People vs.
Dimaano being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of
The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce
proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does
not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.
***********
Facts:
In 1996, Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two (2)
counts of rape and one (1) count of attempted rape.
The complaint for attempted rape stated as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of
Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one
Maricar Dimaano y Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime
of Rape, directly by overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts
of execution which would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause
other than his spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the
complainant's mother.
Issue:
Did the complaint or information for attempted rape sufficiently alleged the
specific acts or omissions constituting the offense?
Held:
No. For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and
the place wherein the offense was committed.
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the
offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these
the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended
to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly
allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must
be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements
of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense.
The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of the
facts that constitute the offense.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned
does not allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the
crime of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for
crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The allegation therein
that the appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the complainant does not
satisfy the test of sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is merely a
conclusion of law by the one who drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a judgment of conviction;
otherwise we would be violating the right of the appellant to be informed of
the nature of the accusation against him. (People vs. Dimaano, G.R. No.
168168, September 14, 2005)
Sasot vs People
FACTS:
The National Bureau of Investigation conducted an investigation
pursuant to a complaint filed by the NBA Properties, Inc. against petitioners
for possible violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code on unfair
competition. Based on the report from the NBI, they have conducted two
investigations due to the petitioners’ alleged participation in the manufacture,
printing, sale and distribution of counterfeit “NBA” garment products, which
led to the search and seizure of several items from petitioner’s
establishment.
 Before arraignment, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash on the ground
that, the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the court did not
have jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused.
Petitioners contend that since the complainant is a foreign corporation not
doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by Philippine
patent laws since it is not a registered patentee. Petitioners aver that they
have been using the business name ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE, INC. since
1972, and their designs are original and do not appear to be similar to
complainants, and they do not use complainants logo or design.
In the Comment/Opposition filed by the trial prosecutor of Manila RTC
Branch 1, it stated that the State is entitled to prosecute the offense even
without the participation of the private offended party, as the crime charged is
a public crime, as provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court sustained the prosecution’s arguments and denied
petitioners’ motion to quash which lead to the filing of a special civil action for
Certiorari with the CA. According to the CA, the petition is not the proper
remedy in assailing the denial of the quashal motion, and that the grounds
raised therein should be raised during the trial of the case on the merits.
Petitioners sought for the reconsideration of the Decision, but was
denied by the CA, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a foreign corporation not doing business in the
Philippines and not licensed to do business in the Philippines have the right
to sue for unfair competition.
HELD: The petition must be denied.
While petitioners raise in their motion to quash the grounds that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the trial court has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person of the accused, their
arguments focused on an alleged defect in the complaint filed before the
fiscal, complainants capacity to sue and petitioners exculpatory defenses
against the crime of unfair competition.
More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code is a public crime. It is essentially an
act against the State and it is the latter which principally stands as the injured
party. The complainant’s capacity to sue in such case becomes immaterial.
Saludaga and Genio vs Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of
Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a competitive public bidding
as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government.
That in or about the months of November and December, 1997, at the
Municipality of Lavezares, Province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, public
officials, being the Municipal Mayor and PNP Member of Lavezares,
Northern Samar in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to
office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with one another, and
with the late Limpio Legua, a private individual, with deliberate intent, with
evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously. Information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of
RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was
quashed for failure to prove the actual damage; hence a new information was
filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit
to a private person. The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation
to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or substantial accused may be charged under either mode or under both. Hence a new
amendment of the first information. preliminary investigation is unnecessary.

Bonifacio vs RTC

Issue: Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of Facts:

the information that would warrant an new preliminary investigation.

Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel after private
Ruling: No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment. respondent Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance
Co., filed a criminal complaint before the Makati City Prosecutor for libel
under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code .

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions

of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to The complaint alleged that petitioners, together with several John Does,
be unlawful: publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor
and integrity, character and reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and
Yuchengco family for exposing them to public hatred and contempt, and
published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
article persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
the said company. This is after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for
in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through
their pecuniary loss under the policies they obtained from the company.
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
Makati City Prosecutor, after finding probable cause to indict the petitioners,
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government
filed separate information against them .
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.

Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on

the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC; the acts
The case at bench discloses no evident indication that respondent
complained of in the Information are not punishable by law since internet libel
Sandiganbayan acted with arbitrariness, whim or caprice. It committed no
is not covered by Article 353 of the RPC. Petitioners maintained that the
error in refusing to order the conduct of another preliminary investigation. As
Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction
sufficiently explained by the prosecution, a new preliminary investigation is
where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended
not necessary as there was neither a modification of the nature of the offense
parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was
charged nor a new allegation. Such conduct of preliminary investigation
printed and first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of
anew will only delay the resolution of the case and would be an exercise in
the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-
futility in as much as there was a complete preliminary investigation actively
published article.
participated by both petitioners.

That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by
causing undue injury or by giving private person unwarranted benefit. That
Issue:

Ramiscal, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan Digest

Whether petitioners’ Motion to Quash due to lack of jurisdiction is valid.

FACTS:

Held:
Yes. Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the
crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases
where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two
places, namely: 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense; or 2) where the alleged defamatory article was
printed and first published.
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General. when he served as
President of the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS).
During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of
AFP-RSBS approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land
situated in General Santos City for development as housing projects.

AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-

The Amended Information in the case opted to lay the venue by stating that in-fact of the 12 individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of
the offending article was first published and accessed by the private sale over the subject property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square
complainant in Makati City. In other words, it considered the phrase to be meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the individual vendors.
equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing and first publication. This is
wrong. For the court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested
jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over
accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all
the same property. The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of
other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or
only P3,000.00 per square meter instead of the actual purchase price of
capable of being accessed. This goes against the purpose as to why
P10,500.00 per square meter.
Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted. It lays down specific rules as to the
venue of the criminal action so as to prevent the offended party in written
defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-
town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts ( Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral
deeds of sale became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by
the Register of Deeds of General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
IN FINE, the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners motion to quash the Amended Information.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of
South Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the
Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against petitioner, along with 27 other
respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public funds
or property through falsification of public documents.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsmanfound petitioner probably
guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public
documents.
THE Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and 12 informations for falsification of public
documents against petitioner and several other co-accused.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that
petitioner be excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal
Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner
participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral
deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the
purchase of the subject property.
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment
to the Office of the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). The OMB-Military
adopted the memorandum of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of
petitioner’s name from the informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito
Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the
recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first motion for
reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. It found
that petitioner indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the
contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers,
and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of P10,500.00 per
square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign
ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the
false purchase price of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of
prosecutors concluded that probable cause existed for petitioner’s continued
prosecution.
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of
the panel of prosecutors.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him
was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan explained that whatever
defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated in the trial of
the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan erred in denying petitioner’s motion
to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him
POLITICAL LAW: The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
sanction the immediate filing of an information in the proper court upon a
finding of probable cause, even during the pendency of a motion for
reconsideration.
HELD:
The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of
an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even
during the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Section 7, Rule II of the
Rules, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Motion for Reconsideration. –
a) Only one motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation of an approved
order or resolution shall be allowed, the same to be filed within five (5) days
from notice thereof with the Office of the Ombudsman, or the proper Deputy
Ombudsman as the case may be, with corresponding leave of court in cases
where the information has already been filed in court;
b) The filing of a motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation shall not bar the
filing of the corresponding information in Court on the basis of the finding of
probable cause in the resolution subject of the motion. (Emphasis supplied)
If the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the resolution finding probable
cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding information, then neither can
it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the normal course of criminal
procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy
Trial Act of 1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused
within 30 days from the filing of the information or from the date the accused
has appeared before the court in which the charge is pending, whichever is
later, thus:
Section 7. Time Limit Between Filing of Information and Arraignment and
Between Arraignment and Trial. - The arraignment of an accused shall be
held within thirty (30) days from the filing of the information, or from the date
the accused has appeared before the justice, judge or court in which the
charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. x x x
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which implements Section 7 of
RA 8493, provides:
Section 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. –
(g) Unless a shorter period is provided by special law or Supreme Court
circular, the arraignment shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused. xxx
Section 1(g), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court and the last clause of Section 7
of RA 8493 mean the same thing, that the 30-day period shall be counted
from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
which is when the accused appears before the court.
Furthermore, Petitioner failed to show that any of the instances constituting a
valid ground for suspension of arraignment obtained in this case. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan committed no error when it proceeded with petitioner’s
arraignment, as mandated by Section 7 of RA 8493.
Panaguiton, Jr. vs. DOJ
Crime: violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. Blg. 22)
Lower Court Decision: dismissed the charges against Tongson
Court of Appeals Decision: dismissed Luis Panaguiton, Jr.’s (petitioner’s)
petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Supreme Court Decision: GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August
2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is
ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner.
Factsw
• In 1992, Cawili borrowed money from Panaguiton amounting to
P1,979,459.
• In 1993, Cawili with his ‘business associate’ Tongson issued 3
checks as payment
• Significantly, all three (3) checks bore the signatures of both Cawili
and Tongson. Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks
were dishonored, either for insufficiency of funds or by the closure of the
account.
• During preliminary investigation, Tongson claimed that he was not
Cawili’s business associate.
• On Dec. 6 1995 City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable
cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
• Petitioner then appeal before DOJ and in 1997 DOJ found that it was
indeed possible for Tongson to co-signed the checks. It then directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI)
• Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP Sampaga)
dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the matter to the
NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor’s resolution. ACP Sampaga held that the
case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which
provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after four (4)
years.
• Moreover, ACP Sampaga stated that the order of the Chief State
Prosecutor to refer the matter to the NBI could no longer be sanctioned
under Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure because the
initiative should come from petitioner himself and not the investigating
prosecutor.
Issues
1. Whether or not the rule on prescription as provided for in Act No.
3326 applies to offenses under B.P. 22
Ruling
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under
Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the
commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only the
filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December
1926, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by
justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment,”[39] and the prevailing rule
at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for
preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.[40]
***************
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.[55] A clear
example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on
24 August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise
timely filed his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal
of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels,
within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up
to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of
nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner’s
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case
as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ’s
flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved
parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue
their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply
because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying
tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
We rule and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner ’s
filing of his complaint–affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24
August 1995 signified the commencement of the proceedings for the
prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive
period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover,
since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the
claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the
information against petitioner.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, Pinote refused
to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge
Ayco, maintaining that prior proceedings conducted in his absence were
void. Judge Ayco considered the prosecution to have waived its right to
cross-examine the two defense witnesses.
Hence, arose the present administrative complaint lodged by Pinote against
Judge Ayco for “Gross Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and
Serious Misconduct.”

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of

Appeals dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and
ISSUE:
SET ASIDE. The resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August
2004 is also

ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to
REFILE the information against the petitioner.
STATE PROSECUTOR RINGCAR B. PINOTE v. JUDGE ROBERTO L.
AYCO
Whether or not Judge Ayco violated the Rules on Criminal Procedure for
allowing the defense to present evidence in the absence of a prosecutor
HELD:

502 SCRA 446 (2006)

The judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the
absence of public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the
purpose is a clear transgression of the Rules.
Judge Roberto L. Ayco of Regional Trial Court (RTC) of South Cotabato
allowed the defense in a criminal case to present evidence consisting of the
testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State Prosecutor Ringcar
B. Pinote who was prosecuting the case. State Prosecutor Pinote was at that
time undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center in Quezon
City.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control
and direction of the public prosecutor. If the schedule of the public prosecutor
does not permit, however, or in case there are no public prosecutors, a
private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the
case, subject to the approval of the court. Once so authorized, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case until the termination of the
trial even in the absence of a public prosecutor, unless the authority is
revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a
whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the
complaining witness. It is on this account that the presence of a public
prosecutor in the trial of criminal cases is necessary to protect vital state
interests, foremost of which is its interest to vindicate the rule of law, the
bedrock of peace of the people.

Judge Ayco’s intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy

disposition of the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a
breach of the Rules. If the accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

Judge Ayco’s lament about Pinote’s failure to inform the court of his inability
to attend the hearings or to file a motion for postponement thereof or to
subsequently file a motion for reconsideration of his Orders allowing the
defense to present its two witnesses on said dates may be mitigating. It does
not absolve Judge Ayco of his utter disregard of the Rules.