the present case is
deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily
must arise. Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on
waiver to apply. cdll
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 2 3 a case relied upon by
petitioner, supposedly to buttress its contention, this Court had occasion to rule that the
mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery of a debt secured by a mortgage
constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is non-payment
of the debt. Nevertheless, alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise.
Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of two remedies so as not to violate the rule
against splitting a cause of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Icarangal.
24
"For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause
of action against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery
of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his
action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of
his mortgage. But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of
the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the
debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to
the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there
exists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff,
then, by applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action
by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint
for foreclosure of the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will
bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate
complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another
to foreclose his mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a
single breach of contract at so much cost to the courts and with so much
vexation and oppression to the debtor." prcd
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the doctrine
enunciated in Caltex, wherein this High Court relaxed the application of the general rules to
wit:
"In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the letter but declare
that it is the collection suit which was waived and/or abandoned. This ruling is
more in harmony with the principles underlying our judicial system. It is of no
moment that the collection suit was filed ahead, what is determinative is the fact
that the foreclosure proceedings ended even before the decision in the collection
suit was rendered. . . ."
Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context. We must stress that the
Caltex case was never intended to overrule the well-entrenched doctrine enunciated in
Bachrach, which to our mind still finds applicability in cases of this sort. To reiterate,
Bachrach is still good law.
We then quote the decision 2 5 of the trial court, in the present case, thus:
"The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather than the rule, dictated by
the peculiar circumstances obtaining therein. In the said case, the Supreme Court
chastised Caltex for making ". . . a mockery of our judicial system when it initially
filed a collection suit then, during the pendency thereof, foreclosed extrajudicially
the mortgaged property which secured the indebtedness, and still pursued the
collection suit to the end." Thus, to prevent a mockery of our judicial system", the
collection suit had to be nullified because the foreclosure proceedings have
already been pursued to their end and can no longer be undone.
xxx xxx xxx
"In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the defendant pursued to the
end or are still pursuing the collection suits filed in foreign courts. There is no
occasion, therefore, for this court to apply the exception laid down by the
Supreme Court in Caltex, by nullifying the collection suits. Quite obviously, too, the
aforesaid collection suits are beyond the reach of this Court. Thus the only way
the court may prevent the specter of a creditor having "plural redress for a single
breach of contract" is by holding, as the Court hereby holds, that the defendant
has waived the right to foreclose the mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on its
properties originally covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-
78762, T-78760 and T-78761." (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe criticism, to say the least. 2 6
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the case of PCIB vs. IAC. 2 7
Again, petitioner tried to fit a square peg in a round hole. It must be stressed that far from
overturning the doctrine laid down in Bachrach, this Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand
on this issue by declaring:
"While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either institute a personal action for
the debt or a real action to foreclosure the mortgage, he cannot pursue both
remedies simultaneously or successively as was done by PCIB in this case." LibLex
xxx xxx xxx

"Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to enforce payment of the 1.3
million promissory note secured by real estate mortgages and subsequently filed
a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the rule against splitting a cause
of action."
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of
filing four civil suits before foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose
the real estate mortgages constituted over the properties of third-party mortgagor and
herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions and by eventually
foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules
against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
LibLex
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of foreclosure after the
collection suit was filed, considering that the creditor should not be afforded "plural
redress for a single breach of contract." For cause of action should not be confused with
the remedy created for its enforcement. 2 8
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the efficacy of the remedy
chosen in addressing the creditor's cause. Hence, a suit brought before a foreign court
having competence and jurisdiction to entertain the action is deemed, for this purpose, to
be within the contemplation of the remedy available to the mortgagee-creditor. This
pronouncement would best serve the interest of justice and fair play and further
discourage the noxious practice of splitting up a lone cause of action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the
governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money. 2 9
We rule in the negative. LLphil
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its crumbling cause. In
the case at bench, Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by
petitioner to prove the English law on the matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our
jurisdiction that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 3 0 Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local
or domestic or internal law. 3 1 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual
presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, 3 2 said foreign law would still
not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. 3 3
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country. 3 4
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. LibLex
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent —

"If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the
filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the others."
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 3 5
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable. Cdpr
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the award
of actual or compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA in
extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate mortgages constituted a clear violation of the
rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in
business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved,
otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no damages will be given. 3 6 Indeed,
the question of the value of property is always a difficult one to settle as valuation of real
property is an imprecise process since real estate has no inherent value readily
ascertainable by an appraiser or by the court. 3 7 The opinions of men vary so much
concerning the real value of property that the best the courts can do is hear all of the
witnesses which the respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully weighing
that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 3 8
In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying heavily on the
valuation made by Philippine Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA questions the act of
the appellate court in giving due weight to the appraisal report composed of twenty three
pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and submitted as evidence by private respondent.
The appraisal report, as the records would readily show, was corroborated by the
testimony of Mr. Reynaldo Flores, witness for private respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:
"The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally offered as evidence the
appraisal report dated March 29, 1993 (Exhibit J, Records, p. 409), consisting of
twenty three (23) pages which set out in detail the valuation of the property to
determine its fair market value (TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 4), in the amount of
P99,986,592.00 (TSN, ibid., p. 5), together with the corroborative testimony of one
Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal
Company, Inc. (TSN, ibid., p. 3). The latter's testimony was subjected to extensive
cross-examination by counsel for defendant-appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-
22)." 3 9
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar and well-
entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court should be respected. 4 0 The time-
tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that trial courts have the advantage
of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 4 1
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses,
principally because they are in a better position to assess the same than the appellate
court. 4 2 Besides, trial courts are in a better position to examine real evidence as well as
observe the demeanor of witnesses. 4 3
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses
rest primarily with the trial court. 4 4 In the case at bar, we see no reason that would justify
this Court to disturb the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, with regard to the award of actual damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial courts justified the award by
presenting the following ratiocination in its assailed decision 4 5 , to wit:
"Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of valuation. The size of the
subject real properties are (sic) set forth in their individual titles, and the Court
itself has seen the character and nature of said properties during the ocular
inspection it conducted. Based principally on the foregoing, the Court makes the
following observations:
"1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo, San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not distant from Metro Manila — the biggest
urban center in the Philippines — and are easily accessible through well-paved
roads;
"2. The properties are suitable for development into a subdivision for low cost
housing, as admitted by defendant's own appraiser (TSN, May 30, 1994, p. 31);
"3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have already been
demolished. Houses of strong materials are found in the vicinity of the property
(Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the vicinity is a growing community. It has even been
shown that the house of the Barangay Chairman is located adjacent to the
property in question (Exh. 27), and the only remaining piggery (named Cherry
Farm) in the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away from the western boundary of the
property in question (TSN, November 19, p. 3); prcd
"4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the property, as indubitably
shown by the fact that on March 18, 1994, ICCS (the buyer during the foreclosure
sale) sold the consolidated real estate properties to Stateland Investment
Corporation, in whose favor new titles were issued, i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T-
187782(m), T-187783(m); T-16653P(m) and T-166521(m) by the Register of
Deeds of Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
"5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject properties to Stateland
Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine Million (P39,000,000.00) Pesos, which is
more than triple defendant's appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly shows that the Court
cannot rely on defendant's aforesaid estimate (Decision, Records, p. 603)."
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility
of witnesses command great respect and consideration especially when the conclusions
are supported by the evidence on record. 4 6 Applying the foregoing principle, we therefore
hold that the trial court committed no palpable error in giving credence to the testimony of
Reynaldo Flores, who according to the records, is a licensed real estate broker, appraiser
and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since 1990. 4 7 As the records show,
Flores had been with the company for 26 years at the time of his testimony. prcd
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine itself to the appraisal
report dated 29 March 1993, and the testimony given by Mr. Reynaldo Flores, in
determining the fair market value of the real property. Above all these, the record would
likewise show that the trial judge in order to appraise himself of the characteristics and
condition of the property, conducted an ocular inspection where the opposing parties
appeared and were duly represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we affirm the ruling of the trial
court as regards the valuation of the property —
". . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00) for the 39-hectare
properties (sic) translates to just about Two Hundred Fifty Four Pesos (P254.00)
per square meter. This appears to be, as the court so holds, a better
approximation of the fair market value of the subject properties. This is the
amount which should be restituted by the defendant to the plaintiff by way of
actual or compensatory damages . . ." 4 8
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court for awarding an amount allegedly not
asked nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint.
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory damages by the
lower court exceeded that prayed for in the complaint, the same is nonetheless valid,
subject to certain qualifications. cda
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:

"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence.
— When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried with the express or implied
consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary
to cause them to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made
upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure to amend
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at
the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment
to be made."
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de

Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. 4 9 citing Northern Cement Corporation vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court 5 0 is enlightening:
"There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the
necessary amendment, the amount proved at the trial may be validly awarded, as
in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the facts shown entitled
plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the complaint was
necessary, especially where defendant had himself raised the point on which
recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the pleading as amended to
conform to the evidence although the pleadings were actually not amended.
Amendment is also unnecessary when only clerical error or non substantial
matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Laguna (48
Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on
amendment need not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice
is caused the objecting party. And in the recent case of National Power
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that where there is a
variance in the defendant's pleadings and the evidence adduced by it at the trial,
the Court may treat the pleading as amended to conform with the evidence. prLL
"It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-mentioned rule and in light
of the decisions cited, the trial court should not be precluded from awarding an
amount higher than that claimed in the pleading notwithstanding the absence of
the required amendment. But it is upon the condition that the evidence of such
higher amount has been presented properly, with full opportunity on the part of
the opposing parties to support their respective contentions and to refute each
other's evidence.
"The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced

during trial does not preclude an adjudication by the court on the basis of such
evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings, or serve as a
basis for a higher award of damages. Although the pleading may not have been
amended to conform to the evidence submitted during trial, judgment may
nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues alleged but also on
the basis of issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the course of
trial. The court may treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to
the evidence, although it had not been actually so amended. Former Chief Justice
Moran put the matter in this way:
'When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied

consent of the adverse party, as to issues not alleged in the pleadings,
judgment may be rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be
considered as if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied
consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse party fails to
object thereto.'
"Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before
it even though the relevant pleading had not been previously amended, so long as
no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse party. Put a little
differently, so long as the basis requirements of fair play had been met, as where
litigants were given full opportunity to support their respective contentions and to
object to or refute each other's evidence, the court may validly treat the pleadings
as if they had been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to
adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it."
In the instant case, in as much as the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to refute and
object to the evidence, both documentary and testimonial, formally offered by private
respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed satisfied. In fact, the testimony of
Reynaldo Flores was put under scrutiny during the course of the cross-examination. Under
these circumstances, the court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed
no reversible error in awarding actual damages the amount of which is higher than that
prayed for. Verily, the lower court's actuations are sanctioned by the Rules and supported
by jurisprudence. prcd
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount of Five Million
Pesos (P5,000,000.00) awarded, being excessive, is subject to reduction. Exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 5 1 Considering its
purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to
unjustly enrich a prevailing party. 5 2 In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages in the present case qualifies the test of reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the amount
awarded as exemplary damages. Accordingly, petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private
respondent the sum of P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P50,000.00
as exemplary damage and the costs of suit. LexLib
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. CA Decision in CA-C.R. CV No. 51094, penned by Justice Ricardo P. Galvez and

concurred in by Justice Fidel V. Purisima and Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz; Rollo, pp.
38-58.
2. CA Resolution in CA G.R. CV No. 51094, dated 22 May 1998; Rollo, p. 60.
3. Rollo, p. 38.

4. Ibid., p. 39.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 40.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Rollo, p. 41.
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. Rollo, pp. 41-42.
14. Rollo, pp. 10-36.
15. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. vs. Esteban Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287.
16. 154 SCRA 446.
17. 71 Phil. 448.

18. 105 Phil. 886.
19. Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 446.

20. Article 2085, Civil Code; Lustan vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663.
21. Cerna vs. Court of Appeals 220 SCRA 517.

22. Ibid.
23. 176 SCRA 741.
24. 68 Phil. 287.
25. Rollo, p. 94.

26. Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 741.
27. 196 SCRA 29.
28. Bachrach Motor vs. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287.
29. Rollo, p. 167.
30. Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Sy Joc Lieng vs. Syquia, 16 Phil. 137.
31. Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472.
32. 167 SCRA 736.
33. Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eighth Edition, 1996, Paras, page 46.
34. Article 17, par. 3, Civil Code.
35. Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eight Edition, 1996, Paras, p. 60.

36. Perfecto vs. Gonzales, 128 SCRA 640, as cited in Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA
447.
37. 22 Am. Jur. 2d 193.

38. City of Manila vs. Corrales, 32 Phil. 85, 96.
39. Rollo, p. 103.
40. People vs. Morales, 241 SCRA 267.
41. People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254.
42. People vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482.
43. Lee Eng Hong vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 392.
44. Ibid.
45. Rollo, pp. 46-47.
46. People vs. Asoy, 251 SCRA 682.
47. TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 6.
48. Decision, Records, ibid.
49. 247 SCRA 361, 377-378.
50. 158 SCRA 408.

51. Article 2229, Civil Code.
52. Philtranco Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 562.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 108292. September 10, 1993.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (Presidential Commission on Good

Government [PCGG] ) petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, JOSE L.
AFRICA, MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R.
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO,
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO ILUSORIO , respondents.
[G.R. No. 108368. September 10, 1993.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN,

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO, ET. AL. , respondents.
[G.R. No. 108548. September 10, 1993.]
JOSE MA. B. MONTINOLA, ROMEO G. GUANZON, HORTENSIA

STARKE, VICENTE LOPEZ, JR., MANUEL ESCALANTE, ROMAN M.
MIRASOL, JESUS T. TALEON, JESUS S. MONTERO, RODOLFO T.
TIONGSON, JR., PABLO G. LIM, JULIO LEDESMA, CENTRAL
AZUCARERA DON PEDRO, SAN CARLOS MILLING, CO., INC. ,
petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO ,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 108550. September 10, 1993.]
JOSE MA. B. MONTINOLA, ROMEO G. GUANZON, HORTENSIA

STARKE, VICENTE LOPEZ, JR., MANUEL ESCALANTE, ROMAN M.
MIRASOL, JESUS T. TALEON, JESUS S. MONTERO, RODOLFO T.
TIONGSON, JR., PABLO G. LIM, JULIO LEDESMA, CENTRAL
AZUCARERA DON PEDRO, SAN CARLOS MILLING, CO., INC. ,
petitioners, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN and ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO ,
respondents.
Custodio O. Parlade & Emerito G. Bagabaldo for petitioners in G.R. No. 108368.
Alampay, del Castillo & Maranilla Law Of ce for P. Sabido, et al. in G.R. Nos. 108548-49 &
108550
DECISION
MELO , J : p

The four (4) herein consolidated petitions have as their common prayer the nulli cation of
the already approved and partially implemented compromise agreement dated November
3, 1990 executed between Roberto S. Benedicto and the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) represented by its then Chairman, David M. Castro, and the
setting aside of the Sandiganbayan decision dated October 2, 1992 approving the
compromise agreement and rendering judgment in accordance with its terms. G.R. No.
108548-49 and 108550 were led by eleven (11) sugar cane planters and two (2)
corporations engaged in the milling of sugar cane who additionally ask for permission to
intervene and to be admitted as parties to Civil Cases No. 0024 and No. 0028 before the
Sandiganbayan.
The subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are Sandiganbayan Civil Case
No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before the
Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages against former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, members of his family, and alleged cronies, one of whom is said to be respondent
Roberto S. Benedicto. cdphil
The compromise agreement involved in these petitions is the third one in a series of global
settlements effected between the Republic and respondent Benedicto. In March, 1990 the
cases brought by the Republic against Benedicto in the United States were settled through
a plea bargaining agreement approved by the New York Court and a "Settlement and
Partial Release of Claims" approved by the California Court of Los Angeles. On July 20 and
23, 1990, the cases in Switzerland involving Benedicto's bank deposits in that country were
settled by another agreement between the Republic and Benedicto. In fact, as early as
December, 1986, the PCGG and Benedicto had already entered into temporary
arrangements covering the management and operations of Benedicto's media business -
BBC Channel 2, IBC Channel 13, Sining Makulay (CATV), and the Daily Express. No
questions have been raised against the rst two settlements. The management issue at
Broadcast City was decided by this Court in Benedicto vs. Board of Administrators of
Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC (207 SCRA 659 [1992]).
Under the compromise agreement, Benedicto and his group-controlled corporations
ceded to the government certain pieces of property listed in Annex A of the agreement and
assigned or transferred whatever rights he may have, if any, to the government over all
corporate assets listed in Annex B of the agreement (pp. 115-125, Rollo in G.R. No.
108292).
The PCGG in turn, lifted the sequestrations over the property listed in Annex C (p. 125,
Rollo) as well as other assets mentioned in the agreement. The Government also extended
absolute immunity to Benedicto, members of his family, and of cers and employees of the
listed corporations such that there would be no criminal investigation or prosecution for
acts or omissions prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated penal
laws, including Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of the assets under the
agreement.
The government agreed to recognize the constitutional right to travel of Mr. and Mrs.
Benedicto and to interpose no objections to the issuance or restoration of their passports
by the government office concerned.
According to the PCGG in G.R. No. 108292 and G.R. No. 108368, respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion in approving an agreement containing provisions
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, and public order. The PCGG contends
that its consent was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation; that it is not in
estoppel to question the validity of the agreement; and that the respondent court was
wrong in passing upon the PCGG's inability to return what was ceded to it should the
agreement be disapproved.
The authority of the PCGG to enter into compromise agreements in civil cases and to grant
immunity, under certain circumstances, in criminal cases is now settled and established. In
Republic of the Philippines and Jose O. Campos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al . (173 SCRA
72, [1989]), this Court categorically stated that amicable settlements and compromises
are not only allowed but actually encouraged in civil cases. A speci c grant of immunity
from criminal prosecutions was also sustained. In Benedicto vs. Board of Administrators
of Television Stations RPN, BBC, and IBC (207 SCRA 659 [1992]), the Court ruled that the
authority of the PCGG to validly enter into compromise agreements for the purpose of
avoiding litigation or putting an end to one already commenced was indisputable. The
Court took cognizance of the fact that the compromise agreement which is now the
subject of the present petitions was pending before the Sandiganbayan for determination
and approval and, therefore, dismissed the petition directed against the agreement's
implementation and enforcement.
Since this Court speci cally ordered the Sandiganbayan to act on the compromise
agreement between the PCGG and Benedicto, what remains to be done is to ascertain the
propriety of the action of the Sandiganbayan in approving the agreement, and the validity
of the agreement itself.
The Sandiganbayan stated in its decision that the contract on its face does not appear to
be contrary to law, morals, or public policy and that it was entered into freely and
voluntarily by the parties (p. 79, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292). There is no intimation of vitiated
consent on the part of the PCGG. On its nding that the compromise agreement was
entered into by the parties freely, voluntarily, and with full understanding of its
consequences, respondent court stated that the agreement is conclusive and binding upon
it.
We agree with the following observations of the Sandiganbayan:
A party that availed himself of and complied with the provisions of a judicial
compromise is under estoppel to question its validity. (Serrano vs. Miave, 13
SCRA 461). In a regime of law and order, repudiation of an agreement validly
entered into cannot be made without any ground or reason in law or in fact for
such repudiation. (Rodriguez vs. Alikpala, 57 SCRA 455).
It is in consequences of this that the Supreme Court in Mayuga vs. Court of

Appeals, 154 SCRA 309, held that a compromise upon its perfection became
binding upon the parties and has the effect and authority of res judicata even if
not judicially approved. (Italics supplied).
In this connection, therefore, We hold that plaintiff is in estoppel to question the
validity of the herein Compromise Agreement since it had already received
benefits thereunder, such as:
"1. Full take over and control of Oriental Petroleum shares of

stocks owned by Piedras Mining and the exercise by the latter company of
the pre-emptive rights granted by Oriental Petroleum. Said shares have a
total value now of P1,094,816,379.00 (P.0675 and P.0775/per A and B
shares, respectively.
2. Full take over, control and management of Broadcast City
(Channel 13) inspite of Supreme Court decision in G.A. No. L-87710 that
the Board of Administration, created under Executive Order No. 11,
continued management is no longer legally possible, upon formal
representation and that Benedicto will comply fully with the terms and
conditions of the Compromise Agreement. Said assets have a total
estimated value of P450 million.
3. Complete turnover of California Overseas Bank, with capital
account of US$18 Million (P406 million), to the Philippine Government
which was in turn sold by the Philippine Government to the PNB.
4. Receipt of US$16.271 million (P386.0 million —
P23.71/$1.00). The total value of the aforesaid assets transferred to the
Philippine Government amount to P2.336 Billion."
In Katipunan Labor Union vs. Caltex, 101 Phils. 1224, the Supreme Court, through
Justice J. B. L. Reyes, stated in effect that a compromise is governed by the basic
principle that the obligations arising therefrom have the force of law between the
parties (citing Article 1159, New Civil Code), which means that neither party may
unilaterally and upon his own exclusive volition escape his obligation under the
contract.
xxx xxx xxx
Since a compromise has, upon the parties and their successors-in-interest, the
effect of res judicata, it can only be rescinded on the ground of vitiated consent,
and, this is true even if the compromise turns out to be unsatisfactory to either of
the parties (Castro vs. Castro, 97 Phils. 705). By merely asking for a renegotiation
of the agreement, the PCGG herein has impliedly admitted that the agreement is
not contrary to law, public policy or morals nor was there any circumstance which
had vitiated or does now vitiate consent."
(Decision, pp. 26-27; pp. 104-105, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292).
In fact, the Court has consistently ruled that a party to a compromise cannot ask for a
rescission after it has enjoyed its bene ts. Thus in Barairo vs. Mendoza (G.R. No. 82545,
May 15, 1989 Resolution), re-echoing 5 Ruling Case Law, 883 (1914) it was held:
Compromises are to be favored, without regard to the nature of the controversy
compromised. They cannot be set aside because the event shows all the gain to
have been on one side, and all the sacri ce on the other, if the parties have acted
in good faith and with a belief of the actual existence of a settlement be made,
free from fraud or mistake, whereby there is a surrender or satisfaction, in whole
or in part, of a claim upon one side in exchange for or in consideration of a
surrender of value, upon the other, however baseless may be the claim upon either
side or harsh the terms as to either of the parties, the other cannot successfully
impeach the agreement in a court of justice which re-echoed 5 Ruling Case Laws
883 (914).
And in Pasay City Government vs. CFI of Manila (132 SCRA 156 [1984]), was most
emphatic in ruling that a party to a compromise agreement cannot ask for its rescission
after it has enjoyed its bene ts. Then Justice, later Chief Justice Makasiar had this to say:
—
[I]t is obvious that the respondent-appellee did not only succeed in enforcing the
compromise but said plaintiff-appellee likewise wants to rescind the said
compromise. It is clear from the language of the law, speci cally Article 2041 of
the New Civil Code that one of the parties to a compromise has two options: 1) to
enforce the compromise; or 2) to rescind the same and insist upon his original
demand. The respondent-appellee in the case herein before Us wants to avail of
both of these options. This can not be done. The respondent-appellee cannot ask
for rescission of the compromise agreement after it has already enjoyed the rst
option of enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ of execution resulting
thereby in the garnishment of the Pasay City funds deposited with the Philippine
National Bank which eventually was delivered to the respondent-appellee. (at p.
168).
It is equally puerile for the PCGG to contend that the agreement is congenitally defective
from the mere happenstance that the agreement was not authenticated before the
consular of cials abroad and without the participation of witnesses and of the Solicitor
General. While the rule of lex loci celeborationis generally governs forms and solemnities
of contracts under Article 17 of the Civil Code (Vitug , Compendium of Civil Law and
Jurisprudence, 1986 First ed., p. 11), the principle of lex rei sitae generally applies with
respect to formalities for the acquisition, encumbrance, and alienation of real and personal
property (1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines annotated, 1989 12th ed., p. 107). And
relative to this precept on lex situs, Philippine substantive law is certainly clear on the
matter that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered into,
subject to the existence of all the essential requisites for their validity (Article 1356 , New
Civil Code). The fact that the compromise agreement was not authenticated before the
consular of cers abroad, as well as the absence of witnesses, cannot be of much legal
signi cance under Philippine law inasmuch as the requirement under Article 1358(a) of the
Civil Code, that a contract intended to extinguish or transmit real rights over the
immovables must be in a public document is merely designed for greater ef cacy or
convenience (4 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, 1991 ed., p. 546).
Neither does the absence of the Solicitor General's participation render the agreement
invalid since under both Executive Order No. 2 and Executive Order No. 14-A, it is the PCGG
which has been "primarily charged" with the responsibility of recovering illegally acquired
or misappropriated assets. It should perhaps be recalled at this juncture that it was during
this period that the OSG withdrew as counsel in PCGG cases, compelling the latter to hire
high-priced and supposedly competent lawyers of its own. Indeed, these events were the
backdrop of the widely acclaimed and erudite decision penned by Justice Flerida Ruth P.
Romero wherein the OSG was advised of its duties, the scope of its authority, the mandate
of its of ce, and thence ordered to re-enter its appearance in PCGG cases. In ne, the OSG
is the least quali ed agency to raise the argument that it had no participation in the
agreement. LibLex
The PCGG submits the notion that Benedicto can renege on his undertaking because the
compromise does not have a clause for breach of warranty. Again, we must point out that
the insinuation (p. 30, Petition; p. 35, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292) along this line is uncalled for
due to the language of Paragraph 4:
IV. Cooperation in Preservation/Recovery Efforts.
The parties herein hereby undertake to cooperate with each other in the
preservation or recovery of sequestered properties and business, including joint
action or defense in the enforcement or resistance as the case may be, or claims
affecting the sequestered properties and businesses involved in this Agreement.prLL
as well of Paragraph 6 of the Compromise Agreement:

VI. Further Acts/Documents.
Each party to this Agreement agrees to perform such other and further acts and
authorizations, including the execution and delivery of such other and further
documents as may be reasonably necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Agreement.
which serve as built-in safeguards against amnesia, so to speak, and possible

repudiation. At any rate, and assuming in gratia argumenti that a breach occurs, the
remedy of the PCGG is clearly set forth in Article 2041 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2041. If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise,
the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and
insist upon his original demand.
It is advocated by the PCGG that respondent Benedicto retaining a portion of the assets is
anathema to, and incongruous with, the zero-retention policy of the government in the
pursuit for recovery of all ill-gotten wealth pursuant to Section 2(a) of Executive Order No.
1. While full recovery is ideal, the PCGG is not precluded from entering into a compromise
agreement which entails reciprocal concessions if only to expedite recovery so that the
remaining "funds, assets and other properties may be used to hasten national economic
recovery" (3rd WHEREAS clause, Executive Order No. 14-A). To be sure, the so-called zero
retention mentioned in Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1 had been modified to read:
WHEREAS, the Presidential Commission on Good Government was created on
February 28, 1986 by Executive Order No. 1 to assist the President in the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates;
which undoubtedly suggests a departure from the former goal of total restitution.
Contrary to the PCGG's observation that the value of the assets ceded by Benedicto
should have been re ected in the contract, Section 5 of Executive Order No. 14-A does not
seem to impose such an element as a condition sine qua non to the validity of a projected
settlement. Information as to net worth of Benedicto's assets need not be stated in the
four corners of the agreement since his duty to disclose all his property is supposed to be
made before the PCGG or to the Sandiganbayan when called upon to testify as a vital
witness on other ill-gotten wealth cases under Section 5 of EO 14-A. It is needless to
stress that the series of negotiations which culminated in the signing of the agreement on
November 3, 1990 afforded every opportunity for Benedicto to reveal his assets for the
PCGG's evaluation in conjunction with its general function to collate evidence relative to ill-
gotten wealth (Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. vs. PCGG (150 SCRA 181 [1987]).
The fact that certain details peculiar in other compromise agreements, such as those
found in the Fonacier, Razon and Floirendo deals, are not re ected in the Benedicto
agreement does not mean that the settlement is susceptible to challenge, especially so
when the PCGG itself concedes that any future agreement need not follow the pattern
fixed in previous contracts (p. 33, Petition; p. 38, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292).
To support the thesis that the agreement per se is contrary to law, the PCGG shifts
discussion to the salient portions of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, particularly those with respect to acts allegedly causing undue injury to the
government, resulting into a manifestly disadvantageous contract and leading to
unwarranted privileges (p. 35, Petition; p. 40, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292). But these
assumptions remain mere verisimilitudes, unsupported by evidence that indeed the
contract was entered into under circumstances which would invite reasonable suspicion of
bad faith on the part of those privy thereto. Cdpr
To backtrack from the effects of the settlement, the PCGG relies on the principle that the
State is never estopped by acts of its agents, as applied in cases which require no citation,
and as affirmed by Section 15, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution:
The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public of cials
or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be
barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.
We agree with the statement that the State is immune from estoppel but this concept is
understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its of cials especially those which are
irregular (Sharp International Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA 299; 306 [1991];
Republic vs. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983], which peculiar circumstances are absent in the
case at bar. Although the State's right of action to recover ill-gotten wealth is not
vulnerable to estoppel, it is non-sequitur to suggest that a contract, freely and in good faith
executed between the parties thereto is susceptible to disturbance ad in nitum . A
different interpretation will lead to the absurd scenario of permitting a party to unilaterally
jettison a compromise agreement which is supposed to have the authority of res judicata
(Article 2037 , New Civil Code), and like any other contract, has the force of law between
privies thereto (Article 1159, New Civil Code; Hernaez vs. Kao, 17 SCRA 296 [966]; 6
Padilla, Civil Code annotated, 7th ed., 1987, p. 711; 3 Aquino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 463).
Thus, as emphasized by Justice Escareal in Civil Case No. 0034:
Viewed against the backdrop of the foregoing factual antecedents and legal
principles, We are of the considered opinion that new PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo lacks the legal and moral authority to overturn and set
aside a previous valid and authorized contract/transaction entered into by his
predecessor in behalf of the Republic. To rule otherwise is to sanction an
unlawful betrayal by one party of the trust and con dence reposed by the other. It
must be noted that the parties to the Agreement are plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines, as represented by the PCGG, and defendant Roberto S. Benedicto, not
anybody else. With this basic premise, it logically follows that after the due
execution of the Agreement by and between PCGG, as representative of plaintiff
Republic of the Philippines, and defendant Benedicto, the same has acquired a
binding and res judicata effect as against the parties thereto. Perforce, any
change in the administrative structure and/or personalities within the PCGG
cannot defeat the validity and binding effect thereof between the parties. A ruling
to the contrary is not only illogical and irrational, but inequitable and pernicious
as well, for it may open the door for capricious adventurism on the part of the
policy-makers of the land, and disregard for the majesty of the law, which could
ultimately bring about the citizenry's loss of faith and con dence in the sincerity
of the government in its dealings with the governed.
(p. 115-116, G.R. No. 108368).

Within the context of the Civil Code, the principle of estoppel under Article 1431 is only of
suppletory application insofar as they are not in direct friction with other provisions of the
Code, such as the binding effect of a compromise agreement under Article 2037, the Code
of Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws (Article 1432 , New Civil Code; 4 Paras,
Civil Code Annotated, 12th ed., 1989, p. 172). The real of ce of the equitable norm of
estoppel is limited to supply deficiency in the law but it should not supplant positive law. LexLib
Furthermore, this Court will reject a settlement only if it contravenes Article 2035 of the
Civil Code (prohibiting compromises on the civil status of persons, the validity of marriage
or a legal separation, or any ground for such separation, future support, the jurisdiction of
courts, and future legitime) or if the stipulations thereof are repugnant to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy ( First Philippine Holdings Corp. vs. Sandiganbayan,
202 SCRA 212 [1991]).
The Sandiganbayan stated in its questioned decision that "the essence of compromise
being mutual concessions by the parties to avoid or end litigation, it is to be expected that
neither will be able to maintain his initial demands wholly unaltered" (Periquet vs. Reyes, 21
SCRA 1503 [1967]). As succinctly stated by Justice Cipriano A. del Rosario in his
concurring opinion, any compromise has at its very essence reciprocal concessions; that
"One must give if one must take. If only one takes all, then one must rst win. But in a
compromise, all win by taking some and giving some" (p. 108, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292). cdphil
The arguments that the compromise is too one-sided in favor of Benedicto and that undue
injury has been caused to the Government while unwarranted bene ts and advantages
have been given to Mr. Benedicto, his family, and employees contrary to Republic Act No.
3019, have no merit.
The compromise agreement was the result of a long drawnout process of negotiations
with each party trying to come out as best as it could. There can be no question of its
being freely and voluntarily entered into by the then PCGG Chairman with full authority from
the Commission itself.
The Sandiganbayan had ample opportunity to examine the validity of the compromise
agreement and to look into any iniquitous or illegal features, express, implied, or hidden.
Two years elapsed from the time the agreement was executed up to the time it was
judicially approved. The joint motion to approve the compromise agreement led by the
PCGG and Benedicto dated November 22, 1990 was followed seven days later by an
opposition from Solicitor General Frank Chavez. Comments, replies, various motions, a
temporary restraining order of the Court in Guingona vs. PCGG and our decision in that
case - 207 SCRA 659 (1992), memoranda, hearings set for August 11, 1992, September 1,
1992, and September 17, 1992, oppositions, manifestations, and the September 17, 1992
resolution of the Sandiganbayan preceded its now questioned October 2, 1992 decision.
Every question regarding the legality and propriety of the compromise agreement was fully
threshed out before the Sandiganbayan by the parties. We are not dealing with the usual
compromise agreement perfunctorily submitted to a court and approved as a matter of
course. The PCGG-Benedicto agreement was thoroughly and, at times, disputatiously
discussed before the respondent court. There could be no deception or misrepresentation
foisted on either the PCGG or the Sandiganbayan.
In Araneta vs. Perez(7 SCRA 923 [1963]), we ruled that a compromise once approved by
nal orders of the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not
be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. It is a long established doctrine that
the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise, foolish, or disastrous
contract, entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he
was doing (Tanda vs. Aldaya , 89 Phil. 497 [1951]). Courts have no power to relieve parties
from obligations voluntarily assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be
disastrous deals or unwise investments (Villacorte vs. Mariano, 89 Phil. 341 [1951]).
In the case at bar, the compromise agreement, as stated by Sandiganbayan, was signed
and executed by the parties "with their eyes wide open" (Decision, p. 23; p. 101, Rollo in
G.R. No. 108292). The PCGG knew the strength of the evidence in its hands, the
advantages of immediate recovery, the projected income if forthwith privatized, and other
bene ts to the Government. The Sandiganbayan itself in two years of proceedings and
deliberations rejected the allegations of fraud, deception, illegality, and contrariness to
morals, good customs, public policy and public order now raised again before us.
There is another aspect of these petitions presented by petitioners which appears
inconsistent and infeasible. The original prayer of the new PCGG Chairman was to
"renegotiate a more just, fair and equitable agreement" (Annex G of Petition in G.R. No.
108292, p. 191, Rollo). At the risk of being redundant, we once again must emphasize that
the government has already taken over everything ceded to it by Benedicto. In fact, it is
already selling if it has not yet sold various ceded property under the privatization
program. In other words, the agreement has not only been executed, it has been
implemented. Even as the PCGG seeks to nullify and declare void the compromise
agreement, it has no intention of returning any of the pieces of property which it received
under the agreement. It states that the rules on the question of "restitution" are not those
on rescissible contracts but those on void and inexistent contracts in the Civil Code.
The PCGG seemingly forgets that the ownership of the ceded property has been vested in
the government not because it won its cases in the courts and the true ownership or illegal
acquisition has been de nitively established. It cannot assume that its allegations have
been sustained by the Sandiganbayan. Ownership has been transferred because of the
compromise agreement, not because of any evidence presented in court by either side on
the merits or demerits of the reconveyance and reversion cases. LexLib
The Compromise Agreement itself declares:

WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss cases, and
also without admitting the merits of their respective claims and counterclaims
presently involved in uncertain, protracted, and expensive litigation, the Republic
of the Philippines, solely motivated by the desire for immediate accomplishment
of its recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto, being interested to lead a peaceful and
normal pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided to withdraw and/or
dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims under the cases pending in the
Philippines earlier referred to;
In other words, the Government wanted to recover as much as it could and as fast as
possible while Benedicto wanted to buy peace without admitting guilt. If the PCGG wants
to nullify the agreement it entered into freely and voluntarily, it must be willing to return all
the property ceded to it because of the Agreement and recover them by proving its cases
in the course of judicial proceedings. This is an essential rst step. It cannot renege on the
agreement while holding on to property which it received as a result of said agreement. Cdpr
More than any person or institution, the government should honor its solemn
commitments. It would set a bad precedent and result in public disenchantment with
government if every new head of a government agency is allowed to freely disown the
legitimate agreements of his predecessors, especially those bearing court approval and,
even as everything is already nal and implemented, insist on further rounds of
negotiations. Under the PCGG's theory, there would be nothing to prevent any of its future
Chairman from repudiating and revoking acts of his predecessors. The vital element of
trust, honor, and stability in dealing with the government would be lost.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 108548-49 and 108550 led their petitions to set aside the
denial of their motion to intervene. They raise essentially the same grounds as the PCGG in
the two other cases in their bid to set aside the compromise agreement. According to said
petitioners, they are intervening because Benedicto should compensate them and the
sugar industry for the systematic plunder of the industry. We agree with the
Sandiganbayan that their rights can be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
There is no doubt that interested parties who claim ownership of some assets embraced
in the settlement can participate in pending litigations involving ill-gotten wealth before the
Sandiganbayan as held in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (184 SCRA 382 [1990]) with
reference to incidents arising from, incidental to, or interwoven with, cases falling within
respondent court's exclusive and original jurisdiction ( PCGG vs. Peña, 159 SCRA 556
[1988]). But inasmuch as the petitioners in G.R. No. 108548-50 led their motion for leave
to intervene and to admit memorandum in intervention on November 13, 1992 (p. 7,
Petition; p. 8, Rollo in G.R. No. 108548-49; p. 7, Petition; p. 7, Rollo in G.R. No. 108550) or
after promulgation of the impugned decision on October 2, 1992, it cannot be gainsaid
that the intended intrusion was not seasonably raised before or during the trial spoken of
by Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 2 — Intervention — A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the
court, in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
At any rate, availability of a separate proceeding for petitioners as third persons to the
compromise agreement before the Sandiganbayan, in accordance with the ruling of this
Court in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan (184 SCRA 382 [1990]) and in PCGG vs. Peña (159
SCRA 556 [1988]), proscribes intervention under Section 2(b), Rule 12 of the Revised
Rules of Court:
Sec. 2(b) — Discretion of court — In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the court, in the exercise of discretion, shall consider whether or not
the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in
a separate proceeding. cdphil
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 108292, 108368, 108548-49, and 108550 are
hereby dismissed. The restraining orders issued in the respective cases dated March 10,
1993, March 23, 1993, and March 24, 1993, are hereby lifted and the parties to the
compromise agreement are ordered to comply strictly with the terms thereof.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Puno and Vitug, JJ ., concur.
Feliciano, J ., is on leave.
Quiason, J ., took no part.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104776. December 5, 1994.]
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL, DONATO B.

EVANGELISTA, and the rest of 1, 767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru
and by their Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL MUNDO ,
petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION'S ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC.
AND/OR ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION ,
respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 104911-14. December 5, 1994.]
BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. HON. NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. and/or ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS
CORPORATION , respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 105029-32. December 5, 1994.]
ASIA INTERNATIONAL BUILDER CORPORATION and BROWN & ROOT

INTERNATIONAL, INC. , petitioners, vs . NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M. AMUL,
DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, ROMEO PATAG, RIZALINO REYES,
IGNACIO DE VERA, SOLOMON B. REYES, JOSE M. ABAN, EMIGDIO
N. ABARQUEZ, ANTONIO ACUPAN, ROMEO ACUPAN, BENJAMIN
ALEJANDRE, WILFREDO D. ALIGADO, MARTIN AMISTAD, JR.,
ROLANDO B. AMUL, AMORSOLO ANADING, ANTONIO T. ANGLO,
VICENTE ARLITA, HERBERT AYO, SILVERIO BALATAZO, ALFREDO
BALOBO, FALCONERO BANAAG, RAMON BARBOSA, FELIX
BARCENA, FERNANDO BAS, MARIO BATACLAN, ROBERTO S.
BATICA, ENRICO BELEN, ARISTEO BICOL, LARRY C. BICOL,
PETRONILLO BISCOCHO, FELIX M. BOBIER, DIONISIO BOBONGO,
BAYANI S. BRACAMANTE, PABLITO BUSTILLO, GUILLERMO
CABEZAS, BIENVENIDO CADALIN, RODOLFO CAGATAN, AMANTE
CAILAO, IRENEO CANDOR, JOSE CASTILLO, MANUEL CASTILLO,
REMAR CASTROJERES, REYNALDO CAYAS, ROMEO CECILIO,
TEODULO CREUS, BAYANI DAYRIT, RICARDO DAYRIT, ERNESTO T.
DELA CRUZ, FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, ONOFRE DE RAMA, IGNACIO
DE VERA, MODESTO DIZON, REYNALDO DIZON, ANTONIO S.
DOMINGUEZ, GILBERT EBRADA, RICARDO EBRADA, ANTONIO
EJERCITO, JR., EDUARTE ERIDAO, ELADIO ESCOTOTO, JOHN
ESGUERRA, EDUARDO ESPIRITU, ERNESTO ESPIRITU, RODOLFO
ESPIRITU, NESTOR M. ESTEVA, BENJAMIN ESTRADA, VALERIO
EVANGELISTA, OLIGARIO FRANCISCO, JESUS GABAWAN, ROLANDO
GARCIA, ANGEL GUDA, PACITO HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO HILARIO,
HENRY L. JACOB, HONESTO JARDINIANO, ANTONIO JOCSON,
GERARDO LACSAMANA, EFREN U. LIRIO LORETO LONTOC, ISRAEL
LORENZO, ALEJANDRO LORINO, JOSE MABALAY, HERMIE
MARANAN, LEOVIGILDO MARCIAL, NOEL MARTINEZ, DANTE
MATREO, LUCIANO MELENDEZ, RENATO MELO, FRANCIS MEDIODA,
JOSE C. MILANES, RAYMUNDO C. MILAY, CRESENCIANO MIRANDA,
ILDEFONSO C. MOLINA, ARMANDO B. MONDEJAR RESURRECCION
D. NAZARENO, JUAN OLINDO, FRANCISCO R. OLIVARES, PEDRO
ORBISTA, JR., RICARDO ORDOÑEZ, ERNIE PANCHO, JOSE PANCHO ,
GORGONIO P. PARALA, MODESTO PINPIN, JUANITO PAREA, ROMEO
I. PATAG, FRANCISCO PINPIN, LEONARDO POBLETE, JAIME
POLLOS DOMINGO PONDALIS, EUGENIO RAMIREZ, LUCIEN M.
RESPALL, GAUDENCIO RETANAN, JR., TOMAS B. RETENER, ALVIN C.
REYES, RIZALINO REYES, SOLOMON B. REYES, VIRGILIO G. RICAZA,
RODELIO RIETA , JR., BENITO RIVERA, JR., BERNARDO J. ROBILLOS,
PABLO A. ROBLES, JOSE ROBLEZA, QUIRINO RONQUILLO, AVELINO
M. ROQUE, MENANDRO L. SABINO, PEDRO SALGATAR, EDGARDO
SALONGA, NUMERIANO SAN MATEO, FELIZARDO DE LOS SANTOS,
JR., GABRIEL SANTOS, JUANITO SANTOS, PAQUITO SOLANTE,
CONRADO A. SOLIS, JR., RODOLFO SULTAN, ISAIAS TALACTAC,
WILLIAM TARUC, MENANDRO TEMPROSA, BIENVENIDO S.
TOLENTINO, BENEDICTO TORRES, MAXIMIANO TORRES,
FRANCISCO G. TRIAS, SERGIO A. URSOLINO, ROGELIO VALDEZ,
LEGORIO E. VERGARA, DELFIN VICTORIA, GILBERT VICTORIA,
HERNANE VICTORIANO, FRANCISCO VILLAFLORES, DOMINGO
VILLAHERMOSA, ROLANDO VILLALOBOS, ANTONIO VILLAUZ,
DANILO VILLANUEVA, ROGELIO VILLANUEVA, ANGEL VILLARBA,
JUANITO VILLARINO, FRANCISCO ZARA, ROGELIO AALAGOS,
NICANOR B. ABAD, ANDRES ABANES, REYNALDO ABANES,
EDUARDO ABANTE, JOSE ABARRO, JOSEFINO ABARRO, CELSO S.
ABELANIO, HERMINIO ABELLA, MIGUEL ABESTANO, RODRIGO G.
ABUBO, JOSE B. ABUSTAN, DANTE ACERES, REYNALDO S. ACOJIDO,
LEOWILIN ACTA, EUGENIO C. ACUEZA, EDUARDO ACUPAN,
REYNALDO ACUPAN, SOLANO ACUPAN, MANUEL P. ADANA,
FLORENTINO R. AGNE, QUITERIO R. AGUDO, MANUEL P.
AGUINALDO, DANTE AGUIRRE, HERMINIO AGUIRRE, GONZALO
ALBERTO, JR., CONRADO ALCANTARA, LAMBERTO Q. ALCANTARA,
MARIANITO J. ALCANTARA, BENCIO ALDOVER, EULALIO V.
ALEJANDRO, BENJAMIN ALEJANDRO, EDUARDO L. ALEJANDRO,
MAXIMINO ALEJANDRO, ALBERTO ALMENAR, ARNALDO ALONZO,
AMADO ALORIA, CAMILO ALVAREZ, MANUEL C. ALVAREZ,
BENJAMIN R. AMBROCIO, CARLOS AMORES, BERNARD P.
ANCHETA, TIMOTEO O. ANCHETA, JEOFREY ANI, ELINO P.
ANTILLON, ARMANDRO B. ANTIPONO, LARRY T. ANTONIO,
ANTONIO APILADO, ARTURO P. APILADO, FRANCISCO APOLINARIO,
BARTOLOME M. AQUINO, ISIDRO AQUINO, PASTOR AQUINO,
ROSENDO M. AQUINO, ROBERTO ARANGORIN, BENJAMIN O.
ARATEA, ARTURO V. ARAULLO, PRUDENCIO ARAULLO, ALEXANDER
ARCAIRA, FRANCISCO ARCIAGA, JOSE AREVALO, JUANITO
AREVALO, RAMON AREVALO, RODOLFO AREVALO, EULALIO
ARGUELLES, WILFREDO P. ARICA, JOSE M. ADESILLO, ANTONIO
ASUNCION, ARTEMIO M. ASUNCION, EDGARDO ASUNCION, REXY M.
ASUNCION, VICENTE AURELIO, ANGEL AUSTRIA, RICARDO P.
AVERILLA, JR., VIRGILIO AVILA, BARTOLOME AXALAN, ALFREDO
BABILONIA, FELIMON BACAL, JOSE L. BACANI, ROMULO R.
BALBIERAN, VICENTE BALBIERAN, RODOLFO BALITBIT, TEODORO
Y. BALOBO, DANILO O. BARBA, BERNARDO BARRO, JUAN A.
BASILAN, CEFERINO BATITIS, VIVENCIO C. BAUAN, GAUDENCIO S.
BAUTISTA, LEONARDO BAUTISTA, JOSE BAUTISTA, ROSTICO
BAUTISTA, RUPERTO B. BAUTISTA, TEODORO S. BAUTISTA,
VIRGILIO BAUTISTA, JESUS R. BAYA, WINIEFREDO BAYACAL,
WINIEFREDO BEBIT, BEN G. BELIR, ERIC B. BELTRAN, EMELIANO
BENALES, JR., RAUL BENITEZ, PERFECTO BENSAN, IRENEO
BERGONIO, ISABELO BERMUDEZ, ROLANDO I. BERMUDEZ, DANILO
BERON, BENJAMIN BERSAMIN, ANGELITO BICOL, ANSELMO BICOL,
CELESTINO BICOL, JR., FRANCISCO BICOL, ROGELIO BICOL,
ROMULO L. BICOL, ROGELIO BILLIONES, TEOFILO N. BITO,
FERNANDO BLANCO, AUGUSTO BONDOC, DOMINGO BONDOC, PEPE
S. BOOC, JAMES R. BORJA, WILFREDO BRACEROS, ANGELES C.
BRECINO, EURECLYDON G. BRIONES, AMADO BRUGE, PABLITO
BUDILLO, ARCHIMEDES BUENAVENTURA, BASILIO BUENAVENTURA,
GUILLERMO BUENCONSEJO, ALEXANDER BUSTAMANTE, VIRGILIO
BUTIONG, JR., HONESTO P. CABALLA, DELFIN CABALLERO,
BENEDICTO CABANIGAN, MOISES CABATAY, HERMANELI
CABRERA, PEDRO CAGATAN, JOVEN C. CAGAYAT, ROGELIO L.
CALAGOS, REYNALDO V. CALDERON, OSCAR C. CALDERON, NESTOR
D. CALLEJA, RENATO R. CALMA, NELSON T. CAMACHO, SANTOS T.
CAMACHO, ROBERTO CAMANA, FLORANTE C. CAMANAG EDGARDO
M. CANDA, SEVERINO CANTOS, EPIFANIO A. CAPONPON, ELIAS, D.
CARILLO, JR., ARMANDO CARREON, MENANDRO M. CASTAÑEDA,
BENIGNO A. CASTILLO, CORNELIO L. CASTILLO, JOSEPH B.
CASTILLO, ANSELMO CASTILLO, JOAQUIN CASTILLO, PABLO L.
CASTILLO, ROMEO P. CASTILLO, SESINANDO CATIBOG, DANILO
CASTRO, PRUDENCIO A. CASTRO, RAMO CASTRO, JR., ROMEO A. DE
CASTRO, JAIME B. CATLI, DURANA D. CEFERINO, RODOLFO B.
CELIS, HERMINIGILDO CEREZO, VICTORIANO CELESTINO,
BENJAMIN CHAN, ANTONIO C. CHUA, VIVENCIO B. CIABAL,
RODRIGO CLARETE, AUGUSTO COLOMA, TURIANO CONCEPCION,
TERESITO CONSTANTINO, ARMANDO CORALES, RENATO C.
CORCUERA, APOLINAR CORONADO, ABELARDO CORONEL, FELIX
CORONEL, JR., LEONARDO CORPUZ, JESUS M. CORRALES, CESAR
CORTEMPRATO, FRANCISCO O. CORVERA, FRANCISCO COSTALES,
SR., CELEDONIO CREDITO, ALBERTO A. CREUS, ANACLETO V. CRUZ,
DOMINGO DELA CRUZ, AMELIANO DELA CRUZ, JR., PANCHITO
CRUZ, REYNALDO B. DELA CRUZ, ROBERTO P. CRUZ, TEODORO S.
CRUZ, ZOSIMO DELA CRUZ, DIONISIO A. CUARESMA, FELIMON
CUIZON, FERMIN DAGONDON, RICHARD DAGUINSIN, CRISANTO A.
DATAY, NICASIO DANTINGUINOO, JOSE DATOON, EDUARDO DAVID,
ENRICO T. DAVID, FAVIO DAVID, VICTORIANO S. DAVID, EDGARDO
N. DAYACAP, JOSELITO T. DELOSO, CELERINO DE GUZMAN,
ROMULO DE GUZMAN, LIBERATO DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE LEON,
JOSELITO L. DE LUMBAN, NAPOLEON S. DE LUNA, RICARDO DE
RAMA, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO, ALBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSE DELA
CRUZ, LEONARDO DELOS REYES, ERNESTO F. DIATA, EDUARDO A.
DIAZ, FELIX DIAZ, MELCHOR DIAZ, NICANOR S. DIAZ, GERARDO C.
DIGA, CLEMENTE DIMATULAC, ROLANDO DIONISIO, PHILIPP G.
DISMAYA, BENJAMIN DOCTOLERO, ALBERTO STO. DOMINGO,
BENJAMIN E. DOZA, BENJAMIN DUPA, DANILO C. DURAN,
GREGORIO D. DURAN, RENATO A. EDUARTE, GODOFREDO E. EISMA,
ARDON B. ELLO, UBED B. ELLO, JOSEFINO ENANO, REYNALDO
ENCARNACION, EDGARDO ENGUANCIO, ELIAS EQUIPANO,
FELIZARDO ESCARMOSA, MIGUEL ESCARMOSA, ARMANDO
ESCOBAR, ROMEO T. ESCUYOS, ANGELITO ESPIRITU, EDUARDO S.
ESPIRITU, REYNALDO ESPIRITU, ROLANDO ESPIRITU, JULIAN
ESPREGANTE, IGMIDIO ESTANISLAO, ERNESTO M. ESTEBAN,
MELANIO R. ESTRO, ERNESTO M. ESTEVA, CONRADO ESTUAR,
CLYDE ESTUYE, ELISEO FAJARDO, PORFIRIO FALQUEZA, WILFREDO
P. FAUSTINO, EMILIO E. FERNANDEZ, ARTEMIO FERRER, MISAEL M.
FIGURACION, ARMANDO F. FLORES, BENJAMIN FLORES, EDGARDO
C. FLORES, BUENAVENTURA FRANCISCO, MANUEL S. FRANCISCO,
ROLANDO FRANCISCO, VALERIANO FRANCISCO, RODOLFO
GABAWAN, ESMERALDO GAHUTAN, CESAR C. GALANG, SANTIAGO
N. GALOSO, GABRIEL GAMBOA, BERNARDO GANDAMON, JUAN
GANZON, ANDRES GARCIA, JR., ARMANDO M. GARCIA, EUGENIO
GARCIA, MARCELO L. GARCIA, PATRICIO L. GARCIA, JR., PANCIANO
G. GARCIA, PONCIANO G. GARCIA, JR., RAFAEL P. GARCIA,
ROBERTO S. GARCIA, OSIAS G. GAROFIL, RAYMUNDO C. GARON,
ROLANDO G. GATELA, AVELINO GAYETA, RAYMUNDO GERON,
PLACIDO GONZALES, RUPERTO H. GONZALES, ROGELIO D. GUANIO,
MARTIN V. GUERRERO, JR., ALEXIS GUNO, RICARDO L. GUNO,
FRANCISCO GUPIT, DENNIS J. GUTIERREZ, IGNACIO B. GUTIERREZ,
ANGELITO DE GUZMAN, JR., CESAR H. HABANA, RAUL G.
HERNANDEZ, REYNALDO HERNANDEZ, JOVENIANO D. HILADO,
JUSTO HILAPO, ROSTITO HINAHON, FELICISIMO HINGADA,
EDUARDO HIPOLITO, RAUL L. IGNACIO, MANUEL L. ILAGAN,
RENATO L . ILAGAN, CONRADO A. INSIONG, GRACIANO G. ISLA,
ARNEL L. JACOB, OSCAR J. JAPITENGA, CIRILO HICBAN,
MAXIMIANO HONRADES, GENEROSO IGNACIO, FELIPE ILAGAN,
EXPEDITO N. JACOB, MARIO JASMIN, BIENVENIDO JAVIER, ROMEO
M. JAVIER, PRIMO DE JESUS, REYNALDO DE JESUS, CARLOS A.
JIMENEZ, DANILO E. JIMENEZ, PEDRO C. JOAQUIN, FELIPE W.
JOCSON, FELINO M. JOCSON, PEDRO N. JOCSON, VALENTINO S.
JOCSON, PEDRO B. JOLOYA, ESTEBAN P. JOSE, JR., RAUL JOSE,
RICARDO SAN JOSE, GERTRUDO KABIGTING, EDUARDO S.
KOLIMLIM, SR., LAURO J. LABAY, EMMANUEL C. LABELLA,
EDGARDO B. LACERONA, JOSE B. LACSON, MARIO J. LADINES,
RUFINO LAGAC, RODRIGO LAGANAPAN, EFREN M. LAMADRID,
GUADENCIO LATANAN, VIRGILIO LATAYAN, EMILIANO LATOJA,
WENCESLAO LAUREL, ALFREDO LAXAMANA, DANIEL R. LAZARO,
ANTONIO C. LEANO, ARTURO S. LEGASPI, BENITO DE LEMOS, JR.,
PEDRO G. DE LEON, MANOLITO C. LILOC, GERARDO LIMUACO,
ERNESTO S. LISING, RENATO LISING, WILFREDO S. LISING,
CRISPULO LONTOC, PEDRO M. LOPERA, ROGELIO LOPERA, CARLITO
M. LOPEZ, CLODY LOPEZ, GARLITO LOPEZ, GEORGE F. LOPEZ,
VIRGILIO M. LOPEZ, BERNARDITO G. LOREJA, DOMINGO B. LORICO,
DOMINGO LOYOLA, DANTE LUAGE, ANTONIO M. LUALHATI,
EMMANUEL LUALHATI, JR., LEONIDEZ C. LUALHATI, SEBASTIAN
LUALHATI, FRANCISCO LUBAT, ARMANDO LUCERO, JOSELITO L. DE
LUMBAN, THOMAS VICENTE O. LUNA, NOLI MACALADLAD,
ALFREDO MACALINO, RICARDO MACALINO, ARTURO V. MACARAIG,
ERNESTO V. MACARAIG, RODOLFO V. MACARAIG, BENJAMIN
MACATANGAY, HERMOGENES MACATANGAY, RODEL
MACATANGAY, ROMULO MACATANGAY, OSIAS Q.
MADLANGBAYAN, NICOLAS P. MADRID, EDELBERTO G. MAGAT,
EFREN C. MAGBANUA, BENJAMIN MAGBUHAT, ALFREDO C.
MAGCALENG, ANTONIO MAGNAYE, ALFONSO MAGPANTAY,
RICARDO C. MAGPANTAY, SIMEON M. MAGPANTAY, ARMANDO M.
MAGSINO, MACARIO S. MAGSINO, ANTONIO MAGTIBAY, VICTOR V.
MAGTIBAY, GERONIMO MAHILUM, MANUEL MALONZO, RICARDO
MAMADIS, RODOLFO MANA, BERNARDO A. MANALILI, MANUEL
MANALILI, ANGELO MANALO, AGUILES L. MANALO, LEOPOLDO
MANGAHAS, BAYANI MANIGBAS, ROLANDO C. MANIMTIM, DANIEL
MANONSON,. ERNESTO F. MANUEL, EDUARDO MANZANO, RICARDO
N. MAPA, RAMON MAPILE, ROBERTO C. MARANA, NEMESIO
MARASIGAN, WENCESLAO MARASIGAN, LEONARDO MARCELO,
HENRY F. MARIANO, JOEL MARIDABLE, SANTOS E. MARINO,
NARCISO A. MARQUEZ, RICARDO MARTINEZ, DIEGO MASICAMPO,
AURELIO MATABERDE, RENATO MATILLA, VICTORIANO MATILLA,
VIRGILIO MEDEL, LOLITO M. MELECIO, BENIGNO MELENDEZ,
RENER J. MEMIJE, REYNALDO F. MEMIJE, RODEL MEMIJE, AVELINO
MENDOZA, JR., CLARO MENDOZA, TIMOTEO MENDOZA, GREGORIO
MERCADO, ERNANI DELA MERCED, RICARDO MERCENA, NEMESIO
METRELLO, RODEL MEMIJE, GASPAR MINIMO, BENJAMIN
MIRANDA, FELIXBERTO D. MISA, CLAUDIO A. MODESTO, JR., OSCAR
MONDEDO, GENEROSO MONTON, RENATO MORADA, RICARDO
MORADA, RODOLFO MORADA, ROLANDO M. MORALES, FEDERICO
M. MORENO, VICTORINO A. MORTEL, JR., ESPIRITU A. MUNOZ,
IGNACIO MUNOZ, ILDEFONSO MUNOZ, ROGELIO MUNOZ, ERNESTO
NAPALAN, MARCELO A. NARCIZO, REYNALDO NATALIA, FERNANDO
C. NAVARETTE, PACIFICO D. NAVARRO, FLORANTE NAZARENO,
RIZAL B. NAZARIO, JOSUE NEGRITE, ALFREDO NEPOMUCENO,
HERBERT G. NG, FLORENCIO NICOLAS, ERNESTO C. NINON,
AVELINO NUQUI, NEMESIO D. OBA, DANILO OCAMPO, EDGARDO
OCAMPO, RODRIGO E. OCAMPO, ANTONIO B. OCCIANO, REYNALDO
P. OCSON, BENJAMIN ODESA, ANGEL OLASO, FRANCISCO
OLIGARIO, ZOSIMO OLIMBO, BENJAMIN V. ORALLO, ROMEO S.
ORIGINES, DANILO R. ORTANEZ, WILFREDO OSIAS, VIRGILIO PA-A,
DAVID PAALAN, JESUS N. PACHECO, ALFONSO L. PADILLA, DANILO
PAGSANJAN, NUMERIANO PAGSISIHAN, RICARDO T. PAGUIO,
EMELIO PAKINGAN, LEANDRO PALABRICA, QUINCIANO PALO, JOSE
PAMATIAN, GONZALO PAN, PORFIRIO PAN, BIENVENIDO PANGAN,
ERNESTO PANGAN, FRANCISCO V. PASIA, EDILBERTO PASIMIO, JR.,
JOSE V. PASION, ANGELITO M. PENA, DIONISIO PENDRAS,
HERMINIO PERALTA, REYNALDO M. PERALTA, ANTONIO PEREZ,
ANTOLIANO E. PEREZ, JUAN PEREZ, LEON PEREZ, ROMEO E.
PEREZ, ROMULO PEREZ, WILLIAM PEREZ, FERNANDO G. PERINO,
FLORENTINO DEL PILAR, DELMAR F. PINEDA, SALVADOR PINEDA,
ELIZALDE PINPIN, WILFREDO PINPIN, ARTURO POBLETE,
DOMINADOR R. PRIELA, BUENAVENTURA PRUDENTE, CARMELITO
PRUDENTE, DANTE PUEYO, REYNALDO Q. PUEYO, RODOLFO O.
PULIDO, ALEJANDRO PUNIO, FEDERICO QUIMAN, ALFREDO L.
QUINTO, ROMEO QUINTOS, EDUARDO W. RACABO, RICARDO C. DE
RAMA, RICARDO L. DE RAMA, ROLANDO DE RAMA, FERNANDO A.
RAMIREZ, LITO S. RAMIREZ, RICARDO G. RAMIREZ, RODOLFO V.
RAMIREZ, ALBERTO RAMOS, ANSELMO C. RAMOS, TOBIAS RAMOS,
WILLARFREDO RAYMUNDO, REYNALDO RAQUEDAN, MANUEL F.
RAVELAS, WILFREDO D. RAYMUNDO, ERNESTO E. RECOLASO,
ALBERTO REDAZA, ARTHUR REJUSO, TORIBIO M. RELLAMA, JAIME
RELLOSA, EUGENIO A. REMOQUILLO, GERARDO RENTOZA,
REDENTOR C. REY, ALFREDO S. REYES, AMABLE S. REYES,
BENEDICTO R. REYES, GREGORIO B. REYES, JOSE A. REYES, JOSE C.
REYES, ROMULO M. REYES, SERGIO REYES, ERNESTO F. RICO,
FERNANDO M. RICO, EMMANUEL RIETA, RICARDO RIETA, LEO B.
ROBLES, RUBEN ROBLES, RODOLFO ROBLEZA, RODRIGO ROBLEZA,
EDUARDO ROCABO, ANTONIO R. RODRIGUEZ, BERNARDO
RODRIGUEZ, ELIGIO RODRIGUEZ, ALMONTE ROMEO, ELIAS
RONQUILLO, ELISE RONQUILLO, LUIS VAL B. RONQUILLO, REYNOSO
P. RONQUILLO, RODOLFO RONQUILLO, ANGEL ROSALES, RAMON
ROSALES, ALBERTO DEL ROSARIO, GENEROSO DEL ROSARIO,
TEODORICO DEL ROSARIO, VIRGILIO L. ROSARIO, CARLITO
SALVADOR, JOSE SAMPARADA, ERNESTO SAN PEDRO, ADRIANO V.
SANCHA, GERONIMO M. SANCHA, ARTEMIO B. SANCHEZ, NICASIO
SANCHEZ, APOLONIO P. SANTIAGO, JOSELITO S. SANTIAGO,
SERGIO SANTIAGO, EDILBERTO C. SANTOS, EFREN S. SANTOS,
RENATO D. SANTOS, MIGUEL SAPUYOT, ALEX S. SERQUINA,
DOMINADOR P. SERRA, ROMEO SIDRO, AMADO M. SILANG,
FAUSTINO D. SILANG, RODOLFO B. DE SILOS, ANICETO G. SILVA,
EDGARDO M. SILVA, ROLANDO C. SILVERTO, ARTHUR B.
SIMBAHON, DOMINGO SOLANO, JOSELITO C. SOLANTE, CARLITO
SOLIS, CONRADO SOLIS, III, EDGARDO SOLIS, ERNESTO SOLIS,
ISAGANI M. SOLIS, EDUARDO L. SOTTO, ERNESTO G. STA. MARIA,
VICENTE G. STELLA, FELIMON SUPANG, PETER TANGUINOO,
MAXIMINO TALIBSAO, FELICISMO P. TALUSIK, FERMIN TARUC, JR.,
LEVY S. TEMPLO, RODOLFO S. TIAMSON, LEONILO TIPOSO, ARNEL
TOLENTINO, MARIO M. TOLENTINO, FELIPE TORRALBA, JOVITO V.
TORRES, LEONARDO DE TORRES, GAVINO U. TUAZON, AUGUSTO B.
TUNGUIA, FRANCISCO UMALI, SIMPLICIO UNIDA, WILFREDO V.
UNTALAN, ANTONIO VALDERAMA, RAMON VALDERAMA, NILO
VALENCIANO, EDGARDO C. VASQUEZ, ELPIDIO VELASQUEZ,
NESTOR DE VERA, WILFREDO D. VERA, BIENVENIDO VERGARA,
ALFREDO VERGARA, RAMON R. VERZOSA, FELICITO P. VICMUNDO,
ALFREDO VICTORIANO, TEOFILO P. VIDALLO, SABINO N. VIERNEZ,
JESUS J. VILLA, JOVEN VILLABLANCO, EDGARDO G. VILLAFLORES,
CEFERINO VILLAGERA, ALEX VILLAHERMOZA, DANILO A.
VILLANUEVA, ELITO VILLANUEVA, LEONARDO M. VILLANUEVA,
MANUEL R. VILLANUEVA, NEPTHALI VILLAR, JOSE V. VILLAREAL,
FELICISIMO VILLARINO, RAFAEL VILLAROMAN, CARLOS VILLENA,
FERDINAND VIVO, ROBERTO YABUT, VICENTE YNGENTE, AND ORO
C. ZUNIGA , respondents.
DECISION
QUIASON , J : p
The petition in G.R. No. 104776, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al. v.
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration's Administrator, et. al.," was filed under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to modify the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-
779 and L-86-05-460;
(2) to render a new decision: (i) declaring private respondents as in default; (ii)
declaring the said labor cases as a class suit; (iii) ordering Asia International Builders
Corporation (AIBC) and Brown and Root International Inc. (BRII) to pay the claims of the
1,767 claimants in said labor cases; (iv) declaring Atty. Florante M. de Castro guilty of
forum-shopping; and (v) dismissing POEA Case No. L-86-05-460; and
(3) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of the NLRC, denying the
motion for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-
288).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 104911-14, entitled "Bienvenido M. Cadalin, et. al., v.
Hon. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.," was led under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases
Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-799 and L-86-05-460 insofar as it: (i) applied
the three-year prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines instead of
the ten-year prescriptive period under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (ii) denied
the "three-hour daily average" formula in the computation of petitioners' overtime pay;
and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 24, 1992 of NLRC, denying the motion
for reconsideration of its Resolution dated September 2, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 8-25; 26-220).
The petition in G.R. Nos. 105029-32, entitled "Asia International Builders
Corporation, et. al., v. National Labor Relations Commission, et. al." was led under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court:
(1) to reverse the Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC in POEA Cases
Nos. L-84-06-555, L-85-10-777, L-85-10-779 and L-86-05-460, insofar as it granted the
claims of 149 claimants; and
(2) to reverse the Resolution dated March 21, 1992 of NLRC insofar as it denied
the motions for reconsideration of AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 2-59; 61-230).
The Resolution dated September 2, 1991 of NLRC, which modi ed the decision
of POEA in four labor cases: (1) awarded monetary bene ts only to 149 claimants and
(2) directed Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco to conduct hearings and to receive evidence
on the claims dismissed by the POEA for lack of substantial evidence or proof of
employment.
Consolidation of Cases
G.R. Nos. 104776 and 105029-32 were originally raf ed to the Third Division
while G.R. Nos. 104911-14 were raf ed to the Second Division. In the Resolution dated
July 26, 1993, the Second Division referred G.R. Nos. 104911-14 to the Third Division
(G.R. No. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 895).
In the Resolution dated September 29, 1993, the Third Division granted the
motion led in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 for the consolidation of said cases with G.R. Nos.
104776 and 105029-32, which were assigned to the First Division (G.R. Nos. 104911-
14, Rollo, pp. 986-1,107; G.R. Nos. 105029-30, Rollo, pp. 369-377, 426-432). In the
Resolution dated October 27, 1993, the First Division granted the motion to consolidate
G.R. Nos. 104911-14 with G.R. No. 104776 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, p. 1109; G.R.
No. 105029-32, Rollo, p. 1562).
I
On June 6, 1984, Bienvenido M.. Cadalin, Rolando M. Amul and Donato B.
Evangelista, in their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other overseas contract workers
(OCWs) instituted a class suit by ling an "Amended Complaint" with the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for money claims arising from their
recruitment by AIBC and employment by BRII (POEA Case NO. L-84-06-555). The
claimants were represented by Atty. Gerardo del Mundo.
BRII is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Houston, Texas, and is
engaged in construction; while AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino workers for overseas employment on
behalf of its foreign principals.
The amended complaint principally sought the payment of the unexpired portion
of the employment contracts, which was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel and Reserved Fund, interest on all
the unpaid bene ts; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe bene ts; refund of SSS
and premium not remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not remitted to the BIR;
penalties for committing prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the license
of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 13-14).
At the hearing on June 25, 1984, AIBC was furnished a copy of the complaint and
was given, together with BRII, up to July 5, 1984 to file its answer.
On July 3, 1984, POEA Administrator, upon motion of AIBC and BRII, ordered the
claimants to le a bill of particulars within ten days from receipt of the order and the
movants to le their answers within ten days from receipt of the bill of particulars. The
POEA Administrator also scheduled a pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984.
On July 13, 1984, the claimants submitted their "Compliance and Manifestation."
On July 23, 1984, AIBC led a "Motion to Strike Out of the Records", the "Complaint" and
the "Compliance and Manifestation." On July 25, 1984, the claimants led their
"Rejoinder and Comments," averring, among other matters, the failure of AIBC and BRII
to le their answers and to attend the pre-trial conference on July 25, 1984. The
claimants alleged that AIBC and BRII had waived their right to present evidence and had
defaulted by failing to file their answers and attend the pre-trial conference.
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied the "Motion to Strike Out of
the Records" led by AIBC but required the claimants to correct the de ciencies in the
complaint pointed out in the order.
On October 10, 1984, claimants asked for time within which to comply with the
Order of October 2, 1984 and led an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA
Administrator direct the parties to submit simultaneously their position papers, after
which the case should be deemed submitted for decision. On the same day, Atty.
Florante de Castro led another complaint for the same money claims and bene ts in
behalf of several claimants, some of whom were also claimants in POEA Case No. L-84-
06-555 (POEA Case No. 85-10-779).
On October 19, 1984, claimants led their "Compliance" with the Order dated
October 2, 1984 and an "Urgent Manifestation," praying that the POEA direct the parties
to submit simultaneously their position papers after which the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. On the same day, AIBC asked for time to le its comment on
the "Compliance" and "Urgent Manifestation" of claimants. On November 6, 1984, it led
a second motion for extension of time to file the comment.
On November 8, 1984, the POEA Administrator informed AIBC that its motion for
extension of time was granted.
On November 14, 1984, claimants led an opposition to the motions for
extension of time and asked that AIBC and BRII be declared in default for failure to le
their answers.
On November 20, 1984, AIBC and BRII led a "Comment" praying, among other
reliefs, that claimants should be ordered to amend their complaint.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator issued an order directing AIBC
and BRII to file their answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
On February 27, 1985, AIBC and BRII appealed to NLRC seeking the reversal of
the said order of the POEA Administrator. Claimants opposed the appeal, claiming that
it was dilatory and praying that AIBC and BRII be declared in default.
On April 2, 1985, the original claimants led an "Amended Complaint and/or
Position Paper" dated March 24, 1985, adding new demands: namely, the payment of
overtime pay, extra night work pay, annual leave differential pay, leave indemnity pay,
retirement and savings bene ts and their share of forfeitures (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 14-16). On April 15, 1985, the POEA Administrator directed AIBC to le its answer
to the amended complaint (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 20).
On May 28, 1985, claimants led an "Urgent Motion for Summary Judgment." On
the same day, the POEA issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to le their answers to
the "Amended Complaint," otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right
to present evidence and the case would be resolved on the basis of complainants'
evidence.
On June 5, 1985, AIBC countered with a "Motion to Dismiss as Improper Class
Suit and Motion for Bill of Particulars Re: Amended Complaint dated March 24, 1985."
Claimants opposed the motions.
On September 4, 1985, the POEA Administrator reiterated his directive to AIBC
and BRII to file their answers in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
On September 18, 1985, AIBC led its second appeal to the NLRC, together with
a petition for the issuance of a writ of injunction. On September 19, 1985, NLRC
enjoined the POEA Administrator from hearing the labor cases and suspended the
period for the filing of the answers of AIBC and BRII.
On September 19, 1985, claimants asked the POEA Administrator to include
additional claimants in the case and to investigate alleged wrongdoings of BRII, AIBC
and their respective lawyers.
On October 10, 1985, Romeo Patag and two co-claimants led a complaint
(POEA Case No. L-85-10-777) against AIBC and BRII with the POEA, demanding
monetary claims similar to those subject of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In the same
month, Solomon Reyes also led his own complaint (POEA Case No. L-85-10-779)
against AIBC and BRII.
On October 17, 1985, the law rm of Florante M. de Castro & Associates asked
for the substitution of the original counsel of record and the cancellation of the special
powers of attorney given the original counsel.
On December 12, 1985, Atty. Del Mundo led in NLRC a notice of the claim to
enforce attorney's lien.
On May 29, 1986, Atty. De Castro led a complaint for money claims (POEA Case
No. 86-05-460) in behalf of 11 claimants including Bienvenido Cadalin, a claimant in
POEA Case No. 84-06-555.
On December 12, 1986, the NLRC dismissed the two appeals led on February
27, 1985 and September 18, 1985 by AIBC and BRII.
In narrating the proceedings of the labor cases before the POEA Administrator, it
is not amiss to mention that two cases were led in the Supreme Court by the
claimants, namely — G.R. No. 72132 on September 26, 1985 and Administrative Case
No. 2858 on March 18, 1986. On May 13, 1987, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
in Administrative Case No. 2858 directing the POEA Administrator to resolve the issues
raised in the motions and oppositions led in POEA Cases Nos. L-84-06-555 and L-86-
05-460 and to decide the labor cases with deliberate dispatch.
AIBC also led a petition in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 78489), questioning the
Order dated September 4, 1985 of the POEA Administrator. Said order required BRII
and AIBC to answer the amended complaint in POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. In a
resolution dated November 9, 1987, we dismissed the petition by informing AIBC that
all its technical objections may properly be resolved in the hearings before the POEA.
Complaints were also led before the Ombudsman. The rst was led on
September 22, 1988 by claimant Hermie Arguelles and 18 co-claimants against the
POEA Administrator and several NLRC Commissioners. The Ombudsman merely
referred the complaint to the Secretary of Labor and Employment with a request for the
early disposition of POEA Case No. L-84-06-555. The second was led on April 28,
1989 by claimants Emigdio P. Bautista and Rolando R. Lobeta charging AIBC and BRII
for violation of labor and social legislations. The third was led by Jose R. Santos,
Maximino N. Talibsao and Amado B. Bruce denouncing AIBC and BRII of violations of
labor laws.
On January 13, 1987, AIBC led a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC
Resolution dated December 12, 1986.
On January 14, 1987, AIBC reiterated before the POEA Administrator its motion
for suspension of the period for ling an answer or motion for extension of time to le
the same until the resolution of its motion for reconsideration of the order of the NLRC
dismissing the two appeals. On April 28, 1987, NLRC en banc denied the motion for
reconsideration.
At the hearing on June 19, 1987, AIBC submitted its answer to the complaint. At
the same hearing, the parties were given a period of 15 days from said date within
which to submit their respective position papers. On June 24, 1987 claimants led their
"Urgent Motion to Strike Out Answer," alleging that the answer was led out of time. On
June 29, 1987, claimants led their "Supplement to Urgent Manifestational Motion" to
comply with the POEA Order of June 19, 1987. On February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII
submitted their position paper. On March 4, 1988, claimants led their " Ex-parte Motion
to Expunge from the Records" the position paper of AIBC and BRII, claiming that it was
filed out of time.
On September 1, 1988, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro led their
memorandum in POEA Case No. L-86-05-460. On September 6, 1988, AIBC and BRII
submitted their Supplemental Memorandum. On September 12, 1988, BRII led its
"Reply to Complainant's Memorandum." On October 26, 1988, claimants submitted
their "Ex-parte Manifestational Motion and Counter-Supplemental Motion," together
with 446 individual contracts of employments and service records. On October 27,
1988, AIBC and BRII filed a "Consolidated Reply."
On January 30, 1989, the POEA Administrator rendered his decision in POEA
Case No. L-84-06-555 and the other consolidated cases, which awarded the amount of
$824,652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. cdphil
On February 10, 1989, claimants submitted their "Appeal Memorandum for

Partial Appeal" from the decision of the POEA. On the same day, AIBC also led its
motion for reconsideration and/or appeal in addition to the "Notice of Appeal" led
earlier on February 6, 1989 by another counsel for AIBC.
On February 17, 1989, claimants led their "Answer to Appeal," praying for the
dismissal of the appeal of AIBC and BRII.
On March 15, 1989, claimants led their "Supplement to Complainants' Appeal
Memorandum," together with their "newly discovered evidence" consisting of payroll
records.
On April 5, 1989, AIBC and BRII submitted to NLRC their "Manifestation," stating
among other matters that there were only 728 named claimants. On April 20, 1989, the
claimants filed their "Counter-Manifestation," alleging that there were 1,767 of them.
On July 27, 1989, claimants led their "Urgent Motion for Execution" of the
Decision dated January 30, 1989 on the grounds that BRII had failed to appeal on time
and AIBC had not posted the supersedeas bond in the amount of $824,652.44.
On December 23, 1989, claimants led another motion to resolve the labor
cases.
On August 21, 1990, claimants led their "Manifestational Motion," praying that
all the 1,767 claimants be awarded their monetary claims for failure of private
respondents to file their answers within the reglementary period required by law.
On September 2, 1991, NLRC promulgated its Resolution, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the POEA in these
consolidated cases is modi ed to the extent and in accordance with the following
dispositions:

1. The claims of the 94 complainants identi ed and listed in Annex
"A" hereof are dismissed for having prescribed;
2. Respondents AIBC and Brown & Root are hereby ordered, jointly
and severally, to pay the 149 complainants, identi ed and listed in Annex
"B" hereof, the peso equivalent, at the time of payment, of the total amount
in US dollars indicated opposite their respective names;
3. The awards given by the POEA to the 19 complaints classi ed
and listed in Annex "C" hereof, who appear to have worked elsewhere than
in Bahrain are hereby set aside.
4. All claims other than those indicated in Annex "B", including those
for overtime work and favorably granted by the POEA, are hereby
dismissed for lack of substantial evidence in support thereof or are beyond
the competence of this Commission to pass upon.
In addition, this Commission, in the exercise of its powers and authority
under Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, hereby directs
Labor Arbiter Fatima J. Franco of this Commission to summon parties, conduct
hearings and receive evidence, as expeditiously as possible, and thereafter submit
a written report to this Commission (First Division) of the proceedings taken,
regarding the claims of the following:
(a) complainants identi ed and listed in Annex "D" attached and
made an integral part of this Resolution, whose claims were dismissed by
the POEA for lack of proof of employment in Bahrain (these complainants
numbering 683, are listed in pages 13 to 23 of the decision of POEA,
subject of the appeals) and,
(b) complainants identi ed and listed in Annex "E" attached and
made an integral part of this Resolution, whose awards decreed by the
POEA, to Our mind, are not supported by substantial evidence" (G.R. No.
104776; Rollo, pp. 113-115; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 85-87; G.R. Nos.
105029-31, pp. 120-122).
On November 27, 1991, claimant Amado S. Tolentino and 12 co-claimants, who
were former clients of Atty. Del Mundo, led a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court (G.R. Nos. 120741-44). The petition was dismissed in a resolution dated January
27, 1992.
Three motions for reconsideration of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the
NLRC were led. The rst, by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo; the second,
by the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro; and the third, by AIBC and BRII.
In its Resolution dated March 24, 1992, NLRC denied all the motions for
reconsideration.
Hence, these petitions led by the claimants represented by Atty. Del Mundo
(G.R. No. 104776), the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro (G.R. Nos. 104911-14)
and by AIBC and BRII (G.R. Nos. 105029-32).
II
Compromise Agreements
Before this Court, the claimants represented by Atty. De Castro and AIBC and
BRII have submitted, from time to time, compromise agreements for our approval and
jointly moved for the dismissal of their respective petitions insofar as the claimants-
parties to the compromise agreements were concerned (See Annex A for list of
claimants who signed quitclaims).
Thus the following manifestations that the parties had arrived at a compromise
agreement and the corresponding motions for the approval of the agreements were
filed by the parties and approved by the Court:
1) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Emigdio Abarquez and 47
co-claimants dated September 2, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 263-406; G.R.
Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 470-615);
2) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Bienvenido Cadalin and 82
co-petitioners dated September 3, 1992 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 364-507);
3) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Jose M. Aban and 36 co-
claimants dated September 17, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 613-722; G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 518-626; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 407-516);
4) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Antonio T. Anglo and 17 co-
claimants dated October 14, 1992 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 778-843; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 650-713; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 530-590);
5) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dionisio Bobongo and 6 co-
claimants dated January 15, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 813-836; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 629-652);
6) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Valerio A. Evangelista and 4
co-claimants dated March 10, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 731-746; G.R. No.
104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
7) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimants Palconeri Banaag and 5

co-claimants dated March 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1657-1703; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 655-675);
8) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Benjamin Ambrosio and 15
other co-claimants dated May 4, 1993 (G.R. No. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 906-956; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 679-729; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1773-1814);
9) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Valerio Evangelista and 3 co-
claimants dated May 10, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1815-1829);
10) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving petitioner Quiterio R. Agudo and 36
co-claimants dated June 14, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 974-1190; G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 748-864; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1066-1183);
11) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Arnaldo J. Alonzo and 19
co-claimants dated July 22, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1173-1235; G.R. Nos.
105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1193-1256; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 896-959);
12) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Ricardo C. Dayrit and 2 co-
claimants dated September 7, 1993 (G.R. Nos. 105029-3, Rollo, pp. 1266-1278; G.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1243-1254; G.R. Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 972-984);
13) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving claimant Dante C. Aceres and 37
co-claimants dated September 8, 1993 (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1257-1375; G.R.
Nos. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 987-1105; G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, pp. 1280-1397);
14) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Vivencio V. Abella and 27 co-
claimants dated January 10, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32, Rollo, Vol. II);
15) Joint Manifestation and Motion involving Domingo B. Solano and six co-
claimants dated August 25, 1994 (G.R. Nos. 105029-32; G.R. No. 104776; G.R. No.
104911-14).
III
The facts as found by the NLRC are as follows:
"We have taken painstaking efforts to sift over the more than fty volumes
now comprising the records of these cases. From the records, it appears that the
complainants-appellants allege that they were recruited by respondent-appellant
AIBC for its accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from
1975 to 1983. They were all deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown &
Root in several countries in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United
Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and
Malaysia.
Having been of cially processed as overseas contract workers by the
Philippine Government, all the individual complainants signed standard overseas
employment contracts (Records, Vols. 25-32. Hereafter, reference to the records
would be sparingly made, considering their chaotic arrangement) with AIBC
before their departure from the Philippines. These overseas employment
contracts invariably contained the following relevant terms and conditions.
PART B —
(1) Employment Position
Classification : —————————
(Code) : —————————
(2) Company Employment
Status : —————————
(3) Date of Employment
to Commence on : —————————
(4) Basic Working
Hours Per Week : —————————
(5) Basic Working
Hours per Month : —————————
(6) Basic Hourly Rate : —————————
(7) Overtime Rate
Per Hour : —————————
(8) Projected Period of Service
(Subject to C (1) of this [sic]) : —————————
Months and/or
Job Completion
xxx xxx xxx
3. HOURS OF WORK AND COMPENSATION
a) The Employee is employed at the hourly rate and overtime rate as set
out in Part B of this Document.
b) The hours of work shall be those set forth by the Employer, and
Employer may, at his sole option, change or adjust such hours as may be deemed
necessary from time to time.
4. TERMINATION
a) Notwithstanding any other terms and conditions of this agreement, the
Employer may, at his sole discretion, terminate employee's service with cause,
under this agreement at any time. If the Employer terminates the services of the
Employee under this Agreement because of the completion or termination, or
suspension of the work on which the Employee's services were being utilized, or
because of a reduction in force due to a decrease in scope of such work, or by
change in the type of construction of such work. The Employer will be responsible
for his return transportation to his country of origin. Normally on the most
expeditious air route, economy class accommodation.
xxx xxx xxx
10. VACATION/SICK LEAVE BENEFITS
a) After one (1) year of continuous service and/or satisfactory completion
of contract, employee shall be entitled to 12-days vacation leave with pay. This
shall be computed at the basic wage rate. Fractions of a year's service will be
computed on a pro-rata basis.
b) Sick leave of 15 days shall be granted to the employee for every year of
service for non-work connected injuries or illness. If the employee failed to avail of
such leave bene ts, the same shall be forfeited at the end of the year in which
said sick leave is granted.
11. BONUS
A bonus of 20% (for offshore work) of gross income will be accrued and
payable only upon satisfactory completion of this contract.
12. OFFDAY PAY
The seventh day of the week shall be observed as a day of rest with 8
hours regular pay. If work is performed on this day, all hours work shall be paid at
the premium rate. However, this offday pay provision is applicable only when the
laws of the Host Country require payments for rest day.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were
deployed, His Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri
Decree No. 23 on June 16, 1976, otherwise known as the Labour Law for the
Private Sector (Records, Vol. 18). This decree took effect on August 16, 1976.
Some of the provisions of Amiri Decree No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of
the complainants-appellants are as follows (emphasis supplied):
Art. 79: . . . A worker shall receive payment for each extra hour
equivalent to his wage entitlement increased by a minimum of twenty- ve
per centum thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a minimum of
fty per centum thereof for hours worked during the night which shall be
deemed to being from seven o'clock in the evening until seven o'clock in
the morning . . . ."
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of rest on full
pay.
. . . an employer may require a worker, with his consent, to work on
his weekly day of rest if circumstances so require and in respect of which
an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal wage shall be paid to
him . . . ."
Art. 81: . . . When conditions of work require the worker to work on
any of cial holiday, he shall be paid an additional sum equivalent to 150%
of his normal wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one year's continuous
service with his employer shall be entitled to leave on full pay for a period
of not less than 21 days for each year increased to a period not less than
28 days after five continuous years of service."
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a quantum meruit in
respect of the proportion of his service in that year."
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period of inde nite
duration may be terminated by either party thereto after giving the other
party thirty days' prior notice before such termination, in writing, in respect
of monthly paid workers and fteen days' notice in respect of other
workers. The party terminating a contract without giving the required notice
shall pay to the other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such notice or the unexpired
portion thereof.
Art. 111: . . . the employer concerned shall pay to such worker, upon
termination of employment, a leaving indemnity for the period of his
employment calculated on the basis of fteen days' wages for each year
of the rst three years of service and of one month's wages for each year
of service thereafter. Such worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the period of his service
completed within a year."
All the individual complainants-appellants have already been
repatriated to the Philippines at the time of the ling of these cases (R.R.
No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 59-65).
IV
The issues raised before and resolved by the NLRC were:
First: — Whether or not complainants are entitled to the bene ts provided
by Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain;
(a) Whether or not the complainants who have worked in Bahrain are
entitled to the above-mentioned benefits.
(b) Whether or not Art. 44 of the same Decree (allegedly prescribing a more
favorable treatment of alien employees) bars complainants from enjoying
its benefits.
Second: — Assuming that Amiri Decree No. 23 of Bahrain is applicable in
these cases, whether or not complainants' claim for the bene ts provided therein
have prescribed.
Third: — Whether or not the instant cases qualify as a class suit.
Fourth: — Whether or not the proceedings conducted by the POEA, as well
as the decision that is the subject of these appeals, conformed with the
requirements of due process;
(a) Whether or not the respondent-appellant was denied its right to due
process;
(b) Whether or not the admission of evidence by the POEA after these
cases were submitted for decision was valid;
(c) Whether or not the POEA acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root
International, Inc.;
(d) Whether or not the judgment awards are supported by substantial
evidence;
(e) Whether or not the awards based on the averages and formula
presented by the complainants-appellants are supported by substantial
evidence;
(f) Whether or not the POEA awarded sums beyond what the complainants-
appellants prayed for; and, if so, whether or not these awards are valid.
Fifth: — Whether or not the POEA erred in holding respondents AIBC and
Brown & Root jointly are severally liable for the judgment awards despite the
alleged finding that the former was the employer of the complainants;
(a) Whether or not the POEA has acquired jurisdiction over Brown & Root;
(b) Whether or not the undisputed fact that AIBC was a licensed
construction contractor precludes a nding that Brown & Root is liable for
complainants claims.
Sixth: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator's failure to hold
respondents in default constitutes a reversible error.
Seventh: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in dismissing the
following claims:
a. Unexpired portion of contract;
b. Interest earnings of Travel and Reserve Fund;
c. Retirement and Savings Plan benefits;
d. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
e. Area Differential Pay;
f. Accrued interests on all the unpaid benefits;
g. Salary differential pay;
h. Wage differential pay;
i. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to SSS;
j. Refund of withholding tax not remitted to BIR;
k. Fringe benefits under B & R's "A Summary of Employee
Benefits" (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
l. Moral and exemplary damages;
m. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of the judgment award;
n. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of
AIBC and the accreditation of B & R issued by POEA;
o. Penalty for violations of Article 34 (prohibited practices), not excluding
reportorial requirements thereof.
Eight: — Whether or not the POEA Administrator erred in not dismissing
POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-460 on the ground of multiplicity of suits (G.R. Nos.
104911-14, Rollo, pp. 25-29, 51-55).
Anent the rst issue, NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the 1989 Revised
Rules on Evidence governing the pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrain's Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for
the Private Sector). NLRC invoked Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
vesting on the Commission ample discretion to use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case without regard to the technicalities of law or
procedure. NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the Amiri Decree No. 23,
being more favorable and bene cial to the workers, should form part of the overseas
employment contract of the complainants.
NLRC, however, held that the Amiri Decree No. 23 applied only to the claimants,
who worked in Bahrain, and set aside awards of the POEA Administrator in favor of the
claimants, who worked elsewhere.
On the second issue, NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for the ling of the
claims of the complainants was three years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in Article 1144 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines nor one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
On the third issue, NLRC agreed with the POEA Administrator that the labor
cases cannot be treated as a class suit for the simple reason that not all the
complainants worked in Bahrain and therefore, the subject matter of the action, the
claims arising from the Bahrain law, is not of common or general interest to all the
complainants.
On the fourth issue, NLRC found at least three infractions of the cardinal rules of
administrative due process: namely, (1) the failure of the POEA Administrator to
consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII; (2) some ndings of fact were not
supported by substantial evidence; and (3) some of the evidence upon which the
decision was based were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII during the hearing.
On the fth issue, NLRC sustained the ruling of the POEA Administrator that BRII
and AIBC are solidarily liable for the claims of the complainants and held that BRII was
the actual employer of the complainants, or at the very least, the indirect employer, with
AIBC as the labor contractor.
NLRC also held that jurisdiction over BRII was acquired by the POEA
Administrator through the summons served on AIBC, its local agent.
On the sixth issue, NLRC held that the POEA Administrator was correct in denying
the Motion to Declare AIBC in default.
On the seventh issue, which involved other money claims not based on the Amiri
Decree No. 23, NLRC ruled:
(1) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the claims for refund of
the SSS premiums and refund of withholding taxes and the claimants should le their
claims for said refund with the appropriate government agencies;
(2) the claimants failed to establish that they are entitled to the claims which are
not based on the overseas employment contracts nor the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976;
(3) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over claims for moral and
exemplary damages and nonetheless, the basis for granting said damages was not
established;
(4) that the claims for salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of their
contract may be allowed if filed within the three-year prescriptive period;
(5) that the allegation that complainants were prematurely repatriated prior to
the expiration of their overseas contract was not established; and
(6) that the POEA Administrator has no jurisdiction over the complaint for the
suspension or cancellation of the AIBC's recruitment license and the cancellation of the
accreditation of BRII.
NLRC passed sub silencio the last issue, the claim that POEA Case No. (L) 86-65-
460 should have been dismissed on the ground that the claimants in said case were
also claimants in POEA Case No. (L) 84-06-555. Instead of dismissing POEA Case No.
(L) 86-65-460, the POEA just resolved the corresponding claims in POEA Case No. (L)
84-06-555. In other words, the POEA did not pass upon the same claims twice.
V
G.R. No. 104776
Claimants in G.R. No. 104776 based their petition for certiorari on the following
grounds:
(1) that they were deprived by NLRC and the POEA of their right to a speedy
disposition of their cases as guaranteed by Section 16, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The POEA Administrator allowed private respondents to le their answers
in two years (on June 19, 1987) after the ling of the original complaint (on April 2,
1985) and NLRC, in total disregard of its own rules, af rmed the action of the POEA
Administrator;
(2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and BRII in
default and should have rendered summary judgment on the basis of the pleadings and
evidence submitted by claimants;
(3) the NLRC and POEA Administrator erred in not holding that the labor cases
filed by AIBC and BRII cannot be considered a class suit;
(4) that the prescriptive period for the filing of the claims is ten years; and
(5) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have dismissed POEA Case
No. L-86-05-460, the case filed by Atty. Florante de Castro (Rollo, pp. 31-40).
AIBC and BRII, commenting on the petition in G.R. No. 104776, argued:
(1) that they were not responsible for the delay in the disposition of the labor
cases, considering the great dif culty of getting all the records of the more than 1,500
claimants, the piece-meal ling of the complaints and the addition of hundreds of new
claimants by petitioners;
(2) that considering the number of complaints and claimants, it was impossible
to prepare the answers within the ten-day period provided in the NLRC Rules, that when
the motion to declare AIBC in default was led on July 19, 1987, said party had already
led its answer, and that considering the staggering amount of the claims (more than
US$50,000,000.00) and the complicated issues raised by the parties, the ten-day rule to
answer was not fair and reasonable;
(3) that the claimants failed to refute NLRC's nding that there was no common
or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy — which was the
applicability of the Amiri Decree No. 23. Likewise, the nature of the claims varied, some
being based on salaries pertaining to the unexpired portion of the contracts while
others being for pure money claims. Each claimant demanded separate claims peculiar
only to himself and depending upon the particular circumstances obtaining in his case;
(4) that the prescriptive period for ling the claims is that prescribed by Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (three years) and not the one prescribed by
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (ten years); and
(5) that they are not concerned with the issue of whether POEA Case No. L-86-
05-460 should be dismissed, this being a private quarrel between the two labor lawyers
(Rollo, pp. 292-305).
Attorney's Lien
On November 12, 1992, Atty. Gerardo A. del Mundo moved to strike out the joint
manifestations and motions of AIBC and BRII dated September 2 and 11, 1992,
claiming that all the claimants who entered into the compromise agreements subject of
said manifestations and motions were his clients and that Atty. Florante M. de Castro
had no right to represent them in said agreements. He also claimed that the claimants
were paid less than the award given them by NLRC; that Atty. De Castro collected
additional attorney's fees on top of the 25% which he was entitled to receive; and that
the consent of the claimants to the compromise agreements and quitclaims were
procured by fraud (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810). In the Resolution dated
November 23, 1992, the Court denied the motion to strike out the Joint Manifestations
and Motions dated September 2 and 11, 1992 (G.R. No. 104911-14, Rollo, pp. 608-
609).
On December 14, 1992, Atty. Del Mundo led a "Notice and Claim to Enforce
Attorney's Lien," alleging that the claimants who entered into compromise agreements
with AIBI and BRII with the assistance of Atty. De Castro, had all signed a retainer
agreement with his law firm (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 623-624; 838-1535).
Contempt of Court
On February 18, 1993, an omnibus motion was led by Atty. Del Mundo to cite
Atty. De Castro and Atty. Katz Tierra for contempt of court and for violation of Canons
1, 15 and 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The said lawyers allegedly
misled this Court, by making it appear that the claimants who entered into the
compromise agreements were represented by Atty. De Castro, when in fact they were
represented by Atty. Del Mundo (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 1560-1614).
On September 23, 1994, Atty. Del Mundo reiterated his charges against Atty. De
Castro for unethical practices and moved for the voiding of the quitclaims submitted by
some of the claimants.
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
The claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 based their petition for certiorari on the
grounds that NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it: (1) applied the three-year
prescriptive period under the Labor Code of the Philippines; and (2) it denied the
claimant's formula based on an average overtime pay of three hours a day (Rollo, pp.
18-22).
The claimants argue that said method was proposed by BRII itself during the
negotiation for an amicable settlement of their money claims in Bahrain as shown in the
Memorandum dated April 16, 1983 of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain (Rollo, pp. 21-
22).
BRII and AIBC, in their Comment, reiterated their contention in G.R. No. 104776
that the prescriptive period in the Labor Code of the Philippines, a special law, prevails
over that provided in the Civil Code of the Philippines, a general law.
As to the memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain on the method of
computing the overtime pay, BRII and AIBC claimed that they were not bound by what
appeared therein, because such memorandum was proposed by a subordinate Bahrain
of cial and there was no showing that it was approved by the Bahrain Minister of
Labor. Likewise, they claimed that the averaging method was discussed in the course
of the negotiation for the amicable settlement of the dispute and any offer made by a
party therein could not be used as an admission by him (Rollo, pp. 228-236).
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
In G.R. Nos. 105029-32, BRII and AIBC claim that NLRC gravely abused its
discretion when it: (1) enforced the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and
not the terms of the employment contracts; (2) granted claims for holiday, overtime
and leave indemnity pay and other bene ts, on evidence admitted in contravention of
petitioner's constitutional right to due process; and (3) ordered the POEA
Administrator to hold new hearings for the 683 claimants whose claims had been
dismissed for lack of proof by the POEA Administrator or NLRC itself. Lastly, they
allege that assuming that the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 was applicable, NLRC erred
when it did not apply the one-year prescription provided in said law (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
VI
G.R. No. 104776
G.R. Nos. 104911-14
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
All the petitions raise the common issue of prescription although they disagreed
as to the time that should be embraced within the prescriptive period.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. NLRC believed otherwise, xing the
prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 and G.R. Nos. 104911-14, invoking different
grounds, insisted that NLRC erred in ruling that the prescriptive period applicable to the
claims was three years, instead of ten years, as found by the POEA Administrator.
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period
was one year as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the
ruling of NLRC that Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative
law.
The POEA Administrator held the view that:
"These money claims (under Article 291 of the Labor Code) refer to those
arising from the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the
Labor Code.
In the instant case, what the respondents violated are not the rights of the
workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri Decree No.
23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the worker's contracts of
employment. Respondents consciously failed to conform to these provisions
which speci cally provide for the increase of the worker's rate. It was only after
June 30, 1983, four months after the brown builders brought a suit against B & R
in Bahrain for this same claim, when respondent AIBC's contracts have undergone
amendments in Bahrain for the new hires/renewals (Respondent's Exhibit 7).
Hence, premises considered, the applicable law of prescription to this
instant case is Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
'Art. 1144. The following actions may be brought within ten years
from the time the cause of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;'
Thus, herein money claims of the complainants against the respondents shall
prescribe in ten years from August 16, 1976. Inasmuch as all claims were led
within the ten-year prescriptive period, no claim suffered the in rmity of being
prescribed" (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, 89-90).
In overruling the POEA Administrator, and holding that the prescriptive period is
three years as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the NLRC
argued as follows:
"The Labor Code provides that 'all money claims arising from employer-
employee relations . . . shall be led within three years from the time the cause of
action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred' (Art. 291, Labor Code, as
amended). This three-year prescriptive period shall be the one applied here and
which should be reckoned from the date of repatriation of each individual
complainant, considering the fact that the case is having (sic) led in this
country. We do not agree with the POEA Administrator that this three-year
prescriptive period applies only to money claims speci cally recoverable under
the Philippine Labor Code. Article 291 gives no such indication. Likewise, We can
not consider complainants' cause/s of action to have accrued from a violation of
their employment contracts. There was no violation; the claims arise from the
bene ts of the law of the country where they worked. (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp.
90-91).
Anent the applicability of the one-year prescriptive period as provided by the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, NLRC opined that the applicability of said law was one of
characterization, i.e., whether to characterize the foreign law on prescription or statute
of limitation as "substantive" or "procedural." NLRC cited the decision in Bournias v.
Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir. [1955], where the issue was the
applicability of the Panama Labor Code in a case led in the State of New York for
claims arising from said Code. In said case, the claims would have prescribed under the
Panamanian Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New York. The U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not
"speci cally intended to be substantive," hence, the prescriptive period provided in the
law of the forum should apply. The Court observed:
". . . And where, as here, we are dealing with a statute of limitations of a
foreign country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute that its purpose was
to limit the enforceability, outside as well as within the foreign country concerned,
of the substantive rights to which the statute pertains, we think that as a yardstick
for determining whether that was the purpose this test is the most satisfactory
one. It does not lead American courts into the necessity of examining into the
unfamiliar peculiarities and refinements of different foreign legal systems. . ."
The court further noted:
xxx xxx xxx
"Applying that test here it appears to us that the libelant is entitled to
succeed, for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the Panamanian period
of limitation in question was speci cally aimed against the particular rights
which the libelant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor Code is a statute having
broad objectives, viz: 'The present Code regulates the relations between capital
and labor, placing them on a basis of social justice, so that, without injuring any
of the parties, there may be guaranteed for labor the necessary conditions for a
normal life and to capital an equitable return to its investment.' In pursuance of
these objectives the Code gives laborers various rights against their employers.
Article 623 establishes the period of limitation for all such rights, except certain
ones which are enumerated in Article 621. And there is nothing in the record to
indicate that the Panamanian legislature gave special consideration to the impact
of Article 623 upon the particular rights sought to be enforced here, as
distinguished from the other rights to which that Article is also applicable. Were
we confronted with the question of whether the limitation period of Article 621
(which carves out particular rights to be governed by a shorter limitation period) is
to be regarded as 'substantive' or 'procedural' under the rule of 'speci city' we
might have a different case; but here on the surface of things we appear to be
dealing with a 'broad,' and not a 'speci c,' statute of limitations" (G.R. No. 104776,
Rollo, pp. 92-94).
Claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 are of the view that Article 291 of the Labor
Code of the Philippines, which was applied by NLRC, refers only to claims "arising from
the employer's violation of the employee's right as provided by the Labor Code." They
assert that their claims are based on the violation of their employment contracts, as
amended by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 and therefore the claims may be brought
within ten years as provided by Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Rollo,
G.R. Nos. 104911-14, pp. 18-21). To bolster their contention, they cite PALEA v.
Philippine Airlines, Inc., 70 SCRA 244 (1976).
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing
law," which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law
exists, it takes precedence over the common-law con icts rule (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo,
pp. 45-46).
First to be determined is whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action

based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall
be the governing law.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 provides:
"A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable
after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract" (G.R. Nos.
105029-31, Rollo, p. 226).
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum.
Procedural matters, such as service of process, joinder of actions, period and
requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the laws of the forum. This is true
even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law (Restatement of the Con ict
of Laws, Sec. 685; Salonga, Private International Law 131 [1979]).
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Con ict of Laws in the sense
that it may be viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law.
Thus in Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Company, supra, the American court applied
the statute of limitations of New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after nding that
there was no showing that the Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural law even in Panama, it has to give
way to the law of the forum on prescription of actions.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law
becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said
statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance (Goodrich, Con ict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). A "borrowing statute" directs
the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims
based on a foreign law (Siegel, Con icts 183 [1975]). While there are several kinds of
"borrowing statutes," one from provides that an action barred by the laws of the place
where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not
run against it (Goodrich and Scoles, Con ict of Laws 152-153 [1938]). Section 48 of
our Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides:
"If by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose, the action
is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines Islands."
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2270 of said Code repealed only those provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedures as to which were inconsistent with it. There is no provision in the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is inconsistent with or contradictory to Section 48 of the
Code of Civil Procedure (Paras, Philippine Conflict of Laws 104 [7th ed.]).
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex
proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum's public policy (Canadian Northern Railway Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 40 S. Ct.
402, 64 L. ed. 713 [1920]). To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the claims in question would contravene the public
policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution
emphasized that:
"The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development" (Sec. 10).
"The state af rms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect
the rights of workers and promote their welfare" (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution
provides:
"Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas,
organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of
employment opportunities for all."
Having determined that the applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law,
the next question is whether the prescriptive period governing the ling of the claims is
three years, as provided by the Labor Code or ten years, as provided by the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
The claimants are of the view that the applicable provision is Article 1144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides:
"The following actions must be brought within ten years from the right of
action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment."
NLRC, on the other hand, believes that the applicable provision is Article 291 of
the Labor Code of the Philippines, which in pertinent part provides:
"Money claims-all money claims arising from employer-employee relations
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be led within three (3) years
from the time the cause of action accrued, otherwise they shall be forever barred.
xxx xxx xxx"
The case of Philippine Air Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., 70 SCRA (1976) invoked by the claimants in G.R. Nos. 104911-14 is inapplicable to
the cases at bench (Rollo, p. 21). The said case involved the correct computation of
overtime pay as provided in the collective bargaining agreements and not the Eight-
Hour Labor Law.
As noted by the Court: "That is precisely why petitioners did not make any
reference as to the computation for overtime work under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
(Secs. 3 and 4, CA No. 494) and instead insisted that work computation provided in the
collective bargaining agreements between the parties be observed. Since the claim for
pay differentials is primarily anchored on the written contracts between the litigants,
the ten-year prescriptive period provided by Art. 1144(1) of the New Civil Code should
govern."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444 as amended by R.A. No.
1993) provides:
"Any action to enforce any cause of action under this Act shall be
commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued otherwise such
action shall be forever barred, . . . "
The court further explained:
"The three-year prescriptive period xed in the Eight-Hour Labor Law (CA No. 444
as amended) will apply, if the claim for differentials for overtime work is solely
based on said law, and not on a collective bargaining agreement or any other
contract. In the instant case, the claim for overtime compensation is not so much
because of Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended but because the claim is
demandable right of the employees, by reason of the above-mentioned collective
bargaining agreement."
Section 7-a of the Eight-Hour Labor Law provides the prescriptive period for
ling "actions to enforce any cause of action under said law." On the other hand, Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines provides the prescriptive period for ling
"money claims arising from employer-employee relations." The claim is the cases at
bench all arose from the employer-employee relations, which is broader in scope than
claims arising from a specific law or from the collective bargaining agreement.
The contention of the POEA Administrator, that the three-year prescriptive period
under Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines applies only to money claims
speci cally recoverable under said Code does not nd support in the plain language of
the provision. Neither is the contention of the claimants in G.R. No. 104911-14 that said
Article refers only to claims "arising from the employer's violation of the employee's
right," as provided by the Labor Code supported by the facial reading of the provision.
VII
G.R. No. 104776
A. As the rst two grounds for the petition in G.R. No. 104776, claimants aver: (1)
that while their complaints were led on June 6, 1984 with POEA, the case was decided
only on January 30, 1989, a clear denial of their right to a speedy disposition of the
case; and (2) that NLRC and the POEA Administrator should have declared AIBC and
BRII in default (Rollo, pp. 31-35).
Claimants invoke a new provision incorporated in the 1987 Constitution, which
provides:
"Sec. 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases
before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies."
It is true that the constitutional right to "a speedy disposition of cases" is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases,
including civil and administrative cases, and in all proceedings, including judicial and
quasi-judicial hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case may demand
expeditious action on all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.
However, as held in Caballero v. Alfonso, Jr ., 153 SCRA 153 (1987), "speedy
disposition of cases" is a relative term. Just like the constitutional guarantee of "speedy
trial" accorded to the accused in all criminal proceedings, "speedy disposition of cases"
is a exible concept. It is consistent with delays and depends upon the circumstances
of each case. What the Constitution prohibits are unreasonable, arbitrary and
oppressive delays which render rights nugatory.
Caballero laid down the factors that may be taken into consideration in
determining whether or not the right to a "speedy disposition of cases" has been
violated, thus:
"In the determination of whether or not the right to a "speedy trial" has been
violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other.
These are length of delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right or failure to
assert it, and prejudice caused by the delay. The same factors may also be
considered in answering judicial inquiry whether or not a person of cially charged
with the administration of justice has violated the speedy disposition of cases."
Likewise, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan, 199 SCRA 298, (1991), we held:

"It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like
the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended
by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjusti ed
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justi ed motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried."
Since July 25, 1984 or a month after AIBC and BRII were served with a copy of
the amended complaint, claimants had been asking that AIBC and BRII be declared in
default for failure to le their answers within the ten-day period provided in Section 1,
Rule III of Book VI of the Rules and Regulations of the POEA. At that time, there was a
pending motion of AIBC and BRII to strike out of the records the amended complaint
and the "Compliance" of claimants to the order of the POEA, requiring them to submit a
bill of particulars.
The cases at bench are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, such that their nal
disposition in the administrative level after seven years from their inception, cannot be
said to be attended by unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive delays as to violate the
constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of the cases of complainants.
The amended complaint led on June 6, 1984 involved a total of 1,767 claimants.
Said complaint had undergone several amendments, the first being on April 3, 1985.
The claimants were hired on various dates from 1975 to 1983. They were
deployed in different areas, one group in and the other groups outside of, Bahrain. The
monetary claims totalling more than US$65 million according to Atty. Del Mundo,
included:
"1. Unexpired portion of contract;
2. Interest earnings of Travel and Fund;
3. Retirement and Savings Plan benefit;
4. War Zone bonus or premium pay of at least 100% of basic pay;
5. Area Differential pay;
6. Accrued Interest of all the unpaid benefits;
7. Salary differential pay;
8. Wage Differential pay;
9. Refund of SSS premiums not remitted to Social Security System;
10. Refund of Withholding Tax not remitted to Bureau of Internal Revenue (B.I.R.);
11. Fringe Bene ts under Brown & Root's "A Summary of Employees Bene ts
consisting of 43 pages (Annex "Q" of Amended Complaint);
12. Moral and Exemplary Damages;
13. Attorney's fees of at least ten percent of amounts;
14. Other reliefs, like suspending and/or cancelling the license to recruit of AIBC
and issued by the POEA; and
15. Penalty for violation of Article 34 (Prohibited practices) not excluding
reportorial requirements thereof" (NLRC Resolution, September 2, 1991, pp.
18-19; G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 73-74).
Inasmuch as the complaint did not allege with suf cient de niteness and clarity
of some facts, the claimants were ordered to comply with the motion of AIBC for a bill
of particulars. When claimants led their "Compliance and Manifestation," AIBC moved
to strike out the complaint from the records for failure of claimants to submit a proper
bill of particulars. While the POEA Administrator denied the motion to strike out the
complaint, he ordered the claimants "to correct the deficiencies" pointed out by AIBC.
Before an intelligent answer could be led in response to the complaint, the
records of employment of the more than 1,700 claimants had to be retrieved from
various countries in the Middle East. Some of the records dated as far back as 1975.
The hearings on the merits of the claims before the POEA Administrator were
interrupted several times by the various appeals, rst to NLRC and then to the Supreme
Court.
Aside from the inclusion of additional claimants, two new cases were led
against AIBC and BRII on October 10, 1985 (POEA Cases No. L-85-10-777 and L-85-10-
779). Another complaint was led on May 29, 1986 (POEA Case No. L-86-05- 460).
NLRC, in exasperation, noted that the exact number of claimants had never been
completely established (Resolution, Sept. 2, 1991, G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, p. 57). All the
three new cases were consolidated with POEA Case No. L-84-06-555.
NLRC blamed the parties and their lawyers for the delay in terminating the
proceedings, thus:
"These cases could have been spared the long and arduous route towards
resolution had the parties and their counsel been more interested in pursuing the
truth and the merits of the claims rather than exhibiting a fanatical reliance on
technicalities. Parties and counsel have made these cases a litigation of emotion.
The intransigence of parties and counsel is remarkable. As late as last month, this
Commission made a last and nal attempt to bring the counsel of all the parties
(this Commission issued a special order directing respondent Brown & Root's
resident agent/s to appear) to come to a more conciliatory stance. Even this
failed" (Rollo, p. 58).
The squabble between the lawyers of claimants added to the delay in the
disposition of the cases, to the lament of NLRC, which complained:
"It is very evident from the records that the protagonists in these
consolidated cases appear to be not only the individual complainants, on the one
hand, and AIBC and Brown & Root, on the other hand. The two lawyers for the
complainants, Atty. Gerardo Del Mundo and Atty. Florante De Castro, have yet to
settle the right of representation, each one persistently claiming to appear in
behalf of most of the complainants. As a result, there are two appeals by the
complainants. Attempts by this Commission to resolve counsels' con icting
claims of their respective authority to represent the complainants prove futile. The
bickerings by these two counsels are re ected in their pleadings. In the charges
and countercharges of falsi cation of documents and signatures, and in the
disbarment proceedings by one against the other. All these have, to a large extent,
abetted in confounding the issues raised in these cases, jumble the presentation
of evidence, and even derailed the prospects of an amicable settlement. It would
not be far-fetched to imagine that both counsel, unwittingly, perhaps, painted a
rainbow for the complainants, with the proverbial pot of gold at its end containing
more than US$100 million, the aggregate of the claims in these cases. It is,
likewise, not improbable that their misplaced zeal and exuberance caused them to
throw all caution to the wind in the matter of elementary rules of procedure and
evidence" (Rollo, pp. 58-59).
Adding to the confusion in the proceedings before NLRC, is the listing of some of
the complainants in both petitions led by the two lawyers. As noted by NLRC, "the
problem created by this situation is that if one of the two petitions is dismissed, then
the parties and the public respondents would not know which claim of which petitioner
was dismissed and which was not."
B. Claimants insist that all their claims could properly be consolidated in a "class
suit" because "all the name complainants have similar money claims and similar rights
sought irrespective of whether they worked in Bahrain, United Arab Emirates or in Abu
Dhabi, Libya or in any part of the Middle East" (Rollo, pp. 35-38).
A class suit is proper where the subject matter of the controversy is one of
common or general interest to many and the parties are so numerous that it is
impracticable to bring them all before the court (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec.
12).
While all the claims are for bene ts granted under the Bahrain Law, many of the
claimants worked outside Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in Indonesia
and Malaysia under different terms and conditions of employment.
NLRC and the POEA Administrator are correct in their stance that inasmuch as
the rst requirement of a class suit is not present (common or general interest based
on the Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical that only those who
worked in Bahrain shall be entitled to file their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII) and the nature of the claims
is the same (for employee's bene ts), there is no common question of law or fact.
While some claims are based on the Amiri Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never
worked in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus, each claimant is interested
only in his own demand and not in the claims of the other employees of defendants.
The named claimants have a special or particular interest in speci c bene ts
completely different from the bene ts in which the other named claimants and those
included as members of a "class" are claiming (Berses v. Villanueva , 25 Phil. 473
[1913]). It appears that each claimant is only interested in collecting his own claims. A
claimants has no concern in protecting the interests of the other claimants as shown by
the fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-claimants and have entered
into separate compromise settlements of their respective claims. A principle basic to
the concept of "class suit" is that plaintiffs brought on the record must fairly represent
and protect the interests of the others (Dimayuga v. Court of Industrial Relations , 101
Phil. 590 [1957]). For this matter, the claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be
allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding. The most that can be accorded to
them under the Rules of Court is to be allowed to join as plaintiffs in one complaint
(Revised Rules of Court, Rule 3, Sec. 6).
The Court is extra-cautious in allowing class suits because they are the
exceptions to the condition sine qua non, requiring the joinder of all indispensable
parties.
In an improperly instituted class suit, there would be no problem if the decision
secured is favorable to the plaintiffs. The problem arises when the decision is adverse
to them, in which case the others who were impleaded by their self-appointed
representatives, would surely claim denial of due process.
C. The claimants in G.R. No. 104776 also urged that the POEA Administrator and
NLRC should have declared Atty. Florante De Castro guilty of "forum shopping,
ambulance chasing activities, falsi cation, duplicity and other unprofessional activities"
and his appearances as counsel for some of the claimants as illegal (Rollo, pp. 38-40).
The Anti-Forum shopping Rule (Revised Circular No. 28-91) is intended to put a
stop to the practice of some parties of ling multiple petitions and complaints
involving the same issues, with the result that the courts or agencies have to resolve the
same issues. Said Rule however, applies only to petitions led with the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals. It is entitled "Additional Requirements For Petitions Filed with
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals To Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple
Filing of Petitioners and Complainants." The rst sentence of the circular expressly
states that said circular applies to an governs the ling of petitions in the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals.
While Administrative Circular No. 04-94 extended the application of the anti-
forum shopping rule to the lower courts and administrative agencies, said circular took
effect only on April 1, 1994.
POEA and NLRC could not have entertained the complaint for unethical conduct
against Atty. De Castro because NLRC and POEA have no jurisdiction to investigate
charges of unethical conduct of lawyers.
Attorney's Lien
The "Notice and Claim to Enforce Attorney's Lien" dated December 14, 1992 was
led by Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to protect his claim for attorney's fees for legal
services rendered in favor of the claimants (G.R. No. 104776, Rollo, pp. 838-810; 1525).
A statement of a claim for a charging lien shall be led with the court or
administrative agency which renders and executes the money judgment secured by the
lawyer for his clients. The lawyer shall cause written notice thereof to be delivered to
his clients and to the adverse party (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 37). The
statement of the claim for the charging lien of Atty. Del Mundo should have been led
with the administrative agency that rendered and executed the judgment.
Contempt of Court
The complaint of Atty. Gerardo A. Del Mundo to cite Atty. Florante De Castro and
Atty. Katz Tierra for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be led
in a separate and appropriate proceeding.
G.R. No. 104911-14
Claimants charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in not accepting their
formula of "Three Hours Average Daily Overtime" in computing the overtime payments.
They claim that it was BRII itself which proposed the formula during the negotiations
for the settlement of their claims in Bahrain and therefore it is in estoppel to disclaim
said offer (Rollo, pp. 21-22).
Claimants presented a Memorandum of the Ministry of Labor of Bahrain dated
April 16, 1983, which in pertinent part states:
"After the perusal of the memorandum of the Vice President and the Area
Manager, Middle East, of Brown & Root Co. and the Summary of the
compensation offered by the Company to the employees in respect of the
difference of pay of the wages of the overtime and the difference of vacation
leave and the perusal of the documents attached thereto e.e.., minutes of the
meetings between the Representative of the employees and the management of
the Company, the complaint led by the employees on 14/2/83 where they have
claimed as hereinabove stated, sample of the Service Contract executed between
one of the employees and the company through its agent in (sic) Philippines, Asia
International Builders Corporation where it has been provided for 48 hours of work
per week and annual leave of 12 days and an overtime wage of 1 & 1/4 of the
normal hourly wage.
xxx xxx xxx
The Company in its computation reached the following averages:
A. 1. The average duration of the actual service of the employee is 35 months for
the Philippino (sic) employees . . . .
2. The average wage per hour for the Philippino (sic) employee is US$2.69 .
...
3. The average hours for the overtime is 3 hours plus in all public holidays
and weekends.
4. Payment of US$8.72 per months (sic) of service as compensation for
the difference of the wages of the overtime done for each Philippino (sic)
employee . . . (Rollo, p.22).
BRII and AIBC countered: (1) that the Memorandum was not prepared by them
but by a subordinate of cial in the Bahrain Department of Labor; (2) that there was no
showing that the Bahrain Minister of Labor had approved said memorandum; and (3)
that the offer was made in the course of the negotiation for an amicable settlement of
the claims and therefore it was not admissible in evidence to prove that anything is due
to the claimants.
While said document was presented to the POEA without observing the rule on
presenting of cial documents of a foreign government as provided in Section 24, Rule
132 of the 1989 Revised Rules on Evidence, it can be admitted in evidence in
proceedings before an administrative body. The opposing parties have a copy of the
said memorandum, and they could easily verify its authenticity and accuracy. LLjur
The admissibility of the offer of compromise made by BRII as contained in the

memorandum is another matter. Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the 1989 Revised Rules
on Evidence, an offer to settle a claim is not an admission that anything is due.
Said Rule provides:
"Offer of compromise not admissible. — In civil cases, an offer of compromise is
not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror."
This Rule is not only a rule of procedure to avoid the cluttering of the record with
unwanted evidence but a statement of public policy. There is great public interest in
having the protagonists settle their differences amicable before those ripen into
litigation. Every effort must be taken to encourage them to arrive at a settlement. The
submission of offers and counter-offers in the negotiation table is a step in the right
direction. But to bind a party to his offers, as what claimants would make this Court do,
would defeat the salutary purpose of the Rule.
G.R. Nos. 105029-32
A. NLRC applied the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976, which provides for greater
bene ts than those stipulated in the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants.
It was of the belief that "where the laws of the host country are more favorable and
bene cial to the workers, then the laws of the host country shall form part of the
overseas employment contract." It quoted with approval the observation of the POEA
Administrator that ". . . in labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of the
provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing regulations shall be resolved in
favor of labor" (Rollo, pp. 90-94).
AIBC and BRII claim that NLRC acted capriciously and whimsically when it
refused to enforce the overseas-employment contracts, which became the law of the
parties. They contend that the principle that a law is deemed to be a part of a contract
applies only to provisions of Philippine law in relation to contracts executed in the
Philippines.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were prepared by AIBC and BRII
themselves, provided that the laws of the host country became applicable to said
contracts if they offer terms and conditions more favorable that those stipulated
therein. It was stipulated in said contracts that:
"The Employee agrees that while in the employ of the Employer, he will not
engage in any other business or occupation, nor seek employment with anyone
other than the Employer; that he shall devote his entire time and attention and his
best energies, and abilities to the performance of such duties as may be assigned
to him by the Employer; that he shall at all times be subject to the direction and
control of the employer; and that the bene ts provided to Employee hereunder are
substituted for and in lieu of all other bene ts provided by any applicable law,
provided of course, that total remuneration and bene ts do not fall below that of
the host country regulation or custom, it being understood that should applicable
laws establish that fringe bene ts, or other such bene ts additional to the
compensation herein agreed cannot be waived, Employee agrees that such
compensation will be adjusted downward so that the total compensation
hereunder, plus the non-waivable bene ts shall be equivalent to the
compensation herein agreed" (Rollo, pp. 352-353).
The overseas-employment contracts could have been drafted more felicitously.

While a part thereof provides that the compensation to the employee may be "adjusted
downward so that the total computation (thereunder) plus the non-waivable bene ts
shall be equivalent to the compensation" therein agreed, another part of the same
provision categorically states "that total remuneration and bene ts do not fall below
that of the host country regulation and custom."
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts should be interpreted
against AIBC and BRII, the parties that drafted it (Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v.
Margarine-Verkaufs-Union, 93 SCRA 257 [1979]).
Article 1377 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
"The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor
the party who caused the obscurity."
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of adhesion where there is

already a prepared form containing the stipulations of the employment contract and
the employees merely "take it or leave it." The presumption is that there was an
imposition by one party against the other and that the employees signed the contracts
out of necessity that reduced their bargaining power (Fieldmen's Insurance Co., Inc. v.
Songco, 25 SCRA 70 [1968]).
Applying the said legal precepts, we read the overseas-employment contracts in
question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and
parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed
(Cheshire, Private International Law, 187 [7th ed]). In such a case, the foreign law is
adopted as a "system" to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of
their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them,
matters of performance, and so forth (16 Am Jur 2d, 150-161).
Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may just agree
that speci c provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their
contract "as a set of terms." By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the
contract does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The
said law does not operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed
written in the contract (Anton, Private International Law 197 [1967]; Dicey and Morris,
The Conflict of Laws 702-703, [8th ed.]).
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation of the parties (Reese,
Choice of Law in Torts and Contracts , 16 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 1, 21
[1977]). Such party expectation is protected by giving effect to the parties' own choice
of the applicable law (Fricke v. Isbrandtsen Co. Inc., 151 F. Supp. 465, 467 [1957]). The
choice of law must, however, bear some relationship to the parties or their transaction
(Scoles and Hayes, con ict of Law 644-647 [1982]). there is no question that the
contracts sought to be enforced by claimants have a direct connection with the Bahrain
law because the services were rendered in that country.
I n Norse Management Co. (PTE) v. National Seamen Board , 117 SCRA 486
(1982), the "Employment Agreement," between Norse Management co. and the late
husband of the private respondent, expressly provided that in the event of illness or
injury to the employee arising out of and in the course of his employment and not due
to his own misconduct, "compensation shall be paid to employee in accordance with
and subject to the limitation of the Workmen's Compensation Act of the Republic of the
Philippines or the Worker's Insurance Act of registry of the vessel, whichever is greater."
Since the laws of Singapore, the place of registry of the vessel in which the late
husband of private respondent served at the time of his death, granted a better
compensation package, we applied said foreign law in preference to the terms of the
contract.
The case of Bagong Filipinas Overseas Corporation v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 135 SCRA 278 (1985), relied upon by AIBC and BRII is inapposite to the
facts of the cases at bench. The issue in that case was whether the amount of the
death compensation of a Filipino seaman should be determined under the shipboard
employment contract executed in the Philippines or the Hongkong law. Holding that the
shipboard employment contract was controlling, the court differentiated said case
from Norse Management Co. in that in the latter case there was an express stipulation
in the employment contract that the foreign law would be applicable if it afforded
greater compensation.
B. AIBC and BRII claim that they were denied by NLRC of their right to due
process when said administrative agency granted Friday-pay differential, holiday-pay
differential, annual-leave differential and leave indemnity pay to the claimants listed in
Annex B of the Resolution. At rst, NLRC reversed the resolution of the POEA
Administrator granting these bene ts on a nding that the POEA Administrator failed
to consider the evidence presented by AIBC and BRII, that some ndings of fact of the
POEA Administrator were not supported by the evidence, and that some of the
evidence were not disclosed to AIBC and BRII (Rollo, pp. 35-36; 106-107). But instead
of remanding the case to the POEA Administrator for a new hearing, which means
further delay in the termination of the case, NLRC decided to pass upon the validity of
the claims itself. It is this procedure that AIBC and BRII complain of as being irregular
and a "reversible error."
They pointed out that NLRC took into consideration evidence submitted on
appeal, the same evidence which NLRC found to have been "unilaterally submitted by
the claimants and not disclosed to the adverse parties" (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
NLRC noted that so many pieces of evidentiary matters were submitted to the
POEA administrator by the claimants after the cases were deemed submitted for
resolution and which were taken cognizance of by the POEA Administrator in resolving
the cases. While AIBC and BRII had no opportunity to refute said evidence of the
claimants before the POEA Administrator, they had all the opportunity to rebut said
evidence and to present their counter-evidence before NLRC. As a matter of fact, AIBC
and BRII themselves were able to present before NLRC additional evidence which they
failed to present before the POEA Administrator.
Under Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, NLRC is enjoined to "use
every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and
objectively and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process."
In deciding to resolve the validity of certain claims on the basis of the evidence of
both parties submitted before the POEA Administrator and NLRC, the latter considered
that it was not expedient to remand the cases to the POEA Administrator for that would
only prolong the already protracted legal controversies.
Even the Supreme Court has decided appealed cases on the merits instead of
remanding them to the trial court for the reception of evidence, where the same can be
readily determined from the uncontroverted facts on record (Development Bank of the
Philippines v. Intermediate Appellate Court , 190 SCRA 653 [1990]; Pagdonsalan v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 127 SCRA 463 [1984]).
C. AIBC and BRII charge NLRC with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
POEA Administrator to hold new hearings for 683 claimants listed in Annex D of the
Resolution dated September 2, 1991 whose claims had been denied by the POEA
Administrator "for lack of proof" and for 69 claimants listed in Annex E of the same
Resolution, whose claims had been found by NLRC itself as not "supported by evidence"
(Rollo, pp. 41-45).
NLRC based its ruling on Article 218 (c) of the Labor Code of the Philippines,
which empowers it "[to] conduct investigation for the determination of a question,
matter or controversy, within its jurisdiction, . . . ."
It is the posture of AIBC and BRII that NLRC has no authority under Article 218(c)
to remand a case involving claims which had already been dismissed because such
provision contemplates only situations where there is still a question or controversy to
be resolved (Rollo, pp. 41-42). Cdpr
A principle well embedded in Administrative Law is that the technical rules of

procedure and evidence do not apply to the proceedings conducted by administrative
agencies (First Asian Transport & Shipping Agency Inc v. Ople , 142 SCRA 542 [1986];
Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople , 152 SCRA 219 [1987]). This principle is
enshrined in Article 221 of the Labor Code of the Philippines and is now the bedrock of
proceedings before NLRC.
Notwithstanding the non-applicability of technical rules of procedure and
evidence in administrative proceedings, there are cardinal rules which must be
observed by the hearing of cers in order to comply with the due process requirements
of the Constitution. These cardinal rules are collated in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
The three petitions were led under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on the
grounds that NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. We find no such abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitions are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
ANNEX A
LIST OF CLAIMANTS WHO SIGNED QUITCLAIMS
Bienvenido Cadalin Ardon Ello
Antonio Acupan Josefino R. Enano
Benjamin Alejandre Rolando E. Espiritu
Wilfredo Aligada Patricio L. Garcia Jr.
Robert Batica Felino M. Jocson
Enrico Belen Eduardo Kolimlim
Guillermo Cabeza Emmanuel C. Labella
Rodolfo Cagatan Ernesto S. Lising
Francisco De Guzman Edilberto G. Magat
Ignacio De Vera Victoriano L. Matilla
Ernesto De la Cruz Renato V. Morada
Reynaldo Dizon Ildefonso c. Muñoz
Ricardo Ebrada Herbert G. Ng
Antonio Ejercito Reynaldo Oczon
Eduardo Espiritu Romeo Orial
Ernesto Espiritu Ricardo Paguio
Rodolfo Espiritu Emilio Pakingan
Oligario Francisco Ernesto Pangan
Antonio Jocson Albert L. Quinto
Alejandro Olorino Romulo M. Reyes
Efren Lirio Leonilo Tiposo
Noel Martinez Manual P. Villanueva
Francis Mediodia Arnaldo J. Alonzo
Luciano Melendez Pastor M. Aquino
Reymundo Milay Ramon Castro
Jose Pancho Graciano Isla
Modesto Pin Pin Renato Matilla
Gaudencio Retana Ricardo B. Morada
Rodelio Rieta, Jr. Pacifico D. Navarro
Jose Robleza Eugenio A. Remonquillo
Nemeriano San Mateo Felix Barcena
Juanito Santos Eliseo Fajardo
Paquito Solanto Sergio S. Santiago
Conrado Solis, Jr. Antonio R. Rodriguez
Menandro Temprosa Luis Val B. Ronquillo
Maximiano Torres Teodorico C. Del Rosario
Francisco Trias Joselito C. Solante
Delfin Victoria Ricardo C. Dayrit
Gilbert Victoria Antonio P. Hilario
Domingo Villahermosa Edgardo O. Salonga
Rogelio Villanueva Dante C. Aceres
Jose M. Aban Reynaldo S. Acojido
Amorsolo S. Anading Esidro M. Aquino
Alfredo S. Balogo Rosendo M. Aquino
Ramon T. Barboza Rodolfo D. Arevalo
Felix M. Bobier Rexy De Leon Ascuncion
Jose H. Castillo Basilio Buenaventura
Emmanuel H. Castillo Alexander Bustamante
Remar R. Castrojerez Virgilio V. Butiong, Jr.
Romeo O. Cecilio Delfin Caballero
Bayani M. Dayrit Danilo M. Castro
Felizardo S. Delos Santos Franscisco O. Corvera
Nestor N. Estava Edgardo N. Dayacap
Rolando M. Garcia Napoleon S. De Luna
Angel D. Guda Benjamin E. Doza
Henry L. Jacob Renato A. Eduarte
Dante A. Matreo Clyde C. Estuye
Renato S. Melo Buenaventura M. Francisco
Resurrecion D. Nazareno Rogelio D. Guanio
Jaime C. Pollos Arnel L. Jacob
Domingo Pondales Renato S. Lising
Eugenio Ramirez Wilfredo S. Lising
Lucien M. Respall Rogelio S. Lopena
Alvin C. Reyes Bernardito G. Loreja
Rizalina R. Reyes Ignacio E. Muñoz
Quirino Ronquillo Romeo C. Quintos
Avelino M. Roque Willafredo Dayrit Raymundo
Pedro L. Salgatar Virgilio L. Rosario
Rodolfo T. Sultan Joselito Santiago
Benedicto E. Torres Ernesto G. Sta. Maria
Sergio A. Ursolino Gavino U. Tuazon
Rogelio R. Valdez Elito S. Villanueva
Dionisio Bobongo Lamberto Q. Alcantara
Crisenciano Miranda Arturo P. Apilado
Ildefonso C. Molina Turiano V. Concepcion
Gorgonio C. Parala Domingo V. Dela Cruz
Virgilio Ricaza Eduardo R. Enguancho
Palconeri D. Banaag Melanio R. Esteron
Bayani S. Bracamante Santiago N. Galoso
Onofre De Rama Joveniano Hilado
Jose C. Melanes Eduardo Hipolito
Romeo I. Patag Romero M. Javier
Valerio A. Evangelista Valentino S. Jocson
Gilbert E. Ebrada Jose B. Lacson
Juanito P. Villarino Armando M. Magsino
Aristeo M. Bicol Avelino O. Nuqui
Quiterio R. Agudo Delmar F. Pineda
Marianito J. Alcantara Federico T. Quiman
Jose Arevalo Alberto M. Redaza
Ramon A. Arevalo Renoza Ronquillo
Jesus Baya Rodolfo Ronquillo
Guillermo Buenconsejo Antonio T. Valderama
Teresito A. Constantino Ramon Valderama
Eduardo A. Diaz
Emigdio Abarquez Benigno N. Melendez
Herbert Ayo Claudio A. Modesto
Mario Bataclan Solomon Reyes
Ricardo Ordoñez Isaias Talactac
Bernardino Robillos William G. Taruc
Francisco Villaflores Oscar C. Calderon
Angel Villarba Pacifico P. Campano
Honesto Jardiniano Eulalio G. Arguelles
Juan Y. Olindo Ben G. Belir
Hernani T. Victoriano Cornelio L. Castillo
Ubed B. Ello, Sr. Valeriano B. Francisco
Ernesto V. Macaraig Jaime L. Relosa
Espiritu A. Muñoz, Sr. Alex Q. Villahermosa
Rodrigo E. Ocampo Vivencio V. Abello, Jr.
Rodolfo V. Ramirez Renato C. Corcuera
Ceferino Batitis Emiliano B. Dela Cruz, Jr.
Augusto R. Bondoc Esteban B. Jose, Jr.
Jaime C. Catli Ricardo B. Martinez
Gerardo B. Limuaco, Jr. Bienvenido Vergara
Macario S. Magsino Pedro G. Cagatan
Domingo B. Solano Francisco Apolinario
Ricardo De Rama Miguel Abestano
Arturo V. Araullo Prudencio Araullo

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963.]
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E.

CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY
CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased , Executor and Heir-appellees, vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA , oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.

Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; DETERMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP; U.S.

CITIZENSHIP NOT LOST BY STAY IN PHILIPPINES BEFORE INDEPENDENCE. — The
citizenship that the deceased acquired in California when he resided there from 1904 to
1913 was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United
States until 1946, and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never intended to abandon his California
citizenship by acquiring another.
2. ID.; VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS; MEANING OF "NATIONAL LAW" IN
ARTICLE 16, CIVIL CODE; CONFLICT OF LAW RULES IN CALIFORNIA TO BE APPLIED IN
CASE AT BAR. — The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly
apply to any general American law, because there is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the union having its own private
law applicable to its citizen only and in force only within the state. It can therefore refer to
no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent was a citizen. In the case
at bar, the State of California, prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for
its citizens domiciled in other jurisdiction. Hence, reason demands that the California
conflict of law rules should be applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar.
3. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING ALIEN'S DOMICILE IN
THE PHILIPPINES. — An American citizen who was born in New York, migrated to
California, resided there for nine years, came to the Philippine in 1913, and very rarely
returned to California and only for short visits, and who appears to have never owned or
acquired a home or properties in that state, shall be considered to have his domicile in the
Philippines.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF RESORTING TO THE LAW OF THE DOMICILE IN DETERMINING
MATTERS WITH FOREIGN ELEMENT INVOLVED. — The rule laid down of resorting to the
law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF DOMICILE BOUND TO APPLY ITS OWN LAW AS DIRECTED
IN THE CONFLICT OF LAW RULE OF DECEDENT'S STATE; APPLICATION OF THE RENVOI
DOCTRINE. — The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, refers back the
case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of domicile can not and should refer the case back
to California, as such action would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the
case will then be tossed back and forth between the two states. If the question has to be
decided, the Philippine court must apply its own law as the Philippines was the domicile of
the decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, California,
and especially because the internal law of California provides no legitime for natural
children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines)
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE LAW TO BE APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — As the
domicile of the deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the Philippines, the validity
of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledge natural child of the latter's legacy,
should be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, not by the law of California.
DECISION
LABRADOR , J : p
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N.
Cusi, Jr., presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949,
approving among other things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to
reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen
Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of
said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the
provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was executed in
Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
"3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named Maria Lucy Christensen
(now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight
years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
"4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendents
except my above named daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen Daney.
xxx xxx xxx
"7. I give, devise and bequeath unto Maria Helen Christensen, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact
that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she
been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now
resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of Three Thousand Six
Hundred Pesos (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trust
for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the Philippine
National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00),
Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
xxx xxx xxx
"12. I hereby give devise and bequeath unto my well-beloved daughter, the
said Maris Lucy Christensen Daney (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as
aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the
income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real,
personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever
situated, of which I may be possessed at my death and which may have come to
me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: . . ."
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account
and project partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and
proposed that the residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy
Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen
Garcia, insofar as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of
the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the
distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of
distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two
acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full ownership. In amplification of
the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the estate of the
deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law
thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines
and even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code,
which requires that the domicile of the decedent apply, should be applicable. It was also
alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child
of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and
of the State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic
validity of the provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in
accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the way he
desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable
(In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal.
286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen
Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER
JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO

RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW.
III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE
INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OR THE
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN
SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF

DISTRIBUTION SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE
PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
LAWS HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE
ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of
the State of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time
of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted
by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
"In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show
that the deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875, in New
York City, N. Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school
teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport 'Sheridan' with
Port of Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A.
He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
"In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed
there for the following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and
was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
"Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913.
However, in 1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and
came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again
returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year,
1939.
"Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military
Forces in the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left
for the United States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees'
Collective Exhibits '6', CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622. as Exhibits 'AA', 'BB' and 'CC-
Daney'; Exhs. 'MM', 'MM-1', 'MM-2-Daney', and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.
"In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly
after the making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he
executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St.
Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953." (Pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are
persuaded by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided
there for nine years, and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California
very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears
never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would indicate
that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
"Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere
temporary presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used
to denote something more than mere physical presence." (Goodrich on Conflict of
Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California
when he resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in
the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946
and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact
that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so
that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring
another. This conclusion is in accordance with the following principle expounded by
Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
"The terms 'residence' and 'domicile' might well be taken to mean the same thing,
a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a
technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never
been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two
homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while
living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for
several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection
with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his
settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up
his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a
domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile.' Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of
meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and
it is not safe to insist that any one use is the only proper one." (Goodrich, p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
"ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of
the country where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order
of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning
of the term "national law" as used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens
only and in force only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American
law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the state of which the decedent is a
citizen, in the case at bar, the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal
property? The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-
appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by
will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl.
2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code
of California, which is as follows:
"If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated,
it is deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his
domicile."
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We
have checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand,
relies on the case cited in the decision and testi ed to by a witness. (Only the case
Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased
Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is
that given in the above-cited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the
testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in force in the State of
California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that
Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory or doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
"The problem has been stated in this way: 'When the Conflict of Laws rule of the
forum refers a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the
corresponding rule of the Conflict of Law of that foreign law, or is the reference to
the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the
foreign law, minus its Conflict of Laws rules?
"On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the
renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the
matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined that the Conflict of
Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back
should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in
the 'endless chain of references' which has so often been criticized by legal
writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law
of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be to the internal law
rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going
on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this
inextricabilis circulas by getting off at the second reference and at that point
applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a bit more
consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
"Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead
that greater uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still
more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-
law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of
the litigation disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject,
or both accept the doctrine, the result of the litigation will vary with the choice of
the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the renvoi,
judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the
Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman.
The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
"The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to
land is in question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In
these cases, the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of
the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference
goes only to the internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs,
will be recognized by every court; and every divorce, valid by the domicile of the
parties, will be valid everywhere." (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
"X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving
movable property in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as
to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
"Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of
the conflict of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an
application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do
would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or whatever corresponds
thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination of
French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to
the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts state of
distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it
alternative course of action: (a) either to apply the French laws as to intestate
succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and apply the
Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a
French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoi doctrine, it will follow the
latter course, thus applying its own law.
"This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws
rule of the forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn
refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower
sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard
Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)
"After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as
governing a particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the
conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a
question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances,
has been the subject of frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the
doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by them as the 'Renvoyer' to
send back, or the Ruchversweisung', or the 'Weiterverweisung', since an
affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption
of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum . . . (15 C.J.S. 872.)
"Another theory, known as the 'doctrine of renvoi', has been advanced. The theory
of the doctrine of renvoi is that the court of the forum, in determining the question
before it, must take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also
its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question
which the rules of the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the
forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been repudiated by the American
authorities." (2 Am. Jur. 296.)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application
in a country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-
1918, pp. 509-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:
"The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws
are to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the
foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to
this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
"Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the institute of International Law,
at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
"(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application
of foreign laws.
"(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall
respect:
"(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its
nationals abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal
statute shall be determined by law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place
where the act in question occurred.
"(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain
that one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the
determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
"If, for example, the English Law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate
of an Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law
of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute
personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he
finds that the Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law
of nationality — that is the English law, — he must accept this reference back to
his own law."
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code as its conflict of laws rule, while the
rule applied in In re Kaufman, supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the
conflict of law rules of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and
appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the
State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California
but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the
determination of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general
principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most matters or rights
which follow the person of the owner.
"When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more estates, and leaves a
will directing the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where
he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal
questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of the situs is consulted
in questions about the devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules
control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate succession, the
same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
disposition of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect
beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are
recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs of the property,
and the reason for the recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the
general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has said on the point;
'The general principle that a disposition of personal property valid at the domicile
of the owner, is valid everywhere, is one of universal application. It had its origin
in that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and in
this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating property
take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule
is more apparent than ever.'" (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California
have prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for
those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the
California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict
of law rules law for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California
as in comity we are bound to do, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we
must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate thereof and as
above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict of laws rule
for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the
place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national of the deceased should
govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited
above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of
laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of
the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of law rule in California,
Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the
domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave
the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a
citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of law rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime
for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887 (4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In Re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil.,
105; Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil., 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil., 130;
and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil., 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can
not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each
case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the
subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California,
is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, the appellant, should be governed by the Philippine law, the domicile,
pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on
succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005.]
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM , petitioners, vs .

ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA ," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)
1 and Ruby Lim assail the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001
reversing the Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as
well as the Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human
relations provisions of the New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto
Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name "Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around
6:00 o'clock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby of
Hotel Nikko, 5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then
approached him. 6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotel's penthouse in
celebration of the natal day of the hotel's manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka. 7 Mr. Reyes
asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of course." 8 Mr. Reyes then went
up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latter's present for
the celebrant. 9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after
which Mr. Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart. 10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet
dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and
embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby Lim, who claimed to speak for
Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof. 11 In a loud voice and within the presence and
hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told
him to leave the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang "). 1 2
Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he was invited by Dr. Filart. 13 Dr. Filart, who was within
hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus adding to his shame and
humiliation. 14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience, a
Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel. 15 Like a common
criminal, he was escorted out of the party by the policeman. 16 Claiming damages, Mr.
Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages, One Million Pesos moral and/or
exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorney's fees. 17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under
the ignominious circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the
Hotel's Executive Secretary for the past twenty (20) years. 18 One of her functions included
organizing the birthday party of the hotel's former General Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. 19 The
year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruoka's party, Ms. Lim generated an exclusive
guest list and extended invitations accordingly. 20 The guest list was limited to
approximately sixty (60) of Mr. Tsuruoka's closest friends and some hotel employees and
that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. 21 At the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes
at the bar counter ordering a drink. 22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruoka's wishes to keep the party
intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the
presence of Mr. Reyes who was not invited. 23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with
the group of Dr. Filart. 24 As Dr. Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and
as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms.
Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. 25 Ms. Lim then
requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 26 Mr. Reyes,
however, lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did
not want to leave. 27 When Ms. Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a
Captain Batung whom she later approached. 28 Believing that Captain Batung and Mr.
Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto, i.e.,
for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited. 29 Still, Mr.
Reyes lingered. When Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak
to him herself as there were no other guests in the immediate vicinity. 30 However, as Mr.
Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait. 31 When Mr. Reyes
went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindi ho
kayo dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at
pagkatapos kung pwede lang po umalis na kayo." 32 She then turned around trusting that
Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her surprise, he began screaming
and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her. 33
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her
version of the story to the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. 34 According
to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the
celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the penthouse but to
Altitude 49. 35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as
he was not properly dressed and was not invited. 36 All the while, she thought that Mr.
Reyes already left the place, but she later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung. 37 Then
there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting. 38 She ignored Mr. Reyes. 39 She
was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him. 40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, 41 giving more credence
to the testimony of Ms. Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes assumed the risk of being thrown out of
the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr.
Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He assumed the risk of being asked to leave for
attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are pecuniary
consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation
of some right. Thus, no recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and
Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v. Court of Appeals, 212
SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if
she allowed him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party.
His action against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim must therefore fail. 42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more
commanding of belief the testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a
loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should
not finish his food and to leave the place within the hearing distance of other
guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which
appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter
as a consequence therefore (Art. 21, New Civil Code). The liability arises from the
acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to morals or
good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot
with impunity intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to
morals or good customs. 43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching
several people to inquire into the presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule
and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart rst and both of them
should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by
appellee Lim was to approach appellee Mrs. Filart and together they should have
told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the
celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the
one to approach appellant because it was she who invited appellant in that
occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filart's invitation, appellant could not have suffered
such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
cTDaEH
xxx xxx xxx
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere
rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of
human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the Civil Code, every
person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts
were attended by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some
motive or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v.
CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603). 44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta
Filart the solidary obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of
Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2) moral damages in the amount of Two
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorney's fees in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000). 45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
affirmed its earlier decision as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply
discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be reconsidered." 46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of
Appeals seriously erred in —
I.
. . . NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING
THAT BY ITS OWN FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
. . . HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE
WITH DR. FILART FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA
"COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR.
FILART'S INVITATION"
III.
. . . DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION
OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
. . . IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE
OF HIS POVERTY, CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO
EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS REGARD
V.
. . . IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE

APPELLANT'S BRIEF, THEREBY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of
being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a
"gate-crasher." HcDSaT
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as
injury" 4 7 ) refers to self-inflicted injury 48 or to the consent to injury 49 which precludes the
recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger,
even if he is not negligent in doing so. 50 As formulated by petitioners, however, this
doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of
the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him
to unnecessary ridicule and shame. iatdcjur
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto
Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant
thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically,
and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her employer, is solidarily
liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions
concerning the same facts and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to
use its latent power to review such findings of facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are
not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising errors of law. 51
One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court. 52 The lower court ruled that Ms.
Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely
and discreetly. The appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for
damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food
and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however,
were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart's invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower court's findings
of fact.

First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel, 53 for-invitation-only, thrown
for the hotel's former Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly
uninvited (by the celebrant) 54 and who could not just disappear into the crowd as his face
is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the organizer of the
party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the
celebrant was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrant's instruction to
keep the party intimate, would naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most
hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch in an otherwise seamless affair
and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To unnecessarily
call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim's ability
to follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the
hotel's personnel. Mr. Reyes, upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim
loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer any satisfactory explanation why
Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the contrary, Mr.
Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms.
Lim talked to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were
at the buffet table? How close was she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she
shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na
lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice? HTcADC
xxx xxx xxx

A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many. 55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and
expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from
a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the hotel business for twenty years
wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr. Reyes
that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the
lower court was correct in observing that —
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the
latter to leave the party was made such that they nearly kissed each other, the
request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiff's reaction to
the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired
between them. . . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to
take him out. 56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes's version of the story is that it is unsupported. It
is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not
presented any witness to back his story up. All his witnesses — Danny Rodinas, Pepito
Guerrero and Alexander Silva — proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the
party. 5 7
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil
Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability
springs from that of its employee. 58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of
rights, 59 is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a
legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible." 60
The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed
not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. 61
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith. 62 Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or
intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21
of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law 64 which
does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to
leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.
Article 21 65 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1)
There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public
order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. 6 6
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, 67 and that is, the act complained of
must be intentional. 68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim
was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally
before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an
explanation for Ms. Lim's alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim,
being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes)
possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."
69 The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint
based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to
recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise
acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our
imprimatur on the appellate court's declaration that Ms. Lim's act of personally
approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr.
Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of
consideration of one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect
of such dignity." 70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim's act of by-passing
Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from Mrs.
Filart's companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes. 7 1 If at all, Ms. Lim
is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad
faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel
Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages 72 especially for the reason stated by
the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held —
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latter's
lowly station in life. This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a
limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by the legal provisions
under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission,
pp. 33-34). And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert
further commission of such acts, exemplary damages should be imposed upon
appellees. 73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted ndings is that it runs counter with the
very facts of the case and the evidence on hand. It is not disputed that at the time of the
incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor of long standing; a co-host of a radio
program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer (MUSICO) chaired
by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and
1992 of cial candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a
number of humanitarian organizations of the Philippines." 74 During his direct
examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had income 7 5 and nowhere did he
say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the
social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion
reached by the appellate court cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis. CAcDTI
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes
might have suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right done within the
bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and
its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Now Dusit Hotel Nikko.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P. Regino and
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring (Rollo, pp. 48-57).
3. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
4. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P. Regino and
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador concurring (Rollo, pp. 59-60).
5. TSN, 08 March 1995, p. 8.
6. Id. at 10.
7. Ibid.
8. Id. 11.
9. Id. at 13.
10. Id. at 13 & 16.
11. COMPLAINT, RTC Record, p. 2.
12. Supra, note 5 at 17.

13. Supra, note 11.
14. Ibid.
15. Id. at 2-3.
16. Id. at 3.
17. Ibid.
18. TSN, 27 July 1996, p. 9.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. at 12-13, 15.
21. Id. at 15-17, 25.
22. Id. at 25.
23. Id. at 27.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 31-32.
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id. at 37.
28. Id. at 38-39.
29. Ibid.
30. Petition, Rollo, p. 18.
31. Supra, note 29 at 41-42.

32. Id. at 42-43.
33. Answer, pp. 32-33, RTC Records; RTC Decision, Rollo p. 62; TSN, 27 July 1995, pp. 43-
46.
34. TSN, 05 November 1997, p. 15.
35. Violeta Filart's "ANSWER WITH COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM," RTC Records, p. 21.
37. Or "Captain Batung" from the testimony of Ruby Lim; Id. at 18.
38. Id. at 19.

39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Dismissed as well were the counterclaims filed by then defendants Nikko Hotel Manila
Garden, Ruby Lim and Violeta Filart, RTC Records, p. 347.
42. RTC Records, p. 342.
43. CA Rollo, p. 205.
44. Id. at 208-209.

45. Id. at 238.
46. CA Rollo, pp. 239-240.
47. E.L. Pineda, Torts and Damages Annotated, p. 52 (2004 ed).
48. Garciano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96126, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA 436, 440.
49. cf. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74553, 08 June
1989, 174 SCRA 80, 88.
50. Sangco, Torts and Damages Vol. 1 , pp. 83-84.

51. Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, 02 June 1995, 244 SCRA 713, 720.
52. Ibid.
53. TSN, 22 May 1999, p. 11.
54. Admitted by Mr. Reyes, see TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 10.
55. TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 20.

56. RTC Records, pp. 340-341.
57. Danny Rodinas and Pepito Guerrero (TSN, 18 May 1995), Alexander Silva (TSN, 21
June 1995).
58. Article 2180, Civil Code.
59. Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, 25 August
1989, 176 SCRA 779, 783.
60. Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217
SCRA 16, 25.
61. Supra, note 61 at 783-784.
62. Ibid.
63. Supra, note 62.
64. Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. See Globe Mackay, supra, note 61 at
784.
65. Civil Code.

67. Civil Code.
68. Ibid.
69. "COMMENT," Rollo, p. 302; "MEMORANDUM," Rollo, p. 417.
70. CA Rollo, p. 209.
71. In fact, Mrs. Filart herself, in her testimony and in her pleadings, consistently disclaimed
having invited Mr. Reyes to the party such that when Mr. Reyes was being escorted out
of the penthouse, she lifted nary a finger to his rescue.
72. Art. 2234, Civil Code.
73. CA Rollo, pp. 209-210.

74. Appellant's Brief, CA Rollo, p. 27; see also TSN, 08 March 1995, pp. 7-8.
75. TSN, 29 October 1998, p. 11.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.]
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH , petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS

and MARILOU T. GONZALES , respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL

COURT; RULE AND EXCEPTIONS. — It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts
will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court
having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of
substance or value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. (People vs.
Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela,
92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA
203 [1984]; People vs., Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414
[1991]; People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991]). Equally settled is the rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized
exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., this Court took the time, again, to
enumerate these exceptions: "(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil.
15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453
[1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-
4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-
9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v.
Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8)
When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970])."
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
2. CIVIL LAW; QUASI-DELICT; TORTS; ART. 21 OF THE CIVIL CODE; CONSTRUED. —
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict is limited to negligent acts or
omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish
legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or
common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false
imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned
by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious
acts. with certain exceptions, are to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between
these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would
have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the
Anglo-American law on torts. (TOLENTINO, A.M. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY; RULE; RATIONALE. — The existing
rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong (Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960])
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote: "The elimination of this
chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil. 866 [1933]). The history of breach of
promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no other action lends
itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm
suits in many of the American states . . ." This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in
this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978]).
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF DAMAGES, JUSTIFIED BECAUSE OF FRAUD AND
DECEIT BEHIND IT; CASE AT BAR. — In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article
21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill
that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept
him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and
deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter.
It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that
it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to
marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their
daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short, the private
respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code
Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for
criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of
the seduction. Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-
in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction.
5. ID.; PARI DELICTO RULE; DEFINED; NOT APPRECIATED IN CASE AT BAR. — The pari
delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not
have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in
sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that
she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that
the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari
delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime;
equal in guilt or in legal fault." (Black's Laws Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004). At most, it could be
conceded that she is merely in delicto. "Equity often interferes for the relief of the less
guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the imposition or
undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud." (37 AM Jur 2d. 401). In
Mangayao vs. Lasud, (11 SCRA 158 [1964]) We declared: "Appellants likewise stress that
both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412,
New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault
on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or
intelligent and the other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR. , J : p
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set
aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which
affirmed in toto the 16 October 1989 Decision or Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether
or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article
21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. cdphil
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the
aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is
twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian
citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20
August 1987; the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the
condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end
of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to
the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the
Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the
filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated
and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries, during a
confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing
of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in
the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to
P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may
be just and equitable. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of
the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack
of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because
the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent;
he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his
apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his place because
he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally,
no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he
was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered
mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for
miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4
embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
"1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian, citizen and resident (sic) of
Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum-Northwestern,
Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine proper.
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette,
Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the present and a (sic)
high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the Manager of the
Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino introduced the defendant to the plaintiff
on August 3, 1986." cdll
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty
thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of three
thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos
at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied." 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner
and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals
or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through
machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, (d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by
him, (e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in
accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens,
inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his
promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has
abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture
and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private respondent's testimony
because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the
evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent
Court as follows:
"According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she
never had a boyfriend before, defendant started courting her just a few days after
they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted
his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same
day he went with her to her hometown of Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he
wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their
intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings)
of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that
day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiff's parents and brothers and
sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October, 1987,
and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed
to his proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to
stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few days that they were in
Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they
continued to live together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of
October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he went to
school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in
relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to
abort the foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept
reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so
because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time
plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter consulted a
lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff,
her lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod send by the barangay captain
went to talk to defendant to still convince him to marry plaintiff, but defendant
insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in
Bacolod City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that
defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed
them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the
wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and
even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding." 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which
docketed the case as CA-G R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court
erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering
him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs. Cdpr
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 1 0 affirming

in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of
fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:
"First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was
already 23 years old at the time, does not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is
uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with
defendant and never had a boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a
barrio lass 'not used and accustomed to the trend of modern urban life', and
certainly would (sic) not have allowed 'herself to be deflowered by the defendant
if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her.' In fact,
we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been
sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because of the deception of
defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed
with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in
the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense
that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he
usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of
Banaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February
27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the
manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50,
tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who
told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left
Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go to
plaintiff's hometown in Banaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of
special relationship between them? And this special relationship must indeed
have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated
not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the
restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed
marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of
marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned
from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-
7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral
character and must think so low and have so little respect and regard for Filipino
women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several
years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study
medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived
with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what
he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent,
trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her." 1 1
and then concluded:
"In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's
fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff
that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on
the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise
these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents
agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage.
And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and
insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been
enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the opportunity to
study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the
moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as the lower court ordered
him to do in its decision in this case." 1 2
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he
raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the
case at bar. 1 3
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed
any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not
professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never
maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions
and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with
such Filipino customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with
Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the
subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem
upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take
four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he
does not possess good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law wife" is
now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian
Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims
that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally,
petitioner asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed
his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of
promise is not actionable. 1 4
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and
the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently
complied with. prLL
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support
of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility
of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not
disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having
heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment
and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or
value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 1 5
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had
overlooked any fact of substance or value which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower
court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs. Asistio,
Jr., 1 6 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
"(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74
Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People,
95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When the Court of
Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto
Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and
(10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970])."
Petitioner has not endeavored to point out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted
exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts
must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 1 7
Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate
Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is
not actionable has been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 1 8
The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has
shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women
and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of
rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states
.." 1 9
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to
expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 2 0
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
"'But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or
determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps in the
statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has
deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil
Code the following rule: LLpr
'ARTICLE 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.'
'An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces the
nineteen-year old daughter of 'X.' A promise of marriage either has not been made,
or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is
no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action
for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral
wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered
incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action for
damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the foregoing rule is approved, would
vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which
it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes." 2 1
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter."
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or

intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law
concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but intentional
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the
general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission
responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and malicious acts. with certain
exceptions, are to. be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 2 2 In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have
been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 lls that vacuum. It is even postulated that
together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than
the Anglo-American law on torts. 2 3
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold,
that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the
proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the
sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her
honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury
should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and
deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that
he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage." 2 4 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral
seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article
337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied-in a breach of
promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima
vs. Court of Appeals, 2 5 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because: LibLex
" . . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction,
not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly
enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are
supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that,
complainant 'surrendered herself' to petitioner because, 'overwhelmed by her love'
for him, she 'wanted to bind' him 'by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy.'"
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 2 6 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if
there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not
convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and
conclusion were made in the said case:
"The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who had been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea
of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S.
vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
'To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise
or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit.
Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue
by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are
calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her
ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer'
(27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
'On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement,

persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out
sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords
her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the
demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by;
which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit.' (47 Am. Jur. 662).
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she
surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the
defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one
year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and
would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under
Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error
was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint." 2 7
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 2 8 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently
retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been
carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:
" . . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to
mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa
vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic);
Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other
words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal
knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence
recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be
no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . . ."
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the
wedding preparations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471)." LLpr
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 2 9 is also of the same persuasion:

"It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos 3 0 still subsists,
notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article 3 1 in the Code. The
example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the
sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of
abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly
given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the
basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by wilfullness (sic), the action
lies. The court, however, must weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to
deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would
deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced
woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting
injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the
criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal
case for that reason."
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that
granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the
latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence,
pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs.
Marcos, 3 2 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter
even goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or
damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own doing," 3 3 for:
" . . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor
sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high school graduate and a mere
employee . . (Annex C ) or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic
security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance (TSN, pp. 51-53, May
18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may
have been offered by the petitioner." 3 4
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he
harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of
the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him,
dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all
moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstanced
could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to
marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the
poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly
believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able
to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of
morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone
his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent
may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is
apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she
found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 3 5 At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto. cdphil
"Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his
transgression has been brought about by the imposition or undue influence of the
party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his
consent to the transaction was itself procured by fraud." 3 6
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 3 7 We declared:

"Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no
action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however,
has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or
less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the
other one is not (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209)."
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said
that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the
petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their
marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is
hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. cdll
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J ., Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J ., is on terminal leave.
Footnotes
1. Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, concurred
in by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Jaime M. Lantin.
2. Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.
3. Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24.

4. Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25.
5. Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33. Per Judge Antonio M. Belen.

6. Id., 33.
7. Rollo, 31-33.
8. Rollo, 54-55.
9. Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.
10. Annex "G", Id.; Id., 53-62.

11. Rollo, 58-59.
12. Rollo, 61.
13. Id., 11.

14. In support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliososo, [CA] 64 O.G.; Wassmer vs. Velez, 12
SCRA 648 [1964]; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; and Estopa
vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
15. People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People
vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs.
Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs. Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs.
Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414 [1991]; and People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278 [1991].
16. 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote omitted; see also, Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138
[1988].
17. Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil.
640 [1960].
18. 58 Phil. 866 [1933].
19. Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.
20. Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].
21. Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This passage is quoted, except for the last
paragraph, in Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994, 996-997 [1966]; the Article 23
referred to is now Article 21.
22. Report of the Code Commission, 161-162.

23. TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72.
24. Rollo, 61.
25. Supra.
26. Supra.
27. At pages 997-999.
28. Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984), 91-92.
29. Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed.,
76-77, omitting footnotes.
30. 7 Phil. 156 [1906].
31. Article 21.

32. Supra.
33. Rollo, 16.
34. Id., 16-17.

35. Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004.
36. 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting citations.

37. 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also, Liguez vs. Court of Appeals, 102 Phil. 577 [1957].

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150355. July 31, 2006.]
MANILA DOCTORS HOSPITAL , petitioner, vs . SO UN CHUA and VICKY

TY , respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ , J : p
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 questioning the
Decision 1 dated October 2, 2001 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61581, which affirmed the Decision dated September 30, 1997 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City, but which reduced the award of damages.
This case originated from an action for damages filed with the RTC by respondents So Un
Chua and Vicky Ty against petitioner Manila Doctors Hospital. 2 The complaint is premised
on the alleged unwarranted actuations of the petitioner towards its patient, respondent So
Un Chua (Chua), who was confined for hypertension, diabetes, and related illnesses.
The antecedents of the case follow:
On December 13, 1993, respondents filed a Complaint averring that on October 30, 1990,
respondent Chua, the mother of respondent Vicky Ty, was admitted in petitioner's hospital
for hypertension and diabetes; that while respondent Chua was confined, Judith Chua, the
sister of respondent Ty, had been likewise confined for injuries suffered in a vehicular
accident; that partial payments of the hospital bills were made, totaling P435,800.00; that
after the discharge of Judith Chua, respondent Chua remained in confinement and the
hospital bills for both patients accumulated; that respondent Chua was pressured by the
petitioner, through its Credit and Collection Department, to settle the unpaid bills; that
respondent Ty represented that she will settle the bills as soon as the funds become
available; that respondent Ty pleaded to the management that in view of the physical
condition of her mother, respondent Chua, the correspondences relating to the settlement
of the unpaid hospital bills should be relayed to the former; that these pleas were
unheeded by the petitioner; that petitioner threatened to implement unpleasant measures
unless respondent Ty undertakes her mother's obligation as well as the obligation of her
sister, Judith Chua, to pay the hospitalization expenses; that petitioner made good its
threat and employed unethical, unpleasant and unlawful methods which allegedly
worsened the condition of respondent Chua, particularly, by (i) cutting off the telephone
line in her room and removing the air-conditioning unit, television set, and refrigerator, (ii)
refusing to render medical attendance and to change the hospital gown and bed sheets,
and (iii) barring the private nurses or midwives from assisting the patient. Respondents
thus prayed for the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
In its Answer, Amended Answer, and Rejoinder, petitioner specifically denied the material
averments of the Complaint and Reply, and interposed its counterclaims arguing that as
early as one week after respondent Chua had been admitted to its hospital, Dr. Rody Sy, her
attending physician, had already given instructions for her to be discharged, but
respondents insisted that Chua remain in confinement; that, through its staff, petitioner
accordingly administered medical examinations, all of which yielded negative results; that
respondent Ty voluntarily undertook, jointly and severally, to pay the hospital bills for both
patients; that although respondent Ty paid up to P435,000.00, more or less, she reneged
on her commitment to pay the balance in violation of the Contract for Admission and
Acknowledgment of Responsibility for Payment dated October 30, 1990 which she
voluntarily executed; that she signed a Promissory Note on June 5, 1992 for the unpaid
balance of P1,075,592.95 and issued postdated checks to cover the same; that no such
undue pressure had been imposed upon respondent Chua to settle the bills, the truth being
that, as a matter of standard procedure, the reminders to settle the bills were transmitted
not to the patients but to their relatives who usually undertook to pay the same; that
respondent Ty deliberately evaded the staff of the Credit and Collection Department; that
the cutting-off of the telephone line and removal of the air-conditioning unit, television set,
and refrigerator cannot constitute unwarranted actuations, for the same were resorted to
as cost-cutting measures and to minimize respondents' charges that were already piling
up, especially after respondent Ty refused to settle the balance notwithstanding frequent
demands; that respondent Ty evaded the staff when the latter attempted to inform her
that the room facilities will be cut off to minimize the rising charges; and that respondents
instituted the present civil case purposely as leverage against the petitioner after the latter
had filed criminal charges for violation of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22 against
respondent Ty for issuing checks, later dishonored, totaling P1,075,592.95, the amount
referring to the unpaid hospital bills. In its compulsory counterclaim, petitioner prayed,
among other items, for the award of no less than P1,000,000.00 as compensatory
damages due to the filing of a malicious and unfounded suit, and, in its permissive
counterclaim, petitioner prayed for respondents to pay P1,075,592.95, the amount
representing the due and demandable obligation under the Promissory Note dated June 5,
1992, including the stipulated interest therein and the 25 percent of the total amount due
as attorney's fees. ASTcEa
During pre-trial, the parties stipulated on the following issues: First, whether the
respondents are liable to the petitioner to pay the hospital bills arising from the
hospitalization of respondent Chua and Judith Chua; and second, whether the parties are
entitled to their respective claims for damages. 3 Furthermore, the parties stipulated on
the following facts: a) Judith Chua was confined from June 14, 1991 to May 2, 1992; b)
respondents failed to pay the balance despite repeated reminders; c) the said reminders
referred to the hospital bills of respondent Chua and Judith Chua; d) one of the attending
physicians of respondent Chua was Dr. Rody Sy; and e) the petitioner ordered the removal
of the facilities in question from the room of its patient, respondent Chua, with the
qualification that they were constrained to discontinue the same after the representative
of respondent Chua refused to update the hospital bills or refused to transfer her to semi-
deluxe room or ward to lessen costs. 4
On September 30, 1997, the RTC rendered its Decision in favor of the respondents, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment on the complaint is hereby rendered
in favor of the [respondents] as against the [petitioner] as follows:
[O]rdering the [petitioner] to pay the [respondents] the following, to wit:
a) P200,000.00 as moral damages;

b) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
c) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and the amount of P50,000.00 as
litigation costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
In brief, the RTC held that the removal of the facilities of the room triggered the
hypertension of respondent Chua; that the petitioner acted in bad faith in removing the
facilities without prior notice; that her condition was aggravated by the pressure employed
by the administration upon her to pay the hospital bills; that the food always came late as
compared to the other patients; that the beddings and clothes of respondent Chua were
no longer changed and, as a result, bed sores emerged on her body; that there was an utter
lack of medical attendance; that, because of these, respondent Chua suffered from self-
pity and depression; that petitioner clearly discriminated against the respondents; that
respondent Ty had no choice but to sign the promissory notes in order to secure the
release of her mother, respondent Chua; that the foregoing actuations constitute an abuse
of rights; that petitioner failed to establish the pecuniary loss it suffered and, hence, it is
not entitled to compensatory damages; and that, since the promissory note is a contract
of adhesion, the petitioner is not entitled to the award of attorney's fees as stipulated
thereon.
On appeal to the CA, the petitioner assigned the following errors:
A.
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FINDING

THE ACTUATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO
BE IN BAD FAITH, OPPRESSIVE AND UNNECESSARY AS TO MAKE IT LIABLE TO
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES FOR DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES.
B.
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT

RULING UPON THE PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIM OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
WITH RESPECT TO THE P1,075,592.95 REPRESENTING THE HOSPITAL BILL OF
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES, WHICH OBLIGATION IS NOT DISPUTED AND WHICH
AMOUNT WAS NEVER CONTROVERTED BY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES. 6
On October 2, 2001, the CA promulgated its Decision the dispositive portion of which
reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that the award of moral damages, exemplary damages as
well as attorney's fees is reduced to Seventy Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00),
Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
respectively. Litigation costs are hereby deleted. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED. 7
Apart from the reduction in the award of damages, the CA affirmed all salient portions of
the RTC Decision and declined to disturb the findings of fact.
Petitioner is now before this Court raising essentially the same grounds heard by the CA.
Incidentally, with respect to the related criminal case against respondent Ty, this Court, on
September 27, 2004, promulgated its Decision entitled Ty v. People of the Philippines, 8
which affirmed the decisions of the lower courts finding respondent Ty guilty of violating
B.P. Blg. 22 and ordering her to pay the private complainant, herein petitioner, the total
amount of the dishonored checks.
The petition is impressed with merit. cAHIaE
While, as a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45, under certain exceptions, the Court may re-examine the evidence presented
by the parties during the trial. At least four exceptions exist in this case, namely: (a) when
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (c) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record; and (d) when the courts a quo manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. 9
The principal questions are, first, whether the actuations of the petitioner amount to
actionable wrongs, and second, whether the counterclaims of the petitioner can be backed
up by the measure of preponderant evidence.
In brief, the courts a quo concurred in the holding that the petitioner and its staff failed to
take into consideration the physical condition of its patient, respondent Chua, when it
removed the facilities provided in her room; 1 0 that the removal of these facilities, namely,
the air-conditioner, telephone lines, television, and refrigerator, aggravated the condition of
the patient, triggered her hypertension, and caused her blood pressure to fluctuate, 1 1
considering that there was no proper ventilation in the room. 1 2 In view of the foregoing,
the courts a quo concluded that the actuations of the petitioner were oppressive,
unnecessary, 1 3 and anti-social, 1 4 done in bad faith without proper notice, 1 5 with no
intention other than to harass or irritate the respondents, 1 6 all of which constitute an
abuse of rights. 1 7
We do not agree. The conclusions of the courts a quo are either haphazard conjectures, or
founded on a misapprehension of facts. The record is replete with evidence that justifies a
different conclusion.
Indeed the operation of private pay hospitals and medical clinics is impressed with public
interest and imbued with a heavy social responsibility. But the hospital is also a business,
and, as a business, it has a right to institute all measures of efficiency commensurate to
the ends for which it is designed, especially to ensure its economic viability and survival.
And in the legitimate pursuit of economic considerations, the extent to which the public
may be served and cured is expanded, the pulse and life of the medical sector quickens,
and the regeneration of the people as a whole becomes more visibly attainable. In the
institution of cost-cutting measures, the hospital has a right to reduce the facilities and
services that are deemed to be non-essential, such that their reduction or removal would
not be detrimental to the medical condition of the patient. 1 8 For the moment, the question
to be considered is whether the subject facilities are indeed non-essential — the air-
conditioner, telephone, television, and refrigerator — the removal of which would cause the
adverse health effects and emotional trauma the respondents so claimed. Corollary to this
question is whether the petitioner observed the diligence of a good father of the family 1 9
in the course of ascertaining the possible repercussions of the removal of the facilities
prior to the removal itself and for a reasonable time thereafter, with a view to prevent
damage. 2 0
After an extensive analysis of the record, it becomes rather worrisome to this Court that
the courts a quo unreservedly drew their conclusions from the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimonies of the respondents the probative value of which is highly
questionable. 2 1 We hold that the respondents failed to prove the damages so claimed.
The evidence in the record firmly establishes that the staff of the petitioner took proactive
steps to inform the relatives of respondent Chua of the removal of facilities prior thereto,
and to carry out the necessary precautionary measures to ensure that her health and well-
being would not be adversely affected: as early as around two weeks after her admission
on October 30, 1990, to the time when the facilities had been removed sometime in the
middle of May 1992, 2 2 and even up to the point when she actually left the premises of the
hospital three weeks later, or during the first week of June 1992, 2 3 the medical condition
of respondent Chua, as consistently and indisputably confirmed by her attending physician,
Dr. Rody Sy, a cardiologist, who was called as witness for both parties, 2 4 whom even
respondent Chua repeatedly praised to be "my doctor" and "a very good doctor" 2 5 at that,
and whose statements at times had been corroborated as well by Sister Mary Philip
Galeno, SPC, the Administrator of the hospital and who also happens to be a registered
nurse, had been "relatively well," 2 6 "ambulatory," 2 7 "walking around in the room," 2 8 and
that she was "able to leave the hospital on her own without any assistance;" 2 9 that
although she complained of symptoms such as dizziness, weakness, 3 0 and abdominal
discomfort, 3 1 Dr. Sy requested several medical examinations, such as the laboratory tests,
renal tests, MRI, ultrasound, and CT scan, 3 2 all of which were administered after procuring
the consent of respondent Chua's family 3 3 as admitted by respondent Ty herself, 3 4 and
even called on other specialists, such as a neurologist, endocrinologist, and
gastroenterologist, to look into her condition 3 5 and conduct other tests as well 3 6
according to their fields of specialty, all of which yielded no serious finding; 3 7 that her
illnesses were "lifelong illnesses" 3 8 at a stage where they cannot be totally removed or
abolished, 3 9 making it clear to her family that "one hundred percent recovery is not
possible" despite being given daily medication in the hospital; 4 0 but that her condition,
nonetheless, is not serious, 4 1 as the blood pressure is more or less controlled and within
acceptable limits, 4 2 "not that critical to precipitate any acute attack," 4 3 nor likely to fall
into any emergency, 4 4 nor yet does she require continuous or prolonged hospitalization 4 5
since she was stable enough to be treated at home and on an "out-patient" basis, so much
so that Dr. Sy encouraged her to exercise and avoid resting all the time, 4 6 and
recommended that "anytime she may be discharged" 4 7 even in just "two weeks after
confinement," 4 8 the propriety of his order of discharge concurred upon by the other
specialists as well, 4 9 had it not been for respondents' insistence to stay in the hospital in
view of their hope for absolute recovery 5 0 despite the admission of respondent Chua
herself that she cannot anymore be totally cured. 5 1
It is also undisputed that the hospital administrator, Sister Galeno, prior to the removal of
the facilities, consulted the attending physician, Dr. Sy. 5 2 To Sister Galeno, also a
registered nurse, the matter of removal and its possible repercussions on the health of the
patient, as a matter of hospital policy, is a critical and sensitive maneuver, and, hence, it is
carried out only after discussing with the doctors to evaluate all important factors. 5 3 The
fact of prior consultation 5 4 as well as the medical determination to the effect that it was
safe to remove the facilities and would cause no harmful effect 5 5 had been amply
corroborated by respondent Chua's own doctor himself. 5 6 When Dr. Sy testified as
rebuttal witness for the respondents themselves and whose credibility respondents failed
to impeach, he categorically stated that he consented to the removal since the removal of
the said facilities would not by itself be detrimental to the health of his patient, respondent
Chua. 5 7 And in this respect, he had been advising respondent Ty, the daughter of the
patient, that the facilities, such as the air-conditioner, television, refrigerator, and telephone,
are not absolutely necessary, and, that although they may add to the comfort of the
patient, if absent, they will not cause any significant deterioration of her condition, 5 8 given
that, in his experience as a cardiologist, and after personally attending respondent Chua on
a daily basis before, during, and after the removal and even up to the time of her actual
discharge, 5 9 he concluded that many hypertensive and diabetic patients, as in her case, do
not at all need in particular an air-conditioning unit, among the other facilities
aforementioned. 6 0 And, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo and the self-serving
testimonies of respondents that the lack of ventilation, after the removal of the air-
conditioner, triggered her hypertension, Dr. Sy categorically stated that during his daily
rounds with the patient he was certain that, although admittedly the blood pressure in
general would fluctuate daily, there had been no adverse effect on her, and that her blood
pressure were within acceptable limits, 6 1 especially considering that he treated the
patient on a daily basis up to the point of actual discharge, 6 2 and accordingly, as
confirmed by the medical records, he made no change in the medications thereafter. 6 3 In
support of Dr. Sy's findings, Sister Galeno, testified that she knew the condition of the
ventilation of the patient's deluxe room, located at the fifth floor, even without the air-
conditioning, notably in times of brownout, and that there had been enough ventilation
since the grilled window of that room was large enough which, if opened, would permit
sufficient ventilation. 6 4 The Court finds that the premise of the RTC judgment refers
merely to hypothetical statements which fail to establish any clear and direct link to the
injury allegedly suffered by the patient:
Q You found it safe to remove these facilities from the room of the patient
suffering from diabetes and hypertension? aTICAc
A Yes, Sir. Many hypertensive, diabetic patients do not need air-conditioning,

or T.V. or refrigerator.
Q Do you agree with me that hypertension is triggered sometimes by

excitement, anger or (sic) a person suffering from such illness?
A Hypertension can be triggered by anything.

Court:
Q And even in other words the discomfort can also trigger?
A Sometimes mental stress can trigger.
xxx xxx xxx
Court:
Q You mentioned earlier that this hypertension may be triggered mentally?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court:
Q Will the removal of these facilities not affect the patient including the
relatives?
A It may to a certain extent. And well, maybe the days after the removal would
prove that fluctuation in blood pressure are within acceptable limits. 6 5
With respect to the findings of the courts a quo that bed sores appeared on the body of
respondent Chua, that she suffered from depression after the disconnection of the said
facilities, that her private midwives were barred, and that the delivery of food was delayed,
this Court holds, as above, that these conclusions are bereft of sound evidentiary basis,
self-serving and uncorroborated as they are. Again, Dr. Sy affirmed that during the daily
rounds he would make on the patient, he did not detect any skin lesion or any other
abnormality up to the time she was actually discharged. 6 6 Nor did he find any sign of
depression, although, admittedly, he observed that she had been "very angry" because of
the removal of the facilities. 6 7 All the while he did not receive any complaint from
respondent Chua indicating that she suffered from the foregoing infirmities, 6 8 considering
that it is the responsibility of the family of the patient to specifically inform the attending
physician or the nurses during their rounds whatever they feel is important, or if there were
any new developments since the last visit. 6 9 As corroborated by Sister Galeno, throughout
respondent Chua's confinement, she never received any complaint from the latter or her
relatives that she had not been attended to by the nursing staff. 7 0 Worth noting again is
the fact that the nursing staff and the attending physicians, which included Dr. Sy, in
accordance with hospital policy, would routinely make their rounds on a daily basis, or
would visit the patient whenever they are called for any problem, 7 1 and, in the case of the
specialists other than the attending physician, they would visit the patient about once a
week. 7 2 The nurses, on the other hand, would make their rounds more frequently, that is, at
least once per shift, or every eight hours. 7 3 Apart from the self-serving statements of
respondents, which by now have become rather indicative of being mere afterthoughts,
there is no clear showing from the record that the petitioner and its medical staff deviated
from the foregoing policy and practice, nor had they been called upon to look into the
alleged physical reactions or emotional trauma respondent Chua claims to have suffered
during and after the removal of the facilities. It must be emphasized that, as stated above,
respondent Chua herself explicitly found Dr. Sy to be a "very good doctor" because he
personally attended to her "almost every hour." 7 4 And throughout her confinement, Dr. Sy
positively stated that her family employed a private midwife who attended to her all the
time. 7 5
The evidence in the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that respondent Chua had been
adequately attended to, and this Court cannot understand why the courts a quo had
declared that there was an "utter lack of medical attendance," or that her health suffered
during the period after the removal of the facilities. The Court finds that the facilities in
question are non-essential for the care of respondent Chua and, hence, they may be
lessened or removed by the petitioner for the sake of economic necessity and survival.
Though human experience would show that the deactivation of the air-conditioner may
cause a temperature differential that may trigger some physical discomfort, or that the
removal of entertainment facilities such as the television set, or the disconnection of
communication devices such as the telephone, may cause some exasperation on the part
of the one who benefits from these, nevertheless, all things considered, and given the
degree of diligence the petitioner duly exerted, not every suppression of the things that
one has grown accustomed to enjoy amounts to an actionable wrong, nor does every
physical or emotional discomfort amount to the kind of anguish that warrants the award of
moral damages under the general principles of tort. The underlying basis for the award of
tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus,
there must first be the breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach
before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort
liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering. 7 6
Moreover, this Court must reiterate the standard of tort to arrive at a proper award for
damages premised on matters that suggest the application of medical knowledge,
especially in the description of the causal link between external or environmental factors,
on one hand, and their effect unto the physical or emotional health of the patient, on the
other, expert opinion, as discussed in Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 7 7 is generally required:
All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its
untidiness; the lack of provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain medicines;
the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation;
the omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even the
subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation
performed on her by the petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstances
pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond cavil to constitute reckless
imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not
through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but
by the unquestionable knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or
surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in the treatment of his
patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. The deference of
courts to the expert opinions of qualified physicians stems from its realization
that the latter possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances
are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert testimony should have been
offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive
of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in
good standing when performing the same operation. It must be remembered that
when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there
is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his
clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently established. This presumption is
rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench. 7 8
With respect to the propriety of the notice of removal of facilities, the evidence shows that
the hospital staff, accompanied by Sister Gladys Lim, SPC, Finance Administrative
Assistant of the hospital, 7 9 through written and verbal notices as per hospital policy,
forewarned the respondents, through respondent Ty and her sister, Judith Chua, of the
impending removal of the facilities over a week beforehand 8 0 in view of their obstinate
refusal to vacate and transfer to a lower rate room 8 1 or to update the mounting hospital
bills 8 2 which, by then, had swollen to approximately one million pesos. 8 3 Respondent Ty
refused to read many of the written notices sent by the Credit Department. 8 4 After
repeated attempts to contact respondent Ty 8 5 and before the actual removal of the
facilities, the staff of the petitioner tried to personally serve the final notice dated April 23,
1992, 8 6 signed by Sister Gladys Lim, addressed to respondent Ty, which adopted the
tenor of the prior verbal warnings, and which expressly and sternly warned the
respondents that the hospital shall be constrained to take legal action and that they shall
be compelled to transfer the patient, respondent Chua, to a lower rate room unless the
balance could be satisfied. 8 7 Respondent Ty, for no justifiable reason, and sticking to her
inclination to avoid the staff, refused to receive or acknowledge this letter as well. 8 8 Worth
noting is that Sister Galeno, testified that, as a matter of hospital policy the tenor of which
respondents, by virtue of the Contract for Admission dated October 30, 1990, agreed to
comply with, 8 9 the hospital can only cut off the non-essential facilities — and only in
extreme cases 9 0 — if the patient occupies a private room all to herself; had the room been
semi-private shared by other patients, or had it been the ward, the hospital cannot
disconnect the facilities since this would unduly prejudice the other patients. But
respondent Chua herself insisted on staying in a private room despite her being fully aware
of the ballooning charges, 9 1 and even if she could have freely gone home anytime to her
condominium unit which, as admitted, was equipped with an air-conditioner. 9 2 With
respect to the "pressure" and "harassment" respondents allegedly suffered daily whenever
the hospital staff would follow up the billing during odd hours, or at 10pm, 11pm, 12
midnight, 1am, or 2am, 9 3 this averment had been convincingly refuted by the witnesses
for the petitioner, namely, Editha L. Vecino, the Head of Credit and Collection, and Sister
Galeno, in that the Credit and Collection Department would only hold office hours from
8am to 5pm and, hence, it is impossible to "harass" the respondents during the times they
so claimed. 9 4
The courts a quo found that respondent Ty had "no choice but to sign the promissory note
in order for her mother to be released from the hospital," 9 5 thus suggesting that the
hospital refused to actually discharge or bodily release its patient, respondent Chua, until
arrangements had been made to settle the charges.
While there are portions of the testimonies of the witnesses for the petitioner which state
that although, as per standard procedure, the patient "cannot leave" 9 6 the hospital without
the "discharge," 9 7 "clearance" or "gate pass" issued only after arrangements on the
settlement of bills had been made, 9 8 still, it must be understood that these are only
demonstrative of the precondition that a patient cannot step out of the premises "without
the consent" of the hospital, or, in other words, that the "clearance" merely indicates that
the hospital expressly consented to the actual release of the patient, 9 9 but, even without
its consent, the patient is still free to leave "anytime" as a matter of policy, in spite of the
refusal to issue a "clearance" or "gate pass," 1 0 0 or even in cases where the accounts have
not yet been liquidated or settled, 1 0 1 or yet even if no promissory note or post-dated
check were executed in favor of the petitioner, as testified by no less than Sister Galeno,
1 0 2 and corroborated by Editha Vecino; 1 0 3 and that, petitioner, a private hospital
established for profit, 1 0 4 being also a business, by warning respondents that it shall
withhold clearance, is simply exercising its right to protest against an absconding patient
as a precursor to avail of other appropriate legal remedies; that, on the contrary, the
respondents opted not to leave because of their own promise not to leave unless the
hospital bills were fully settled; 1 0 5 that the accusations found in the Demand Letter dated
May 19, 1992, and signed by the counsel for the respondents, 1 0 6 particularly, that the
petitioner "refused to discharge the patient, [respondent Chua,] despite orders from the
attending physician, Dr. Rody Sy," had all been refuted by Sister Galeno when she read its
contents in front of the counsel for respondents, emphatically telling him that "we are not
detaining his clients;" that "[respondent Ty] was the one who told us that they are not going
to leave the hospital unless they have fully paid the hospital;" 1 0 7 and that, most
importantly, no physical restraint upon the person of respondent Chua or upon the person
of her relatives had been imposed by the staff.
Authorities, including those of common law origin, explicitly declare that a patient cannot
be detained in a hospital for non-payment of the hospital bill. If the patient cannot pay the
hospital or physician's bill, the law provides a remedy for them to pursue, that is, by filing
the necessary suit in court for the recovery of such fee or bill. 1 0 8 If the patient is prevented
from leaving the hospital for his inability to pay the bill, any person who can act on his
behalf can apply in court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus. 1 0 9

The form of restraint must be total; movement must be restrained in all directions. If
restraint is partial, e.g., in a particular direction with freedom to proceed in another, the
restraint on the person's liberty is not total. 1 1 0 However, the hospital may legally detain a
patient against his will when he is a detained or convicted prisoner, or when the patient is
suffering from a very contagious disease where his release will be prejudicial to public
health, or when the patient is mentally ill such that his release will endanger public safety,
1 1 1 or in other exigent cases as may be provided by law. Moreover, under the common law
doctrines on tort, it does not constitute a trespass to the person to momentarily prevent
him from leaving the premises or any part thereof because he refuses to comply with
some reasonable condition subject to which he entered them. In all cases, the condition of
this kind of restraint must be reasonable in the light of the circumstances. 1 1 2 At any rate,
as stated above, the patient is free to leave the premises, even in the ostensible violation of
these conditions, after being momentarily interrupted by the hospital staff for purposes of
informing him of those reasonable conditions, such as the assessment of whether the
patient is fit to leave, insane, or suffering from a contagious disease, etc., or simply for
purposes of making a demand to settle the bill. If the patient chooses to abscond or leave
without the consent of the hospital in violation of any of the conditions deemed to be
reasonable under the circumstances, the hospital may nonetheless register its protest and
may choose to pursue the legal remedies available under law, provided that the hospital
may not physically detain the patient, unless the case falls under the exceptions
abovestated. cACHSE
Authorities are of the view that, ordinarily, a hospital, especially if it is a private pay hospital,
1 1 3 is entitled to be compensated for its services, by either an express or an implied
contract, and if no express contract exists, there is generally an implied agreement that the
patient will pay the reasonable value of the services rendered; 1 1 4 when a hospital treats a
patient's injuries, it has an enforceable claim for full payment for its services, regardless of
the patient's financial status. 1 1 5 At this juncture, it must be noted that there is testimony,
though to a degree disputable, to the effect that the execution of the promissory note and
the issuance of postdated checks were conditions imposed not by the petitioner but
voluntarily offered by the counsel for respondents. 1 1 6 At any rate, however, this Court
holds, in view of the foregoing authorities, that the requirement to have the relative of
respondent Chua to execute a promissory note as part of the arrangement to settle the
unpaid obligations is a formality that converts any implied contract into written form and,
moreover, amounts to a reasonable condition, the non-fulfillment of which, in itself,
however, as discussed, cannot allow the hospital to detain the patient. It must also be
stressed, contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, that such an agreement embodied in
a promissory note, as well as the Contract for Admission and Acknowledgment of
Responsibility for Payment dated October 30, 1990, do not become contracts of adhesion
simply because the person signing it was under stress that was not the result of the
actions of the hospital, 1 1 7 especially taking into account that there is testimony to the
effect that respondent Ty signed the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992 in the presence
of counsel and acting under his advise. 1 1 8
But as to the propriety of the circumstances surrounding the issuance of the postdated
checks to cover the amount stated in the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992, this Court
must refer to the discussion of the recent case of Ty v. People of the Philippines 1 1 9 where
this Court affirmed the conviction of respondent Ty for the issuance of bouncing checks
addressed to the petitioner herein. While the instant case is to be distinguished from the
Ty case in nature, applicable law, the standards of evidence, and in the defenses available
to the parties, hence, the judgment of conviction in that case should not at all prejudice the
disposition of this case, even if the facts coincide, nonetheless, for purposes of
convenience and instructive utility, the Court quotes the relevant portions:
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and imminent.
Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks a condition the hospital
allegedly demanded of her before her mother could be discharged for fear that her
mother's health might deteriorate further due to the inhumane treatment of the
hospital or worse, her mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is
not the uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mother's illness was so life-
threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its alleged
unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded apprehension of her death.
Secondly, it is not the law's intent to say that any fear exempts one from criminal
liability much less petitioner's flimsy fear that her mother might commit suicide.
In other words, the fear she invokes was not impending or insuperable as to
deprive her of all volition and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved
exclusively by the hospital's threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice but to
commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many opportunities available
to her to avoid committing one. By her very own words, she admitted that the
collateral or security the hospital required prior to the discharge of her mother
may be in the form of postdated checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced
to open an account with the bank and issue the checks, she had all the
opportunity to leave the scene to avoid involvement.
Moreover, petitioner had sufficient knowledge that the issuance of checks without
funds may result in a violation of B.P. 22. She even testified that her counsel
advised her not to open a current account nor issue postdated checks "because
the moment I will not have funds it will be a big problem." Besides, apart from
petitioner's bare assertion, the record is bereft of any evidence to corroborate and
bolster her claim that she was compelled or coerced to cooperate with and give in
to the hospital's demands.
Ty likewise suggests . . . that the justifying circumstance of state of necessity
under par. 4, Art. 11 of the Revised Penal Code may find application in this case.
We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt
the actor from liability under this paragraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided
actually exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it;
(3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. TSADaI
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or

anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or anticipated or
may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken
advantage of an available option to avoid committing a crime. By her own
admission, she had the choice to give jewelry or other forms of security instead of
postdated checks to secure her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater injury
feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or imprudence,
more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the issuance of the bounced
checks was brought about by Ty's own failure to pay her mother's hospital bills.
The Court also thinks it rather odd that Ty has chosen the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear and the justifying circumstance of state of
necessity to absolve her of liability. It would not have been half as bizarre had Ty
been able to prove that the issuance of the bounced checks was done without her
full volition. Under the circumstances, however, it is quite clear that neither
uncontrollable fear nor avoidance of a greater evil or injury prompted the issuance
of the bounced checks.
Parenthetically, the findings of fact in the Decision of the trial court in the Civil
Case for damages filed by Ty's mother against the hospital is wholly irrelevant for
purposes of disposing the case at bench. While the findings therein may establish
a claim for damages which, we may add, need only be supported by a
preponderance of evidence, it does not necessarily engender reasonable doubt as
to free Ty from liability. 1 2 0
In view of the foregoing, the Court therefore holds that the courts a quo committed serious
errors in finding that the petitioner was "biased," 1 2 1 "discriminated" against the
respondents, 1 2 2 and "purposely intended to irritate" 1 2 3 or "harass" 1 2 4 them; that it "acted
in bad faith in removing the facilities without prior notice;" 1 2 5 and that its acts were "anti-
social." 1 2 6 The aforequoted declarations of the witnesses, significant portions of which
this Court considers as expert testimony, are reliable and remain considerably trustworthy
to controvert respondents' assertions as well as to reverse the conclusions of fact and law
of the CA and the RTC that respondent Chua suffered the physical and emotional anguish
so claimed, and so, for these reasons, the Court holds that the petitioner inflicted no
actionable wrong.
This Court observes that the courts a quo awarded both respondents moral damages. But
it is well-settled that in case of physical injuries, with some exceptions, 1 2 7 moral damages
are recoverable only by the party injured and not by her spouse, next of kin, or relative who
happened to sympathize with the injured party. 1 2 8 Hence, even if the courts a quo were
correct in their basis for damages, they should have declined to award damages to
respondent Ty.
The last issue to be resolved is the question whether the counterclaims of the petitioner
are supported by a preponderance of evidence.
We agree with the petitioner that the courts a quo seriously erred in mistaking the case of
its compulsory counterclaim for its permissive counterclaim and for failing to consider the
evidence which impressively supports the latter. First, for failure without justifiable cause
of respondents' counsel to comment on the Partial Formal Offer of Evidence dated
February 14, 1996 1 2 9 filed by the petitioner, the RTC issued an order during the course of
the trial, which counsel for respondents neither contested nor raised on appeal, admitting
Exhibits "1" to "16", together with their submarkings and the purposes for which the same
were offered, 1 3 0 all of which had also been previously authenticated and their contents
verified by the witnesses for the petitioner. 1 3 1 These documents include the Contract for
Admission of respondent Chua dated October 30, 1990, duly executed by respondent Ty,
incorporating therein the rules and regulations of the hospital, including the duty to
understand the same 1 3 2 as well as the undertaking of respondent Ty to be jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the hospital bills of respondent Chua; 1 3 3 the
Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992 in the amount of P1,075,592.95 duly executed by
respondent Ty in favor of the petitioner agreeing to be jointly and severally liable to pay the
unpaid obligations of respondent Chua and Judith Chua, including interest and attorney's
fees in case of default; 1 3 4 the Undertakings signed by respondent Ty dated March 3, 1992
and April 7, 1992 to maintain regular deposits; 1 3 5 and the credit memos and statements
of account that support the amount referring to the unpaid obligation. 1 3 6 Second, the
parties stipulated during pre-trial that respondents failed to pay the balance despite
repeated reminders. 1 3 7 And third, respondent Ty in open court identified and admitted
that she signed the Contract of Admission dated October 30, 1990 as well as the
Undertakings dated March 3, 1992 and April 7, 1992 but which, for no justifiable reason,
she "did not bother to read," 1 3 8 and, what is more, she repeatedly admitted during the
course of the trial that she failed to fully settle the foregoing hospital bills. 1 3 9 In fact, while
the Ty case cannot control the incidents of the instant case as heretofore stated, it is still
worth mentioning, at least for informative purposes, the findings of this Court in Ty with
respect to respondents' obligations to the petitioner:
Ty's mother and sister availed of the services and the facilities of the hospital. For
the care given to her kin, Ty had a legitimate obligation to pay the hospital by
virtue of her relationship with them and by force of her signature on her mother's
Contract of Admission acknowledging responsibility for payment, and on the
promissory note she executed in favor of the hospital. 1 4 0
In view of all these findings, the Court earnestly disagrees with the sweeping conclusion of
the CA that "[Petitioner] failed to present any iota of evidence to prove his claim," 1 4 1 a
statement apparently referring to the permissive counterclaim of P1,075,592.95. However,
with respect to the compulsory counterclaim predicated on the filing of a baseless suit
and injury to its reputation, petitioner did not raise this matter on appeal and, hence, is
deemed to have waived the same. HIAEaC
But the Court in Ty made a partial finding on the civil liability of respondent Ty with respect
to the amount covered by seven of the several dishonored checks she issued equivalent to
P210,000.00. 1 4 2 Since this amount forms a fraction of her total civil liability, then this
amount, in deference to Ty, should be deducted therefrom.
The claim for attorney's fees, as stipulated under the Promissory Note dated June 5, 1992,
should be reduced for being unreasonable under the circumstances, from 25 percent to 12
percent of the total amount due. 1 4 3
As a final word, the Court takes judicial notice of the pending Senate Bill No. 337, entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Detention of Patients in Hospitals and Medical Clinics on Grounds
of Non-Payment of Hospital Bills or Medical Expenses," which declares, among others, that
it shall be unlawful for any hospital or medical clinic to cause directly or indirectly the
detention of patients for non-payment, in part or in full, of their hospital bills, 1 4 4 and,
furthermore, requires patients who have fully recovered and are financially incapable to
settle the hospitalization expenses to execute a promissory note, co-signed by another
individual, to the extent of the unpaid obligation before leaving the hospital. 1 4 5 While this
Court may have touched upon these matters in the adjudication of the instant case, it must
be stated that this decision should in no way preempt any constitutional challenge to the
provisions of Senate Bill No. 337 if passed into law, bearing in mind the standards for the
exercise of the power of judicial review 1 4 6 as well as the recognition that the tenor of the
bill may adjust with the times, or that the bill itself may fail to pass, according to the
dynamism of the legislative process, especially in light of the objections interposed by
interest groups to date. 1 4 7
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
October 2, 2001, together with the Decision dated September 30, 1997 of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 63958, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Another judgment is
entered dismissing the Complaint and ordering respondents, jointly and severally, to pay
the petitioner the amount of P865,592.95, with stipulated interest of 12 percent reckoned
from the date of extrajudicial demand until full payment, and 12 percent of the total
amount due as attorney's fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr. and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Eliezer R. De Los Santos, concurring, rollo, pp. 38-50.
2. Although the Complaint impleaded the petitioner as "Manila Doctors Hospital,

defendant," allegedly a domestic corporation, the petitioner specifically denied this
averment and alleged that "Manila Doctors Hospital" is merely a tradename of "Manila
Medical Services, Inc.," the real party in interest. This allegation was not disputed by the
respondents, nor was any correction made by the courts a quo. See Answer dated
February 4, 1994, item 2; Amended Answer dated February 10, 1994, item 2; Rejoinder
dated March 28, 1994, item 3; records, pp. 1, 15, 25, 42; The 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 3, §1 (1997); id. Rule 8, §4; Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 201 Phil. 369
(1982); Chiang Kai Shek v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58028, April 18, 1989, 172 SCRA
389.
3. Partial Pre-Trial Order dated May 2, 1994, rollo, p. 87.

4. Partial Pre-Trial Order dated May 4, 1994, id. at 90-91.
5. Id. at 107.
6. CA rollo, p. 39.
7. Rollo, p. 50.
8. G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 220, 238.
9. Heirs of Dicman v. Cariño, G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006; Rivera v. Roman, G.R. No.
142402, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 276, 287; Mercury Drug Corp. v. Libunao, G.R.
No. 144458, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 404, 413-414; The Insular Life Assurance
Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April 28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86;
Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122249, January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 319; C &
S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279, 288 (2002); Martinez v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 123547, May 21, 2001, 358 SCRA 38, 49 (2001).
10. RTC Decision, rollo, p. 99.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 104; CA Decision, id. at 43.
13. Id. at 103; CA Decision, id.
14. Id. at 46.

15. Id. at 103-104.
16. Id. at 42, 44.
17. Id. at 104; CA Decision, id. at 42, 46. See THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, R.A.
386, as amended, Articles 19-21, 2219 (1950).
18. See PEDRO P. SOLIS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 322 (1988) (discussing the corporate
liability of hospitals arising from the failure to furnish safe and reliable equipment).
19. See Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1198, 1241 (1999), citing JOSE O. VITUG,
COMPENDIUM OF CIVIL LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE 822 (1993).
20. The primary duties of a hospital are to furnish safe and well maintained premises, to
provide adequate and safe equipment, and to exercise reasonable care in the selection
of the members of the hospital staff. See PEDRO P. SOLIS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
310-11, 321-29 (1988). A hospital conducted for private gain is under a duty to exercise
ordinary care in furnishing its patients a suitable and safe place. If an unsafe condition
of the hospital's premises causes an injury, there is a breach of the hospital's duty. 40A
AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 35 (1999), citing Sharpe v. South Carolina Dept.
of Mental Health, 281 S.C. 242, 315 S.E.2d 112 (1984); United Western Medical Centers
v. Superior Court, 42 Cal. App. 4th 500, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682 (4th Dist. 1996). Where the
patient refuses to leave a private hospital inspite of the order for his discharge, he may
do so and continue to stay in that hospital, provided the corresponding hospital bill is
properly satisfied and with the consent of the attending physician. PEDRO P. SOLIS,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 336 (1988). The relationship between the hospital as a
private corporate entity and the admitted patient is one principally governed by contract.
This conclusion stems from the general rule that the management and operation of a
private hospital are governed by the rules applied in the case of private corporations
generally, except as modified by statute. See 40A AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums
§13 (1999), citing Burris v. Morton F. Plant Hospital, 204 So. 2d 521 (1967). The contract
between the private hospital and the patient normally stipulates the conditions of
admission. See, e.g., 9A AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D § 136:63. As the petitioner is a
private hospital as opposed to a public one, it is given more leeway in making rules and
regulations as regards the admission of patients, hospital facilities, selection of staff,
among others, provided that such rules and regulations are not arbitrary, discriminatory,
unreasonable, monopolistic, or contrary to law or public policy, PEDRO P. SOLIS,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 310 (1988).
21. See, e.g., Tan v. Villapaz, G.R. No. 160892, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 720, 727;
Nautica Canning Corp. v. Yumul, G.R. No. 164588, October 19, 2005, 473 SCRA 415, 423;
Jardine Davies, Inc. v. JRB Realty, Inc., G.R. No. 151438, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 555,
561; Lim v. Chuatoco, G.R. No. 161861, March 11, 2005, 453 SCRA 308, 316; Chico v.
Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 37, 43 (1998).
22. TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 53-54.
23. TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 13. The exact date when respondent Chua actually left the
hospital is under dispute, which is either June 4 or June 5, 1992.
24. See TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 1-34 (offering Dr. Rody Sy as rebuttal witness for
respondents and whose credibility had not been impeached).
25. TSN, June 24, 1994, pp. 16, 32.

26. TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 6.

27. Id. at 8, 13.
28. Id. at 13.
29. Id. at 8-9.
30. Id. at 7, 10.
31. TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 7 (testifying as witness for the respondents).
32. TSN, August 15, 1996, p. 13.

33. Supra note 31.
34. Supra note 32.
35. Supra note 31.
36. Id. at 9.
37. TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 10.
38. TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 22.
39. TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 7.
40. Id. at 15.

41. Supra note 37.
42. Supra note 38.
43. TSN, September 7, 1995, pp. 12-13.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 14.
46. Id. at 18.
47. Id. at 6-7.
48. Id. at 8.
49. Id. at 11.
50. Id. at 7, 10, 12; TSN, August 22, 1996, supra.
51. TSN, June 24, 1994, p. 32.
52. TSN, January 19, 1996, p. 12; TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 75, 76.
53. TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 76.

54. Although there is some inconsistency as to the exact dates when the hospital
administrator, Sister Galeno, consulted with the doctors, due to memory lapse of the
witnesses, it is fairly established that it was done during a reasonable time before the
removal. See TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 12, 76-77; TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 17 (Dr. Rody
Sy testifying for the respondents as rebuttal witness).
55. TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 13.

56. Id. at 12-13.
57. Supra note 55.
58. Id. at 18.
59. TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 17; TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 19.
60. TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 14.

61. Id. at 22.
62. Id. at 19.
63. Id. at 28.
64. TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 32.
65. Id. at pp. 14, 18-19.

66. TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 16.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 21-22.
69. Id.
70. TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 48.
71. TSN, September 7, 1995, p. 20; TSN, August 22, 1996, pp. 6, 8, 24; TSN, October 5, 1995,
p. 13.
72. TSN, August 22, 1996, p. 8.

73. Supra note 46.
74. TSN, June 24, 1994, pp. 16, 31-32.
75. Supra note 46.

76. Spouses Custodio v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 575, 585-586 (1996). See Expertravel &
Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 444, 448-449 (1999) (summarizing the rules on
moral damages).
77. 346 Phil. 872 (1997).

78. Id. at 884-885.
79. TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 28.
80. Id. at 12, 27.
81. Id. at 26, 31-32.
82. Id. at 12, 31, 42.
83. Id. at 26.
84. Id. at 5.
85. Id. at 30-31.
86. Exhibit "5."
87. Id.; TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 29.
88. TSN, October 27, 1994, p. 13; TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 27-29.
89. Exhibit "1".
90. TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 17.
91. Id. at 31, 42; Partial Pre-Trial Order dated May 4, 1994, rollo, pp. 90-91; RTC Decision, id.
at 94-95.
92. TSN, June 24, 1994, pp. 27-28; TSN, August 15, 1996, p. 14.
93. TSN, June 24, 1994, pp. 6, 9, 36.

94. TSN, October 27, 1994, p. 34; TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 44-45.
95. RTC Decision, rollo, p. 106. This conclusion had been impliedly affirmed by the CA. See
TSN, July 1, 1994, p. 17 (respondent Ty testifying that she was "forced to sign" the
promissory notes and execute the postdated checks as a condition for the release or
discharge of her mother, respondent Chua). See also id. at 21.
96. TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 18-19, 23.
97. Id. at 35.

98. Id. at 17-18, 22, 32; TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 25. It can be observed from the testimonies
that the discharge order issued by the attending physician is a discharge from a medical
standpoint, while the discharge or clearance issued by the Nursing Station, Accounting,
Cashier, Security, or the other departments whose functions may be administrative in
nature refer to matters not solely confined to medical aspects, such as the settlement of
dues, deposits or breakage, all of which depend on the rules and regulations as well as
hospital policy.
99. TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 26; TSN, September 14, 1995, p. 23-24.
100. Id.; id.

101. TSN, September 14, 1995, pp. 23-24.
102. TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 26-27, 48-49.
103. Supra note 101.

104. See PEDRO P. SOLIS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 305-307 (1988) (discussing the
various classifications of hospitals).
105. TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 49-50.

106. Exhibits "B" to "B-1."
107. TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 40-42.

108. PEDRO P. SOLIS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 338 (1988), citing Gadsden General
Hospital v. Hamilton, 103 So. 553 (1925). See LOUIS J. REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT
AND THE LAW 113 (1949), citing Cook v. Highland Hospital, 84 S.E. 352; In re Carlsen,
130 Fed. 379; Re Baker, 29 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 485; Ollet v. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. R. Co.
(Pa.), 50 Atl. 1011; Lord v. Claxton (Ga.), 8 S.E.2d 657.
109. PEDRO P. SOLIS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 338 (1988).
110. C.R.A. MARTIN, LAW RELATING TO MEDICAL PRACTICE 340-41 (1979) (citations
omitted).
111. PEDRO P. SOLIS, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 338 (1988).
112. C.R.A. MARTIN, LAW RELATING TO MEDICAL PRACTICE 41 (1979) (citations omitted).
113. As opposed to a private charitable or eleemosynary hospital. PEDRO P. SOLIS,
MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 306-7 (1988)
114. 40A AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums §8 (1999), citing Porter v. McPherson, 198
W. Va. 158, 479 S.E.2d 668 (1996).
115. Id. citing Trevino v. HHL Financial Services, Inc., 945 P.2d 1345 (Colo. 1997).
116. TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 43-44, 58-59, 62.
117. See 40A AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums §8 (1999), citing Heartland Health
Systems, Inc. v. Chamberlin, 871 S.W.2d 8 (1993).
118. TSN, October 27, 1994, p. 26-27.
119. G.R. No. 149275, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 220.
120. Id. at 230-233.

121. Rollo, p. 44.
122. Id. at 103.
123. Id. at 42.
124. Supra note 121.
125. Supra note 122; id. at 43.
126. Id. at 46.
127. See THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Republic Act No. 386, as amended, Article
2219 (1950).
128. See Soberano v. Manila Railroad Company , 124 Phil. 1330, 1337 (1966); Strebel v.
Figueras, 96 Phil. 321, 330 (1954); Araneta v. Arreglado, 104 Phil. 529, 533 (1958).
129. Records, pp. 178-197.
130. TSN, August 15, 1996, pp. 4-5.
131. TSN, October 27, 1994, pp. 8, 10-11, 24-27, 32-33; TSN, October 5, 1995, pp. 18, 21, 26,
35-36, 51-53; TSN, January 25, 1996, 8-9, 12.
132. Exhibit "1".

133. Exhibits "1-a" and "1-b".
134. Exhibits "2" to "2-c."

135. Exhibits "3" to "4-b."
136. Exhibits "11", "11-b"; Exhibits "13" to "14-a"; Exhibits "16" to "16-d."
137. Rollo, pp. 94-95; Partial Pre-Trial Order dated May 4, 1994, id. at 90-91.
138. TSN, July 1, 1994, pp. 5, 8, 19-22.
139. Id. at 5, 9-10.
140. Ty v. People of the Philippines, supra note 8, at 234.
141. Rollo, p. 47.
142. The dispositive portion of Ty v. People states:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 31 July 2001, finding petitioner Vicky C. Ty GUILTY of violating Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Vicky C. Ty is
ORDERED to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of each dishonored check
subject of the seven cases at bar with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
accordance with Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code. She is also ordered to pay private
complainant, Manila Doctors' Hospital, the amount of Two Hundred Ten Thousand
Pesos (P210,000.00) representing the total amount of the dishonored checks. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
(emphasis supplied)
143. THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Republic Act No. 386, as amended, Art. 2208
(1950) ("In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.").
See, e.g., Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87182, February 17, 1992, 206
SCRA 317.
144. Section 1 of the draft bill.

145. Section 2 of the draft bill.
146. Where questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its
power of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied: First, there must be
before the Court an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review. Second, the
question before the Court must be ripe for adjudication. Third, the person challenging the
validity of the act must have standing to challenge. Fourth, the question of
constitutionality must have been raised at the earliest opportunity, and lastly, the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. Allied Banking Corporation v.
Quezon City Government, G.R. No, 154126, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 303, 317; Board
of Optometry v. Colet, 328 Phil. 1187, 1205 (1996); Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 100883, December 2, 1991, 204 SCRA 516, 522; Santos III v. Northwest Orient
Airlines, G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992, 210 SCRA 256, 261.
147. See Position Paper dated September 22, 2004, submitted by the Philippine Medical
Association for the presentation in the public hearing for the Committee of Health and
Demography, Senate, Republic of the Philippines.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.]
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION , petitioner,

vs . HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S.
MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL
CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER) , respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision 1 dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution 2 dated 9 May 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, af rming the Resolution 3 dated 20
November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño
(Montaño) granting bereavement leave and other death bene ts to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation
(Continental Steel) and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro
Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (Union) led on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave
and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:
ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE
xxx xxx xxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE. — The Company agrees to grant a
bereavement leave with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee's
legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on
the following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan — 7 days
2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila — 11 days
xxx xxx xxx
ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE. — The Company shall grant death
and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
IHSTDE
xxx xxx xxx

4.3 DEPENDENTS — Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00)
in case of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and
children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents,
brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g., death
certificate). 4
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's wife, Marife V.
Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy. 5 According to the Certi cate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female
fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. 6
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave but denied his
claims for bereavement leave and other death bene ts, consisting of the death and
accident insurance. 7
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillano's claims for
bereavement and other death bene ts, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery
provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences held, the parties still failed to settle
their dispute, 8 prompting the Union to le a Notice to Arbitrate before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), National Capital Region (NCR). 9 In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October
2006, the Union and Continental Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of
whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death bene ts pursuant to
Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA. 1 0 The parties mutually chose
Atty. Montaño, an Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, to resolve said issue. 1 1
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the
parties proceeded to submit their respective Position Papers, 1 2 Replies, 1 3 and Rejoinders
1 4 to Atty. Montaño.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death
bene ts pursuant to the CBA. The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article
XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not speci cally state that the d ep end ent should have
rst been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death bene ts. The Union cited cases wherein
employees of MKK Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation
(Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano
were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.
The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of
Mayer Steel, whose wife also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to
the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary
contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel. 1 5 Dugan's child was only
24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillano's child who was
already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.
The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the
same compound as Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer
Steel who signed the CBA with their respective employees' unions were the same as the
representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the Union. HECTaA
Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in
labor legislations and labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and
decent living for the laborer.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not
contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that
there are two elements for the entitlement to the bene ts, namely: (1) death and (2) status
as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano's case. Continental Steel,
relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 1 6 of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a
fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term
dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus
that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any
support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.
Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous.
Since neither of the parties quali ed the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted
de nitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted by both parties. The failure of the
Union to have unborn child included in the de nition of dependent, as used in the CBA —
the death of whom would have quali ed the parent-employee for bereavement leave and
other death bene ts — bound the Union to the legally accepted de nition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister
companies, MKK Steel and Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and
incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct personalities of the companies.
Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and other
death bene ts to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted
"company practice".
On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montaño, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator,
issued a Resolution 1 7 ruling that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay
and death benefits.
Atty. Montaño identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:
This Of ce declares that for the entitlement of the bene t of bereavement leave
with pay by the covered employees as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the
parties' CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1) there is
"death"; (2) such death must be of employee's "dependent"; and (3) such
dependent must be "legitimate".
On the otherhand, for the entitlement to bene t for death and accident insurance
as provided under Article XVIII, Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties' CBA, four
(4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is "death"; (b) such death
must be of employee's "dependent"; (c) such dependent must be "legitimate"; and
(d) proper legal document to be presented. 1 8 CTSAaH
Atty. Montaño found that there was no dispute that the death of an employee's legitimate
dependent occurred. The fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very
moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could
not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else,
speci cally, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she
died during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife
were lawfully married, making their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.
In the end, Atty. Montaño decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING
[herein petitioner Continental Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of
Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00), representing his
bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Pesos (P11,550.00) representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00
The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein
dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel led with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, 1 9 under Section 1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
101697.
Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montaño erred in granting Hortillano's claims for
bereavement leave with pay and other death bene ts because no death of an employee's
dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at whatever stage of pregnancy, was
excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the CBA was the
death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical
personality. Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that
the term death was quali ed by the phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the
status of a child could only be determined upon said child's birth, otherwise, no such
appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillano's entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, af rmed Atty. Montaño's
Resolution dated 20 November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as
follows:
[Herein petitioner Continental Steel's] exposition on the legal sense in which the
term "death" is used in the CBA fails to impress the Court, and the same is
irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave and
death bene ts thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with
[Continental Steel] that the acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is
conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not follow that such event
of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a "death" as to be
covered by the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the
affected employee, with whom the dead fetus stands in a legitimate relation.
[Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical signi cance to the term
"death of a legitimate dependent" as condition for granting bereavement leave
and death benefits under the CBA. Following [Continental Steel's] theory, there can
be no experience of "death" to speak of. The Court, however, does not share this
view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than "loss of
human life", especially for the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave
and death bene ts are meant to assuage the employee and the latter's immediate
family, extend to them' solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal
status or personality upon the unborn child. [Continental Steel's] insistence that
the certi cate of fetal death is for statistical purposes only sadly misses this
crucial point. 2 0 CSHcDT

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited
Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montaño is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel]. 2 1
In a Resolution 2 2 dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for
Reconsideration 2 3 of Continental Steel.
Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and
unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one
with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical personality.
We are not persuaded.
As Atty. Montaño identi ed, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2
of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child,
brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the
employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4
(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent,
spouse, or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee;
and (4) presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death
certificate.
It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the
provisions of the CBA are clear and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying
Hortillano's claim for bereavement leave and other death bene ts rests on the purportedly
proper interpretation of the terms "death" and "dependent" as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to
the interpretation or construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted
that neither management nor the Union sought to de ne the pertinent terms for
bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
de nition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 de nes when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil
Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the
very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the tness to be the subject of legal relations,
is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act,
which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. CDHacE
We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical
capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her
death that were passed on to or assumed by the child's parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death bene ts in the instant case pertain directly to the
parents of the unborn child upon the latter's death.

Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a de nition of death.
Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been de ned as the cessation of life. 2 4 Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality rst before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of
the unborn from conception , 2 5 that the State must protect equally with the life of the
mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental
Steel itself de nes, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to
exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else". Under said general
definition, 2 6 even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano's child could not
have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano's wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question
that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the
parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a quali cation for
the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such quali cation, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mother's
womb.
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child's status in relation to his/her
parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, 2 7 we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz.:
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful
marriage. Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate
liation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be
more emphatic on the matter: "Children conceived or born during the marriage of
the parents are legitimate". (Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel, 2 8 we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The ne distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been
eliminated in the Family Code. Now, there are only two classes of children —
legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of legitimate
children) and illegitimate. All children con cei v ed and born outside a valid
marriage are illegitimate, unless the law itself gives them legitimate status.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case,
it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child
was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element
entitling him to death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death
certificate of his unborn child. CSaIAc
Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death bene ts
under the CBA, Hortillano's claims for the same should have been granted by Continental
Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death bene ts are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his
family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents' grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents
whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
Being for the bene t of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other
death bene ts should be interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and
again, the Labor Code is speci c in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation
of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. 2 9 In
the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In
Marcopper Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission, 3 0 we pronounced:
Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed
decision that "when the pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces
are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of labor". While
petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code
shall be resolved in favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the
amended CBA which is essentially a contract between private persons. What
petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our
Constitution, to accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are,
likewise, sworn to uphold.
In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)],
we categorically stated that:
When con icting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the
scales of social justice, the heavier in uence of the latter should be
counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.
Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265
(1991)], we declared:
Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor
pursuant to the social justice policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF , the Petition is DENIED . The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and
Resolution dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, af rming
the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S.
Montaño, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave pay and other death
bene ts in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00)
and Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on
the death of his unborn child, are AFFIRMED . Costs against Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation.
SO ORDERED . DHSaCA
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Nachura and Peralta, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam
and Sesinando E. Villon concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.
2. Id. at 42.
3. Penned by Atty. Allan S. Montaño, Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator; records, pp. 381-392.
4. CA rollo, p. 26.
5. Rollo, pp. 84-92.
6. Id. at 93.
7. Id. at 86.
8. Id. at 33.
9. CA rollo, p. 60.
10. Id. at 67.
11. Id. at 46.
12. Id. at 25.
13. Id. at 62-65.

14. Id. at 66-72.
15. Records, pp. 46-53.
16. Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours
after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and
obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
17. CA rollo, pp. 24-34.
18. Id. at 32.
19. Id. at 2-18.

Art. 262-A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section 7, Rule XIX of Department
Order No. 40-03 series of 2003 provides that the decision, order, resolution or award of
the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be nal and executory after ten (10) calendar days from
receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and that it shall not be subject
of a motion for reconsideration.
20. Rollo, pp. 38-39.
21. Id. at 39.
22. Id. at 153.
23. Id. at 136-143.
24. Black's Law Dictionary.

25. Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution reads in full:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of
the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic ef ciency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
26. As opposed to the more limited or precise de nition of a dependent child for income tax
purposes, which means "a legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted child chie y
dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if such dependent is not more than twenty-
one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if such dependent,
regardless of age, is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical defect".
27. G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 363, 369.
28. 483 Phil. 483, 491 (2004).
29. Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
164060, 15 June 2007, 524 SCRA 709, 716.
30. 325 Phil. 618, 634-635 (1996).

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-16439. July 20, 1961.]
ANTONIO GELUZ , petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

OSCAR LAZO , respondents.
Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A. P. Salvador for respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; ABORTION; CONSENT OF WOMAN OR HUSBAND DOES NOT

EXCUSE CRIMINAL ACT. — Abortion, without medical necessity to warrant it, is a criminal
act, and neither the consent of the woman nor that of the husband would excuse it.
2. DAMAGES; UNBORN FOETUS: WITHOUT PERSONALITY; AWARD FOR DEATH OF A
PERSON DOES NOT COVER UNBORN FOETUS. — The minimum award for the death of a
person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality
and incapable of having rights and obligations.
3. ID.; ID.; PARENTS OF UNBORN FOETUS CANNOT SUE FOR DAMAGES ON ITS
BEHALF. — Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death
pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to the
parents or heirs of an unborn child.
4. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY PARENTS OF UNBORN CHILD. —
The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral
damages for the illegal arrest of normal development of the foetus, i.e., on account of
distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental
expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them
(Art. 2230, New Civil Code).
DECISION
REYES, J.B.L. , J : p
This petition for certiorari brings up for review the question whether the husband of a
woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician
who caused the same.
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent
Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the evidence adduced, the trial court
rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz ordering the
latter to pay P3,000 as damages, P700 as attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority
vote of three justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:
"Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in
1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her
present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself
aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her
pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the
defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion and the
latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo
and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife.
Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of
fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of
Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of,
nor gave his consent to, the abortion."
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiffs basis in filing this action and
award of damages. Upon application of the defendant Geluz, we granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of
P3,000.00 upon the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award
of P3,000 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is
not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consecuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del
Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado" Vol. 1, p. 49). being incapable
of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right
of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action
did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death,
since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality
(or juridical capacity, as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40
of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by
imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the conditions specified in the following article". In the present case, there
is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and is generally held that
recovery can not be had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co.,
70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northhampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases
collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such
damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or
violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the
parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would
normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of
the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e. on account of distress and anguish attendant to
its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code, Art. 2217), as
well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But
in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any
basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections. The lower court
expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was
likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared
to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the
appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from
the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000 damages and P3,000
attorneys fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly
exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
"It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels
outraged by the abortion which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a
physician would be high-minded rather than mercenary; and that his primary
concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an
unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and
with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he
had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for
damages of which not only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries."
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife,
without medical necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that
can not be too severely condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband
does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an award of
damages that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without
costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Department of Justice and the Board of
Medical Examiners for their information and such investigation and action against the
appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., did not take part.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-60101. August 31, 1983.]
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC ., petitioner, vs. JOSEPHINE LUCERO,

NATIONAL SEAMEN BOARD, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION , respondents.
Valera, Cainglet & Dala Law Office for petitioner.

Jose R. Millares for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS; ABSENCE; PRESUMPTION OF DEATH; WHERE THE RULE OF

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE CONTROL; CASE AT BAR. — There is thus enough
evidence to show the circumstance attending the loss and disappearance of the M/V
Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically, are suf cient to lead to a
moral certainty that the vessels had sunk and that the persons abroad had perished with it.
Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code
must yield to the tale of preponderance of evidence. As this Court said in Joaquin vs.
Navarro (93 Phil. 257) "Where there are facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule of preponderance
of evidence controls."
DECISION
ESCOLIN , J : p
Petition for review led by the Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. to set aside the decision of the
National Labor Relations Commission, which af rmed the judgment rendered by the
National Seamen Board, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby ordered to pay complainant her monthly
allotments from March, 1980 up to the amount of P54,562.00 within ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision. Respondent is likewise further ordered to pay
complainant her future monthly allotment up to the arrival of the M/V EASTERN
MINICON in the port of Manila or after four (4) years when the presumptive death
established by law takes effect."
The material facts that gave rise to this petition are as follows: On October 31, 1979, Capt.
Julio J. Lucero, Jr. was appointed by petitioner Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc., Company for
short, as master/captain to its vessel M/V Eastern Minicon, plying the Hongkong/Manila
route, with the salary of P5,560.00 exclusive of ship board allowances and other bene ts.
Under the contract, his employment was good for one (1) round trip only, i.e., the contract
would automatically terminate upon arrival of the vessel at the Port of Manila, unless
renewed. It was further agreed that part of the captain's salary, while abroad, should be
paid to Mrs. Josephine Lucero, his wife, in Manila. LibLex
On February 16, 1980, while the vessel was enroute from Hongkong to Manila where it was
expected to arrive on February 18, 1980, Capt. Lucero sent three (3) messages to the
Company's Manila office:
First Message: 1
"February 16, 1980 0700 GMT Via Intercom
EMINICON
Urgent
Eastship Manila
REGRET TO INFORM YOU ENCOUNTERED BOISTEROUS WEATHER WITH

STRONG NORTHEASTERLY WINDS WITH GAIL FORCE CAUSING THE VESSEL
ROLLING AND PITCHING VIOLENTLY VESSEL NOW INCLINING 15 TO 20
DEGREES PORT FEARING MIGHT JETTISON CARGO ON DECK IF EVERYTHING
COME TO WORSE SITUATION HOWEVER TRYING UTMOST BEST TO FACILITATE
EVERYTHING IN ORDER STOP NO FIX POSITIONS FROM NOON 15th UP TO 0600
HRS TO DATE NEED ASSISTANCE APPROXIMATE DR POSITIONS AT 0600 HRS
10TH WITHIN THE VICINITY LATITUDE 20-02, ON LONGTITUDE 110-02, OE
COURSE 120 DEGREES REGARDS . . .
LUCERO"
Second Message: 2
"February 16/80 1530 GMT VIA INTERCOM
EMICON
EASTSHIP MANILA
RYC NOTED ACCORDINGLY SINCE WASTE PAPER CARGO ON PORT SIDE AND
HAD BEEN WASH OUT VESSEL AGAIN LISTING ON STARBOARD SIDE REGRET
WE HAVE TO JETTISON STARBOARD SIDE WASTE PAPER CARGO IN ORDER TO
BALANCE THE VESSEL NOW ALMOST BACK TO NORMAL POSITION HOWEVER
VESSEL STILL LABORING VIOLENTLY REGARDS.
LUCERO"
Third Message: 3
"FEBRUARY 16/80 2150 HRS
PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD
NEED IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE POSITION 19-35 N 116-40 E SEAWATER

ENTERING INSIDE HATCH VESSEL INCLINING 15 TO 20 DEGREES PORT IF
POSSIBLE SEND IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE VESSEL IN DANGER PREPARING TO
ABANDON ANYTIME
MASTER"
Acting on these radio messages, the Company, respondent below, took the following
steps:
"RESPONDENT informed of the grave situation, immediately reported the matter
to the Philippine Coast Guard for search and rescue operation and the same was
coordinated with the U.S. Air Force based at Clark Air Base. Respondent also
released radio messages to all vessels passing the Hongkong/Manila route
requesting them to be very cautious and vigilant for possible survivors and to
scan the area whether there are signs of debris from the ill fated vessel "EASTERN
MINICON" which has foundered. In the meantime, two (2) vessels of the
respondent were also dispatched to the area last reported by the Master for
search and rescue operation, but the collective efforts of all parties concerned
yielded negative results." (p. 79, Rollo)
Subsequently, the Lloyds of London, insurer of the M/V Eastern Minicon, through its
surveyors, con rmed the loss of the vessel. Thereafter, the Company paid the
corresponding death bene ts to the heirs of the crew members, except respondent
Josephine Lucero, who refused to accept the same. LLjur
On July 16, 1980, Mrs. Lucero led a complaint with the National Seamen Board, Board for
short, for payment of her accrued monthly allotment of P3,183.00, which the Company had
stopped since March 1980 and for continued payment of said allotments until the M/V
Minicon shall have returned to the port of Manila. She contended that the contract of
employment entered into by her husband with the Company was on a voyage-to-voyage
basis, and that the same was to terminate only upon the vessel's arrival in Manila.
Upon the other hand, the Company maintained that Mrs. Lucero was no longer entitled to
such allotments because: [a] the Lloyds of London had already con rmed the total loss of
the vessel and had in fact settled the Company's insurance claim and [b] the Company,
with the approval of the Board, had likewise paid the corresponding death bene ts to the
heirs of the other seamen. The Company further invoked the provisions of Article 643 of
the Code of Commerce, to wit:
"Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo should be totally lost, by reason of capture or
wreck, all rights shall be extinguished, both as regards the crew to demand any
wages whatsoever, and as regards the ship agent to recover the advances made.
. . ."
On May 19, 1981, the Board rendered the aforecited judgment in favor of Mrs. Josephine
Lucero and against petitioner Company. The Board held that the presumption of death
could not be applied because the four-year period provided for by Article 391(1) of the
Civil Code had not yet expired; and that the payment of death bene ts to the heirs of the
other crew members was based upon a voluntary agreement entered into by and between
the heirs and the Company, and did not bind respondent Mrs. Lucero who was not a party
thereto.
On appeal, the respondent National Labor Relations Commission af rmed the said
decision. It held that:
"Within the context of the foregoing circumstances, the only recourse is to
presume the vessel totally lost and its crew members dead. But in this connection,
the question that comes to the fore is: When will the presumption arise? Article
391 of the Civil Code provides the answer, to wit:
Art, 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the
division of the estate among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is
missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or
aeroplane; . . .
"By the aforequoted law, it is quite clear that the person to be presumed dead
should rst "not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel" before
he can be presumed dead for all purposes. Applied to Capt. LUCERO, it is
evidently premature to presume him dead as four years has not yet expired. Thus,
even in Judge Advocate General vs. Gonzales, et al., (CA) 48 O.G. 5329, the very
case cited by the respondent herein, the court said in the case of the missing
soldier that although nothing was heard of him since 7 May 1942, the fact of his
death is not presumed until seven years after 1942.
"Since Capt. LUCERO cannot yet be presumed dead as demonstrated hereinabove,

it logically follows that as of now, he is presumed alive. It is of no moment to Us
that the vessel was conceded by the Lloyds of London to have been totally lost
which, in the rst place, was admittedly merely based on presumption as even the
whereabouts of the vessel remains unknown. Similarly, even the agreement,
which formed the basis of the Decision of the NSB ordering payment of death
bene ts to the heirs of some of the crew must have been predicated upon a
presumption of death of the crewmembers concerned. Such circumstances do
not suffice to establish the actual death of Capt. LUCERO.
xxx xxx xxx

"Indeed, by the terms of the appointment of Capt. LUCERO, his engagement
terminates upon the return of the vessel at the Port of Manila. He is considered to
be still working entitling his spouse to allotment until the vessel returns or until it
is of cially declared totally lost, or until the presumption of his death becomes
effective in which case the burden of proving that he is alive is shifted to his wife
for purposes of continuing her allotment."
We are unable to agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the respondent NLRC.
It is undisputed that on February 16, 1980, the Company received three (3) radio
messages from Capt. Lucero on board the M/V Eastern Minicon, the last of which,
received at 9:50 p.m. of that day, was a call for immediate assistance in view of the
existing "danger": "sea water was entering the hatch"; the vessel "was listing 50 to 60
degrees port," and they were "preparing to abandon the ship any time.' After this message,
nothing more has been heard from the vessel or its crew until the present time. LibLex
There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and
disappearance of the M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite
logically, are suf cient to lead Us to a moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the
persons aboard had perished with it. Upon this premise, the rule on presumption of death
under Article 391(1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule of preponderance of evidence.
As this Court said in Joaquin vs. Navarro 4 "Where there are facts, known or knowable,
from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the
rule of preponderance of evidence controls."
Of similar import is the following pronouncement from American Jurisprudence: 5

"Loss of Vessel. — Where a vessel sets out on a voyage and neither the vessel nor
those who went in her are afterward heard of, the presumption arises, after the
utmost limit of time for her to have completed the voyage and for news of her
arrival at any commercial port of the world to have been received, that the vessel
has been lost and that all on board have perished. The presumption of death in
such cases does not rest on the fact alone that the person in question has been
absent and unheard from for a speci c length of time, but also on the fact that
the vessel has not been heard from. The question, moreover, is not whether it is
impossible that the person may be alive, but whether the circumstances do not
present so strong a probability of his death that a court should act thereon. The
presumption of death from absence of tidings of the vessel on which the
absentee sailed is strengthened by proof of a storm to which the vessel probably
was exposed. The presumption is even stronger where it appears af rmatively
that the vessel was lost at sea, that nothing has been heard of a particular person
who sailed thereon, and that a suf cient time has elapsed to permit the receipt of
news of any possible survivors of the disaster."
In People vs. Ansang 6 where, in open sea, the appellant aboard a vinta ignited three home-
made bombs and threw them at the boat occupied by the victims, and the said boat was
later washed ashore and the passengers thereof were never heard or seen again by
anybody, this Court convicted the appellant of multiple murder, holding that the victims
were dead. LLpr
Similarly, in People vs. Sasota, 7 the claim of the appellants therein that there was no
conclusive evidence of death of the victim because his body was never found was
overruled by this Court in this wise:
"In a case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to
show where it can be found. There are cases like death at sea, where the nding
or recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death and the criminal
agency be proven. There are even cases where said death and the intervention of
the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established by
circumstantial evidence.
"Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cases decided by this
Court, where besides the act of treason the accused is held responsible for the
death of persons he had arrested or tortured and later taken away, where the
victims were never later seen or heard from, it has been presumed that they were
killed or otherwise criminally disposed of or liquidated by the accused, this, for the
purpose of fixing the penalty."
If in the foregoing criminal cases, where the proof required for conviction must be beyond
reasonable doubt, the rule of presumption was not applied and the fact of death was
deemed established, with more reason is this Court justi ed in entering a nding of death.
Indeed, We cannot permit Article 391 to override, or be substituted for, the facts
established in this case which logically indicate to a moral certainty that Capt. Lucero died
shortly after he had sent his last radio message at 9:50 p.m. on February 16, 1980.
In view of the conclusion arrived at above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other
issued raised in this case, they being mere adjuncts to the principal issue already disposed
of.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC subject of this petition is hereby set aside, and the
complaint of respondent Josephine Lucero dismissed. However, Mrs. Lucero is entitled to
death benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Aquino, J ., I concur. Mrs. Lucero is entitled to death benefits.
Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ ., are on leave.
Footnotes
1. Annex "1".
2. Annex "1-A".
3. Annex "1-B".
4. 93 Phil. 257.
5. 16 Am. Jr., 25-26.
6. 93 Phil. 44.
7. 91 Phil. 111.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-9268. November 28, 1959.]
VICTORY SHIPPING LINES, INC. , petitioner, vs . WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL. , respondents.
Eddy A. Deen for petitioner.

Ricardo S. Inton for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; DEATH COMPENSATION; PRESUMPTION OF

DEATH OF PERSONS ABOARD A VESSEL LOST DURING A SEA VOYAGE; ARTICLE 391
OF NEW CIVIL CODE WHEN APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. — Article 391 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of persons aboard a vessel lost
during a sea voyage applies to cases wherein the vessel cannot be located nor
accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts,
inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same
meaning as "missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking
both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence.
Where, as in the case at bar, none of the foregoing conditions appears to exist, the rule
does not apply. Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the
fact of death.
2. ID.; ID.; WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION; NOTICE OF
HEARING; FAILURE OF EMPLOYER TO FILE REPORT OF ACCIDENT ON TIME AND TO
ALLEGE RIGHT TO CONTROVERT CLAIM, A WAIVER OF JURISDICTIONAL GROUNDS. —
The failure of the employer to file with the Workmen's Compensation Commission the
employer's report of the accident within the period prescribed by section 45 of Act No.
4328, as amended by Republic Act No. 772, and to allege its right to controvert the
claim resulted in the loss of the right of the employer to controvert the claim for
compensation or jurisdictional grounds.
3. ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER'S NEGLIGENCE WHICH WILL EXCEMPT EMPLOYER
FROM LIABILITY; BURDEN OF PROOF ON EMPLOYER; CASE AT BAR. — The kind of
negligence on the part of the employee which will exempt the employer from liability for
injuries suffered by the former is notorious negligence. Such negligence must be
proved, the burden of proof resting on the employer. The correct presumption to be
followed is that when a warning of danger is given, the laborer by instinct of self-
preservation takes precaution to avoid such danger unless an intention is attributed to
end his life. In the case at bar, P.I., in jumping overboard upon walking up and finding the
vessel on fire, was not guilty of gross negligence because his act was rather impelled
by fright or by the instinct of self-preservation.
DECISION

PARAS , C. J : p
On February 23, 1954, Pedro Icong, an employee of the petitioner, was sleeping
on board the latter's vessel, M/V "Miss Leyte," when it caught re. Awakened by the re,
Pedro Icong jumped overboard. Since then, he has not been heard of. The employee
was unmarried, receiving daily P4.00 with meals estimated at P1.20, and respondent
Juan Icong, his father, was his partial dependent. On April 30, 1954, the latter led with
the Workmen's Compensation Commission and the petitioner a notice of claim for
death compensation. The petitioner reported the matter to the Commission only on
August 17, 1954. The Commission rendered an award in favor of respondent Juan
Icong in the sum of P2,038.40, plus P200.00 for burial expenses and P20.00 as legal
fee.
The petitioner has appealed to this Court for the review of the award and has
presented three points of law, namely: I. That Article 391 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines was not applied in determining whether or not Pedro Icong should be
considered dead; II. That Section 49 of Republic Act No. 772, providing for the right of
the employer to notice and hearing of the claim against him, was disregarded; III. That
Pedro Icong should have been held guilty of notorious negligence in jumping overboard.
The petitioner contends that in the absence of proof of the death of Pedro Icong,
the nearest approach to the matter, from the facts of his case, is the provision on the
presumption of death established in Article 391 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
according to which the person to be presumed dead must be unheard of for at least
four years; that inasmuch as Pedro Icong had been missing for only a few months from
the alleged accident, there is as yet no legal presumption of death on which to base any
award for compensation.
The petitioner next contends that it never had its day in court, because no notice
of any hearing was ever served upon it; and as this error affects its substantive rights,
the decision under review was without jurisdiction.
It is lastly contended that although there was admittedly an alarm of re; no
person other than Pedro Icong jumped overboard; that the usual course of a prudent
man under the circumstance would be to resort to a life saver, life raft or life boat and
to await instructions from the captain and his of cers; that the act of Pedro Icong was
in complete disregard of adverse consequences constituting gross negligence which is
a bar to the right of compensation.
The respondent Commission obviously did not apply the rule on presumption of
death because in the employer's report of the accident submitted by petitioner, laborer
Pedro Icong was reported as the only casualty, and in transmitting said report
petitioner's counsel had implicitly admitted the fact that Pedro Icong's death. We agree
with this conclusion.
Quite recently, in the case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. vs. Nieves Baens del
Rosario, et al., G. R. No. L-13130, promulgated Oct. 31, 1959, we reproduced with
approval the explanation of the respondent Commissioner therein that Article 391 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines relating to presumption of death of persons aboard a
vessel lost during a sea voyage applies to cases wherein the vessel cannot be located
nor accounted for, or when its fate is unknown or there is no trace of its whereabouts,
inasmuch as the word "lost" used in referring to a vessel must be given the same
meaning as "missing" employed in connection with an aeroplane, the persons taking
both means of conveyance being the object of the rule expressed in the same sentence.
In the instant case, none of the foregoing conditions appear to exit. The fate of
petitioner's vessel is not unknown. It was not lost or missing. As a matter of fact, it had
been de nitely destroyed by re and washed ashore. And in view of the further fact that
when petitioner's vessel caught re, Pedro Icong jumped overboard and since then had
not been heard from, the aforementioned rule on presumption of death does not apply.
Instead the rule on preponderance of evidence applies to establish the fact of death. In
the same case of Madrigal Shipping Co., Inc. supra, we said:
"Where a person was last seen in a state of imminent peril that might
probably result in his death and has never been seen or heard from again, though
diligent search has been made, inference of immediate death may be drawn."
(Brownlee et al. vs. Mutual Benefit, Health and Accident Association, 29 Fed [2nd]
71).
As to the alleged lack of notice of hearing, the records disclose that the
petitioner did not le with the respondent Commission the employer's report of the
accident within the period prescribed by Section 45 of Act No. 4328, as amended by
Republic Act No. 772, and that neither was its right to controvert the claim ever alleged.
Under the law such failure results in the loss of the right to controvert the claim on
jurisdictional grounds; the employer cannot be subsequently heard to complain that the
law was strictly construed against him.
We rule that the act of Pedro Icong in jumping overboard upon waking up and
nding the vessel on re is not constitutive of gross negligence. Respondent
Commission correctly termed it as "rather impelled by fright or by the instinct of self-
preservation." "The kind of negligence on the part of the employee which will exempt
the employer from liability for injuries suffered by the former is notorious negligence.
Such negligence must be proved, the burden of proof resting on the employer. The
correct presumption to be followed is that when a warning of danger is given, the
laborer by instinct of self-preservation takes precaution to avoid such danger unless an
intention is attributed to end his life." (Francisco's Comments on Labor Laws, 2nd Ed., p.
888.)
In view of what has been said, the decision appealed from is hereby af rmed,
with costs against the petitioner.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Endencia, Barrera and
Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

2 Cases Second Batch

Enviado por

Dados do documento

Direitos autorais

Formatos disponíveis

Compartilhar este documento

Compartilhar ou incorporar documento

Opções de compartilhamento

Você considera este documento útil?

Este conteúdo é inapropriado?

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

2 Cases Second Batch

Enviado por

Direitos autorais:

Formatos disponíveis

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

1. US vs. Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, 19 March 1910

[G.R. No. 5272. March 19, 1910.]

THE UNITED STATES , plaintiff-appellee, vs . AH CHONG , defendant-

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

1. JUSTIFICATION HOMICIDE; SELF-DEFENSE; MISTAKE OF FACTS. —

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. Nos. 120744-46. June 25, 2012.]

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ , petitioner, vs . HONORABLE

[G.R. No. 122677. June 25, 2012.]

MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA ,

[G.R. No. 122776. June 25, 2012.]

GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO , petitioners, vs .

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

Criminal Case No. 16613 :

Criminal Case No. 16614 :

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

3.Records, Vol. 1, pp. 1-2.

6.Records, Vol. 1, p. 46.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

28.Id. at 17-20, 24-26, 41-47; id. at 10-14, 18-23.

36.TSN, October 25, 1991, pp. 17-44.

41.Id. at 23-25; Id. at 4.

71.TSN, January 9, 1991, pp. 4-12.

77.Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 57-65.

80.Rollo (G.R. No. 122776), pp. 101-103.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

87.Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 230-232.

91.Dated September 28, 1988, Exhibit "C."

94.Dated April 5, 1988, Exhibit "O."

97.See notes 38 and 39.

104.Rollo (G.R. No. 122677), pp. 230-232.

112.People v. Oanis, supra note 106, at 262.

115.335 Phil. 579 (1997).

127.15 Phil. 488 (1910).

130.Supra note 106.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

143.People v. Ramirez, 104 Phil. 720, 726 (1958).

147.People v. Oanis, supra note 106, at 262.

150.42 O.G. 1914, 1921.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988.]

Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioner.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

(1)Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and

(3)Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of

II.RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

[G.R. No. 94723. August 21, 1997.]

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father

Erlinda S. Carolino for petitioners.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; INSTANT PETITION FOR DECLARATORY

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. © 2016 cdasiaonline.com

b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered:

ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class

The antecedent facts: