Communicative Rationality

and Inter-culturality: A Symposium with

Jiirgen Habermas

Weidong Cao*

Editor's Notes: From April 15 to April 29, Jiirgen Habermas made a

historical visit to China, comparable to those by Bertrand Russell and
John Dewey several decades ago. During his visit, he delivered seven
lectures at universities and research institutes in Beijing and Shanghai.
Their topics range from human rights, practical rationality, models of
democracy, and globalization. In addition, he also participated at several
symposia with Chinese intellectuals. Recorded below is the one he had
at the office of Reading ~ ] ~ ) ) , a very influential book review
monthly, on April 17, 2001. Following this article, we publish a lengthy
study of the relevance of Haberrnas's philosophy to Chinese discourse
of modernity.
Huang Ping ~ { x : We are very pleased to have Professor Jfirgen Habermas,
a distinguished G e r m a n philosopher, join us here at the Reading for a sym-
posium. Professor Habermas has attracted increasing attention in the Chi-
nese intellectual world, and many o f his books have been translated or are
being translated into Chinese. It is thus very timely that we are going to
have a personal conversation with Professor Habermas here today.
Cao IVeidong ~ t ~ l ~ : O n the way here, Professor Habermas indicated that
he has the following main questions related to China. O n e is about the con-

* Professor of Literary Theory, Beijing Normal University. E-mail: caoweidong2000

@yahoo.com.cn
Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophyDecember, 2001, Vol. I, No 1, pp. 73-79.
9 Global Publications, State University of New York at Binghamton.
74 Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophy

temporary Chinese legal system and its relationships to the Western legal
system on the one hand and to traditional Chinese legal ideas on the other.
The second question is related to religions in contemporary China. Exactly
how many religious followers are there, what religious traditions do they
belong to, and what part does religion play in people's everyday lives? In
relation to that, Professor Habermas is greatly concerned about Fanlun
Gong, mainly, of course, from an academic point of view. In Germany
there are sects similar to Fanlun Gong, and so how to deal with them is also
an important social issue in Germany. Finally, Professor Habermas is also
interested in the current debate between so-called "liberals" and "new left-
ists" among Chinese thinkers.
Wei Song ~]r Of course, everyone here is also welcome to discuss other
issues that interest us all. In addition to his other questions, Professor
Habermas is curious about the philosophical positions of us who are here
today. He read many books and articles related to China before his trip, and
so he would like to know more about the current state of the Chinese intel-
lectual world.
Habermas:. I'm very grateful for the invitation that Reading and Professor
Wang Ping have extended to me for this event. To meet you all here and
have a discussion within this small circle is a very pleasant experience. It is
very difficult to get together with some people of common interests in
Germany. Before I left for China, I tried to read something about China,
mostly in English, including the interview with Wang Hui ~H~, the general
editor of the Reading, published in the New Left Rem'ew. From them I got to
know something about the intellectual world in China today. For example, I
know that there is a debate between "liberals" and "new leftists" and that
the Reading is a very influential journal among Chinese intellectuals. Also, I
heard that some new intellectual trends in the West are immediately re-
sponded to and often accepted in China. For example, post-structuralism
and postmodernism are very appealing.
Huang Ping. We at Reading have often held symposia like this. Our only goal
is to provide a space for free discussion, and to create a "public academic
sphere." I think now is the time for us to start our conversation with Pro-
fessor Habermas. Of course, we don't have to limit ourselves to the above
issues.
Xin Chu~an ~ : My question is related to Professor Habermas's con-
cept of human rights. In your lecture on human rights this morning at
China Academy of Social Sciences, I think you presented a liberal concep-
tion of human rights, which is very different from the impression we have
gotten from your earlier works. We have always considered you as a critic
 Cao:A SymposiumwithJiirgenHabermas 75

of the status quo. I think there is something dangerous inherent in the

Western liberal conception of human rights. For example, it is conducive to
hegemonism, and it has the tendency to radicalize individual interests. How
would you look at that? In addition, in your lecture you also compared Chi-
nese and Western traditions and concluded that the former gives priority to
social welfare, while the latter favors the individual's interests. How is this
related to your conception of human rights?
Haberma~. I believe that, whether in China or in Germany, how to interpret
"human rights" is still something that needs to be discussed. When I said
that the Chinese tradition emphasizes more collectivity while the Western
tradition focuses more on individuality, I was only making a relative com-
parison. We should not see collectivism and individualism as a dichotomy.
For example, in the West, there is a communitarian tradition that can be
traced all the way back to Aristotle. This tradition pays a great deal of atten-
tion to social welfare. Hegelianism and Marxism also belong to this tradi-
tion. As we know, Hegel insisted on the importance of the communitarian
interests and the unity between morality and actual life. There is something
similar between this Hegelian view and Confucianism. I think that the most
important facet in the issue of human rights is our self-identification, the
dialectical relationship between the individuality and sociafity within each of
us. In my view, an individual can realize his or her individuality only in the
process of socialization and realize his and her socialization only in the
process of individualization.
Not long ago I published my work in legal philosophy, BetweenFacts
andNorms. In this book, I developed my ideas of human rights and the legal
person, particularly the latter, from the perspective of legal sociology. In my
view, the legal person has to be socialized. In other words, we can give dif-
ferent interpretations of a subject's rights. However, we cannot give one-
sided emphasis on the collective rights without any considerations of a sub-
ject's rights.
Idu Beicheng ~l]:J~,h~: We have often heard of the "Habermas-Foucault De-
bate." Professor Habermas, could you say something about the major phi-
losophical disagreements between you and Foucault?
Habermas:. As a matter of fact, there is no serious disagreement in the strict
sense between us. In contrast, we were rather good friends. Foucualt invited
me and my wife to visit France in 1982. I have great memories of him. We
planned to have our second meeting the year after, to discuss Kant's idea of
Enlightenment. It was a great pity that he passed away before that.
Perhaps you all know that Foucault published an important essay,
entitled, "What Is Enlightenment," discussing Kant's idea of enlightenment.
76 Dao:A Journalof ComparativePhilosophy

In this essay, he distinguished between two different models of critique, the

genealogical critique and historical critic. The Frankfurt School has always
believed that these two models should be combined, and Foucault actually
held a similar view. If there is any disagreement between me and Foucault,
it is this: whether Foucault can simply regard himself as a so-called "positiv-
ist," analyzing power from the perspective of discourse; in other words,
which perspective Foucault should use to approach power. Foucault already
realized this issue, and he told me that he planned to discuss this issue in
the third volume of The History of Sexuality. This volume was published after
Foucault died. I read it carefully and found that Foucault did discuss this
issue as he promised. It can be seen that he discussed ethical life, moral life,
and aesthetical life in terms of Greek Culture. In contrast, I grew up in the
Kantian-Hegelian tradition, emphasizing the normative arguments, and thus
I don't entirely agree with Foucault. Unfortunately, there will be no more
opportunity for me to discuss this issue face to face with Foucault. Never-
theless, we were good friends.
Huang Ping. The article by Foucault that Professor Habermas has just men-
tioned, "What Is Enlightenment," has been translated into Chinese by Mr.
Wang Hui. In addition, Habermas's The PhilosophicalDiscourse of Modernity, in
which he discusses in some detail such French post-structuralists as Fou-
cault and Derrida, is also going to appear in the book series Translations in
Humanities and Sodety ( ( ~ k ~ l ~ • published by Yilin Chubanshe
~ - ~ ~ h ~ • I believe that their publication will facilitate our understand-
ing of the debate between Habermas and Foucault.
IVan Junren ~ ) ~ : I would like to ask Professor Habermas a question. In
1993, I visited Professor John Rawls at Harvard University. Rawls told me
that he planned to spend two to three years to study your work, as he
thought that you are a very profound philosopher. We all know that you
criticized his political liberalism, and he made a detailed response. It can be
seen that, while he complained that your discussion is still within a particu-
lar metaphysical context, you protested that he did not pay enough atten-
tion to procedure and form. I think both you and Rawls have Kant as the
starting point, and so I would like to know how you look at Rawls's "re-
treat" from the Kantian ethics to political philosophy.
Habermar. Rawts's theory is, of course, very West-oriented. My criticism of it
is concerned with both its method and contents. We all know that, in his
Poh'#cal IJberah'sm, Rawls's fundamental question is what kind a state can
guarantee that individuals can live their lives according to their own ideals.
The common liberal idea of the state is to provide equal protection to indi-
viduals, so that they can all live their own chosen lives. Republicanism,
 Cao:A SymposiumwithJiirgenHabermas 77

however, has a fundamentally different assumption, according to which an

individual's ability and language should be reconciled with those of a soci-
ety. It is important to develop a consciousness of democracy to realize the
democratic institutions. In this sense, republicanism continues the Kantian-
Hegelian-Marxist tradition. It was Kant who developed the idea of auton-
omy. While this is a very complicated idea, what it certainly implies is that
an individual will have no freedom if everyone else is not free. In contrast,
in the Lockean tradition, it is possible for some but not others to have free-
dom.
i_i Yinhe ~j~n-J: My question is again related to Foucault. Foucault once
said that there is a utopian tendency in your thinking. Do you have anything
to say about this? In addition, how would you assess Foucault's work both
philosophically and politically? You once said that Foucault is a young con-
servative. Did you mean that all post-modernists are political conservatives?
Habermas: There are no fundamental differences between Foucault and me.
For example, I am entirely in agreement with him on his analysis of "micro-
powers." My "communicative physiology" is also consistent with his view.
The only difference is perhaps that I paid more attention to the inter-
subjective communications, to the rational persuasion of one to another in
inter-subjective communications.
Sun Ge ~,~,~: My question is related to another debate. In 1986, there was a
debate between you and some German historians. The central issue of the
debate was whether German history in the Nazi period is a special history,
comparable to the Russian history of the Gulag Islands or the Cambodian
history of Pol Pot. My question is how your conception of "constitutional
patriotism" developed in "On the Public Use of History" is received in aca-
demia. In addition, it seems that your conception of history leaves some
room for "pure history," and this is very different from the first generation
of the Frankfurt School. According to Adorno and Benjamin, pure eviden-
tial examination is not history. Historical study stripped of ideas will be-
come a positive science.
Habermas:. I developed my idea of "constitutional patriotism" in "Historians'
Debate." There were two positions formed at that time regarding how to
look at German history during the Nazi period. One is that we should
abandon this history. The other is exactly opposite: we have to make it clear
who should be responsible for this period of history. The significance of
this debate is to invite public participation in discussion of history in the
public sphere. For in my view, while history is indeed the object of histori-
ans, it should also be the intellectual resources for the public. In other
words, history has the duty to socialize itself. I do not agree with you that
78 Dao: A Journal of ComparativePhilosophy

my understanding of history differs from that of the first generation of the

Frankfurt School. I do not think there is such a disagreement. As you per-
haps know, Adomo wrote an essay in the 1950's, specifically discussing the
publicness of history. I have basically inherited Adorno's position.
Now, I would like to ask you a few questions. The first one is, as
Cao Weidong mentioned at the beginning, related to legal philosophy in
Chinese tradition. In other words, what is the structure of the traditional
Chinese legal system?
Xin Chunyan: Let me try to answer your question. The Chinese legal system,
in its origin, belongs to the "continental legal tradition," coming from Ger-
many through Japan to China. It was in the late Qing Dynasty ~ period,
when the reformation of the traditional Chinese legal system became emer-
gent. Many options were available at that time and finally the continental
legal system was adopted. From the standpoint of legal philosophy, this
transplantation of the legal system was not accompanied by the transplanta-
tion of its theory and philosophy. Thus, in its efforts to modernize (West-
ernize) the legal system, China was still dominated by the Confucian phi-
losophy, which minimizes the function of laws. For example, "rights" is
one of the most fundamental concepts in Western philosophy, but it is ab-
sent in the Chinese tradition, which gives priority to harmony. What makes
the traditional Chinese legal system unique is (1) the lack of separation of
powers; (2) the lack of the separation of the public sphere and civil society;
and (3) the ignorance of individual rights and the emphasis on social har-
mony. In the People's Republic of China since 1949, there have been some
new characteristics in Chinese legal philosophy. First, there have been influ-
ences from the former Soviet legal philosophy such as the idea of law as
instrument; secondly, during the last twenty years, the legal philosophy of
classical Western liberalism has found its way into Chinese legal philosophy
and into the legal system; finally, as not done in any other countries in the
world, the Chinese constitution has established Marxism as the official ide-
ology and legal philosophy.
Habermas:. Thanks for your detailed explanation of Chinese legal system. I
am wondering why Chinese at that time decided to adopt the "continental
legal system" instead of the "common law system"?
Xin Chunyan:. I think there were perhaps two reasons. First, the "common
law system" put more emphasis on the legal professions and on the impor-
tance of judges. Yet at that time, there was no division of professions or the
division was not that clear in China. Secondly, the "continental legal sys-
tem" emphasizes the hierarchical order of rules, which is congenial to the
Chinese tradition of thought. However, since the policy for reformation
 Cao:A SymposiumwithJiingenHabermas 79

and opening was adopted about twenty years ago, the "common law sys-
tem" has attracted increasing attention. The reformation of the legal system
has become an important part of our political reform since then, which has
contributed to the stability of the society.
Habermas:. You mentioned that, in the last twenty years, legal reform has
been an instrument for political reform. I think there are some limitations
here. Modern legal systems should be based on a completely democratic
society. In other words, modem legal systems can not exist without basic
freedom, equality, rights for political participation, and basic social justice.
Now, could you tell me something about the debate between the liberals
and the new leftists?
Huang Ping. It is difficult to discuss this debate. First of all, the debate is still
going on and it is a bit too early to have a general view of it; secondly, there
are many participants in the debate and their positions are not all clear-cut;
thirdly, the definitions of the "liberals" and "new leftists" are vague and
many who are called liberals or new leftists may be unwilling to identify
themselves as such; finally, up to this point, the debate has remained on
rather superficial levels and profound and significant insights are yet to be
developed.
What is certain, though, is that there are disagreements among
Chinese intellectuals today, which is very different from the situation in the
1980's. At that time, the Cultural Revolution was just over, and there was a
general consensus in Chinese academia: we should reflect upon the history
of socialism and we should open our minds. Since the 1990's, as interna-
tional society has undergone dramatic changes, there have also been
changes in the constitution of Chinese academia. We have been facing
many new issues, such as market economy, globalization, and moderniza-
tion. It is thus natural that different perspectives have emerged to compete
with each other. It is our hope that in the process of this competition we
will have what Professor Habermas calls free communication, through
which some constructive consensus may be reached regarding some prob-
lems China is facing today.
Habermar. Thanks for you introduction.
Huang Ping. Due to the time limit, I have perhaps not clearly explained my
view, and other people here may disagree with me. We hope our conversa-
tion can be further continued in the future. Here, on behalf of the Reading
and its publisher, Joint Books ~ I ~ ~-~J~, I would like to thank again Pro-
fessor Habermas and his wife for joining us here.