Institute for Palestine Studies

University of California Press

Hamas: A Historical and Political Background

Author(s): Ziad Abu-Amr
Source: Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer, 1993), pp. 5-19
Published by: University of California Press on behalf of the Institute for Palestine Studies
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 HAMAS: A HISTORICALAND
POLITICAL BACKGROUND
ZIAD ABU-AMR

Hamas-the Islamic ResistanceMovement-was born of the intifada,

whichmarkedthebeginningofthetruepoliticalrevivalof the Islamicforces
in theWest Bankand Gaza Stripin thefaceof Israelioccupationon theone
hand,and thenationalsecularforcesled by thePLO on theother. Up until
thattime,themostimportant Islamicmovementin the occupiedterritories,
the MuslimBrotherhood, had shied away fromactiveresistanceagainstthe
Israelioccupation,a decisionthatstoodin thewayofitsfulldevelopmentas
a popularforce.This situationwas suddenlyto changewiththeoutbreakof
thePalestinianuprising,whichled theMuslimBrotherhood to playan active
rolein theresistanceforthefirsttime. This itdid throughHamas,theorgan-
izationit createdfromits own ranksexpresslyforthatpurpose. It was thus
thattheIslamicmovement, aftermanyyearsin existence,was able to emerge
as thefirsttruechallengeeverposed in theoccupiedterritories to thedomi-
nantnationalisttrend.
The new force-forHamas soon overshadowedits parentorganization-
now prevailsin a numberoflocalities,especiallytheGaza Strip,witha mag-
nitudethatparallelsthatof Fateh,thelargestof the PLO factions.Its emer-
gencehas broughtabout a stateof imbalancein thepoliticalforcesthathad
held swayfordecades. Moreover,thedevelopingrivalry betweentheIslamic

Ziad Abu-Amr, an associate professorof political science at Birzeit

is theauthorofIslamicFundamentalism
University, in theWestBankand Gaza:
The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic Jihad (Indiana UniversityPress,
forthcoming). This articleis based on an articlethatappearedin the spring
1993 issue of our sisterpublication,Majallatal-Dirasatal-Filastiniya.

Joumnal
ofPalestine
StudiesXXII,no. 4 (Summer1993), pp. 5-19.

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6 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

trendled by Hamas and the nationalseculartrendunderthe PLO maynot

cease in the eventthatthe Israelioccupationends, since whatis at stakein
this rivalryis nothingless than the leadership,the identity,
and the future
directionof the Palestinianpeople.

TheRiseoftheIslamicGroupsin theOccupiedTerritories
Since Hamas was the creationof the MuslimBrotherhood in Palestine,to
understandit one mustbegin withthe historyof the parentorganizationin
the occupied territories.
TheMuslimBrotherhood
Up untilthe 1980s, when the radicalIslamicJihadbrokeaway fromthe
MuslimBrotherhood Society,the historyof the Islamicmovementsin Pales-
tinecan be reducedto thehistoryof theBrotherhood.The Brotherhood had
been foundedin Egyptin 1928 by Hasan al-Banna,and soon spreadto other
partsoftheArabworld. In his attemptto revitalizetheIslamiccall, al-Banna
stressedthreeelements:revival,organization, and upbringing.Basically,the
goal of al-Banna'smovement, like otherIslamicrevivalgroups,was to trans-
formsocietyto approximateas closelyas possible thatestablishedby the
ProphetMuhammadand his Companions. This would entailthe establish-
mentof an Islamic state,withno distinctionbeing made betweenreligion
and government, and withthe Quran and thesunna servingas the basis for
all aspectsof life.
The Brotherhood'sconnectionwith Palestinedates back to 1935, when
Hasan al-Bannasenthis brother,'Abd al-Rahmanal-Banna,to establishcon-
tacts there. In 1945, the group inauguratedits firstbranch in Jerusalem.
Withtheassistanceofthemothergroupin Egypt,morebrancheswereestab-
lishedin otherPalestiniantowns,reachingtwenty-five bytheyear1947. The
brancheshad membershipsrangingfrom12,000 to 20,000, and were at-
tachedto thecommandoftheMuslimBrotherhood in Cairo.' Al-HaiiAmin
al-Husseini,preeminentPalestiniannationalistleader,was named a local
leaderoftheBrotherhood, whichhelped spreaditsinfluencein thecountry.2
It should be noted thatthe MuslimBrotherhood in Palestine,while em-
bracingthe same ideologyas the Societyacrossthe Arab world,does give a
special place to two figures,aside fromthe founder,Hasan al-Banna. One
important model forPalestinianIslamistsis SayyidQutb,who was executed
in Egyptin 1966 and is considereda truesymbolof revolutionary Islam. In
contrastto Hasan al-Banna,knownforhis moderation,Qutb embodiesthe
conceptof activeoppositionto,and noncooperation with,theexistingorder.
The othersource of inspirationforPalestinianIslamistsis 'Izz al-Din al-
Qassam, thefirstleaderof armedresistancein thehistoryof modernPales-
tine,who was killedby the Britishin 1935 in the eventsleadingup to the
GreatPalestinianRebellionof 1936-39. The military branchof Hamas today
bears his name.

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HAMAS:A BACKGROUND 7

Afterthecreationof Israelin 1948, relationsbetweentheBrotherhood and

the Hashemiteleadershipin Jordan,whichhad annexed the West Bank in
1950,weregenerallysmoothand cordial,despiteperiodictensions. The ac-
tivityoftheBrotherhood in theWest Bankwas notpoliticalin themain,but
social and religious.In the Gaza Strip,on the otherhand, administered by
Egyptuntil 1967, the Brotherhood's relationswiththe administration were
problematicmost of the time, and the Brotherswere persecuted and
outlawed.
In theyearsfollowingtheIsraelioccupationoftheWest Bankand Gaza in
1967, theBrotherhood continuedto concentrate mainlyon whatit described
as "the upbringingof an Islamic generation"throughthe establishment of
religiousschools,charityassociations,social clubs,and so on. ButtheBroth-
erhood'semphasison the Islamicrestructuring of societyand religiousedu-
cation seemed to have littlerelevancefor a populationthat was seeking
liberationfromforeignoccupation. The emergingPalestiniannationalist
resistancemovementhad fargreaterappeal, and thefailureoftheBrothers to
participatein thisresistancecost themmanypotentialadherents.
Severalfactors,bothorganizational and objective,contributed to strength-
eningtheBrotherhood.In 1973,al-Mujamma'al-Islami(the IslamicCenter)
was establishedin Gaza by ShaykhAhmad Yasin, a dynamicpreacherand
1948 refugeewho was laterto become the primaryforcebehind Hamas.
Withina relatively shortperiodof time,virtually all religiousorganizations
and institutions dominatedby the Brotherhood-including the Islamic Uni-
versityin Gaza-were controlledthroughtheCenter.Then,in the 1970s,the
centralizingeffectofal-Mujamma'was reinforced by a reorganization within
the leadershipof the MuslimBrotherhood:the societiesin the Gaza Strip,
West Bank,and Jordanwere now mergedinto a singleorganizationcalled
"The MuslimBrotherhood Societyin Jordanand Palestine."3This reorgani-
zationaffected the positionand policies of the Brotherhood in the occupied
territoriesby bringingguidance,instruction, and support from the Society
and its leadershipbased in Jordan.
The organizationalchanges laid the groundworkfor the Brotherhood's
growth. Then, in the late 1970s, a certaindisillusionmenthad begun to
spreadwithregardto thePalestinianresistancemovement, makingthepopu-
lationmoreamenableto alternative politicalor ideologicalapproaches. The
Islamic revolutionin Iran also had a galvanizingeffect,capturingpeople's
imaginations.These factorsgave a boost to the Brotherhood, whichstepped
up its politicalactivities,
especiallywithinPalestinianuniversities.Initially,
most of these activitieswere aimed at counteringthe secularistideas and
influenceof thenationalistfactionsof thePLO, withonlypartof thegroup's
effortsbeingdirectedagainsttheIsraelioccupation. Moreover,while theoc-
cupationauthoritieswere expendingconsiderableenergieson dismantling
and repressingthe resistanceorganizations, the MuslimBrotherhood, which
was not involvedin armed resistance,was able to build its organizational

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8 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

structureand pursue its work among the masses with little Israeli
interference.
The MuslimBrotherhood had a numberofmeansat itsdisposalin spread-
ing religiousideas and rallyingsupportforthe Islamic movement.Aside
fromthe various associationsit had establishedthroughout the territories
such as librariesand sportsand social clubs, the organizationused zakat
(alms giving,one of the fivepillars of Islam) to help thousandsof needy
families.Thousandsofchildrenwereenrolledin nurseryschools,kindergar-
tens,and schools run by the Islamic movement.Loans were extendedto
studentsin Palestinianand Arab universities.
The Brotherhood was also able to gain significantaccess to thepopulation
throughits increasingcontroloverthe religiousinstitution of thewaqf(reli-
gious endowments),whichcontrolsan extensivenetworkof property thatit
leases to thelocal inhabitants.In theGaza Strip,waqfconstitutes 10 percent
ofall real estate: "Hundredsofshops,apartments, garages,publicbuildings,
and about 2,000 acresofagricultural land belongedto itstrusts,and thewaqf
employed scores of people, from preachersand other clerics to grave
diggers."4
ButtheMuslimBrotherhood's mosteffective toolin spreadingitsinfluence
was themosques,especiallygiventheirproliferation followingthe Israelioc-
cupation. Thus,in theperiodfrom1967 to 1987, thenumberofmosquesin
the West Bank rose from400 to 750, in the Gaza Stripfrom200 to 600.5
Afterdailyafternoon and sunsetprayers, theMuslimBrotherhood was able to
use mosques-as sanctuariesgenerallynot subjectto interference fromthe
Israeliauthorities-forpoliticalworkand forrecruiting followers.
Still,despitethe Brotherhood's growthand effectiveness in gatheringsup-
portthroughits social servicesand activities, a certainamountof dissatisfac-
tion continuedbecause of its failureto engage in fighting the occupation.
This dissatisfaction led to thecreationoftheIslamicJihadmovement, which
brokeaway fromthe Brotherhood in the early1980s.
TheMuslimBrotherhood
and theIslamic
Jihad
While IslamicJihadhas remainedsmall and nevercommandedanywhere
near thefollowingof theBrotherhood, it is important to dwell brieflyon the
movementand its positions,because these positionsencompass criticisms
leveled at the Brotherhoodand which in factwere later addressedin the
creationof Hamas-that is, theBrotherhood's lack of commitment to an all-
out struggleagainstIsrael.
IslamicJihadwas foundedby two 1948 refugees who grewup in camps in
the Gaza Strip,Fathial-Shaqaqi and 'Abd al-'Aziz Auda. As university stu-
dentsin Cairo, both were strongly influencedby trendswithinthe Muslim
Brotherhood Societyin Egypt,and notablybythemilitantIslamicgroupsthat
had emergedfromthe ranksof the EgyptianBrotherhood in the mid-1970s,
al-Takfirwa al-Hijra(The Atonementand Holy Flight),and Tandhim al-Jihad
(the JihadOrganization).

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HAMAS:A BACKGROUND 9

Ideologically,the Islamic Jihadshareswiththe MuslimBrotherhoodthe

same basic preceptsconcerningtheneed fortheestablishment of an Islamic
stateand fortheapplicationof Islamicprinciplesin an Islamicsociety.The
chiefdifference betweenthetwogroupslies in theplace of Palestinein their
prioritiesand theirmeans of action.
All Islamicgroups,notonlyin Palestinebutthroughout theMuslimworld,
considerPalestinein its entirety as Muslimland, no partof which can be
ceded underany circumstances.The establishment of a Palestinianstatein
theWest Bankand Gaza is therefore seen as sinfulifit entailsconcedingthe
restof Palestineto Israel,an illegitimate entity.For the Islamicgroups,Pal-
estineis not merelya Palestinianor an Arab problem,but an Islamicprob-
lem of concernto theentireIslamicnation;trueMuslimsare called upon to
sacrificelives and moneyto liberateeveryinch of the holyland.
Where the Islamicgroupsdiffer is on the centralityof the Palestineissue
and the propertimingforliberatingthe country.For the MuslimBrother-
hood, thefirstpriority is the Islamictransformation of society,whichit sees
as a prerequisite to theliberationofPalestine.Accordingto theBrotherhood,
armed struggleQihad) cannotbe undertakenuntilthe societyis reformed,
untilsecularideas are abandonedand Islam adopted. The IslamicJihad,on
the otherhand, considersPalestineits centralissue, and advocatesarmed
struggle as itsstrategy forpoliticalactionwithoutwaitingfortheIslamization
of society.6The IslamicJihadwas all themorecriticalof the Brotherhood's
failureto engagein armedstrugglein thatjihadis one of the fivepillarsof
Islamic doctrine.The new organizationfurther rejectedthe Brotherhood's
reformist approachand traditionalist ideas and practicesin favorof revolu-
tionaryactionby an Islamicvanguard;forthe IslamicJihad,theproblemsof
Arab societycan notbe solvedby gradualmeasuresor "truce,patching,and
reform," but by "decisivenessand revolution."7
In a similarvein,IslamicJihadobjectedto theMuslimBrotherhood's posi-
tionof coexistencewiththeArab regimes,especiallythosehavingstrongties
withtheWest such as Saudi Arabia,Egypt,and Jordan.These it regardedas
an "actualsecurity beltforIsrael,"considering theArabregimesand Israelas
"twofacesofthesame coin; theyareboththefruitoftheWesterninvasionof
theArabworld."8 Giventheseviews,it is not surprising thatanothersource
of disagreement betweenthetwogroupswas the attitudetowardthe Islamic
revolutionin Iran,which the Brotherhood began to criticizeafterthe Iran-
Iraq war brokeout. The Jihadmovement, on theotherhand,consideredthe
AyatollahKhomeinias an important sourceof ideologicalinspiration.
Becauseofitsfocuson Palestineas a centralissue,theIslamicJihadshares
a commonobjectivewiththe PLO factions.Despite its Islamic approachto
the achievementof this objectiveand its disapprovalof the PLO's political
programand diplomaticconductas being incompatiblewith the "Islamic
view of history," the IslamicJihaddoes not see itselfas a rivalor alternative
to the PLO. The Brotherhood, forits part,has accused the Jihadof being

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10 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

partof the Fateh movement,the "Islamic Fateh," and forconcentrating on

politicalmattersat the expense of Islamic education.
Despitethechallengeby themoreradicalIslamicJihadand thenationalist
forces-a challengemade stronger by the IslamicJihad'slaunchingof mili-
taryoperationsin the mid-1980sand even participation in certainjoint ac-
tions with Fateh against Israeli targetsin the occupied territories9-the
Brotherhood held firmin its refusalto engagein outwardresistanceto the
occupation.Soon,however,theintifadawas abruptly to changeall thegivens
of the situationand move the organizationto an unprecedentedchange of
course, involvingit for the firsttime in organizedresistanceagainst the
occupation.

TheFormation
ofHamas
Despiteclaimsto thecontrary, theintifadaeruptedspontaneously without
any politicaldecisionby any organizedgroup,and caughtthe Brotherhood,
like the PLO, by surprise. On 8 December 1987, a motoraccidentin the
Gaza Stripinvolvingan Israelitruckand smallvehiclestransporting Palestin-
ian workers,severalofwhomwerekilled,triggered the riotsthatspreadand
evolvedintowhatbecame knownas theintifada.The verynextday,leading
membersoftheMuslimBrotherhood in Gaza metto discusswaysofutilizing
theeventto stirup religiousand nationalistsentiments and assurethespread
of wide public demonstrations.The meetingwas held at the house of
AhmadYasin, thefounderof the IslamicCenter,and was attendedby other
prominentleaders of the Center: Dr. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi(age 40), a
physicianresidingin Khan Yunis; Dr. Ibrahimal-Yazuri(age 45), a pharma-
cistresidingin Gaza city;ShaykhSalih Shihada (age 40), an instructor at the
IslamicUniversity residingin thetownof BaytHanun; 'Isa al-Nashshar(age
35), an engineerin Rafah;MuhammadSham'a (age 50), a teacherin al-Shati
refugeecamp; and 'Abd al-FattahDukhan (age 50), a school principalat al-
Nusayratcamp.10 The groupwas soon meetingregularly to developcontin-
gencyplans to deal withthe fast-developing situation.
On 14 December,the Brotherhood leadersissued a statementcallingon
thepeople to standup to the Israelioccupation. Hamas retrospectively con-
sideredthis its firstserializedleaflet,thoughthe new organizationdid not
identify itselfas such untilJanuary1988 when it issued leafletsunder the
"
name Hamas."11 MeanwhileShaykhYasin and his colleagueswerein con-
tactwiththeircounterparts in the West Bank. That same month,January
1988, ShaykhYasin assignedShaykhJamilHamami,a Brotherhood activist
in the West Bank and one of the youngpreachersat Jerusalem'sal-Aqsa
mosque,to establishwithhis colleaguesa branchof Hamas there. Hamami
thus became the liaison betweenShaykhYasin on the one hand and the
Hamas commandin the West Bank and the Brotherhood commandin Jor-
dan on theother. It shouldbe notedthatthislastprovidedfinancialsupport
forthe intifada.12

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HAMAS:A BACKGROUND 11

The establishment of Hamas, which means "zeal" in Arabic and is the

acronymforHarakatal-Muqawamaal-Islamfrya (the IslamicResistanceMove-
ment),was not a clear-cutand immediately consciousdecision,but evolved
overtime. Indeed,the Brotherhood's responseto the uprisingwas the sub-
ject of tensionswithinthe organization.In the West Bank, especially,the
youngerstrataof the Brotherhood were eager to participatein the uprising
againstthe occupation,while the traditionalleadersinitiallyhad a reserved,
wait-and-seeattitude.It was onlywhen the intifadawas in fullswingand
Hamas had become an activeparticipantthatthe discrepancybetweenthe
youngactivistsand the traditionalleaderscame to an end.
But the questionof participationin the intifadawas not merelyone of
youngversusold; the new situationconfronted the Brotherhood witha real
ideologicaldilemma. On theone hand,giventheunprecedented eventstak-
ing place in Palestineand the internalpressureswithinthe movement,it
would have been politicallyimpossibleforYasin and the otherleaders to
allow the Brotherhood to remainon the sidelines,especiallyin the lightof
theBrotherhood's ongoingand bitterrivalry withPLO factions.On theother
hand, it was not easy forthe group to justifysuddenlyjoining the intifada
whenitspreviouspositionswerewell known;untiltheveryeve of theupris-
ing,Yasin and the otherleadershad been arguingthatthe timehad not yet
come forthe actualjihad. Accordingto theiroft-stated views,the Brother-
hood was stillin the phase of educatingthe Muslimgenerationin prepara-
tionfortherestructuring oftheMuslimcommunity; thisin turnwould be the
preludeto the declarationofjihad againstIsrael. Similarly,Yasin and his
close associatesin the Brotherhood had to finda way to join the intifada
withoutcompromising the futureof the movementtheyhad built up with
such painstakingefforts and personalsacrifice(Yasin and a numberofothers
havingalreadyservedprisonsentences).
It was ShaykhYasin's idea, as a way out of thesedilemmas,to createan
ostensiblyseparateorganizationout of the MuslimBrotherhood to take re-
sponsibilityforitsparticipation in theintifada.The calculationwas probably
thatifthe intifadafailedthe Brotherhood could disclaimHamas and escape
Israeliretribution
forits participation,whereasifthe intifadacontinued,the
Brotherhood could derivebenefitby claimingHamas as itsown. This is pre-
ciselywhat happened when the Hamas charterwas issued in August1988
proclaiming Hamas as a wingoftheBrotherhood.13 In a sense,theestablish-
mentof Hamas by theBrotherhood in theoccupiedterritories was parallelto
thefoundingof the UnifiedNationalLeadershipof theUprising(UNLU) by
thePLO factions, withbothservingto channeltheirrespective bodies' resist-
ance activities.
Hamas's activerole in the intifadaand thegrowingawarenessof its rela-
tionshipto theBrotherhood gave thislast a credibilitymuchneeded because
of the PLO campaignscriticizingit forits nonparticipation in the armed
struggle.Indeed,theBrotherhood began deliberately to equate thetwoorga-
nizations,and Yasin and his colleaguesbecame morevocal and less circum-

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12 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

spectin termsoftheirpoliticalvisibility:Hamas had soon become a credible

and convenientname fora rehabilitatedMuslim BrotherhoodSociety,en-
ablingthe "new" organizationto attractfollowersand supporterswho had
not been membersof the Brotherhood.Beforelong,in fact,Hamas had be-
come a forcethatcould not be ignoredand even a seriouschallengeto the
secularforcesled by the PLO.
Aims,and Strategies
Ideology,
Hamas's aims and strategies are spelled out in the charterit issued on 18
August1988, whichcontainsthephilosophyof the Movement,its rationale,
and itspositionsnotonlyon such centralissues as thePalestineproblembut
also on social welfare,therole ofwomen,otherIslamicmovements, nation-
alistmovementsand the PLO, the Arab countries,and so on.* One might
note thatrecentrumorsto the effectthatHamas is consideringfar-reaching
changes in its charter14have been vigorouslydenied, notablyby Hamas
leaderDr. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rantisi.15
The contentofthecharterdoes notdiffer frompositionstakenbytheMus-
lim Brotherhoodon the same issues; as statedin article2 of the charter,
Hamas is only a branchof the Muslim BrotherhoodSociety. There is no
doubt,however,thatthecharterpayslittleattention to theBrotherhood's core
goal of transforming society,placing fargreateremphasison the Palestine
problemandjihad.
ConcerningPalestine,the charterstatesthat"the land of Palestineis an
Islamictrust('wacf') upon all MuslimgenerationsuntiltheDay of Resurrec-
tion. It is not rightto give it up nor any part of it" (article 11). In the
opinion of Hamas, the solutionof the Palestineproblemrestsin the up-
rootingof the Stateof Israel and the establishment of an Islamic statein its
place. The charteralso mentionsthreespheresconnectedwiththe Palestin-
ian cause. These are the Palestinian,the Arab, and the Islamic, each of
whichhas its role in the struggleagainstIsrael (article14).
Concerningpeace negotiationsand initiatives, the charterstates: "What
are called 'peacefulsolutions'and 'international conferences'to solve the
Palestinequestion all conflictwith the doctrineof the Islamic Resistance
Movement,forgivingup any partof the homelandis like givingup partof
the religiousfaithitself"(article13). Accordingto the charter,thereis no
solutionto the Palestineproblemexceptjihad: "When an enemyoccupies
some of theMuslimlands,jihadbecomes obligatory on everyMuslim"(arti-
cle 15). Thus,all peace initiatives
are a "wasteoftimeand actsof absurdity"
(article13). In keepingwiththis,Hamas protestedagainstthepeace confer-
ence thatwas held in Madrid in October 1991, and continuesto oppose
Palestinianparticipation in the currentArab-Israelinegotiations, callingfor
immediatewithdrawalfromthesenegotiations.

* See specialdocument.

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HAMAS:A BACKGROUND 13

Althoughit is stillpremature to determinehow farHamas would go in its

oppositionto the Palestinian-Israelipeace negotiations,it is evidentthat
Hamas's oppositionis temperedby therealizationofthehardshipsfacingthe
Palestiniansin theoccupiedterritories. Despitevocal opposition,theorgani-
zationdoes notwish to projectitselfas an obstructive forcewhen theremay
be a chance,howeverslim,of findinga solution. Hamas's oppositionto the
talksis further temperedby lack of availablealternatives and awarenessthat
the internalPalestinianbalance of powerstillfavorsthe PLO. More impor-
tantis theinfluenceof theMuslimBrotherhood in Jordan,its patron,whose
oppositionto Jordaniangovernment policiescan notbe allowedto reachthe
pointof alienatingthe king.
As forHamas's relationswiththenationalistmovement, thecharterrefers
to thePLO as a "father, brother, relative,or friend"oftheIslamicmovement
and stressesthe factthatthe two movementshave a common plightand
commondestinyand face the same enemy(article27). At the same time,
Hamas sharplycriticizesthe PLO's secularcourseand its leadership,as well
as itspoliticalprogramcallingfortheestablishment ofa Palestinianstatethat
would coexistwiththe Stateof Israel. Hamas had alreadycondemnedthe
PLO's recognitionof the Stateof Israel and its acceptanceof UN Security
Resolutions242 and 338.
AlthoughHamas does not openlyquestionthe PLO's statusas the sole
legitimaterepresentative of the Palestinianpeople, in factit objects to the
organization'swidespreadacceptanceas thepeople's frameof reference and
definerof theiridentity and nationalgoals. Hamas makesno explicitclaims
to beingan alternative to thePLO, but itsrepeatedreferences to Islam as the
alternativeto thefailednationalistand secularideologieswould seem to im-
ply a certainprojectionof itselfas an alternative to an organizationembrac-
ing such failedideologies. Hamas's rejectionof the PLO's politicalprogram
and itscall fortheestablishment ofan Islamicsocietyin Palestineand forthe
establishment of an Islamicleadershipto spearheadthepopularstruggleare
all manifestations of its rivalrywiththe PLO forleadership.
and Leadership
Organization
Althoughthe MuslimBrotherhood has in theorymaintainedits internal
organizationalstructure, and althoughHamas, as a "wing" of the organiza-
tion,is in theoryseparate,in practicethetwohavebecomeincreasingly inter-
twined. It is thusthatthe divisionof labor withinthe leadershipand rank-
and-filelevels is consideredan "internal"affair.
The initialleadershipof Hamas consistedofShaykhAhmadYasin and the
othersix foundingmembers.Later,as the movementdeveloped,leadership
wingsand committees were set up to takechargeof politicalmatters,secur-
ity,military operations,and the media. Even so, Hamas has remainedrela-
tivelysimple and lacks the complex bureaucracyof the PLO. Overall
leadershipof themovementis entrusted to a majlisshura(consultativecoun-
cil) whose memberslive inside and outsidethe occupied territories.

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14 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

Fromthebeginning, theleadership hasbeenplaguedbyrepeated lossesin

itsranksthrough deportations and imprisonment, necessitatingperiodicre-
organizations bothat thecentralleadership and committee orbranchlevels
and obligingHamas to graduatesuccessiveleadershipechelons. After
ShaykhYasinwas arrested in May 1989 and sentenced to fifteenyearsin
prison,Dr. 'Abd al-'Azizal-Rantisi tookcommandof Hamasin theGaza
Strip.In theWestBank,thebetterknownleadersincludedHusaynAbu
Kuwik,a prominent unionist, Fadil Salih,an imam,and Hasan Yusuf,a
schoolteacherand imam. All theseweredeported by Israelin December
1992. TheHamasconnection oftherenowned advocateShaykh BassamJar-
rar,also deported byIsrael,is notconfirmed. Amongthewell-known lead-
ers of Hamas outsidePalestineare Musa Abu Marzuq,head of the
Movement's politicalbureau,Muhammad Nazzal,representative in Jordan,
and 'Imadal-Alami, representativein Tehran.The identity ofa numberof
Hamas leaders,bothinsideand outsidethe occupiedterritories, remains
unknown.
Themassdeportations ofDecember1992aimedmainly at Hamasandthe
MuslimBrotherhood removed notonlymostof thefront-line leaders,but
alsolargenumbers ofsecond-andthird-tier leadersandotheractivists, leav-
ingtheoccupiedterritories seemingly bereft ofmajorleaders.Nonetheless,
thedevastating effectofthedeportations is somewhat mitigated bythefact
thattheleadership insidetheterritories has alwaysreliedforits strategic
decisions on guidance from itsextended leadership abroad,including leaders
oftheMuslimBrothers in Jordan andEgypt.In addition, thearmedactions
performed bythe"Martyr 'Izz al-Dinal-QassamBattalions" maynotbe af-
fected,as theIsraeliauthoritiesdo notappeartohavesucceededin arresting
anyoftheirleaders.
Mostprobably, theleadership vacuumresulting fromthemassdeporta-
tionswillpavethewayfortheappearance ofa newmilitant leadership giving
less weightto politicalconsiderations thanmostof the deportedMuslim
leaders,whosepositions hadbeentempered bythemoderation arising from
involvement in practical
politics.

Activities
and Popularity

As a branchof theMuslimBrotherhood and indeedinextricablyinter-

twinedwithit,Hamashas beenable to buildon themother organization's
extensive in expanding
infrastructure itspublicbaseofoperations.Itis thus
thatnursery schools,kindergartens,socialand sportsclubs,libraries,and
othersuchassociations fallunderits auspices,and theIslamicUniversity
continuesunderitscontrol.Thesevariousinstitutions-tosaynothing ofthe
network ofmosques-areusefulvehiclesforspreading Hamas'sideas and
influenceand enlistingsupporters. Followingtheexampleof theBrother-
hood,Hamasalso organizes trips,particularly
amonguniversity students,as
wellas visitsto theDomeoftheRock.

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HAMAS:A BACKGROUND 15

In the politicalrealm,Hamas sponsorsforums,politicalgatherings, and

Islamic exhibitions,particularly on university campuses,thatserveas vehi-
cles forits influence.It issues statements, brochures,and pamphlets,and
commemorates martyrs and Islamicevents. It organizesdemonstrations and
strikesand otherexpressionsofprotest.Its successin callingforcomprehen-
sive strikesis testimony to its influence;it is doubtfulthatany PLO faction,
exceptforFateh,could alone finda similarresponseto its strikecalls.
The movementnow participatesin the intifadaon an equal footingwith
the PLO groups. At presentit is largerthan any single factionexcept for
Fateh,and, like Fateh,has a strongpresencethroughout theoccupiedterrito-
ries. There is no doubt that Hamas's actions,includingthe use of arms
againstIsraelimilitary targets,havebeen a majorfactorin thecontinuation of
the uprisingbecause of the movement'swide followingand quick mobility.
Moreover,its nonparticipation in the politicalprocesshas led it to concen-
trateits effortson intifadaactivity:Hamas has become the partymost en-
gaged in armedactionsagainstIsraelitargetsand is estimatedto have more
membersunderdetentionthanany othergroupexceptFateh. It should be
noted thatHamas's militaryactivitiesare intendednot only to strikeat the
occupation,but also to embarrassthe negotiating factionsand to bolsterits
own positionas a majorPalestinianforcethatcannotbe ignoredand without
whichno agreementcan be reached.
In the absence of freeand directdemocraticelections,it is impossibleto
determinewithany certainty the size of Hamas's following.However,some
idea can be obtainedfromthesectoralelectionsheld in professionalassocia-
tions,tradeunions, studentcouncils,chambersof commerce,and so on,
whereresultspointto themovement'sincreasingpopularity.An analysisof
the resultsof the electionsthatHamas did not win indicatethatit obtained
morevotesthanany individualfactionexceptFateh,scoringanywherefrom
35 to 45 percentof the totalpopularvote. In some elections,whereFateh
ranon a jointballotwithotherfactions(as was thecase in the 1992 elections
fortheRamallahChamberofCommerceand thestudentcouncilsat theuni-
versitiesin Gaza and Hebron),Hamas actuallywon overFateh,althoughin
generalmoreinstitutions are dominatedby PLO supportersthanby Hamas
supporters.It should nonethelessbe notedthatunderthe electionssystem
followedin the occupied territories, the percentagesof the popularvote do
not translateinto an equivalentratioof seats in the elected councils. For
instance,thepro-HamasIslamicBloc won 45 percentofthetotalvotesin the
electionsforthe Nablus Chamberof Commercein 1992, but obtainedonly
threeoutoftwelveseats. Similarly, theBloc won morethan40 percentofthe
votes in the studentcouncil electionsof al-Najah University(Nablus) in
1992, but did not obtaina singlecouncil seat.
It was in keepingwiththepopularpercentagesthatHamas, in responseto
an invitationtojoin the PLO, demanded40 to 50 percentof theseats in the
PalestineNationalCouncil(PNC) as a precondition tojoiningthatbody. But
givenHamas's rejectionof thePLO program,it is possiblethatthisdemand,

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16 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

clearlyimpossible
forthePLO to meet,was intended
to relieveHamasof
publiccriticism
forrejecting
unityand cooperationwiththe nationalist
movement.
ExternalRelations
Fromtheoutset, Hamashas beencloselyinterconnected withtheMuslim
Brotherhood inJordan, whichhas provided itwitha widerangeofdoctrinal,
political,
moral,and material support.Hamashas also enjoyedthesupport
ofIslamicmovements in Egypt,SaudiArabia,theGulfstates, Sudan,Algeria,
andTunisia,nottomention ofIslamiccommunities andorganizations in the
UnitedStatesand Europe.
Theorganization further hadgoodrelations withofficialelements in Saudi
ArabiaandtheGulfstates, butthesedeterioratedas a resultoftheGulfwar,
whenHamastooka position notmuchdifferent from thatofthePLO,oppos-
ingIraq'sinvasion ofKuwaitbutstrongly opposingthemassiveforeign mili-
taryintervention in theregion.Meanwhile, relationswithIran,whichhad
begunto improveas a resultof Hamas'sparticipation in theintifada and
especiallyfollowing the improvement of relationsbetweenIran and the
Brotherhood in Jordan, improved evenmoreas a resultof theGulfwar;
Hamaswas keenon finding newalliesafter thedeterioration ofitsrelations
withSaudiArabiaand theGulfstatesas wellas theIslamicmovements in
thesecountries. Itis thusthatHamasopenedan office inTehran, andIranis
saidtobe providing militarytraining
to Hamasactivists bothin Iranand at
pro-IranianHizballahbases in Lebanon. It shouldbe notedthatHamas
(alongwithIslamicJihad)participated in a conference heldin Tehranto
protesttheconvening oftheMadridpeaceconference ofOctober1991.
FinancialNeeds and Funding
Hamasdoes notuntilnowpossessa complexbureaucracy likethePLO,
and theleadership and cadresare characterizedbymodesty in expenditure
and absenceoffinancial corruption. Infrastructural
expendituresarethere-
forestillquitelimited.Its resourcesin no waycomparewiththefinancial
potentialofthePLO,restricting toengageincomparable
itsability patronage
activities.
It shouldalsobe mentioned ofHamasare
thattheresponsibilities
notas diversifiedas thoseofthePLO, andwhilethePLO assumesfinancial
burdensin thePalestinian diasporaas well as in theoccupiedterritories,
Hamas'sexpenditures arelimitedto theWestBankand Gaza Strip.None-
themovement
theless, hasfinancial thatareincreasing
responsibilities dayby
dayto keeppacewiththeparallelgrowth and thesize ofits
ofitsactivities
organization.
Hamasdependsforitsfinances on a numberofsources,especially local
contributions, donationsfromindividuals and Islamicmovements abroad,
and certain governments.
For thelocal sourcesin theoccupiedterritories, individualscontribute
eitherdirectlyto themovement or to thezakatcommittees or otherfounda-

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HAMAS: A BACKGROUND 17

tions supervisedby Hamas or the Muslim Brotherhood.Money fromthe

zakat is used forHamas's activitiesin helpingthe poor, buildingmosques
and schools,and othercharitableworks.
As forindividualforeigncontributions, just as financialsupportwas given
to themujahidin of Afghanistan, Muslimsthroughout theworld,includingin
the UnitedStatesand Europe,are now offering supportto the "mujahidin of
Palestine." These individualdonationsare collectedon Hamas's behalfboth
by individualsupportersand Islamic organizationsin variouscountries.Fi-
nancial supportto resistthe Israeli occupationand reinforcethe Islamic
trendagainstsecularforcesin the occupied territories is also receivedfrom
theinternational Islamicmovementin variouscountries,particularly Jordan,
Egypt,Saudi Arabia,the Gulfstates,Sudan, Iran,and others.
Despite assertionsby the Hamas leadershipthatit does not receivedona-
tionsfromgovernmental sources,'6reference has been made to financialsup-
portfromsome governments, notablySaudi Arabiaand theGulfstates. This
was the case particularly beforethe Gulfwar, althoughsome supporthas
reportedly continuedeven afterwards as a way of penalizingthe PLO forits
positionsconcerningIraq. Iran is also reportedto have contributed millions
of dollars,above and beyondits military and otherassistance.
Othersourcesof financialsupporthave includedthe PLO, at least once
and at the instruction of Yasir Arafat,'7and possiblythe movement'sown
investment projects,althoughthemovementhas deniedownershipof profit-
makingprojects.

FutureProspects
While Hamas (and the Islamic movementin the West Bank and Gaza
Stripin general)have made greatgains,becominga majorpoliticalforcein
Palestiniansociety,it continuesto face importantchallenges.
Thereis no questionthatHamas has benefitedimmenselyfrombeing in
the "opposition." It has no responsibility forthe painfulconcessionsthat
thosein authority-meaning the PLO-have had to make withoutthus far
receivingany tangibleresultsin return.The PLO's abandonmentof revolu-
tionaryslogans and shiftto politicalpragmatismenabled Hamas to fillthe
resultingideologicaland doctrinalvacuumat a timeofincreasingdisillusion-
mentin thenationalistprogram.Butwhile themaximaliststandsof the Is-
lamicgroupsmaysound appealingin the lightof growingdoubtsabout the
PLO's abilityto deliveron its goals, thereis no evidencethatHamas is any
betterable to achieveeitherits transitionalobjective(endingtheoccupation)
or itsstrategicobjective(establishingan Islamicstatein Palestine). It is true
thatHamas has the advantageof being able to revertto the Brotherhood's
earlierstance of deferring the liberationof Palestineand jihad until more
propitiouscircumstances.The PLO, on the otherhand, cannotsuggestthat
its morelimitedgoals of self-determination and statehoodon some 20 per-
centofPalestineare no longerfeasibleand mustbe postponedsinedie; these

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18 JOURNALOF PALESTINE STUDIES

objectives,afterall, are the raison d'etreof the PLO. Nonetheless,Hamas

cannotrelyindefinitely on thefailuresofothersas a means ofgaininglasting
influence.In the longerterm,it will itselfhave to "deliver."
Hamas has also benefitedfroma trendtowardconservatism thathas been
growingin theterritories since theoutbreakoftheintifada.The atmosphere
ofoppression,deprivation, and hopelessnesshas moreovercontributed to the
spreadof an Islamicclimate. ThatthePLO factionsthemselvesare sensitive
to this shiftis clear fromthe increaseduse of religiousexpressionsand
Quranicversesin the statements issued by the UNLU. It is also significant
thatthe pro-PLO nationalistgroupsran in the May 1992 electionsforthe
Nablus Chamber of Commerceunder the name "The National Muslim
Trend."
18
Nonetheless,it is farfromclear whetherHamas can ever make Islam a
politicalframeof referenceforthe Palestinianpeople. The Islamic move-
ment'ssocial outlookcreatesanxietyamong large segmentsof the popula-
tion;Palestiniansocietyhas a strongseculartradition, perpetuatedin a large
numberof secularinstitutions.Palestinealso has an activeand influential
Christianminority.
Hamas has thusfarfailedto takea clearstanceon a numberof important
issues. Democracyand pluralismare amongthese. Froma theoreticaland
doctrinalstandpoint, PalestinianIslamists,includingHamas, dismissdemoc-
racyas a Westernconceptwithno place in a Muslimsociety. They argue
thatIslamic doctrineprovidesprinciplesthathave greaterjustice and com-
prehensiveness.In an Islamic order,politicalpartieswhose frameof refer-
ence is not Islam would be banned,but beforethe establishment of Islamic
rule,democracyis preferred to dictatorship as morehospitableto the flour-
ishingof Islam.'9 For thetimebeing,Islamistscan arguethatnationalliber-
ationtakesprecedenceoverthedebateoverdemocracyand pluralism.In the
long run,however,failureto articulateacceptablepositionson these issues
may alienatesignificant segmentsof Palestiniansocietyand underminethe
movement'sinfluence.
Finally,forall the currentdisappointment in the peace process and the
pro-PLO negotiators, the PLO has a legitimacy acquiredthroughmorethan
twenty-five yearsof nationalistresistanceto Israelioccupation. It is credited
withreviving and crystallizing
Palestiniannationalidentity and withdefining
the nationalrightsof the Palestinianpeople. As long as Hamas does not
espouse a definednationalistprogramrespondingto the aspirationsof the
Palestinianpeople, it can not become an alternative to the PLO or even a
seriouscontenderforthe legitimaterepresentation of the Palestinians.
The futureof Hamas (and theMuslimBrotherhood) will be influencedby
local, regional,and internationaldevelopmentsthatwill eitherreinforceor
weakenits position. Crucialwill be its abilityto sustainits activismagainst
theIsraelioccupation,as well as the PLO's abilityto safeguardand advance
thefixednationalrightsof thePalestinianpeople-self-determination, state-
hood, and the rightof return.AnyPLO failurewill probablytranslateinto

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HAMAS:A BACKGROUND 19

gainsfortheHamasmovement. In preserving itsposition,Hamaswillneed

to containtoughIsraelimeasures againstit. Thereis no doubtthattheDe-
cember1992deportations oflargenumbers ofitsleadersand activists,even
whilereinforcingitspoliticalandmoralpositionamongthePalestinians, has
negativelyaffecteditsorganizational strength.
To meetthemanychallenges thatfaceit,themovement mustsafeguard its
unityinsideand outsidetheoccupiedterritories. It mustalso solidify
to the
maximum itsrelations
withtheotherIslamicmovements insidePalestine;in
thisregard,considerable progress has already beenmadein improving rela-
tionswiththeIslamicJihad.Discussions havetakenplacebetweenthetwo
groupsto explorethepossibility ofclosercooperation and evenunity.Iran
andSudan,traditional supporters ofIslamicJihad, maybe playing a mediat-
ingrole,or evenpushingforclosercoordination betweenthetwogroups.20
Hamasshouldalso tryto ensurethehighestlevelof supportfromother
Islamicmovements abroad. In thewordsof a notedleaderoftheMuslim
Brotherhood in Egypt, an Islamicsolutionto thePalestine problemrequires
the"mobilization oftheIslamicnation.",21In thelastanalysis, Hamas'ssuc-
cesswilldependon itsability, orlackthereof, tomobilizeitsreserve support
outsidePalestineas represented bytheotherIslamicmovements and forces,
and to convincethemto engagein theconfrontation againstIsrael.

NOTES

1. Ziad Abu-Amr, al-Harakat al-Islamiyyafi al-

al-dcffa 10. Froma personalinterview withDr. Ibrahimal-
gharbiyya wa qita' Gaza. Jama'atal-Ikhwan al-Muslimin Yazuri,executivedirectoroftheIslamicCenterin Gaza
waHarakatal-Jihad al-Islami(The IslamicMovement in and one of thefounders of Hamas,9 July1991. It is
the West Bank and Gaza: The MuslimBrotherhood worthnotingthatthese founders, exceptforShaykh
and theIslamicJihad)(Acre: Dar al-Aswar,1989), p. Yasin and Dr. Yazuri,wereamongthosedeportedin
21. December1992.
2. 'Arifal-'Arif, al-Nakba:nakbatbaytal-muqaddas wa 11. Abu-Amr, al-Harakaal-Islamiyya,p. 101.
al-firdawsal-mafqud, 1947-1955,vol. 11(The Catastro- 12. This information was partof ShaykhYasin's con-
phe: The Catastrophe ofJerusalem and theLostPara- afterhis arrestin
fessionsto the Israeliinvestigators
dise) (Tyre and Beirut: Manshuratal-Maktabaal- May 1989;al-Bayareq, 25 December1992,p. 12.
Asriyya, 1956), p. 103. 13. Mithaq Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya(Hamas)
3. Interview withYusefal-'Azm,a MuslimBrother- (The Charterof the Islamic ResistanceMovement,
hoodleaderand memberofparliament in Jordan, Am- Hamas), 18 August1988,article2, p. 5.
man,30 May 1989. 14. al-Hayat,as quotedinMideast
Mirror, 7 April1993,
4. Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari,Intifada:ThePalestin- p. 25.
ian Uprising-Israel's ThirdFront(New York: Simon 15. Sawtal-Haq waal-Humiyya,
no. 152/3, 7 May1993,
and Schuster, 1989), p. 224. pp. 1, 23.
5. FahmiHuwaydi,"Hawl al-'usuliyyun fi al-ardal- 16. al-Bayareq,25 December1992,p. 13.
muhtalla"(AbouttheFundamentalists in theOccupied 17. The authorwas able to reviewtheminutesof the
Territories),al-Ahram, 8 December1987. meeting ofthePLO CentralCouncilheldin Baghdadin
6. Hala Mustafa,"al-Jihadal-Islami fi al-ard al- 1990.
muhtalla"(The IslamicJihadin theOccupiedTerrito- 18. al-Quds,18 May 1992.
ries),QadayaFikrijya, no. 6 (April1987), p. 179. 19. InterviewwithDr. Mahmudal-Zahhar,an Islamic
7. Interview withShaykh'Abdal-'AzizAuda,thespiri- leaderin theGaza Strip,4 December1991.
tual leaderof the IslamicJihadMovement, Gaza, 24 20. InterviewwithIbrahimGhawshah,official
spokes-
March1987. man of Hamas,and withan IslamicJihadleaderwho
8. al-Fajr,28 August1987,p. 9. requestedanonymity,Amman,January1992.
9. Abu-Amr, al-Harakaal-Islamiyya, p. 36. 21. InterviewwithMa'mural-Hudaybi,a leaderofthe
"MuslimBrother Group"in Egypt,Cairo,3 May 1992.

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