1 Was Viana Still A Passenger During The Time of The Accident, Thus Making Aboitiz Liable For His Death?

1 Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v.
v. Court  Viana (farmer) boarded a vessel owned by Aboitiz Was Viana still a passenger during the time of the accident,
of Appeals, G.R. No. 84458, 6 Shipping Corporation at the port of San Jose, thus making Aboitiz liable for his death?
November 1989 Occidental Mindoro bound for Manila.  YES. Still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the
 After the vessel landed, the Pioneer Stevedoring Corp accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his
took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on cargoes. Viana had to claim his baggage which was possible
said vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement only one (1) hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly
between Pioneer and Aboitiz. standard procedure in the case of petitioner’s vessels that the
 The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the unloading operations shall start only after that time (reasonable
vessel and one (1) hour after the passengers of said cause for Viana’s presence at Aboitiz’s premises).
vessel had disembarked, it started operation by  The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues
unloading the cargoes from the vessel. until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination
 Remembering that some of his cargoes were still and has left the vessel owner’s dock or premises. Once
loaded in the vessel, Viana went back to the vessel, created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the
and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the passenger has, after reaching his destination, safely alighted
vessel to the place where his cargoes were loaded that from the carrier’s conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity
the crane hit him, pinning him between the side of the to leave the carrier’s premises. All persons who remain on the
vessel and crane. He died after 3 days. premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to
 Viana’s parents filed a complaint for damages for be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
breach of contract of carriage against Aboitiz. reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the
o Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at circumstances, and includes a reasonable time to see after his
the time of the accident, the vessel was baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger
completely under the control of Pioneer relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person
 Aboitiz filed a third-party complaint against Pioneer transported has been carried to his destination if, for example,
imputing liability for Viana’s death as having been such person remains in the carrier’s premises to claim his
allegedly negligent (negligence of crane operation was baggage.
an employee of Pioneer under its exclusive control and  That reasonableness of time should be made to depend on the
supervision). attending circumstances of case, such as the kind of common
 RTC: Ordered Aboitiz to pay damages and Pioneer to carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and
reimburse the former. so forth, and therefore precludes a consideration of the time
 Upon MR, RTC: Absolved Pioneer from liability for element per se without taking into account such other factors.
failure of the Vianas and Aboitiz to preponderantly The primary factor to be considered is the existence of a
establish a case of negligence against the crane reasonable cause as will justify the presence of the victim on or
operator near the petitioner’s vessel.
 CA: Affirmed RTC, except as to amount of damages  A carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to
awarded to Vianas their destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to
claim their baggage.
2 Bacarro v. Castano, G.R. No. L-  CASTAÑO boarded the jeep at Oroquieta bound for WON Montefalcon, the driver, is negligent? YES
34597, 5 November 1982 Jimenez, Misamis Oriental. The jeep was filled to WON only diligence of a good father of a family required of
capacity, with 12 passengers in total. Montefalcon? NO
Castaño boarded a jeep being driven  The jeep was running quite fast and while it was
by Montefalcon. While approaching approaching the Sumasap bridge, there was a cargo Montefalcon was negligent
Sumasap Bridge, a cargo truck truck who blew its horn, signaling its intent to overtake.  Had Montefalcon slackened the speed of the jeep at the time
coming from behind blew its horn to  The jeep gave way, by swerving to the right, but it did the truck was overtaking it, instead of running side by side with
signal its intention to overtake the not change speed (40 km/hr). The cargo truck and the the cargo truck, there would have been no contact and
jeep. The jeep gave way by swerving jeep were running side by side for a distance of around accident. He should have foreseen that at the speed he was
to the right, such that both vehicles 20 meters. The driver of the jeep was not able to return running, the vehicles were getting nearer the bridge and as the
ran side by side for a distance of the jeep to the proper lane and instead ran obliquely road was getting narrower the truck would be too close to the
around twenty (20) meters, and that towards the canal until it fell into the ditch. jeep and would eventually sideswiped it. Otherwise stated, he
Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 1
thereafter as the jeep was left behind,  When the jeep was running on the side of the road, the should have slackened his jeep when he swerved it to the right
its driver was unable to return it to its road was inclined a little and Castaño was pushed to give way to the truck because the two vehicles could not
former lane and instead it obliquely outward by the passengers beside him such that he cross the bridge at the same time.
ran unto an inclined terrain towards was clinging with his leg and half of his body outside
the right until it fell into a ditch pinning the jeep. Exercise of extraordinary diligence required
down and crushing Castaño’s right  The jeep then fell, breaking the leg of Castaño.  There was a contract of carriage between the private
leg in the process.  Castaño was rushed to St. Mary’s Hospital where he respondent and the herein petitioners in which case the Court
stayed for 2 months. Because of the accident, his right of Appeals correctly applied Articles 1733, 1755 and 1766 of
leg is now shorter by 1 ½ inches necessitating him to the Civil Code which require the exercise of extraordinary
use specially made shoes. He complained that he was diligence on the part of petitioner Montefalcon.
not able to squat, kneel, nor sit for a long time because o Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their
of his leg. He also lost two fingers on his right hand and business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
the remaining 3 fingers feels numb up to this time. observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
 Montefalcon’s defense hinged on his allegation that the the goods and for the safety of the passengers
accident was because the cargo truck overtook the jeep transported by them, according to all the
so closely that in the process of overtaking sideswiped circumstances of each case.
the jeep, hitting the reserve tire placed at the left side of o Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
the jeep. This caused the jeep to swerve and run into passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
the ditch, falling into the canal. can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
 CFI decided in favor of Castaño and the CA affirmed. cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
o Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the
rights and obligations of common carriers shall be
governed by the Code of Commerce and by special
laws.
 Indeed, the hazards of modern transportation demand
extraordinary diligence. A common carrier is vested with public
interest. Under the new Civil Code, instead of being required to
exercise mere ordinary diligence a common carrier is exhorted
to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide “using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons.” (Article 1755). Once a passenger in the
course of travel is injured, or does not reach his destination
safely, the carrier and driver are presumed to be at fault.
Accident was not a fortuitous event

 The sideswiping of the jeepney by the cargo truck, was
something which could have been avoided considering the
narrowness of the Sumasap Bridge which was not wide enough
to admit two vehicles. As found by the Court of Appeals,
Montefalcon contributed to the occurrence of the mishap.
3 Singson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.  Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin 1.) Whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when
119995, 18 November 1997 Crescentino Tiongson bought from respondent Cathay it failed to confirm the booking of petitioner.
Pacific Airways two (2) open-dated, identically routed,
round trip plane tickets (Manila to LA and vice versa). 2.) Whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but
Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons: also for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
a. flight coupon no. 1 - Manila to Hongkong;
b. flight coupon no. 2 - Hongkong to San HELD:
Francisco; 1.) Yes. The round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger
c. flight coupon no. 3 - San Francisco to Los was in itself a complete written contract by and between the carrier
Angeles; and the passenger. It had all the elements of a complete written
d. flight coupon no. 4 - Los Angeles back to San contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested
Francisco; by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the
e. flight coupon no. 5 - San Francisco to carrier to and from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong
Hongkong; back to the Philippines, and the carrier’s acceptance to bring him to
f. flight coupon no. 6 - Hongkong to Manila. his destination and then back home; (b) cause or consideration,
 The procedure was that at the start of each leg of the which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket;
trip a flight coupon corresponding to the particular and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger from
sector of the travel would be removed from the ticket the place of departure to the place of destination and back, which
booklet so that at the end of the trip no more coupon are also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the
would be left in the ticket booklet. instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied
 Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their flight to with its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e.,
Manila; apparently, the coupon corresponding to the 5th Los Angeles. , x x x the loss of the coupon was attributable to the
leg of the trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still negligence of CATHAY’s agents and was the proximate cause of
attached. It was not until few days later that the the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight.
defendant finally was able to arrange for his return to
Manila. 2.) Yes.
 Singson commenced an action for damages based on Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach
breach of contract of carriage against CATHAY before of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where
the Regional Trial Court. the mishap results in the death of a passenger, or where the carrier
 CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the
yet existing such that CATHAY’s refusal to immediately negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually
book him could not be construed as breach of contract amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewise becomes
of carriage. entitled to recover moral damages.
 The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner x x x these circumstances reflect the carrier’s utter lack of care and
herein holding that CATHAY was guilty of gross sensitivity to the needs of its passengers, clearly constitutive of
negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the rights
it was adjudged to pay petitioner P20,000.00 for actual of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from
damages with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent fraud, malice and bad faith. As the rule now stands, where in
(12%) per annum from 26 August 1988 when the breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is shown to
complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for have acted fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of
moral damages, P400,000.00 for exemplary damages, moral and exemplary damages, in addition to actual damages, is
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and, to pay the costs. proper.
 On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00
the trial court’s finding that there was gross negligence exemplary damages awarded by the trial court have to be reduced.
amounting to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral damages
modified its judgment by deleting the awards for moral depends upon the discretion of the court based on the
and exemplary damages, and the attorney’s fees as circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited by the
well. principle that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive" as to indicate that it was the result of
prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Damages are
not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to alleviate the moral suffering
that the injured party had undergone by reason of the defendant's
culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination
of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar facts.
In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious
or extensive as to warrant an award amounting to P900,000.00. The
assessment of P200,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and
realistic.
On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals
that the amount of P20,000.00 granted by the trial court to petitioner
should not be disturbed.
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with
third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. It was
therefore erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award
made by the trial court; consequently, petitioner should be awarded
attorney's fees and the amount of P25,000.00, instead of
P100,000.00 earlier awarded, may be considered rational, fair and
reasonable.
4 Japan Airlines v. Court of Appeals,  The passengers boarded Japan Airlines in San Whether JAL as common carrier has the obligation to shoulder the
G.R. No. 118664, 7 August 1998 Francisco, California bound for Manila on June 13, 1991 hotel and meal expenses of its stranded passengers until they have
and as incentive for travelling with JAL, they were to reached their final destination even if delay were caused by force
make an overnight stop over at Narita, Japan at the majeure.
airlines’ expense before proceeding to Manila the next • No, the SC ruled that though we sympathize with the private
day. respondents’ plight we are unable to accept their contention.
 However, on the final leg of their journey to Manila their • We are not unmindful of the fact that in plethora of cases we
trip was cancelled due to Mt. Pinatubo eruption that have consistently ruled that a contract to transport passengers
unrelenting ashfall blanketed NAIA rendering it is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
inaccessible to airline traffic. relation. It is safe to conclude that it is a relationship imbued
 To accommodate the needs of the stranded passengers with public interest. Failure on the part of the common carrier to
of JAL they rebooked all the Manila-bound passengers live up to the exacting standards of care and diligence renders it
to June 16 flight and paid for their hotel expenses for liable for any damages that may be sustained by its
their unexpected overnight stay. passengers. However, this is not to say that common carriers
 Again, the June 16 flight was cancelled due to NAIA’s are absolutely responsible for all the injuries or damages even if
indefinite closure and JAL informed the passengers that the same were caused by a fortuitous event. To rule otherwise
it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation would render the defense of “force majeure” as an exception
expenses during their stay in Narita. With that, the from any liability, illusory and ineffective.
passengers forced to pay for their expenses from their • There is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his
personal funds until June 21. obligation because of “force majeure” the general rule is that he
 Still reeling from the experience, private respondents on cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance.
June 25 commenced an action for damages against Hence, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to
JAL before the RTC of QC Branch alleging that JAL Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever
failed to live up to its duty to provide care and comfort to losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the
its stranded passengers when it refused to pay for their stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it
expenses from June 16 to 21 at Narita, Japan. is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of
 JAL DEFENSE: Airline passengers have no vested right respondents for their unexpected stay on June 15..
to these amenities in case a flight is cancelled due to • Admittedly, to be stranded for almost one week in a foreign land
force majeure. was an exasperating experience for the private respondents.
 RTC RULING: To be sure, they underwent distress and anxiety during their
 Ruled in favor of the passengers and ordered JAL unanticipated stay in Narita, but their predicament was not due
to pay actual, moral and exemplary damages: to the fault or negligence of JAL but the closure of NAIA to
 Enrique Agana, Adalia B. Francisco and international flights. Indeed, to hold JAL, in the absence of bad
Maria Angela Nina Agana –Php 1,246,936 faith or negligence, liable for the amenities of its stranded
 Jose Miranda – Php320,616.31 passengers by reason of fortuitous event is too much of a
 Attorney’s Fees – Php200,000 burden to assume.
CA RULING: • However, JAL is not completely absolved from any liability. It
Affirmed the RTC ruling with exception of lowering the must be noted that private respondents bought tickets from the
damages awarded: United States with Manila as their final destination. While JAL
• Moral damages – Php200,000 per plaintiff was no longer required to defray private respondents’ living
• Exemplary damages – Php300,000 expenses during their stay in Narita on account of fortuitous
• Attorney’s Fees – Php100,000 event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements
to transport private respondents on the first available
connecting flight to Manila. JAL reneged on its obligation to
look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers when
it declassified private respondents from “transit passengers” to
“new passengers” as a result of which private respondents were
obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for
the next flight to Manila.
• CA ruling is hereby modified. JAL is ordered to pay each of the
private respondents nominal damages in the sum of
Php100,000 each including attorney’s fees of Php50,000.
5 Philippine Airlines v. Court of SSS: Zapatos was a passenger in Cebu – Ozamiz Flight. ISSUE:
Appeals, G.R. No. L-82619, 15 This flight was diverted to Cotabato due to rains. Zapatos Did CA err when they awarded damages to respondent ZAPATOS?
September 1993 wanted to take PAL flight to Manila with stopover in Cebu
but was refused boarding – since he was #9 in the check in HELD:
The relation of carrier and passenger sequence for the original flight, and only 6 seats were CA Correct. PAL has to exercise extraordinary diligence in
continues until the latter has been available for the 2nd flight. He tried to stop the flight since he safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its
landed at the port of destination and claims his belongings were onboad the flight. PAL did not stranded passengers until they have reached their final
has left the carrier's premises. heed his request. Zapatos filed a case for damages and destination.
breach of contract of carriage. Both CFI and IAC decided in
Hence, PAL necessarily would still favor of Zapatos. Hence this case. Private respondent's amended complaint touched on PAL's
have to exercise extraordinary indifference and inattention to his predicament. He testified that PAL
diligence in safeguarding the comfort, Flight 477 (Original Flight) refused to help him and he was not even accomodated in the
convenience and safety of its Respondent Pedro Zapatos was a passenger in a PAL flight transport for PAL personnel to Downtown Cotabato City.
stranded passengers until they have with a Cebu  Ozamiz City  Cotabato route. (Flight 477)
reached their final destination. PAL claims that they cannot be liable for damages since passenger
While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes failed to inform PAL of the nature of his trip and possible business
before landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot received a losses, and that he was to be blamed for refusing the free ticket PAL
radio message that the airport was closed due to issued.
heavy rains and inclement weather and that he
should proceed to Cotabato City instead. PAL’s diversion of flight was a fortuitous event; BUT that did not
terminate PAL’s contract with passengers,
On arrival at Cotabato the PAL Station Agent informed the
passengers of 3 options: PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a
fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate
1) Fly to cebu the same day and take the flight to PAL's contract with its passengers.
Ozamiz 2 days after.
2) Take the flight to Cebu the following day Being in the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in
3) Remain in Cotabato and take the flight to Ozamiz 3 the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations as in
days after the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be
stressed, i.e., the relation of carrier and passenger continues
Flight 560 until the latter has been landed at the port of destination and
The agent then informed them the availability of 1 flight has left the carrier's premises.
to Manila with a stopover in Cebu (Flight 560). This
flight had 6 alloted seats to the diverted passengers - Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to exercise
the basis for priority would be the check in sequence in extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort,
Cebu. convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they
have reached their final destination.
Zapatos chose to return to Cebu but was not accomodated
because he checked in as passenger no. 9 on flight 477 On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle
between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and
He tried to stop the departure of Flight 560 as his personal the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place.
belongings and a camera was on board. But PAL did not
heed his request. He was then given a flight to Iligan which HOWEVER,
he refused, PAL neither provided him with Zapatos’ insistence on being given priority in accommodation was
transportation ,food, and accomodation in Cotabato. unreasonable considering the fortuitous event and that there was a
sequence to be observed in the booking, i.e., in the order the
His personal effects including the camera, which were passengers checked-in at their port of origin. His intransigence in
valued at P2,000.00 were no longer recovered. fact was the main cause for his having to stay at the airport longer
than was necessary.
Zapatos filed a complaint for damages for breach of contract
of carriage against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL), before the SC:
then Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental. Affirmed.
Award reduced for being excessive (passenger’s insistence on
CFI: Declared PAL liable in damages for breach of contract being given priority was unreasonable – since fortuitous event)
IAC: affirmed CFI decision
SC:
6 Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v.  Theodore M. Lardizabal was driving a passenger bus Whether Dangwa and Lardizabal’s negligence is the proximate
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95582, 7 belonging to Dangwa Transportation Co. when it ran cause of the death of the victim?
October 1991 over its passenger, Pedrito Cudiamat. However, instead  Yes. The testimonies show that the bus was at full stop when
of bringing Pedrito immediately to the nearest hospital, the victim boarded the same and confirm the conclusion that
the said driver, first brought his other passengers and the victim fell from the platform of the bus when it suddenly
cargo to their respective destinations before bringing accelerated forward. When the bus is not in motion there is no
necessity for a person who wants to ride the same to signal his
said victim to the Lepanto Hospital where he expired.
intention to board. A public utility bus, once it stops, is in effect
 The heirs of Pedrito Cudiamat, represented by making a continuous offer to bus riders.
Inocencia Cudiamat, filed a complaint for damages  It is the duty of common carriers of passengers, including
against petitioners. common carriers by railroad train, streetcar, or motorbus, to
 The trial court rendered a decision, pronouncing that stop their conveyances a reasonable length of time in order to
Pedrito Cudiamat was negligent in trying to board a afford passengers an opportunity to board and enter, and they
moving vehicle, especially with one of his hands holding are liable for injuries suffered by boarding passengers resulting
an umbrella and, without having given the driver or the from the sudden starting up or jerking of their conveyances
conductor any indication that he wishes to board the while they are doing so.
bus. Such negligence was the proximate cause of his  It is not negligence per se, or as a matter of law, for one to
death. Nonetheless, Lardizabal and Dangwa attempt to board a train or streetcar which is moving slowly and
Transportation were also found negligent because when both the driver and conductor in this case could not have been
the deceased Cudiamat attempted to board defendants' unaware of such an ordinary practice.
 The victim herein, by stepping and standing on the platform of
bus, the vehicle's door was open instead of being the bus, is already considered a passenger and is entitled to all
closed. the rights and protection pertaining to such a contractual
 The Cudiamats appealed to the Court of Appeals which, relation. The duty which the carrier of passengers owes to its
set aside the decision of the lower court, and ordered patrons extends to persons boarding the cars as well as to
Dangwa and Lardizabal to pay the Cudiamats those alighting therefrom.
indemnities and damages as it is evident from  Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary
testimonies of witnesses that the subject bus was at full
diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them,
stop when Pedrito Cudiamat boarded the same and that
according to all the circumstances of each case (Art. 1733). A
the latter did indicate his intention to board the bus. The common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
incident took place due to the gross negligence of the as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
appellee-driver in prematurely stepping on the diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
accelerator. Dangwa’s and Lardizabal’s motion for circumstances (Art. 1735).
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.  In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not
Hence, the petition. make an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
 The Supreme Court affirmed the challenged judgment carrier in order to hold it responsible to pay the damages sought
and resolution of the Court of Appeals, with by the passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier
modifications. assumes the express obligation to transport the passenger to
his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence
with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that
might be suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier. This is an exception to the
general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore
incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755
of the Civil Code. Failure to bring injured immediately to hospital
patent proof of negligence.
7 La Mallorca v. Court of Appeals, G.R.  Sps Beltran, along with their minor daughters, Whether the contract of carriage was terminated – NO
No. L-20761, 27 July 1966 boarded a Pambusco Bus owned and operated by
La Mallorca. The bus was bound for Pampanga.
The Beltran family boarded a bus and  At the time, they were carrying with them four
everybody got off at the destination. pieces of baggages containing their personal Although it is true that the Beltrans had alighted from the bus at a
Mariano Beltran left a bayong so he belonging. place designated for disembarking or unloading of passengers, it
went back to the bus. His daughter  When the bus stopped they went to a shaded spot was also established that the father had to return to the vehicle
followed him, unnoticed. The bus’ on the left pedestrians side of the road about five (which was still at a stop) to get one of his bags or bayong that was
motor was not shut off while meters away from the vehicle. Afterwards, Mariano left under one of the seats of the bus.
unloading. When Mariano Beltran was Beltran returned to the bus to get his other bayong,
getting his bayong, the bus moved which he had left behind, but in so doing, his
forward. His daughter was run over by daughter Racquel followed him, unnoticed.
There can be no controversy that as far as the father is concerned,
the said bus.  While said Mariano Beltran was on the running
when he returned to the bus for his bayong which was not unloaded,
board of the bus waiting for the conductor to hand
him his bayong which he left under one of its seats the relation of passenger and carrier between him and the petitioner
near the door, the bus, whose motor was not shut remained subsisting.
off while unloading, suddenly started moving
forward, evidently to resume its trip,
notwithstanding the fact that the conductor has not The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease
given the driver the customary signal to start, since
where the latter, after alighting from the car, aids the carrier’s
said conductor was still attending to the baggage
left behind by Mariano Beltran. servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.
 Incidentally, when the bus was again placed into a
complete stop, it had travelled about ten meters
from the point where the plaintiffs had gotten off.
Sensing that the bus was again in motion, Mariano The issue to be determined here is whether as to the child, who
Beltran immediately jumped from the running board was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away
without getting his bayong from the conductor. He from the bus, the liability of the carrier for her safety under the
landed on the side of the road almost in front of the contract of carriage also persisted.
shaded place where he left his wife and children.
 At that precise time, he saw people beginning to
gather around the body of a child lying prostrate on
The relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the
the ground, her skull crushed, and without life.
moment the passenger alights from the carrier’s vehicle at a
 The child was none other than his daughter
Raquel, who was run over by the bus in which place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but
she rode earlier together with her parents. continues until the passenger has had a reasonable time or a
 The trial court held La Mallorca liable for beach of reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier’s premises.
contract of carriage
 On appeal to the CA, La Mallorca claimed that
there could not be a breach because the child was And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within
no longer a passenger when the accident occurred. this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.
Therefore, the contract of carriage had already
terminated.
 CA sustained the said theory but nevertheless
found La Mallorca guilty of quasi-delict. CA even Thus, a person who, after alighting from a train, walks along
increased the damages awarded the station platform is considered still a passenger.
In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent

had exercised the “utmost diligence” of a “very cautious person”
required by Article 1755 of the Civil Code to be observed by a
common carrier in the discharge of its obligation to transport safely
its passengers.
(1) the driver, although stopping the bus, nevertheless did not
put off the engine
(2) he started to run the bus even before the bus conductor
gave him the signal to go and while the latter was still
unloading part of the baggages of the passengers Mariano
Beltran and family.
The presence of said passengers near the bus was not

unreasonable and they are, therefore, to be considered still as
passengers of the carrier, entitled to the protection under their
contract of carriage.

Whether La Mallorca can be held liable for quasi-delict,
considering that the complaint was for a breach of contract -
YES
Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already

terminated, herein petitioner can be held liable for the negligence of
its driver, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Article 2180
of the Civil Code.
The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon

which the claim was predicated when it was alleged in the complaint
that “the death of Raquel Beltran was caused by the negligence and
want of exercise of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person
on the part of the defendants and their agent.”
This allegation was also proved when it was established during the
trial that the driver, even before receiving the proper signal from the
conductor, and while there were still persons on the running board
of the bus and near it, started to run off the vehicle. The
presentation of proof of the negligence of its employee gave rise to
the presumption that the defendant employer did not exercise the
diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of its employees. And this presumption, as the Court of
Appeals found, petitioner had failed to overcome. Consequently,
petitioner must be adjudged pecuniarily liable for the death of the
child Raquel Beltran.
8 Necesito v. Paras, G.R. No. L-10605,  Aboard a Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines passenger auto Was the carrier liable for damages due to a manufacturing
30 June 1958 truck bound for Manila from Agno, Pangasinan were defect of the steering knuckle?
Severina Garces and her one-year old son, Precillano  YES. Not fortuitous event. There is testimony that such defect
Necesito. may be detected. Periodical visual inspection of the steering
 After passing Mangatarem, Pangasinan, the bus knuckle as practiced by the carrier’s agents did not measure up
entered a wooden bridge, but the front wheels served to to the required legal standard of “utmost diligence of very
the right; the driver lost control, and after wrecking to cautious persons”—“as far as human care and foresight can
the bridge’s wooden rails, the bus fell on its right side
provide”, and therefore that the knuckle’s failure cannot be
into a creek where water was breast deep. The mother
downed; the son was injured. considered a fortuitous event that exempts carrier from
 Two actions for damages and AF were filed @ CFI, responsibility.
Tarlac were filed against carrier Philippine Rabbit Bus  The carrier is not an insurer of the passengers' safety. His
Lines. The latter pleaded that the accident was due to liability rests upon negligence, his failure to exercise the
engine or mechanical trouble independent or beyond "utmost" degree of diligence that the law requires, and by Art.

the control of the carrier or the driver. 1756, in case of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears
 RTC: Dismissed the complaint on the ground of the burden of satisfying the court that he has duly discharged
fortuitous event. The court also found that the bus was the duty of prudence required. In the American law, where the
proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of the road; carrier is held to the same degree of diligence as under the new
that the accident was caused by the fracture of the right Civil Code, the rule on the liability of carriers for defects of
steering knuckle, which was defective in that its center equipment is thus expressed: "The preponderance of authority
or core was not compact but "bubbled and cellulous", a is in favor of the doctrine that a passenger is entitled to recover
condition that could not be known or ascertained by the
damages from a carrier for an injury resulting from a defect in
carrier despite the fact that regular thirty-day
inspections were made of the steering knuckle. an appliance purchased from a manufacturer, whenever it
appears that the defect would have been discovered by the
carrier if it had exercised the degree of care which under the
circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to inspection
and application of the necessary tests. For the purposes of this
doctrine, the manufacturer is considered as being in law the
agent or servant of the carrier, as far as regards the work of
constructing the appliance. According to this theory, the good
repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from
liability."
 The fact that the passenger has neither choice nor control over
the carrier in the selection and use of the equipment and
appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity whatever with
the manufacturer or vendor of the defective equipment, the
passenger has no remedy against him, while the carrier usually
has. The carrier, while not an insurer of the safety of his
passengers, should nevertheless be held to answer for the
flaws of his equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable.
 The liability of the manufacturer must depend on the terms of
the contract between him and the carrier, of which the
passenger has no knowledge, and over which he can have no
control, while the carrier can introduce what stipulations and
take what securities he may think proper. For injury resulting to
the carrier himself by the manufacturer's want of care, the
carrier has a remedy against the manufacturer; but the
passenger has no remedy against the manufacturer for damage
arising from a mere breach of contract with the carrier.
 When the carrier elects to have another build its cars, it ought
not to be absolved by that facts from its duty to the public to
furnish safe cars. The carrier cannot lessen its responsibility by
shifting its undertaking to another's shoulders. Its duty to furnish
safe cars is side by side with its duty to furnish safe track, and
to operate them in a safe manner. The manufacturer should be
deemed the agent of the carrier as respects its duty to select
the material out of which its cars and locomotive are built, as
well as in inspecting each step of their construction. If there be
tests known to the crafts of car builders, or iron moulders, by

which such defects might be discovered before the part was
incorporated into the car, then the failure of the manufacturer to
make the test will be deemed a failure by the carrier to make it.
 When the passenger has proved his injury as the result of
a breakage in the car or the wrecking of the train on which
he was being carried, whether the defect was in the
particular car in which he was riding or not, the burden is
then cast upon the carrier to show that it was due to a
cause or causes which the exercise of the utmost human
skill and foresight could not prevent. And the carrier in this
connection must show, if the accident was due to a latent
defect in the material or construction of the car, that not
only could it not have discovered the defect by the
exercise of such care, but that the builders could not by
the exercise of the same care have discovered the defect
or foreseen the result. This rule applies the same whether
the defective car belonged to the carrier or not.
9 Pestaño v. Sumayang, G.R. No.  Sumayang, accompanied by another person, was riding WON Pestano and Metro Cebu Bus is liable
139875, December 04, 2000 a motor vehicle on a highway in Cebu. While turning left
at a junction, Sumayang was violently hit by a speeding Pestano is negligent
bus driven by Pestano. Sumayang and his companion
died due to the accident. Petitioners are raising a question of fact based on Pestaño’s
 The heirs of Sumayang filed a civil action against testimony contradicting that of Eyewitness Ignacio Neis and on the
Pestano and Metro Cebu Bus Company, the owner of location of the dents on the bumper and the grill. Neis testified that
the Bus driven by Pestano. as the two vehicles approached the junction, the victim raised his
 A witness named Neis accounts that before Sumayang left arm to signal that he was turning left to Tabagon, but that the
turned left, the former had raised his left arm as a signal latter and his companion were thrown off the motorcycle after it was
but was run over by the bus and was thrown 14 meters bumped by the overspeeding bus. These contentions have already
away. been passed upon by the trial and the appellate courts.
 Pestano alleges the victims were negligent because 15-
20 meters away, he had already blown the bus’ horn The Court finds no cogent reason to reverse or modify their factual
and even blew it a second time when he got near but findings. The CA agreed with the trial court that the vehicular
could only step on the brake after the bus had hid the collision was caused by Pestaño’s negligence when he attempted to
motor vehicle. overtake the motorcycle. As a professional driver operating a
 RTC and CA held Pestano liable and also held Metro public transport bus, he should have anticipated that
Cebu Bus liable for negligence. overtaking at a junction was a perilous maneuver and should
thus have exercised extreme caution.
Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are

conclusive and binding on this Court. Petitioners failed to
demonstrate that this case falls under any of the recognized
exceptions to this rule. Indeed, the issue of negligence is
basically factual and, in quasi-delicts, crucial in the award of
damages.
Metro Cebu Bus is liable for the acts of Pestano

There were factual findings that the bus had a defective
speedometer and the Company was held to have shown laxity in the
conduct of its operations and supervision of employees. Under
Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are
responsible for damages caused by their employees. When an
injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the
master or employer is presumed to be negligent either in the
selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption
may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer
exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and the supervision of its employee. The CA said that
allowing Pestaño to ply his route with a defective speedometer
showed laxity on the part of Metro Cebu in the operation of its
business and in the supervision of its employees. The
negligence alluded to here is in its supervision over its driver,
not in that which directly caused the accident. The fact that
Pestaño was able to use a bus with a faulty speedometer shows
that Metro Cebu was remiss in the supervision of its employees and
in the proper care of its vehicles. It had thus failed to conduct its
business with the diligence required by law.
10 Mallari, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.  The passenger jeepney driven by Mallari Jr. and owned WON Mallari Jr. and Mallari Sr. are liable for the death of Israel
No. 128607, 31 January 2000 by Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of Bulletin
along the National Highway in Brgy. San Pablo, Yes.
Dinalupihan, Bataan. Mallari Jr. testified that he went to  The collision occurred immediately after Mallari Jr. overtook a
the left lane of the highway and overtook a Fiera which vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway.
had stopped on the right lane. Before he passed by the This act of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a)
Fiera, he saw the van of Bulletin coming from the and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The
opposite direction. It was driven by one Felix Angeles. Land Transportation and Traffic Code. A driver abandoning his
The collision occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear
impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its and not to proceed if he cannot do so in safety. When a motor
left side resulting in injuries to its passengers one of vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special
whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver
gravity of his injuries. does not have the right to drive on the left hand side relying
 Claudia Reyes, the widow of Israel Reyes, filed a upon having time to turn to the right if a car approaching from
complaint for damages against Mallari Sr. and Mallari the opposite direction comes into view.
Jr., and also against Bulletin, its driver Felix Angeles,  Mallari Jr. already saw that the Bulletin delivery van was coming
and the N.V. Netherlands Insurance Co. The complaint from the opposite direction and failing to consider the speed
alleged that the collision which resulted in the death of thereof since it was still dark at 5:00 o'clock in the morning
Israel was caused by the fault and negligence of both mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook 2 vehicles in
drivers of the passenger jeepney and the Bulletin Isuzu front of it at a curve in the highway. Clearly, the proximate
delivery van. cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel was the
 The trial court found that the proximate cause of the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, Mallari
collision was the negligence of Felix Angeles, driver of Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane
the Bulletin delivery van, considering the fact that the where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art.
left front portion of the delivery truck driven by Felix 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is
Angeles hit and bumped the left rear portion of the presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
passenger jeepney driven by Alfredo Mallari Jr. negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic
 On appeal the Court of Appeals modified the decision regulation. Mallaris failed to present satisfactory evidence to
of the trial court and found no negligence on the part of overcome this legal presumption.
Angeles and consequently of his employer, respondent  The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger
BULLETIN. Instead, the appellate court ruled that the jeepney is binding against petitioner Mallari Sr., who admittedly
collision was caused by the sole negligence of was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a
petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr. who admitted that common carrier, considering the fact that in an action based on
immediately before the collision and after he rounded a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding
curve on the highway, he overtook a Fiera which had of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
stopped on his lane and that he had seen the van responsible for the payment of damages sought by the
driven by Angeles before overtaking the Fiera. passenger. Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier
is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances.
Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or
injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it
observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759
of the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to
passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease
upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection of its employees. Clearly, by the
contract of carriage, the carrier jeepney owned by Mallari Sr.
assumed the express obligation to transport the passengers to
their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence
with due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury or
death that might be suffered by its passengers is right away
attributable to the fault or negligence of the carrier.
11 Yobido v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.  Spouses Tito and Leny Tumboy and their minor Whether the tire blow-out is a fortuitous event
113003, 17 October 1997 children named Ardee and Jasmin, boarded a Yobido No.
Liner bus bound for Davao City. Along the trip, the left  Characteristics of fortuitous event:
front tire of the bus exploded. The bus fell into a ravine a. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected
around 3 ft. from the road and struck a tree. The occurrence, or the failure of the debtor to comply with
incident resulted in the death of Tito and physical his obligations, must be independent of human will;
injuries to other passengers. b. It must be impossible to foresee the event which
 Factual backdrop based on testimony of Leny: the constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it
winding road the bus traversed was not cemented and must be impossible to avoid;
was wet due to the rain; it was rough with crushed c. The occurrence must be such as to render it
rocks. The bus which was full of passengers had impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a
cargoes on top. Since it was running fast, (at a speed of normal manner; and
50-60kph based on another witness’ testimony) she d. The obligor must be free from any participation in the
cautioned the driver to slow down but he merely stared aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor
at her through the mirror.  Art 1174: no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event
 A complaint for breach of contract of carriage was filed which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was
by Leny and her children against Alberta Yobido, the inevitable
owner of the bus, and Cresencio Yobido, its driver;  Tire blowout - mechanical defect of the conveyance or a fault in
Yobidos raised the affirmative defense of caso fortuito; its equipment which was easily discoverable if the bus had
they also filed a third-party complaint against Philippine been subjected to a more thorough or rigid check-up before it
Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. took to the road
 Upon a finding that the third party defendant was not  When a passenger boards a common carrier, he takes the risks
liable under the insurance contract, the lower court incidental to the mode of travel he has taken. After all, a carrier
dismissed the third party complaint. is not an insurer of the safety of its passengers and is not
bound absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and
without injury. However, when a passenger is injured or dies
while travelling, the law presumes that the common carrier is
negligent. (see Art. 1756)
 Art. 1755 provides that a common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances. In culpa contractual,
once a passenger dies or is injured, the carrier is presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently. This disputable
presumption may only be overcome by evidence that the carrier
had observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Arts.
1733, 1755 and 1756 or that the death or injury of the
passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
 The explosion of the new tire may not be considered a
fortuitous event; there are human factors involved in the
situation; the fact that the tire was new did not imply that it was
entirely free from manufacturing defects or that it was properly
mounted on the vehicle
12 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Keywords: Baliwag bus accident, Stalled cargo truck ISSUE:
Appeals, G.R. No. 116110, 15 May Did the Court of Appeals err in absolving A & J Trading from liability
1996 Leticia Garcia and 5 yo son Allan, boarded Baliwag Bus and holding Baliwag solely liable for the injuries suffered by Leticia
driven by Jaime Santiago (SANTIAGO) to Cabanatuan. and Allan Garcia in the accident?
A common carrier is bound to
carry its passengers safely as far The bus was running at a very high speed despite the HELD:
as human care and foresight can drizzle and the darkness of the highway. The passengers CA was correct. There was no proof that Baliwag exercised
provide, using the utmost diligence pleaded for its driver to slow down when they saw a stalled extraordinary diligence. The ff evidence demonstrates the
of a very cautious person, with due cargo truck, but their plea was ignored. recklessness of their driver Santiago:
regard for all the circumstances.
The Bus rammed into the said stalled truck driven by Julio o Leticia testified that Santiago smelled of liquor (she was
Recontique (RECONTIQUE) . The truck was owned by seated right behind him)
respondent A &J Trading. Such accident instantly killed o Another passenger testified that immediately before the
Santiago and Escala, the helper of Recontique. collision, the bus driver was conversing with a co-
employee.
Both Leticia and Allan suffered injuries. Leticia sued as an
injured passenger of Baliwag and as mother of Allan. Further, the stalled cargo truck’s driver substantially complied with
the requirement for a warning device as they put a kerosene lamp
Baliwag, A&J Trading, and Recontique all disclaimed on the road to serve as an early warning device.
responsibility for the accident.
Common Carrier; Baliwag Breached its contract of carriage
TC: All defendants were held liable and were ordered to pay As a common carrier, Baliwag breached its contract of carriage
the Garcia Spouses. when it failed to deliver its passengers, Leticia and Allan Garcia to
their destination safe and sound. A common carrier is bound to
CA: Absolved A&J Trading and held Baliwag solely liable carry its passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of a very cautious
Hence this petition by Baliwag. person, with due regard for all the circumstances.
In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was

at fault or was negligent when a passenger dies or is injured. Unless
the presumption is rebutted, the court need not even make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the common
carrier. This statutory presumption may only be overcome by
evidence that the carrier exercised extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the Civil Code.
Actual damages reduced; not supported by evidence on

record. However, all other awards affirmed
Best evidence wasn’t presented for hospitalization expenses
SC: Baliwag liable. However, Actual damages reduced.

13 Bachelor Express Inc. and Cresencio
Rivera v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
85691, 31 July 1990
14 GACAL vs PAL  Ten minutes after take off of a PAL aircraft from the Whether hijacking or air piracy during martial law and under
Davao Airport bound for Manila, members of the the circumstances obtaining herein, is a caso fortuito or force
(PAL plane hi-jacked during martial MNLF hi-jacked the plane. majeure which would exempt an aircraft from payment of
law 10 passengers dead, others  Three armed with grenades, and three armed with damages to its passengers whose lives were put in jeopardy
injured) pistols and whose personal belongings were lost during the incident –
 The passengers were not served food and water NO
until two days after. They were only given ¼ slice
of sandwich and 1/10 cup of PAL water The source of a common carrier’s legal liability is the contract of
 After that, relatives of the hijackers were allowed to carriage, and by entering into said contract, it binds itself to carry the
board the plane but immediately after they alighted passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide.
therefrom, an armored car bumped the stairs. There is breach of this obligation if it fails to exert extraordinary
 That commenced the battle between the military diligence according to all the circumstances of the case in exercise
and the hijackers which led ultimately to the of the utmost diligence of a very cautious person.
liberation of the surviving crew and the
passengers, with the final score of ten (10)
passengers and three (3) hijackers dead on the
spot and three (3) hijackers captured It is the duty of a common carrier to overcome the presumption of
 Surviving passengers were hospitalized negligence and it must be
 They instituted an action for damages
 The trial court dismissed the complaints finding that shown that the carrier had observed the required extraordinary
all the damages sustained in the premises were diligence of a very cautious person as far as human care and
attributed to force majeure. The case eventually foresight can provide or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous
reached the Supreme Court event.
 Petitioners alleged that the main cause of the
unfortunate incident is the gross, wanton and
inexcusable negligence of respondent Airline
personnel in their failure to frisk the passengers ELEMENTS OF CASA FORTUITO:
adequately in order to discover hidden weapons in
(a) the cause of the breach of the obligation must be independent of
the bodies of the six (6) hijackers. the human will (the will of the debtor or the obligor);
o They claimed that despite the prevalence
of skyjacking, PAL did not use a metal (b) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable
detector which is the most effective
means of discovering potential skyjackers (c) the event must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
among the passengers to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner
 PAL’s defense: FORTUITOUS EVENT
o It averred it has exercised the utmost (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or aggravation
diligence of a very cautious person with of the injury to the creditor
due regard to all circumstances.
o But the security checks and measures
and surveillance precautions in all flights, Caso fortuito or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary
including the inspection of baggages and
events not foreseeable or avoidable, events that could not be
cargo and frisking of passengers at the
foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is, therefore,
Davao Airport were performed and
rendered solely by military personnel who not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
under appropriate authority had assumed anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible
exclusive jurisdiction over the same in all to foresee or to avoid. The mere difficulty to foresee the happening
airports in the Philippines. is not impossibility to foresee the same.
o the negotiations with the hijackers were a
purely government matter and a military
operation, handled by and subject to the
Under normal circumstances, PAL might have foreseen the
absolute and exclusive jurisdiction of the
military authorities. skyjacking incident which could have been avoided had there been
a more thorough frisking of passengers and inspection of baggages
as authorized by R.A. No. 6235. But the incident in question
occurred during Martial Law where there was a military take-over of
airport security including the frisking of passengers and the
inspection of their luggage preparatory to boarding domestic and
international flights. In fact military take-over was specifically
announced on October 20, 1973 by General Jose L. Rancudo,
Commanding General of the Philippine Air Force in a letter to Brig.
Gen. Jesus Singson, then Director of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration later confirmed shortly before the hijacking incident.
Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to

perform its obligations in a normal manner and obviously it cannot
be faulted with negligence in the performance of duty taken over by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines to the exclusion of the former.
Finally, there is no dispute that the fourth element has also been
satisfied.

15 Lasam v. Smith, G.R. No. L-19495, 2  Smith, owner of a public garage in San Fernando, la Source of Smith’s legal liability?
February 1924 Union, undertook to convey Spouses Sanchez from Breach of contract of carriage.
San Fernando to Currimao, Ilocos Norte in a Ford
automobile. Was the accident a caso fortuito?
 On leaving San Fernando, the car was operated by a NO, first element lacking.
licensed chauffer, but after reaching San Juan, the Caso fortuito is an unexpected event or act of God which could
chauffeur allowed his assistant, Bueno, to drive the car. either be foreseen nor resisted, such as floods, torrents, shipwrecks,
Bueno had no driver’s license. After some time, defects conflagrations, lightning, compulsion, insurrections, destructions,
developed in the steering gear so as to make accurate destruction of buildings by unforeseen accidents and other
steering impossible, and after zigzagging for a distance occurrences of a similar nature.
of about half a kilometer, the car left the road and went
down a steep embankment. When the car overturned, Essential characteristics of caso fortuito
Spouses Sanchez were pinned down under it. 1) cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the
 Complaint to recover damages for physical injuries failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be
sustained in the accident was filed about a year and a independent of the human will
half after the occurrence. It alleged that the accident 2) must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the
was due to defects in the automobile as well as to the caso fortuito, of it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid
incompetence and negligence of the chauffeur. Alleged 3) occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor
as tort action. to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner
 RTC: Breach of contract of carriage, thus Art. 1903 not 4) obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the
applicable. Not caso fortuito, thus Smith is liable. aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor
As far as the records show, the accident was caused either by

defects in the automobile or else through negligence of its driver.
That is not a case fortuito.
Damages due?
YES, but up until P1,254.10 only.
The greater part of the damages claimed by the plaintiffs resulted
from the fracture of a bone in the left wrist of Joaquina Sanchez and
from her objections to having a decaying splinter of the bone
removed by a surgical operation. As a consequence of her refusal to
submit such an operation, a series of infections ensued and which
required constant and expensive medical treatment.
16 Calalas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.  Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman at Whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage
122039, 31 May 2000 the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney YES.
owned and operated by Vicente Calalas.
 As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 Distinction between culpa aquiliana or culpa extracontractual,
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an and culpa contractual Transportation Law, 2004
“extension seat,” a wooden stool at the back of the door
at the rear end of the vehicle. Quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra
 On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. On
the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was the other hand, breach of contract or culpa contractual is premised
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an In quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract,
Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
jeepney. contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common
 As a result, Sunga was injured. Her attending physician carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
and orthopedic surgeon certified she would remain on a
cast for a period of 3 months and would have to Common carriers presumed at fault unless they observed
ambulate in crutches during said period. extraordinary diligence; Burden of proof
 Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas
before the RTC of Dumaguete City (Branch 36), In case of death or injuries to passengers, Article 1756 of the Civil
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at
former in failing to exercise the diligence required of fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they
him as a common carrier. observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Articles 1733 and
 Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint 1755 of the Code. The provision necessarily shifts to the common
against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. carrier the burden of proof.
 RTC: rendered judgment against Salva as third-party
defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that Doctrine of proximate cause applicable only in quasi-delict, not
it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible in breach of contract
for the accident.
 CA: RTC decision was reversed on the ground that The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
Sunga’s cause of action was based on a contract of quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine
carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation
failed to exercise the diligence required under the Civil between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is
Code. The appellate court dismissed the third- party created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual
complaint against Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create
damages to Sunga. the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the
 Calalas’ motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, relation thus created. Herein, it is immaterial that the proximate
the petition for review on certiorari. cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver.
Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 NCC
Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects

regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence
required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers
as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury
to passengers.
- Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that “Common carriers,
from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746,
Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety
of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
“
- Article 1755 of the Civil Code provides that “ A common carrier
is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.”
- Article 1756 provides that “In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at
fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733
and 1755.”
Driver of jeepney did not exercise utmost diligence of very

cautious persons
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the

presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the duty of
petitioner to prove that he observed extraordinary diligence in the
care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga safely as far as human
care and foresight could provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances as
required by Art. 1755? NO.
The jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a
violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code.
The driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating

capacity of the jeepney, a violation of Section 32(a) of the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an “extension seat” placed her in
a peril greater than that to which the other passengers were
exposed.
The driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga “safely as far as

human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances” as required by Article 1755. Not only was
Calalas unable to overcome the presumption of negligence
imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the
evidence shows he was actually negligent in transporting
passengers.
Notes:
A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,

though foreseen, was inevitable. This requires that the following
requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent
of the debtor’s will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable;
(c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill
his obligation in a normal manner, and (d) the debtor did not take
part in causing the injury to the creditor.
The driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby

hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact
that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck (Verena) who took her to the
hospital does not imply that Calalas was utterly indifferent to the
plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.
17 Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

52159, 22 December 1989
18 Fortune Express, Inc. v. Court of  On November 22, 1989, Atty. Caorong boarded a bus 1. Did the petitioner breach the contract of carriage therefore liable
Appeals, G.R. No. 119756, 18 March of petitioner going to Iligan City. Three armed Maranaos to damages?
1999 who pretended to be passengers, seized the bus at 2. Is the seizure of the bus a case of force majeure?
Linamon, Lanao del Norte at around 6:45PM. The 3. Was the deceased guilty of contributory negligence?
leader of the Maranaos, identified as one Bashier
Mananggolo, ordered the driver, Godofredo Cabatuan, First, Art. 1763 of the Civil Code provides that a common carrier is
to stop the bus on the side of the highway. responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
Mananggolo then shot Cabatuan on the arm, which willful acts of other passengers, if the employees of the common
caused him to slump on the steering wheel. Then one carrier could have prevented the act the exercise of the diligence of
of the companions of Mananggolo started pouring a good father of a family. In the present case, it is clear that
gasoline inside the bus, as the other held the because of the negligence of petitioner’s employees, the seizure of
passengers at bay with a handgun. Mananggolo then the bus by Mananggolo and his men was made possible.
ordered the passengers to get off the bus. The
passengers, including Atty. Caorong, stepped out of the Second, Art. 1174 of the Civil Code defines a fortuitous even as an
bus and went behind the bushes in a field some occurrence which could not be foreseen or which though foreseen,
distance from the highway. is inevitable. In Yobido v. Court of Appeals, we held that to be
 However, Atty. Caorong returned to the bus to retrieve considered as force majeure, it is necessary that: (1) the cause of
something from the overhead rack. At that time, one of the breach of the obligation must be independent of the human will;
the armed men was pouring gasoline on the head of the (2) the event must be either unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) the
driver. Cabatuan, who had meantime regained occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to
consciousness, heard Atty. Caorong pleading with the fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (4) the obligor must be
armed men to spare the driver as he was innocent of free of participation in, or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
any wrong doing and was only trying to make a living. The absence of any of the requisites mentioned above would
The armed men were adamant as they repeated their prevent the obligor from being excused from liability.
warning that they were going to burn the bus along with
its driver. During this exchange between Atty. Caorong The petitioner contends that Atty. Caorong was guilty of contributory
and the assailants, Cabatuan climbed out of the left negligence in returning to the bus to retrieve something. But Atty.
window of the bus and crawled to the canal on the Caorong did not act recklessly. It should be pointed out that the
opposite side of the highway. He heard shots from intended targets of the violence were petitioner and its employees,
inside the bus. Larry de la Cruz, one of the not its passengers. The assailant’s motive was to retaliate for the
passengers, saw that Atty. Caorong was hit. Then the loss of life of two Maranaos as a result of the collision between
bus was set on fire. Some of the passengers were able petitioner’s bus and the jeepney in which the two Maranaos were
to pull Atty. Caorong out of the burning bus and rush riding. Mananggolo, the leader of the group which had hijacked the
him to the Mercy Community Hospital in Iligan City, but bus, ordered the passengers to get off the bus as they intended to
he died while undergoing operation. burn it and its driver. The armed men actually allowed Atty.
 The private respondents brought this suit for breach of Caorong to retrieve something from the bus. What apparently
contract of carriage in the Regional Trial Court, Branch angered them was his attempt to help the driver of the bus by
VI, Iligan City. In the decision, dated December 28, pleading for his life. He was playing the role of the good Samaritan.
1990, the trial dismissed the case on the following Certainly, this act cannot be considered an act of negligence, let
grounds: first argument is that the petitioner should alone recklessness.
have placed security guards knowing that their buses
are subject to threats- the trial court’s stand is that the
diligence demanded by law does not include the
posting of security guards and it is not a guarantee that
the killing would have been definitely avoided. Also, that
obligation belongs to the state, second argument is that
there is failure on the part of defendant to accord faith
and credit to the report of Generalao and the fact that it
did not provide security to its buses cannot, in the light
of the circumstances, be characterized as negligence.
 Finally, the evidence clearly shows that the assailants
did not have the least intention of harming any of the
passengers. They ordered all the passengers to alight
and set fire on the bus only after all the passengers
were out of danger. The death of Atty. Caorong was an
unexpected and unforseen occurrence over which
defendant had no control. His death was solely due to
the willful acts of the lawless which defendant could
neither prevent nor stop.
19 Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. L-25499, 18
February 1970
20 Philippine Airlines v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 120262, 17 July
1997
21 Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v.  As a Philtranco bus was pushed, its engine started Whether Philtranco can invoke the defense of diligence of a
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120553, thereby the bus continued on its running motion and it good father of a family – NO
17 June 1997 occurred at the time when Ramon A. Acuesta who was The complaint filed is an action for damages based on quasidelict
still riding on his bicycle was directly in front of the said under Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code against petitioner
(Philtranco bus ran over a person bus. Manilhig and his employer Philtranco.
riding bicycle, and it did not stop but
continued running until a police officer  As the engine of the Philtranco bus started abruptly and The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle, like
who witnessed everything intervened) suddenly, its running motion was also enhanced by the Philtranco, for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is
said functioning engine, thereby the subject bus primary, direct, and solidary with the driver. As to solidarity, Article
bumped on the victim Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a 2194 expressly provides:
result thereof fell and, thereafter, was run over by the
said bus. ART. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict is solidary.
 The bus did not stop although it had already bumped Since the employer’s liability is primary, direct and solidary, its only
and run over the victim; instead, it proceeded running. recourse if the judgment for damages is satisfied by it is to recover
what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or
 A policeman who was then jogging, witnessed negligence which gave rise to the action based on quasi-delict.
everything. He approached the bus driver and signalled
to him to stop, but the latter did not listen. So the he ART. 2181. Whoever pays for the damage caused by his

jumped into the bus and introducing himself to the dependents or employees may recover from the latter what he has
driver defendant as policeman, ordered the latter to paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
stop.
 A complaint for damages was instituted by the Heirs of

Acuesta for gross negligence, reckless, violation of
traffic rules and regulations, abandonment of victim,
and attempt to escape from a crime.
 Philtranco alleged that it exercised the diligence of a

good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees, including petitioner Manilhig who had
excellent record as a driver and had undergone months
of rigid training before he was hired. Petitioner Manilhig
had always been a prudent professional driver,
religiously observing traffic rules and regulations. In
driving Philtranco’s buses, he exercised the diligence of
a very cautious person.
 The trial court held Philtranco and the driver solidarily

liable.
 CA affirmed. It sustained the awards of moral and

exemplary damages and of attorney’s for they are
warranted under Articles 2206, 2231, and 2208(1),
respectively, of the Civil Code.
 Anent the solidary liability of petitioner Philtranco, the

same finds support in Articles 2180 and 2194. The
defense that Philtranco exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of its employees crumbles in the face of the gross
negligence of its driver, which caused the untimely
death of the victim.
22 Trans-Asia Shipping Lines v. Court of  Atty. Arroyo (public attorney) bought a ticket from Contract of common carriage present?
Appeals, G.R. No. 118126, 4 March Trans-Asia for a voyage from Cebu to Cagayan de Oro YES.
1996 City. Upon boarding, he noticed that repairs were being
undertaken on the engine of the vessel (apparently, Seaworthy vessel?
cylinder head cracked). The ticket could be returned to NO. Only one functioning engine, instead of two.
Trans-Asia and corresponding cash would be returned For a sea vessel to be seaworthy, it must be adequately equipped
to him. The vessel departed with only 1 engine running. for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent
 After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped and officers and crew. The failure of a CC to maintain in seaworthy
dropped its anchor. Some passengers, including Atty. condition its vessel involved in a contract of carriage is a clear
Arroyo, demanded that they should be allowed to return breach of duty prescribed in Art 1755 of the Civil Code.
to Cebu City for they were no longer willing to continue
their voyage. The vessel headed back to Cebu City. Actual damages due?
 At Cebu City, passengers were allowed to disembark. NO. Only moral and exemplary damages. No convincing evidence
There was an announcement that passengers were that Atty. Arroyo did not receive his salary for the day he wasn’t able
given 10 minutes only to do so (may be inferred that the to be in CDO nor that his absence was not excused.
boat will proceed to CDO). Thereafter, the vessel
proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Atty. Arroyo Trans-Asia is liable for any pecuniary loss or loss of profits wc Atty.
boarded the next day’s voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. Aroyo may have suffered by reason thereof. It would be the loss of
 He filed an action for damages arising from bad faith, income if unable to report to his office on the day he was supposed
breach of contract and from tort for Trans-Asia’s failure to arrive were it not for the delay. This, however, assumes that he
to carry him to his place of destination as contracted, stayed on the vessel and was with it when it thereafter resumed its
while he was inflicted with emotional distress (by voyage; but he did not. He took the other vessel the following day,
reason of Trans-Asia’s wanton, reckless, and willful using the ticket he had purchased for the previous day’s voyage.
acts, he was unnecessarily exposed to danger and,
having been stranded, incurred additional expenses Any further delay in Atty. Arroyo’s arrival at the port of destination
and loss of income). was caused by his decision to disembark. Had he remained on the
 RTC: Action based on a breach of contract. Dismissed first vessel, he would have lost only the salary for half of the day.
complaint bc no fraud, negligence or delay nor bad Actual or compensatory damages must be proved.
faith, malice, and wanton attitude.
 CA: Reversed RTC. Allowed moral (P20k) and To merit an award of attorney’s fees, the amount must be proven in
exemplary (P10k) damages, as well as attorney’s fees the concept of actual damages. Moreover, such must be specifically
(P5k). Did not allow grant of damages for the delay in prayed for—as was not done in this case—and may not be deemed
the performance of Trans-Asia’s obligation (bc no incorporated within a general prayer for such other relief and
evidence to prove that the contract provided for liability remedy as this court may deem just and equitable.
in case of delay in departure, nor that a designation of
time of departure was controlling motive for the
establishment of the K).
23 Philippine National Railways v. Court  Winifredo Tupang, husband of Rosario Tupang, Whether PNR is not liable and is immune from suit
of Appeals, G.R. No. L-55347, 4 boarded Train 516 of the Philippine National Railways
October 1985 at Libmanan, Camarines Sur, as a paying passenger PNR created under RA 4196; PNR may sue and be sued like any
bound for Manila. other corporation
 Due to some mechanical defect, the train stopped at
Sipocot, Camarines Sur, for repairs, taking some two The PNR was created under A 4156, as amended. Section 4 of the
hours before the train could resume its trip to Manila. said Act provides that “the Philippine National Railways shall have
 Unfortunately, upon passing Iyam Bridge at Lucena, the following powers: (a) To do all such other things and to transact
Quezon, Winifredo Tupang fell off the train resulting in all such business directly or indirectly necessary, incidental or
his death. The train did not stop despite the alarm conducive to the attainment of the purpose of the corporation; and
raised by the other passengers that somebody fell from (b) Generally, to exercise all powers of a corporation under the
the train. Corporation Law.” Under the foregoing section, the PNR has all the
 Instead, the train conductor, Perfecto Abrazado, called powers, the characteristics and attributes of a corporation under the
the station agent at Candelaria, Quezon, and requested Corporation Law. PNR may sue and be sued and may be subjected
for verification of the information. Police authorities of to court processes just like any other corporation.
Lucena City were dispatched to the Iyam Bridge where
they found the lifeless body of Winifredo Tupang. PNR has obligation to observe extraordinary diligence in
 Winifredo Tupang died of cardio-respiratory failure due transporting passengers to their destinations
to massive cerebral hemorrhage due to traumatic injury.
Tupang was later buried in the public cemetery of PNR has the obligation to transport its passengers to their
Lucena City by the local police authorities. destinations and to observe extraordinary diligence in doing so.
 Rosario Tupang, the deceased’s widow filed a Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to
complaint against PNR. the presumption that it was negligent in the performance of its
obligation under the contract of carriage.
 CFI: PNR liable for damages for breach of contract of
carriage and ordered it to pay Rosario Tupang the sum PNR failed to overthrow such presumption of negligence with clear
of P12,000.00 for the death of Winifredo Tupang, plus and convincing evidence, inasmuch as PNR does not deny
P20,000.00 for loss of his earning capacity, and the (1) that the train boarded by the deceased Winifredo Tupang was so
further sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and overcrowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but
P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees, and cost. to sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train
 CA: sustained the holding of the trial court that the PNR (2) that the train did not even slow down when it approached the
did not exercise the utmost diligence required by law of Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, and
a common carrier. It further increased the amount (3) that neither did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other
adjudicated by the trial court by ordering PNR to pay passengers that a person had fallen off the train at Iyam Bridge.
the Rosario Tupang an additional sum of P5,000,00 as
exemplary damages. Contributory negligence of Tupang warrants deletion of moral
 Moving for reconsideration of the above decision, the damages
PNR raised for the first time, as a defense, the doctrine
of state immunity from suit. The motion was denied. While PNR failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by
Hence the petition for review. law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with contributory
negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the
coaches of the train, he should have held tightly and tenaciously on
the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid
falling off from the speeding train. Such contributory negligence,
while not exempting the PNR from liability, nevertheless justified the
deletion of the amount adjudicated as moral damages.
24 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals, G.R. No. 80447, 31 January
1989

1 Was Viana Still A Passenger During The Time of The Accident, Thus Making Aboitiz Liable For His Death?

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1 Aboitiz Shipping Corporation v.

Accident was not a fortuitous event

In the circumstances, it cannot be claimed that the carrier’s agent

The presence of said passengers near the bus was not

Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 8

Even assuming arguendo that the contract of carriage has already

The plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded the culpa or negligence upon

Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 9

Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 10

Factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are

Metro Cebu Bus is liable for the acts of Pestano

Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 11

In a contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier was

Actual damages reduced; not supported by evidence on

SC: Baliwag liable. However, Actual damages reduced.

Otherwise stated, these events rendered it impossible for PAL to

Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 16

As far as the records show, the accident was caused either by

Articles 1733, 1755, and 1756 NCC

Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects

Driver of jeepney did not exercise utmost diligence of very

In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the

The driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating

The driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga “safely as far as

A caso fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which,

The driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby

17 Pilapil v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

19 Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of

20 Philippine Airlines v. Court of

Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 21

 A complaint for damages was instituted by the Heirs of

 Philtranco alleged that it exercised the diligence of a

 The trial court held Philtranco and the driver solidarily

 CA affirmed. It sustained the awards of moral and

 Anent the solidary liability of petitioner Philtranco, the

24 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of

Vol. 2 : February 12 Transportation Digests – Atty. Germaine Chua 24

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