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PEDRO B
SOFÍA VICTORIA CORRO BORBÓN
PATRICIA MICHELLE RÍOS DE PUENTE
10°I
HISTORY
ALIS DE BARSALLO
III TRIMESTRE
U2 ACCIDENT
PEDRO BRIN 10°I
➢ Event of the Cold War
➢ Compare free enterprise economics with daily life
In June 1948 the U.S. and Britain announced a proposal for establishing a new
currency, the Deutschmark, into West Berlin. This immediately caused economic
chaos in the Soviet Union as people frantically struggled to adjust to the new
system of currency. The Soviets responded on June 24 by cutting off all road,
rail and canal links between West Germany and West Berlin. This was the start
of the Berlin Blockade. Stalin was attempting to get western influence out of his
West Berlin. He managed to cut off all of the land and water routes however the
air was still available. This began the Berlin Air Lift. During the eleven months
of the Berlin Airlift, U.S. and British planes supplied West Berlin with 1.5 million
tons of supplies, a plane landing every three minutes, day and night. The U.S.
and British gave the people of West Berlin food, medical supplies and all sorts of
other goods. In the eyes of the rest of the world this made the U.S. look like
heroes. It made Stalin look like a terrible leader. On May 12, 1949, Stalin,
knowing he couldn’t risk shooting down the planes and realizing the PR disaster
he’d caused, lifted the blockade. The whole experience was very embarrassing for
the Soviet Union and was considered a win for the U.S. and its allies. This was
very important to the Cold War because in a cold war where there is no direct
fighting, it is things like this that decide who wins and who loses. This was a
huge win for the U.S. and put many countries on our side.
Free Enterprise:
Pros Cons
Freedom War
During The Cold War, we can endure very well some of the main aspect that the
war affected between 1946-1991. To understand better, we have to know what
the war was about; so The Cold War was a long period of tension between the
democracies of the Western World and the communist countries of Eastern
Europe. The west was led by the United States and Eastern Europe was led by
the Soviet Union. These two countries became known as superpowers. Although
the two superpowers never officially declared war on each other, they fought
indirectly in proxy wars, the arms race, and the space race.
Time Period (1945-1991)
The Cold War began not too long after World War II ended in 1945. Although,
the Soviet Union was an important member of the Allied Powers, there was great
distrust between the Soviet Union and the rest of the Allies. The Allies were
concerned with the brutal leadership of Joseph Stalin as well as the spread of
communism. The Cold War came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991.
Proxy Wars
The Cold War was often fought between the superpowers of the United States and
the Soviet Union in something called a proxy war. These were wars fought
between other countries, but with each side getting support from a different
superpower. Examples of proxy wars include the Korean War, the Vietnam
War, the Yom Kippur War, and the Soviet Afghanistan War.
Now that we have the concept of what the Cold War was, we can know talk about
social and political issues that came with it. The end of the war didn't bring peace
or whatsoever, instead it brought a New World Order that consists of an ''instant
democracy''- numerous regional conflicts and ethnics rivalries and national
rivalries such as:
• Invasion of Panama, Operation Just Case (1989-1990)
• Gulf War- Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait (1991) former
• Yugoslavia (1991-1999)
• Somalia (1992)
• Rwanda (1994)
• Afghanistan (2001-present)
• US Invasion of Irak (2003-present)
CONCLUSION
The argument here has delineated a certain U.S. horizon of expectations that
permitted the Cold War to appear as a worthy, indeed vitally necessary, project to
be undertaken on a massive, global scale. Roosevelt's particular framing of World
War II made possible a political reorientation afterward such that Washington
was able to interpret Soviet behavior as a totalitarian, fascist-like, lethal attack on
the very being of the Western states and to label this attack a Cold War. The
derivation, then, began with the revealed inner nature of the Soviet regime itself,
which no immediate U.S. act and no negotiation or settlement could change. The
Soviet Union and the communist movement were by definition a Cold War. Indeed,
the central reason there was not an outright open war on the West was that the
latter happened still to be stronger than the Soviet Union. The response to this
mortal challenge was first to maintain and preferably increase one's massive
preponderance of strength so as to keep Moscow from launching such an open
attack and, second, to fight the already existing Cold War to the lethal end, an
end that, logically, could only come about when the Soviet regime ceased to be or
surrendered unconditionally.
This configuration or outlook was uniquely "American." The Cold War would not
have happened had Britain been the overwhelmingly superior Western power.
The infamous "percentage deal" between Stalin and Winston Churchill in October
1944 about their respective future influence in eastern Europe, unthinkable in
any properly American context, is enough to illustrate the difference. The Soviet
view, meanwhile, was conceptually and geopolitically defensive. Launching a Cold
War made no sense whatsoever for Moscow and was never projected before it
became a reality. When it did, the Soviet interpretation could only place it within
the old antifascist frame and the heroic narrative about the Great Patriotic War. Thus,
Moscow saw the Cold War as fascist-like aggression to destroy the progressive
achievements of the Soviet Union and the progressive camp. At first sight this
seems to be a mirror image of the U.S. position. The crucial difference lies in the
logic of the response: defensive coalition politics for relative gains, the strategic
object always being prevention of exacerbated forms of aggression, to be achieved
by making it politically impossible for the other side not to come to terms. Such a
process of recognition would then secure the foundations for future Soviet
successes, presumably in the interest of everyone. Negotiations and deals in the
traditional sense of Lippmann's diplomacy were at the center of this strategy of
recognition. Détente, not surprisingly, would be its apotheosis.