REPUBLIC V ESTATE OF SANTOS applied for; that the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title

or grant could no longer be availed of by the applicant; and that the subject land
was a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic and not subject to
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the May
private appropriation.
22, 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100999, which
affirmed the April 5, 2013 Amended Order2of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch
74, Taguig City (MeTC) in LRC Case No. 326, a land registration case under Section On July 12, 2007, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) submitted its
14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. Report14 stating that the subject property, as plotted, did not appear to overlap with
any previously plotted decreed properties and that it was not in a position to verify
whether or not the aforesaid land was already covered by a land patent and
The Antecedents
previously approved isolated surveys.

On October 9, 2006, the Application for Land Registration 3 of a parcel of land

Thereafter, trial ensued.
identified as Lot No. 10839-C (subject land) located at P. Burgos St., Sta. Ana,
Taguig City, with an area of 3,942 square meters and an assessed value of
P82,400.00, was filed by respondent Estate of Virginia Santos (respondent estate), To support its allegation of possession and occupation, respondent estate presented
through its administrator, Pacifico Santos (Pacifico). The subject land was a Romualdo B. Flores (Romualdo) who testified that Virginia owned the subject land;
subdivision of Lot No. 10839 described under survey Plan Csd-00-000352 that he had been tilling the land since 1970; that his father, Sixto Cuevas Flores
(Subdivision Plan of Lot No. 10839, MCadm 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping). (Sixto), tilled the land for Alejandro even before the Japanese occupation in 1941;
and that he knew this for a fact as he was already nine (9) years old and attained
the age of reason at that time. Respondent estate also offered in evidence several
Together with its application for registration, respondent estate submitted the
tax declarations covering Lot No. 10839, the earliest of which was T.D. No. 6532
following documents: (1) Letters of Administration 4 showing that Pacifico was
issued on August 19, 1949.15
appointed as the administrator of the estate of Virginia Santos ( Virginia); (2) Oath
of Office of Pacifico;5 (3) Subdivision Plan6 of Lot No. 10839, MCadm 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping (Csd-00-000352) with the annotation that the survey was inside The MeTC Ruling
L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of
Forest Development on January 03, 1968; (4) Technical Description of Lot No.
In its August 31, 2011 Decision 16 the MeTC denied respondent estate's application
10839-C, Csd-00-000352;7 (5) Certification in Lieu of Surveyor's/Geodetic
for registration of the subject land. It opined that respondent estate failed to
Engineer's Certificate8issued by the Land Survey Records Section, Department of
present sufficient evidence to establish its claim of possession and ownership over
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), National Capital Region; (6) Tax
the subject land. The MeTC reasoned that mere casual cultivation of portions of the
Declaration (T.D.) No. FL-013-01057;9 and (7) Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate by
subject land did not constitute sufficient basis for a claim of ownership. It did not
Sole Heir of the Late Alejandro Santos,10 dated March 27, 1975.
give much weight either to the tax declarations offered in evidence as it stated that
these documents were mere indication of claim of ownership and not ownership
Respondent estate alleged that the late Virginia was the only child and heir of itself. 17
Alejandro Santos (Alejandro), who was the owner of the subject land during his
lifetime. It further asserted that on March 27, 1975, or after Alejandro's death,
The MeTC added that respondent estate failed to prove the alienable and disposable
Virginia executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate by Sole Heir of the Late
character of the subject land. It opined that the certification at the dorsal portion of
Alejandro Santos (Extrajudicial Settlement) and appropriated the subject land for
the survey plan was not the kind of evidence contemplated in an application for
herself. Respondent estate further alleged that Virginia, by her and through her
original registration of title to land. The decretal portion of the decision, thus,
predecessor-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and adverse
reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
possession of the property in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years. 11

WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the instant application for registration of land
On October 9, 2006, the MeTC issued a notice of hearing setting the case for initial
filed by the Estate of Virginia Santos represented by Pacifico S. Santos, is hereby
hearing on February 7, 2007.12
denied.

On April 30, 2007, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Opposition 13 to the Application, raising
the following grounds: that neither the applicant nor the predecessors-in-interest of
Virginia had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land for a period of not less than thirty (30) years; that
the tax declarations and/or tax payment receipts attached to the application did not
constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land
SO ORDERED.18
On September 16, 2011, respondent estate filed its Motion for Reconsideration
(With Alternative Motion for New Trial). 19 On February 24, 2012, the MeTC granted
the motion and allowed respondent estate to present further evidence in support of
its application. In granting the motion, the MeTC explained that respondent
committed mistake or excusable negligence which ordinary prudence could not have
guarded against xxx."20
Respondent estate presented, among others, Felino Flores (Felino), who, through
his judicial affidavit,21testified that he had been tilling the subject land for Virginia
and her estate since 1979; that before him, his father, Romualdo, tilled the land
from 1969 until he took over in 1979; that before his father, his grandfather, Sixto,
tilled the land even before the Second World War; and that such claim was an
accepted fact in their family history.
On April 5, 2013, the MeTC issued the Order 22 granting the subject application. In
completely reversing itself, the trial court stated that the tax declarations submitted
by respondent estate and the certification appearing at the dorsal portion of the
survey plan of Lot No. 10839, showing that the land was disposable and alienable,
were already sufficient to establish respondent estate's claim over the property as
well as the alienable and disposable character of the subject land.
On the same day, the MeTC issued the Amended Order 23 correcting the dispositive
portion of the earlier order where the area of the subject property was
omitted: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, this Court hereby confirms the title of
applicant ESTATE OF VIRGINA M. SANTOS, represented herein by the duly
appointed administrator, PACIFICO M. SANTOS, Filipino, of legal age, married to
Priscilla Santos and a resident of No. 93 P. Mariano Street, Ususan, Taguig City over
the subject parcel of land designated as Lot 10839-C, as shown on subdivision plan
Csd-00-000352, being a portion of Lot 10839, MCadm-590-D, Taguig Cadastral
Mapping, situated at Barangay Sta. Ana, Taguig City, Metro Manila consisting
of Three Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Two (3,942) Square Meters, more or
less and hereby order the registration thereof in its name.
After finality of this Decision and upon payment of the corresponding taxes due on
the said lot, let an Order for the issuance of decree of registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.24 [Emphasis and underscoring in the original]
Aggrieved, the Republic, through the OSG, elevated an appeal to the CA. 25cralawred
The CA Ruling
In its assailed Decision, dated May 22, 2015, the CA dismissed the Republic's appeal
and affirmed the Amended Order, dated August 5, 2013 of the MeTC. The appellate
court noted that the cadastral survey in this case was the same cadastral survey in
the case of Natividad Sta. Ana Victoria vs. Republic 26 (Sta. Ana Victoria), wherein
the Court granted the application for registration of property. The CA concluded that
it could not take a view contrary to the ruling in the aforesaid case. It also
concurred with the trial court that the DENR certification at the dorsal portion of the
subdivision plan of Lot No. 10839 was sufficient evidence to prove the character of
Lot No. 10839-C as alienable and disposable.
The appellate court further ratiocinated that the alleged discrepancies in the area of
the property applied for could be explained by the fact that the subject land was a
subdivision of Lot No. 10839. It also found that respondent estate was able to prove
its open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession in the concept of owner.
Relying again on Sta. Ana Victoria, the CA held that a tax declaration issued in 1949
could be accepted as proof of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation in the concept of an owner. The dispositive portion of the said
decision states: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Amended Order dated April 5, 2013 of
the Regional Trial Court (sic), Branch 74, Taguig City in LRC Case No. 326, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.27
Hence, this petition, anchored on the following
GROUNDS
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN TAKING "JUDICIAL NOTICE"
OF A "CADASTRAL SURVEY'' SUBMITTED IN A DIFFERENT CASE ENTITLED
"STA. ANA VICTORIA VS. REPUBLIC" TO PROVE, DURING THE APPEAL
PROCEEDINGS, THE DATE WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS FIRST DECLARED
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE SUBJECT
APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
DOUBT IN THE TOTAL AREA OF THE PARCEL OF LAND BEING APPLIED FOR
REGISTRATION.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ON THE STA. ANA
VICTORIA CASE AND IN UTTERLY DISREGARDING THAT THERE IS ABSENCE
OF EVIDENCE TO PROVE POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION BY RESPONDENT
OR ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST SINCE JUNE 12, 1945, OR EARLIER. 28
The Republic argues, first, that the CA gravely erred in its over-reliance on Sta. Ana
Victoria. It posits that although the CA could take judicial notice of Sta. Ana Victoria,
it could not hastily rule that the subject land was also alienable and disposable
based merely on the allegation that the subject property and the property
registered in the said case belonged to the same cadastral survey. Second, the
Republic asserts that respondent estate failed to establish its open, exclusive,
continuous and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership over the subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. It contends that the
tax declarations submitted by respondent estate were considered not proofs of
ownership. Moreover, the earliest tax declaration submitted by respondent estate
was for the year 1949, short of the required possession under the law. Lastly, the
Republic insists that respondent estate's witnesses merely gave shady statements
on the supposed ownership of Virginia and Alejandro, without showing any
manifestation of acts of dominion over the property.
In its Comment,29 respondent estate countered that judicial decisions of this Court,
including the findings of facts which were integral parts thereof, formed part of the
legal system which all other courts were bound to follow and be familiar with. It
asserted that since the subject land emanated from the same cadastral survey
declared as alienable and disposable in Sta. Ana Victoria, the subject property must
likewise be declared as alienable and disposable. It further advanced that the
contents of the certification at the dorsal portion of the survey plan and the
technical description of the property enjoyed the presumption of their accuracy.
With regard to possession and occupation, respondent estate averred that its
witnesses testified on the identity of the property, the crops planted thereon, and
the three generations of tenancy agreement involving the subject land. It claimed
that these testimonies were further supplemented by the tax declarations it
presented, which showed that Virginia and her predecessor-in-interest were in
possession of the subject land for more than fifty (50) years.
In its Reply,30 the Republic reiterated its position that respondent estate failed to
adduce sufficient evidence of possession and occupation on or before June 12,
1945; and that the appellate court erred in concluding that the subject land was
declared alienable and disposable based merely on the facts sustained in Sta. Ana
Victoria.
The Court's Ruling
Essentially, the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether the CA erred in
granting respondent estate's application for registration despite its failure to comply
with the requirements for original registration of title to/and under Section 14 of
P.D. No. 1529.
The petition is meritorious.
At the onset, the Court notes that there was some confusion as to what law on
which the application for registration of the subject land was based. As per
examination of respondent estate's application, it would seem that the basis for
their application was Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 considering its allegation of
possession and occupation in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years.
The MeTC, and later the appellate court, however, granted the application under
Section 14(1) of the same law making reference to June 12, 1945, or prior thereto,
as the earliest date of possession and occupation. Thus, the Court deems it proper
to discuss respondent estate's application for registration of title to the subject
property vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 14(1) and (2) of P.D. No. 1529.
Respondent Estate Failed to Comply with the
Requirements under Section 14(1) of
P.D. No. 1529
In Republic of the Philippines vs. Cortez, 31 the Court explained that applicants for
original registration of title to land must first establish compliance with the
provisions of either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. Section 14(1)
provides that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Sec. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Under Section 14(1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish
the following: first, that the land or property forms part of the disposable and
alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
The first requisite of Section 14(1) only entails that the property sought to be
registered be alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application for
registration.32
In this case, to prove that the subject land formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, respondent estate relied on the annotation on
the subdivision plan of Lot No. 10839 and on the certification issued by Rodelina M.
De Villa, Forester II of the Forest Management Services (FMS) of the DENR, which
both stated that the subject land was verified to be "within the alienable and
disposable land under Project No. 27-B, Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map
No. 2623."33
These pieces of evidence, however, would not suffice. The present rule is that to
prove the alienability and disposability of the land sought to be registered, an
application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a City Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Officer (PENRO) Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian
of the official records.34Clearly, the annotation on the subdivision plan and the
certification from the FMS fall short of these requirements. 35
The judicial notice by the appellate court of the cadastral survey submitted in Sta.
Ana Victoria will not cure respondent estate's shortcomings.
In Spouses Latip vs. Chua,36 it was ruled that a court cannot take judicial notice of
any fact which, in part, was dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact
of which the court has no constructive knowledge.37
In this case, in concluding that the subject land formed part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the CA, in effect, assumed and took judicial
notice that it was located within L.C. Map No. 2623. This is, however, erroneous
considering that the CA had no constructive knowledge as to the location of the
subject land and the technical boundaries of L.C. Map No. 2623. Furthermore, the
CA erred in assuming the identity and location of the subject land because such
matter was still under dispute. In fact, the Republic relentlessly raised this issue
even during the trial arguing that the identity of the land in question was doubtful.
This position was further reiterated by the Republic in its Reply when it argued that
respondent estate failed to prove that the subject property was actually covered by
the same cadastral survey submitted in Sta. Ana Victoria.
Accordingly, the CA erred in taking judicial notice of the identity and location of
subject land. Its declaration that the subject land was alienable and disposable
based merely on the declaration in Sta. Ana Victoria was erroneous.
Proof of Possession
Aside from the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be
registered, the applicant must also prove that he/she and/or his/her predecessors-
in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious, and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional. It is exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion
over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit. And it is
notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the
public or the people in the neighborhood. 38 Respondent estate in this case also failed
to prove this requirement.
Respondent estate presented several tax declarations in the name of Virginia and
Alejandro. The earliest of these tax declarations, however, dates back to 1949 only,
short of the requirement that possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of
ownership should be since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Respondent also offered the testimonies of Romualdo and Felino to prove that
Virginia's predecessor-in-interest had been in possession and occupation under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. Romualdo testified as
follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Valdez
Q.
At the time you started to farm the property, please describe the condition thereof?
A. It was being farmed and planted to rice, sir.
Q.
Who planted it with rice?
A.
My father, Sixto Cuevas Flores, sir.
Q.
Since when did your father start tilling the land?
A.
He started tilling the land even before the Japanese time in 1942?
Q.
How do you know?
A.
I have already reached the age of reason at the time being nine (9) years old in
1941, sir.39
It needs to be pointed out, however, that in Republic vs. Remman Enterprises,
Inc.40 (Remman), the Court held that for purposes of land registration under Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, proof of specific acts of ownership must be presented to
substantiate the claim of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land subject of the application. "Applicants for land registration
cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law rather than
factual evidence of possession. Actual possession consists in the manifestation of
acts of dominion over it of such nature as a party would actually exercise over his
own property."41
In a plethora of cases, the Court has repeatedly held that unsubstantiated claims of
cultivation of land do not suffice to prove open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the public land applied for in the concept of an owner.
In Remman, the Court denied the application for original registration of title to land
located in Taguig City as the testimony of the applicant's witness lacked specifics as
to the nature of the alleged cultivation. It was observed
that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although Cerquena testified that the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest
cultivated the subject properties, by planting different crops thereon, his testimony
is bereft of any specificity as to the nature of such cultivation as to warrant the
conclusion that they have been indeed in possession and occupation of the subject
properties in the manner required by law. There was no showing as to the number
of crops that are planted in the subject properties or to the volume of the produce
harvested from the crops supposedly planted thereon.42 (Underscoring supplied)
In Aranda vs. Republic of the Philippines,43 the Court held that mere statements
regarding cultivation of land would not establish possession in the concept of an
owner, stating that: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
X x x And even assuming that Lucio actually planted rice and corn on the land, such
statement is not sufficient to establish possession in the concept of owner as
contemplated by law. Mere casual cultivation of the land does not amount to
exclusive and notorious possession that would give rise to ownership. Specific acts
of dominion must be clearly shown by the applicant.44 (Underscoring supplied)
In Republic vs. Candy Maker, Inc.,45 the Court did not give credit to the unsupported
claim of the respondent-applicant's predecessor-in-interest that he and his father
cultivated the property applied for since 1937 by planting palay during the rainy
season and vegetables during the dry season. The Court emphasized the importance
of showing specific acts of dominion by the applicant or his predecessors-in-interest,
to wit: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Fourth. When he testified on October 5, 2001, Antonio Cruz declared that he was
"74 years old." He must have been born in 1927, and was thus merely 10 years old
in 1937. It is incredible that, at that age, he was already cultivating the property
with his father. Moreover, no evidence was presented to prove how many cavans of
palay were planted on the property, as well as the extent of such cultivation, in
order to support the claim of possession with a bona fide claim of ownership.
(Underscoring supplied)
Similarly in this case, assuming the veracity of the claim that Alejandro and/or
Virginia cultivated the subject land through Romualdo and Sixto, the Court finds
that the same could only be considered as a mere casual cultivation because his
testimony was bereft of any specificity to warrant the conclusion that Alejandro
and/or Virginia had been indeed in possession and occupation of the subject land.
Romualdo's statements failed to show the nature of the cultivation and the volume
of crops planted and harvested on the property. Respondent estate, therefore, failed
to satisfy the requisite exclusivity and notoriety of the possession and occupation of
the property because exclusive dominion and conspicuous possession over the
subject land were not established.
days of my grandfather Sixto, there was not much source of livelihood of the people
but the farm. Many people worked or derived their income from the farms.
Clearly, Felino failed to convincingly show that he had personal knowledge of the
ownership or possession over Lot No. 10839-C on or before June 12, 1945 having
been born only in 1962. He also talked of how his father and grandfather cultivated
the land based on their family stories which were not substantiated. Hence, the
above testimony of Felino does not deserve any credit for being hearsay.
From all the foregoing, the subject land cannot be registered in the name of Virginia
and/or her estate under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 for respondent estates
failure to prove its alienable and disposable character, and its possession and
occupation from June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Respondent Failed to Comply with the

Felino's testimony during the new trial of this case was likewise insufficient to prove
Requirements under Section 14(2) of
the required possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Felino's
P.D. No. 1529
pertinent testimony in his judicial affidavit was as
follows: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Atty. Valdez The subject land cannot also be registered under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529,
Q. which states: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Since when did you start tilling the property? Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
A. (2)
the provision of existing laws.
In 1979 at the age of 17.

Q. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic 46 (Malabanan), the Court explained that
Before you, who cultivated the property, if any? when Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 stated that persons "who have acquired
A. ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws,"
Romualdo Flores, my father then as tenant of the owner. it unmistakably referred to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of
lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition
Q. of private lands by prescription, including patrimonial property belonging to the
Since when did Romualdo cultivate or till the property? State.
A.
Since 1969.
Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription, as set forth in the
Q. Civil Code. In this regard, the Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of
As tenant, up to when did your father till the property? the State may be acquired by private persons through prescription. This is brought
A. about by Article 1113, which provides that all things which are within the commerce
Up to 1979 when I took over. of man are susceptible to prescription, and that property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. 47
Q.
In 1969 when Romualdo took over, who was cultivating or tilling the property, if This does not necessarily mean, however, that when a piece of land is declared
any? alienable and disposable, it can already be acquired by prescription. In Malabanan,
A. this Court ruled that declaration of alienability and disposability was not enough —
Sixto Flores, his father and my grandfather. there must be an express declaration that the public dominion property was no
Q. longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that
Since when did Sixto start to cultivate the property? the property had been converted into patrimonial, thus: ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A.
Before the Second World War. Q. How do you know when you were born only in
1962? (2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
A. that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
It is an accepted fact in our family history. I heard my parents and grandparents ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
talk about it very, very often. Everyone assumes it to be true. Besides during the patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when
the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition
of property of the public dominion begin to run.48 (Underscoring supplied)
In this case, and as already stated, respondent estate merely relied on the
annotation on the subdivision plan of Lot No. 10839 and on the certification issued
by FMS-DENR which certified the subject land to be "within the alienable and
disposable land under Project No. 27-B, Taguig Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map
No. 2623." No certification or any competent evidence, however, was ever
presented to the effect that the subject land, or even the lands covered by L.C. Map
No. 2623, were no longer intended for public service or for the development of the
national wealth pursuant to Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Hence, respondent
estate failed to prove that acquisitive prescription had begun to run against the
State, much less that it had acquired title to the subject property by virtue thereof.
In fine, respondent failed to satisfy all the requisites for registration of title to land
under either Sections 14(1) or (2) of P.D. No. 1529. Respondent's application for
original registration of imperfect title over Lot No. 10839-C must be denied.
Without Prejudice
This denial, however, is without prejudice. As the FMS-DENR certified the subject
land to be "within the alienable and disposable land under Project No. 27-B, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping as per LC Map No. 2623," the respondent must be given the
opportunity to present the required evidence. This is but fair and reasonable
because a property within an alienable and disposable land must be deemed to be
of the same status and condition. As earlier stated, however, the respondent must
prove that the subject property was actually covered by the same cadastral survey
and that they and their predecessors in interest were in possession and ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 22, 2015 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100999 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The Application for Registration of the Estate of Virginia Santos in LRC Case No. 326
is DENIED, without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 165141 : September 11, 2009]
PEREGRINA MISTICA, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals (CA) April 2, 2004
Decision1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75058 and August 18, 2004 Resolution 2 denying
petitioner Peregrina Mistica's motion for reconsideration.
On July 23, 1998, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, an Application for Registration of Title 3 over a parcel of land
known as Lot 7766-D located in Malhacan, Meycauayan, Bulacan.4
In her application, docketed as Land Registration Case No. N-98-09, petitioner
alleged that she is the owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered. She
claimed that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the
subject lot since time immemorial. She further averred that she did not know of any
lien, mortgage or encumbrance affecting said lot or that any person has any claim
or interest therein, legal or equitable, remainder, reversion, or expectancy. 5
Attached to the application were the following documents: 1) the technical
description of the subject lot; 62) Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor's
Certificate;7 3) tax declaration of Real Property No. 06075, covering the subject lot
effective 1998;8 4) official receipts of realty tax payments; 9 and 5)
blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan Csd-03-010587-D. 10
Petitioner, thus, prayed for the registration and confirmation of her title over the
subject lot.11
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition 12 to the application on
the grounds that: a) neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land
in question since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; b) the muniments of title did not
appear to be genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a
bona fide acquisition of the land applied for, or of petitioner's open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof in the concept of an
owner since June 12, 1945; c) the claim of ownership in fee simple of the subject lot
on the basis of a Spanish title or grant could no longer be availed of by petitioner
who failed to file an appropriate application for registration within a period of six (6)
months from January 16, 1976 as required by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 892;
and d) the subject lot applied for was a portion of the public domain belonging to
the Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation. 13
During trial, petitioner testified that the previous owner and possessor of the subject
lot was her father. She added that her father acquired the property by virtue of a
contract of sale but she could not remember the vendor's name. 14 In support
thereof, she presented a photocopy of a document 15 dated May 16, 1921, written in
Spanish, which allegedly was the Deed of Sale of the subject lot, with his father as
the vendee. No translation of the contents of the document, however, was
offered.16 She further said that after the death of her father, the heirs executed an
extrajudicial settlement of his estate. Eventually, she acquired sole ownership over
the subject property.17
Meanwhile, on July 20, 1999, there being no private oppositor to petitioner's
application, the trial court issued an order of general default against the whole world
except the government.18
On March 2, 2001, the MTC, upon a finding that the subject property was alienable
and disposable, and that petitioner sufficiently established her right over the lot in
question, granted petitioner's application for registration, thus:
WHEREFORE, confirming the order of General Default issued by this Court on July
20, 1999, anent the instant application, this Court hereby renders judgment
APPROVING the registration of Lot No. 7766-D under Plan CSD-03-010587-D, being
a portion of Lot 7766 Cad. 337 Meycauayan Cadastre, located [in] Malhacan,
Meycauayan, Bulacan, covered by Tax Declaration No. 06075, in favor of applicant
herein Peregrina Mistica.
After this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree issue.
Furnish copy of this decision, the Land Registration Authority, Quezon City; the
Office of the Solicitor General, Makati City; the Land Management Bureau, Manila;
and the applicant herein.
SO ORDERED.19
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration, 20 respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal21 stating that it was appealing to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The appeal
was given due course by the MTC on July 20, 2001.22
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that the case should
have been elevated to the CA. She argued that since the MTC heard and decided the
case in the exercise of its delegated jurisdiction, the appeal should not have been
taken to the RTC.
Acting on petitioner's motion, the RTC held that it indeed had no jurisdiction over
the appeal. However, it refused to dismiss the case. It instead forwarded the case to
the CA considering that the appeal had already been perfected when the MTC gave
due course to petitioner's notice of appeal.23
In the assailed decision,24 the CA set aside the MTC decision and, consequently,
dismissed petitioner's application for registration. Contrary to the conclusions of the
trial court, the appellate court found that the most important requirement for
granting petitioner's application for registration - that the applicant has been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
lot since June 12, 1945 - had not been adequately established. 25 Petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied on August 18, 2004.26
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT SHE HAS BEEN [IN]
OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND
OCCUPATION OF AN ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
UNDER BONA FIDE CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP SINCE JUNE 12, 1945 OR EARLIER. 27
We deny the petition.
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to the
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Likewise, Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1073, provides:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First
Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership,
since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application
for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.
In accordance with the aforesaid laws, any person, by himself or through his
predecessor-in-interest, who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, may file in the
proper trial court an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through his duly authorized representative.28
Being the applicant for confirmation of imperfect title, petitioner bears the burden of
proving that: 1) the land forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the
public domain; and 2) she has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
from June 12, 1945 or earlier.29 These the petitioner must prove by no less than
clear, positive and convincing evidence.30 ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω
lιbrαrÿ
To prove that she has been in possession of the subject lot, petitioner presented
documentary evidence such as the technical description of the subject lot,
Certification in Lieu of Lost Surveyor's Certificate, tax declaration of real property,
official receipts of realty tax payments, blueprint/machine copies of Subdivision Plan
Csd-03-010587-D, joint affidavits of her co-heirs, and Deed of Partition dated July
30, 1980. Moreover, to prove that her predecessors-in-interest had also been in
possession thereof, petitioner presented a document written in Spanish which she
claimed to be a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 16, 1921. Lastly, she testified that
she acquired the subject lot from her parents who had been the owners and
possessors thereof since she was still very young.
As aptly held by the appellate court, these pieces of evidence, taken together, do
not suffice to prove that petitioner and her predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier. The technical description, Certification in Lieu of
Lost Surveyor's Certificate, and blueprint copies of the subdivision plan only prove
the identity of the lot sought to be registered. The joint affidavits of her co-heirs, as
well as the Deed of Partition, merely show that petitioner acquired the property
through succession.
It is true that petitioner presented tax declarations of the subject lot, as well as tax
receipts evidencing payment thereof. The Court notes, however, that the tax
declaration was effective only in 1998, and that the tax receipts were dated 1997
and 1998. She failed to adduce in evidence any tax declaration over the property
under the name of her parents and that the realty taxes for the property had been
paid prior to 1998. At best, she offered a copy of a tax declaration which began in
1985 in the name of her co-heirs. While a tax declaration by itself is not adequate to
prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for inferring possession. 31 The
voluntary declaration of a piece of real property for taxation purposes not only
manifests one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property, but also
announces an adverse claim against the state and all other interested parties with
an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act
strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 32
The presentation of a document dated May 16, 1921 which, according to petitioner,
was a Deed of Sale of the subject property where her father was the vendee, did
not work to her advantage. In the first place, the document was written in Spanish
and petitioner did not bother to have the contents thereof translated to English or to
any other language that the court could understand. We cannot, therefore,
determine if, indeed, the document was a Deed of Sale, and if the subject matter
thereof was the property sought to be registered.
Moreover, in her direct testimony, petitioner only stated that her parents were the
owners and possessors of the subject lot since she was still very young. She added
that, considering that she was 73 years old when she testified (in 1999), her
parents could have owned and possessed the property for more than 50 years. Still,
her testimony failed to meet the standard required by law. Petitioner failed to state
the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged ownership of the land applied
for. To be sure, general statements that are mere conclusions of law and not factual 8173-A from their father, Jose, who, in turn, inherited the same from his father,
proof of possession are unavailing and cannot suffice.33 Felipe; that on August 3, 1996, they executed the Extra-judicial Settlement of the
More importantly, we would like to stress that possession alone is not sufficient to Estate of Felipe Rayos Del Sol,5 wherein Lot 8173-A was adjudicated to them pro
acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires indiviso; and that, through their predecessor-in-interest, they had been in open,
possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
"and," the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. disposable land of public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since the
Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. 1930s, when Felipe was still alive. 6
When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words Respondents declared that on January 4, 2004, Lot No. 8173 was subdivided into
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight four (4) parcels of land - Lot 8173-A-1 consisting of 25,335 square meters; Lot
the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. 8173-A-2 consisting of 1,138 square meters; Lot 8173-A-3 consisting of 6,756
Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of square meters; and Lot 8173-A-4 consisting of 71 square meters. 7Moreover, they
such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. 34 averred that in 2006, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
With the general statements made by petitioner that she and her predecessors-in- Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), purchased Lot 8173-A-2, a
interest have been in possession of the property, and even with the Deed of portion of the subject lot, which was embodied in the undated Deed of Absolute
Absolute Sale allegedly executed in 1921, actual possession of the subject lot was Sale.8
not convincingly established.
In sum, petitioner could not have acquired an imperfect title to the land in question During the trial, respondent Lydia Rayos del Sol-Alcantara (Lydia), Gloria Serviño
because she has not proven possession openly, continuously and adversely in the (Gloria), wife of the present tenant of the subject lot, and Engineer Justa delas Alas
concept of an owner since June 12, 1945, the period of possession required by (Engr. delas Alas) were presented as witnesses by respondents.
law.35 Accordingly, the CA did not err in reversing the decision of the trial court and
in denying the application for registration of title over the subject lot. Lydia testified that she, together with the other respondents, inherited the subject
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The lot from their father, Jose, who died on September 25, 1953 per his death
April 2, 2004 Decision and August 18, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in certificate; that their father inherited the same from their grandfather Felipe, who
CA-G.R. CV No. 75058 are AFFIRMED. died on July 2, 1932 per his epitaph; that Felipe cultivated the lot during his lifetime
SO ORDERED. and planted it with rice, vegetables and some fruit trees and then Jose continued
farming the same; that respondents also cultivated the lot through their caretaker;
that they possessed the lot for more than seventy (70) years since their
G.R. No. 211698, May 30, 2016 grandfather's time; and that they paid the taxes on the lot. 9

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CESAR P. RAYOS DEL SOL,
LYDIA P. RAYOS DEL SOL, GLORIA P. RAYOS DEL SOL AND ELVIRA P.
RAYOS DEL SOL, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the
September 25, 2013 Decision1 and the February 25, 2014 Resolution2 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96654, which affirmed the July 20, 2010
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 271, Pasig City (RTC) in a land
registration case filed under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.
The Facts
On January 16, 2009, an application for land registration involving Lot 8173-A, with
an area of 33,298 square meters, located in Barangay Ligid Tipas, Taguig, Metro
Manila, with an assessed value of P665,960.00, was filed by the respondent siblings,
namely: Cesar P. Rayos Del Sol, Lydia P. Rayos Del Sol, Gloria P. Rayos Del Sol, and
Elvira P. Rayos Del Sol (respondents).4
Respondents alleged, among others, that they were the children of Jose Rayos Del
Sol (Jose) and the grandchildren of Felipe Del Sol (Felipe); that they inherited Lot
Gloria testified that the subject lot was composed of more than three (3) hectares
which they had farmed for respondents, who were the owners of the lot; that
respondents were the children of the previous owner, Jose, for whom her father and
her husband had worked; that nobody else claimed the lot; and that she was born
in 1942 and she grew up knowing that her father farmed the lot for Jose.
For her part, Engr. delas Alas testified that she conducted a survey on the lot and
issued the corresponding Geodetic Engineer Certificate 10 and Technical
Description,11 which were approved by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
Respondents presented, among others, the following documents: (1) Extrajudicial
Settlement of the Estate of Felipe, dated August 3, 1996; (2) Deed of Absolute Sale
of Lot 8173-A-2, undated; (3) Conversion Subdivision Plan, 12 which stated that the
subject lot was inside an alienable and disposable land as per L.C. Map No. 2623
certified by the Bureau of Forest Development on January 3, 1968; and (4) tax
declarations of Lot 8173-A for the years 1948, 1965, 1973, 1978, 1979, 1984,
1990, 1993, 1999, and 2002,13 and the new tax declarations for subdivided lots for
the years 2005 to 2006. 14
The RTC Ruling
In its decision, dated July 20, 2010, the RTC ruled that Lot 8173-A could be
registered in respondents' names. The trial court stated that respondents were able
to prove that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject lot under the circumstances provided in Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529; that added that the deed of absolute sale between respondents and the DPWH
they had actual possession of the subject lot; and that the tax declarations they acknowledged that the former were the true and lawful owners of the subject parcel
presented constituted sufficient proof of possession in the concept of an owner for of land described as Lot No. 8173-A-2.
more than thirty (30) years.
The Republic moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the CA in its
The RTC further stated that even if the subject lot was only declared as alienable assailed resolution, dated February 25, 2014.
and disposable public land in 1968, their continued possession during Felipe's
lifetime up to the present had already been more than thirty (30) years. Hence, the Hence, this petition.
trial court concluded that the applicants were entitled to the issuance of the decree ISSUE
of registration on the subject lot pursuant to Section 39 of P.D. No. 1529. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS WERE ABLE TO ESTABLISH THE
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered thus: REQUIREMENTS SET IN SECTION 14 OF PD NO. 1529 AND THAT SHE AND
HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
The title of the petitioners Cesar P. Rayos Del Sol, Lydia P. Rayos Del Sol, Gloria P. EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF THE
Rayos Del Sol and Elvira P. Rayos Del Sol on Lot 8173-A of Thirty Three Thousand SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR THE PERIOD REQUIRED BY LAW.16
Two Hundred Ninety Eight Square Meters (33, 298 sqms.), more or less, as shown
by the Conversion Subdivision Plan Swo-00-01890 and the corresponding technical The OSG argues, first, that respondents failed to prove that their predecessors-in-
descriptions, situated at Barangay Ligid, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila is hereby interest had been occupying the subject land since June 12, 1945, as required by
CONFIRMED. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The earliest tax declaration presented by
respondents was only for 1948, clearly short of the required period of occupation.
Upon the finality of judgment, let the proper decree of Registration and Certificate The OSG asserts that the tax declarations are inconclusive to prove the character of
of Title be issued in the names of Cesar P. Rayos Del Sol, Lydia P. Rayos Del Sol, possession over the property. Second, the OSG claims that respondents were not
Gloria P. Rayos Del Sol and Elvira P. Rayos Del Sol pursuant to Section 39 of P.D. able to establish that they had an open, exclusive, continuous, and notorious
1529. possession and occupation under a bona fideclaim of ownership over the subject
land. It points out that the testimonies of the witnesses were general in character
Let two (2) copies of this Decision be furnished the Land Registration Authority and bereft of specific overt acts of possession or dominion regarding the subject
Administrator thru the Chief of the Docket Division of said Office at East Avenue, land. Lastly,the OSG stresses that the deed of sale between respondents and the
Quezon City. DPWH pertained to Lot 8173-A-2, and not the subject of the present case, Lot8173-
A.
SO ORDERED.15
In their Comment,17 respondents countered that the testimonies of their witnesses
On September 6, 2010, the Republic moved for reconsideration but its motion was sufficiently established that, through their predecessors-in-interest, they had been
denied in the RTC resolution, dated November 16, 2010. in open and continuous possession of the subject land even before June 12, 1945.
They also asserted that Gloria's testimony bolstered the fact that from the time she
Aggrieved, Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), elevated an was born in 1942, her father was already the tenant of the subject lot and that
appeal before the CA. respondents' father, Jose, owned the property. Together with the tax declarations,
respondents insisted that these pieces of evidence were sufficient to grant their
The CA Ruling registration. They also claimed that although the sale between respondent and the
Republic only referred to Lot 8173-A-2, the same was undeniably a portion of Lot
In its assailed decision, dated September 25, 2013, the CA dismissed the Republic's 8173-A, the lot in question.
appeal. The CA stated that the subject lot had been declared as alienable and
disposable land as early as January 3, 1968. The appellate court found that In its Reply,18 the OSG averred that it was impossible for Lydia, a witness for
respondents were able to present sufficient evidence to prove that they had an respondents, to observe their grandfather, Jose, cultivate the subject land because
open, exclusive, continuous, and notorious possession and occupation under a bona the latter died in 1932, while she was only born in 1937. Further, the OSG
fideclaim of ownership over the subject land. The CA gave full credence to the reiterated that respondents did not establish any specific overt acts of possession or
witnesses who testified that respondents' open and continuous possession of the dominion over the land.
subject property began as early as the 1930s when their grandfather, Felipe, The Court's Ruling
cultivated the land and planted it with rice, vegetables and some fruit trees; that
upon Felipe's death, their father, Jose, took over the ownership and possession of The Court denies the petition.
the same; and that upon the latter's death, respondents, through their tenants,
continued farming the said land. The applicable law in this case is Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, which provides:
The CA opined that although tax declarations, as a rule, were not conclusive Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
evidence of ownership, these served as proof that respondents had a claim of title First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
over the subject land and as sufficient basis for inferring possession. Finally, the CA through their duly authorized representatives:
 validly granted respondents' application for land registration.
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable Tax declarations have
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership probative value in land
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. registration proceedings

xxx
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 refers to the original registration of "imperfect" titles
to public land acquired under Section 11(4) in relation to Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, or the Public Land Act, as amended. The requisites
under the said provision are enumerated as follow:
1. That the subject land forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain;
2. That the applicants, by themselves or through their predecessors- in-interest,
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and
3. That such possession and occupation must be since June 12,1945 or earlier. 19
A person who seeks the registration of title to a piece of land on the basis of
possession by himself and his predecessors-in-interest must prove his claim by clear
and convincing evidence, that is, he must prove his title and should not rely on the
absence or weakness of evidence of the oppositors. 20
In the present case, the OSG does not question respondents' compliance with the
first requisite, or the fact that the subject land formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. It is undisputed that the subject lot was inside
an alienable and disposable land as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau
of Forest Development on January 3, 1968. The OSG alleges, however, that
respondents failed to comply with the second and third requisites, or that the
applicants had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945.
The OSG argues that the earliest tax declaration presented by respondents was in
the year 1948, hence, they could not have possessed the land since June 12, 1945
or earlier, as required by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529. The OSG also insists that
respondents failed to establish that they had, through their predecessors-in-
interest, an open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership and, hence, their application
for registration must be denied.
The records reveal that respondents and their predecessors-in-interest religiously
paid the realty taxes of the subject lot over the decades. Although a tax declaration
by itself is not adequate to prove ownership, it may serve as sufficient basis for
inferring possession. The voluntary declaration of a piece of real property for
taxation purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title
to the property, but also announces an adverse claim against the state and all other
interested parties with an intention to contribute needed revenues to the
government. Such an act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership.22
As properly found by the CA, even though the earliest tax declaration was not dated
June 12, 1945 or earlier, it did not mean that the applicants failed to comply with
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. In Recto v. Republic,23 it was held that "[a]s long as
the testimony supporting possession for the required period is credible, the court
will grant the petition for registration."
Similarly, in Spouses Llanes v. Republic24 the earliest tax declaration presented in
the application under Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 was only for 1948. The Court,
nevertheless, espoused:
xxx While tax declarations and receipts are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they constitute, at least, proof that the holder has a claim of title over
the property, xxx Tax declarations are good indicia of possession in the concept of
an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or constructive possession. Moreover, while tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the land,
nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of
great weight and can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. 25
In that case, the Court took into account the testimonial and documentary evidence
presented by the applicants therein, as a whole, and found that they had been in an
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject property, in
the concept of an owner, even prior to June 12, 1945.
Hence, even if the earliest tax declaration was not dated June 12, 1945 or earlier,
the application may still be granted as long as the evidence presented, as a whole,
established the applicants' open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of
the subject property, in the concept of an owner, on or before June 12, 1945.

The Court is not persuaded. In the case at bench, the Court finds that the CA and the RTC did not simply grant
the registration of respondents based solely on the presentation of their tax
First, only where pure questions of law are raised or involved can an appeal be declarations. Both courts considered respondents' testimonial and documentary
brought to the Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. 21 In this evidence to prove (1) that they and their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and
case, the OSG evidently presents questions of fact because it assails the CA and the possessed the subject land since June 12, 1945; and (2) that they had occupied the
RTC's appreciation of the evidence offered by respondents. If the petition requires a same in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious manner, under a bona fide claim
calibration of the evidence presented, then it poses a question of fact, which cannot of ownership. Their evidence shall be discussed in seriatim.
be raised before the Court.
Testimonial evidence establish
Second, even if the Court applies procedural liberality, a judicious scrutiny of the respondents' claim of possession
records shows that both the CA and the RTC properly appreciated the evidence and and occupation since June 12, 1945
or earlier
Lydia also testified on the nature and characteristic of their possession over the
Respondents presented Lydia and Gloria as their witnesses. A review of their subject land. When asked whether she could recall what crops were planted on the
testimonies showed that they have proven the assailed requisites under Section property, she replied that there were rice, vegetables and some fruit; trees. True
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Lydia's pertinent testimony is as follows: enough, the tax declaration 26 for Lot 8173-A declared the subject land as a rice
Atry. Aguilar field. She added that it was their caretaker who tilled the land in their behalf.
Moreover, Lydia stated that from the time her grandfather cultivated the land, their
Q. Since when had your grandfather been in open and continuous family had been in an open and continuous possession of the subject lot for seventy
possession of the property? (70) years, clearly sufficient to establish their claim of ownership over the same.
A. When he was still alive until his death.
Gloria, the wife of the tenant, testified as follows:
Q. Can you tell us, when did your grandfather die? Court
A. July 2,1932.
Q. What is the identity of the lot?
Court A. The lot is at Malaking Kahoy, Palingon, Tipas, and Taguig of more than three (3)
hectares.
Q. Why do you say that he owned the property aside from the tax declarations?
A. Because I have seen them cultivate the land. Q. Do you know the boundaries of the lot?
A. I do not know, my husband knows.
Q. And do you recall what was planted on the property?
A. It was planted with rice, vegetables and some fruit trees. Q. Why do you know that the petitioners are the owners of the property?
A. Because they are the children of the owner of the lot for whom my father
Q. And upon the death of your grandfather, who took over the ownership used to work and for the lot is now being farmed by my husband.
and possession of the property?
A. My father Jose Rayos del Sol continued farming the land. Q. And who is the previous owner of the property?
A. Jose Rayos Del Sol and the petitioners are his children.
Q. And upon his death of your father in 1953, who continued with the
cultivation of the land? Q. You said that your father previously worked for Jose Rayos Del Sol, since
A. Upon the death of my father, I, together with my co-petitioners, my when did your father work with Jose Rayos Del Sol?
siblings, continued farming the land. A. I was born in 1942 and since I grew into reason, it was my father who
served as a farmer for Jose Rayos Del Sol.
Court
Q. Aside from farming, what was your father doing in that property?
Q. How do you do that? A. He served only as a farmer.
A. We have a caretaker who tills the land.
Q. And since when did your father farm on that land?
Q. And who is that caretaker? A. Until the year 1980.
A. A certain Ramon, I forgot his family name. Until now he is working with us.
Q. And from 1980 to the present, who is farming that property?
Atty Aguilar A. My husband.

Q. From the time that your grandfather cultivated the property, how long Q. What is the name of your husband?
has your family been in open and continuous possession of the lot? A. Ramon Servifio.
A. For over seventy (70) years now.
[Emphases Supplied] Q. At the time your father was farming the property, do you know the nature of his
arrangement with Jose Rayos del Sol?
As can be gleaned from above, Lydia explained the origin of their property. It was A. Yes, ma'am.
respondents' grandfather, Felipe, who first possessed and cultivated the land until
his death in 1932. Afterwards, it was their father, Jose, who continued its Q And what was their arrangement?
cultivation. Then, when Jose died in 1953, respondents cultivated and farmed the A. Their agreement was that my father will provide the labor and Jose Rayos Del Sol
land through their caretaker. Noticeably, the possession and occupancy of will provide the capital.
respondents and their predecessors-in-interest happened prior to June 12, 1945.
Though, as the OSG pointed out, that it was improbable for Lydia to meet Felipe, Q. You said that since 1980 you and your husband were farming the property. Now,
who died in 1932, it was undeniable that her testimony referred to their possession what is your arrangement with the petitioners regarding that lot?
of the land even before June 12, 1945. A. "Buwisan." We will provide the labor and capital and they provide the lot and we
only give them a percentage of the harvest. respondents if it believed that there was some other claimant to the property. As
correctly stated by the CA, although the deed of absolute sale "may not be
Q. Since the time your father worked as a farmer on the lot and up to the considered as direct proof of ownership on the part of [respondents], it is sufficient
present, do you know if there are claimants on the property? proof to substantiate the latter's allegations that they have been in open,
A. No, ma'am. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
property and that the same has not been claimed by any other person." 28
Q. And from the time of your father up to the present, do you know who are
the owners of that property? The tax declarations, together with the credible testimonies of Lydia and Gloria, and
A. During the time of my father, Jose Rayos Del Sol and after his death, his the documents presented to bolster the application, indeed prove that respondents
children. have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
[Emphases Supplied] of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945. To the
Court's mind, the evidence offered by respondents satisfies the burden of proof and
The above testimony conveys that from the time Gloria was born in 1942, constitutes clear and convincing evidence to merit a grant of their application.
respondents, through their father, Jose, had been occupying the land in the concept Glaringly, the OSG did not present an iota of evidence to disprove or contradict the
of an owner. Evidently, the same testimony substantiates respondents' claim that claims of respondents.
they have been in possession of the property since June 12, 1945. Gloria specifically
stated that her father and her husband had been working as farmers of the land for In fine, as all the requisites under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 have been
respondents and their father. She also expressly recognized respondents as the complied with, respondents' application for original registration of imperfect title is
owners of the subject lot and even testified in detail as to the arrangement her in order.chanrobleslaw
family had with respondents in cultivating the land and sharing the harvest.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 25, 2013 Decision and the
More importantly, Gloria's testimony was to the effect that from the time her father February 25, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96654 are
worked as a farmer of the subject lot, there were no other claimants over the land. hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
She stressed that respondents and their father were known as the owners of the
property. The said testimony reflects the exclusive and notorious characteristics of SO ORDERED.
respondents' possession over the land and their occupation of it in the concept of an
owner to the exclusion of all other persons.
G.R. No. 92013 July 25, 1990
Documentary evidence
substantiate respondents'
nature and character of
possession
SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner,
Aside from testimonial evidence, respondents presented documentary evidence to
establish that they had an open and continuous possession of the subject property. vs.
The Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Felipe Rayos Del Sol would show that
the subject property had been part of Felipe's estate and it had been adjudicated to RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as
respondents. This would also confirm that the ownership and possession of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive Secretary,
subject land by respondents from the time of Felipe's death had continued up to the respondents.
present.

Also, respondents offered the Deed of Absolute Sale between them and the
Republic. The OSG attempts to deny the relevance of such deed, alleging that it
pertains to Lot 8173-A-2 and not to Lot 8173-A, which is the subject matter of the G.R. No. 92047 July 25, 1990
present case.

Again, the said argument of the OSG fails to persuade.

There is no dispute that Lot 8173-A was subdivided into four (4) lots, one of which DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner,
was Lot No. 8173-A-2. Necessarily, the latter, which was the subject of the deed of
sale, was part of the former. Even the OSG admits that "Lot No. 8173-A-2 is
vs.
presumptuously a portion of Lot 8173-A xxx." 27 Hence, the relevance of the deed of
sale in the registration proceedings cannot be denied.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG, JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST
The Court is of the view that the Republic would not have bought Lot 8173-A-2 from CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL ROSARIO, et al., as
members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE I
UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION PETITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES
IN JAPAN, respondents.

The subject property in this case is one of the four (4) properties in Japan acquired
by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with
Arturo M. Tolentino for petitioner in 92013. Japan on May 9, 1956, the other lots being:

(1) The Nampeidai Property at 11-24 Nampeidai-machi, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo

which has an area of approximately 2,489.96 square meters, and is at present the
site of the Philippine Embassy Chancery;
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

(2) The Kobe Commercial Property at 63 Naniwa-cho, Kobe, with an area of

These are two petitions for prohibition seeking to enjoin respondents, their
around 764.72 square meters and categorized as a commercial lot now being used
representatives and agents from proceeding with the bidding for the sale of the
as a warehouse and parking lot for the consulate staff; and
3,179 square meters of land at 306 Roppongi, 5-Chome Minato-ku Tokyo, Japan
scheduled on February 21, 1990. We granted the prayer for a temporary restraining
order effective February 20, 1990. One of the petitioners (in G.R. No. 92047)
likewise prayes for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to fully disclose
to the public the basis of their decision to push through with the sale of the
(3) The Kobe Residential Property at 1-980-2 Obanoyama-cho, Shinohara,
Roppongi property inspire of strong public opposition and to explain the proceedings
Nada-ku, Kobe, a residential lot which is now vacant.
which effectively prevent the participation of Filipino citizens and entities in the
bidding process.

The properties and the capital goods and services procured from the Japanese
government for national development projects are part of the indemnification to the
The oral arguments in G.R. No. 92013, Laurel v. Garcia, et al. were heard by the
Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during World
Court on March 13, 1990. After G.R. No. 92047, Ojeda v. Secretary Macaraig, et al.
War II.
was filed, the respondents were required to file a comment by the Court's resolution
dated February 22, 1990. The two petitions were consolidated on March 27, 1990
when the memoranda of the parties in the Laurel case were deliberated upon.

The Reparations Agreement provides that reparations valued at $550 million would
be payable in twenty (20) years in accordance with annual schedules of
procurements to be fixed by the Philippine and Japanese governments (Article 2,
The Court could not act on these cases immediately because the respondents filed a
Reparations Agreement). Rep. Act No. 1789, the Reparations Law, prescribes the
motion for an extension of thirty (30) days to file comment in G.R. No. 92047,
national policy on procurement and utilization of reparations and development
followed by a second motion for an extension of another thirty (30) days which we
loans. The procurements are divided into those for use by the government sector
granted on May 8, 1990, a third motion for extension of time granted on May 24,
and those for private parties in projects as the then National Economic Council shall
1990 and a fourth motion for extension of time which we granted on June 5, 1990
determine. Those intended for the private sector shall be made available by sale to
but calling the attention of the respondents to the length of time the petitions have
Filipino citizens or to one hundred (100%) percent Filipino-owned entities in national
been pending. After the comment was filed, the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 asked
development projects.
for thirty (30) days to file a reply. We noted his motion and resolved to decide the
two (2) cases.

The Roppongi property was acquired from the Japanese government under the
Second Year Schedule and listed under the heading "Government Sector", through
Reparations Contract No. 300 dated June 27, 1958. The Roppongi property consists unjustified bias of the Philippine government in favor of selling the property to non-
of the land and building "for the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy" (Annex M-D to Filipino citizens and entities. These petitions have been consolidated and are
Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 503). As intended, it became the site of the resolved at the same time for the objective is the same - to stop the sale of the
Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai on July 22, 1976 Roppongi property.
when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our
government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained
undeveloped since that time.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 raises the following issues:

A proposal was presented to President Corazon C. Aquino by former Philippine

Ambassador to Japan, Carlos J. Valdez, to make the property the subject of a lease
agreement with a Japanese firm - Kajima Corporation — which shall construct two (1) Can the Roppongi property and others of its kind be alienated by the
(2) buildings in Roppongi and one (1) building in Nampeidai and renovate the Philippine Government?; and
present Philippine Chancery in Nampeidai. The consideration of the construction
would be the lease to the foreign corporation of one (1) of the buildings to be
constructed in Roppongi and the two (2) buildings in Nampeidai. The other building
in Roppongi shall then be used as the Philippine Embassy Chancery. At the end of
the lease period, all the three leased buildings shall be occupied and used by the (2) Does the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority and
Philippine government. No change of ownership or title shall occur. (See Annex "B" jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property?
to Reply to Comment) The Philippine government retains the title all throughout the
lease period and thereafter. However, the government has not acted favorably on
this proposal which is pending approval and ratification between the parties.
Instead, on August 11, 1986, President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan Petitioner Dionisio Ojeda in G.R. No. 92047, apart from questioning the authority of
through Administrative Order No. 3, followed by Administrative Orders Numbered 3- the government to alienate the Roppongi property assails the constitutionality of
A, B, C and D. Executive Order No. 296 in making the property available for sale to non-Filipino
citizens and entities. He also questions the bidding procedures of the Committee on
the Utilization or Disposition of Philippine Government Properties in Japan for being
discriminatory against Filipino citizens and Filipino-owned entities by denying them
the right to be informed about the bidding requirements.
On July 25, 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 296 entitling non-
Filipino citizens or entities to avail of separations' capital goods and services in the
event of sale, lease or disposition. The four properties in Japan including the
Roppongi were specifically mentioned in the first "Whereas" clause.
II

Amidst opposition by various sectors, the Executive branch of the government has
been pushing, with great vigor, its decision to sell the reparations properties
starting with the Roppongi lot. The property has twice been set for bidding at a
minimum floor price of $225 million. The first bidding was a failure since only one
bidder qualified. The second one, after postponements, has not yet materialized.
The last scheduled bidding on February 21, 1990 was restrained by his Court. Later,
the rules on bidding were changed such that the $225 million floor price became
merely a suggested floor price.
In G.R. No. 92013, petitioner Laurel asserts that the Roppongi property and the
related lots were acquired as part of the reparations from the Japanese government
for diplomatic and consular use by the Philippine government. Vice-President Laurel
states that the Roppongi property is classified as one of public dominion, and not of
private ownership under Article 420 of the Civil Code (See infra).

The Court finds that each of the herein petitions raises distinct issues. The petitioner
in G.R. No. 92013 objects to the alienation of the Roppongi property to anyone
while the petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 adds as a principal objection the alleged
The petitioner submits that the Roppongi property comes under "property intended
for public service" in paragraph 2 of the above provision. He states that being one of
public dominion, no ownership by any one can attach to it, not even by the State.
The Roppongi and related properties were acquired for "sites for chancery,
diplomatic, and consular quarters, buildings and other improvements" (Second Year
Reparations Schedule). The petitioner states that they continue to be intended for a
necessary service. They are held by the State in anticipation of an opportune use. the national patrimony stated in the Preamble of the 1987 Constitution. It also
(Citing 3 Manresa 65-66). Hence, it cannot be appropriated, is outside the allegedly violates:
commerce of man, or to put it in more simple terms, it cannot be alienated nor be
the subject matter of contracts (Citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 20
[1915]). Noting the non-use of the Roppongi property at the moment, the petitioner
avers that the same remains property of public dominion so long as the government
has not used it for other purposes nor adopted any measure constituting a removal (1) The reservation of the ownership and acquisition of alienable lands of the
of its original purpose or use. public domain to Filipino citizens. (Sections 2 and 3, Article XII, Constitution;
Sections 22 and 23 of Commonwealth Act 141).i•t•c-aüsl

The respondents, for their part, refute the petitioner's contention by saying that the
subject property is not governed by our Civil Code but by the laws of Japan where (2) The preference for Filipino citizens in the grant of rights, privileges and
the property is located. They rely upon the rule of lex situs which is used in concessions covering the national economy and patrimony (Section 10, Article VI,
determining the applicable law regarding the acquisition, transfer and devolution of Constitution);
the title to a property. They also invoke Opinion No. 21, Series of 1988, dated
January 27, 1988 of the Secretary of Justice which used the lex situs in explaining
the inapplicability of Philippine law regarding a property situated in Japan.

(3) The protection given to Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and
trade practices;

The respondents add that even assuming for the sake of argument that the Civil
Code is applicable, the Roppongi property has ceased to become property of public
dominion. It has become patrimonial property because it has not been used for
public service or for diplomatic purposes for over thirteen (13) years now (Citing (4) The guarantee of the right of the people to information on all matters of
Article 422, Civil Code) and because the intention by the Executive Department and public concern (Section 7, Article III, Constitution);
the Congress to convert it to private use has been manifested by overt acts, such
as, among others: (1) the transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai (2) the
issuance of administrative orders for the possibility of alienating the four
government properties in Japan; (3) the issuance of Executive Order No. 296; (4)
the enactment by the Congress of Rep. Act No. 6657 [the Comprehensive Agrarian (5) The prohibition against the sale to non-Filipino citizens or entities not
Reform Law] on June 10, 1988 which contains a provision stating that funds may be wholly owned by Filipino citizens of capital goods received by the Philippines under
taken from the sale of Philippine properties in foreign countries; (5) the holding of the Reparations Act (Sections 2 and 12 of Rep. Act No. 1789); and
the public bidding of the Roppongi property but which failed; (6) the deferment by
the Senate in Resolution No. 55 of the bidding to a future date; thus an
acknowledgment by the Senate of the government's intention to remove the
Roppongi property from the public service purpose; and (7) the resolution of this
(6) The declaration of the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
Court dismissing the petition in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., G.R. No. 87478
involving public interest (Section 28, Article III, Constitution).
which sought to enjoin the second bidding of the Roppongi property scheduled on
March 30, 1989.

III
In G.R. No. 94047, petitioner Ojeda once more asks this Court to rule on the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. He had earlier filed a petition in G.R.
No. 87478 which the Court dismissed on August 1, 1989. He now avers that the
executive order contravenes the constitutional mandate to conserve and develop
Petitioner Ojeda warns that the use of public funds in the execution of an
unconstitutional executive order is a misapplication of public funds He states that
since the details of the bidding for the Roppongi property were never publicly
disclosed until February 15, 1990 (or a few days before the scheduled bidding), the
bidding guidelines are available only in Tokyo, and the accomplishment of
requirements and the selection of qualified bidders should be done in Tokyo,
interested Filipino citizens or entities owned by them did not have the chance to
comply with Purchase Offer Requirements on the Roppongi. Worse, the Roppongi
shall be sold for a minimum price of $225 million from which price capital gains tax
under Japanese law of about 50 to 70% of the floor price would still be deducted.
 (1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks shores roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
IV

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
The petitioners and respondents in both cases do not dispute the fact that the
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Roppongi site and the three related properties were through reparations
agreements, that these were assigned to the government sector and that the
Roppongi property itself was specifically designated under the Reparations
Agreement to house the Philippine Embassy.
ART. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated
in the preceding article, is patrimonial property.

The nature of the Roppongi lot as property for public service is expressly spelled
out. It is dictated by the terms of the Reparations Agreement and the corresponding
contract of procurement which bind both the Philippine government and the
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the
Japanese government.
Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.

There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown

Has the intention of the government regarding the use of the property been
that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
changed because the lot has been Idle for some years? Has it become patrimonial?

As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use
Embassy service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such
and enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in
conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen
the social group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the
and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be
citizens; it is intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object
part of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until
of appropration. (Taken from 3 Manresa, 66-69; cited in Tolentino, Commentaries
there is a formal declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from
on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1963 Edition, Vol. II, p. 26).
being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335 [1960]).

The applicable provisions of the Civil Code are:

The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of
the intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it
patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite
Abandonment cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use
ART. 419. Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.
was attributable not to the government's own deliberate and indubitable will but to
a lack of financial support to repair and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino
Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988]). Abandonment must be a certain and
positive act based on correct legal premises.
ART. 420. The following things are property of public dominion
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not
relinquishment of the Roppongi property's original purpose. Even the failure by the
government to repair the building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier
stated, there simply was a shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative
Orders authorizing a study of the status and conditions of government properties in
Japan were merely directives for investigation but did not in any way signify a clear
intention to dispose of the properties.
Executive Order No. 296, though its title declares an "authority to sell", does not
have a provision in its text expressly authorizing the sale of the four properties
procured from Japan for the government sector. The executive order does not
declare that the properties lost their public character. It merely intends to make the
properties available to foreigners and not to Filipinos alone in case of a sale, lease
or other disposition. It merely eliminates the restriction under Rep. Act No. 1789
that reparations goods may be sold only to Filipino citizens and one hundred
(100%) percent Filipino-owned entities. The text of Executive Order No. 296
provides:
Section 1. The provisions of Republic Act No. 1789, as amended, and of
other laws to the contrary notwithstanding, the above-mentioned properties can be
made available for sale, lease or any other manner of disposition to non-Filipino
citizens or to entities owned by non-Filipino citizens.
Executive Order No. 296 is based on the wrong premise or assumption that the
Roppongi and the three other properties were earlier converted into alienable real
properties. As earlier stated, Rep. Act No. 1789 differentiates the procurements for
the government sector and the private sector (Sections 2 and 12, Rep. Act No.
1789). Only the private sector properties can be sold to end-users who must be
Filipinos or entities owned by Filipinos. It is this nationality provision which was
amended by Executive Order No. 296.
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the
sources of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the
properties of the Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi
property from being classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine
properties abroad. Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to
those reserved for public use or service. Rep Act No. 6657, therefore, does not
authorize the Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely
enumerates possible sources of future funding to augment (as and when needed)
the Agrarian Reform Fund created under Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any
property outside of the commerce of man cannot be tapped as a source of funds.
The respondents try to get around the public dominion character of the Roppongi
property by insisting that Japanese law and not our Civil Code should apply.
It is exceedingly strange why our top government officials, of all people, should be
the ones to insist that in the sale of extremely valuable government property,
Japanese law and not Philippine law should prevail. The Japanese law - its coverage
and effects, when enacted, and exceptions to its provision — is not presented to the
Court It is simply asserted that the lex loci rei sitae or Japanese law should apply
without stating what that law provides. It is a ed on faith that Japanese law would
allow the sale.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute
over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect
of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be
determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and
(2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a
domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should
apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the
respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the
relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the
alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in
what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring
the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should
determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on
acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly
owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this
opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when
there is no showing that it can be sold?

The subsequent approval on October 4, 1988 by President Aquino of the
recommendation by the investigating committee to sell the Roppongi property was
premature or, at the very least, conditioned on a valid change in the public
character of the Roppongi property. Moreover, the approval does not have the force
and effect of law since the President already lost her legislative powers. The
Congress had already convened for more than a year.
Assuming for the sake of argument, however, that the Roppongi property is no
longer of public dominion, there is another obstacle to its sale by the respondents.
There is no law authorizing its conveyance.
Section 79 (f) of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 provides
Section 79 (f ) Conveyances and contracts to which the Government is a party. —
In cases in which the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is a party to any
deed or other instrument conveying the title to real estate or to any other property
the value of which is in excess of one hundred thousand pesos, the respective
Department Secretary shall prepare the necessary papers which, together with the
proper recommendations, shall be submitted to the Congress of the Philippines for
approval by the same. Such deed, instrument, or contract shall be executed and
signed by the President of the Philippines on behalf of the Government of the
Philippines unless the Government of the Philippines unless the authority therefor be
expressly vested by law in another officer. (Emphasis supplied)
The requirement has been retained in Section 48, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).
SEC. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. — Whenever real property of
the Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall
be executed in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) For property belonging to and titled in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, by the President, unless the authority therefor is expressly vested by
law in another officer.
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines but titled in the
name of any political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by
the executive head of the agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his
or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a
law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the
sale of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain
much less authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration
abandoning the public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No.
734 which raises serious policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding
investigation of the circumstances behind the decision to sell the Philippine
government properties in Japan.
The resolution of this Court in Ojeda v. Bidding Committee, et al., supra, did not
pass upon the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 296. Contrary to respondents'
assertion, we did not uphold the authority of the President to sell the Roppongi
property. The Court stated that the constitutionality of the executive order was not
the real issue and that resolving the constitutional question was "neither necessary
nor finally determinative of the case." The Court noted that "[W]hat petitioner
ultimately questions is the use of the proceeds of the disposition of the Roppongi
property." In emphasizing that "the decision of the Executive to dispose of the
Roppongi property to finance the CARP ... cannot be questioned" in view of Section
63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657, the Court did not acknowledge the fact that the
property became alienable nor did it indicate that the President was authorized to
dispose of the Roppongi property. The resolution should be read to mean that in
case the Roppongi property is re-classified to be patrimonial and alienable by
authority of law, the proceeds of a sale may be used for national economic
development projects including the CARP.
Moreover, the sale in 1989 did not materialize. The petitions before us question the
proposed 1990 sale of the Roppongi property. We are resolving the issues raised in
these petitions, not the issues raised in 1989.
 It is for what it stands for, and for what it could never bring back to life, that its
significance today remains undimmed, inspire of the lapse of 45 years since the war
ended, inspire of the passage of 32 years since the property passed on to the
Having declared a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
Philippine government.
property from public domain to make it alienable and a need for legislative authority
to allow the sale of the property, we see no compelling reason to tackle the
constitutional issues raised by petitioner Ojeda.

Roppongi is a reminder that cannot — should not — be dissipated ... (Rollo-92047,

p. 9)
The Court does not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions unless these
questions are properly raised in appropriate cases and their resolution is necessary
for the determination of the case (People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937]). The Court will
not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if
It is indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the
the case can be disposed of on some other ground such as the application of a
inflated prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic
statute or general law (Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175,
value to all Filipinos — veterans and civilians alike. Whether or not the Roppongi
[1909], Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]).
and related properties will eventually be sold is a policy determination where both
the President and Congress must concur. Considering the properties' importance
and value, the laws on conversion and disposition of property of public dominion
must be faithfully followed.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 92013 states why the Roppongi property should not be
sold:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. A writ of

prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from proceeding with the sale of the
Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining
The Roppongi property is not just like any piece of property. It was given to the
Order is made PERMANENT.
Filipino people in reparation for the lives and blood of Filipinos who died and
suffered during the Japanese military occupation, for the suffering of widows and
orphans who lost their loved ones and kindred, for the homes and other properties
lost by countless Filipinos during the war. The Tokyo properties are a monument to
the bravery and sacrifice of the Filipino people in the face of an invader; like the
SO ORDERED.
monuments of Rizal, Quezon, and other Filipino heroes, we do not expect economic
or financial benefits from them. But who would think of selling these monuments?
Filipino honor and national dignity dictate that we keep our properties in Japan as
memorials to the countless Filipinos who died and suffered. Even if we should
become paupers we should not think of selling them. For it would be as if we sold Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino and Regalado, JJ., concur.
the lives and blood and tears of our countrymen. (Rollo- G.R. No. 92013, p.147)

The petitioner in G.R. No. 92047 also states:

Roppongi is no ordinary property. It is one ceded by the Japanese government in

atonement for its past belligerence for the valiant sacrifice of life and limb and for
deaths, physical dislocation and economic devastation the whole Filipino people
endured in World War II.

G.R. No. L-17652 June 30, 1962


IGNACIO GRANDE, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DOMINGO CALALUNG, and ESTEBAN CALALUNG, respondents.
Bartolome Guirao and Antonio M. Orara for petitioners.
Gonzales and Fernandez for respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is an appeal taken by petitioners Ignacio, Eulogia, Alfonso, Eulalia, and Sofia Grande, from the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 25169-R) reversing that of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela (Civil Case No. 1171), and dismissing petitioners' action against respondents Domingo and
Esteban Calalung, to quiet title to and recover possession of a parcel of land allegedly occupied by the
latter without petitioners' consent.
The facts of the case, which are undisputed, briefly are: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land,
with an area of 3.5032 hectares, located at barrio Ragan, municipality of Magsaysay (formerly Tumauini),
province of Isabela, by inheritance from their deceased mother Patricia Angui (who inherited it from her
parents Isidro Angui and Ana Lopez, in whose name said land appears registered, as shown by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982, issued on June 9, 1934). Said property is identified as Lot No. 1, Plan PSU-
83342. When it was surveyed for purposes of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary
was the Cagayan River (the same boundary stated in the title). Since then, and for many years thereafter,
a gradual accretion on the northeastern side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so
much so, that by 1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its original
site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares), more or less, had been added to
the registered area (Exh. C-1).
On January 25, 1958, petitioners instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
against respondents, to quiet title to said portion (19,964 square meters) formed by accretion, alleging in
their complaint (docketed as Civil Case No. 1171) that they and their predecessors-in-interest, were
formerly in peaceful and continuous possession thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents
entered upon the land under claim of ownership. Petitioners also asked for damages corresponding to
the value of the fruits of the land as well as attorney's fees and costs. In their answer (dated February 18,
1958), respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they have been in continuous, open,
and undisturbed possession of said portion, since prior to the year 1933 to the present.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Isabela, on May 4, 1959, rendered a decision adjudging the
ownership of the portion in question to petitioners, and ordering respondents to vacate the premises and
deliver possession thereof to petitioners, and to pay to the latter P250.00 as damages and costs. Said
decision, in part, reads:
It is admitted by the parties that the land involved in this action was formed by the gradual deposit of
alluvium brought about by the action of the Cagayan River, a navigable river. We are inclined to believe
that the accretion was formed on the northeastern side of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 2982 after the survey of the registered land in 1931, because the surveyors found out that the
northeastern boundary of the land surveyed by them was the Cagayan River, and not the land in
question. Which is indicative of the fact that the accretion has not yet started or begun in 1931. And, as
declared by Pedro Laman, defendant witness and the boundary owner on the northwest of the registered
land of the plaintiffs, the accretion was a little more than one hectare, including the stony portion, in
1940 or 1941. Therefore, the declarations of the defendant Domingo Calalung and his witness, Vicente C.
Bacani, to the effect that the land in question was formed by accretion since 1933 do not only contradict
the testimony of defendants' witness Pedro Laman, but could not overthrow the incontestable fact that
the accretion with an area of 4 hectare more or less, was formed in 1948, reason for which, it was only
declared in that same year for taxation purposes by the defendants under Tax Dec. No. 257 (Exh. "2")
when they entered upon the land. We could not give credence to defendants' assertion that Tax Dec. No.
257 (Exh. "2") cancelled Tax Dee. No. 28226 (Exh. "1"), because Exh. "2" says that "tax under this
declaration begins with the year 1948. But, the fact that defendants declared the land for taxation
purposes since 1948, does not mean that they become the owner of the land by mere occupancy, for it is
a new provision of the New Civil Code that ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by
occupation (Art. 714, New Civil Code). The land in question being an accretion to the mother or
registered land of the plaintiffs, the accretion belongs to the plaintiffs (Art. 457, New Civil Code; Art. 366,
Old Civil Code). Assuming arguendo, that the accretion has been occupied by the defendants since 1948,
or earlier, is of no moment, because the law does not require any act of possession on the part of the
owner of the riparian owner, from the moment the deposit becomes manifest (Roxas v. Tuason, 9 Phil.
408; Cortez v. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). Further, no act of appropriation on the part of the reparian
owner is necessary, in order to acquire ownership of the alluvial formation, as the law does not require
the same (3 Manresa, C.C., pp. 321-326).
This brings us now to the determination of whether the defendants, granting that they have been in
possession of the alluvium since 1948, could have acquired the property by prescription. Assuming that
they occupied the land in September, 1948, but considering that the action was commenced on January
25, 1958, they have not been in possession of the land for ten (10) years; hence, they could not have
acquired the land by ordinary prescription (Arts. 1134 and 1138, New Civil Code). Moreover, as the
alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the registered property, the same may be considered as registered
property, within the meaning of Section 46 of Act No. 496: and, therefore, it could not be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession by another person.
Unsatisfied, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which rendered, on September 14, 1960, the
decision adverted to at the beginning of this opinion, partly stating:
That the area in controversy has been formed through a gradual process of alluvium, which started in the
early thirties, is a fact conclusively established by the evidence for both parties. By law, therefore, unless
some superior title has supervened, it should properly belong to the riparian owners, specifically in
accordance with the rule of natural accession in Article 366 of the old Civil Code (now Article 457), which
provides that "to the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers, belongs the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters." The defendants, however, contend that
they have acquired ownership through prescription. This contention poses the real issue in this case. The
Court a quo, has resolved it in favor of the plaintiffs, on two grounds: First, since by accession, the land in
question pertains to the original estate, and since in this instance the original estate is registered, the
accretion, consequently, falls within the purview of Section 46 of Act No. 496, which states that "no title
to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession"; and, second, the adverse possession of the defendant began only in the month of
September, 1948, or less than the 10-year period required for prescription before the present action was
instituted.
As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is not quite correct. An accretion to
registered land, while declared by specific provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land
as a natural accession thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection does not extend
beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold otherwise, would be productive of
confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and the technical description of the land given therein, of
their character of conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not protect the riparian
owner against the erosion of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adjoining
stream (Payatas Estate Development Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all
the rights conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is concerned. What
rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of the Civil Code on accession: and these
provisions do not preclude acquisition of the addition area by another person through prescription. This
Court has held as much in the case of Galindez, et al. v. Baguisa, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19249-R, July 17,
1959.
We now proposed to review the second ground relied upon by the trial court, regarding the length of
time that the defendants have been in possession. Domingo Calalung testified that he occupied the land
in question for the first time in 1934, not in 1948 as claimed by the plaintiffs. The area under occupancy
gradually increased as the years went by. In 1946, he declared the land for purposes of taxation (Exhibit
1). This tax declaration was superseded in 1948 by another (Exhibit 2), after the name of the municipality
wherein it is located was changed from Tumauini to Magsaysay. Calalung's testimony is corroborated by
two witnesses, both owners of properties nearby. Pedro Laman, 72 years of age, who was Municipal
president of Tumauini for three terms, said that the land in question adjoins his own on the south, and
that since 1940 or 1951, he has always known it to be in the peaceful possession of the defendants.
Vicente C. Bacani testified to the same effect, although, he said that the defendants' possession started
sometime in 1933 or 1934. The area thereof, he said, was then less than one hectare.
We find the testimony of the said witnesses entitled to much greater weight and credence than that of
the plaintiff Pedro Grande and his lone witness, Laureana Rodriguez. The first stated that the defendants
occupied the land in question only in 1948; that he called the latter's attention to the fact that the land
was his, but the defendants, in turn, claimed that they were the owners, that the plaintiffs did not file an
action until 1958, because it was only then that they were able to obtain the certificate of title from the
surveyor, Domingo Parlan; and that they never declared the land in question for taxation purposes or
paid the taxes thereon. Pedro Grande admitted that the defendants had the said land surveyed in April,
1958, and that he tried to stop it, not because he claimed the accretion for himself and his co-plaintiffs,
but because the survey included a portion of the property covered by their title. This last fact is conceded
by the defendants who, accordingly, relinquished their possession to the part thus included, containing
an area of some 458 square meters.1äwphï1.ñët
The oral evidence for the defendants concerning the period of their possession — from 1933 to 1958 —
is not only preponderant in itself, but is, moreover, supported by the fact that it is they and not the
plaintiffs who declared the disputed property for taxation, and by the additional circumstance that if the
plaintiff had really been in prior possession and were deprived thereof in 1948, they would have
immediately taken steps to recover the same. The excuse they gave for not doing so, namely, that they
did not receive their copy of the certificate of title to their property until 1958 for lack of funds to pay the
fees of the surveyor Domingo Parlan, is too flimsy to merit any serious consideration. The payment of the
surveyor's fees had nothing to do with their right to obtain a copy of the certificate. Besides, it was not
necessary for them to have it in their hands, in order to file an action to recover the land which was
legally theirs by accession and of which, as they allege, they had been illegally deprived by the
defendants. We are convinced, upon consideration of the evidence, that the latter, were really in
possession since 1934, immediately after the process of alluvion started, and that the plaintiffs woke up
to their rights only when they received their copy of the title in 1958. By then, however, prescription had
already supervened in favor of the defendants.
It is this decision of the Court of Appeals which petitioners seek to be reviewed by us.
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether respondents have acquired the alluvial property in
question through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and Article 366 of the old,
petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as they are the registered owners of the land
which it adjoins. The question is whether the accretion becomes automatically registered land just
because the lot which receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property
imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an unregistered land
purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not, by extension, become ipso facto
registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one thing, and registration under the Torrens system of
that ownership is quite another. Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is
governed by the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration law.
Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or give title to the land, but
merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already possessed by the owner, making it
imprescriptible by occupation of third parties. But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed
under the operation of the registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The
fact remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property (which was
formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 2982 was
registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance
of Isabela in 1958. The increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled
or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property under the Torrens
system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.
The next issue is, did respondents acquire said alluvial property through acquisitive prescription? This is a
question which requires determination of facts: physical possession and dates or duration of such
possession. The Court of Appeals, after analyzing the evidence, found that respondents-appellees were in
possession of the alluvial lot since 1933 or 1934, openly, continuously and adversely, under a claim of
ownership up to the filing of the action in 1958. This finding of the existence of these facts, arrived at by
the Court of Appeals after an examination of the evidence presented by the parties, is conclusive as to
them and can not be reviewed by us.
The law on prescription applicable to the case is that provided in Act 190 and not the provisions of the
Civil Code, since the possession started in 1933 or 1934 when the pertinent articles of the old Civil Code
were not in force and before the effectivity of the new Civil Code in 1950. Hence, the conclusion of the
Court of Appeals that the respondents acquired alluvial lot in question by acquisitive prescription is in
accordance with law.
The decision of the Court of Appeals under review is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-40912 September 30, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the MINDANAO MEDICAL CENTER, petioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ALEJANDRO Y DE JESUS, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor for petitioner.
Ananias C. Ona for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Apiwals in its CA-G.R. No. 39577-R, raising
the question of whether or not petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over a full
12.8081-hectare land by virtue of an executive proclamation in 1956 reserving the area for medical
center site purposes.
On January 22, 1921, Eugenio de Jesus, the father of respondent Alejandro de Jesus, applied with the
Bureau of Lands for Sales Patent (Sales Application No. 5436) of a 33-hectare situated in barrio Libaron,
Municipality of Davao (now Davao City). 1 The property applied for was a portion of what was then
known as Lot 522 of the Davao Cadastre.
On January 23, 1934, the Bureau of Lands, through its Davao District Land Officer, accepted sealed bids
for the purchase of the subject land. One Irineo Jose bidded for P20.00 per hectare, while a certain Dr.
Josc Ebro submitted a bid of P100.50 per hectare The Director of Lands, however, annulled the auction
sale for the reason that the sales applicant, Eugenio de Jesus, failed to participate in the bidding for non-
service of notice on him of the scheduled bidding.
In lieu of that sale, another bidding was held on October 4, 1934. Sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus was
the lone bidder. He equalled the bid previously submitted by Dr. Jose Ebro and made a deposit of P221.00
representing 10% of the price of the land at P100.50 per hectare.
On November 23, 1934, the Director of Lands issued to Eugenio de Jesus an Order of Award, the
dispositive portion of which reads: 2ñé+.£ªwph!1
In view of the foregoing, and it appearing that the proceedings had in connection with the Sales
Application No. 5436 were in accordance with law and existing regulations, the land covered thereby is
herebyawarded to the said applicant, Eugenio de jesus, at P100.50 per hectare or P2,211.00 for the
whole tract.
This application should be entered in the records of this office as Sales Application No. 3231, covering the
tract herein awarded, which is more particularly described as follows:
Location: Central, Davao,ñé+.£ªwph!1
Davao
Area: 22 hectares
Boundaries:ñé+.£ªwph!1
N—Maria Villa Abrille and Arenio Suazo;
SE—Provincial Road and Mary Gohn;
SW—Public Land;
W—Municipal Road;
Because the area conveyed had not been actually surveyed at the time Eugenio de Jesus filed his Sales
Application, the Bureau of Lands conducted a survey under Plan Bsd-1514. On July 29, 1936, the plan was
approved and the land awarded to Eugenio de Jesus was designated as Lot Nos. 1176-A, 1176-B-1-A and
1176-B-1-B with an aggregate area of 20.6400 hectares, Bsd-10153, City of Davao.
On August 28, 1936, the Director of Lands ordered an amendment of the Sales Application of Eugenio de
Jesus stating that "a portion of the land covered by Sales Application No. 5436 (E-3231) of Eugenio de
Jesus is needed by the Philippine Army for military camp site purposes, the said application is amended
so as to exclude therefrom portion "A" as shown in the sketch on the back thereof, and as thus amended,
it will continue to be given due course." The area excluded was Identified as Lot 1176-B-2, the very land
in question, consisting of 12.8081 hectares.
On September 7, 1936, President Manuel L. Quezon issued Proclaimation No. 85 withdrawing Lot No.
1176-B-2 from sale and settlement and reserving the same for military purposes, under the
administration of the Chief of Staff, Philippine Army.
On November 29, 1939, Eugenio de Jesus paid P660.45 covering the 8th and 10th installment for 20.6400
hectares, the remaining area after his Sales Application was amended. This payment did not include the
military camp site (Lot No. 1176-B-2) as the same had already been excluded from the Sales Application
at the time the payment was made. 3 Thereafter, or on May 15, 1948, then Director of Lands Jose P. Dans
ordered the issuance of patent to Eugenio de Jesus, pursuant to his Sales Application for "a tract of land
having an area of 20.6400 hectares, situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao. 4 On the same
date, then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Mariano Garchitorena granted a Sales Patent
to Eugenio de Jesus for "a tract of agricultural public land situated in the City of Davao, Island of
Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares, 64 ares, and 00 centares. 5
On August 11, 1956, President Ramon Magsaysay revoked Proclamation No. 85 and declared the
disputed Lot 1176-B-2 open to disposition under the provisions of the Public land Act for resettlement of
the squatters in the Piapi Beach, Davao City. 6 In the following October 9, President Magsaysay revoked
this Proclamation No. 328 and reserved the same Lot No. 1176-B-2 for medical center site purposes
under the administration of the Director of Hospital. 7
Whereupon, on December 6, 1969, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center applied for the Torrens
registration of the 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 with the Court of First Instance of Davao. The Medical
Center claimed "fee simple" title to the land on the strength of proclamation No. 350 reserving the area
for medical center site purposes.
Respondent Alejandro de Jesus, the son and successor-in-interest of sale applicant Eugenio de Jesus,
opposed the registration oil the ground that his father, Eugenio de Jesus, had aquired a vested right on
the subject lot by virtue of the Order of Award issued to him by the Director of Lands.
A certain Arsenio Suazo likewise filed his opposition to the registration on the claim that the 2-hectare
portion on the northeastern part of Lot 1176-B-2 belongs to him.
After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Davao rendered judgment on September 2, 1966,
directing "the registration of the title to Lot No. 1176-B-2 of Subdivision Plan Bsd-5134, shown on Plan
Ap-6512, situated in the Barrio of Central, City of Davao, and containing an area of 128,081 square
meters in the name of the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical Services, Department of Health.
The two oppositors, Alejandro de Jesus and Arsenio Suazo, excepted from this judgment of the trial court
and appealed the case to the respondent Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1974, the Appellate Court held: ñé+.£ªwph!1
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby modified insofar as it denies the claim of appellant
Arsenio Suazo, the same is hereby affirmed, in regard the appeal of appellant Alejandro Y. de Jesus,
registration Lot 1176-B-2, situated in Barrio Central, Davao City, and containing an area of 12.8081 square
meters, is hereby decreed in the name of said appellants, but said appellant is hereby ordered to
relinquish to the appellee that portion of Lot 1176-B-2 which is occupied by the medical center and
nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appartenances, no costs.
On July 5, 1974, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center moved for reconsideration, maintaining ownership
over the entire area of 12.8081 hectares, but the Appellate Court in a Special Division of Five denied the
motion on June 17, 1975. 8
Forthwith, petitioner Mindanao Medical Center elevated the matter to Us thru the present appeal.
We find petitioner's appeal to b meritorious.
1. Petitioner Mindanao Medical Center has registerable title over the whole contested area of 12.8081
hectares, designated Lot No. 1176-B-2, and not only on a portion thereof occupied by the Medical Center,
its nervous disease pavilion and their reasonable appurtenances. Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9,
1956, of President Magsaysay legally effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of
Medical Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validity sufficient for initial registration under
the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a "fee simple" tile or absolute title in favor of
petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of
grants or patents involving public lands, provides that "Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands
belonging to the Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or to
public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act [Land
Registration Act, Act 496] and shall become registered lands." 9 It would be completely absurd to rule
that, on the basis of Proclamation No. 350, the Medical Center has registerable title on the portion
occupied by it, its nervous disease pavilion and the reasonable appurtenances, and not on the full extent
of the reservation, when the proclamation explicitly reserved the entire Lot 1176-B-2 of 12.8081 hectares
to the Center.
Certainly, proclamation no. 350 is free of any legal infirmity. It proceeds from the recognized competence
of the president to reserve by executive proclamation alienable lands of the public domain for a specific
public use or service. 10 section 64 (e) of the Revised Administrative Code empowers the president "(t)o
reserve from sale oe other disposition and for specific public uses for service, any land belonging to the
private domain of the Government of the Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law.
the land reserved "shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order until
otherwise provided by law." Similarly, Section 83 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) authorizes the President
to "designate by proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as reservations for the use
ofthe commonwealth of the Philippines or of any of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, ... or for
quasi-public uses or purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations for ... other
improvements for the public benefit.
2. Respondent Appellate Court erroneously ruled that Alejabdro's father, Eugenio de jesus, had
acquired ownership over the whole 12.8081-hectare Lot 1176-B-2 because the Sales Award issued to him
on November 23, 1934 by then Director of Lands Simeon Ramos covered the 33 hectares applied for,
including the 12.8081 hectares. We fail to see any reasonable basis on record for the Appellate Court to
draw such conclusion. On the contrary, the very Sales Award describes the tract awarded as located in
Central, Davao, Davao, with an area of 22 hectares, and bounded on the north by Maria Villa Abrille and
Arsenio Suazo; on the southeast by a provincial road and Mary Gohn; on the southwest by a public land;
and on the west by a municipal road. 11 This area of 22 hectares was even reduced to 20.6400 hectares
upon actual survey made by the Bureau of Lands. The same area was reckoned with by then Lands
Director Jose P. Dans when he directed the issuance of a patent to Eugenio de Jesus on May 15, 1948 for
his application filed on January 22, 1921 covering "a tract of land having an area of 20.6400 hectares,
situated in the barrio of Poblacion, City of Davao." 12 In like manner, the Sales Patent issued to Eugenio
de Jesus on the same date, May 15, 1948, by then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Mariano Garchitorena indicated therein the sale to Eugenio de Jesus of "a tract of agricultural public land
situated in the City of Davao, Island of Mindanao, Philippines, containing an area of 20 hectares 64, ares
00 centares." Seen in the light of Patent, and Sales Order for Issuance of Patent, and Sales Patent,
invariably bearing the area awarded to sales applicant Eugenio de Jesusas 20.6400 hectares, it becomes
imperative to conclude that what was really awarded to Eugenio de jesus was only 20.6400 hectares and
not 33 hectares as applied for by him.
However, We observe that in the public bidding of october 4, 1934, the succesful bidder, submitted a bid
of 100.50 per hectare and made a cash deposit of only P221.00, which amount represents 10% of the
purchase price of the land. 13 At P100.50 per hectare, the purchase would be P2,221.00 for 22 hectares,
10% deposit of which amounts to P221.00. For 33 hectares, the total purchase price would be P3,316.50
at P100.50 per hectare and the 10% deposit would be P331.65, not P221.00, as what was actually
deposited by sales applicant Eugenio de Jesus. Withal, if Eugenio de Jesus was really awarded 33 hectares
in that public bidding, he should have made the required 10% deposit of P331.65. That he merely
deposited P221.00 strongly suggests that what was bidden for and awarded to him was only 22 hectares
and not 33 hectares as applied for. As a matter of fact, his last payment of P660.45 on November 29,
1939 for the 8th te 10th installment intended only to cover 20.6400 hectares, the remaining area after
the amendment of the Sales Application on August 28, 1936, excluding "the military camp site [Lot
1176B-2 of 12.8081 hectares] for the reason that the said site, at the time of last installment was already
excluded from Sale Application SA-5436 of Eugenio de Jesus, as ordered ... by the Director of Lands." 14
But, respondent Appellate Court reasons out that if the area bidden for and awarded in 1934 ws only 22
hectares and since two years thereafter the Director of Lands ordered an amendment excluding the
military camp site of 12.8081 hectares, then only 10 hectares, then would have been left to applicant
Eugenio de Jesus and not 20.6400 hectares would have been left in the Sales Patent. The Appellate
Court's reasoning is premised on wrong assumption. What was ordered amended was the Sales
Application for 33 hectares and not the Order of 22 hectares or 20.6400 hectares. The Order states:
"Order: Amendment of Application." Necessarily so, because the amendment was already reflected in
the Order of Award, since only an area of 22 hectares was awarded.
3. The phrase "whole tract" in the Sales Award 15 cannot be licitly seized upon as basis for the conclusion
that the area awarded to applicant Eugenio de Jesus was the applied area of 33 hectares. Such general
description of "whole tract" cannot prevail over the specific description delineating the area in quantity
and in boundaries. Thus, the Sales Award specifies the area awarded as 22 hectares, located at Central,
Davao, Davao, and bounded on the north by the property of Maria Villa Abrille and Arsenio Suazo; on the
southwest by a provincial road and the property by Mary Gohn on the southwest by a public land; and on
the west by a municipal road. 16 Specific description is ordinarily preferred to general description, or that
which is more certain to what which is less certain. 17 More so, when it is considered that the series of
executive proclamations (Proclamation Nos. 85, 328, 350) continuously maintained the intent of the
Government to reserve the subject land for a specific purpose or service.
Besides, patents and land grants are construed favorably to the Governement, and most strongly against
the grantee. 18 Any doubt as to the intention or extent of the grant, or the intention of the Government,
is to be resolved in its favor. 19 In general, the quantity of the land granted must be ascertained from the
description in the patent is exclusive evidence of the land conveyed. 20 And courts do not usually go
beyond a description of a tract in a patent and determine the tract and quantity of land apart from the
patent itself. 21
4. We cannot share the view of respondent Appellate Court that eugenio de jesus's alleged
occupation, cultivation and improvement of the 33-hectare land (including the 12-hectare camp site)
since 1916 vested in him a right of preference or pre-empive right in the acquisition of the land, which
right was controverted into "a special propriety right" when the Sales Award was issued to him in 1934.
Not only for the earlier reasons that the Sales Award was only for 22 hectares (later found to be 20,6400
fectares upon actual survey) and not for 33 hectares, the privilege of occupying public lands a view to
preemption confers np contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the
President to withdraw suchlands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use,
prior to the divesting by the government of title threof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect
right of a settler. 22 Lands covered by reservation are not subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on
them can be acquired. 23 The claims o0f persons who have settled on occupied, and improved a parcel of
public land which is later included in a reservation are considered worthy of protection and are usually
respected, but where the President, as authorized by law, issuesa proclamation reserving certain lands
and warning all persons to depart therefrom, this terminates any rights previously avquired in such lands
by a person who was settled thereon in order to obtain a preferential right of purchase. 24 And patents
for lands which have been previously granted, reserved from sale, or appropriate, are void. 25
It is true that Proclamation No. 350 states that the same is subject to "privilege rights, if any there be,"
but Eugenio de Jesus or his son Alejandro de Jesus failed to prove any private rights over the property
reserved. Wee-settled is the rule that unless the applicant has shown by clear and convincing evidence
that a certain portion of the public domain was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition
title from the Spanish Government or by possessory information title, or any other means for the
acquisition of public lands, such as grants or patents, the property must be held to be part of the public
domain. 26 Nor could respondent Alejandro de Jesus legetimately claim to have obtained title by
prescription over the disputed 12.8081 hectares, inasmuch as by applying for the sale thereof (assuming
hypothetically that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the original sales application for 33 hectares),
his father, Eugenio de Jesus, necessarily admits that the portions applied for are part of the public
domain, against which no acquisitive prescription may lie 27 except as provided in Section 48(b) of C.A.
141, as amended.
5. Respondent Appellate Court mistakenly sustained Eugenio de Jesus's pretense that the
military "camp site" (Lot 176-B-2) had been donated by him to the Philippine Army, thru Secretary Serafin
Marabut of the Department of National Defense, sometime in 1936 subject to the condition that it would
be returned to him when the Philippine Army would no longer need it. As found by the trial court in
1936, the Department of National Defense was not yet in existence, so that no Defense Secretary by the
name of Serafin Marabut could have entered into a deed of donation with Eugenio de Jesus over Lot
1176-B-2 consisting of 12.8081 hectares. The Department of National Defense was only organized in
1939. Nonetheless, respondent Alejandro de Jesus, would prove by secondary evidence the existence of
such donation thru the testimony of persons who supposedly saw it. In this regard, the Rules provides
that before the terms of a transaction in realty may be established by secondary evidence, it is n that the
due execution and subsequent loss of the original instrument evidencing the transaction be proved. For it
is the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss that would constitute the foundation for
the introduction of secondary evidence to prove the contents of such document. And the due of the
execution of the document would be proved through the testimony of (1) the person or persons who
executed it; (2) the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, or (3) any who was present
and saw it executed and delivered, or who, after its execution and delivery, saw it and recognized the
signatures, or by a person to whom the parties to the instrument had previously confessed the execution
thereof. 28 None of these modes of proof was ever followed by respondent Alejandro de Jesus. His
predecessor- in-interest, Eugenio de Jesus, merely made a broad statement that he executed a deed f
donation in 1936 with Defense Secretary Marabut when at hat time the Defense Department was not yet
in existence. The notary public who presumptively acknowledged the donation or the witnesses to the
instrument were never presented. It has been ruled that the failure of the party to present the notary
Public and thore s who must have seen the signing of the document as witnesses to testify on its
execution interdicts the admission of a secondary evidence of the terms of the deed. 29 This is especially
true in realty donations where Art. 748 of the new Civil Code requires the accomplishment thereof in a
public document in order to be valid. The testimony of Marcelo Belendres that Sesinando de jesus,
brother of Eugenio de Jesus showed him a copy of the "paper" signed by Secretary Marabut and Eugenio
de Jesus; of Jose Tinio, Acting Register of Deeds of Davao, that in May or June 1937, Col. Simeon de jesus
went to his office to register a document" executed by Eugenio de Jesus and Secretary Marabut; of
former Secretary Brigido Valencia that Col. Simeon de Jesus showed him a deed of donation signed by
Eugenio de Jesus and Serafin Marabut. hardly suffer to satisfy the requisites of the Rules, as to which very
strict compliance is imposed because of the importance of the document involved. 30 First none of these
persons was a witness to the instrument, nor any of them saw the document after its execution and
delivery ind recognized the signatures of the parties nor to whom the parties to the instrument had
previously confessed the execution; second, the reference to a "paper" or "document" ambigous as to be
synonymous with a "deed of donation;" and third, the persons who showed the deed, Sesinando de Jesus
and Col. Simeon de Jesus were not parties to the instrument. Respondent Alejandro de Jesus's narration
of the existence and loss of the document equally deserves no credence. As found by the trial court, he
testified that the copy of the deed which his father kept was sent to him in Manila thru his uncle,
Sesinando de Jesus in July 1942, while his father himself, Eugenio de Jesus, declared that his copy of the
deed was burned in Davao during the Japanese occupation. The replies of the Undersecretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Acting Executive Secretary that the property was "still needed
for military purposes" and may not therefore be released from the reservation cannot substitute the
proof so required. These replies are not confirmatory of the existence of such donation much less official
admissions thereof.

Even on the gratuitous assumption that a donation of the military "camp site" was executed between
Eugenior de jesus and Serafin Marabut, such donation would anyway be void, because Eugenior de jesus
held no dominical rights over the site when it was allegedly donated by him in 1936. In that year,
proclamation No. 85 of President Quezon already withrew the area from sale or settlement and reserved
it for military purposes. Respondent Appellate Court, however, rationalizes that the subject of the
donation was not the land itself but "the possessory and special proprietary rights" of Eugenio de jesus
over it. We disagree. It is true that the gratiuitous disposal in donation may consist of a thing or right. 31
But the term "right" must be understood in a "propriety" sense, over which the processor has the jus
disponendi. 32 This is because, in true donations, there results a consequent impoverishment of the
donor or diminution of his assets. 33 Eugenio de Jesus cannot be said to be possessed of that
"proprietary " right over the whole 33 hectares in 1936 including the disputed 12.8081 hectares for at
that time this 12.8081-hectare lot had already been severed from the mass of disposable public lands by
Proclamation No. 85 and excluded in the Sales Award. Impoverishment of Eugenio's assets as a
consequence of such donation is therefore farfetehed. In fact, even if We were to assume in gratia
argumenti that the 12.8081-hectare lot was included in the Sales Award, still the same may not be the
subject of donation. In Sales Award, what is conferred on the applicant is merely the right "to take
possession of the land so that he could comply with the requirements prescribed by law." 34 In other
words, the right granted to the sales awardee is only "possessory right" as distinguished from
"proprietary right," for the fundamental reason that prior to the issuance of the sales patent and
registration thereof, title to the land is retained by the State. 35 Admittedly, the land applied for may be
considered "disposed of by the Government" upon the issuance of the Sales Award, but this has the
singular effect of withdrawing the land from the public domian that is "disposable" by the Director of
Lands under the Public Land Act. Moreover, the dsiposition is merely provisional because the applicant
has still to comply with the requirements of the law before any patent is issued. It is only after
compliance with such requirements to the satisfaction of the Director of Lands, that the patent is issued
and the land applied for considered "permanently disposed of by the Government." This again is a
circumstance that demeans the irrevocable nature donation, because the mere desistance of the sales
applicant to pursue the requirements called for would cause the virtual revocation of the donation.

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgement of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on July 2, 1974, and its
resolution of Jane 17, 1975, denying petitioner's motion for reconsiderations, are hereby reversed and
set aside. The disputed Lot 1176-B-2, Plan Bsd-1514 of Davao Cadastre and containing an area of 12.8081
hectares, is hereby adjudicated in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical Center. The urgent motion of the
petitioner for leave to construct essential hospitawl buildings, namely: (a) communicable and contagious
diseas pavilion; (b) hospital motorpool; and (c) physician's quarters, is hereby granted. With costs against
private respondent.

SO ORDERED.