municipality of san juan,metro manila vs.
CA the provisions of the Public Land Act, as amended, subject to future survey, which are
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing and seeking to reverse and set aside: a) the decision dated
November 23, 1995 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 159; and b) the resolution dated May 28,
1996 denying reconsideration of said decision.
The generative facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1716 reserving for Municipal Government Center Site Purposes certain parcels of
land of the public domain located in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Considering that the land covered by the above-mentioned proclamation was
occupied by squatters, the Municipality of San Juan purchased an 18-hectare land in
Taytay, Rizal as resettlement center for the said squatters. Only after resettling these
squatters would the municipality be able to develop and construct its municipal
government center on the subject land.
After hundreds of squatter families were resettled, the Municipality of San Juan
started to develop its government center by constructing the INP Building, which now
serves as the PNP Headquarters, the Fire Station Headquarters, and the site to
house the two salas of the Municipal Trial Courts and the Office of the Municipal
Prosecutors. Also constructed thereon are the Central Post Office Building and the
Municipal High School Annex Building.
On October 6, 1987, after Congress had already convened on July 26, 1987,
former President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716. Said amendatory proclamation pertinently reads as follows:
PROCLAMATION NO. 164
AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1716, DATED FEBRUARY 17, 1978,
WHICH RESERVED FOR MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT CENTER
SITE PURPOSES CERTAIN PARCELS OF LAND OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN,
METROPOLITAN MANILA, ISLAND OF LUZON, BY EXCLUDING
FROM ITS OPERATION THE PARCELS OF LAND NOT BEING
UTILIZED FOR GOVERNMENT CENTER SITES PURPOSES BUT
ACTUALLY OCCUPIED FOR RESIDENTIAL PURPOSES AND
DECLARING THE LAND OPEN TO DISPOSITION UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT, AS AMENDED.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and
by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of
the Philippines, do hereby amend Proclamation No. 1716, dated February 17, 1978,
which established for municipal government center site purposes certain parcels of
land mentioned therein situated in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, by
excluding from its operation the parcels of land not being utilized for government
center site purposes but actually occupied for residential purposes and declaring the
land so excluded, together with other parcels of land not covered by Proclamation No.
1716 but nevertheless occupied for residential purposes, open to disposition under
hereunder particularly described as follows :
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the
Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 6th day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and eighty-seven.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
On June 1, 1988, the Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association, Inc., one of
herein private respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region (Pasig, Branch 159) a petition for prohibition with urgent prayer for
restraining order against the Municipal Mayor and Engineer of San Juan and the
Curator of Pinaglabanan Shrine, to enjoin them from either removing or demolishing
the houses of the association members who were claiming that the lots they occupied
have been awarded to them by Proclamation No. 164.
On September 14, 1990, the regional trial court dismissed the petition, ruling
that the property in question is being utilized by the Municipality of San Juan for
government purposes and thus, the condition set forth in Proclamation No. 164 is
absent.
The appeal before the Court of Appeals was dismissed in a decision dated July
17, 1991. This decision became final and the said judgment was duly entered on April
8, 1992.
Disregarding the ruling of the court in this final judgment, private respondents
hired a private surveyor to make consolidation-subdivision plans of the land in
question, submitting the same to respondent Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in connection with their application for a grant under Proclamation
No. 164.
To prevent DENR from issuing any grant to private respondents, petitioner
municipality filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction against respondent DENR and private
respondent Corazon de Jesus Homeowners Association.
The regional trial court sustained petitioner municipality, enjoining the DENR
from disposing and awarding the parcels of land covered by Proclamation No. 164.
The Court of Appeals reversed, hence, the present recourse.
Cutting through the other issues, it would appear that ultimately, the central
question and bone of contention in the petition before us boils down to the correct
interpretation of Proclamation No. 164 in relation to Proclamation No. 1716.
Petitioner municipality assails the decision of the Court of Appeals by
hammering on the issue of res judicata in view of the fact that an earlier judgment,
which had become final and executory, had already settled the respective rights of
the parties under Proclamation No. 164. This notwithstanding, petitioner reiterates the
reasons why the court had previously ruled in favor of petitioners rights over the
subject property against the claims of private respondents.
We find good legal basis to sustain petitioners position on the issue of res
judicata insofar as the particular area covered by Proclamation No. 164, which was
the subject matter of the earlier case, is concerned.
The basic elements of res judicata are: (a) the former judgment must be final;
(b) the court which rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the first and
second actions identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action (Mangoma vs.
Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 21 [1995]).
The existence of the first three elements can not be disputed. As to identity of
parties, we have ruled that only substantial identity is required and not absolute
identity of parties (Suarez vs. Municipality of Naujan, 18 SCRA 682 [1966]). The
addition of public respondent DENR in the second case will thus be of no
moment. Likewise, there is identity of cause of action since the right of the
municipality over the subject property, the corresponding obligation of private
respondents to respect such right and the resulting violation of said right all remain to
be the same in both the first and the second actions despite the fact that in the first
action, private respondents were the plaintiff while in the second action, they were the
respondents.
The last requisite is identity of subject matter. Res judicata only extends to such
portion of land covered by Proclamation No. 164 which the court ruled may not be
automatically segregated from the land covered by Proclamation No. 1716. It does
not include those portions which are outside the coverage of Proclamation No. 1716.
Withal, reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals would be justified upon
the above premise and our discussion may properly end here. However, there exists
a more basic reason for setting aside the appealed decision and this has reference to
a fundamental and gross error in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 on October
16, 1987 by then President Aquino.
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued by the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on February 17, 1978 in the due exercise of legislative power vested upon him by
Amendment No. 6 introduced in 1976. Being a valid act of legislation, said
Proclamation may only be amended by an equally valid act of
legislation. Proclamation No. 164 is obviously not a valid act of legislation. After the
so-called bloodless revolution of February 1986, President Corazon Aquino took the
reigns of power under a revolutionary government. On March 24, 1986, she issued
her historic Proclamation No. 3, promulgating the Provisional Constitution, or more
popularly referred to as the Freedom Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1 of the
Freedom Constitution, the President shall continue to exercise legislative power until
a legislature is elected and convened under a new constitution. Then came the
ratification of the draft constitution, to be known later as the 1987 Constitution. When
Congress was convened on July 26, 1987, President Aquino lost this legislative
power under the Freedom Constitution. Proclamation No. 164, amending
Proclamation No. 1716 was issued on October 6, 1987 when legislative power was
already solely on Congress.
Although quite lamentably, this matter has escaped the attention of petitioner as
well as the courts before which this case has already passed through, this Court
cannot help noticing this basic flaw in the issuance of Proclamation No. 164. Because
this unauthorized act by the then president constitutes a direct derogation of the most
basic principle in the separation of powers between the three branches of government
enshrined in our Constitution, we cannot simply close our eyes and rely upon the
principle of the presumption of validity of a law.
There is a long standing principle that every statute is presumed to be valid
(Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734 [1970]; Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30
[1978]). However, this rests upon the premise that the statute was duly enacted by
legislature. This presumption cannot apply when there is clear usurpation of
legislative power by the executive branch. For this Court to allow such disregard of
the most basic of all constitutional principles by reason of the doctrine of presumption
of validity of a law would be to turn its back to its sacred duty to uphold and defend
the Constitution. Thus, also, it is in the discharge of this task that we take this
exception from the Courts usual practice of not entertaining constitutional questions
unless they are specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued.
We, therefore, hold that the issuance of Proclamation No. 164 was an invalid
exercise of legislative power. Consequently, said Proclamation is hereby declared
NULL and VOID.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET
ASIDE. Public respondent Department of Environment and Natural Resources is
hereby permanently ENJOINED from enforcing Proclamation No. 164.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
LOUIS “BAROK” C. BIRAOGO
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010
(PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the
previous administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative
body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in
contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an
information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which
was hitherto inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the
“Truth Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those
of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ
created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for
investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as
if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any
event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as
amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create
or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by
Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E.
O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act
or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and
privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on
their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of
sustaining, any personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O.
No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In
private suits, standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that
“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who
asserts a “public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a
representative of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial
protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public
order and the securing of relief as a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury
as a result.” The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition
covers matters of transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed.
The powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the
Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this
constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an
inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly
advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power
of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be
earmarked for the operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President will be the very source of the
funds for the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in the
funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of
the two offices. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the
appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section
1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly
constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to
the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least,
have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all
other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined
and all public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution
should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997
I. THE FACTS
Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, the
GSIS sold in public auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). Only 2
bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,
which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and
Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme Court to compel the GSIS to
allow it to match the bid of Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First
Policy enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that “in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.”
II. THE ISSUES
1. Whether §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into effect;
2. Assuming §10, paragraph 2, Article XII is self-executing, whether the controlling
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form part of our patrimony as a nation;
3. Whether GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, mandated to implement §10,
paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution; and
4. Assuming GSIS is part of the State, whether it should give preference to the petitioner,
a Filipino corporation, over Renong Berhad, a foreign corporation, in the sale of the
controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
III. THE RULING
[The Court, voting 11-4, DISMISSED the petition.]
1. YES, §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-
executing provision and does not need implementing legislation to carry it into
effect.
Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to make it
appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But, certainly, the
legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional
provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor
details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
Respondents . . . argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10,
second par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. The argument is flawed. If
the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate and
exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as in the
third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can only be
self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order to give
preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-
executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.
 xxx. Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory,
positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision
does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially
enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges,
and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall be
preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in certain specified
circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the
absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute
especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their
bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
2. YES, the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation form
part of our patrimony as a nation.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the
term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of
our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes
within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual
control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be
disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents’ claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands.
3. YES, GSIS is included in the term “State,” hence, it is mandated to
implement §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
It is undisputed that the sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out
with the prior approval of the State acting through respondent Committee on
Privatization. [T]his fact alone makes the sale of the assets of respondents GSIS and
MHC a “state action.” In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts of persons distinct from
the government are considered “state action” covered by the Constitution (1) when
the activity it engages in is a “public function;” (2) when the government is so
significantly involved with the private actor as to make the government responsible for
his action; and, (3) when the government has approved or authorized the action. It is
evident that the act of respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent
MHC comes under the second and third categories of “state action.” Without doubt
therefore the transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a
transaction of the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is
composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable
that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving
its authority from the State.
4. YES, GSIS should give preference to the petitioner in the sale of
the controlling shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is
not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed
the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere
tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the award yet,
nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest bidder. For in
choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987
Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and
other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. Certainly, the
constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even
the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to the
Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of the
basic law.
ENDENCIA vs. DAVID
Saturnino David, the then Collector of Internal Revenue, ordered the taxing of Justice
Pastor Endencia’s and Justice Fernando Jugo’s (and other judges’) salary pursuant to
Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 590 which provides that
No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines
shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby
declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by
law.

The judges however argued that under the case of Perfecto vs Meer, judges are
exempt from taxation – this is also in observance of the doctrine of separation of
powers, i.e., the executive, to which the Internal Revenue reports, is separate from
the judiciary; that under the Constitution, the judiciary is independent and the salaries
of judges may not be diminished by the other branches of government; that taxing
their salaries is already a diminution of their benefits/salaries (see Section 9, Art. VIII,
Constitution).

The Solicitor General, arguing in behalf of the CIR, states that the decision in Perfecto
vs Meer was rendered ineffective when Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

HELD:
No. The said provision is a violation of the separation of powers. Only courts have the
power to interpret laws. Congress makes laws but courts interpret them. In Sec. 13,
R.A. 590, Congress is already encroaching upon the functions of the courts when it
inserted the phrase: “payment of which [tax] is hereby declared not to be a diminution
of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.”

Here, Congress is already saying that imposing taxes upon judges is not a diminution
of their salary. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the
meaning of the phrase “which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office,” found in Section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of
judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the
Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction
of the Judiciary.

“The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory
act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any
binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is
not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be
usurping a judicial function in defining a term.

The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the
exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial department, and that in enacting a
law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way
that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the
courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, especially when the interpretation
sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already
given in a case by the highest court of the land.